Recientemente el turismo se ha convertido en una de las actividades económicas de mayor crecimiento en el mundo. El turismo se ha vuelto una herramienta clave en el tema de progresosocio-económico, tanto en países en vías de desarrollo como en países industrializados o desarrollados, dando origen a una gama de nuevos destinos a nivel global. Esta tesis doctoral centra su atención en el primer y más exitoso destino turístico planificado exnovo en México: Cancún, Quintana Roo. La ordenación del territorio del noreste de la Península de Yucatán estriba en el desarrollo turístico de sol y playa que ha iniciado en aquella zona en los años 70, específicamente en la conocida zona turística de Cancún. Esta tesis pretende demostrar la insuficiencia del sistema de planificación urbana implementado en Cancún y desarrollado por el Gobierno mexicano para asumir la integración de las áreas urbanas en una ciudad turística exnovo. El objetivo es proveer un análisis crítico de la capacidad del Gobierno mexicano de generar los espacios urbanos donde se lleva a cabo el intercambio diario y las relaciones humanas características de una ciudad sin restar mérito al haber generado un destino turístico económicamente exitoso en un tiempo record y de acuerdo a los estatutos políticos de la Nación. El crecimiento tanto económico como poblacional generado por el turismo de sol y playa ha hecho que en Cancún se concentre más de la mitad de la población del Estado de Quintana Roo. Esta tésis estudia la génesis de la ciudad y su evolución desde el punto de vista urbanístico, sus patrones de crecimiento, tendencias y patologías. El turismo masivo de sol y playa en México surge de la conjunción de las políticas federales encaminadas al desarrollo económico y social en las costas del litoral mexicano más deprimidas y apartadas. Este trabajo parte del recuento histórico del turismo en México desde 1920, momento en el que, en el marco nacional, se crean nuevas instituciones políticas y nuevas formas de tenencia de la tierra, al finalizar la Revolución Mexicana; y en el marco internacional, inician los primeros movimientos de extranjeros con fines turísticos a México, al culminar la Primera Guerra Mundial. La política de fomento al turismo en México tiene dos componentes que marcan las directrices de desarrollo y consecuentemente, la resultante volumétrica edificada. Por un lado, se encuentra la parte legislativa que procura el bienestar social y que va a responder a los principios constitutivos de la Secretaría de Gobernación y a partir de 1974, de la propia Secretaría de Turismo (SECTUR). En segundo lugar, la parte económica que va a estar guiada por los principios constitutivos del Banco de México la Banca Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) y el Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo (FONATUR). Este trabajo hace un relato histórico del turismo planificado en Quintana Roo que se remonta a la década de 1970 cuando se conjugan esfuerzos federales en la creación de la SECTUR, FONATUR, el Estado de Quintana Roo y el Municipio de Benito Juárez. La apuesta por el turismo de sol y playa en Cancún se materializa en un destino turístico que segrega los usos turístico-recreativos de los usos habitacionales y de servicios; ubicando los primeros sobre una formación geológica única: una estrecha isla de naturaleza postarrecifal, separada de la placa continental donde se encuentran los servicios administrativos, el comercio y la residencia de la población trabajadora local, por medio del Sistema Lagunar Nichupté. Este trabajo hace un estudio de la tipología edificatoria característica del espacio turístico en este sitio. Este trabajo se concentra en el espacio turístico que toma la forma de un macizo monofuncional sustentado en la tipología de hotel cinco estrellas en patio abierto al mar y se consolida en el frente del desarrollo dejando oculta a la población local y la ciudad operativa detrás de las lagunas. Actualmente el espacio turístico se encuentra en proceso de consolidación. La supremacía de la tipología del hotel cinco estrellas ha llevado al debilitamiento de otras piezas en el conjunto. En el sitio se notan cambios de los usos originales propuestos, sustitución de piezas obsoletas e introducción de nuevos tipos que pretenden el fortalecimiento y la diversificación de actividades y flujos sobre la isla por medio de la densidad constructiva y en algunos casos, el cambio de escala y proporción que el conjunto había tenido previamente. La metodología de estudio se basa en la lectura de documentos históricos, leyes, reglamentos y planes directores, la digitalización de imágenes y fotografías históricas, la elaboración de esquemas y planos arquitectónicos y urbanísticos para llevar a cabo un análisis crítico contrastando los documentos escritos con la información gráfica propuesta y con la de la ciudad existente. Los indicadores que se utilizan para medir la magnitud del desarrollo son los censos de población nacional y estatal, los montos de inversión del proyecto original para sufragar las obras de infraestructura requeridas y los ingresos por concepto de divisas generadas en el sitio. En resumen, este caso de estudio analiza las grandes maniobras políticas y económicas en el Territorio de Yucatán para convertirlo el sitio propio para el desarrollo del turismo de sol y playa. Encuentra la correspondencia entre la construcción de las infraestructuras y la implementación de una estrategia comercial determinada en un sitio con relevante vocación turística, con su desarrollo económico y social a un ritmo acelerado. Señala la intención de recuperación económica de la vasta inversión en el menor tiempo posible como una de las causas que orillan a la ocupación de las mayores cadenas hoteleras mundiales sobre el frente de mar. Encuentra la tipología urbanística característica del espacio turístico como la pieza que dicta la forma urbana en el conjunto e indirectamente impone en el territorio una estructura de ordenación. El trabajo sintetiza la forma del espacio turístico en Cancún que resulta del monocultivo del hotel cinco estrellas. El espacio turístico que solamente atendía las necesidades del turista, hoy tiende a volverse más urbano y más complejo al introducir el uso residencial y crear la interacción de residentes estacionales y turistas en la trama turística. Desde el punto de vista económico, el espacio turístico responde directamente a los intereses de recuperación económica del capital invertido en el menor tiempo posible y con las mayores utilidades, e indirectamente, a la explosión de los usos turísticos sobre el litoral del Caribe y al nuevo rol que ha adquirido Cancún como punto nodal en el sistema de comunicaciones, distribución de bienes y personas en la región. Este trabajo toma este caso como muestra de la primera etapa de desarrollo de un sitio con grandes rezagos que renace económicamente con la actividad turística y ésta a su vez imprime un esquema de ordenación sobre el territorio. Esta tesis tiene como intención ser un libro que resuma la historia del turismo planificado en Cancún y se vuelva un texto de apoyo a los interesados en el tema. Otra de las intenciones de este trabajo es presentar un método de análisis de la forma urbana actual a través de material gráfico disponible de la ciudad y encontrar su correspondencia con los documentos legales y sus intenciones. Asimismo este trabajo hace uso del análisis morfotipológico de las piezas características que integran el tejido turístico para servir como ejemplo y base para futuros estudios urbanísticos. ; Recently tourism has become one of the most rapidly increasing economic activities of the world. Tourism has become an effective tool to enhance socio-economic growth, in developing countries as well as in industrialised or developed countries, launching a range of new tourism destinations worldwide. This thesis has focused on the first and most economically successful planned exnovo tourism destination in Mexico: Cancun, Quintana Roo. The regional planning of the north-east side of theYucatan Peninsula is based on the sun and beach tourism development that has started in the seventies. This work studies the urban typology of the tourism space in this place. This dissertation intends to show the inadequacy of the urban planning system implemented in Cancun and developed by Federal Government to assume integration between urban areas in an exnovo tourism city. The aim is to make a critical analysis of the capacity of the Mexican Government to generate the urban spaces where the human relationships take place in a city though its extrordinary capacity to generate an economically successful tourism destination in a short period of time. The rapid pace of socio-economic growth has brought together more than half of the total population of the State of Quintana Roo to the site.This work has studied the origin of tourism space and its evolution from the urban viewpoint. It has deepen in the study of patterns and pathologies of the urban form. Massive sun and beach tourism in Mexico has been the result of Federal politics towards economic and social developement of the most depressed and idle Mexican coasts. This work makes a historic review since the 1920s. This historical moment marks the begining of new political institutions and new forms of land tenure at the end of the Mexican Revolution. It is also the start of foreigner tourism flows to Mexico, after the World War I. There have been distinguished two components on tourism promotion politics. On one hand, there is a legal part that enhances social welfare and derives from the statutory principles of the Secretary of Government and Secretary of Tourism. On the other, on the economic side, the statutory principles of the Bank of Mexico and its subsidiary bank, the Banca Nacional Financiera which will be executed by the trust fund, the Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo (FONATUR). This dissertation analyses the history of planned tourism in Quintana Roo State which has started in 1974 when Federal Government strived for the creation of the Secretary of Tourism, the FONATUR, the State of Quintana Roo and the Municipality of Benito Juarez. Federal Government has ventured in sun and beach tourism in Cancun that takes the form of a segregated city where tourism and recreational space lays on a unique geological formation: a narrow island, separated from the continental plaque where the administrative, commercial and residential uses for the local inhabitants sit. This research focuses on tourism space that has resulted as a solid one-landuse space based on the five-star open-patio-to-the-sea hotel which separates the seafront, leaving the local inhabitants and the city behind the lagoons. Actually this space is in a consolidation process. The supremacy of the five-star hotel typology has weaken other pieces of the complex. There have been changes from the original landuses, sustition of obsolete pieces and introduction of new typologies that intend to strengthen and diversify activities and fluxes through the island, increase the density and in some cases, change the scale and proportion of the building in the skyline. The methodology of this study is based on the analysis of historical documents, laws, regulations and master plans, the elaboration of sketches and blueprints based on aerial photographs and the elaboration of urban plans to make a comparison between the written documents and the graphic information or the original proposal and the existing city. The indicators that have been used to measure the size of the development are census, the original project investment and the recently generated tourism development revenues. In conclusion, this casestudy analyses the huge investment in political and economical terms on the Yucatan Territory to create the proper scenario for massive sun and beach tourism development. It finds a direct relationship between the construction of infraestructural premises and the implementation of a certain commercial strategy on a site with strong tourism advocacy, with its increasingly rapid socio-economic growth. It points out the intentions of fund recovery in the shortest period of time as a cause of the waterfront occupancy by the strongest hotel groups worldwide. It finds out the urban typolgy that characterises the tourism space and leads the urban form and the territorial structure. This thesis synthetises the morphology of the tourism space in Cancun that results from the fivestar hotel sitting. Tourism space which previously attended tourism requirements, nowadays has become more complex, has introduced dwelling uses and has widen its scope to create interaction between seasonal residents and tourists. From the economic viewpoint tourism space corresponds directly to the intentions of fund recovery with the highest revenues in the shortest period of time and indirectly to the new rol that Cancun has acquired as a nodal point of the communication, goods distribution and commuting system in the region. This dissertation takes this casestudy as a sample of the first stage of development of a site with great lacks that comes across an economic activity strong enough to pull it out from the decay and at the same time stamp the zoning system on the region. This study summarizes the history of tourism planning in Cancun and intends to be a text book of Cancun planning history. Other intentions of this works are to develop the urban morphology analysis methodology based on graphic material of the city to make a critical analysis and find the relationship between the legal documents and the existing forms. This work intends to become the base for further urban studies. ; Postprint (published version)
Crisis en ZimbabweTras varias semanas de violencia política, el líder de la oposición en Zimbabwe, Morgan Tsvangirai, anunció que no se presentará a la segunda vuelta electoral, prevista para el 27 de junio, por considerar que las condiciones actuales imposibilitan la celebración de comicios libres y transparentes. La decisión prácticamente garantiza la reelección del presidente Robert Mugabe, de 84 años, que gobierna el país desde 1980.Con este escenario de fondo, Tsvangirai pidió ayer la intervención de la ONU para que restablezca la paz y cree las condiciones necesarias para la celebración de un proceso electoral libre. Refugiado en la embajada holandesa ubicada en la capital de Zimbabwe, Morgan Tsvangirai, aseguró que el presidente de ese país, Robert Mugabe, "declaró la guerra" y no unas elecciones. El mundo entero presionan para que se ponga fin a la "campaña de violencia" y permita elecciones libres.Tres meses después de que la oposición certificara su victoria en primera vuelta, y a cuatro días de la celebración de la segunda ronda, el Consejo de Seguridad condenó sin paliativos a Mugabe Más de 90 opositores han sido asesinados y centenares están presos desde que el régimen desencadenó su violenta campaña para aferrarse al poder tras perder los comicios de marzo pasado. Varios medios informan al respecto:"New York Times" : " Zimbabwe Opposition Leader Pulls Out of Runoff":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/world/africa/23zimbabwe.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin"El País" de Madrid: "El acoso de Mugabe fuerza la renuncia del líder de la oposición de Zimbabwe, Morgan Tsvangirai rechaza presentarse a la segunda vuelta de las presidenciales tras haber ganado la primera y las legislativas":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/acoso/Mugabe/fuerza/renuncia/lider/oposicion/Zimbabue/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_6/Tes"CNN": "Mugabe rival seeks refuge in embassy":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/23/zimbabwe.main/index.html"Time": "Robert Mugabe: A Despot's Cruel Resolve":http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1815715,00.html"Time": "Tsvangirai Seeks Dutch Refuge":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817207,00.html"La Nación": "Zimbabwe: la oposición se retira: Dijo que no se presentará al ballottage por la ola de violencia":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1023873 "The Economist": "Zimbabwe's tragedy and farce: "What next after the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, pulls out of the run-off election?":http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11609190&source=features_box_main "The Economist": "Zimbabwe: Robert Mugabe seems determined to steal the presidential run-off but Africa may be slowly turning against him and talk of a unity government has intensified":http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11585249"El País" de Madrid: "Los líderes africanos aumentan su presión sobre Zimbabwe: La comunidad internacional se inclina por no reconocer las elecciones de Zimbabue.- La Comisión Electoral confirma la segunda vuelta": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/lideres/africanos/aumentan/presion/Zimbabue/elpepuint/20080625elpepuint_13/Tes"El País" de Madrid: "El mundo acorrala a Robert Mugabe":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/mundo/acorrala/Robert/Mugabe/elpepuint/20080625elpepiint_2/Tes"MSNBC": "Mugabe rival calls for negotiations to end crisis: Opposition supporters seek refuge at South African Embassy":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25361747/"MSNBC": "U.N. declares fair Zimbabwe vote impossible. Council accuses Mugabe's government of waging a 'campaign of violence'":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25341813/"Newsweek": "Living on Pennies: An undercover visit to Zimbabwe reveals a deeply troubled land full of disenchanted people.":http://www.newsweek.com/id/143122"El Tiempo" de Colombia: "Zimbabue ignora a la ONU y mantiene fecha de elecciones":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/otrasregiones/home/zimbabue-ignora-a-la-onu-y-mantiene-fecha-de-elecciones-_4344649-1"Le Monde": "Zimbabwe : Morgan Tsvangirai demande l'aide des dirigeants africains":http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2008/06/25/l-opposition-tente-d-internationaliser-la-crise-au-zimbabwe_1062455_3212.html#ens_id=1009994"New York Times": "Queen Strips Mugabe of Knighthood":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/world/africa/26zimbabwe.html?ref=world"New York Times": "Ally Warns Outsiders Not to Push Zimbabwe":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/world/africa/25zimbabwe.html?ref=africa"CNN": "Mandela weighs in on Zimbabwe crisis":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/25/zimbabwe.main/index.html"La Nación": "Zimbabwe: duras declaraciones de la oposición":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024581"CNN": "Official: Mugabe wins re-election after opposition pulls out":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/22/zimbabwe.main/index.html"Time": "Zimbabwe Opposition Lacks Leverage":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1730726,00.html?iid=sphere-inline-bottomAMERICA LATINA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Las FARC entregan una prueba de vida de un diputado secuestrado hace ocho años: Sigifredo López es el único sobreviviente del grupo de 12 políticos que la guerrilla capturó en la ciudad colombiana de Cali en 2002":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/FARC/entregan/prueba/vida/diputado/secuestrado/hace/anos/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_1/Tes"La Nación" informa: "El conflicto armado en Colombia, Crece la presión por un canje humanitario: Fuerte reclamo al gobierno y las FARC, tras la difusión de pruebas de vida de un rehén secuestrado en 2002": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1023971"The Economist" analiza: "The unstoppable crop: A big rise in coca in Colombia":http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11585224"El País" de Madrid publica: "26 detenidos en una gran operación anticorrupción en Brasil":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/26/detenidos/gran/operacion/anticorrupcion/Brasil/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_2/Tes"La Nación" publica: "Presentó su renuncia el presidente de Paraguay. Duarte Frutos elevó su dimisión al Congreso a casi dos meses de finalizar su mandato; intenta asumir como senador":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024051"El País" de Madrid informa: "Fidel Castro niega que haya pugnas internas en el Partido Comunista: "Escribo porque sigo luchando, y lo hago en nombre de las convicciones que defendí toda mi vida", indica Castro en un artículo publicado en la página web 'Cubadebate'":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Fidel/Castro/niega/haya/pugnas/internas/Partido/Comunista/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_4/Tes"La Nación" informa: "Fidel: "En Cuba no se torturó a nadie": El líder cubano apuntó contra Bush y los medios que no reprodujeron el reconocimento de la Unesco al sistema educativo de la isla":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024016"The Economist" analiza: "Venezuela's economy: A funny way to beat inflation, Hugo Chávez invites the private sector to help him build socialism": http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11585215"El Tiempo" de Colombia informa:"Presidente de Venezuela anunció que su país continuará fortaleciendo su poderío militar":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/home/presidente-de-venezuela-anuncio-que-su-pais-continuara-fortaleciendo-su-poderio-militar_4345052-1"La Nación" publica: "A poco de terminar la nueva Constitución: Ecuador: renuncia el presidente de la Asamblea": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024041"El Mercurio" de Chile publica: "Partidarios de Cristina Fernández instalados frente al Congreso en apoyo a su postura frente al agro: Gobierno argentino y alcaldía de Buenos Aires se enfrentan por las "carpas kirchneristas"": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/06/25/internacional/_portada/noticias/B3478E1C-36FA-4B14-BF0A-0BD3961BAD96.htm?id={B3478E1C-36FA-4B14-BF0A-0BD3961BAD96}"The Economist" analiza: "Argentina's farm dispute: Cristina's climbdown": http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11586057"El País" de Madrid informa:"Tarija cierra el ciclo de referendos autonómicos contra la Constitución de Evo Morales. Los colegios abren para el cuarto plebiscito para aprobar un estatuto considerado ilegal por el Gobierno boliviano":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Tarija/cierra/ciclo/referendos/autonomicos/Constitucion/Evo/Morales/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_7/TesESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"CNN" informa: "Flood zone residents watch levees as river crests":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/weather/06/23/midwest.flooding.ap/index.html"MSNBC" publica: "MEXICAN DRUG WAR 'ALARMING' U.S. OFFICIALS":http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/06/25/1166487.aspx"The Economist" analiza:; "Political segregation : Americans are increasingly choosing to live among like-minded neighbours. This makes the culture war more bitter and politics harder":http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11581447"CNN" informa: "Obama, McCain gear up for race-based attacks":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/23/obama.ads.ap/index.html"El Tiempo" de Colombia informa: "Bill Clinton ofrece su apoyo a Barack Obama":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/euycanada/home/bill-clinton-ofrece-su-apoyo-a-barack-obama_4344496-1EUROPA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Berlusconi gobierna para Berlusconi, Il Cavaliere desata la guerra contra los jueces para intentar librarse de los juicios": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Berlusconi/gobierna/Berlusconi/elpepuint/20080622elpepiint_1/Tes"El País" de Madrid informa: "Sarkozy apuesta en Jerusalén por la creación de un Estado palestino, El mandatario francés dice que es la mejor solución para la seguridad de Israel": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Sarkozy/apuesta/Jerusalen/creacion/Estado/palestino/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_9/Tes"La Nación" informa: "Fuerte respaldo de Sarkozy a Israel: El presidente de Francia aseguró que "un Irán nuclear es inaceptable"; además, condicionó un acuerdo de paz al cese de la colonización en los territorios palestinos":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024028"El País" de Madrid publica: "Sarkozy gana el pulso a los sindicatos: La popularidad del presidente francés sigue bajo mínimos, pero su programa de reformas sociales sigue adelante": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Sarkozy/gana/pulso/sindicatos/elpepuint/20080622elpepiint_5/Tes "El Tiempo" de Colombia informa: "Ante la desaceleración de la economía, España se 'aprieta el cinturón'":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/ante-la-desaceleracion-de-la-economia-espana-se-aprieta-el-cinturon_4343124-1"La Nación" informa: "Zapatero anunció un recorte de la oferta del empleo público: El presidente de España reconoció un estancamiento económico pero dijo que no será "duradero", auguró un "crecimiento débil":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024031"The Economist" analiza: "Ireland's voters speak: But will anybody listen to them?":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11580212"El Tiempo" de Colombia publica: "La Unión Europea perdió la paciencia con Irán por programa nuclear y le impuso fuertes sanciones":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/la-union-europea-perdio-la-paciencia-con-iran-por-programa-nuclear-y-le-impuso-fuertes-sanciones_4343100-1Asia – Pacífico /Medio OrieNTE"The Economist" analiza: "Beijing Olympics: Limbering up for the games, The security forces rehearse their exercise routine": http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11591389"CNN" informa: "Beijing: Cars come off roads for Olympics":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/23/pollution.olympics.ap/index.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "China asegura haber liberado a más de un millar de tibetanos: El Gobierno chino cree que el paso de la antorcha olímpica por la capital de Tíbet ayudará a olvidar los graves disturbios de hace tres meses": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/China/asegura/haber/liberado/millar/tibetanos/elpepuint/20080621elpepuint_6/Tes"China Daily" publica: "Tropical storm hits China's SE coast": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/25/content_6794435.htm "El País" de Madrid informa: "Al menos 155 muertos por el paso del ciclón Fengshen en Filipinas: El balance puede aumentar por el naufragio de un ferry en el que viajaban 700 personas.- Hay decenas de desaparecidos": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/155/muertos/paso/ciclon/Fengshen/Filipinas/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_3/Tes"New York Time" publica: "Hundreds Feared Dead in Philippines":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/world/asia/23filip.html?ref=world"Time" informa: "Vietnam's Prime Minister Tackles Inflation":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817174,00.html"China Daily" publica: "Tibet greets first foreign tourists after riot":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/25/content_6795095.htm"Time" publica: "S. Korea, US Agree on Beef Imports":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1816968,00.html "El Universal" de Méjico informa: "Yihad viola la tregua en Gaza: Lanza cohetes contra la ciudad de Sderot, en represalia por muerte de 2 miembros":http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/internacional/58195.html"MSNBC" informa: "Israel closes Gaza crossings after rocket fire: Day of violence presents cease-fire with its first serious test":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25346051/"El Tiempo" de Colombia publica: "'No podemos aceptar que un país como Irán tenga armas nucleares', dice el Primer Ministro de Israel":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/orienteproximo/home/no-podemos-aceptar-que-un-pais-como-iran-tenga-armas-nucleares-dice-el-primer-ministro-de-israel_4346248-1 "The Economist" analizA: "Israel and the Palestinians: Can a ceasefire hold?":http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11592840"New York Times" informa: " Female Suicide Bomber Kills 15 in Iraq":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/world/middleeast/23iraq.html?ref=world"Time" analiza: "The Mind of a Female Suicide Bomber":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817158,00.html"MSNBC" publica: "Iran won't rule out U.S. diplomatic presence: State Department eyes first office in Tehran since 1979 Islamic Revolution":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25348720/"CNN" publica: "Violent clashes continue in northern Lebanon":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/23/donors.palestinians.ap/index.html"New York Times" informa: "At Oil Conference, Saudis Offer Slight Rise in Production":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/world/middleeast/23saudi.html?ref=world "The Economist" analiza: "Saudi Arabia: The puzzle of oil production. Why the Saudis are worried about the high price of crude": http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11592833"MSNBC" informa: "Official: Taliban kills 22 from rival tribe: Bodies found dumped along road in Pakistan after border town seized":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25359276/"El País" de Madrid informa: "Mueren cuatro soldados de la coalición internacional en una emboscada en Afganistán. Los militares estaban embarcados en la ofensiva contra los talibanes iniciada esta semana en el sur del país": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Mueren/soldados/coalicion/internacional/emboscada/Afganistan/elpepuint/20080621elpepuint_7/TesAFRICA"MSNBC" informa: "Kenyan children tell of abductions, torture: Hundreds have been terrorized, first by militias and then the army":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25352892/ECONOMIA"CNN" publica: "Citigroup is readying to cut 10% of 65,000-person investment banking group worldwide, The Wall Street Journal reports.":http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/22/news/companies/citigroup_layoffs.ap/index.htm?cnn=yes"The Econoimist" publica su informe semanal: "Business this week":http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11599022&CFID=10602990&CFTOKEN=49506190"El País" de Madrid informa: "Trichet admite que "es posible" que el BCE suba los tipos de interés la próxima semana: El presidente del instituto emisor europeo advierte que el BCE está "determinado" y "en alerta máxima" para atajar la inflación": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Trichet/admite/posible/BCE/suba/tipos/interes/proxima/semana/elpepueco/20080625elpepueco_6/Tes"CNN" informa: "Oil prices surges despite Saudi pledge":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/23/oil.prices.ap/index.html"The Economist" publica: "Yahoo!, eBay and Amazon: The three survivors": http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11580247OTRAS NOTICIAS"La Nación" informa: "Sin acuerdo para frenar la escalada del petróleo: Sólo Arabia Saudita se comprometió a extraer más crudo":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1023918
