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Since October, Egypt has joined most of the international community in calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. With Egypt being the only Arab country to border Gaza, Cairo's stakes are high. The longer Israel's war on the besieged enclave continues, the threats to Egypt's economy, national security, and political stability will become more serious.Located along the Gaza-Egypt border is Rafah, a 25-square-mile city that until recently was home to 300,000 Palestinians. Now approximately 1.4 million Palestinians are sheltering in Rafah because of the Israeli military's wanton destruction of Gaza City, Khan Younis, and other parts of the Strip. Having asserted that four Hamas battalions are now in Rafah, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that deploying Israeli forces to this Palestinian city is necessary for his country to defeat Hamas amid this war. As of writing, Israel's military is preparing to launch a campaign for Rafah.Officials in Cairo fear that Israeli military operations in Rafah could result in a large number of Palestinians entering the Sinai. "An Israeli offensive on Rafah would lead to an unspeakable humanitarian catastrophe and grave tensions with Egypt," said European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on February 10.Not only could such a scenario fuel massive amounts of friction between Cairo and Tel Aviv, but it could also severely heighten tensions between the Egyptian public and President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi's government. It's easy to imagine a mass expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, which would amount to essentially a "Nakba 2.0," triggering widespread unrest in Egypt if the government in Cairo is widely seen by Egyptians as playing a role in permitting, if not facilitating, such an ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza. Along with economic considerations, this is one of the main reasons why Cairo has articulated that Israel depopulating Gaza of Palestinians and forcing them into Egypt is a red line that Tel Aviv must not cross."The biggest concern for Cairo is related to the fate of the [Palestinians in Gaza] forcibly evacuated by the Israelis and who might find a 'safe haven' in Sinai. An uncontrolled influx of Palestinians into the [Sinai] Peninsula would be an enormous burden on Egypt, which would have to manage a problematic situation from a political and security point of view, as well as having to justify internally to its own public opinion an imposition that came from outside," Giuseppe Dentice, head of the Middle East and North Africa Desk at the Italian Center for International Studies, told RS."It is no coincidence that Cairo has reinforced the border with Gaza, closed the Rafah crossing, and warned Israel that any unilateral action involving a forced exodus of the Strip's inhabitants to Egyptian territory could jeopardize not only bilateral relations, but the preconditions for peace and stability guaranteed in the [Camp David Accords]," added Dentice.On February 15, Maxar Technologies, a Colorado-headquartered space technology company, captured satellite images showing Egypt's construction of a wall roughly two miles west of the Egypt-Gaza border. The following day, the London-based Sinai Foundation for Human Rights said that this construction "is intended to create a high-security gated and isolated area near the borders with the Gaza Strip, in preparation for the reception of Palestinian refugees in the case of [a] mass exodus."What might happen to the Camp David Accords?On February 11, two Egyptian officials and one Western diplomat told the Associated Press that Cairo might suspend the 1979 Camp David Accords if Israeli troops wage an incursion into Rafah. A day later, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry denied such reports about his government's plans to freeze the peace treaty with Israel, yet he emphasized that Egypt's continued adherence to the 1979 deal would depend on Tel Aviv reciprocating. Alarming to Egyptian officials were Netanyahu's statements late last year about the Israeli military taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor (a nine-mile-long demilitarized buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt which was established in accordance with Egypt and Israel's peace treaty) because such a move on Israel's part would be a breach of the Camp David Accords.Are Egyptian officials serious about possibly freezing the historic peace deal? Or does such talk amount to empty threats issued for political purposes at home, as well as pursuing certain Egyptian aims vis-à-vis Washington and Tel Aviv? Mouin Rabbani, a political analyst and co-editor of Jadaliyya, told RS that if these statements from anonymous Egyptian officials are geared toward a domestic audience but Cairo doesn't follow through, Sisi's government could have a "potentially serious problem on its hands."Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with the Chatham House and a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, doubts that Egypt would go as far as suspending the Camp David Accords. "In the end, Egypt is unlikely to take the first step to tear the treaty up unilaterally," he said.But what Egypt is doing is embracing "discursive strategic posturing" whereby Cairo uses "rhetorical escalation" and directs messages at three audiences, Aboudouh told RS. First is the domestic audience to say that Cairo is standing up for Egypt's core security interests as well as the Palestinian cause. The second is Washington to relay the Egyptian government's anger at the Biden administration for not stopping Israeli actions that threaten to displace Palestinians into the Sinai. Third is to Netanyahu, generals in the Israeli Defense Forces, and the Israeli intelligence community.Gordon Gray, a former U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, also discounts recent suggestions that Cairo would suspend its peace treaty with Israel for three main reasons. "First, Egypt does not seek military confrontation — even an inadvertent one — with Israel. Second, Egypt does not want to risk losing U.S. military assistance ($1.3 billion annually), which was granted as a direct result of the Camp David Accords. Finally, while Egypt abhors the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, it shares Israel's views about the threat Hamas poses," said Gray in an interview with RS.What would come from Egypt freezing the treaty?Despite many experts believing that Egypt would not freeze the Camp David Accords, that potential scenario should be considered. There are important questions to raise about what it could lead to in terms of region-wide ramifications, as well as Cairo's relationships with Western capitals. But it's difficult to predict how events would unfold if Egypt took that step because there would be so many unknown variables in play.Egypt could act in different ways after suspending the peace treaty with Israel. Rabbani asked, "Would it simply declare the peace treaty suspended and leave it at that or would it stop implementing provisions of that treaty?"Regardless, any freezing of the Camp David Accords by Egypt would inevitably bring a layer of instability to Egyptian-Israeli relations never seen since Jimmy Carter's administration, which — with help from Iran, Morocco, and Romania — brought Egypt's then-President Anwar Sadat and Israel's then-Prime Minister Menachim Begin together in northern Maryland's Catoctin Mountains to sign the peace treaty in September 1978. The response from Washington would likely be extreme, particularly given how central Egyptian-Israeli peace has been to U.S. foreign policy agendas in the Middle East for almost half a century while surviving a host of regional crises, including Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and all the previous Gaza wars."The U.S. is certain to act true to form and retaliate against Egypt without holding Israel in any way accountable for producing this crisis, and Washington may well cease foreign assistance to Egypt, which is a direct function of its peace treaty with Israel. The EU will probably announce it is launching an investigation of the Egyptian school curriculum or some other nonsensical initiative," Rabbani told RS.Irrespective of how Egypt approaches its relationship with Israel, the fact that officials in Cairo are suggesting a potential freeze of the Camp David Accords speaks volumes about the Gaza war's impact on Israel's diplomatic standing in the Arab world. With the probability of more Arab countries joining the Abraham Accords in the foreseeable future having essentially dropped to zero, the pressing question is not which Arab government might be next to normalize with Tel Aviv. The focus has shifted to questions about how Arab countries already in the normalization camp, such as Egypt, will manage their formalized relationships with Israel at a time in which Israeli behavior in Gaza is widely seen across the Arab-Islamic world as genocidal.