Captura de Radovan KaradzicEl ex presidente de la República Serbia de Bosnia, Radovan Karadzic, de 63 años, es acusado de genocidio y crímenes de guerra . Es uno de los hombres más buscados del mundo, ha sido detenido el pasado martes en Serbia.Apodado el "carnicero de Sarajevo", estuvo prófugo desde 1996, está inculpado por el Tribunal Penal Internacional para la antigua Yugoslavia (creado ad hoc para juzgar los delitos cometidos durante ese conflicto).Se le acusa también de haber orquestado las ejecuciones de hasta 8.000 musulmanes en Srebrenica durante la guerra en Bosnia en 1995.Se ocultaba tras una identidad falsa y un aspecto irreconocible, con barba, pelo largo y mucho más delgado. Ejercía la medicina alternativa en Belgrado, donde ha sido detenido. Varios medios informan al respecto:"CNN":"Fugitive Karadzic hid as bearded medic":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/22/serb.arrest/index.html"Time":"Karadzic's Arrest Comes Too Late":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1825366,00.html"Karadzic Hid with False Identity":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1825377,00.html"Judge Orders Karadzic to UN Tribunal":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1825268,00.html"Le Monde":"Karadzic se cachait à Belgrade sous une fausse identité":http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/07/22/le-serbe-radovan-karadzic-inculpe-de-genocide-a-ete-arrete_1075780_3214.html#ens_id=1075781"La Serbie solde en partie les comptes de son passé":http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/07/22/la-serbie-solde-en-partie-les-comptes-de-son-passe_1075844_3214.html#ens_id=1075781"Radovan Karadzic, fourrier d'un sanglant ultranationalisme serbe":http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/07/22/radovan-karadzic-l-icone-de-l-ultranationalisme-serbe_1075820_3214.html"New York Times":"Serb Officials Detail Capture of Karadzic":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/europe/23serbia.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin"La Nación": "Satisfacción en la UE por la detención de Radovan Karadzic: Sin embargo, los líderes mostraron prudencia sobre los avances con Serbia a partir del arresto del criminal de guerra más buscado; no declaró en su primer interrogatorio":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1032472"Detienen al criminal de guerra más buscado: Es Radovan Karadzic, acusado de genocidio en los Balcanes":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1032386"The Economist":"Arrest of a strongman: Radovan Karadzic is arrested at last, in a big boost to Serbia's prospects of joining the European Union":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11778164&source=features_box_main"Los Angeles Times":"Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect Radovan Karadzic caught":http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-warcrime22-2008jul22,0,7520714.story"Times":"Wanted fugitive Radovan Karadzic developed alter ego as New Age doctor":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4377240.ece"The dark life and times of Radovan Karadzic":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4377484.ece"Eyewitness: the role of Karadzic in Sarajevo's vicious civil war: As a foreign correspondent for The Times, Edward Gorman visited many theatres of war during the 1990s. Here he recalls the dark days of the siege of Sarajevo":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4377963.ece"Factfile: Bosnia's bloody history:The tangled and troubled history to the Bosnian civil war, which saw the worst massacres in Europe since WW2":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4378742.ece"El Tiempo":"Arrestado el ex jefe militar serbobosnio Radovan Karadzic, acusado de genocidio":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/arrestado-el-ex-jefe-militar-serbobosnio-radovan-karadzic-acusado-de-genocidio-_4388156-1"El Universal": "Envían a La Haya a Karadzic: El fiscal Vladimir Vukcevic dijo el martes a la prensa que el juez emitió la orden para la entrega del sospechoso a la corte internacional por 11 crímenes de guerra":http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/524272.html"MSNBC":"War crimes suspect quizzed after decade on run: Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic worked as doctor while hunted for massacres":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25793223/"Background, quotes on The Hague, Karadzic: Tribunal facts and what key figures have to say about the fugitive's arrest":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25798405/"El Mercurio":"Presunto criminal de guerra requerido en La Haya: Luego de 12 años de búsqueda detienen a Radovan Karadzic, el "carnicero de Sarajevo"":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/22/internacional/_portada/noticias/B62A3BF4-561F-42DF-B372-E6A97619E49E.htm?id={B62A3BF4-561F-42DF-B372-E6A97619E49E}"El País" de Madrid:"Celebración en Sarajevo, disturbios en Belgrado: Cientos de nacionalistas serbios se enfrentan con la Policía por la detención de Radovan Karadzic, muy celebrada en Bosnia":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Celebracion/Sarajevo/disturbios/Belgrado/elpepuint/20080722elpepuint_13/Tes"Detenido en Serbia Karadzic, el criminal de guerra más buscado":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Detenido/Serbia/Karadzic/criminal/guerra/buscado/elpepuint/20080722elpepuint_2/Tes"Los ministros de Exteriores de la UE esperarán al informe del TPYI para descongelar el pacto de adhesión de Serbia: La detención de Karadzic acerca al país de los Balcanes a Europa":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/ministros/Exteriores/UE/esperaran/informe/TPYI/descongelar/pacto/adhesion/Serbia/elpepuint/20080722elpepuint_9/Tes AMERICA LATINA"MSNBC" publica: "Haiti food aid lags, hunger deepens: As nation starves, aid is stuck in port or inside warehouses":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25773473/"El País" de Madrid informa: "Mueren cuatro militares venezolanos y un boliviano al caer un helicóptero en el centro de Bolivia: La aeronave iba a ser utilizada hoy por el presidente Evo Morales":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Mueren/militares/venezolanos/boliviano/caer/helicoptero/centro/Bolivia/elpepuint/20080721elpepuint_13/Tes"MSNBC" publica: "Helicopter crashes in Bolivia, killing five: Copter was often used to transport Bolivian president":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25785714/"CNN" informa: "Dolly intensifies; Texas and Mexico brace for hurricane":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/weather/07/21/tropical.weather/index.html"La Ancion" publica: "La crisis política / La embestida kirchnerista contra el vicepresidente: El Gobierno echó a seis funcionarios de Cobos":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1032410"El Mercurio" publica: "El secretario de Agricultura sería la primera baja del gabinete argentino":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/22/internacional/internacional/noticias/217A4F30-1D6C-4B42-9354-B2E194388F5A.htm?id={217A4F30-1D6C-4B42-9354-B2E194388F5A}"CNN" publica: "Chavez set to spend big on Russian weapons":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/07/22/chavez.russia/index.html"La Nación" informa: "Chávez inició una estratégica visita a Rusia: El mandatario realizó una nueva compra de armas y selló importantes acuerdos energéticos tras reunirse con su par ruso, Dimitri Medvedev":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1032471"The Economist" analiza: "Deadly masaje: How not to tackle a soaring murder rate":http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11750858"El Mercurio" informa: "20 muertos habría dejado ataque a base de las FARC": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/22/internacional/internacional/noticias/E029D5C3-F87C-466E-81E2-32434314CDC9.htm?id={E029D5C3-F87C-466E-81E2-32434314CDC9}"The Economist" analiza: "Mending an icon: How Rio's first good governor in decades is starting to renew Brazil's most famous city": http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11750451 ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA "New York Times" publica: "Obama Meets Iraqi Officials in Baghdad":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/22/us/politics/22obama.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin"CNN" informa: "Obama finds 'consensus' in Iraq for U.S. troop withdrawal":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/07/22/obama.mideast/index.html"El Mercurio" de Chile publica: "Campaña electoral por la Casa Blanca: Gira de Obama desata frenesí periodístico en Estados Unidos":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/22/internacional/internacional/noticias/F0B3A5F6-8B0C-4F9B-B389-83E111BEDDB1.htm?id={F0B3A5F6-8B0C-4F9B-B389-83E111BEDDB1}"The Economist" analiza: "The Hispanic vote: ¡Voten por mi!. Latino voters are turning away from John McCain. That's a symptom of a bigger problem for Republicans":http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11750600"Time" informa: "Never Underestimate McCain, But.":http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1825337,00.html"Time" publica sitio web sobre elecciones en los Estados Unidos: "The Page":http://thepage.time.com/"La Nación" informa: "Guantánamo: comenzó el primer juicio: El acusado es el ex chofer de Osama ben Laden, que ayer se declaró inocente ante un tribunal militar":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1032343"Time" publica: "Bin Laden Driver Pleads Not Guilty":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1825089,00.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "El chófer de Bin Laden niega las acusaciones en el primer juicio en Guantánamo: Salim Ahmed Hamdan se enfrenta a una pena de cadena perpetua por conspiración y apoyo a actividades terroristas": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/chofer/Bin/Laden/niega/acusaciones/primer/juicio/Guantanamo/elpepuint/20080721elpepuint_6/Tes EUROPA "The Economist" analiza: "Bosnia's future: Balkan end-games. The long and winding road towards the European Union":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11751332"El País" de Madrid publica: " Sarkozy transmite a Irlanda su respeto al resultado del referéndum: El mandatario francés, que ejerce la presidencia rotatoria de la UE, se ha reunido con el primer ministro de Irlanda Brian Cowen en busca de una explicación al 'no'": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Sarkozy/transmite/Irlanda/respeto/resultado/referendum/elpepuint/20080721elpepuint_16/Tes"El Mercurio"de Chile informa: "Sarkozy logra estrecha victoria con aprobación a reforma constitucional":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/22/internacional/_portada/noticias/11AF2738-5487-43B6-9D0F-71C578D6BE24.htm?id={11AF2738-5487-43B6-9D0F-71C578D6BE24}"MSNBC" publica: "Spanish police smash 'most wanted' ETA cell: 9 held as raids target Basque separatist group following series of attacks":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25799230/"CNN" indorma: "Nine ETA bombing suspects arrested":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/22/spain.arrests/index.html"La Nación" informa: "La lucha contra el terrorismo en España: Desarticulan el comando más activo de ETA. Detuvieron a nueve personas, entre ellos el jefe; serían los responsables de la mayoría de los atentados cometidos tras el fin de la tregua":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1032470"El País" de Madrid informa: "España confirma que el Rey sí verá a Chávez: Un comunicado del Gobierno español dice que se reunirán el viernes en Mallorca, a pesar de que el presidente venezolano desmintió ayer que haya confirmado el encuentro": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Espana/confirma/Rey/vera/Chavez/elpepuint/20080721elpepuint_2/Tes"La Nación" publica: "Cerraron el caso Maddie por falta de evidencias: Los padres harán otra investigación":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1032387"The Economist" analiza: "Berlusconi fiddles, Italy burns: Silvio Berlusconi's government is turning out to be depressingly similar to his previous one":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11751325Asia – Pacífico /Medio OrieNTE"MSNBC" informa: "Myanmar cyclone caused $4 billion in damage: Country needs at least $1 billion in aid over three years, U.N. says":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25785731/"The Economist" informa: "Business in China: Busting trust. The land of the mega-monopoly is about to adopt an antitrust law":http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11751042"Time" publica: "China Pulls Troops From Quake Zone":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1825310,00.html"MSNBC" analiza: "Olympic city halves traffic to aid polluted skies: Car ban forces Beijing residents to take public transport in clean air bid":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25778988/"CNN" infroma: "Indian government's future on a knife edge":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/22/india.vote/index.html"Time" publica: "India MPs to Hold Confidence Vote":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1825382,00.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "El tifón Kalmaegi causa 18 muertos en Taiwán: El tifón ha causado graves inundaciones, corrimientos de tierra y pérdidas agrícolas de alrededor de diez millones de euros":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/tifon/Kalmaegi/causa/muertos/Taiwan/elpepuint/20080721elpepuint_1/Tes"Time" informa: "ASEAN Turns Blind Eye to Burma Rights":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1825357,00.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "Brown: "La paz entre palestinos e israelíes está al alcance de la mano": El líder laborista, primer 'premier' británico que habla ante la 'Knesset' (parlamento israelí).- Exige de nuevo a Irán que suspenda su programa nuclear":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Brown/paz/palestinos/israelies/alcance/mano/elppgl/20080721elpepuint_11/Tes"La Nación": "Brown pidió a Irán que cese su plan nuclear":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1032345"Times" publica: "Bulldozer driver shot dead in Jerusalem after ramming cars":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article4378076.ece AFRICA"El País" de Madrid publica: "Gobierno y oposición de Zimbabue acuerdan iniciar un proceso de diálogo para salir de la crisis: El líder del MDC, vencedor de las elecciones que nunca reconoció el régimen de Mugabe, firmará en persona el acuerdo":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Gobierno/oposicion/Zimbabue/acuerdan/iniciar/proceso/dialogo/salir/crisis/elpepuint/20080721elpepuint_12/Tes"CNN" informa: "Zimbabwe rivals sign deal on talks":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/07/21/zimbabwe.deal/index.html"Time" informa: "Breakthrough in Zimbabwe: Let's Talk":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1825151,00.html"CNN" publica: "Zimbabwe: Inflation 'highest in the world'":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/07/17/zimbabwe.inflation.ap/index.html"The Economist" analiza: "Sudan's leader is accused, but others can expect to follow: Will the indictment of Sudan's president for alleged war crimes help or hinder the prospects for peace in Darfur?":http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11751353ECONOMIA"CNN" informa: "Oil jumps $2 on Iran, storm: Crude prices bounce back from $16 slide as Iran nuclear talks end without agreement and traders fear tropical storm in Gulf of Mexico.":http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/21/markets/oil/index.htm?postversion=2008072115"The Economist" publica su informe semanal: "Business this week":http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11751734&CFID=13935362&CFTOKEN=69812019"El País" de Madrid publica: "El rescate de Fannie Mae y Freddie Mac le costará al contribuyente 25.000 millones de dólares: Según la Oficina de Presupuesto del Congreso.- Los dos bancos hipotecarios siguen su desplome en la bolsa":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/rescate/Fannie/Mae/Freddie/Mac/le/costara/contribuyente/25000/millones/dolares/elpepueco/20080722elpepueco_8/TesOTRAS NOTICIAS"El País" de Madrid publica: "Movilización mundial contra las FARC: Ingrid Betancourt pide en París la liberación de todos los secuestrados. Miles de asistentes a un concierto reclaman el fin de la guerrilla en Colombia":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ingrid/Betancourt/pide/Paris/liberacion/todos/secuestrados/elpepuint/20080721elpepiint_3/Tes"CNN" informa: "World rallies for FARC hostages' freedom":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/07/20/colombia.hostages.ap/index.html"The Economist" publica: "Iran and America: A surprising move. Why America is sending a top man to talk directly to the Iranians":http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11751318
Part four of an interview with Gloria Mulcahy and Marion Madonia. Topics include: Issues that concerned their father: water problems in Fitchburg. How they were treated growing up as the daughters of the city mayor. Memories with their father- fireworks on the 4th of July, vacationing at Somerset, lunch when they were home sick from school. What it was like being perceived as "rich." ; 1 MARIANNE: We have accomplished many improvements that the war and shortage of labor and materials that the president had denied us. But we had paid dearly for them… I know there's one thing that he did for the City that people are talking about to now. Joe Bally had mentioned, you know, Josey Bally had mentioned that what [Dad had done of this] talking about, and she was, "Mayor Levanti was still here. He solved the water, the water problem there." GLORIA: That was the big thing. MARIANNE: Yeah, that was the biggest thing. That's what I'm trying to get to. SPEAKER 1: Well, just tell me what you remember. MARIANNE: Okay. SPEAKER 1: What's the water problem? And we can all go back to the books about that. MARIANNE: Okay. This is what happened. The memory is gone. That's why we -- we've got to get our memories going back here. Well, I guess me and [Mettle] was always -- Fitchburg had -- [unintelligible - 00:01:07] Highway wasn't even open in those days. And that [unintelligible - 00:01:09] was the busy place now, and I think… I don't know. It seems like… I was in high school, and we were in high school, and we were so interested in boys and stuff. SPEAKER 1: Why do I get the impression that you know a lot more but you just don't want to share… MARIANNE: I do want to share. I got to get my brain working. Okay. [Crosstalk] SPEAKER 1: What about… what about the water? I don't know about… MARIANNE: I don't -- well, I do and I don't. I guess we needed reservoirs in Fitchburg, so he tried to get me and Mettles, and John Fitch, something about putting the lines in. And if he could make that reservoir, we wouldn't be running out of water. They always ran 2 out of water and stuff. GLORIA: Yeah. MARIANNE: And we didn't, and that's something I will have to look into the history of it. And see, now that I am older, now I would like to look into the history. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: You know, because I can … SPEAKER 1: Apparently, your father made a decision. MARIANNE: Yes. As mayor of Fitchburg, yeah. He did something that I know helped the city very much, and that's all I remember. SPEAKER 1: Do you remember the other issues that he was faced with being mayor? MARIANNE: Oh, I know the normal issues and all that, and I'm just thinking of the normal things. There was a parking garage that he had to build in Fitchburg. Is that where it started? Oh, that was in his third year and his third term, but did he build a parking garage? GLORIA: Yeah. MARIANNE: That one that's still here? SPEAKER 1: Yeah. MARIANNE: It's still here. That's the one? No, I can't remember. It was across from a bowling alley. SPEAKER 1: Or a pressing issue? You know, like the rest of us. You almost don't want to get out of bed because you don't want to deal with something. MARIANNE: Oh, no. He was… SPEAKER 1: Have you ever heard of anything like that? MARIANNE: No, he was -- he enjoyed it so much because, you know, when I graduated in '53 from high school, I used to ride to work with him because I worked in the Building Department as a junior clerk typist, and I remember I would get rides, and I didn't have a car. 3 And in those days, you didn't even have a car; and I didn't go to college, and I went right to work. So I remember he used to warn me. I had to be ready to go to work, and I was always a late person, and he was the type, "Come on, we better go." You know, and he was just busy all day, eight thirty to five or longer. Because I remember he was afraid I would take the car and [crosstalk] the feel of that, because that got me [unintelligible - 00:03:43]. So I was home while he was mayor, and I didn't get married until '59, so. SPEAKER 1: So that was a busy time then when he was mayor, and he was still connected with the parking company. MARIANNE: Oh, yeah. And that's why he had, that's why -- yeah. So in '53, I went to work for the trucking company and [unintelligible - 00:04:05]. And he wasn't at the trucking company at all because he was too busy at the City of Fitchburg taking care of the city. SPEAKER 1: Right. MARIANNE: And he took care of his business, but my father was a trusting person because he was trusting. He never thought that anybody was going to steal from you. And he loved the city, and he was so active in everything and he was such a warm person. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: And it mattered to -- and even to all of us. We enjoyed it just as much as he did. SPEAKER 1: Right. Yeah. MARIANNE: We enjoyed being in the public eye. 'Cause when you're in it when you're little, you know, you can't help it. You grow with it. And… knowing that we were the mayor's daughters, and that was -- that was hard though sometimes because you didn't know if some of your friends liked you, especially being in high school during that period. You know, I remember I was initiated into the 4 [Tri-Hi-Y] Club, and I wasn't sure if they really -- now as I got older, I think did, "They really like me as a friend or because I was the mayor's daughter?" You know, but… SPEAKER 1: Do you remember feeling differently because you were the mayor or the city councilor's daughter growing up? Were you treated differently than maybe other… MARIANNE: No, just particularly as the mayor's daughter, not council. Do you remember how we were treated? No, we knew because our father was active in politics, so. So maybe they just thought because we had our own company. My father has his own company, they thought… SPEAKER 1: They thought we had money. MARIANNE: They thought we had money. And even to this day, like once I went out with Mike, the son of [unintelligible - 00:05:56], and they said "Oh, you. You are the [upper]. You are from the rich, you are the rich," and I said no, I wasn't. But we didn't live down Warner Street, and there was a difference then. You know, when I went to go to school, Dauby and I used to get kicked around the school because our fathers had their own trucking company. So now everybody else had to go to work. Our parents worked very hard, but they used to pick on us and say that we are rich, so. [We've been in] a lot of fights, and I used to like it. But being in a political -- he was in politics then when I was in Grand School, right? GLORIA: Right. MARIANNE: That was city councilor. But no. That I remember -- it was just because he was self-employed. That was what the kids would point out to us, but we didn't feel any different… Maybe I did feel a little different growing up. If I really think back. GLORIA: I didn't.5 MARIANNE: I don't think… That was my life, and I just loved Dad so much. We all did. We loved our dad and our father, I mean all that. I mean, I think mayor. It did a little bit more because that was the whole city that we were in charge of. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: I might have felt a little bit different in high school. Not insecure, but it is insecure in a certain way because the boys are looking at you, but you're not looking back. But just the being proud was being proud of your father because he was always at the relay races where they shoot the gun. You know, where the first guy… SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: You know relay race and all that. It was just a nice thing. SPEAKER 1: So how did they make all of you feel special? MARIANNE: Oh, how did it make me feel special… SPEAKER 1: He must have been a busy guy and out a lot and what did he do to keep the family… MARIANNE: Oh, we played tag [crosstalk] we used to play a lot. GLORIA: [unintelligible - 00:07:55] MARIANNE: We just started playing a lot of -- yeah, well, when he was home, I think we had more quality time because I remember I was sitting on the floor once, all of us because in those day we didn't have TV. SPEAKER 1: Right. MARIANNE: We would listen to like a radio theater, and then we talked [unintelligible - 00:08:15] on the radio shows… And he was with us, and those days we still had the air raids and the parties. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm MARIANNE: Remember? GLORIA: [unintelligible - 00:08:27] fireworks. Remember? MARIANNE: Oh yeah, that's right. July 4th. That's right. 6 GLORIA: [unintelligible - 00:08:34]. MARIANNE: And we always had that, like a summer camp that we rented, for like two weeks. We always had a vacation, and he did come for that because he loved swimming. SPEAKER 1: Where was that? MARIANNE: Somerset. SPEAKER 1: Somerset. MARIANNE: Yeah. I forgot about that. Let's get back to when we were young. We at least had an outhouse there. Oh, God. In the old days it was hard to go, right? SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: He did find time for us. I remember when I used to be sick he would always come for lunch because I was not in school. And at grammar school, you would go home for your lunch those days. And he would be home and he would come home and stay for about an hour or half an hour, and if I was home sick like with the mumps—I remember that time—he would come home and we would play cards. I was lying on the couch, and he would come in and we would talk and play cards, because I always loved that. And he did find time for us even though he was a busy man. SPEAKER 1: So let me [Unintelligible - 00:09:55]. He was strict. You went to [Nolan] School. [Unintelligible - 00:09:57] the kids who went in the patch? Where did they do? MARIANNE: They went to Nolan as well. We all went to the same school. SPEAKER 1: Yeah, so you weren't living up in the patch. MARIANNE: Well, they all thought we were richer because we lived up on the… GLORIA: And now we are down the patch. MARIANNE: And now we came back. We came back to where our first house was. GLORIA: [Unintelligible - 00:10:17] and that's funny. 7 SPEAKER 1: It's interesting that other people perceived you as being rich, but you didn't feel like you were. MARIANNE: We didn't feel rich. No. No. We just… No, we didn't feel rich. SPEAKER 1: Because you know, usually I hear, "Now we are not poor, but we feel poor." MARIANNE: No, that's true. But we didn't feel poor. I think because we were up the hill, they thought people up the hill -- well, we had our own home. I mean, they had -- some of them had their own homes, too. But maybe it's because there were five of us girls, and they always dressed us. We barely paid our bills, but we always were dressed nice. I mean, I don't know. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. So relatively speaking, you may have had more money. But it just doesn't feel like they were right. MARIANNE: No. Because I remember them saying, "Oh, they buy [crosstalk]. GLORIA: --clothing store. SPEAKER 1: Uh-huh. GLORIA: Mayor of city hall. That's where -- going back, we always -- Easter, Christmas, school. MARIANNE: And then the cabbage there. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. You remember that. MARIANNE: And they let us pay two dollars… GLORIA: I don't remember that. MARIANNE: He was -- I remember he would come -- they would collect in those days, and they would come and collect the money. Even when I went to city hall and I was in high school, we would pay two dollars a month. But we were all dressed well, so I mean that could have made a difference. I don't know, so… Well… [Crosstalk] MARIANNE: Of course not. GLORIA: Right.8 SPEAKER 1: Well maybe it is that whole perception thing, because in all these photographs that you show me of your dad, he is dressed up. MARIANNE: Yeah, we were always dressed nice. My mother always dressed very nicely, and she always wore… GLORIA: Never went without a [unintelligible - 00:12:23]. MARIANNE: No. No. He really supported us well. My mother never worked. Never worked. She didn't have to. GLORIA: Never. SPEAKER 1: What were the boundaries in Fitchburg? You know, the physical boun-, the patch, and [unintelligible - 00:12:41] and things like that? MARIANNE: Yeah, I know. So there were boundaries, but with the patch were supposed to be the Italians, but it could have gone with the first. This picture would have been with that one. Maybe English. I don't know. I can't remember, but in those days, there was always something. But now, it's not. Now it is a one-on-one community, right? Yeah, when you think back to… the pretty things would separate, and like loved ones would be [unintelligible - 00:13:23] Canton, and it would be a certain district. And then further on was Ward Two…/AT/pa/kb/es
Correspondence between Melchor Ortega and Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles who is living in exile in San Diego, CA. He tells about the political events occurred in Guanajuato and Michoacán. He tells him about the "super-provecho" law, the electoral campaign of Almazán and that he had to express his support to him because the members of the Reformist Party of Guanajuato had done so. He also tells about the reaction of the Mexican president to the brochure published by Mr. Richberg about the oil expropriation. Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles replies informing that he is sending his point of view regarding the situation in Mexico and that he respects his decision to support Almazán. Melchor Ortega writes to Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles informing of the situation of the oil industry. He states it is risky to make an agreement with the Sinclair group since it only represents a part of the industry. He says he accompanied Almazán to Guanajuato and was impressed to see the amount of people that support him. He asks the General to ask Mr. Castellanos about politics in the U.S. and the possibilities of Roosevelt to be reelected. He informs the General that Juan Platt will visit him. Reply from the Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles stating that the situation of the railroads and oil industry represents two significant problems in Mexico that must be solved by the government. The General states that the US government has changed its positions regarding the "New Deal" and that the success of the electoral campaign of Almazán is due to the failure of the government. Melchor Ortega sends to Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles an analysis of the fourteen claims by the oil workers to the president. He mentions the note sent from the United States to Mexico asking to submit the oil matter to an arbitration tribunal. He writes about Roosevelt and the birth of his son. Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles writes to Melchor Ortega expressing he has learned about the European conflict through the newspapers and radio. He writes about the war in Europe, the note from the US to Mexico and the electoral campaign of Roosevelt. Letter from Melchor Ortega to General Plutarco Elías Calles writing about the war in Europe, the public opinion in Mexico regarding the involvement of the U.S., and politics in Mexico. He tells he attended the reception for Almazán in Monterrey, he talked to Plutarco Elías Calles Jr. and that he is concerned about General Tapia's health. Reply from Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles. He says General Tapia had a surgery and is getting better. He writes about the war in Europe and analyzes the attitude of the Latin American countries and the United States. Last page of a letter signed by Melchor Ortega in which he writes about Almazán. Note dated on November 13, 1940 in which they write about measures to take in Mexico and that are urgent. Encoded letter dated on November 14, 1940 in San Antonio Texas in which the author expresses he is disappointed because of an unsuccessful business. The author informs that "Güero" Ortiz called him from Torreon and offered to accompany him during his trip. Letter from Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles in which he writes about a matter and recommends solving it in Mexico. It is likely that he refers to the election of Almazán and his decision to accept loss even when everyone thought he had won. Letter from Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles expressing he is glad to be back home and says he does not know the date for his return to Mexico. Letter from Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles to Melchor Ortega expressing his sympathy for the death of Ortega's father-in-law and writing about the political situation in Mexico. He informs he has not any trip planned to Havana and that he already decided to go back to Mexico. / Correspondencia entre Melchor Ortega y el general PEC, que se encuentra en el exilio en San Diego, Cal. Melchor Ortega escribe al general PEC comentando los últimos acontecimientos políticos, sobre todo en los estados de Guanajuato y Michoacán, adonde ha estado de visita. Le informa del revuelo que ha causado la ley del súper-provecho; de la arrolladora fuerza que ha adquirido la candidatura de Almazán en los estados de Guanajuato y Morelia, que incluso ya él tuvo que pronunciarse a favor de este candidato porque así se han declarado los miembros del Partido Renovador Guanajuatense. Lamenta haber tenido que dar este paso aisladamente. Por último le comenta de la reacción violenta del Presidente de la República contra el folleto que sobre la cuestión petrolera publicó Mr. Richberg. Respuesta del general PEC indicando que con un amigo común le envía sus puntos de vista sobre la situación del país. Le dice que respeta su decisión de unirse al grupo independiente guanajuatense que apoya a Almazán, lamenta que los partidos independientes no se hayan podido poner de acuerdo para lanzar un candidato que se oponga al actual régimen, cuyas líneas de conducta parece que quieren sepultar la revolución, han destruido la economía y los valores morales de nuestro pueblo. Melchor Ortega escribe al general PEC comentando que ya cambió impresiones con el amigo común que lo visitó y con Fernando Torreblanca, quien también acaba de regresar de San Diego. Le informa de la difícil situación de la industria petrolera que obligó al presidente a pactar con el sindicato, ya que se gasta más que los rendimientos en sueldos y prestaciones, por lo que el erario tiene que prestarle a la empresa. En lo que se refiere al arreglo con la Sinclair piensa que puede ser peligroso porque sólo representa a un grupo de compañías. Le comenta que acompañó a Almazán en una gira por Guanajuato y que está impresionado de la cantidad de personas que lo apoyan. Por conducto del general PEC pide a Castellanos que le informe del desarrollo de la política norteamericana y de las posibilidades de que se reelija Roosevelt. Le informa que lo visitará Juan Platt. Respuesta del general PEC en la que se refiere al asunto de los Ferrocarriles y del petróleo como dos serios problemas del país que deben quedar resueltos por el actual gobierno. Respecto a la situación política en Estados Unidos, después de siete años de política del "New Deal" comenta que dicha administración ha suavizado su postura y su radicalismo y se ocupa preferentemente de los problemas que puedan surgir con la actual guerra. Le informa que la prensa norteamericana confirma sus noticias sobre la gira de Almazán por Guanajuato y su éxito, que se debe a la demagogia, desenfreno, falta de garantías y desorden del actual régimen. Melchor Ortega escribe al general PEC analizando los catorce puntos petitorios que hizo el presidente a los trabajadores petroleros, cuya repuesta fue una negativa en todo lo que se refería a prestaciones. Le habla de la nota que el gobierno de Estados Unidos envió a México pidiendo se someta la cuestión del petróleo a un Tribunal de Arbitraje, a lo que ya anteriormente el presidente se había negado. Respecto a la cuestión electoral en Estados Unidos parece que Roosevelt no podrá reelegirse por tercera vez, lo que es probable que dé oportunidad a un republicano de llegar a la presidencia. Le comunica el nacimiento de un varoncito y que tanto el bebé como su señora se encuentran bien. Respuesta del general PEC comentando que ha estado pendiente, a través de la prensa y la radio, del conflicto europeo y que la guerra se ha desencadenado a raíz de la invasión alemana a Dinamarca y Noruega; también comenta que cada país y medio de información da una versión distinta de los hechos. Su opinión es que Alemania ha extendido sus dominios a los países nórdicos y ha creado el frente de guerra que deseaban Inglaterra y Francia, como válvula de escape de las energías contenidas. El general PEC se lamenta de la nota que el Departamento de Estado envió a la cancillería en relación con el asunto del petróleo. Respecto a la política norteamericana hay indicios de que los partidarios de Roosevelt tienen esperanzas de que los acontecimientos mundiales exijan su permanencia en el poder. Los republicanos y algunos líderes demócratas opinan lo contrario. Carta de Melchor Ortega al general PEC disculpándose por no haber escrito antes, pues estuvo fuera de la ciudad, y comentando la guerra en Europa, donde las tropas alemanas han asolado con su técnica, rapidez y audacia. Habla de la opinión generalizada de que Estados Unidos va a entrar seguramente, y de que es posible que arrastre a México, lo que sería un desastre sin importar si el resultado es el triunfo o una derrota. Con respecto a la política nacional le informa que hizo unas declaraciones a la prensa contestando ataques que constantemente se hacen a los callistas. También comenta que tomó parte en la organización de la recepción que se hizo a Almazán en Monterrey. Le comenta que a pesar de que el gobierno sostiene que respetaría el voto, en todas las capas sociales hay la certidumbre de que no será así. Le informa que en Monterrey saludó a Aco (Plutarco Elías Calles Chacón) y se muestra inquieto por la salud del general Tapia. Respuesta del general PEC informando que el general Tapia fue operado pero ya se encuentra bien; respecto a la guerra en Europa le comenta que el mundo está asombrado y considera que la apreciación de Melchor Ortega en sentido moral es justa al condenar la agresión a Holanda, Bélgica y Luxemburgo, países que habían observado neutralidad. Analiza la actitud de los países hispanoamericanos, que hasta el momento es ecuánime, lo que no sucede con Estados Unidos, donde flota una pasión partidista y una histeria de guerra. Respecto a los ataques que han sufrido los pocos amigos que le quedan piensa que es lógico suponer que las declaraciones de Melchor Ortega deben haber causado estupor. En cuanto al resultado de las elecciones está de acuerdo en que es muy difícil que se respete la decisión del pueblo. Última página de una carta firmada por Melchor Ortega en la que habla de Almazán, de su campaña, que se ha enfriado mucho, de su falta de definición en asuntos prioritarios; así como de la inexperiencia y poco tino de la dirección política. Comenta que hay la idea de que traicionará la esperanza de quienes lo apoyan y aceptará la imposición. Nota fechada 13 de noviembre de 1940, sin destinatario ni firma, en la que se habla de una "acción que debe llevarse a cabo en el país y que se ha aplazado para completar los arreglos necesarios que le den eficacia. Le urgen al destinatario que accione dentro del país en las próximas horas. Le asegura al final que todos están dispuestos a acompañarlo. Carta en clave firmada por M. sin especificar el nombre del destinatario fechada en San Antonio, Texas, el 14 de noviembre de 1940, en la que el autor se manifiesta muy desilusionado en el negocio, que tiende a liquidarse, que la responsabilidad es de quien quiso concentrarla, que es seguro no se firmarán contratos de trabajo. Le informa que el Güero Ortiz le llamó desde Torreón y le ofreció acompañarlo en su viaje de regreso, le aseguró que las cosas cambiarían y que todo sería diferente. Respuesta sin especificar remitente ni destinatario, pero con las características de papel, máquina, etc., del general PEC en la que manifiesta que sus dudas respecto al éxito de la empresa eran válidas, que temía algo desagradable le hubiera pasado, porque su situación era comprometida y que para que un "negocio de esa naturaleza" tenga éxito es necesario un guía de firme voluntad, lo que no ocurrió en este caso. Le recomienda que este asunto se resuelva en el país, sin comprometer la soberanía nacional. Es posible que se trate de la elección de Almazán y de su decisión de aceptar su derrota en las urnas cuando todos estaban convencidos de que ganó. Carta del general PEC a Melchor Ortega congratulándose de haber regresado con bien a su hogar y de haber logrado garantías para sus amigos y correligionarios. Respecto a la actitud de Juan Rajas (Juan Andrew Almazán) es estéril hacer algún comentario, la opinión pública lo juzgó. Respecto a su regreso al país no ha definido fecha, ya que tiene que arreglar asuntos de familia y personales. Carta del general PEC a Melchor Ortega lamentando la muerte de su suegro y comentando la situación del país, la política del nuevo gobierno y su opinión de que es necesario extirpar el quiste cardenista para que México progrese. Le participa que no ha pensado hacer ningún viaje a La Habana y que tiene decidido regresar al país.
This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. ; Winner of the 2021 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY "Trafficking for a Cause": Cuban Drug Trafficking Operations as a Foreign Policy Alan Chase Cunningham Norwich University Advisor: Gamze Menali 01 June 2021 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ABSTRACT A capable intelligence service and military force is immensely integral to the national security policy of any nation, regardless of their political ideology or international activity. Cuba's national security apparatuses have proven themselves time and again to be exceptional at accomplishing the Republic's foreign policy goals. From the nation's early beginnings, in the 1960s and 70s, elements of the Cuban government were involved in the drug trade, either on an official or unofficial basis, utilizing drug trafficking as a form of aiding likeminded non-state actors, acquiring small arms and other weaponry, gaining U.S. currency, and making war against the United States. In the 1980s, following increased international outcry, multiple members of Cuba's military and intelligence forces were arrested, tried, and either executed or sentenced to prison for their roles in the drug trade. Many international observers, alongside defectors from Cuba's military and intelligence services and foreign governments, claimed that these trials were for show designed to protect the Castros. This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Gamze Menali, at Norwich University. She provided exceptional advice and support that was highly integral to the completion of this thesis and my degree. Her comments were always well-received and significantly bolstered my paper's overall effect and allowed my research to take on a professional quality. A better advisor could not have been provided nor found. I additionally must thank those persons who sacrificed their time and allowed themselves to be interviewed for my final project. Bobby Chacon of the FBI, Fulton Armstrong of the Intelligence Community, Harry Sommers of the DEA, Mike Powers of the DEA, Pierre Charette of the DEA, Richard Gregorie of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, Mike Waniewski of the DEA, Harry Fullett of the DEA, and Seth Taylor of the U.S. Customs Service. This work is intended to honor them and their years of service and dedication to the U.S. government. I would also like to thank two professors whom were of immense importance in my academic career; Professor Jonathan Brown and Assistant Professor Joshua Frens-String of the University of Texas. Both sparked my interest in Latin American affairs and guided me on how to conduct historical research. They were inspirations and role models for me as a historian. Finally, I would like to offer special thanks to both my mother and father who supported me in more ways than one through my entire educational career. My family, importantly Kaytlynn Lopez, were a source for comfort, relaxation, and support throughout this endeavor. I could not have done this without any of them. I hope this work looks well upon all of those who helped and inspired me and allows a new generation of researchers and scholars to better understand this period in Cuban history. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham Table of Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….01 A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services……………………………….03 Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s…………………………………………….07 A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s………………………………………….16 The Cocaine Boom: Cuba and Drugs in 1980s……………………………………………….21 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros…………………………………….52 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………61 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham1 Introduction Cuba's intelligence and military services are among the best in the world. They have been described in laudatory terms by intelligence professionals, national security theorists, and academics alike. Brian Latell, a former National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America and career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, agrees and recounts how veteran counterintelligence officers from all areas of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) would, "stand in awe of how Cuba, a small island nation, could have built up such exceptional clandestine capabilities and run so many successful operations against American targets".1 The CIA's former Chief of Counterintelligence, James M. Olson, agrees, writing, "no foreign intelligence service rankled me more than [Cuba's]…It was ruthless, it was devious, and worst of all, it was very, very good".2 Analysts from the research and analysis think tank CNA agree with Latell, writing, "[Cuba's] intelligence services are widely regarded as among the best in the world – a significant accomplishment given the country's meager financial and technological resources".3 The longtime lead historian of Cuban affairs, Jorge I. Dominguez, wrote in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, "Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)…have been among the world's most successful military".4 Longtime attorney and the Chief of Narcotics for the U.S. 1 Brian Latell, Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 01, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/733231302. 2 James M. Olson, To Catch A Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019), p. 31, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/1055568332. 3 Sean Durns, "Castro's dead, but his spies live on," The Hill, Capitol Hill Publishing, published 05 December 2016, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/308811-castros-dead-but-his-spies-live-on. 4 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Military and Politics," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, published 29 May 2020, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1810. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham2 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL) during the early 1980s, Richard Gregorie, has said that Cuba's intelligence services "is better than the CIA in Miami".5 It is apparent that, across multiple fields and specialties, Cuba is a well-regarded foreign power with a highly effective intelligence apparatus and robust military force. Not only that, but Cuba has been able to maintain effective relationships with like-minded state and non-state actors. Throughout the Cold War, Cuba maintained effective relationships with Latin American states by encouraging leftist revolutions amongst foreign populaces and aligning with foreign political parties6, becoming a benefactor to various regimes, political parties, and revolutionary groups in places like Venezuela, Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These relationships were maintained in a variety of ways from the providing of covert financial and military aid to the physical commitment of Cuban troops to ground warfare. It is well documented that, one of these relationships included the providing of security to drug traffickers and the usage of Cuba as a weigh station for drug traffickers. Through this almost three decade long covert operation, Cuba was heavily entrenched in building up beneficial relationships with non-state actors like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and legitimate nation states like Manuel Noriega's Panama, finding a steady source of income, and being able to make war against their age old adversary, the United States of America. By efficiently coordinating these operations and working to traffic illicit substances abroad, Cuba was able to improve their standing in Latin America and assist in the making of revolution abroad, essentially using the trafficking of drugs and other narcotics as a form of positive foreign policy. 5 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 6 "Castro and the Cold War," American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service, published 2005, republished November 2015, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/comandante-cold-war/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham3 Despite the fact that this incident offers a great deal of information as to how Cuba has conducted themselves in a foreign policy sense and has made war against the United States, it has been only minimally studied. In researching this area, one can find only a few academic papers and books written from the late 1990s which covers this issue in depth, with other books on Cuban history or drug trafficking in Latin America failing to cover this area or devoting only a paragraph or two to the entire ordeal. By examining this issue in depth, one can be able to determine just how intricate and involved Cuba's foreign policy endeavors were in addition to better understanding Cuba and the Castro's commitment to the exportation of revolution. This research chronologically catalogs how Cuba engaged in the drug trade, where they expanded and how they altered plans to most effectively suit their own needs. This research also intends to determine the level of knowledge Fidel and Raul Castro, Cuba's most well-known and high ranking officials, had of the operation and show how Cuba's drug trafficking efforts either succeeded or failed in bringing about the results desired by the island nation. A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services To fully and best understand Cuba's involvement in the drug trade, one must first come to understand the nation's intelligence and military infrastructure. The history of the FAR began when Fidel Castro and the military arm of his 26th of July Movement (M26) returned to the nation in December of 1956.7 Though soundly crushed by Fulgencio Batista's forces, Castro's rebellion was able to persevere by launching successful guerilla raids upon important military targets and acquiring a devoted following of students and lower to middle-class Cuban citizens, eventually becoming militarily superior to Batista's forces and claiming the country in January of 1959.8 The rebel army, under the command of Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 7 Marc Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 111. 8 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham4 purged the military corps of Batista's regime, executing, exiling, or simply discharging various officers before officially creating the FAR in October of 1959.9 The FAR was initially under the control of the Ministry of Defense, yet this was renamed to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and was headed by Raul Castro, Fidel's brother and later Vice President.10 Between 1959 and 1961, Castro populated the FAR with officers and enlisted personnel who would remain loyal to the new government, implemented educational programs which served to expose the military to Communist and Marxist teachings, and established militias which bridged the gap between Cuba's military and societal structures.11 Cuba's intelligence service, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (until 1989, the service went by the acronym DGI, before being changed to DI; the acronym DGI will be used when referring to this service), was created sometime in 1961, the actual date being unclear, as placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MININT).12 What is clear with the DGI, however, is their connections to the Soviet Union and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezposnosti (KGB). Immediately following the Bay of Pigs crisis, the KGB assisted Cuba in infiltrating Cuban exile groups in Florida and New York to determine if the Kennedy administration would try and oust Castro from power again.13 In March of 1962, the KGB set up an "operations base in Havana to export revolution across Latin America,"14 while later beginning an information 9 Damián J. Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Graduate School of International Studies, 1989), p. 05. 10 Ibid. 11 Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro ed. Jaime Suchlicki, p. 07-08. 12 "Cuba, Intelligence and Security," in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security, ed. K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner (Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group, 2004), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/55960387. 13 Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (United States of America: Basic Books, 2009), p. 51-53. 14 Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (United States of America: Basic Books, 2001), p. 184, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/727648881. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham5 sharing operation with the Cubans and even putting in place a KGB liaison officer within the DGI.15 Since the beginning of Cuba's foray into the world of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection, the KGB has been heavily invested and taken a special interest in Cuban intelligence operations. Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s Stratfor, a private geopolitical intelligence firm based in Austin, Texas, wrote in 2008 that, "While seeking refuge from Batista forces in the hills outside Havana, the future dictator was sheltered by marijuana farmers. Castro promised the growers protection for their hospitality".16 While trying to corroborate this claim about Castro's promise is difficult, it is well-documented that the Sierra Maestra mountain range, where Castro and his 26th of July Movement carried out guerilla attacks against the Batista regime, "had been traditional outlaw country long before Castro – rife with smuggling, marijuana growing…".17 Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade seemingly sometime shortly after the DGI was founded in 1961. A declassified Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD – the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) document details how, in 1961, a meeting was held between Che Guevara (then the President of Cuba's National Bank and head of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA)18), Ramiro Valdes (Che's deputy during the revolution and now head of the "[state's] security and intelligence apparatus"19), a Captain from Valdes' outfit, and Salvador Allende, then a Senator from Chile.20 The meeting first revolved 15 Ronald Young, "Cuba," in Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 186, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/436850527. 16 "Organized Crime in Cuba," Stratfor, Rane Corporation, published 16 May 2008, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/organized-crime-cuba. 17 Gil Carl Alroy, "The Peasantry in the Cuban Revolution," The Review of Politics Vol. 29, No. 01 (1967), p. 97, https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/1405815?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents. 18 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2010), p. 424. 19 Anderson, Che Guevara, p. 368. 20 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990), p. 24. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham6 around Chilean politics, "but soon Comandante Valdes turned the talk to setting up a cocaine-trafficking network in order to raise money to help finance Allende…Valdes…suggested that Roberto Alvarez, chief of Cuban espionage, head the new organization".21 While attempts were made to gain access to this document via a FOIA request to the DEA, the DEA was unable to provide the document by the time of publication. This is not the only document which alleges Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade during the early 1960s. Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN - the precursor to the BNDD and therefore the DEA) Henry Giordano specified in multiple letters and internal memoranda that the FBN and BNDD had located, "a "pattern of Cuban nationals," who were "suspected Castro sympathizers . . . dominating the traffic" and "operating in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to distribute large quantities of cocaine throughout the United States",".22 This mirrors what Giordano's predecessor, Harry J. Anslinger, seemed to believe in early 1961, that "the island nation [was] trying to subvert the United States with drugs".23 The BNDD too apparently, "investigated a purported Cuban government operation to sponsor marijuana and heroin crops in Cuba's Oriente province, using a secret department within the country's National Institute of Agrarian Reform".24 While both these incidences mention drug trafficking/production on the part of INRA and within Chile, seemingly backing up what the defector alleged to the BNDD, Giordano and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury David Acheson both changed their opinions in the mid-1960s. The two officials believed that while individual Cubans were involved in the drug trade, this was not government 21 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 24-25. 22 William L. Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America (Chicago, IL: Chicago Review Press, 2010), p. 92, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/592756109. 23 William O. Walker III, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996), 171, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/33132446. 24 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 91. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham7 sanctioned and was of such a tiny scale that it would be "too small to have much of an effect on the supply of dollars to that country".25 Naturally, for a government official to change their personal opinion (especially those with the highest access to sensitive documents), they must have been exposed to some form of information which detailed to them that their previously held notion of Cuban involvement was faulty. This being said, evidence collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), individual FBN agents, and allegations by Soviet defectors, seem to corroborate the investigations by federal agencies, pointing to drug trafficking endeavors sanctioned by the Cuban government. According to a letter penned by J. Edgar Hoover, the longtime director of the FBI, "several Colombian airplanes taken to Cuba in 1967 were hijacked on behalf of the Cuban government for the purpose of obtaining the cargo—smuggled heroin".26 The Federal Bureau of Narcotics also agreed with the FBI's assessment and even estimated the total worth of the heroin was in the twenty million dollar range.27 Also in 1967, "a Cuban trained Venezuelan intelligence officer established…Cuban link of drugs for guerrilla weapons in the hemisphere," detailing this information before the Organization of American States (OAS), "providing a major connection between Havana, the guerilla movements, and narcotics".28 Acting Federal Narcotics Commissioner and long-time FBN agent Charles Siragusa also claimed in March of 1962 that six Cuban drug traffickers arrested in Miami and New York were transporting cocaine from Cuba to the U.S. for the purposes of "raising money [and] 25 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 92. 26 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 93. 27 Ibid. 28 Ralph E. Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A., Ralph E. Fernandez, P.A., published 22 January 2003, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham8 demoralizing Americans and discrediting Cuban exiles in Miami".29 An FBN agent involved in the investigation and raid also confirmed this.30 A 2003 historical assessment focusing on the Cuban government's involvement in the drug trade and terrorism published by the law offices of Ralph E. Fernandez in Tampa, Florida indicated that Juvenito Pablo Guerra, the Miami group's ringleader, was an intelligence officer.31 Among the evidence that this cell was linked to the Cuban government and that Guerra was an intelligence officer includes "a supply of Communist literature and pictures of Cuban premier Fidel Castro in Guerra's apartment".32 While this piece of information is highly circumstantial in trying to link Castro to the drug ring, it does indicate that this cell was most likely not a grouping of exiled Cubans, ones who fled following Castro's claiming power in 1959, but rather were supporters of the Castro regime. Upon being sentenced in June of 1962 to "fifteen years in prison [for] narcotics conspiracy and assault with intent to kill a Federal officer…an undercover narcotics agent testified that Guerra was closely associated with Premier Castro and has been a member of a ring that had smuggled cocaine into this country from Cuba to obtain arms for Dr. Castro during the revolution".33 Also in the early 1960's, a FBN agent named Salvatore Vizzini was involved in the arrest of, "two Cuban agents…in Miami with large amounts of cocaine in their possession".34 29 "Cuba Plot Is Cited in Narcotics Raids," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 31 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/31/archives/cuba-plot-is-cited-in-narcotics-raids.html?searchResultPosition=78. 30 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/30/archives/big-cocaine-seizure-held-cuban-in-origin.html?searchResultPosition=106. 31 Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A, p. 02. 32 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times. 33 "U.S. Jails 2 in Narcotics Case; One Reported Close to Castro," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 June 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/06/02/archives/us-jails-2-in-narcotics-case-one-reported-close-to-castro.html?searchResultPosition=12. 34 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 25. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham9 Recounting the arrest in a 1978 letter to Morley Safer of CBS' 60 Minutes, Vizzini detailed that the subsequent investigation proved conclusively that the arrestees (Ramon Diaz and Jose Barrel) were both working for the Cuban government and were either selling the cocaine for profit or were involved in trading the coke for weapons.35 Throughout Vizzini's law enforcement career, this would not be the only time he would encounter evidence of Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade. Writing in his 1972 memoirs, Vizzini recounted one undercover operation in which he was sent to San Juan, Puerto Rico and received a teletype by HQ. The teletype contained "a lot of unconfirmed rumor" which included headquarters' suspicion, "that Castro and his boys were secretly involved in the smuggling [of narcotics]," while also including the names of two Cuban expats, Luis Valdez and Caesar Vega.36 Eventually being able to infiltrate the Puerto Rican underworld and meet with Valdez and Vega, Vizzini bought $750.00 USD for an ounce of cocaine. While the eventual arrests of those involved failed to capture both Valdez and Vega, the San Juan Police Department's Narcotics Squad seemed to believe the two had already fled back to Cuba.37 While the FBN seemingly was never able to confirm their suspicions about Valdez and Vega's relationships to the Castro government, it is worth pointing out that, in early Summer 1959, a Cuban Major similarly named Cesar Vega was in charge of a Castro sanctioned operation to overthrow the Panamanian government.38 Vizzini it seems held that, "there was reason to believe the operation was being carried on with the knowledge of Fidel Castro, that his supporters were running it, and that the profits were getting back to shore up the dictator's shaky 35 Sal Vizzini, letter to Morley Safer, 27 February 1978. 36 Sal Vizzini, Vizzini: The Secret Lives of America's Most Successful Undercover Agent (New York, NY: Pinnacle Books, 1972), p. 284. 37 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 309. 38 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars: The Age of the Professional Soldier Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2003), p. 56. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m0 government".39 In an extension of remarks placed in the Congressional Record in May of 1965, the CIA's view of these allegations and claims comes through. DeWitt S. Copp, a CIA analyst, detailed additional evidence concerning Castro and the Cuban government's culpability in the drug trade in a paper titled, "Castro's Subversion in the United States". Copp writes, "In December 1964, three Castro agents were arrested at Miami Airport – one of them a Cuban, Marlo Carabeo Nerey…On January 15, 1965, Oscar H. Reguera and Elidoro Martinéz were taken into custody in a New York motel with $3 million worth of cocaine in their luggage. Martinéz is believed to be a Cuban agent," while also making the claim that Cuba was engaging in narcotics trafficking in order "to finance an insurrection in Puerto Rico".40 The CIA, while any comment on the arrests of Juvenito Guerra's cell or the other arrests listed was unable to be found, certainly seemed to investigating that Cuba was, on some level, involved in the trafficking of narcotics to better support their own desires and machinations. This would also not be the last time that a group of drug traffickers would be alleged to be aligned with Cuba in the 1960s as well. In September of 1967, it was reported that, following an investigation conducted by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and Queens District Attorney's Office, six persons were arrested for their involvement in a drug ring which brought in, "$2.88 million [of cocaine]…from Cuba to Montego Bay, Jamaica and then to New Orleans for the flight to New York".41 According to law enforcement officers, Cuban governmental officials knew about this drug trafficking ring yet, "did not interfere in the 39 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 282. 40 Representative Craig Hosmer, Extension of Remarks, on 25 May 1965, "Castro's Subversion in the United States – Part I," 89th Cong., Congressional Record, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100003-7.pdf. 41 "6 Are Seized Here With Cocaine Worth Nearly $3-Million," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 September 1967, https://www.nytimes.com/1967/09/10/archives/6-are-seized-here-with-cocaine-worth-nearly-3million-cuban-did-not.html?searchResultPosition=156. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m1 narcotics ring's activities and, in return, ring members supplied the Cuban government with information about anti-Castro elements in the United States," with members posing, "as fundraisers for anti-Castro elements," and then transmitting the contributor's information back to Cuba.42 Attempts to access the NYPD's files or interview detectives with relevant knowledge of the case were unsuccessful. In the late 1960s as well, it appears that some measure of involvement by the Cuban military in the drug trade was occurring within South Florida. Around 1969, two agents from the FBN/BNDD's Miami Field Office (FO) went undercover as local drug dealers to meet with a Cuban contact at a dock behind the Playboy Club in Miami at 7701 Biscayne Boulevard. According to former DEA Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC) Pierre Charette, "the two agents did meet with a Cuban general and had discussed using Cuba as an entry point [for drugs]".43 Charette, who was not himself involved in the meeting but was close with one of the agents who was present, also confirmed that the Cuban general was an "active-duty [officer] with Castro's forces" and that the conversation was audio recorded by one of the agents.44 What one can see here is Cuba utilizing drug trafficking, not as a way of gaining an upper hand against the United States or to gain a better financial standing, but rather as a form of information gathering and intelligence collection on potential political and national security threats. By aligning themselves with a non-state actor able to work abroad in foreign land without arising suspicion from counterintelligence organizations, the Cuban government was able to better defend from foreign threats by Batista supporters and anti-Castro groups. In the form of gaining the upper hand on adversaries and gathering intelligence, this is an ingenious 42 Ibid. 43 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 44 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m2 tactic. In the late-1960s, a defector alleged that "Raúl Castro and/or his associates within the Cuban Defense Ministry actively discussed the issue of drug trafficking as an ideological weapon to be used against the United States [and that] Czech intelligence operatives trained Cuban agents to produce and distribute drugs and narcotics into the United States".45 This claim was made by Major General Jan Sejna, a military officer in the Czechoslovak People's Army and, "chief of the political wing of the Czech Defense Ministry and…member of the Communist Party's General Staff and the National Assembly, the country's legislative body".46 Sejna defected in 1968 following the "Prague Spring" under allegations of embezzlement by reformist Communists led by Alexander Dubček, a political opponent of Sejna's "patron, Antonin Novotny".47 Following Sejna's defection, both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) kept Sejna on their payroll as a counterintelligence analyst and consultant.48 Throughout the 1960s, it is apparent that Cuba was, at the least, a way station for drug traffickers to resupply before heading on into the United States (as the island nation had served since the mid-1500s)49 or, at the most, was officially sanctioning the trafficking of narcotics into the U.S. for profit. Given the fact that Cuba was a newly created country and was in dire need of economic stability, it makes sense that Castro's regime would engage in some form of drug 45 Emilio T. González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 01-02, https://scholarship.miami.edu/discovery/delivery?vid=01UOML_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12355424610002976#13355471490002976. 