U.S. President Joe Biden's brief trip to the Middle East, comprising just a few hours in Tel Aviv, will be remembered in this tragic chapter in the recent history of the Middle East for two main reasons. Firstly, because of the almost exaggerated reaffirmation of the alliance with Israel, and secondly, because of the metaphorical slap he received for the abrupt cancellation of a summit in Amman that was organized and canceled within just a few hours, due to the heightened tension after the Ahli Hospital massacre in Gaza. (A rearranged conference was held in Cairo last Saturday; 31 countries were represented, as was the UN.) The cancellation was a humiliation for the president and American diplomacy, but also a sign of a change of direction, and the beginning of a new order in the power equation in the Middle East.Let's start with the reasons behind the American request to meet at short notice with Jordanian King Abdullah, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. The purpose of the summit revolved around the idea of getting as many Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip as possible. This idea — which, in short, involves emptying the enclave to aid the military goal of eliminating Hamas and its infrastructure — came from Israel, but won the Biden administration's support in Washington. To begin carrying this out, Israeli authorities ordered more than a million Palestinians from Gaza's north to move to the south — primarily toward the cities of Khan Younis and Rafah, Gaza's gateway to Egypt, which the authorities in Cairo have kept shut.Danny Ayalon, a former Israeli deputy foreign minister, made the following remarks in an interview with Marc Lamont Hill on Al Jazeera in English on Oct. 15: "[We're not telling Gazans to] go to the beaches, go drown yourselves, God forbid … There is a huge expanse, almost endless space in the Sinai desert, just on the other side of Gaza. The idea is … for them to leave over to [sic] the open areas where we, and the international community, will prepare the infrastructure … Tent cities, with food and with water … just like for the refugees of Syria that fled the butchering of [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad a few years ago to Turkey." To be refugees or fugitives: that is what Ayalon, and indeed Israel, is offering to 2 million Palestinians.The majority of Gaza's population is, in fact, composed of descendants of Palestinians who took refuge on the southern coast of Mandate Palestine, in the area of Gaza's commercial port, forced out of their homes in places like Jaffa, Majdal, and present-day Ashkelon. Even then, waiting for them — like nearly all the refugees of 1948 — were tents and tent cities. Anyone familiar with the name given to the Nakba's refugees, the "people of the tents," knows that to propose a tent city in Sinai is to remind them, as if necessary, of what they were forced to become."This proposal cannot be accepted, and not only by the Palestinians. It dives into the most significant change in the Middle East in the last century, the birth of the State of Israel and the Nakba. This change is etched in the history of neighboring countries, first and foremost Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The uprooting of Palestinians to Sinai would be a burden on the Arab countries' shoulders — a burden they cannot bear, as was declared loud and clear in the statements issued by all the Arab leaders after Blinken's visit. They all focused on the Palestinian refugee issue, rejecting any possibility of a new population transfer from Palestine.Hypothetically, even if Blinken had received suggestions from Israel to propose, during his diplomatic tour of the region, a transfer of the Palestinian population to Sinai, the firm stance of all Arab interlocutors would have convinced the U.S. administration that it could go no further. Blinken made clear in an interview with Randa Abul Azm of Al-Arabiya that the United States would not support a transfer. "We've heard, and I've heard directly from Palestinian Authority President Abbas and from virtually every other leader that I've talked to in the region, that that idea is a nonstarter, and so we do not support it. We believe that people should be able to stay in Gaza, their home." King Abdullah expounded on the reason for the refusal on Tuesday at a press conference in Berlin with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, where he referred to refugees as "a red line." The next day, the Egyptian president said the same to Scholz at a journalists' gathering in Cairo. Finally, after his quick return from Amman to Ramallah after the attack on Al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza, Abbas clarified that Palestinians will not leave their country. Abbas, a veteran refugee from Safed, has all the experience to determine that, for the Palestinians, Nakba 2.0 is the fear that has been hovering over them in recent months and years, and is a chapter in their history that they refuse to live again at all costs.Blinken's diplomatic whirlwind tour of major Arab capitals, from Cairo to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Amman, in which he attempted to formulate an exit strategy for the Israelis from Gaza, effectively failed even before the mass killings at Al-Ahli Hospital. From the very moment Al Jazeera began broadcasting the horrific images of the dead in the hospital compound, another element entered the game: the emotional and political reaction of the Arab street, of the people and societies looking at a story that is already etched in their personal biographies and national history.There were immediate, spontaneous demonstrations in the streets of Amman, Tunisia, Beirut, and Cairo. Governments were careful not to prohibit the protests, instead settling for restricting them, because they know very well that everything is different since the Arab Spring of 2011. Through the history of rebellions and revolutions, anyone who has gone out into the streets has internalized the following: a regime can fall. Everyone knows this, including the rulers.The surprising momentum of the events following the hospital bombing led to the hasty cancellation of the summit. For the Arab players, it was impossible to meet with the United States about the issue of refugees while the Americans are increasingly perceived as clinging to their alliance with Israel. On the other hand, the events shifted the discussion from the refugee question to an immediate demand for a ceasefire — not humanitarian corridors, but an immediate cessation of hostilities. The Arab states are demanding an end to the war, as is the UN.As has already happened in the region's history, the wind rising from Gaza blows beyond the narrow boundaries of the enclave, with all the dangers involved. For example, Sisi does not want to go down as the first president in the history of the Egyptian republic to allow Nakba 2.0, and certainly not before the Egyptian elections this December, which are supposed to consolidate his rule. King Abdullah heads a state with a significant Palestinian presence, not only numerically but also in terms of economic weight. And above all, relations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Hashemite Kingdom have always been chilly and at times very complicated. The question of preserving the holy sites of Islam and Christianity in the Old City of Jerusalem is, among other things, at the heart of a fierce diplomatic clash between Jordan and the Netanyahu-led extreme right-wing coalition that has unfolded in recent years.Even Saudi Arabia, although it has begun the process of normalizing its relations with Israel, is no longer the same country that offered a peace plan 20 years ago in exchange for security, out of sensitivity to its alliance with the United States. The deepening presence of China in the Middle East, which during the COVID-19 pandemic consolidated its economic ties with many of the Persian Gulf coastal countries, is one of the main factors in the game today, first and foremost because China has managed to mediate a surprising reconciliation between the two biggest competitors in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran.In other words, the United States' leeway for action is shrinking. The role of Washington, which clings so closely to Israel, is in danger of being tested at a critical moment when the Middle East will no longer be what it was. It seems that the United States does not have a sufficient understanding of the region, just as the $100 million offered by Biden as aid to the Palestinians at the end of his visit to Israel certainly does not suffice: each of Gaza's reconstruction plans, after five Israeli military operations in the past 15 years, is estimated at billions of dollars.This article was republished with permission from +972 Magazine..

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU's (African Union's) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only "about" data, but which "is" data. According to an article by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), "At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge." Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is "trust" – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. "This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy", says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect 2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect 3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa) project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly), have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high-performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during 17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management. ; Department of Science & Innovation (DSI); National Research Foundation (NRF)

L'objectiu de la tesi es centra en la definició, en l'àmbit de l'ordenament comunitari, de l'actual estatut jurídic dels treballadors extracomunitaris assalariats que formen part del mercat de treball regular d'un Estat membre. Els treballadors nacionals de tercers països que formen part del mercat de treball regular d'un Estat comunitari, així com els membres de les seves famílies, gaudeixen d'un estatut jurídic fragmentat: els seus drets són variables, depenen de la norma que els regula. En aquest sentit, la situació varia en funció de la llei interna de l'Estat d'acollida, l'existència o no d'acords bilaterals entre l'Estat d'acollida i l'Estat d'origen, i les normes de dret comunitari. Aquesta situació també és diferent atenent a l'existència i el contingut d'un acord extern celebrat per la Comunitat i els seus Estats membres i el país de la nacionalitat de l'immigrant, aquest aspecte centra el present estudi. Els acords que s'analitzen són aquells que juntament amb aspectes econòmics, contenen disposicions relatives als treballadors, i que s'han celebrat, prenent com a base jurídica l'actual article 310 TCE, amb països geogràficament fronterers amb la Unió Europea. D'entre ells, el model a seguir és l'Acord d'Associació amb Turquia, que preveu uns objectius més amplis, com ara la creació d'una unió duanera enfront a la zona de lliure comerç prevista en els altres acords i que s'ha desenvolupat mitjançant les decisions adoptades pel seu Consell d'Associació. Aquest acord ha estat objecte d'una àmplia jurisprudència per part del Tribunal europeu, relativa a l'aplicació i la interpretació de les seves disposicions. A fi de delimitar l'abast de les disposicions de l'Acord, i valorar si es tracta d'un estatut privilegiat respecte del dels altres treballadors extracomunitaris, es comparen les seves disposicions amb les corresponents a les dels acords celebrats amb els països del Magreb, entenent per aquests el Marroc, Tunísia i Algèria i amb els 10 països d' Europa Central i Oriental (els anomenats PECO's). A fi de clarificar l'estatut jurídic dels treballadors extracomunitaris, és necessari entrar a considerar altres aspectes directament relacionats amb aquest estatut, com són les condicions d'accés i de permanència en un Estat, matèries, que, fins a l'entrada en vigor del Tractat d'Amsterdam, eren competència exclusiva de cadascun dels Estats membres. De totes maneres, no es fa un estudi comparatiu de les diferents legislacions internes en matèria d'immigració, donat que l'àmbit d'anàlisi es limita a l'ordenament comunitari, i no a l'ordenament intern. La tesi s'estructura en dues parts diferenciades, correspon la primera als 2 Capítols inicials i la segona als altres 3. En els dos primers Capítols se segueix un criteri cronològic, començant amb el Tractat de Roma i culminant amb el Tractat de Niça. En aquests Capítols s'analitzen les possibles bases jurídiques del dret originari que podien haver-se utilitzat, així com la cooperació que varen fer els Estats membres, tant a dins com a fora, de la Unió Europea, en relació a les mesures adoptades destinades a la regulació de l'accés i de l'estatut jurídic dels treballadors immigrants. L'entrada en vigor, l'1 de maig de 1999 del Tractat d'Amsterdam ha suposat un important avenç per a l'atribució de competències a la Comunitat en matèria d'immigració, que queda vinculada al nou objectiu de la creació de l'espai de llibertat, seguretat i justícia. A partir d'aquest moment, s'assumeix la lliure circulació de persones com objectiu propi, que requereix la regulació del control a les fronteres externes, d'asil, de la immigració i de la cooperació dels Estats membres en la prevenció i la lluita contra la delinqüència. Això es concreta en la comunitarització d'una part del Tercer Pilar destinada a visats, asil i immigració, amb l'exclusió del Regne Unit, Irlanda i Dinamarca, i en la integració del cabal Schengen a l'estructura de la Unió Europea, tot i que permetent una exclusió per al Regne Unit i Irlanda. Es crea, doncs, una cooperació sui generis plena de solucions d'enginyeria jurídica, que si bé suposa un avenç, trenca la unitat i l'homogeneïtat del dret comunitari. Tot i aquestes complexitats tècniques que deriven de la reforma del Tractat d'Amsterdam, el nou article 63 en els seus apartats 3 i 4 permet abordar, a través de la coordinació o de l'harmonització, els temes d'interès comú vinculats al fenomen de la immigració. Entre ells, hi ha la possibilitat d'elaborar un estatut comú per als treballadors no comunitaris. Les iniciatives legislatives presentades des de l'entrada en vigor del Tractat d'Amsterdam demostren l'acceleració en l'elaboració i el desenvolupament d'una política comunitària d'immigració, integrada en uns objectius comuns, per primera vegada sembla realista pensar en l'adopció d'un estatut jurídic únic per l'extracomunitari que sigui resident de llarga durada. Tot i que aquest