46 Louie Estrada, "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech Defector, Dies," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/08/27/gen-jan-sejna-czech-defector-dies/0aa7916b-1005-4595-9a2e-5dc51012dbf5/. 47 David Stout, "Jan Sejna, 70, Ex-Czech General and Defector," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 August 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/30/world/jan-sejna-70-ex-czech-general-and-defector.html. 48 "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech defector, dead at 70," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 26 August 1997, https://apnews.com/article/395f04eda00526846fb4d3cfff44f726. 49 T.J. English, The Corporation: An Epic Story of the Cuban American Underworld (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2018), p. 04, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/990850150. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m3 production and trafficking to provide a certain level of income. Additionally, it also would allow the new nation to craft strong foreign ties to non-state actors and individual governmental officials abroad who could prove valuable in other, more legitimate matters. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April of 1961, in which the United States and the Cuban governments became more antagonistic towards one another, one can see (based upon U.S. documents and defector testimony) that Cuba began taking further actions of trafficking narcotics into the U.S. as a method of covert action, "those activities carried out by national governments or other organizations…to secretly influence and manipulate events abroad".50 Sejna's allegations, if true, corroborate a great deal of what the FBN/BNDD and FBI found during the course of their criminal investigations, that the Cuban government was involved in the creating of narcotics and the trafficking of drugs throughout the Latin America region. Given the abundance of evidence surrounding Cuba and the drug trade in the 1960s, it would be logical to believe that some elements of the Cuban government (either individual ministers, agency heads, etc.) or Fidel and Raul Castro themselves, were involved in the trafficking or shipping of narcotics to the United States from Cuba. While the amount of evidence conclusively linking the Castros to the drug trade in the 1960s is minimal (with perhaps the most concrete evidence being the undercover agent's testimony during the Guerra trial), given the fact that Castro exerted a tight grasp upon the daily functions of the government and was heavily involved in minute details of military operations, foreign policy endeavors, and domestic matters, it is hard to envision that Castro was not aware of these operations or was completely oblivious to them. These operations to traffic drugs, throughout the 1960s, do not appear to be a large scale 50 Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz, "Part IV: Covert Action," in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology, ed. Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 237. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m4 policy stance. It did not appear to be organized nor a prominent feature of the Cuban government's foreign policy or income. The usage of drug trafficking by governmental entities and the allowing of drug traffickers to ply their trade within the island nation indicates this was done in an effort to garner additional currency, gather intelligence on threatening groups, or temporarily assist foreign allies. These operations do not seem to be large scale or integral to the overall conduct of the Cuban government, but are instead minor and almost done in a tentative way, perhaps out of fear of reprisal from the U.S. or the Soviet Union had their activities been uncovered. A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s Throughout the 1970s, the solidifying of the relationship between the Cuban state and non-state actors became more apparent. It was at this time that the Cuban government began making more long-lasting and profitable strides into the global drug trade while also greatly increasing their alignment with non-state actors and strengthening their foreign policy goals. At this time in Cuban history, Cuba was involved in a variety of foreign policy endeavors and military conflicts. Having failed in the 1960s to become self-sufficient economically, the island, "turned to the Soviet Union for support…[increasing] its subsidies for the Cuban economy through running trade deficits with the island and paying above-market prices for its sugar", further cementing the Soviets' presence in the nation-state.51 Given the fact that Cuba was in need of hard currency and did not desire to be too reliant upon the Soviets, Cuba can be seen as somewhat increasing their drug trafficking and security operations significantly in the mid to late-1970s. Evidence of Cuban involvement in the 1970's drug trade came through in the early-mid 51 Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions, p. 127. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m5 1980s and onward, with multiple defectors and arrested drug traffickers from Cuban military/intelligence organizations and Latin American cartels respectively offering this information to the U.S. government. Cuban defectors and drug cartel associates arrested in the 1980s indicated "in late 1975, some of Colombia's best-known and biggest cocaine kingpins met secretly in Bogotá…with the Cuban ambassador Fernando Ravelo-Renendo…Havana not only was prepared to ignore drug-laden mother ships operating in its waters but also to provide fueling and repair services to its ports…Havana also offered to escort the narcotics boats upon leaving Cuban ports, as well as provide Cuban flags to disguise their origin all the way to feeder vessels stationed off the Florida Keys," in return for roughly "$800,000 per vessel".52 In her book Narco-Terrorism, Rachel Ehrenfeld, then a research scholar at New York University School of Law, claims that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative from the Departamento América53, a "parallel intelligence apparatus"54 headed by Manuel Piñeiro Losada. It does seem that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative of sorts as, upon his death in July of 2017, a former Cuban Army officer wrote a detailed obituary documenting Ravelo-Renendo's services to Cuba, mentioning his entry into Cuba's intelligence service and his tenure during the 1970s as Cuba's Ambassador to Colombia.55 According to Dirk Krujit, professor emeritus of development studies at Utrecht University, the Departamento América was a unit which, "conducted Cuba's secret foreign 52 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 29-30. 53 Ibid. 54 Nora Gámez Torres, "He now hunts Cuban human-rights abusers in the U.S. Was he one himself?" Miami Herald, The McClatchy Company, published and updated 12 July 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article214754450.html. 55 Alfredo García, "Cuban internationalist veteran Fernando Ravelo dies," Colarebo, Colarebo, published 04 July 2017, https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=https://colarebo.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/fallece-veterano-internacionalista-cubano-fernando-ravelo/&prev=search&pto=aue. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m6 relations under the direct supervision of, and access to, Fidel Castro"56 with these secret foreign relations techniques coming in the form of "[supplying] arms, money, intelligence, guidance, and a rear base to a variety of leftist guerilla movements in Latin America that wanted to duplicate the Cuban model".57 Manuel Piñeiro Losada too was a close friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro, having solidified his position as a loyal intelligence officer during the revolution.58 An interview with retired Resident Agent-in-Charge (RAC) of the DEA's Tampa office, Mike Powers, also was able to shed some light on how important Cuba was in the Colombian drug trade. He relayed an incident detailed to him by a smuggler arrested sometime in the 1980s who later became an informant. According to the smuggler, in the early 1970s, "he was flying a load of marijuana from Colombia to Florida…As he was almost across [Cuban airspace], a Cuban MiG came up, flew next to him and signaled to follow him and land. At that point, he [the smuggler] held up a bale of marijuana and the pilot laughed and signaled [him to] go ahead [through Cuban airspace]".59 While this incident does not indicate official government sanctioning of the drug trade nor some larger effort by the Cuban government to enter into the drug trade, this piece of information is indicative of how important Cuban airspace was in the drug trade and also how individual Cuban military officers or officials may have begun engaging in the drug trade to attain either larger foreign policy goals or as an extra source of income. This information is all quite interesting as this is the first time there is some form of evidence, albeit tangentially, in which Cuban officials and members of drug cartels met to 56 Dirk Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America: An Oral History (London, UK: Zed Books, 2017), p. 05, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/964892858. 57 Larry Rohter, "Manuel Pineiro, Spymaster For Cuba, Is Dead at 63," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 13 March 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/world/manuel-pineiro-spymaster-for-castro-is-dead-at-63.html. 58 Dirk Krujit, "Cuba and the Latin American Left: 1959-Present," Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina Vol. 28, No. 02 (2017), p. 32, http://eial.tau.ac.il/index.php/eial/article/view/1519/1623. 59 Mike Powers (retired Resident Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 20 December 2020. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m7 discuss a potential relationship revolving around the drug trade. However, this information must be treated with care in that these come from the mouths of defectors who must be listened to warily and have their claims treated with suspicion given the facts they, on occasion, will say anything in order to be given a lesser sentence or protection. Attempts to try and access CIA or other IC members' files were largely unsuccessful. However, declassified files were able to shed some light on the area. According to a declassified November 1983 document from the CIA, the Agency documented a series of claims revolving around Cuba and the drug trade, including one which mentioned how "Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, has considered a scheme in 1979 to deal with narcotics smugglers in order to obtain hard currency for Cuba and contribute to the deterioration of US society".60 The CIA did mention as well that "not all of [these reports] have been corroborated", though were comfortable enough with the totality of the reports that they did endorse the belief that Cuba was involved, in some measure, with drug traffickers.61 The American non-profit, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba (FHRC), produced a historical work in 2019 documenting Cuba's involvement in Venezuela, including a section on Cuba's alleged involvement in the international drug trade. They allege that Cuba's official entry into the narcotics trade began in 1978, "with the creation of a department for [MININT] operations inside the Cuban corporation CIMEX [Corporación de Industrias Mixtas de Exportación], for money laundering and marijuana trafficking".62 The FHRC cites Norberto 60 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Drug Trafficking: The Role of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Sovereign States (Langley, November 1983), p. 05-06, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6.pdf. 61 Ibid. 62 Juan Antonio Blanco, Rolando Cartaya, Luis Domínguez, & Casto Ocando, "Cubazuela: Chronicle of a Cuban Intervention," Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, published April 2019, p. 87, https://www.fhrcuba.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CUBAZUELA-CUBAN-INTERVENTION-English.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m8 Fuentes, an original member of the Cuban Revolution and Castro historian, as the source for the claims. While Fuentes' exact statements were unable to be accessed, it is known that a defector from Cuba's Ministry of the Interior, Major Jose Rodriguez Antonio Menier, too claimed that CIMEX was "linked to the drug trade" while even going a step further and stating that Castro had knowledge of general drug trafficking and CIMEX operations, using the profits to "support and opulent lifestyle [and fund] off-budget projects".63 Maria C. Werlau, an independent scholar and Cuban human rights activist, speaking to other anonymous defectors from the DGI, confirmed that CIMEX had a department entirely under the control of MININT in addition to making the allegation that, "100% of their revenue went into Fidel Castro's accounts".64 In testimony before Congressional subcommittees during the late-1980s, two convicted drug traffickers provided similar statements on Cuban involvement in the drug trade. One of them, Luis Garcia, testified that, in either "late-1979 or early-1980, Cuban officials offered him use of airstrips for refueling drug flights" and though he did not accept, "he was aware of other smugglers who did".65 Another trafficker named George Morales claimed that during a 1979 meeting in Cuba, he was sold planes which were seized by the Cuban government (presumably, Morales either stripped these planes for parts or would use them in his own drug trafficking endeavors) before eventually getting the Cubans to agree "to allow his pilots overflight rights through Cuban airspace".66 Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 63 Don Podesta, "Ex-Cuban Officer Says Castro Profited from Drug Trafficking," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 26 August 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/26/ex-cuban-officer-says-castro-profited-from-drug-trafficking/5f7a23ba-b4ad-4bc6-b8ec-fbea4470bac5/. 64 Maria C. Werlau, "Fidel Castro, Inc. A Global Conglomerate," Cuba in Transition Vol. 15 (2005), p. 379, https://ascecuba.org//c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v15-werlau.pdf. 65 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, p. 64. 66 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m9 Narcotics, and International Operations, did however call Morales' statements "obviously incomplete", indicating that Morales' assertions required additional substantiation either through federal investigations, informants, or defectors.67 Attempts to find further evidence of Cuban involvement in the Western Hemispheric drug trade during the 1970s was minimal. It does appear that a top-secret, interagency, criminal investigation, initially codenamed "Operation Delta", was being conducted by the FBI, DEA, NYPD, and Chicago Police Department with the stated goal of "[digging] into the burgeoning Cuba-to-Florida narcotics trade and the distribution of drugs out of Miami".68 The details of this operation, however, are incredibly marginal, with attempts to access the records of this operation failing, despite multiple FOIA requests to the relevant agencies. It is possible that Cuba was not as active in the drug trade during this time due to the other foreign policy endeavors the nation-state was undertaking at that time (extensive military operations in Angola, South Africa, and Ethiopia). Due to the immense pressures going on with the nation, it is highly possible and logical even that Cuba toned down any drug trafficking activities that may have been going on. However, with the Soviet Union's death becoming more imminent and Cuba's foreign policy becoming more Latin American focused in the 1980s, Cuba seems to have significantly increased their ability at trafficking and providing security for drugs shipments as the crack epidemic swept into the U.S. during that time. The Cocaine Boom: Cuban and Drugs in the 1980s The 1980s saw a boom of drug trafficking and use throughout the Western Hemisphere. During the late 1970s, cocaine "[surged] in popularity…[being] associated with celebrities, high 67 Joan Mower, "Witness Claims Contra Drug Smuggling, Payoffs To Cuban, Bahamian Officials With," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 15 July 1987, https://apnews.com/article/5f5dd485a6d6825e88496281a2b1711c. 68 "Drugs gangs here, terrorist linked," Chicago Sun-Times, Sun-Times Media Group, published 16 April 1979, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/faln-drugs.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m0 rollers and glamorous parties" with this continuing into the 1980s before peaking in 1985 and being declared a nationwide epidemic.69 Throughout this time period, cocaine (and the even more popular derivative crack cocaine) was trafficked into the United States predominantly by organized criminal elements utilizing "a distribution system that imported cocaine from South America into the U.S. market using sea and air routes via the Caribbean and the South Florida coast" in addition to trafficking drugs through Mexico.70 While these trafficking routes are now largely managed and controlled by Mexican cartels like the Gulf Cartel or the Los Zetas, in the 1980s, the Colombians were the largest drug traffickers in the Western Hemisphere. The Medellín and Cali Cartels were the two largest players in the drug trade, with the Medellín Cartel being the dominant organized criminal element until 1993 with the death of Pablo Escobar.71 While both the Medellín and Cali Cartels are now extinct, they were incredibly powerful at the time, with the Medellín Cartel raking "up to $60 million daily in drug profits"72 and the Cali Cartel, by 1992, being "responsible for seventy percent of the cocaine sold in the United States, as well as for the extraordinary growth of the cocaine market in Europe".73 Because of the massive influence these organizations had and their wide area of operations throughout Central and North America, these cartels, mainly the Medellín, also joined forces with legitimate state enterprises such as Manuel Noriega's Panama to drastically increase their 69 Jason Ferris, Barbara Wood, & Stephanie Cook, "Weekly Dose: cocaine, the glamour drug of '70s, is making a comeback," The Conversation, The Conversation, published 08 March 2018, updated 12 March 2018, https://theconversation.com/weekly-dose-cocaine-the-glamour-drug-of-the-70s-is-making-a-comeback-88639. 70 Deonna S. Turner, "Crack epidemic," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 08 July 2016, updated 04 September 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/crack-epidemic. 71 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Strategic Intelligence Section, The Cocaine Threat to the United States (Springfield, VA, 19 July 1995), p. 04, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/154678NCJRS.pdf. 72 Sara Miller Llana, "Medellín, once epicenter of Colombia's drug war, fights to keep peace," The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Publishing Society, published 25 October 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/1025/Medellin-once-epicenter-of-Colombia-s-drug-war-fights-to-keep-the-peace. 73 Juan E. Méndez, Political Murder and Reform in Colombia: The Violence Continues (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 1992), p. 82. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m1 drug trafficking abilities.74 During the 1980s, many organized elements utilized the Caribbean to traffic narcotics either into Europe or into North America. It is without question that Cuba was one of these locations in which both air and sea craft landed to refuel and resupply before continuing on their way with payloads of narcotics.75 The first instance of Cuban involvement in the drug trade came in 1982 and 1983, with the apprehension and subsequent investigation of three persons with firsthand knowledge of these operations. These persons were Mario Estebes Gonzalez, an associate of Cuban intelligence, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian weapons and drug smuggler, and Johnny Crump, a Colombian lawyer and drug smuggler. Mario Estebes' story was first reported on in the New York Times in April of 1983. According to Selwyn Raab, Estebes "was arrested by the Coast Guard on Nov. 29, 1981, while he was transporting 2,500 pounds of marijuana in a speedboat off the Florida coast. He was indicted on a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and faced a maximum prison term of 15 years".76 Facing many years in prison, Estebes decided to turn state's evidence and inform, in returning for immunity from some criminal charges, delivering rather explosive testimony. Estebes' testified that his mission priorities included, "disrupting Cuban exile groups and performing economic espionage, but that his principal mission was the distribution of cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone[sic] tablets in New York, northern New Jersey, and 74 Mimi Yagoub, "How Panama's Criminal Landscape Has Changed Since the Days of Narco-Dictator Noriega," InSight Crime, InSight Crime, published 30 May 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-panama-criminal-landscape-changed-since-narco-dictator-noriega/#. 75 Robert Filippone, "The Medellin Cartel: Why We Can't Win the Drug War," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 17, Iss. 04 (1994), p. 332, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109408435960. 76 Selwyn Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 April 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/04/nyregion/a-defector-tells-of-drug-dealing-by-cuba-agents.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m2 Florida" and returned multiple millions of dollars back to Cuba.77 He also testified that "heroin and other narcotics were shipped to the New York area inside vans with concealed compartments to hide the drugs" in addition to claiming "he saw Vice Admiral [Aldo] Santmaria give orders permitting the unloading of narcotics at Paredon Grande [a small island off the Northern Coast of Cuba] brought in by a reputed international narcotics trafficker, Jaime Guillot Lara".78 In May of that same year, Estebes spoke before the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in a joint hearing, testifying that the Cuban government, "used the 1980 Mariel boatlift to send as many as 7,000 spies to the United States, some of whom were ordered to help drug smugglers ''flood'' this country with illegal narcotics [and that] some agents were in this country for propaganda purposes and others were to create ''chaos'' in the event of war".79 Estebes expanded upon his earlier allegations and stated, "one scheme [involved] 23,000 pounds of marijuana and 10 million methaqualone tablets [being] shipped from Cuba to Florida," the profits of which were to be split between Cuban officials and the smugglers themselves.80 Jaime Guillot Lara is perhaps the most important of the three. Guillot Lara was a well-known drug/arms smuggler in Colombia who also happened to be "a close personal friend of the leader of the M-19 guerilla group, Jaime Bateman".81 As far as his smuggling habits, Guillot Lara, according to the DEA who had been keeping tabs on him as far back at 1975, "he was delivering over 400,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 20 million illicit methaqualone pills and 77 Alex Larzelere, Castro's Ploy-America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift (Fort. Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University, 1988), p. 229-230, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/23/2002287258/-1/-1/0/LARZELERE_MARIEL_BOATLIFT.PDF. 78 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 79 "Cuban Ties Boatlift To Drug Trade," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 01 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/01/us/cuban-ties-boatlift-to-drug-trade.html. 80 Ibid. 81 LT. Timothy J. Doorey, "The Cuban Interventionary Forces: The Growing Strategic and Regional Threat to the United States and NATO" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1986), p. 115, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a180123.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m3 thousands of pounds of cocaine to U.S. markets each year" while also acquiring an impressive fleet of ships for trafficking purposes.82 Guillot Lara first became introduced to the Cuban ambassador to Colombia, Ravelo-Renendo, through their mutual friend, Johnny Crump, during a meeting (conducted at Gonzalo Bassols' apartment, the number two at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia) which resulted in a profitable relationship between Guillot Lara and the Cubans. While Crump would also corroborate this meeting between the following members, Guillot Lara's girlfriend, who was there when the meetings took place, corroborated many aspects, while also testifying that Bassols "told Mr. Guillot-Lara that the drug scheme had been cleared by a high Cuban official" which Bassols then identified was Fidel Castro.83 Either during or immediately after this introduction, according to Congressional testimony from Francis M. Mullen, Jr., the Administrator of the DEA in the early 1980s, Guillot Lara "began to receive official Cuban protection for the movement of his drug-ladened[sic] vessels to the United States…[in addition to transporting and delivering] arms which were ultimately destined for the Colombian terrorist group, M-19" on Cuban behalf.84 Not only did Guillot Lara traffic weapons to Cuban aligned rebels and allow the Cubans in on his drug trafficking endeavors, it appears he "also transferred funds to the guerillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank" acting as something of a go-between.85 From 1980 to 1981, Guillot Lara 82 Nathan M. Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest, Reader's Digest Association, Inc., published July 1982, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/drugs.htm. 83 Extensions of Remarks, Cuba's Active Role in Drug Trafficking to the United States, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 130, pt. 24B: 10400, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8-2-3.pdf. 84 Leslie Maitland Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 November 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/10/us/us-officials-link-castro-and-drugs.html. 85 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 12 March 1982), p. 02, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QafYFT9344IVwbKAk5KG_OJydGlr3Q7oZPpK8WHGSx3JeWsUS431ZZwaW55TaMUk3UvHW4jiCHRb9Utgv1_TsoAFZD6FOi8njL3jjxp8gSVFo2zCTKSLLP0KOTaXLPl9ZdycsUgqn7e8ud91hnk09ZPGbYZ0QYrbwbNypMoakmWoqtvZNPGG0e9cQ33AwwDL7jITmBXQF CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m4 and the Cubans entered into a cozy relationship, though one that quickly became fraught with complications. In March of 1981, Colombian authorities found a "cache of M-19 weapons" and, with captured M-19 fighters implicating Cuban involvement, the Colombian government "[broke] off diplomatic relations with Havana and [expelled Ambassador Ravelo] and his staff".86 From midsummer to November of 1981, two Guillot Lara operated boats and one aircraft (the aircraft and one of the boats carried weapons for M-19) were apprehended by both the Colombian Coast Guard and United States Coast Guard; the capture of three M-19 rebels by the Colombian military also resulted in smuggling operations being significantly damaged.87 Guillot Lara fled Colombia, facing criminal charges, before being arrested by Mexican authorities.88 Awaiting extradition by the Mexicans to either the United States or Colombia, Guillot Lara revealed to both Mexican and U.S. investigators that he had "been involved in trafficking operations to Colombia for the M-19 on behalf of the government of Cuba. The latter provided the funds for the purchase of the arms".89 Following his revelations, however, Guillot Lara was released from Mexican custody and disappeared; according to the Colombian daily newspaper El Tiempo, Guillot Lara died in early April 1991 in Cuba of a myocardial infarction having "been detained on the island for twelve years".90 xujwOix6ni7j0-eT0RVti430wKPH9bicd8LdzulTZPXR8JDPGMTsyF2guKz20_HFjQkKlW8r6xpBfdR4TEC5SqWHYuetwHCl4rS7YWkCl0. 86 Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest. 87 John Dorschner & Jim McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine, The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 20 November 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/crump.htm. 88 Edna Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald, Knight Ridder, published 24 January 1982, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000303490005-9.pdf. 89 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 90 "Guillot Died of a Infarction," El Tiempo, Casa Editorial El Tiempo S.A., published 13 April 1991, https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-61284. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m5 Johnny Crump is where the public first became aware of a Cuban connection to the drug trade, though the last defector to be arrested by U.S. authorities. Crump, according to investigative reporter Ernest Volkman, was a Colombian lawyer of American descent who "went into the narcotics racket, running a large-scale cocaine and marijuana-smuggling operation" following the failing of his family's ranch in the late-1970s.91 Being politically well-connected, he was asked to serve as a guide for the newly appointed Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, the aforementioned Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, in 1975, the two quickly becoming friends.92 The two became so close that Crump even asked Ravelo to be his newborn daughter's godfather.93 At one point in 1979, in both federal testimony and statements made to Miami Herald journalists John Dorschner & Jim McGee, Crump detailed a meeting he had between Ravelo in which the ambassador detailed, "was dealing with some Chileans who needed help…seeking American weapons, not traceable back to Cuba, to use in the fight to overthrow Augusto Pinochet," to which Crump agreed and offered assistance.94 Following this, Crump tried to arrange a deal in which a plane would transport marijuana into the country, however, few pilots were willing to enter Cuba's Camaguey airport where Ravelo had arranged for refueling.95 In a previously mentioned meeting between Ravelo, Crump, 91 Ernest Volkman, "The Odd Couple: Castro and Vesco: The Cocaine Alliance," The Gadsden Times, Edward Marsh, published 29 April 1984, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1891&dat=19840428&id=jKkfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=etYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5242,6122535. 92 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 93 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript, NBC Network, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01070R000100380010-3.pdf. 94 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 95 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, transcript, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/cubaandcocaine.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m6 and Guillot Lara, the four agreed to transport the drugs via boat to Cuba with protection from Cuban Navy and Coast Guard forces.96 In a 1991 interview with PBS Frontline, Crump detailed the finalization of the first watercraft drug shipment to Cuba, discussing how he disembarked from "the plane to a Cuban government car that was waiting for us in the airport. I mean, there's no way that you can go to any country with no passport, with nothing like that, landing from another country in an international airport and have a car waiting for you right there in the field. It has to be with the OK of that government, that country… Everything was paid by the Cuban government. The hotel, you had to sign, like, you are a guest from the Cuban government because they don't let me pay for the hotel"; while Crump left the country before he personally could see any drugs entering the country, he was reassured by Ravelo that the drugs indeed touched down on Cuban soil.97 From that point onward, Crump became very involved in trafficking narcotics and arms with the Cubans, doing so via air and seacraft and aiding the Cubans larger foreign policy goals in aiding left-wing insurgent groups through Central and South America. In January of 1982, however, Crump was arrested in a joint Customs-DEA operation "at the Omni Hotel in Miami…on drug trafficking charges".98 At the time, Crump was acquiring arms and other weaponry "to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia" via his friend Jaime Guillot Lara.99 Much like Estebes, Crump was facing heavy prison time and began cooperating with federal 96 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 97 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, accessed through vault, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/cuba-and-cocaine/. 98 Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald. 99 U.S. Department of State. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m7 authorities, providing them "with details of his meetings and alleged drug dealings with Cuban government officials in Bogota and Havana".100 Much of Estebes, Guillot Lara, and Crump's claims are astounding, however, it must be kept in mind that these persons are convicted drug traffickers and defectors from Colombian drug cartels or are in some way associated with Cuba's military respectively. Despite this, many prosecutors and U.S. government agencies found some, if not a sizeable portion of their claims, credible. In Estebes' case, Richard Gregorie commented at the time on Estebes' validity as a witness describing how his comments were "very credible" and had been "independently corroborated".101 In an interview with Gregorie, the former attorney stressed he "found him credible because of that [outside and additional] corroboration".102 The Senate Chair of one committee also stated that Estebes' credibility was "checked out…with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration".103 As far as Guillot Lara's credibility goes, the CIA's opinion of him seems to be rather high. According to a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate from 1983, "[t]he Guillot Lara case…is proof that Cuba has used Colombian drug smuggling networks move arms to Colombian insurgents. In this case, Cuban officials and Colombian drug traffickers were clearly associated in facilitating narcotics shipments to the United States. Guillot paid the Cubans in hard currency and used his vessels and smuggling networks to move arms to Colombia for the insurgents. On the other hand, Cuba rather routinely searches some drug-smuggling ships found 100 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript. 101 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 102 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 103 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m8 in Cuban waters, confiscates drugs found and often imprisons the crew".104 Through this excerpt, the CIA seems to endorse the view that the overall claims about drug traffickers smuggling weaponry and drugs in collusion with Cuban figures and through Cuban waters is true and based in fact. While the CIA did seem to treat the accounts and his entire involvement with legitimacy, the agency was careful to note they were unsure of "the extent to which Cuba has continued to facilitate drug trafficking, either for money or arms".105 While the following document is not exactly an intelligence estimate or official analysis, an August 1982 conference report conducted by the CIA and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) stated, "Given the involvement of senior Cuban officials and at least two Cuban embassies, we believe this activity was approved at the highest levels of the Cuban Government. It almost certainly was not a case of corruption by mid- or low-level Cuban officials…Given the level of Guillot's Cuban contacts and the political implications of the arrangements, the operation was almost certainly approved at the highest levels of the Havana government" though the document was clear in stating that the U.S. government was uncertain as to who was behind the operation.106 These three witnesses were able to corroborate a great deal of information that the U.S. federal government, mainly the DEA and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), had been investigating since the late 1970s. With this testimony from defectors and arrested drug traffickers who were seemingly vetted and verified, the U.S. government finally was able to bring forth official charges against certain members of the Cuban government and military. 104 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Implications for the United States of the Colombian Drug Trade Vol. II (Langley, 28 June 1983), p. 02, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00302R000600990002-9.pdf. 105 Ibid. 106 U.S. Intelligence Community, National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics and Terrorism (Langley, August 1982), p. iii, 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00851R000100160008-1.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m9 On 05 November, 1982, an indictment brought by the USAO-SDFL in Miami, Florida charged that certain drug traffickers and members of the Cuban government did "knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree, together with each other, and with diverse other persons who are both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit certain offenses against the United States" in the importation and possession of methaqualone tablets and marijuana and "used and caused to be used facilities in interstate and foreign commerce, including the telephone, and traveled and caused others to travel in interstate and foreign commerce between the Southern District of Florida, Colombia, Cuba and elsewhere, with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of an unlawful activity, said unlawful activity being a business enterprise involving controlled substances".107 The persons charged in this indictment brought forth by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida included Jaime Guillot Lara, Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez, Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, and David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. alongside multiple other, predominantly, Miami-based drug traffickers.108 Neither Crump or Estebes were charged as both had testified for the prosecution and received either partial or full immunity in addition to new identities and federal protection. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Cuba's foreign policy arm operating as an independent section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, commented that the charges against Ravelo, Bassols, Santamaria, and Rodriguez-Cruz were "all lies"109; a January 1982 letter from 107 United States v. Jaime Guillot Lara et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 05 November 1982), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/indictment-82.htm. 108 Ibid. 109 George Volsky, "U.S. Drug Charges Cite 4 Cuban Aides," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/06/us/us-drug-charges-cite-4-cuban-aides.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m0 Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX) denied Cuba ever utilized drug traffickers to transport arms to rebels in Latin America, never gave arms to guerillas in Colombia, and denied that Guillot Lara had ever set foot in Cuba or received any monies from the Republic of Cuba.110 The denial by Cuba of having never gave arms to Colombian guerillas was roundly criticized, most notably in a 1990 interview with former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Thomas Boyatt.111 Among those charged were high level Cuban officials, some of whom have already been discussed including the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia Ravelo-Renendo and his "minister-counsel" at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia Bassols-Suarez.112 In addition to these figures, the indictment also charged Vice Admiral (VADM) of the Cuban Navy Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado and Rene Rodriguez-Cruz a "member of the Cuban Community Party Central Committee and president of the Cuban Institute of Friendship With The Peoples [ICAP]" with the same charges.113 It is worth noting that the ICAP was described by the CIA in a 1984 brief as being an organization which, in addition to bringing in foreign youths interested in Communism, Socialism, or Cuba also "provided Cuban intelligence services with a registry of aliens who might prove useful for intelligence collection efforts and operations in their homelands".114 110 "Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs," Minister of Foreign Affairs Isidoro Malmierca Peoli (28 January 1982), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America Report, Cuba, JPRS L/10334, 18 February 1982, p. 03-04, heading: Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs, Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Latin America Report, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030043-6.pdf. 111 Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt (Ret.), interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 08 March 1990, p. 48, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Boyatt,%20Thomas%20D.toc.pdf?_ga=2.264396167.981542772.1592939617-1066174783.1588020094&_gac=1.137161348.1589401103.EAIaIQobChMIgqnAwtSx6QIVSx-tBh2tGgsJEAAYASAAEgKALvD_BwE. 112 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba (Langley, October 1979), p. 224, https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/07/66/14/00003/AA00076614_00003.pdf. 113 Mary Thornton, "Four Cuban Officials Indicted in Drug Smuggling," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/11/06/four-cuban-officials-indicted-in-drug-smuggling/d70ed042-0adc-42d2-971b-23475f7adc83/. 114 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Castro's Propaganda Apparatus and Foreign Policy (Langley, November 1984), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000972183.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m1 David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. is an interesting figure within this legal case as he, in December of 1982, pled guilty to the first count of the criminal indictment.115 In his plea, Lorenzo Perez indicated culpability on Guillot Lara's part to "purchase, receive, store, and possess with intent to distribute approximately eight and one-half million methaqualone tablets" while indicating "that Jaime Guillot-Lara would provide ships to transport methaqualone tablets from Columbia[sic] with the knowledge of the Cuban governmental officials".116 Lorenzo Perez admitted he assisted Guillot Lara in all of these actions while also admitting he "traveled by private vessel from the Southern District of Florida to Paredon Grande, Cuba [and] met with Cuban government officials" including Santamaria and Rodriguez-Cruz.117 In Congressional testimony, Lorenzo Perez also testified that that "Cuban government was also to receive one-third of the profit of the marihuana[sic] sale" yet this did not go through as it appears Guillot Lara kept the profits [just under half a million USD] to himself.118 This case was the most significant development in the long standing allegations against Cuba on the area of narcotics trafficking. However, it is incredibly important to note that there was no evidence linking the Castros to the drug trade. The lead attorney who personally handled the case for the DOJ, Richard Gregorie, stated "Was Fidel Castro involved? At this point, no…[I] can't honestly say I saw that open Cuban involvement [and] did not come up with anyone who spoke directly to Fidel in those early cases".119 115 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 09 December 1982), p. 01, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr.htm. 116 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE, p. 02, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr-1.htm. 117 Ibid. 118 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 April 1983, p. 33. 119 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m2 Also around this time, many officials from the DOJ and U.S. Department of State (DOS) changed their previously emphasized opinions on the extent of Cuban involvement in the drug trade. In an October 1983 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, DEA Administrator Mullen stated, "I moved very cautiously at first wanting to have evidence before publicly stating I was convinced that the Cuban Government was involved in drug trafficking. I am now convinced, as I have stated in prior sessions, that there is Cuban Government involvement in drug trafficking", bringing forth the above indictments and other "[classified and confidential] information" to support his reasoning.120 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, James H. Michel, stated before Congress also in May of 1983 "the evidence clearly indicates more than a case of corruption by local or mid-level security officials in Cuba…Narcotics trafficking has apparently been sanctioned by Cuba as a means to finance subversion in Latin America".121 These comments were found by the Washington Post to, "fit in with a Reagan administration campaign to rally public and congressional support for its Central American policies, including more aid for El Salvador's army".122 Michel was not the only State Department official to make this claim either. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger stated in May of 1983 that he "would find it very difficult to believe that the Cuban Government itself is not 120 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Impact of the South Florida Task Force on Drug Interdiction In The Gulf Coast Area, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 October 1983, p. 16, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/97516NCJRS.pdf. 121 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 30 April 1983), p. 02, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Cuban_Involvement_in_Narcotics_Trafficki/NItKAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0. 122 Edward Cody, "Castro Ties To Drugs Suggested," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 01 May 1983, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/05/01/castro-ties-to-drugs-suggested/242170fe-a930-4bc4-b30c-18016f794497/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m3 involved… [The evidence is] really quite clear that there is major Cuban involvement in the drug traffic in this country", while also accusing the Castro government of playing a role in this.123 However, this appears to be more Eagleburger's own personal opinion as a more senior State Department official stated later that no agency had been able to prove "personal involvement by Fidel Castro".124 A spokesman for the Cuban Interests Section responded to the comments by Mullen and Michel by stating, "[This is] propaganda against the Cubans…We [the Cuban government] are refusing this accusation. We have consistent fighting against drug traffic. There are many American people who are put in Cuban jails for drug trafficking".125 At this stage, in relation to the Guillot Lara/Crump case, these definitive comments that Castro or the Cuban government officially was involved seemed to an extreme jump and other officials protested against this characterization. Stanley Marcus, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and the attorney whose office brought forth the indictments against the four Cuban officials, stated before Congress "I think it is a fair and accurate statement to say some of the major organs and institutions of the Cuban state and some high-ranking officials of those organs and institutions of the state are involved in drug-running to the United States".126 William H. Webster, then Director of the FBI, also spoke about this in a television interview, stating the majority of the evidence currently being used by some officials to make judgements "[came] from one set of 123 Kenneth B. Noble, "Official Ties Cuba to U.S. Drug Traffic," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/02/world/official-ties-cuba-to-us-drug-traffic.html. 124 Ibid. 125 Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times. 126 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 30 April 1983, p. 15. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m4 sources and should be viewed with care".127 At this juncture, there was a great deal of conflicting views upon the established evidence, some most likely based upon political and individual biases based upon preconceived notions on both the nature of Communism and Latin America in general. While the evidence linking Castro or the Cuban government as a whole is very minimal (mostly relegated to evidence that would be considered hearsay in a U.S. court of law), it is undeniable that sections of the Cuban government, including areas of Cuba's diplomatic and intelligence services, were utilizing drug traffickers to achieve larger foreign policy goals within the Latin American region. As the 1980s progressed, additional evidence of Cuban involvement in the drug trade became even more apparent with defectors from Noriega's Panama, Cuba's DGI, and the arrests of multiple drug traffickers all speaking to U.S. officials. During this time as well, many criminal investigators of the U.S. federal government found or came across evidence of drug trafficking on Cuba's part along with the U.S. IC coming to a more solid conclusion on the matter. Prior to these November 1982 indictments, an FBI investigation into Cuban involvement in the drug trade was underway. In October of 1982, a U.S. Customs plane near Corpus Christi, Texas intercepted a Cessna aircraft that was having a mechanical malfunction and tracked it to Cleburne, Texas. The pilot, an American, "was arrested with 877 pounds of marijuana onboard" with "Chemical analysis [showing the marijuana] almost certainly was grown in Cuba".128 Following the pilot's conviction in April of 1983, federal investigators detailed "the ring operated for two years in violation of government embargoes on trade with Cuba by shipping computers and other equipment. Some of the return flights carried high-grade Cuban 127 Ibid. 128 "Did Cuba get computers in return for marijuana?" The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 02 April 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/computers.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m5 marijuana".129 The evidence necessary to make the claim that this ring was operating with the explicit approval of Cuban government officials or the Castros themselves is very lacking, however, what this does indicate is that there were individual smugglers beyond large metropolitan centers who were found to have ties to Cuba and that Cuba seemingly was involved in producing drugs in some quantity. In December of 1984, the CIA released an interagency intelligence memorandum stating outright, "Cuba is currently supporting drug trafficking…We judge that Fidel Castro is fully cognizant of and condones the drug-related activity that is taking place with the support of Cuban officials…The key Cuban participants are officers of the Interior Ministry or America Department of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee…Their participation strongly indicates a sanctioned government policy, rather than an arrangement for personal gain".130 While a good portion of this document is redacted, this is the first time in which an intelligence agency, or the CIA at least, has openly accused the upper echelon of the Cuban government and Castro himself of playing some role or in some way supporting the activities occurring. During this period, many criminal investigations uncovered more information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade, with additional evidence of Castro involvement becoming more apparent. In addition to this, many Congressional hearings and panels were convened with the goal of exploring the Latin American drug trade, during which many witnesses were called. Among these witnesses was Diego Viafara Salinas, an M-19 physician who infiltrated an armed civilian group with ties to members of the Medellín Cartel.131 Salinas held the belief he would be 129 Ibid. 130 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Government Involvement in Drug Trafficking (Langley, December 1984), p. 03, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T00217R000700140002-5.pdf. 131 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 September 1989, p. 70, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146771NCJRS.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m6 killed due to his past association with M19 and began providing evidence to the Colombian government, which eventually resulted in the deaths of many prominent Medellín Cartel leaders.132 In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Salinas recalled that, "[on November 22, 1988] two pilots flying a Commander 1000 aircraft were planning to stop and refuel in Cuba. They were leaving from an estate [in the Department of Cordoba] …When the seats of the plane were removed to load the cocaine, I saw the navigation charts, which indicated they were flying over the southern coast of Cuba. These pilots commented that they had to be sure to carry some amount of U.S. dollars with them to leave in Cuba as prearranged payment for the stopover".133 While the pilots Salinas spoke with never identified who gave them clearance to fly over Cuba with drugs, Salinas did testify "that it [the drug trafficking operation] was all the way up to Fidel Castro" with this information apparently coming from Fidel's spokesman.134 It is worth noting that this piece of testimony would effectively qualify as hearsay in a U.S. court of law. Many informants also came forward with information that would prove to be incriminatory to many persons with ties to the drug trade, including certain high-ranking Cuban leaders. On such source, a confidential informant for the DEA, who, after being arrested in 1985 on conspiracy charges, provided information on much of the Medellín's drug trafficking activities to the U.S. government.135 In a request for payment from the DEA's Asuncion Country Office, the agency noted the source's decades of service to the United States, describing him as having led "successful 132 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 73. 133 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 71-72. 134 Ibid. 135 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Asuncion Country Office, REQUEST for PAYMENT under 28 U.S.C. 524 (C)(1)(B) for CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (CS #####) (Asuncion, post-2009), p. 01. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m7 negotiations for landing rights and refueling operations in [among other countries] Cuba…[the source] purchased a birthday surprise (an airplane bought in the U.S.) for Fidel CASTRO's[sic] birthday, which he personally handed over to Castro's brother Raúl (then Cuba's Minister of Defense) during lunch".136 This information is quite damning to the Castro regime and, if true, would prove that, at the least, Raúl Castro did have knowledge of Cuban involvement in the drug trade and condoned those operations. While it cannot be emphasized enough that this confidential source pled "nolo contendere to the conspiracy charges in 1986", it does speak volumes that the DEA found him an essential and trustworthy source to continue using well into the 21st century.137 At this same time, another development implicated an American fugitive with close ties to the Castro regime in the drug trade. In April of 1985, appearing "before the Senate subcommittee on children, family, and drugs" (which was investigating Nicaraguan governmental involvement in the drug trade) were two convicted smugglers who provided further information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade.138 One of them was smuggler James A. Herring, Jr. who, while insisting he never transported drugs for the Cubans or Nicaraguans, detailed his smuggling activities with the Cubans in an interview with PBS Frontline, saying, "When I would go into Varadero with boatloads of equipment, we would be received by marked vessels that the Cuban navy, so to speak, utilized, their military gunboats. They would escort us into the gunboat dockage there at Varadero. From there they would offload. We would stay as long as we felt necessary to refuel us, wined and dined us. And when we were ready to return to 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 "Witnesses Testify on Vesco Link to Drug trafficking in Nicaragua, Cuba," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 19 April 1985, https://apnews.com/article/09e42836a8f58d76da155fa155da7847. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m8 the Keys, they would take and escort us out".139 In addition to this, Herring also claimed that the DGI, "would even offer drugs in lieu of the cash. [They] had the availability of enormous amounts of drugs that they had warehoused through seizures that they had made in their country on drug operations that weren't paying protection for their air space or their waterways. So they had a readily available amount of drugs in the form of cocaine, Qualudes[sic] and marijuana".140 Herring also testified that "he worked with Cuban Government officials and [Robert Vesco] to help the Nicaraguan government build a cocaine-processing laboratory near Managua".141 Vesco had been a successful businessman in the United States, creating a hundred-million-dollar manufacturing empire by 1970 before being twice indicted on federal charges for "defrauding thousands of investors [of $224 million USD]" and "for making illegal contributions totaling $250,000" to Richard Nixon's re-election campaign in 1972 and 1976 respectively.142 Following this, Vesco fled to numerous Latin American countries (including Nicaragua) before settling in Cuba around 1984.143 In a March 1996 profile for Vanity Fair, Vesco's immediate family indicates a friendly relationship to Fidel and Raul Castro in addition to a partnership to traffic narcotics with Col. Antonio De La Guardia, a high-ranking figure in the DGI and an important part of Cuba's overall foray into the drug trade.144 Eventually, however, Vesco attracted the eye of U.S. federal law enforcement for his 139 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 140 Ibid. 141 Joel Brinkley, "Panel Hears Details Linking Managua and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 20 April 1985, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/20/world/panel- hears-details-linking-managua-and-drugs.html. 142 Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Robert L. Vesco," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 20 July 1998, updated 30 November 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-L-Vesco. 143 Ibid. 144 Ann Louise Bardach, "Vesco's Last Gamble," Vanity Fair, Condé Nast, published March 1996, https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/1996/3/vescos-last-gamble. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m9 alleged participation in drug trafficking and, though some convicted drug traffickers and Cuban intelligence defectors implicated him in criminal acts, the "FBI and [DEA] denied he had any role" in certain elements of the drug trade, disproving these traffickers and defectors' claims.145 Ultimately, Vesco was arrested and sentenced to prison in Cuba in 1996 "for economic crimes against the government of Fidel Castro".146 Since at least April of 1987, the DEA's Miami Office was actively pursuing an investigation against Cuban government and military officials. Harry Sommers, a newly minted DEA agent to the Miami FO and later Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Atlanta FO, was the lead investigator on the case and detailed his investigation in an April 1990 academic work for Florida International University. According to Sommers, in April of 1987, "two pilots [an American and Cuban national] flew approximately 480 pounds of cocaine from Colombia to [Varadero Military Base, Cuba]…where the cocaine was transferred to Cuban military officers".147 According to Sommers, the pilots were both questioned by U.S. officials and, in this interview, both pilots claimed they had stopped in Cuba to make "emergency repairs" and "presented documentation from the Cuban government confirming their story".148 The drugs were then placed upon a boat named the "Flerida" and, while attempting to enter Florida waters that April, was intercepted by the DEA. In the ensuing interviews with the boat's operators (all Cubans who were "residing in 145 Jim McGee, Pierre Thomas, Guy Gugliotta, & Jerry Knight "Vesco Held In Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 09 June 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/09/vesco-held-in-cuba/874c16d3-81a5-4700-84ce- 6a4e8300fdab/. 146 Douglas Farah, "Vesco Gets 13-Year Sentence in Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/27/vesco-gets-13-year-sentence-in-cuba/77271414- 9219-4efe-b68c-5d30b0f9b11b/. 147 Harry Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," (graduate paper, Florida International University, 23 April 1990), p. 07. 148 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m0 Miami"), the DEA found the boat was "[initially] met at sea by a Cuban Coast Guard vessel and escorted to the military base in Varadero [where the] crew members were housed and fed until the cocaine was loaded onto the vessel" upon which the boat was escorted out of Cuban waters by a Coast Guard ship.149 Additional evidence showing U.S.-based drug traffickers of Cuban descent docking and landing at Varadero and interacting heavily with Cuban military officers was uncovered through further investigations in May and November of 1987.150 This investigation led to the federal indictments of various figures in late 1988, including Reinaldo and Rueben Ruiz, a Cuban father and son drug trafficking team operating out of the South Florida.151 Reinaldo Ruiz, facing a sentence of life imprisonment, agreed to make a deal with the government in return for a lighter sentence.152 In a television interview with PBS Frontline before his death, Ruiz detailed his involvement in the drug trade and his associations with the Cuban government. According to Ruiz, he would transport a boat from Florida to Varadero where "everything had been arranged in advance [by Colonel Pardo, Chief of Command of Naval Operations in Varadero]" while his son, Rueben, would fly the cocaine from Colombia to Varadero which, upon landing, would be transferred to Ruiz's boat by members of the Cuban military and MININT.153 In this interview, Ruiz also stated "Every time that I went over there, I was completely sure that I was a 100 percent backing[sic], all the way to the top, otherwise I never, ever touch a thing out there". 154 149 Ibid. 150 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08-10. 151 Buddy Nivens, "Jury Links Cuba To Drug Smuggling," South Florida Sun Sentinel, Tribune Publishing, published 27 February 1988, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1988-02-27-8801120759-story.html. 152 Richard Cole, "Prosecutors: Trafficker Implicated More Top Cuban Officials," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 21 August 1989, https://apnews.com/article/348da22ca41fd9a7e77c7ab9226c504e. 153 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 154 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m1 Despite Ruiz's comment, he never once indicated to federal investigators he met Fidel or Raul Castro; the closest Ruiz got to implicating either senior leader was a secret recording made by a DEA informant in which Ruiz claimed "The [payoff] money went in Fidel's drawer".155 Again, Ruiz never identified this person as being Fidel Castro and, if he did, the information would have come from someone who had heard this information from someone else, effectively being inadmissible evidence. What is quite serious about Ruiz's allegations and testimony however are his connections to Cuban intelligence. According to Harry Sommers and confirmed by other federal investigations, Ruiz was a "cousin of Miguel Ruiz-Poo…a Cuban captain in the Ministry of the Interior" who was working in Panama when he met Reinaldo Ruiz.156 While they initially began transporting U.S. goods and products to circumvent the embargo, Reinaldo Ruiz eventually floated the idea of trafficking cocaine through Cuba which resulted in Ruiz-Poo informing his superior Major Amado Padrón Trujillo and Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia, both members of the Moneda Convertible (MC) Department, a division meant to "circumvent the United States embargo and earn Cuba hard currency".157 This is where Ruiz's involvement in shipping boats and aircraft filled with cocaine and other narcotics to Cuba and then on to Florida began. According to esteemed journalist Andres Oppenheimer, shortly after de la Guardia and Ruiz initially met, Ruiz asked de la Guardia if Fidel Castro was aware of their arrangement to traffic narcotics to which de la Guardia replied in the affirmative. Oppenheimer writes however 155 "Secret Drug Case Tape Talks of 'Fidel' Payoffs" Associated Press, Associated Press, published 09 March 1988, https://apnews.com/article/0800e600293914df73901e1fe452316b. 156 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 11. 