estatut pot quedar configurat com un estàndard mínim de protecció, considero que la seva adopció constituiria un pas de gran rellevància en la clarificació dels drets d'aquest col·lectiu de treballadors. Els altres tres Capítols conformen la segona part de la tesi, dedicada a analitzar l'actual estatut dels treballadors nacionals de tercers Estats. Aquest estatut es caracteritza pel seu caràcter fragmentat, que deriva de la diversitat de les disposicions contingudes en els acords externs. Mitjançant un estudi comparatiu, s'analitzen els objectius, l'estructura, els antecedents i el desenvolupament dels acords celebrats amb Turquia, amb els països del Magreb i amb els PECO's. El contingut dels objectius d'aquests acords constata que ens trobem davant 3 models diferents que reflecteixen una disminució del compromís comunitari. El Tribunal de Justícia, en la seva jurisprudència, ha manifestat que tant els acords externs celebrats per la Comunitat, com les decisions adoptades pels òrgans que els desenvolupen, formen part de l'ordenament jurídic comunitari. El Tribunal de Justícia és l'òrgan competent per interpretar-los, contribuint a clarificar el contingut d'aquests instruments jurídics. Aquesta perspectiva es completa amb l'anàlisi de les nocions que recullen els acords externs, a fi de dilucidar si un mateix terme té idèntic contingut, i si, tot i la diversitat dels instruments jurídics utilitzats, tenen una mateixa interpretació jurisprudencial. Per aquest motiu ha estat necessari, que el Tribunal de Justícia determinés l'abast dels diferents conceptes emprats, i clarifiqués si és el mateix que el relatiu als treballadors comunitaris o és diferent. La redacció dels acords estudiats reflecteix un estatut jurídic privilegiat per als treballadors turcs en relació als altres treballadors immigrants. Els treballadors originaris dels països d'Europa Central i Oriental o del Magreb, podran millorar la seva situació actual en la mesura en què les disposicions dels seus respectius acords siguin, en el futur, desenvolupades. De totes maneres, aquesta situació de privilegi que ha estat un fet fins el moment actual, ha canviat amb l'entrada en vigor de diferents lleis d'estrangeria estatals, i pot modificar-se, també, amb el desenvolupament del Tractat d'Amsterdam. Actualment, a un treballador turc li perjudica, més que no beneficia el sistema de terminis que per accedir a un lloc de treball preveu la Decisió 1/80. Els treballadors turcs que formen part del mercat regular de treball d'un Estat membre haurien de quedar protegits pel règim jurídic que els sigui més beneficiós, amb independència de que aquest sigui l'intern de l'Estat d'acollida, el comunitari previst a l'Acord d'Associació i el seu posterior desenvolupament, o el que derivi de les futures directives quan entrin en vigor. Si bé aquestes disposicions dels Acords d'Associació varen ser positives, actualment hauran de ser objecte de modificació, la qual cosa no implica la seva desaparició. El seu contingut haurà de tendir a ressaltar l'especificitat de les relacions que es volen establir amb un tercer Estat concret, establint en aquest sentit un tractament preferent als seus nacionals enfront als altres immigrants, i reconeixent el seu dret de residència com derivat del permís de treball. De tota manera, amb l'entrada en vigor de la directiva relativa a l'estatut dels residents de llarga durada, aquest règim privilegiat només afectarà als immigrants residents legals a l'Estat d'acollida durant els primers 5 anys, és a dir, abans de que se'ls concedeixi el citat estatut. ; La tesis doctoral pretende determinar el estatuto jurídico de los trabajadores extracomunitarios, tomando como modelo de referencia la situación jurídica que el ordenamiento comunitario otorga a los trabajadores turcos que forman parte del mercado de trabajo regular de un Estado miembro de la Unión Europea, y comparando su situación con la de los trabajadores provenientes de los países del Magreb y de Europa Central y Oriental regulada en los correspondientes acuerdos Euromediterráneos y Europeos. Los dos primeros capítulos se destinan al análisis de las posibles bases jurídicas a utilizar por la Comunidad Económica Europea en su momento, y la actual Comunidad Europea y la unión Europea para definir el alcance de los derechos que se atribuyen al colectivo de trabajadores extracomunitarios. Debido a la estrecha relación entre el estatuto jurídico de este colectivo y el estatuto jurídico general de los immigrantes, las medidas relativas a las condiciones de acceso también son objeto de atención, aunque solamente con la finalidad de contribuir a la concreción del objetivo fundamental de la tesis. Des estea primera parte de la tesis, se desprende que el principal instrumento jurídico utilizado hasta la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Amsterdam han sido los acuerdos concluidos por la Comunidad y sus Estados miembros por una partey un Tercer Estado por otra, a su análisis se dedica la segunda parte de la tesis doctoral. A fin de interpretar correctamente las disposiciones de los acuerdos externos relativas a los trabajadores inmigrantes, en el tercer capítulo se lleva a cabo un estudio comprativo de los objetivos, etapas, instituciones, y desarrollo de los diversos acuerdos, así como de las características de estas disposiciones y de las decisiones que se desarrollan. El capítulo cuarto se destina a las nociones conceptuales que se utilizan, determinando sus semejanzas y diferencias con los conceptos comunitarios. Este capítulo sirve de base para el siguiente destinado a la interpretación que, de las diversas disposiciones de los acuerdos, ha llevado a cabo el Tribunal de Justicia. ; The aim of the thesis is centred on the definition, within European Community regulations, of the current statutory juridical status of employed workers who are from outside the European Community who form part of the employment market in a European Community state. The workers from non-European Community states, who form part of the regular employment market of a member state, as well as the members of their families, possess a fragmentary judicial statute: their rights are variable depending on the regulation which they are subject to. In this sense the situation varies and is dependent on the internal laws of the receiving state, the absence of bilateral agreements between the receiving state and the state of origin and the procedures and regulations of Community law. This situation will also vary depending on the existence and the content of an external agreement made by the Community and its member states and the country of origin of the immigrant. This study focuses on this aspect. The agreements which are analysed here are those which, along with economic aspects, contain provisions relating to the workers which have been adopted, taking as its juridical base the current article 310 European Community Treaty (ECT), with countries which border geographically with the European Union. Amongst them, the model to be followed is the Agreement of Association with Turkey, which foresees broader objectives, such as the creation of a customs union, in line with the area of free trade envisioned by other agreements, and which has been developed in the decisions adopted by its Council of Association. This aforementioned agreement has been the object of abundant jurisprudence relating to the application and interpretation of its provisions, in the European Court in order to define the scope of the provisions of the agreement and also asses whether we are dealing with a privileged status in contrast with other workers coming from countries outside the European Union. These provisions will be compared with those affecting the countries of Magreb, by which we mean Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria and the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In order to clarifying the juridical status of workers from outside the European Community other aspects directly relating to this statute must be considered. These include the conditions of access and residence in a state, subjects which until the application of the Treaty of Amsterdam were the exclusive province of each one of the member states. However, this is not a comparative study of different areas of internal legislation regarding immigration, given that the area of analysis is restricted to European Community regulations and not to internal regulations. The thesis is structured in two different parts, which correspond, in the first case, to the first two Chapters and, in the second, to the remaining three Chapters. In the first two Chapters the criteria are chronological, beginning with the Treaty of Rome and ending with the Treaty of Nice. In these Chapters the original juridical bases which could have been utilised, as well as the co-operation exercised by the member states, both within and outside the European Union are analyzed, in relation to the measures adopted and destined to the regulation of access and the juridical status of immigrant workers. The implementation, on 1st May 1999, of the Treaty of Amsterdam has signified an important step forward towards the attribution of jurisdictional competence in the Community on matters relating to immigration which remain linked to the new objective of creating an area of freedom, safety and justice. From this point on, the free movement of people is assumed as an aim. This requires the regulation of border controls, of asylum, of immigration and co-operation in the struggle to prevent delinquency. This is specified in the comunitarization of a part of the Third Pillar regarding visas, asylum and immigration, excluding the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, and in the integration of "acquis" Schengen in the structure of the European Union albeit at the cost of excluding the United Kingdom and Ireland. An area of co-operation has been created, sui generis, complete with juridical engineering solutions, which, while signifying an advance, break the unity and homogeneity of Community law. Despite all the technical complexities that derive from the Treaty of Amsterdam, the new article 63 and clauses, 3 and 4 enable the Community to assume areas of common interest linked to the phenomenon of immigration through co-ordination and harmonisation. Amongst these, there is the possibility of formulating a common statute for workers who are not members of the European Community. The legislative initiatives which have been presented since the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam show the acceleration in the formulation and development of a community policy of immigration, integrated within some common objectives. For the first time, it seems realistic to envision the adoption of a sole juridical statute for the non-community worker who is a long-term resident. Despite the fact that this statute might be characterised as a minimum standard of protection, I believe that the adoption of such a statute would constitute a great step forward in the clarification of the rights of this collective of workers. The remaining three chapters form the second part of the thesis which is dedicated to analysing the present status of workers from other states outside the European Community. This status is characterised by its fragmentary nature, which derives from the diversity of the provisions contained in external agreements. The objectives, structure antecedents and development of the agreements formulated in agreement with Turkey with the countries of the Magreb and with the countries of east and central Europe (PECO's) were analyzed by means of a comparative study. The content of the objectives of the said agreements alleges that we find ourselves facing three different models that reflect a gradual diminishing of the European commitment to safeguarding the status of the immigrant worker. The Court of Justice in its jurisprudence has manifested that both those external agreements adopted by the Community, as well as the decisions taken by the organs which develop them, form part of the juridical regulations of the community. It is the Court of Justice which is the organ most competent to interpret these provisions, contributing to the clarification of the content of these juridical instruments. This perspective will be complemented with the analysis of the notions which take into account external agreements. The aim of this study is to clarify whether the same term has the same content in each agreement and if, despite the diversity of the juridical instruments used, they have the same interpretation in jurisprudence. In order to do this, it has been necessary, for the Court of Justice to determine the scope of the different concepts employed and to clarify whether it applies to the workers of the community or if differs significantly. The drawing up of the agreements studied reflects a privileged juridical status for Turkish workers in comparison with other immigrants. The immigrants who come from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Magreb can improve their current situation in as far as the provisions of their respective agreements are developed in the future. However, this privileged situation which has been a fact to date, has changed with the implementation of immigration laws in different states. These may be modified in addition to and following on from the development of the Treaty of Amsterdam. At present, a Turkish worker is affected adversely rather than benefiting from the system of quotas to gain access to a job in accordance with Decision 1/80. The Turkish workers who form part of the regular employment market in a member state should be protected by the juridical ruling which is most beneficial to them, independent of the fact that this may be the internal ruling of the receiving state, the community member foreseen in the Agreement of Association and its latter development, or that which is derived from future directives when they are in force. If the provisions from agreements of association were initially positive they should have be the object of modification, which should not imply their disappearance. Their content should stress the specificity of the relationships which they wish to establish with a third state, in this sense establishing favourable treatment for these nationals as opposed to other immigrants and recognising their right of residence as well as their right to obtain a work permit. However, with the implementation of the directive regarding the status of immigrants who are long term residents, this privileged status only affects those immigrants who are legally resident in the receiving state for the first five years, that is to say before they are given the cited statute.