157 González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m2 "It is unclear whether Tony de la Guardia had personally discussed his cocaine-trafficking plans with Castro. The Commandante, with his instinctive revulsion for money matters, seldom got involved in dirty business deals. That was Interior Minister Abrantes's job…De La Guardia's statement to Reinaldo Ruiz may have reflected the colonel's assumption that Abrantes never would have okayed something as hot as a drug operation without Fidel's blessing".158 Also around this time was the federal indictment against Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama who had become an increasing annoyance to the U.S. government. Despite having initially been friendly to the U.S., providing information to the CIA and DEA159, his involvement in substantial drug trafficking and racketeering efforts (in addition to the significant corruption and general abuses of his regime) had made him a liability.160 Among the witnesses who provided information against Noriega was Jose Blandón Castillo, a former key member of Noriega's intelligence service and a "consul general in New York".161 Blandón provided first-hand knowledge of incidences, confirming some of what was already suspected by American officials and investigators on Noriega's activities, but also claimed Fidel Castro mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellín Cartel in the Darién Province of Panama. According to Blandón, he "met with Castro in Havana on June 21 or 22, 1984 [and] Castro recommended that Noriega return the $5 million in protection money and return the plant, personnel, and equipment to the Cartel" and on either June 27th or 28th, "Noriega and Castro met 158 Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 29. 159 Robert L. Jackson, "Noriega Gave DEA Limited Aid for 5 Years, Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, Times Mirror Company, published 16 December 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-16-mn-517-story.html. 160 Philip Shenon, "Noriega Indicted by U.S. For Links to Illegal Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 February 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/06/world/noriega-indicted-by-us-for-links-to-illegal-drugs.html. 161 Stephen Engelberg with Elaine Sciolino, "A U.S. Frame-Up of Nicaragua Charged," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 February 1988, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100160023-3.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m3 directly" and Noriega agreed to go forward with Castro's suggestions, resulting in the release of numerous prisoners.162 While this information was used in indictments against senior Cuban officials and Manuel Noriega, some have found reason to doubt Blandón's claims. John Dinges, a noted investigative journalist and current Professor Emeritus of International Journalism at Columbia University, documented Blandón's claims in his 1991 book Our Man in Panama, stating, "There was no independent corroboration for the story…No other witnesses, including [Floyd Carlton Caceres, Noriega's personal pilot], had any knowledge of the Cuban meeting. If investigators had checked flight records and even press clips in Panama, they might have discovered that Blandón had gotten some basic facts of the Darién incident wrong: the dates for the trip to Cuba were wrong, and the prisoners supposedly released at Castro's urging had been freed more than one month before Blandón and Noriega went to Cuba".163 Richard Gregorie, who met with Blandón, disagrees with Dinges' assertions, saying, "Blandón provided the US government with valid evidence that was corroborated, but Blandón volunteered his cooperation and no one knew his true motivation. He was caught, prior to trial, recording his interviews by agents… The photos and information he provided were valid, but whether this was a lure by some foreign intelligence service or an attempt to sell his story for personal gain made him untrustworthy as a witness".164 Castro was interviewed around this time by Maria Shriver of NBC News and wholeheartedly rejected "José Blandón's charge" while also "[inviting] the Congressional committee [which heard Blandón's claims] to visit Cuba to receive evidence that Blandón was 162 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66. 163 John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega (New York, NY: Random House, 1991), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/232993288. 164 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m4 lying to Congress".165 In this interview, he also "[denied] that the Medellín drug cartel has ever trafficked drugs through Cuba to the United States".166 Despite Castro's invitation to the committee, subcommittee chairman Senator John Kerry approached the Cuban Interests Section in D.C. and requested to visit Cuba on the conditions that "staff [be] permitted to advance the trip and…the Cubans agreed to discuss the drug trafficking problem in general" along with being able to meet Robert Vesco; the trip never materialized as "The Cubans never replied to any of these requests and never made any further arrangements for the visit".167 The concentrated U.S. criminal investigations, Congressional hearings, and federal indictments, the intense media speculation and reporting, along with seeming pressure from the Soviet Union168 forced the Cuban government's hand. On 12 June, 1989, multiple high-ranking members of Cuba's military and intelligence services were arrested. These members included General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez,169 Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia, Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia (twin brother to Patricio), Colonel Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan, Captain Jorge Martinez Valdes, Lieutenant Colonel Alexis Lago Archoa, and Major Amado Padrón Trujillo.170 Also charged were Captain Leonel Estevez-Soto, Captain Antonio Sanchez-Lima, First Lieutenant Jose Luis Pineda-Bermudez, Captain Miguel Ruiz-Poo, Captain Rosa Maria Abierno-Gobin, and Captain Eduardo Diaz-Izquierdo.171 165 Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (New York, NY: Ocean Press, 1992), p. 239, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/944186211. 166 Ibid. 167 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66-67. 168 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, International Narcotics Situation Report (Langley, VA: May 1989), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91M01043R002200150004-9.pdf. 169 Robert Pear, "Cuba Arrests Top General on Corruption Charges," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 16 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/16/world/cuba-arrests-top-general-on-corruption-charges.html?searchResultPosition=8. 170 Robert Pear, "Cuba Seizes 6 More Officers Amid Signs of Big Shakeup," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 17 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/world/cuba-seizes-6-more-officers-amid-signs-of-big-shakeup.html. 171 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 14. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m5 The majority of these persons were members of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and intelligence services, though Estupinan and Martinez were both former aides-de-camp to General Ochoa.172 Save for Archoa and Trujillo, who were not charged with any crime, the other persons were charged with a variety of public corruption crimes, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and treason. As well, though all were arrested rather simultaneously, there were two separate cases going on which involved the drug trade in Cuba. The first involved, "[Antonio "Tony"] de la Guardia, Major Padrón, and six other officers who worked at [the MC Department] … The Cuban government charged that de la Guardia's group arranged for six tons of cocaine to be sent from Colombia through Cuba to the United States in the two years after April 1987, and that they were paid $3.4 million for doing so".173 The second case involved primary Ochoa and his aide-de-camp Martinez (in addition to "several others") in which the Cuban government charged that "[Ochoa] enriched himself in black-market trading, using army resources, when he was stationed in Angola in 1988, and to have neglected his military duties…[stole] $161,000 from Nicaragua's Sandinista army through a failed weapons deal…[and] was said to have conceived of a scheme to send major cocaine shipments to the United States, and for that purpose to have sent Martínez secretly to Medellín, Colombia, in 1988 to meet with Pablo Escobar Gaviria, a magnate of the drug cartel".174 The charges against Ochoa did not allege he was involved in de la Guardia's operations nor ever took part in a drug deal, alleging only he engaged in treason and efforts to gain private funds for either independent military operations or for personal use. 172 Ibid. 173 Julia Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books, NYREV, Inc., published 07 December 1989, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1989/12/07/the-trial-that-shook-cuba/. 174 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m6 The trial (which aired on public television throughout Cuba) began on 25 June, 1989, thirteen days after Ochoa had initially been arrested, with the first hearing beginning on the 26th of June.175 Throughout the course of the trial, numerous witnesses were called who testified in regards to the charges, in some cases admitting culpability and accepting responsibility for individual actions which were illegal while also implicating others such as Ochoa and the de la Guardia brothers in the illegal activities they had been charged with. Both Patricio and Tony de la Guardia and Arnaldo Ochoa admitted their involvements in drug trafficking and treasonous activities, respectively, before the trial had commenced.176 At the trial's conclusion, the prosecutor for the government recommended to the Honor Tribunal, a board of 47 high-ranking Cuban military officers (one of whom was Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, who had been charged with drug trafficking by the U.S. in 1982)177, that "Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, Antonio de la Guardia Font, Jorge Martinez Valdez, Amado Bruno Padron Trujillo, Antonio Sanchez Lima, Alexis Lago Arocha, and Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo [receive] the death penalty…[for] the most serious crimes in this indictment, which are drug trafficking and treason against the fatherland".178 The prosecutor also recommended "30 years imprisonment for defendants Patricio de la Guardia Font and Rosa Maria Abierno Gobin, 25 years imprisonment for defendants Gabriel Prendes Gomez, Leonel Estevez Soto, Miguel Ruiz 175 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 03, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a347578.pdf. 176 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 07, 154, 164. 177 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 44. 178 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 187. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m7 Poo, and Luis M. Pineda Bermudez, and 15 years imprisonment for defendant Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan".179 The Honor Tribunal agreed unanimously on 11 July 1989, with the stripping of ranks coming later on 12 July 1989.180 On 13 July 1989, Ochoa, Tony de la Guardia, Valdez, and Trujillo were all executed by way of firing squad.181 During and following the trial, Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and the Cuban government as a whole was revamped; Diocles Torralba Gonzalez, Cuba's Minister of Transportation "was dismissed [on 14 June 1989] for "improper conduct" – suggesting he may have been engaged in corruption"182 while Cuba's Minister of the Interior, Brigadier General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, "was dismissed [on] June 26" and then arrested on 31 July 1989 alongside "Brig. Gen. Roberto Gonzalez Caso, a former head of immigration; Oscar Carreno Gomez, former customs chief; Lt. Col. Rolando Castaneda Izquiero, and Hector Carbonell Mendez, director of a state-owned company that dealt in foreign currency".183 Five more Brigadier Generals of the Cuban military, presumably aligned with the Ministry of the Interior, were also "demoted to colonel and retired".184 Both Abrantes and Torralba would later receive twenty year prison sentences, with Abrantes dying in 1991 of a heart attack.185 Replacing Abrantes in the MININT was "trusted four-star general Abelardo Colomé Ibarra" who quickly revamped much of MININT's capabilities.186 179 Ibid. 180 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 208-209. 181 Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, p. 01-03. 182 Jim Anderson, "U.S.: High-level shakeup may be under way in Cuba," United Press International, United Press International, published 14 June 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/06/14/US-High-level-shakeup-may-be-under-way-in-Cuba/4954613800000/. 183 Isaac A. Levi, "Five Senior Cuban Officers Arrested in Drug Scandal," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 31 July 1989, https://apnews.com/article/0782d185225919535cf3aa518ed550a9. 184 Ibid. 185 Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 285. 186 Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America, p. 183. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m8 During and after the trial, the charges and convictions were heavily criticized. Some cast doubt on the trial's veracity in regards to having a military officer who had allegations of drug trafficking leveled against him187, while others (Cuban human rights activities, American journalists, and international human rights advocacy and monitoring groups) took offense to the lack of questions asked by the defendants' military appointed prosecutors (in addition to the rather loaded way in which some questions were asked).188 Jaqueline Tillman, a member of the National Security Council, was quoted as saying, "The evidence of Cuban involvement in narcotics trafficking was becoming so abundant that the regime moved to protect Fidel Castro by dissociating him from those activities" while Frank Calzon, a member of the human rights group Freedom House stated that either of the Castros, either Fidel or Raul, "had to approve of this activity, or at least [look] the other way".189 Even civilians of the island nation, according to former diplomat Wayne Smith, were "questioning the official explanation and arguing that there has to be a lot more to this than what is contained in the official announcement".190 Following the trials and into the 1990s, however, Cuba seemingly became more committed to halting drug traffic in Cuba. Fulton Armstrong, a former NIO for Latin America and two-time Director for Inter-American Affairs for the NSC, has stated that "Since Ochoa, collaboration has been good" mentioning that, since 1997, a formal relationship between the United States and Cuba exists, with both the U.S. and Cuba "[identifying] this as a matter of 187 Richard Cole, "Admiral's Role Calls Cuba Drug Crackdown Into Question," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 29 June 1989, https://apnews.com/article/9ef279d0c5de07e958d53e9c1a7bea5b. 188 Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books. 189 Robert Pear, "Cuba Discloses A Drug Network Of Top Officials," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 24 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/24/world/cuba-discloses-a-drug-network-of-top-officials.html. 190 Larry Rohter, "Castro Is Anxious About His Military," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 25 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/weekinreview/the-world-castro-is-anxious-about-his-military.html?searchResultPosition=10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m9 national interest".191 Pierre Charette, the ASAC for the DEA's Caribbean division during the late-1980s, identified that into the early-1990s, cooperation with the Cuban government has been "fantastic [with] drug trafficking through go-fast boats dropping significantly" and that this productive relationship remains in place today.192 In 1991, the U.S. Customs Service detailed to Frontline that "[drug, arms, and other illicit] trafficking had declined since the trial, but…not stopped".193 The DEA's Administrator194 and Chief of International Operations195, in 1996 and 1999 respectively, both testified before Congress that, despite large profile cases in the media, the Cuban government itself nor senior officials were not involved in drug trafficking. Also in 1996, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "recognized cuban[sic] counter-drugs efforts, stating that the cuban[sic] government was giving anti-narcotics policies higher public profile in the face of growing narcotics transshipments and consumption".196 General Barry McCaffrey, who served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and was President Clinton's Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ODNCP) from 1994 to 2001, recalled in 2015 "Cuba's a police state, and I don't believe the Cuban government wants to be a hub for drug smugglers. They saw it as a 191 Fulton Armstrong (retired National Intelligence Officer for Latin America with NSC) in discussion with the author, 13 January 2021. 192 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 193 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 194 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Statement by: Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 104th Cong., 06 June 1996, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/h960606c.htm. 195 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Statement by: William E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, 106th Cong., 17 November 1999, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/ct111799.htm. 196 Isabella Bellezza-Smull, "Will Cuba Update its Drug Policy for the Twenty First Century?," Igarapé Institute, Igarapé Institute, published 29 December 2017, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/08-11-2017-NE-29-Cuba-Drog-Policy.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m0 threat to their children, the workforce, their economy, their government" while noting that though cooperation was imperfect, there was constant communication with the Cubans throughout his time in terms of combating drug trafficking.197 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros The involvement on the part of Fidel and Raul Castro in the drug trade is something that has long been debated and speculated. Since the 1960s, individual criminal investigations, U.S. federal government memorandums, Cuban intelligence defectors, convicted criminals, and congressional hearings have included testimony that has tried to implicate Fidel, Raul, or both Castros in the drug trade. With the 1989 trials, these speculations have increased and, in some cases, due to the handling of the trials, been given more credence. At least two U.S. Congressional hearings have been conducted since 1989, both of which focused on continuing drug traffic in Cuba.198 199 Into the 1990s, more evidence of possible involvement by the Castro regime was revealed. First were the allegations of Carlos Ledher, an experienced drug trafficker and pilot and co-founder of the Medellín Cartel.200 Ledher, upon his arrest and extradition in 1987, was "convicted…on charges of conspiracy and running a criminal enterprise as well as other charges related to the importation and sale of cocaine" in May of 1988.201 Due to this, Ledher began 197 Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, "In fight against drugs, Cuba and U.S. on same team," The Washington Post, Nash Holdings, LLC., published 05 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-fight-against-drugs-cuba-and-us-on-same-team/2015/01/05/6416305a-90fc-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html. 198 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Cuba's Link to Drug Trafficking, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 November 1999, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2027. 199 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean: Do Traffickers Use Cuba and Puerto Rico As Major Transit Locations For State-Bound Narcotics?, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3-4 January 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg69521/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg69521.pdf. 200 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 45, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/45086854. 201 Patricia Bauer, "Carlos Ledher," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 18 June 2018, updated 03 September 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Carlos-Lehder. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m1 cooperating with the U.S. government for a lesser sentence. In federal testimony during the Noriega trial, Ledher claimed "that Castro mediated a bitter 1984 dispute between Noriega and Colombia's Medellin cartel that saved Panama's strongman from probable assassination…and bribed Cuban government officials to ship tons of cocaine into the United States".202 Lieutenant Colonel Luis del Cid, a close aide to Manuel Noriega, alleged during Noriega's trial that he "accompanied Noriega on a flight to Cuba and met Castro following the raid [in which Panamanian troops raided a cocaine lab in Darién province Colombia]" though specified he did not attend the meeting in question.203 While both Ledher and del Cid's testimonies seem to corroborate what Blandón had previously testified in regards to Castro's connections to Noriega and the Medellín Cartel, it must be noted that both del Cid and Ledher testified in exchange for reductions in their sentences (which numbered into the hundreds of years for each of them) and also could easily have become aware of Blandón's testimony in any of the three years prior to their providing evidence to the U.S. government. Two former officials who defected from Cuba two years before the trials, Oscar Valdes from the Ministry of Trade and Manuel de Beunza from the Ministry of the Interior, offered their insights on the trial, claiming the trials were for "show" and were more politically motivated as Castro desired to remove opponents whom he saw as a threat to his power.204 This allegation that the drug trials were a show trial meant to snub out political opponents of Castro's hold on Cuba has become a very prominent. 202 Robert L. Jackson, "Cartel Leader Reveals Secrets of Drug World," The Los Angeles Times, Time Mirror Company, published 21 November 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-11-21-mn-404-story.html. 203 Richard Cole, "Former Aide Tells of Drug Cash, Castro, and Prostitutes," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 24 September 1991, https://apnews.com/article/0b7fcac1c0842630af2d1cc758ab1acd. 204 Jim Anderson, "Defectors: Cuba trials about politics, not drugs," United Press International, United Press International, published 27 July 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/07/27/Defectors-Cuba-trial-about-politics-not-drugs/2648617515200/?spt=su. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m2 Other defectors, including those from the DGI who defected, also voiced their views on the trial. Jorge Masetti, a DGI officer and Tony de la Guardia's son-in-law who defected from Cuba in 1990, claimed in an interview, "If this operation really existed, it could only have existed if Fidel and Raúl Castro knew about it. They made these accusations, which were supposed to make the case against Ochoa. Arnaldo Ochoa was never proven to have smuggled drugs. The direct evidence does not exist, but they accused Ochoa, and why? Because Fidel wanted to send a message to all the officials with high authority".205 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, a seemingly credible defector206 from Cuba's MININT who was the personal bodyguard to Castro for seventeen years, wrote in his book The Double Life of Fidel Castro that Castro had knowledge of subordinates' involvement in the drug trade and sanctioned it. Sánchez recalls overhearing a conversation in 1988 between Minister of the Interior Jose Abrantes and Castro in "centered on a Cuban [drug trafficker] living in the United States" who wanted to travel to Cuba to visit his parents; Castro approved the trip along with allowing the trafficker to, as a cover, say he was a Cuban intelligence operative while also requesting that Tony de la Guardia handle "the logistics of the trip".207 This conversation, while innocuous, seems to indicate that Castro did maintain a friendly relationship with some drug traffickers, yet reveals no legitimate information of Castro's involvement in the drug trade. Into the 1990s, working off the indictments against the Ruiz Family in 1988 and the 1992 Noriega trial, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida began investigating senior level members of the Cuban government. In 1993, the USAO-SDFL "drafted a [proposed 205 The Cuba Libre Story, season 1, episode 7, "Secrets and Sacrifices," directed by Emmanuel Amara, Kai Christiansen, & Florian Dedio, aired 11 December 2015, https://www.netflix.com/title/80109535. 206 Edward A. Lynch, "All Socialists Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal Than Others," Military Review (November-December 2019), p. 124, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-19/ND-19-Book-B.pdf. 207 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez with Axel Gyldén, The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Líder Máximo (New York, NY: St. Martin's Griffin, 2015), p. 230. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m3 indictment that] would have charged Raul Castro and 14 other top Cuban officials [including Manuel Piñeiro, head of the Departamento América] with conspiracy and racketeering for allegedly providing safe passage for Medellin cartel cocaine loads, including permission to fly over Cuba and use its waters".208 Among others allegedly involved in this large enterprise was Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, the Minister of the Interior who replaced Jose
Introduction -- Part I. Historical Perspectives -- Vertebrates of Upper Mesopotamia: Present Evidence and Archaeological Data -- Fishing Gears and Methods: A Comparison of Ancient Mesopotamia and Other Ancient Worlds -- Ichthyological Characteristics Available in the Fish Images Existed in the Art of the Ancient Mesopotamia -- The Effectiveness of Ancient Mesopotamian Medical Practices: The Example of šūšu-Licorice -- Part II. The Abiotic Aspects of the Tigris–Euphrates River System -- Management of Water Resources Using Storage Reservoirs -- Estimation of Irrigated Agricultural Area and Water Consumption in Iraq -- The Nature of Tigris–Euphrates Rivers Flow: Current Status and Future Prospective -- Streamflow Alteration Impacts with Particular Reference to the Lower Zab River, Tributary of the Tigris River -- Ecohydrology in Iraq: Challenges and its Future Pathways -- Oil Pollution in the Shatt Al-Arab River and its Estuary 1980–2018 -- Pesticides in the Waters, Sediments, and Biota of the Shatt Al-Arab River for the Period 1980–2017 -- Surface Water Salinity of the Euphrates, Tigris, and Shatt al-Arab Rivers -- Renewable Energy for Water–Energy Nexus in Euphrates and Tigris River Basin: A Literature Review -- Impacts of Dams on Aquatic Biodiversity, Fisheries, Fishes and Their Environment: Problems that Could Be Present in Iraq with Recommendations -- Water, Politics and Dams in the Mesopotamia Basin of the Northern Middle East: How Turkey Instrumentalises the South-Eastern Anatolia Project for Political, Military and Strategic Interests -- Dams and their Impacts on Fishes in Iran -- Part III. The Biotic Aspects of the Tigris–Euphrates River System -- Preliminary Review of the Aquatic Biodiversity in Al-Kahla River, Missan Province, Iraq -- Freshwater Fish Biodiversity in Iraq: Importance, Threats, Status, and Conservation Challenges -- Effect of Climate Changes on the Freshwater Biodiversity in the Mesopotamian Plain: Recommendations for Avoidance and Plans for the Future -- River Corridors as a Refuge for Freshwater Biodiversity: Basic Information and Recommendations to the Policymakers for Possible Implications in Iraq -- Biodiversity of Fungi in Aquatic Environment of Iraq -- Potability of Drinking Water in Basra-Iraq -- Algal Studies in Iraqi Inland Waters. A Review -- The Distribution of Epilitic Diatoms in the Turkish Part of the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin -- Plant Biodiversity in Shatt Al-Arab Estuary and Ecological Variations -- Medicinal Plants of Shatt al-Arab River and Adjacent Area -- The Role of Plants as a Canopy in the Inland Waters: Basic Information for Application in Iraq -- The Zooplankton Fauna of the Turkish Part of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin -- Kinds and Distribution of Icthyoplankton in Shatt Al-Arab River -- Rotifer Diversity in Iranian Waters: A Review -- Biodiversity of the Freshwater Amphipods in Iran -- The Freshwater Molluscs of the Mesopotamian Plain -- Freshwater Annelida of Iraq -- A Critical Checklist of the Inland Fishes Native to the Euphrates and Tigris Drainages -- Fish Fauna of Shatt al-Arab River, Basrah, Iraq: A More than Quarter a Century of Changes -- The Common Carp, Cyprinus carpio: Effect on the Environment and the Indigenous Fish Species in Iraq -- The Good and the Bad in Releasing the Grass Carp Ctenopharyngodon idella in the Freshwater System: Recommendations for the Policymakers in Iraq -- The Avifauna of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin -- The Feasible Approaches to Assist Migratory Birds Visiting the Southern Reaches of Mesopotamia -- A Proposal for Establishing Bird Observatory Centre in the South of Iraq -- The Potential Role of Waterbirds as a Vector in Dispersing Invertebrates and Plants in the South of Iraq -- The Wild Mammals of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers Basin -- The Amphibians and Reptiles of Euphrates and Tigris Basin -- A Preliminary Pictorial Guide to the Herpetofauna of Tigris and Euphrates River Basin -- Policy Guidance for Sustainable Aquaculture in the Inland Waters of Iraq -- How Possible to Use the Desert Area in Iraq for Aquaculture Industry: Basic Facts and Recommondations -- Aquaculture Industry in Iraq: Past, Present, and Future Perspectives -- Towards an Improved Tilapia Farming in Iraq: Recommendations for Future Application -- Information and Recommendations of Aquaculture Stress and its Source in Hatcheries: The Iraqi Aquaculture Industry Investors -- Exotic and Invasive Freshwater Fishes in the Tigris-Euphrates River System -- Part IV. Water Resources -- The Ecology and Modelling of the Freshwater Ecosystems in Iran -- Enhancing Rural Women's Participation in Fisheries in Iraq -- The Impact of Destructive Fishing Gear on the Fish Biodiversity in the Inland Waters of Iraq -- Evaluating Variations in Fisheries by Means of Fishers' Information: Suggested Methodology to Improve Small-Scale Fisheries in Rivers in Iraq -- A Possibility to Apply a Traditional Fisheries Enforcement Programme in the Inland Waters of Iraq -- Market-Resource Relations and Fish Seller Livelihood as Seen in Inland Waters of Iraq -- The Potential Impact of Deformities in Fishes upon Aquatic Production: Case of Iraq -- The Impact of some Social Taboos on Fisheries in Iraq -- Inland Water Fishes and Fisheries in Iran -- The Possibility of Introducing an Inland Fisheries Education in Iraq -- The Marine and Diadromous Fisheries of Iraq -- Part V. Stress of the Environment of the Two Rivers -- Fish Deformities in the Freshwater Fishes of Iraq: A Short Review and a Study Case on the Indian Catfish Heteropneustes fossilis -- The Phenomenon of Fluctuating Asymmetry: As Fish Welfare Indicator Represented by Case Study from the Freshwater Fishes of Iraq -- The Studies on Sediments Pollution by Different Types of Metals in Turkey -- Macroplastic and Microplastic in the Freshwater Environment of Southern Iraq: Evidences Obtained from Freshwater Fish Species -- Heavy Metals in Freshwater Invertebrates of Iran: A Review on the Bioaccumulation and Effects -- Fish Parasites of Tigris and Euphrates River Systems -- The Parasites of Fishes of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers: Iraq and Turkey -- Ornamental Fishes: A Looming Danger for Inland Fish Diversity of Iraq -- Part VI. The Health of the Human Community Inhabiting Freshwater Zones -- Aquatic Snails as a Vector of Diseases to the Human in Iran -- Death by Drowning in Rivers in Iraq -- The Dangerous Catfish Species in the Freshwater System of Iraq: First Time Reports on Cases of Envenomation -- Fish Species of the Order Cypriniformes as a Source of Ichthyootoxin and Ichthyogallotoxin in Iraq: Cases Reports -- First Reports on Cases of Hallucinatory Fish Poisoning (Ichthyoallyeinotoxism) and Scombrotoxic Fish Poisoning in Iraq -- Part. VII. Conservation -- Freshwater Management and Conservation in Iran: Past, Present, and Future -- The Need of Biodiversity Conservation Strategies in Iraq: The State of Protected Areas -- Benthic Macroinvertebrates of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in Turkey -- Freshwater Ecosystem Conservation in Iraq: Recommendations for Management -- Utilising Phenotypic Difference to Regulate Protection Value: A Scheme for Application of a Novel Approach to the Inland Water of Iraq -- Hatchery-Reared Fish Stocks Released into the Wild: A Conservation Problem as Seen in a Case Study from Iraq -- Part VIII. Social Perspectives -- Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full? An Appraisal of the Four Decades of Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) -- Part IX. Food Security -- How Possible to Build Rice–Fish Farming in Iraq in order to Support Food Security Plan: Positive and the Negative Aspects -- The Importance of Non-commercial and Small-Sized Fish Species: A Proposal for an Additional Revenue to Iraq -- Sociocultural Aspects Influence Food Consumption Habits in Iraq: Management of Food Security -- A Preliminary Investigation of Determinants of Food Security in Rural Areas of Basrah Province, Iraq.
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Tomorrow night, we settle in for a much anticipated show-down between President Joe Biden and former President Trump. Foreign policy rarely plays a huge role in presidential debates, but with two live conflicts (Ukraine and Middle East) and escalating tensions with China, the Quincy Institute has anticipated questions that could be asked on the key issues of the day and offered these suggestions on how the candidates should respond tonight. How long should the U.S. continue to send aid to Ukraine?Battlefield conditions have turned against Ukraine recently, as Russia has made its first territorial gains since early in the war. Despite its advantages in manpower and military, Russia has shown little capacity for conquering, let alone governing, the vast majority of Ukrainian territory. The Biden administration has pushed for sending aid to Ukraine, and continues to say that it will do "'nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine." At the same time, Biden has maintained that the U.S. will not get directly involved in a war with Russia.However, as conditions have gotten increasingly more dire on the Ukrainian frontlines, leadership in Kyiv has urged Washington and its other Western allies to grow their involvement in the conflict. If Ukraine's partners go down that path, it could invite a more aggressive response from Russia and perhaps nuclear escalation.To avoid such an outcome, Washington should push Kyiv to pursue a negotiated settlement. Continuing U.S. aid is critical to provide Ukraine with leverage at the negotiating table. "U.S. aid to Ukraine should continue as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to orchestrate a negotiated settlement of the war," says George Beebe, director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute. "Absent a negotiating strategy, continued aid will only prolong Ukraine's suffering, deepen its destruction, and increase the chances the United States and Russia stumble into a direct military confrontation."Already the war has had a destructive impact on Ukraine. Its economy has cratered, and Ukraine is now thoroughly dependent on Western assistance to sustain it. The country has suffered a massive population decline. And the longer the war continues, the more strained Ukrainian democracy and civil rights will likely become.The Middle East: Is a defense pact with Saudi Arabia in the U.S. interest? In the midst of Israel's war on Gaza, which has now killed more than 37,000 Palestinians, including at least 15,000 children, the Biden administration has gone full steam ahead in its pursuit of a defense pact with Saudi Arabia that it views as the pathway to peace between Israel and Palestine and the broader Middle East. The looming agreement would offer Riyadh a security guarantee in exchange for the normalization of relations with Israel.Such an agreement could exacerbate regional tensions and introduce more arms, potentially including nuclear weapons, into the Middle East. Washington would be further implicated in a Saudi Arabian foreign policy that has proven reckless without gaining much in return."It is not in U.S. interests to extend a security guarantee to Saudi Arabia, which could potentially require the US to send American troops to fight and die to defend the House of Saud," Annelle Sheline, Middle East research fellow at the Quincy Institute, told RS. "The U.S. is no longer dependent on Saudi oil and therefore should reduce its military commitments to the Kingdom, not super-size them."In addition to risking American lives, a defense commitment for Riyadh would further tie Washington to a regime that has a concerning human rights record, carried out a war on Yemen that killed nearly 400,000 Yemenis, and who recent court documents show were complicit in the 9/11 attacks.Biden ran pledging to turn Saudi Arabia into a "pariah," but quickly reversed course and has made the potential defense pact a top foreign policy priority. Trump, for his part, also cultivated close ties with Riyadh, launching the first normalization agreements under the Abraham Accords, between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain during his presidency. How do we compete with China and avoid conflict?Both the Biden and Trump administrations pinpointed China as their primary national security threat and foreign policy priority. Though tensions have not yet bubbled over into outright conflict, the Biden administration has largely followed his predecessor's lead with aggressive rhetoric and economic policies."U.S.–China relations have been quiet recently, but dangerous pressures are building under the surface. If we stay the present course, we're likely to see major conflict in the next presidential term, no matter who wins in November," Jake Werner, acting director of the East Asia Program at the Quincy Institute, told RS. "To change U.S.–China competition from toxic to healthy, we need fewer provocations on both sides, particularly on the most sensitive issue, Taiwan. Even as we implement prudent safeguards, America should stop trying to exclude China from important markets, technologies, and the life of our country."An escalation of conflict with China could have devastating consequences for the United States. Estimates suggest that a war over Taiwan cost the worldeconomy $10 trillion — around 10% of global GDP, and the U.S. and its regional allies would likely lose thousands of service members, dozens of ships, and hundreds of aircraft. One war game concluded that in the first three weeks of war, the United States would suffer roughly half as many casualties as it did in 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan."We need to recognize that the US and China share interests on the most important issues to regular Americans, including climate change, public health, peaceful world politics, and expanding opportunity in the global economy," says Werner. "If each side stops regarding the other as an inevitable enemy, we could begin serious talks on the reforms that would make space for both countries to thrive."Are we spending enough on our military?The U.S. Congress is currently debating a military budget of nearly $900 billion, and some experts say that the real number has already surpassed $1 trillion. Some prominent Senators want the budget to grow even more, citing the threats posed by China and Russia as the reason. But Washington spends more than the next ten countries combined. And that total is far higher than is required to keep Americans safe. "We can mount a robust defense of America and its allies for far less than we are spending now if we adopt a less interventionist posture and take a more realistic view of the challenge posed by China," Bill Hartung, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute, tells RS. Neither Trump nor Biden has shown much appetite for cutting the Pentagon budget, but pursuing a strategy could allow the next president to put diplomatic, economic, and cultural engagement, as opposed to militarism, at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. Pursuing such a strategy might push allies to stop free-riding on U.S. military largesse and begin to invest in their own defense and would free up funds that could be invested back into the urgent challenges facing Americans at home.
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Why did Europe go to war in 1914? How did the Cold War end? Will the U.S. and China go to war over Taiwan? Imagine a grand chessboard stretching across the globe, where great powers with vast resources strategize and maneuver their pieces. In this high-stakes game of survival, each move reflects a nation's pursuit of security, wealth, prestige and influence. Every nation must navigate the wide and intricate web of alliances and trade, rivalries, and war. The great powers must vigilantly track all the pieces on the board and anticipate many moves ahead. Every move — a trade agreement, military deployment, or diplomatic negotiation — can have far-reaching and unintended consequences. It can either strengthen bonds of cooperation or push nations closer to conflict.Dale Copeland, professor of international relations at the University of Virginia, has authored two magisterial books on great power hostilities, which can serve as essential guides to this most dangerous and complex game. His 2014 Opus Magnum "Economic Interdependence and War" offers in-depth analyses of all the great power wars from the Napoleonic Wars to the end of the Cold War. His latest book, "A World Safe for Commerce" takes a comprehensive examination of U.S. foreign policy from the Revolution to China's rise. Both books present an impressive variety of evidence in favor of Copeland's unique theoretical perspective, which he calls "dynamic realism."According to Copeland, dynamic realism synthesizes the greatest strengths of offensive and defensive realism by recognizing "how states grapple with the tension presented by needing to reduce simultaneously the risk of spirals of misunderstanding and the risk of not doing enough to build the nation's power sphere."Copeland concurs with offensive realists that "rational security-maximizing states may need to expand to hedge against future threats." But he just as strongly agrees with defensive realists that "if this expansionism ends up creating those future threats, then it may be self-defeating." States constantly need to assess "the likelihood of the other being nasty rather than nice."Copeland's second key distinction from other schools of realism is his emphasis on the significance of economic relations. He argues that the complex economies of great powers are deeply dependent on vital foreign markets, trade routes and raw materials. Their leaders view access to critical strategic commercial networks as a security necessity. If they anticipate positive trade relations with another nation will continue, they strengthen ties of peaceful cooperation. However, if they fear losing access to crucial markets, they adopt hardline policies that often lead to war. "This tension between needing to expand one's economic sphere of influence and wanting to avoid an escalatory spiral that might restrict access to vital markets is baked into the DNA of modern great power politics," he says."Economic Interdependence and War" convincingly demonstrates that dynamic realism surpasses all other theories of international relations in explanatory power. Copeland shows that "in thirty of the forty case periods, economic interdependence played a moderate to strong causal role." Trade expectations often mattered when we least expected it. Japan tried hard to make peace with the U.S. until 1941, when the U.S. embargo pushed its leaders into a desperate attempt to secure the nation's survival through conquest and war. Pessimistic trade expectations also exacerbated German fears of encirclement, which partially explain both world wars.Copeland explores how regime type, interest groups and psychology shape great power dynamics, despite his conviction that domestic factors rarely serve as the primary cause of war. Ideological divides sparked the French revolutionary wars and intensified the Cold War. Nationalism drove the German and Italian wars of unification.Copeland discusses statistical studies indicating that democracies are less likely to engage in conflict with one another only if both are developed nations. He suggests that developed nations are better positioned to cultivate strong trade ties. This perspective overlooks a crucial explanation highlighted by Jack Levy and William Thompson in their fact-filled book "The Arc of War" — developed states increase both the costs of war and the benefits of trade for every other nation. As a result, developed nations are highly motivated to avoid conflict with each other. Although highly developed democracies and autocracies have frequently waged asymmetric wars against weaker opponents, the absence of war between them since 1945 offers hope that a stable peace among major powers is achievable."A World Safe for Commerce" is an engaging history of U.S. foreign policy that uncovers how the motives of American leaders were frequently less benign than most Americans think: "Even if they cloak their policies in the warm and fuzzy language of liberalism and freedom, and occasionally find themselves trapped by it, they are careful calculators of national security through the lens of commercial power."Copeland recounts that Britain's harsh mercantilist restrictions pushed the American revolutionaries into their war for independence. The ideology of liberty only gained momentum when the first shots were fired. The Wars of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War and numerous interventions in Latin America and Asia were all fought to safeguard and expand the U.S. sphere of economic interests.The U.S. came close to war with Britain in 1916, but ultimately declared war on Germany when it became the greater threat to U.S. trade with Europe and Latin America. The massive expansion of U.S. power during World War II was primarily driven by the imperative to ensure access to global markets in order to counter the threat of Axis dominance over Eurasia. The U.S. economic containment policy against the Soviet Union initiated the Cold War, while the lifting of U.S. sanctions played a crucial role in facilitating Gorbachev's efforts to bring about its end. Trade expectations and classic geopolitics also explain the wars in Korea and Vietnam.Copeland outlines why China's Belt and Road Initiative and military buildup could be interpreted as either aggressive moves or the predictable actions of a rising power seeking security and resources. He emphasizes the need for the U.S. to better understand the forces driving China's behavior to craft "a balanced policy that both signals resolve and avoids creating spirals of hostility." He argues that an all-out economic containment strategy and interference in China's domestic policies could push China toward military conflict over disputed regions like Taiwan and the South China Sea.In his view maintaining open trade and diplomacy can build trust and reduce fears of economic decline. He advises the U.S. to project military strength in East Asia to deter Chinese expansion, while reassuring China that economic engagement will continue as long as it avoids aggression.The vivid historical case studies in both volumes are packed with surprising insights into the root causes of the largest wars in modern history, challenging the conventional wisdom. Copeland's pioneering work serves as a dire warning that any "downward spiral in commercial and political relations" can lead us straight to catastrophe. Indeed, wise leaders must play a grand chess game for peace.
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With the European Parliament elections already in full swing in some of the European Union's 27 member states, the consensus among EU watchers is that the populist right is poised to make sweeping gains in the pan-European legislature. Some alarmed mainstream commenters warn of a "Trumpian moment" in Europe.It is true that parties broadly fitting in the populist right/national-conservative camp have been going from strength to strength in the EU. Today, they are either leading, are part of ruling coalitions, or offer crucial parliamentary backing in Italy, Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Croatia, and the Czech Republic, with the Netherlands soon to join the club following the electoral victory of Geert Wilders's party. If the populist right wins in Austria later this year, as the polls predict, and manages to form a government, then roughly one third of EU countries will be governed by right-wing populists. For a full picture, in France, the National Rally party is polling around 30% for the European Parliament, far ahead of the liberal President Emmanuel Macron's party, which is stuck at just 15%. And in Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is polling second to the center-right Christian-Democratic Union, ahead of all three ruling coalition parties — center-left social-democrats, Greens, and center-right liberals. In Poland, the Law and Order party, though no longer in government, is still a potent force. Since the European elections are, in effect, a sum of 27 national elections, it is entirely expectable that they will mirror these trends and see a further rise of the populist right. Yet hyperbolic comparisons with the Trumpian phenomenon obscure far more than they enlighten. Two reasons stand out.First, even the most optimistic (or alarming, according to one's perspective) projections do not predict that any of the existing populist right groups in the European Parliament will earn a plurality of the seats in the new assembly. There are currently two such groups: European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID). The polls predict that the more successful of them – ECR – could garner around 86 seats in a 720-member strong assembly (that is an increase from the current 66 seats). ID is expected to win 67 seats (up from the current 49), and that excludes the German AfD, which could bring another 20 but was recently expelled from the ID over its lead member's pro-Nazi comments. Still, both ECR and ID are very far from challenging the center-right European People's Party (EPP) which is widely expected to win the elections with 172 MEPs, as well as center-left Socialists&Democrats (S&D), which is slated to get around 137 seats.Second, the comparisons with Trump do not stand because there is no European equivalent of the Republican Party, and the right populist parties come in many shades and forms. The closest thing the EU has to the Republican party on the pan-European level is the EPP, itself a big tent that uneasily holds together centrist German and Benelux Christian-democrats, French Gaullists, Spanish post-Francoists, Nordic market liberals, and eastern European and Balkan ethnic nationalists. Since a Trump-style takeover of the EPP is impossible, for the populist right to fundamentally reshape European politics, it needs to establish a firm alliance with the EPP while forging its own internal cohesion. That is a tall order. While all parties on the populist right, and increasingly many within the EPP, share restrictive stances on immigration (particularly from Muslim countries), climate action skepticism, and social conservatism of varying degrees, there is a crucial divide on the war in Ukraine. All the EPP parties are solidly pro-Ukraine. So are the leading forces in the ECR — Italian Prime-Minister Giorgia Meloni and the Polish Law and Order. ID, by contrast, offers a more mixed picture: While the Italian Lega, Meloni's coalition partner, generally toes the line on Ukraine, other heavy hitters, such as the French Marine Le Pen, and, before its expulsion, the German AfD, have been seen as far more reluctant to back Kyiv. Add to that one of Europe's chief Ukraine skeptics, the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban and his Fidesz party, currently without an affiliation in the European Parliament. Leaders like Orban and Le Pen consistently call for a consolidation of the populist right into a single powerful bloc and court the ECR's Meloni and the Poles to that end, but Ukraine remains a powerful deal-breaker. To find a way around it, however, it is the Ukraine skeptics who will more likely have to come around to adopt the mainstream EU line. The Dutch Wilders, whose party sits with Le Pen's ID in the European Parliament, used to be a staunch opponent of military aid to Ukraine, but as soon as he got a shot to form a government in the Netherlands, he shed his previous misgivings and pledged both support for Ukraine and increased defense spending to reach NATO's 2% of GDP target. Le Pen, in what one observer called the "process of Melonisation," is similarly working to overcome her pro-Kremlin image and now offers full-throated support for Ukraine. Orban, of course, remains something of an outlier, but despite punching above his weight, he represents a relatively small Central European country and is dependent on EU cash handouts. Herein lies another key difference with the "Trumpian moment": Whereas in the U.S. the rise of the populist right has led to an emergence of a strong pro-foreign policy restraint camp within the Republican party, the European populist right is more likely to follow the opposite path by accepting the mainstream orthodoxies on foreign policy as a ticket to acceptance and power.That may yet prove to be an Achilles heel for the populist right. While Europe has shown consistent solidarity with Ukraine and resilience in the sanctions war with Russia, there are signs of growing war fatigue. This hasn't translated into demands to abandon Ukraine and appease Russia, but rather an expectation of some sort of a negotiated settlement to the war. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations' EU-wide poll, 41% of Europeans hold the view that the EU should push Ukraine towards negotiating a peace deal with Russia, while 31% say the EU should support Ukraine in taking back the territories occupied by Russia.By failing to articulate the preferences of that 41%, the populist right is leaving the field wide open for competitors from its own camp, as well as forces on the far left. The latter, according to the polls, may not reach even 40 MEPs and won't win any votes in the European Parliament on an anti-war platform, but they could use their presence in the assembly strategically to channel the voice of those Europeans who do not feel represented by the current mainstream on questions of war and peace.