Allergic rhinitis (AR) and asthma represent global health problems for all age groups. Asthma and rhinitis frequently coexist in the same subjects. Allergic Rhinitis and its Impact on Asthma (ARIA) was initiated during a World Health Organization workshop in 1999 (published in 2001). ARIA has reclassified ARas mild/moderate-severe and intermittent/persistent. This classification closely reflects patients' needs and underlines the close relationship between rhinitis and asthma. Patients, clinicians, and other health care professionals are confronted with various treatment choices for the management of AR. This contributes to considerable variation in clinical practice, and worldwide, patients, clinicians, and other health care professionals are faced with uncertainty about the relative merits and downsides of the various treatment options. in its 2010 Revision, ARIA developed clinical practice guidelines for the management of AR and asthma comorbidities based on the Grading of Recommendation, Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) system. ARIA is disseminated and implemented in more than 50 countries of the world. Ten years after the publication of the ARIAWorld Health Organization workshop report, it is important to make a summary of its achievements and identify the still unmet clinical, research, and implementation needs to strengthen the 2011 European Union Priority on allergy and asthma in children. (J Allergy Clin Immunol 2012;130:1049-62.) ; Stallergenes ; ALK-Abello ; European Academy of Allergy and Clinical Immunology (EAACI) ; MSD ; Novartis ; Nycomed/Takeda ; PHADIA/Thermo Fischer ; 3M ; AstraZeneca ; GlaxoSmithKline ; Merck Frosst ; Altair ; Amgen ; Asmacure ; Boehringer-Ingelheim ; Genentech ; Pharmaxis ; Schering ; Wyeth ; Ache ; Brazilian Research Council ; Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa da Bahia ; Fundacao Ciencia e Tecnologia ; Sociedade Portuguesa de Alergologia e Immunologia Clinica ; Abdi Ibrahim ; OrionPharma ; Nasonebs ; Merck ; McNeal ; Chiesi ; Nycomed ; Air Liquid Healthcare ; Mundipharma ; Almirall ; Kyorin ; Teva ; UK National Health Service ; Aerocrine ; AKL Ltd ; PREDICTA ; Swiss National Science Foundation ; MeDALL ; Global Allergy and Asthma European Network (GA 2LEN) ; Christine Kuthe Center for Allergy Research and Education ; Faes Farma ; Bial ; Johnson Johnson ; Sanofi ; HAD treasurer ; Innovative Medicine Initiative (EU) ; Helse Sor-Ost RHF (Southern and Eastern Norway Regional Health Authority) ; MEDA ; Alcon ; ISTA ; Thermo-Fisher ; Airsonett ; Medical Research Council ; Moulton Charitable Trust ; AB Science ; Canadian Institutes for Health Research ; AllerGen NCE ; Merck/Schering-Plough ; Circassia ; University Hospital ; Medical School of Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Mexico ; Children's Research Foundation (Ireland) ; Danone ; Food Standards Agency (United Kingdom) ; European Union (EU) ; DTG ; Netherlands Asthma Foundation ; Merck-Sharp-Dohme, Mexico ; Allerquim Mexico ; Abbott ; Apotex ; HRA ; MedImmune ; Schering-Plough ; Proctor Gamble ; Sunovion (Sepracor) ; Phadia ; Servier ; CSC JohnsonJohnson ; Oxygen Plus ; New Medics ; European Respiratory Society ; Societe de Pneumologie de Langue Francaise Asthma ; Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Labor ; Altana ; Takeda ; UCB ; Uriach advisory board ; NAPP ; Royal College of GPs Clinical Champion in Allergy ; Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) ; AnseII ; Bayer Schering ; OST ; Fujisawa ; IHAL ; Henkel ; Kryolan ; Leti ; MSO ; Procter and Gamble ; Sanofi-Aventis ; Scientific Advisory Board for the German Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology ; German Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection ; European Centre for Allergy Research Foundation (ECARF) ; Hop Arnaud Villeneuve, Dept Resp Dis, Univ Hosp, Montpellier, France ; INSERM, U1018, CESP Ctr Res Epidemiol & Populat Hlth, Resp & Environm Epidemiol Team, Villejuif, France ; McMaster Univ, Dept Clin Epidemiol & Biostat & Med, Hamilton, ON, Canada ; Med Univ Warsaw, Dept Prevent Environm Hazards & Allergol, Warsaw, Poland ; Univ Hosp Montpellier, Hop Arnaud Villeneuve, INSERM, U657, Montpellier, France ; Catholic Univ, Fac Med, Res Ctr Resp Med CIMER, Cordoba, Argentina ; Univ Genoa, Sch Specializat, Genoa, Italy ; Univ Ghent, Dept Otorhinolaryngol, Upper Airways Res Lab, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium ; CNR, Inst Translat Pharmacol, Rome, Italy ; Univ Naples 2, Naples, Italy ; Univ Laval, Inst Univ Cardiol & Pneumol Quebec, Quebec City, PQ, Canada ; Univ Genoa, Dept Internal Med, DIMI, I-16126 Genoa, Italy ; Creighton Univ, Dept Med, Div Allergy & Immunol, Omaha, NE 68178 USA ; Univ Fed Bahia, ProAR Nucleo Excelencia Asma, Salvador, BA, Brazil ; CNPq, Salvador, BA, Brazil ; Univ Amsterdam, Dept Otorhinolaryngol, NL-1012 WX Amsterdam, Netherlands ; Univ Amsterdam, Acad Med Ctr, Dept Otorhinolaryngol, NL-1105 AZ Amsterdam, Netherlands ; Univ Porto, Sch Med, Dept Hlth Informat & Decis Sci, P-4100 Oporto, Portugal ; Univ Porto, Sch Med, CINTESIS, P-4100 Oporto, Portugal ; Hosp S Joao & Inst, Dept Allergy, Oporto, Portugal ; Hosp CUF Porto, Oporto, Portugal ; Erasmus MC, Dept Internal Med, Sect Allergol, Rotterdam, Netherlands ; Univ Washington, Sch Med, Seattle, WA USA ; Helsinki Univ Hosp, Dept Allergy, Skin & Allergy Hosp, Helsinki, Finland ; GARD ARIA Coordinator, Geneva, Switzerland ; Med Univ Lodz, Dept Internal Med Asthma & Allergy, Barlicki Univ Hosp, Lodz, Poland ; Univ S Florida, Coll Med, Dept Internal Med, Div Allergy & Immunol, Tampa, FL 33612 USA ; James A Haley Vet Hosp, Tampa, FL USA ; Univ Oslo, Oslo Univ Hosp, Dept Paediat, Oslo, Norway ; CIBERES, IDIBAPS, Hosp Clin, Rhinol Unit,ENT Dept, Barcelona, Spain ; CIBERES, IDIBAPS, Hosp Clin, Smell Clin,ENT Dept, Barcelona, Spain ; Univ Chicago, Dept Otolaryngol Head & Neck Surg, Chicago, IL 60637 USA ; Alfred Hosp, Dept Allergy Immunol & Resp Med, Melbourne, Vic, Australia ; Monash Univ, Melbourne, Vic 3004, Australia ; Teikyo Univ, Sch Med, Dept Med, Div Resp Med & Allergol, Tokyo 173, Japan ; EFA European Federat Allergy & Airways Dis Patien, Brussels, Belgium ; Univ Athens, Dept Allergy, Pediat Clin 2, Athens, Greece ; Nippon Med Sch, Bunkyo Ku, Tokyo 113, Japan ; Univ Aberdeen, Dept Primary Care Resp Med, Aberdeen, Scotland ; Woodbrook Med Ctr, Loughborough, Leics, England ; Univ Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Midlothian, Scotland ; Univ Manitoba, Fac Med, Winnipeg, MB, Canada ; NIAID, Bethesda, MD 20892 USA ; Univ N Carolina, Sch Pharm, Chapel Hill, NC USA ; Celal Bayar Univ, Sch Med, Dept Pulmonol, Manisa, Turkey ; Allergy & Asthma Inst, Islamabad, Pakistan ; Med Univ Graz, Dept Dermatol, Graz, Austria ; Showa Univ, Sch Med, Div Allergol & Resp Med, Tokyo 142, Japan ; Transylvania Univ, Fac Med, Brasov, Romania ; Int Union TB & Lung Dis Union, Paris, France ; Univ Zurich, Swiss Inst Allergy & Asthma Res SIAF, Davos, Switzerland ; Minist Hlth, Publ Hosp Med Serv, Antananarivo, Madagascar ; INSERM, EPAR U707, Paris, France ; Univ Paris 06, EPAR, UMR S, Paris, France ; Hosp Quiron Bizkaia, Dept Allergy & Immunol, Erandio Bilbao, Spain ; Univ Cape Town, Dept Med, Fac Hlth Sci, Div Pulmonol, ZA-7925 Cape Town, South Africa ; WHO, Collaborating Ctr Asthma & Rhinitis, Montpellier, France ; Univ Modena & Reggio Emilia, Dept Oncol Hematol & Resp Dis, Modena, Italy ; Ctr Hosp Univ Rabta, Serv Pneumol Allergol, Tunis, Tunisia ; Univ Amsterdam, Acad Med Ctr, Dept Pulmonol, NL-1105 AZ Amsterdam, Netherlands ; Hop Mami, Ariana, Tunisia ; Bangladesh Lung Fdn, Dhaka, Bangladesh ; Natl Inst Dis Chest & Hosp, Dhaka, Bangladesh ; Charite, Dept Dermatol, Allergy Ctr Charite, D-13353 Berlin, Germany ; Univ Med Ctr, Dept Dermatol & Allergy, Bonn, Germany ; Odense Univ Hosp, Dept Dermatol, DK-5000 Odense, Denmark ; Odense Univ Hosp, Allergy Ctr, DK-5000 Odense, Denmark ; Univ Tennessee, Ctr Hlth Sci, Memphis, TN 38163 USA ; Univ Verona, Dept Paediat, I-37100 Verona, Italy ; Univ Laval, Fac Med, Quebec City, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada ; Hop Malbaie, La Malbaie, PQ, Canada ; Univ Leicester, Inst Lung Hlth, Leicester LE1 7RH, Leics, England ; Royal Brompton Hosp, Dept Paediat Resp Med, London SW3 6LY, England ; Univ London Imperial Coll Sci Technol & Med, Natl Heart & Lung Inst, Sect Allergy & Clin Immunol, London, England ; Ctr Med Docente La Trinidad Caracas, Dept Immunol, Caracas, Venezuela ; Univ Austral Chile, Fac Med, Dept Pediat, Valdivia, Chile ; Univ Fed Sao Joao del Rei, Hlth Sci Ctr, Hlth Sci Postgrad Program, Divinopolis, Brazil ; Univ Cartagena, Immunol Res Inst, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia ; So Calif Res, Mission Viejo, CA USA ; Metropolitan Univ Barranquilla, Allergy & Immunol Lab, Barranquilla, Colombia ; IRCCS San Raffaele Pisana, Rome, Italy ; Univ Cattolica Sacro Cuore, Dept Thorac Surg, Rome, Italy ; Leiden Univ, Med Ctr, Dept Publ Hlth & Primary Care, Leiden, Netherlands ; Capital Inst Pediat, Asthma Clin, Natl Cooperat Grp Pediat Res Asthma, Beijing, Peoples R China ; Capital Inst Pediat, Educ Ctr, Beijing, Peoples R China ; Ctr Asthma Res & Educ, Beijing, Peoples R China ; Hop Arnaud Villeneuve, Univ Hosp, Allergy Unit, Montpellier, France ; Univ Hosp, Dept Allergol, Sch Med CEU San Pablo Madrid, Madrid, Spain ; Georgian Natl Univ, AIETI Med Sch, SEU Clin, Med Ctr, Tbilisi, Rep of Georgia ; Univ Genoa, Dept Internal Med, IRCCS Azienda Osped Univ San Martino, I-16126 Genoa, Italy ; Univ Montpellier I, Primary Care Dept, Montpellier, France ; Nova SE Univ, Coll Osteopath Med, Davie, FL USA ; Univ Manchester, Manchester, Lancs, England ; Aarhus Univ Hosp, Dept Resp Dis, DK-8000 Aarhus, Denmark ; Tech Univ Munich, Dept Dermatol & Allergy Biederstein, Munich, Germany ; TUM, Div Environm Dermatol, Munich, Germany ; TUM, Allergy Helmholtz Ctr, Munich, Germany ; Univ Hosp Strasbourg, Chest Dis Dept, Div Pulmonol Asthma & Allergol, Strasbourg, France ; Univ Med & Pharm Iuliu Hatieganu, Dept Allergy, Med Clin 3, Romanian Soc Allergy & Clin Immunol, Cluj Napoca, Romania ; McMaster Univ, AllerGen NCE, Dept Med, Hamilton, ON, Canada ; McMaster Univ, AllerGen NCE, Michael G DeGroote Sch Med, Div Clin Immunol & Allergy,Fac Hlth Sci, Hamilton, ON, Canada ; Univ Versailles St Quentin, Hop Foch, UPRES EA 220, Suresnes, France ; Ctr Hosp Reg Annecy, Serv Pneumol, Annecy, France ; Univ Ss Cyril & Methodius, Univ Clin Pulmonol & Allergy, Skopje, Macedonia ; Georgia Hlth Sci Univ, Augusta, GA USA ; Ctr Hosp Univ Beni Messous, Serv Pneumoallergol, Algiers, Algeria ; Vilnius Univ, Fac Med, Collaborating Ctr GA2LEN, Vilnius, Lithuania ; Univ London Imperial Coll Sci Technol & Med, Natl Heart & Lung Inst, London, England ; Wake Forest Univ, Bowman Gray Sch Med, Winston Salem, NC USA ; Ain Shams Univ, Childrens Hosp, Pediat Allergy & Immunol Unit, Cairo, Egypt ; Egyptian Soc Pediat Allergy & Immunol, Cairo, Egypt ; Soc Marocaine Malad Resp, Casablanca, Morocco ; Ctr Resp Dis & Allergy, Casablanca, Morocco ; Vilnius Univ, Fac Med, Vilnius, Lithuania ; Univ Milan, Sch Med, Melloni Hosp, Milan, Italy ; Educ Hlth, Warwick, England ; Dokkyo Med Univ, Mibu, Tochigi, Japan ; WHO, Country Off Georgia, Tbilisi, Rep of Georgia ; Clin Ricardo Palma, Lima, Peru ; Univ Nuevo Leon UANL, Hosp Univ, Fac Med, Monterrey, Mexico ; Ctr Allergy & Immunol, Tbilisi, Rep of Georgia ; Clin Hosp Univ Chile, Dept Med, Immunol & Allergol Div, Santiago, Chile ; Univ Hosp Leuven, Dept Otorhinolaryngol Head & Neck Surg, Louvain, Belgium ; Cent Reg Denmark, Ctr Publ Hlth & Qual Improvement, Aarhus, Denmark ; Allergy Ctr Vienna W, Vienna, Austria ; Natl Univ Ireland Univ Coll Cork, Dept Paediat & Child Hlth, Cork, Ireland ; Univ Southampton, Fac Med, Southampton SO9 5NH, Hants, England ; Univ Paris 11, Serv Pneumol, Hop Antoine Beclere, AP HP,INSERM,U999, Clamart, France ; Salvador Univ, Sch Med, Dept Immunol, Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina ; Univ St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland ; Univ Paris, APHP, Ctr Asthme & Allergies, Grp Hosp Trousseau La Roche Guyon, F-75252 Paris, France ; Hacettepe Univ, Sch Med, Pediat Allergy & Asthma Unit, Ankara, Turkey ; George Washington Univ, Sch Med, Washington, DC USA ; Inst Asthma & Allergy, Chevy Chase, MD USA ; Hacettepe Univ Hosp, Dept Chest Dis, Adult Allergy Unit, Ankara, Turkey ; Charite, Inst Social Med Epidemiol & Hlth Econ, D-13353 Berlin, Germany ; McMaster Univ, Hamilton, ON, Canada ; Hotel Dieu France, Serv Pneumol & Reanimat Med, Beirut, Lebanon ; Univ St Joseph, Fac Med, Beirut, Lebanon ; Natl Med Ctr, Seoul, South Korea ; Seoul Natl Univ, Seoul, South Korea ; Korea Asthma Allergy Fdn, Seoul, South Korea ; Ctr Hosp Univ, Serv Malad Resp, Abidjan, Cote Ivoire ; Univ Groningen, Univ Med Ctr Groningen, GRIAC Res Inst, Beatrix Childrens Hosp,Dept Pediat Pulmonol & Ped, Groningen, Netherlands ; Med Univ Lodz, Dept Immunol Rheumatol & Allergy, Lodz, Poland ; Karolinska Inst, Dept Clin Sci & Educ, Stockholm, Sweden ; Karolinska Inst, Sachs Childrens Hosp, Stockholm, Sweden ; Vilnius Univ, Ctr Pulmonol & Allergol, Vilnius, Lithuania ; Vilnius Univ Hosp Santariskiu Klinikos, Vilnius, Lithuania ; Hosp Med Sur, Dept Allergy, Mexico City, DF, Mexico ; Univ Med & Pharm, Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam ; Hop Sacre Coeur Montreal, Montreal, PQ, Canada ; Univ Montreal, Montreal, PQ, Canada ; Guangzhou Med Univ, Affiliated Hosp 1, State Key Lab Resp Dis, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China ; Univ Tennessee, Coll Med, Memphis, TN USA ; Univ Dundee, Ninewells Hosp, Asthma & Allergy Res Grp, Dundee, Scotland ; Dubai Hlth Author, Sharjah, U Arab Emirates ; Univ Sharjah, Sharjah, U Arab Emirates ; Univ Mississippi, Med Ctr, Div Clin Immunol & Allergy, Jackson, MS 39216 USA ; Univ Arizona, Coll Med, Arizona Resp Ctr, Tucson, AZ USA ; Univ Arizona, Inst BIO5, Tucson, AZ USA ; Shahid Beheshti Univ Med Sci, NRITLD, Tehran, Iran ; Shahid Beheshti Univ Med Sci, Chron Resp Dis Res Ctr, Tehran, Iran ; Charite, Dept Dermatol & Allergy, D-13353 Berlin, Germany ; Maputo Cent Hosp, Dept Peadiat, Maputo, Mozambique ; Eduardo Mondlane Univ, Fac Med, Maputo, Mozambique ; Childrens Hosp La Fe, Unit Pediat Allergy & Pneumol, Valencia, Spain ; Karolinska Inst, Inst Environm Med, S-10401 Stockholm, Sweden ; Karolinska Univ Hosp, Astrid Lindgren Childrens Hosp, Stockholm, Sweden ; Univ Calif San Diego, Allergy & Asthma Med Grp, San Diego, CA 92103 USA ; Univ Calif San Diego, Res Ctr, San Diego, CA 92103 USA ; IMSS, Dept Allergy & Clin Immunol, Ctr Med Nacl Siglo 21, Mexico City, DF, Mexico ; Univ Aachen, Dept Dermatol, Aachen, Germany ; Inst Pneumol Marius Nasta, Bucharest, Romania ; Tishreen Univ, Sch Med, Dept Internal Med, WHO EMRO Collaborating Ctr Training & Res Chron R, Latakia, Syria ; CUF Descobertas Hosp, Immunoallergy Dept, Lisbon, Portugal ; Univ Padua, Dept Pediat, Food Allergy Referral Ctr Veneto Reg, Padua, Italy ; Mustapha Hosp, Algiers, Algeria ; Sci Ctr Childrens Hlth RAMS, Moscow, Russia ; Hosp Hospitaller Bros Buda, Budapest, Hungary ; Charite, Allergie Ctr Charite ECARF, Dept Dermatol Venerol & Allergy, D-13353 Berlin, Germany ; German Red Cross Hosp Westend, Berlin, Germany ; Jagiellonian Univ, Sch Med, Dept Pulmonol, Krakow, Poland ; Kinshasa Univ, ENT Dept, Kinshasa, Zaire ; Chiba Univ Hosp, Dept Otorhinolaryngol, Chiba, Japan ; Nippon Med Sch, Dept Otolaryngol, Bunkyo Ku, Tokyo 113, Japan ; Ctr Hosp Univ Pediat Charles de Gaulle, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso ; Marmara Univ, Div Pediat Allergy & Immunol, Istanbul, Turkey ; Mem Hlth Grp, Istanbul, Turkey ; Charles Univ Prague, Fac Med Plzen, Dept Immunol & Allergol, Prague, Czech Republic ; MESSERLI Res Inst, Vienna, Austria ; Med Univ Vienna, Univ Vet Med Vienna, Vienna, Austria ; Univ Vienna, Vienna, Austria ; Ajou Univ, Sch Med, Suwon 441749, South Korea ; NICE, Paris, France ; Soc Pneumol Langue Francaise, Paris, France ; Krankenhaus Hietzing, Karl Landsteiner Inst Expt & Clin Pneumol, Dept Pulm Med, Vienna, Austria ; Alexanders Univ Hosp, Clin Allergy & Asthma, Sofia, Bulgaria ; 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L'objectiu de la tesi es centra en la definició, en l'àmbit de l'ordenament comunitari, de l'actual estatut jurídic dels treballadors extracomunitaris assalariats que formen part del mercat de treball regular d'un Estat membre. Els treballadors nacionals de tercers països que formen part del mercat de treball regular d'un Estat comunitari, així com els membres de les seves famílies, gaudeixen d'un estatut jurídic fragmentat: els seus drets són variables, depenen de la norma que els regula. En aquest sentit, la situació varia en funció de la llei interna de l'Estat d'acollida, l'existència o no d'acords bilaterals entre l'Estat d'acollida i l'Estat d'origen, i les normes de dret comunitari. Aquesta situació també és diferent atenent a l'existència i el contingut d'un acord extern celebrat per la Comunitat i els seus Estats membres i el país de la nacionalitat de l'immigrant, aquest aspecte centra el present estudi. Els acords que s'analitzen són aquells que juntament amb aspectes econòmics, contenen disposicions relatives als treballadors, i que s'han celebrat, prenent com a base jurídica l'actual article 310 TCE, amb països geogràficament fronterers amb la Unió Europea. D'entre ells, el model a seguir és l'Acord d'Associació amb Turquia, que preveu uns objectius més amplis, com ara la creació d'una unió duanera enfront a la zona de lliure comerç prevista en els altres acords i que s'ha desenvolupat mitjançant les decisions adoptades pel seu Consell d'Associació. Aquest acord ha estat objecte d'una àmplia jurisprudència per part del Tribunal europeu, relativa a l'aplicació i la interpretació de les seves disposicions. A fi de delimitar l'abast de les disposicions de l'Acord, i valorar si es tracta d'un estatut