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Kenyan troops are expected to touch down in Port-au-Prince today, marking the start of a much-anticipated peacekeeping mission. Their arrival coincides with that of Kenyan President Willian Ruto in Washington, whose official state visit to the U.S., meant to strengthen bilateral ties between the U.S. and Kenya, continues today. The deployment of Kenyan troops aims to alleviate the escalating crisis that has gripped Haiti since the assassination of former President Jovenel Moïse in 2023. In the wake of Moïse's death, gangs have thrived in the ensuing political power vacuum, prompting acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry to resign in April and agree to the establishment of a transitional government brokered by foreign states, including the U.S.But with a fragile government established only a few weeks ago and no clear plan for the military operation, doubts linger about how effective the Kenyan force can be in addressing the dire situation. Analysts fear that this is yet another U.S.-backed mission that fails to address the need for deeper structural change in Haiti.While it may be Kenyan troops on the ground in Haiti, this mission is ultimately engineered by the U.S., Robert Fatton Jr., a professor at the University of Virginia, told RS. After all, it was the U.S. that co-sponsored a resolution in the United Nations Security Council requesting approval for Kenya to lead a multinational peacekeeping operation, a move that followed unsuccessful attempts to persuade Canada and Brazil to do so. Washington pledged its financial and logistical support for the mission in a defense agreement with Kenya signed in September 2023. It was then that Kenya committed to deploying 1,000 troops to Port-au-Prince. The mission is also expected to include about 1,500 soldiers and police officers from other countries, bringing the total size of the prospective intervention force to 2,500.This is an unprecedented model for a peacekeeping operation, says Jake Johnston of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. The U.N. is authorizing the multinational intervention but is not leading the mission itself, meaning the U.N. does not have direct oversight and responsibility for how the mission unfolds. With Haiti's transitional government still on shaky ground, it's not clear who will be held accountable for the mission's execution. The accord that outlines Haiti's transitional presidential council mandates that a national security council is formed to oversee and define how international support will be carried out, including the Kenyan troops' involvement. But this council still doesn't exist, meaning the outgoing government and the depleted Haitian police force are stuck managing how resources come into Haiti. "This is all a logistical coordination nightmare," Johnston says. "You have a mission ostensibly designed to support and build local capacity, but which is being done without the involvement of the government that those same international actors helped put in power."Potential shortcomings of the mission don't end there. The Kenyan troops are supposedly tasked to protect strategic sites in Port-au-Prince such as airports, the palace, and ministries. But it is unclear whether the forces are authorized to engage directly in combat, as well as if or how they will be integrated with the Haitian police force and military. Johnston says this is concerning given that these forces will be operating in densely-populated civilian areas. Fatton Jr. says the Kenyan forces will also face significant challenges when on the ground in Haiti. It is estimated that there are approximately 200 armed gangs operating in Haiti. Most of them are concentrated in Port-au-Prince, where 2 major coalitions have been fighting for control for years. Fatton Jr. says they are knowledgeable about the terrain, engaging in guerilla urban warfare that will be challenging for a stationary army to face up to. The gangs have also acquired a higher degree of autonomy that makes them harder than ever to control. They have built up streams of income to fund their activity through drug and weapons trafficking, as well as the capacity to "tax" people by using extortion and threatening punishment. The ensuing chaos and violence has caused hundreds of thousands to flee. The Kenyan forces will also be met with a language barrier, as they do not speak Haitian Creole, the most widely spoken language in Haiti, a fact that could badly undermine any attempts to communicate with gang leaders. The size of Kenya's force further casts doubt on its potential effectiveness. It is expected that only a few soldiers will arrive at first, and that number could eventually climb to 1,000. "I don't see how you can really re-impose a modicum of order in Haiti with 1,000 troops," Fatton Jr. said. This slapdash approach makes it clear that the timing of the mission has less to do with the situation in Haiti and more to do with Washington politics, Johnston says, as the U.S. and Kenya's collaboration on this mission is touted as a success for the U.S.-Kenya security cooperation. "This is about a symbolic victory for a high profile meeting," Johnston said. "If you were actually proceeding with a more reasonable approach to Haiti, you'd be coordinating with some entity on the ground."For all these reasons, experts argue that this military intervention is a short-sighted remedy to the broader crisis in Haiti. The current emergency is a result of deeply-entrenched inequality in Haitian society, an economic crisis, and an unaccountable government. Military interventions may quell violence for a limited time, but will do little to address its underlying causes. "We've seen this pattern repeat over and over and over again, whether it be through paramilitary groups locally, or foreign intervention. But ultimately, it is going to just allow this inherently unsustainable system to continue in place," Johnston said.Past foreign interventions in Haiti have been complete failures, as Fatton Jr. noted. Most notable is the U.N.-led MINUSTAH mission that lasted from 2004 — when President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown after being flown out of Haiti by the U.S. with assistance from Canada — until 2017. The mission not only brought a deadly cholera outbreak to Haiti, but failed to establish any institutionalized justice systems or prevent the re-emergence of gangs. The severity of Haiti's security crisis today may mean there is a role for the Kenyan military to play, though, Fatton Jr. says. As thousands of Haitians are killed and displaced by the violence, everyone wants to see something change. But the troops will need to be very effective once they arrive, he says, an outcome that is all the more difficult to picture given how unclear plans for the mission's are. "There's a very small window of opportunity for the Kenyans, to show that they can, in fact, re-establish a modicum of order," Fatton Jr. said. "If they can do that, then we'll see what happens."Editor's note, May 24 at 9:45 a.m.: This piece has been updated to reflect the total number of soldiers expected to participate in the U.N. authorized peacekeeping mission.
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Pyotr Tolochko, the pre-eminent historian and archeologist of Kievan Rus, passed away quietly in Kyiv, Ukraine, late last month at the age of 87. Tolochko devoted his entire life to studying the early history of Ukraine, including 30 years as head of the Institute of Archeology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.His hundreds of scholarly articles and more than two dozen monographs led to international acclaim and appointments at several European and international academies, as well as two state prizes of Ukraine in science and technology. Along the way, he twice served as a member of the national parliament, from 1998 to 2006, first in the Hromada Party, then in Yulia Timoshenko's Bloc. Thanks to his efforts, the country got its first law on the protection of its archeological heritage in 2004.The passing of a medieval historian, even one of such note as Tolochko, is not usually seen as a moment for political reflection. But Tolochko was no ordinary historian. He was also an unrelenting gadfly to Ukrainian political leaders, constantly rebuking them for abusing Ukrainian history and lying to Ukrainians about their past.Believing firmly that politics should rest on a sound historical foundation, Tolochko used his considerable scholarly authority to argue that the government-sponsored narrative about Ukrainians and Russian having distinct origins was nothing but pseudo-science.Drawing on his encyclopedic knowledge of Ukrainian history, he pointed to many inconvenient historical facts. First, that Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus had all emerged from a single civilization that for centuries shared a common culture, common religion, and common language. The people who shared this culture defined themselves as Rusichy or more simply Rus. In the north and northwest, they eventually formed the Velikoross or "Great Russian" ethnos; in the west, the Belarus or "White Russian" ethnos; and in the south, the Maloross or "Little Russian" ethnos. There were other communities, such as Black Rus in the far north, and Red Rus, in modern day Ukrainian Galicia, but only these three developed into the nations that we know today as Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The term Little Russian evokes passionate dislike among many Ukrainians today, but Tolochko refused to see anything objectionable in the term. Indeed, he often referred to himself as a Maloross and argued that Ukrainian nationalists knowingly distorted its meaning. Little Russia never referred to being a smaller part of Rus, but rather to the oldest part of Rus, its true heartland. He also insisted on viewing another controversial historical episode — Bohdan Khmelnitsky's decision in 1654 to join the Russian Empire — as a reunification of Great and Little Russians. Despite the gradual loss of local autonomy, he considered it a good thing for Ukraine, since without it the Western half of the country would have likely been consumed by Poland and lost its cultural, religious, and linguistic identity. Finally, Tolochko argued that, as an ethnic and political nation, Ukrainians appeared only after the collapse of the Russian empire, and thanks to the Soviet regime, which introduced territorial divisions along ethnic lines and tried to impose nearly total Ukrainianization on political and cultural life during the late 1920s and early 1930s, an effort that notably failed. Throughout his career, Tolochko considered ideologically imposed versions of history to be exceedingly dangerous for society, whether they stemmed from communist ideology or from contemporary Ukrainian nationalism. He described the current nationalist narrative of an indigenous European Ukraine as merely a degraded copy of the narratives created by Ukrainian intellectuals at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Their sole purpose, in his view, is to divide Ukrainian and Russians and argue that their separate origins had led them to make divergent political and cultural choices — one in favor of liberalism and Europe, the other in favor of despotism and Asia.The danger of such a simplistic dichotomy, he said, is that it demonizes the entire Eastern half of Ukraine. After three decades of struggle to have their local cultural and religious autonomy respected, their resentment exploded in 2014 when the Maidan uprising left them with no other prospect but living in an even more aggressively nationalistic Ukraine. As Tolochko put it, "We should blame ourselves for the fact that Crimea left us. We pushed it away."Since Ukraine's independence, an entire generation has been raised without any inkling of the common history and shared life in the USSR or the Russian Empire. The last 300 years have been portrayed to them as nothing but a series of conflicts between Ukraine and Russia, when in fact, says Tolochko, the Russian empire was largely a co-creation of Ukrainians and Russians. Its greatness and its darkness should thus be shared by both, just as the Scots share the glory and responsibility for the British Empire with the English. There is ultimately no other way to become a truly sovereign historical actor, Tolochko argued, than to assume personal responsibility for one's actions.On the other hand, Tolochko agreed with Ukrainian leaders that Ukraine's choice for a Christian European identity was made over a millennium ago, with the baptism of Rus on the Dnipro River. But he understood this choice not as one made by Ukrainians alone, but rather by the entire family of Eastern Slavic peoples known as Rus'.Remembering this common heritage was therefore essential to preserving national unity, and he implored Ukrainian political leaders to recognize that there were, in fact, several different kinds of Ukrainians — "Russian Ukrainians, Ukrainian Ukrainians, Polish Ukrainians, Hungarian Ukrainians, and so on. If we insist on discriminatory policies in Ukraine, on dividing native from non-native, on prohibiting language [usage], then just as we were sewn together, we can be unsewn at these seams." Instead of trying to build an identity for all Ukrainians around just the four Westernmost regions (Galicia), Tolochko urged Ukrainians to embrace the multiplicity of Ukrainian identities and to take pride in their coexistence over time.Given the resonance of his views with those of Russian President Vladimir Putin (and, if we are to be honest, with the views of most mainstream Western historians before 2014), it is not hard to see why Tolochko was eventually removed from all administrative and political positions, and prevented from speaking publicly in Ukraine. He withstood such restrictions philosophically, telling his friends that he lived not for today but in the Middle Ages.When asked about Ukraine's future, Tolochko remained cautiously optimistic. He saw Ukrainians and Russians as estranged brothers who, whatever their differences, are condemned to closeness because of their intertwined histories. Relations between them, he liked to point out, had frequently moved from closeness to alienation, and back again. The current cycle might last a long time, but in the end he felt confident that "common sense will prevail." All that was needed was patience, compassion, and a sense of history.
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Turkey recently suspended trade with Israel because of the "worsening humanitarian tragedy" in Gaza.Ankara says it will resume trade if Israel permits an "uninterrupted and sufficient flow" of aid into the enclave. Predictably, Israel's chief diplomat, Israel Katz, accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of behaving like a "dictator" while "disregarding the interests of the Turkish people and businessmen and ignoring international trade agreements." Hamas unsurprisingly praised Turkey.Tensions between Turkey and Israel have soared at various points in recent decades, such as the 2009 Davos Summit and the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid. Yet, until now, Turkish-Israeli economic relations always weathered those storms. Therefore, Turkey halting trade with Israel this month is a big deal."Since mid-October last year, when President Erdogan stepped up his sharp criticism of Israel's attack on civilians in Gaza, trade has been the one element of the two countries' relationship that has remained positive. Now that Turkey has cut off all trade with Israel, that positive element is gone," Matthew Bryza, the former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, told RS."Erdogan appears to be breaking with tradition in taking a holistic approach to ties with Israel. In previous crises, trade relations always remained distinct from strained political ties. Now, the government appears not to be concerned with escalation on all fronts," said Batu Coşkun, a political analyst who specializes in Turkish affairs at the Sadeq Institute, in an interview with RS.According to Murat Aslan, a faculty member at Hasan Kalyoncu University and a researcher at the SETA Foundation, Turkey has cards it can play if it seeks to increase pressure on Israel beyond suspending trade. These include encouraging other countries to join Turkey in imposing embargos on Israel and closing Turkish airspace to Israeli flights. "We have to wait and see [if Turkey takes] these steps, but I know that there are [many] options," said Aslan.Domestic pressures and mounting tensionTurkey's domestic politics must be considered. At an earlier stage in the Gaza war, segments of Turkish society started pressuring Erdogan's government to take concrete steps against Tel Aviv beyond strong rhetoric. A few weeks ago, Turkey curbed trade with Israel in 54 areas, including steel, fertilizer, and jet fuel.In the lead up to last month's municipal elections, there were calls for severing all trade with Israel, which resonated with many of Erdogan's constituents. As a result, a fair share of Erdogan's traditional supporters either refused to vote, or they supported the New Welfare Party, an Islamist party that campaigned on opposing the government's policy of permitting continued trade with Israel amid the Gaza war.Now, in deciding to halt Turkish trade with Israel, "Erdogan appears to be reacting to retain his popularity," according to Coşkun. "This means that the president is likely to continue escalating rhetoric, which means more tension in ties with Israel."The economic impactIsrael has long maintained robust trade, investment, and commercial relations with Turkey. In 2023, bilateral trade stood at roughly $7 billion. Zorlu Holding, a Turkish conglomerate, is a major investor in Israel's economy, and Turkish construction companies have made lots of money in Israel over the years. It can be taken for granted that construction costs will increase in Israel, and there will be inflationary effects due to Ankara's decision to halt trade.But, for the time being, it is less than clear how much harm the Turkish embargo will inflict on Israel's economy, and how long the harm will last. Countries can adapt when their trade relations are interrupted or sanctions are imposed. Russia adjusting its trade routes and supply chains after the West waged financial warfare against Moscow in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is an example. Similarly, Israeli policymakers are now busy trying to assess what damage will likely be inflicted on their economy and how to adjust to offset the effects of Turkey's embargo.Additionally, Turkey's economy will take a hit too. This was a major reason why Ankara did not implement the embargo sooner. There is widespread support across Turkey's political spectrum for the Palestinians, but also a debate over how much of a price the nation should pay to support Gaza."It will definitely harm the Israeli economy in unprecedented ways given the internal situation in Israel and the Houthis' measures at the entrance of the Red Sea," said Ali Bakir, an assistant professor at Qatar University's Ibn Khaldon Center and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, in an interview with RS."Having said this, it will also harm the Turkish economy, which is already struggling and is being adjusted to recover," Bakir added, noting that regional governments that are afraid of taking such financial risks should step up to help those, like Turkey, that are willing to do so. Azerbaijani oilThe impact of Turkey's actions on Azerbaijan and, more specifically, its oil exports to Israel will matter. Azerbaijani oil goes through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and then on to Israel via tanker. If Ankara would stop allowing Azerbaijan to export oil to Israel through the Ceyhan port, Israel's economy could greatly suffer."It's not clear at this point whether or not Turkey will cut off those flows of [Azerbaijani] oil…to Israel. Were that to be the case, that could have a more significant impact on Israel's economy as the economy adjusts to having to find new supplies," said Bryza, who also served as U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan. He noted that Israel has long-term energy contracts with Azerbaijan, and it would have to pay much more for oil if bought on the spot market."If Turkey halts this flow…then Israel has to find another source for energy. Otherwise, they will be in trouble," added Aslan.Nonetheless, given the nature of the Ankara-Baku alliance, Turkey may refrain from taking this action. "I would be surprised if Turkey were to cut off flows of Azerbaijani oil through and from the Turkish port of Ceyhan to Israel because that would also damage the interests of Azerbaijan," said Bryza. "Turkey and Azerbaijan have the closest of bilateral relationships with the cliche describing that relationship, they are 'one nation and two states.'"Will others follow Turkey in halting trade with Israel?Turkey's suspension of bilateral trade will inevitably harm the Israeli economy, at least in the near-term. This will be an additional cost that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government, and Israel as a country will have to pay for its crimes against the civilians of Gaza. However, if Turkey is alone in imposing an embargo on Israel, the economic harm inflicted on Israel could be limited. What needs to be considered is the possibility of other countries following Ankara's lead, which could make Israel's economic challenges more serious.Turkey's decision will certainly be welcome by Arab citizens across the Middle East and North Africa. They will likely point to Ankara's embargo on Israel as an example of how Muslim countries should deal with Israel and call on their governments to follow suit. Whether those governments will do so, however, is another question.
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On March 17 Niger's National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) suspended its military agreement with the United States after a visit by senior U.S. officials to the capital, Niamey. A CNSP spokesman said the decision was made after the U.S. delegation warned the military regime against partnering with Russia and Iran. Niger, which hosts around 1,000 U.S. troops and a drone base, has been an important partner in Washington's counterterrorism operations in the region. But relations have deteriorated considerably since July 2023, when Niger's presidential guard removed democratically elected Mohamed Bozoum and installed General Abdourahamane Tchiani.Russian influence looms large in Western discourse on the Sahel, and now informs U.S. policy and decision-making in places like Niger. This is a mistake. Outsized focus on Russia misunderstands the scale and scope of Moscow's presence. More importantly, it ignores longstanding patterns of governance and denies the role of Africans in emerging pro-sovereignty movements and political blocs. Neither the U.S. nor Russia are in a position to force Africans to choose sides, efforts to do so will only result in rebuke.African governments seek to balance outside powers while retaining the ability to work with each. Historically, local elites leverage these often unequal relations with powerful states to enhance their own domestic position. In francophone Africa, the cozy relationship between French officials, companies, and African autocrats came to be known as Françafrique. Niger had become somewhat of an exception among its peers, however, when it pursued close military ties with the United States.Recent years have seen a wave of anti-French sentiment hit the Sahel. Military regimes seeking political legitimacy have helped foment anti-French sentiment, but they do not control it. The backing of Paris is politically poisonous; kicking the French military out of Niger was necessary to the CNSP's survival.Neither the U.S. nor Russia have a policy to address the humanitarian, economic, and security implications of France's departure from the Sahel, which explains, in part, the focus on ideological narratives.Without a clear strategy, Russia responds opportunistically to events on the ground. And while Moscow has enjoyed more success than America in exporting security to Africa recently, it lacks comparable experience and capabilities in the humanitarian field. "We understand everything through Africa Corps," a Russian security expert in the region says. "We can strengthen it, expand it, redirect it. There are now some aspects of soft power, your matryoshkas and balalaikas. But now we need to do serious things, and that requires a lot of time, money, and people."Even though Washington historically ceded policy priorities in francophone Africa to France, anti-French sentiment did not carry over to anti-American sentiment in Niger. Close military relations, and leadership in the humanitarian field still carried weight.It appears that the U.S. delegation's visit to Niamey in March — led by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley — did significant damage. Sahel expert Alex Thurston noted the reportedly uniliteral announcement of the U.S. delegation's visit, and the relatively low rank of visiting officials, may have played a part.The subject of the talks — Niger's turn towards Russia and Iran — appears to have been equally insulting. Ironically, the U.S. delegation's attempt to counter Russian influence in Niger has further pushed the CNSP to seek ties with Russia.U.S. focus on Russia misses the reality that Africans, not Russians or Americans, are driving major political shifts in the Sahel. The formation of the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), for example, was a project initiated by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger first and foremost to counteract the military threat from a regional bloc, ECOWAS. That Russia welcomed the development does not mean Moscow inspired it.Indeed, the overthrow of Bozoum was as unexpected in Moscow as it was in Washington. "The coup was a surprise with no obvious advantage," a Russian diplomat in the region admitted. Western media were still quick to divine a Russian hand. Implicit was the belief that Russian influence thrives in instability and can "spill" across borders.Such tropes, however, fail to account for a basic building block of politics: personal relationships. Russia's arrival in Mali was not a product of information warfare — it was the result of collaboration between Russian advisers in Mali and Malian military officers who trained in Russia, the history of which goes back to the Soviet era. Malians, not Russians, cleared the way politically, working to secure the buy-in of trade unions and other powerbrokers in Bamako.There is no equivalent history in neighboring Niger. The U.S. has the monopoly on relations with Niger's officer corps. Moscow doesn't have an embassy in Niamey. Lacking strong, proven connections, Russian diplomats and security officials feel they don't have a good read on the junta. Moreover, Russian officials have little gauge over the mood within the broader Nigerien military. "Pressure to break with the U.S.," a high-ranking Nigerien military officer adds, "comes from within, not Russia."Sensing wariness on both sides, the CNSP has tried to attract, rather unsuccessfully thus far, the Kremlin's attention. When a CNSP delegation visited Moscow in January, they couldn't land a meeting with Vladimir Putin or even Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. Still, Niamey was among the first countries to congratulate Putin on his election victory.The saga of Niger reflects a strange, transitory phase between Washington's "War on Terror" and "Great Power Competition," the strategic rivalry between the U.S., China, and Russia, in which geopolitical foes find themselves on the same side against al-Qaida and ISIS-affiliated armed groups.The Kremlin views and frames its intervention in the Sahel in counterterrorism terms — a fact likely to continue following the recent terror attacks in Moscow. This resonates far better with Sahelian leaders than geopolitical rivalry. "If the United States does not participate in the fight against terrorists, then why are they here?" the Nigerien officer asked. "To track and contain the Russians? This is not their business. We respect America, we need their help. But this does not mean that we are ready listen to reproaches and accusations from incompetent people."Some time has passed now since the U.S. delegation's visit and the denunciation of Niger's military agreement with the U.S., and it appears that the initial tension from the Nigerien authorities' categorical statement has subsided. There is still a chance that the denunciation was a strong-arm tactic to coerce Washington into dialogue.At the same time, the AES continues to gather steam, with Chad now expressing interest in joining. Niger is an integral part of this new alliance and is closer to the U.S. and further from Russia compared to Mali and Burkina Faso.If the U.S. loses a foot in the alliance, which is very possible, it will be the result of efforts to force Africans to choose sides. In the long run, if the U.S. and Russia wish to continue fighting Islamist militancy in the Sahel, they will need to find a way to, if not cooperate, at least deconflict and accommodate for each other's presence. If not, they'll both find themselves on the outside looking in.
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A Louisiana Senate panel has sent on its way to needed passage a bill emulating law in several states that will help to ensure more coherent governance and more faithful translation of aggregate voter preferences.
SB 101 by Republican state Sen. Blake Miguez would prohibit ranked choice voting (RCV) for any election in Louisiana (save votes cast by military personnel overseas as by federal law in order to provide an "instant runoff"). There are many varieties to the concept, but basically it involves an electoral structure where all candidates by or regardless of party affiliation (if any) run together in an initial or only election, and then lower-ranking candidates are eliminated in either vote computation or by ballot redistribution.
Louisiana with its blanket primary actually uses a very diluted form of this. The initial general election eliminates all but two candidates by vote computation where the two highest then compete in a runoff election, unless one candidate receives a majority.
But the form most often associated with is concept in the U.S. is for single-position contests, whether for office or a partisan nomination, where only a single election occurs and voters rank order candidates. At the counting phase, unless someone has obtained an outright majority, the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is eliminated and those voters' second choices then are redistributed to the remaining candidates. The iterative process continues until a candidate receives a majority of all votes, whether redistributed.
Theoretically, the system is sold as doing a better job of echoing voter preferences because it allows for gradations of support rather than an all-or-nothing choice. Entire reliance on first choices could mask more general support for other candidates. Yet therein lies the fatal flaw for it as well.
The system assumes within a voter's mind that gradations between candidates and intensities of support are monotonic. That is, let's say there are five candidates for one position, and that in the voter's mind he grades out, with 0 being entirely unacceptable, 25 as annoying, 50 as indifferent, 75 as acceptable, and 100 as enthusiastically supporting, candidates of a scale of 0-100.
In this hypothetical election with the hypothetical voter, his preferences are congruent with the assumptions behind RCV if he grades candidate A at 100, B at 75, C at 50, D at 25, and E at 0. But what if he grades A at 100, but B at 90, C at 50, D at 30, and E at 0? His ballot would reflect less support for B and D that he truly feels because the ballot scaling involved (called Likert scaling) imposes an intensity in preference ordering – same distance between all candidates – that may not match the voter's. This could wash out in the aggregate – say another voter ranks things as A=0, B=10, C=50, D=70, E=100 – but there's no guarantee of that and in fact is highly unlikely in a system where there are vast differentials in resources to inform voters about specific candidates, as well as vast differences in specific voter capacities to evaluate candidates.
This can create incongruities, if not perversities, in outcomes. For example, let's use the above example where A and E are quality candidates identifying with opposing major parties, B and D are somewhat lesser candidates identifying with the same opposing major parties, and C is a no party candidate. Resource-rich A and E campaign heavily, B and D aren't as fortunate but they do get the word out, and C does little. When the votes are in, no candidate has a majority, A and E lead the way as they attract most partisan support, B and D drag the rear with some partisan support, lagging C who picked up mainly nonpartisan support and attracted the bulk of his votes precisely because most voters knew little more about him than he wasn't a Republican or Democrat. In this scenario, either B or D is dropped and his votes reallocated, leaving the other at the rear and next to be culled.
Prior to dropping the last of B or D, the vote was A at 40 percent, E at 30 percent, C at 20 and the other at 10 percent. But let's say A and E were bitterly opposed by B or D supporters and they overwhelmingly had C as their second choice, chosen simply because he wasn't A or E. So, in this redistribution, C narrowly jumps ahead of E, and A remains around 40 percent. And say C was the third choice for A and E supporters – B and D respectively being their second but those now are unavailable as sorting targets. So, what next happens is E is eliminated but as those voters almost exclusively had C as the next viable choice, C ends up winning 60-40 – not because many voters truly preferred him or even knew who he was, but because he was the least disliked by partisans on both sides as well as the least known and acted as an empty vessel.
And this scenario furthered can be skewed by removing the assumption that all voters use, in this example, all five of their votes. Some may give only their first choice, perhaps out of ineptitude in understanding the system or that they strongly dislike all other candidates. Others may not fill out all five choices for similar reasons. If so, a significant amount of roll-off may occur – the final vote count much less than the total votes cast – which leads to many voters not even having a say when it comes to the final result when a candidate achieves a simple majority. In fact, this has been observed in typical RCV-structured elections in America, with the least educated and informed voters disproportionately likely to roll off.
To some degree, these shortcomings can be made less relevant either by having a strong party system that can educate and encourage voters about candidates and the navigation of the complexity of RCV-based elections or by filling (for plenary bodies) offices through proportional representation – or both, as the two often go hand in hand. But we don't have PR in America nor strong parties, and especially in Louisiana with the country's weakest.
Indeed, introducing RCV would be a disaster for policy-making in Louisiana, which already suffers from a high degree of personalism in politics focusing too much on candidate attributes and too little on ideology. This is precisely what makes the system so vulnerable to special interests and more resistant to accountability and responsiveness. RCV only would exacerbate this by degrading party – a glue that holds candidates together to focus them on following an agenda on which they campaigned in common rather than as individuals trying to service parochial interests – and increasing the importance of personalistic campaigning and governing.
Thus, it's best to forestall RCV use. In an election system like Louisiana has – which would benefit from closed primaries for all contests for precisely the same reasons RCV would be harmful, given the state's political culture, as it strengthens party – aggregate voter preferences become best translated into coherent policy through its first-past-the-post structure than would RCV. This justifies SB 101 becoming law.