privilegiat respecte del dels altres treballadors extracomunitaris, es comparen les seves disposicions amb les corresponents a les dels acords celebrats amb els països del Magreb, entenent per aquests el Marroc, Tunísia i Algèria i amb els 10 països d' Europa Central i Oriental (els anomenats PECO's). A fi de clarificar l'estatut jurídic dels treballadors extracomunitaris, és necessari entrar a considerar altres aspectes directament relacionats amb aquest estatut, com són les condicions d'accés i de permanència en un Estat, matèries, que, fins a l'entrada en vigor del Tractat d'Amsterdam, eren competència exclusiva de cadascun dels Estats membres. De totes maneres, no es fa un estudi comparatiu de les diferents legislacions internes en matèria d'immigració, donat que l'àmbit d'anàlisi es limita a l'ordenament comunitari, i no a l'ordenament intern. La tesi s'estructura en dues parts diferenciades, correspon la primera als 2 Capítols inicials i la segona als altres 3. En els dos primers Capítols se segueix un criteri cronològic, començant amb el Tractat de Roma i culminant amb el Tractat de Niça. En aquests Capítols s'analitzen les possibles bases jurídiques del dret originari que podien haver-se utilitzat, així com la cooperació que varen fer els Estats membres, tant a dins com a fora, de la Unió Europea, en relació a les mesures adoptades destinades a la regulació de l'accés i de l'estatut jurídic dels treballadors immigrants. L'entrada en vigor, l'1 de maig de 1999 del Tractat d'Amsterdam ha suposat un important avenç per a l'atribució de competències a la Comunitat en matèria d'immigració, que queda vinculada al nou objectiu de la creació de l'espai de llibertat, seguretat i justícia. A partir d'aquest moment, s'assumeix la lliure circulació de persones com objectiu propi, que requereix la regulació del control a les fronteres externes, d'asil, de la immigració i de la cooperació dels Estats membres en la prevenció i la lluita contra la delinqüència. Això es concreta en la comunitarització d'una part del Tercer Pilar destinada a visats, asil i immigració, amb l'exclusió del Regne Unit, Irlanda i Dinamarca, i en la integració del cabal Schengen a l'estructura de la Unió Europea, tot i que permetent una exclusió per al Regne Unit i Irlanda. Es crea, doncs, una cooperació sui generis plena de solucions d'enginyeria jurídica, que si bé suposa un avenç, trenca la unitat i l'homogeneïtat del dret comunitari. Tot i aquestes complexitats tècniques que deriven de la reforma del Tractat d'Amsterdam, el nou article 63 en els seus apartats 3 i 4 permet abordar, a través de la coordinació o de l'harmonització, els temes d'interès comú vinculats al fenomen de la immigració. Entre ells, hi ha la possibilitat d'elaborar un estatut comú per als treballadors no comunitaris. Les iniciatives legislatives presentades des de l'entrada en vigor del Tractat d'Amsterdam demostren l'acceleració en l'elaboració i el desenvolupament d'una política comunitària d'immigració, integrada en uns objectius comuns, per primera vegada sembla realista pensar en l'adopció d'un estatut jurídic únic per l'extracomunitari que sigui resident de llarga durada. Tot i que aquest estatut pot quedar configurat com un estàndard mínim de protecció, considero que la seva adopció constituiria un pas de gran rellevància en la clarificació dels drets d'aquest col·lectiu de treballadors. Els altres tres Capítols conformen la segona part de la tesi, dedicada a analitzar l'actual estatut dels treballadors nacionals de tercers Estats. Aquest estatut es caracteritza pel seu caràcter fragmentat, que deriva de la diversitat de les disposicions contingudes en els acords externs. Mitjançant un estudi comparatiu, s'analitzen els objectius, l'estructura, els antecedents i el desenvolupament dels acords celebrats amb Turquia, amb els països del Magreb i amb els PECO's. El contingut dels objectius d'aquests acords constata que ens trobem davant 3 models diferents que reflecteixen una disminució del compromís comunitari. El Tribunal de Justícia, en la seva jurisprudència, ha manifestat que tant els acords externs celebrats per la Comunitat, com les decisions adoptades pels òrgans que els desenvolupen, formen part de l'ordenament jurídic comunitari. El Tribunal de Justícia és l'òrgan competent per interpretar-los, contribuint a clarificar el contingut d'aquests instruments jurídics. Aquesta perspectiva es completa amb l'anàlisi de les nocions que recullen els acords externs, a fi de dilucidar si un mateix terme té idèntic contingut, i si, tot i la diversitat dels instruments jurídics utilitzats, tenen una mateixa interpretació jurisprudencial. Per aquest motiu ha estat necessari, que el Tribunal de Justícia determinés l'abast dels diferents conceptes emprats, i clarifiqués si és el mateix que el relatiu als treballadors comunitaris o és diferent. La redacció dels acords estudiats reflecteix un estatut jurídic privilegiat per als treballadors turcs en relació als altres treballadors immigrants. Els treballadors originaris dels països d'Europa Central i Oriental o del Magreb, podran millorar la seva situació actual en la mesura en què les disposicions dels seus respectius acords siguin, en el futur, desenvolupades. De totes maneres, aquesta situació de privilegi que ha estat un fet fins el moment actual, ha canviat amb l'entrada en vigor de diferents lleis d'estrangeria estatals, i pot modificar-se, també, amb el desenvolupament del Tractat d'Amsterdam. Actualment, a un treballador turc li perjudica, més que no beneficia el sistema de terminis que per accedir a un lloc de treball preveu la Decisió 1/80. Els treballadors turcs que formen part del mercat regular de treball d'un Estat membre haurien de quedar protegits pel règim jurídic que els sigui més beneficiós, amb independència de que aquest sigui l'intern de l'Estat d'acollida, el comunitari previst a l'Acord d'Associació i el seu posterior desenvolupament, o el que derivi de les futures directives quan entrin en vigor. Si bé aquestes disposicions dels Acords d'Associació varen ser positives, actualment hauran de ser objecte de modificació, la qual cosa no implica la seva desaparició. El seu contingut haurà de tendir a ressaltar l'especificitat de les relacions que es volen establir amb un tercer Estat concret, establint en aquest sentit un tractament preferent als seus nacionals enfront als altres immigrants, i reconeixent el seu dret de residència com derivat del permís de treball. De tota manera, amb l'entrada en vigor de la directiva relativa a l'estatut dels residents de llarga durada, aquest règim privilegiat només afectarà als immigrants residents legals a l'Estat d'acollida durant els primers 5 anys, és a dir, abans de que se'ls concedeixi el citat estatut. ; La tesis doctoral pretende determinar el estatuto jurídico de los trabajadores extracomunitarios, tomando como modelo de referencia la situación jurídica que el ordenamiento comunitario otorga a los trabajadores turcos que forman parte del mercado de trabajo regular de un Estado miembro de la Unión Europea, y comparando su situación con la de los trabajadores provenientes de los países del Magreb y de Europa Central y Oriental regulada en los correspondientes acuerdos Euromediterráneos y Europeos. Los dos primeros capítulos se destinan al análisis de las posibles bases jurídicas a utilizar por la Comunidad Económica Europea en su momento, y la actual Comunidad Europea y la unión Europea para definir el alcance de los derechos que se atribuyen al colectivo de trabajadores extracomunitarios. Debido a la estrecha relación entre el estatuto jurídico de este colectivo y el estatuto jurídico general de los immigrantes, las medidas relativas a las condiciones de acceso también son objeto de atención, aunque solamente con la finalidad de contribuir a la concreción del objetivo fundamental de la tesis. Des estea primera parte de la tesis, se desprende que el principal instrumento jurídico utilizado hasta la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Amsterdam han sido los acuerdos concluidos por la Comunidad y sus Estados miembros por una partey un Tercer Estado por otra, a su análisis se dedica la segunda parte de la tesis doctoral. A fin de interpretar correctamente las disposiciones de los acuerdos externos relativas a los trabajadores inmigrantes, en el tercer capítulo se lleva a cabo un estudio comprativo de los objetivos, etapas, instituciones, y desarrollo de los diversos acuerdos, así como de las características de estas disposiciones y de las decisiones que se desarrollan. El capítulo cuarto se destina a las nociones conceptuales que se utilizan, determinando sus semejanzas y diferencias con los conceptos comunitarios. Este capítulo sirve de base para el siguiente destinado a la interpretación que, de las diversas disposiciones de los acuerdos, ha llevado a cabo el Tribunal de Justicia. ; The aim of the thesis is centred on the definition, within European Community regulations, of the current statutory juridical status of employed workers who are from outside the European Community who form part of the employment market in a European Community state. The workers from non-European Community states, who form part of the regular employment market of a member state, as well as the members of their families, possess a fragmentary judicial statute: their rights are variable depending on the regulation which they are subject to. In this sense the situation varies and is dependent on the internal laws of the receiving state, the absence of bilateral agreements between the receiving state and the state of origin and the procedures and regulations of Community law. This situation will also vary depending on the existence and the content of an external agreement made by the Community and its member states and the country of origin of the immigrant. This study focuses on this aspect. The agreements which are analysed here are those which, along with economic aspects, contain provisions relating to the workers which have been adopted, taking as its juridical base the current article 310 European Community Treaty (ECT), with countries which border geographically with the European Union. Amongst them, the model to be followed is the Agreement of Association with Turkey, which foresees broader objectives, such as the creation of a customs union, in line with the area of free trade envisioned by other agreements, and which has been developed in the decisions adopted by its Council of Association. This aforementioned agreement has been the object of abundant jurisprudence relating to the application and interpretation of its provisions, in the European Court in order to define the scope of the provisions of the agreement and also asses whether we are dealing with a privileged status in contrast with other workers coming from countries outside the European Union. These provisions will be compared with those affecting the countries of Magreb, by which we mean Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria and the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In order to clarifying the juridical status of workers from outside the European Community other aspects directly relating to this statute must be considered. These include the conditions of access and residence in a state, subjects which until the application of the Treaty of Amsterdam were the exclusive province of each one of the member states. However, this is not a comparative study of different areas of internal legislation regarding immigration, given that the area of analysis is restricted to European Community regulations and not to internal regulations. The thesis is structured in two different parts, which correspond, in the first case, to the first two Chapters and, in the second, to the remaining three Chapters. In the first two Chapters the criteria are chronological, beginning with the Treaty of Rome and ending with the Treaty of Nice. In these Chapters the original juridical bases which could have been utilised, as well as the co-operation exercised by the member states, both within and outside the European Union are analyzed, in relation to the measures adopted and destined to the regulation of access and the juridical status of immigrant workers. The implementation, on 1st May 1999, of the Treaty of Amsterdam has signified an important step forward towards the attribution of jurisdictional competence in the Community on matters relating to immigration which remain linked to the new objective of creating an area of freedom, safety and justice. From this point on, the free movement of people is assumed as an aim. This requires the regulation of border controls, of asylum, of immigration and co-operation in the struggle to prevent delinquency. This is specified in the comunitarization of a part of the Third Pillar regarding visas, asylum and immigration, excluding the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, and in the integration of "acquis" Schengen in the structure of the European Union albeit at the cost of excluding the United Kingdom and Ireland. An area of co-operation has been created, sui generis, complete with juridical engineering solutions, which, while signifying an advance, break the unity and homogeneity of Community law. Despite all the technical complexities that derive from the Treaty of Amsterdam, the new article 63 and clauses, 3 and 4 enable the Community to assume areas of common interest linked to the phenomenon of immigration through co-ordination and harmonisation. Amongst these, there is the possibility of formulating a common statute for workers who are not members of the European Community. The legislative initiatives which have been presented since the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam show the acceleration in the formulation and development of a community policy of immigration, integrated within some common objectives. For the first time, it seems realistic to envision the adoption of a sole juridical statute for the non-community worker who is a long-term resident. Despite the fact that this statute might be characterised as a minimum standard of protection, I believe that the adoption of such a statute would constitute a great step forward in the clarification of the rights of this collective of workers. The remaining three chapters form the second part of the thesis which is dedicated to analysing the present status of workers from other states outside the European Community. This status is characterised by its fragmentary nature, which derives from the diversity of the provisions contained in external agreements. The objectives, structure antecedents and development of the agreements formulated in agreement with Turkey with the countries of the Magreb and with the countries of east and central Europe (PECO's) were analyzed by means of a comparative study. The content of the objectives of the said agreements alleges that we find ourselves facing three different models that reflect a gradual diminishing of the European commitment to safeguarding the status of the immigrant worker. The Court of Justice in its jurisprudence has manifested that both those external agreements adopted by the Community, as well as the decisions taken by the organs which develop them, form part of the juridical regulations of the community. It is the Court of Justice which is the organ most competent to interpret these provisions, contributing to the clarification of the content of these juridical instruments. This perspective will be complemented with the analysis of the notions which take into account external agreements. The aim of this study is to clarify whether the same term has the same content in each agreement and if, despite the diversity of the juridical instruments used, they have the same interpretation in jurisprudence. In order to do this, it has been necessary, for the Court of Justice to determine the scope of the different concepts employed and to clarify whether it applies to the workers of the community or if differs significantly. The drawing up of the agreements studied reflects a privileged juridical status for Turkish workers in comparison with other immigrants. The immigrants who come from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Magreb can improve their current situation in as far as the provisions of their respective agreements are developed in the future. However, this privileged situation which has been a fact to date, has changed with the implementation of immigration laws in different states. These may be modified in addition to and following on from the development of the Treaty of Amsterdam. At present, a Turkish worker is affected adversely rather than benefiting from the system of quotas to gain access to a job in accordance with Decision 1/80. The Turkish workers who form part of the regular employment market in a member state should be protected by the juridical ruling which is most beneficial to them, independent of the fact that this may be the internal ruling of the receiving state, the community member foreseen in the Agreement of Association and its latter development, or that which is derived from future directives when they are in force. If the provisions from agreements of association were initially positive they should have be the object of modification, which should not imply their disappearance. Their content should stress the specificity of the relationships which they wish to establish with a third state, in this sense establishing favourable treatment for these nationals as opposed to other immigrants and recognising their right of residence as well as their right to obtain a work permit. However, with the implementation of the directive regarding the status of immigrants who are long term residents, this privileged status only affects those immigrants who are legally resident in the receiving state for the first five years, that is to say before they are given the cited statute.

L'objectiu de la tesi es centra en la definició, en l'àmbit de l'ordenament comunitari, de l'actual estatut jurídic dels treballadors extracomunitaris assalariats que formen part del mercat de treball regular d'un Estat membre. Els treballadors nacionals de tercers països que formen part del mercat de treball regular d'un Estat comunitari, així com els membres de les seves famílies, gaudeixen d'un estatut jurídic fragmentat: els seus drets són variables, depenen de la norma que els regula. En aquest sentit, la situació varia en funció de la llei interna de l'Estat d'acollida, l'existència o no d'acords bilaterals entre l'Estat d'acollida i l'Estat d'origen, i les normes de dret comunitari. Aquesta situació també és diferent atenent a l'existència i el contingut d'un acord extern celebrat per la Comunitat i els seus Estats membres i el país de la nacionalitat de l'immigrant, aquest aspecte centra el present estudi. Els acords que s'analitzen són aquells que juntament amb aspectes econòmics, contenen disposicions relatives als treballadors, i que s'han celebrat, prenent com a base jurídica l'actual article 310 TCE, amb països geogràficament fronterers amb la Unió Europea. D'entre ells, el model a seguir és l'Acord d'Associació amb Turquia, que preveu uns objectius més amplis, com ara la creació d'una unió duanera enfront a la zona de lliure comerç prevista en els altres acords i que s'ha desenvolupat mitjançant les decisions adoptades pel seu Consell d'Associació. Aquest acord ha estat objecte d'una àmplia jurisprudència per part del Tribunal europeu, relativa a l'aplicació i la interpretació de les seves disposicions. A fi de delimitar l'abast de les disposicions de l'Acord, i valorar si es tracta d'un estatut privilegiat respecte del dels altres treballadors extracomunitaris, es comparen les seves disposicions amb les corresponents a les dels acords celebrats amb els països del Magreb, entenent per aquests el Marroc, Tunísia i Algèria i amb els 10 països d' Europa Central i Oriental (els anomenats PECO's). A fi de clarificar l'estatut jurídic dels treballadors extracomunitaris, és necessari entrar a considerar altres aspectes directament relacionats amb aquest estatut, com són les condicions d'accés i de permanència en un Estat, matèries, que, fins a l'entrada en vigor del Tractat d'Amsterdam, eren competència exclusiva de cadascun dels Estats membres. De totes maneres, no es fa un estudi comparatiu de les diferents legislacions internes en matèria d'immigració, donat que l'àmbit d'anàlisi es limita a l'ordenament comunitari, i no a l'ordenament intern. La tesi s'estructura en dues parts diferenciades, correspon la primera als 2 Capítols inicials i la segona als altres 3. En els dos primers Capítols se segueix un criteri cronològic, començant amb el Tractat de Roma i culminant amb el Tractat de Niça. En aquests Capítols s'analitzen les possibles bases jurídiques del dret originari que podien haver-se utilitzat, així com la cooperació que varen fer els Estats membres, tant a dins com a fora, de la Unió Europea, en relació a les mesures adoptades destinades a la regulació de l'accés i de l'estatut jurídic dels treballadors immigrants. L'entrada en vigor, l'1 de maig de 1999 del Tractat d'Amsterdam ha suposat un important avenç per a l'atribució de competències a la Comunitat en matèria d'immigració, que queda vinculada al nou objectiu de la creació de l'espai de llibertat, seguretat i justícia. A partir d'aquest moment, s'assumeix la lliure circulació de persones com objectiu propi, que requereix la regulació del control a les fronteres externes, d'asil, de la immigració i de la cooperació dels Estats membres en la prevenció i la lluita contra la delinqüència. Això es concreta en la comunitarització d'una part del Tercer Pilar destinada a visats, asil i immigració, amb l'exclusió del Regne Unit, Irlanda i Dinamarca, i en la integració del cabal Schengen a l'estructura de la Unió Europea, tot i que permetent una exclusió per al Regne Unit i Irlanda. Es crea, doncs, una cooperació sui generis plena de solucions d'enginyeria jurídica, que si bé suposa un avenç, trenca la unitat i l'homogeneïtat del dret comunitari. Tot i aquestes complexitats tècniques que deriven de la reforma del Tractat d'Amsterdam, el nou article 63 en els seus apartats 3 i 4 permet abordar, a través de la coordinació o de l'harmonització, els temes d'interès comú vinculats al fenomen de la immigració. Entre ells, hi ha la possibilitat d'elaborar un estatut comú per als treballadors no comunitaris. Les iniciatives legislatives presentades des de l'entrada en vigor del Tractat d'Amsterdam demostren l'acceleració en l'elaboració i el desenvolupament d'una política comunitària d'immigració, integrada en uns objectius comuns, per primera vegada sembla realista pensar en l'adopció d'un estatut jurídic únic per l'extracomunitari que sigui resident de llarga durada. Tot i que aquest estatut pot quedar configurat com un estàndard mínim de protecció, considero que la seva adopció constituiria un pas de gran rellevància en la clarificació dels drets d'aquest col·lectiu de treballadors. Els altres tres Capítols conformen la segona part de la tesi, dedicada a analitzar l'actual estatut dels treballadors nacionals de tercers Estats. Aquest estatut es caracteritza pel seu caràcter fragmentat, que deriva de la diversitat de les disposicions contingudes en els acords externs. Mitjançant un estudi comparatiu, s'analitzen els objectius, l'estructura, els antecedents i el desenvolupament dels acords celebrats amb Turquia, amb els països del Magreb i amb els PECO's. El contingut dels objectius d'aquests acords constata que ens trobem davant 3 models diferents que reflecteixen una disminució del compromís comunitari. El Tribunal de Justícia, en la seva jurisprudència, ha manifestat que tant els acords externs celebrats per la Comunitat, com les decisions adoptades pels òrgans que els desenvolupen, formen part de l'ordenament jurídic comunitari. El Tribunal de Justícia és l'òrgan competent per interpretar-los, contribuint a clarificar el contingut d'aquests instruments jurídics. Aquesta perspectiva es completa amb l'anàlisi de les nocions que recullen els acords externs, a fi de dilucidar si un mateix terme té idèntic contingut, i si, tot i la diversitat dels instruments jurídics utilitzats, tenen una mateixa interpretació jurisprudencial. Per aquest motiu ha estat necessari, que el Tribunal de Justícia determinés l'abast dels diferents conceptes emprats, i clarifiqués si és el mateix que el relatiu als treballadors comunitaris o és diferent. La redacció dels acords estudiats reflecteix un estatut jurídic privilegiat per als treballadors turcs en relació als altres treballadors immigrants. Els treballadors originaris dels països d'Europa Central i Oriental o del Magreb, podran millorar la seva situació actual en la mesura en què les disposicions dels seus respectius acords siguin, en el futur, desenvolupades. De totes maneres, aquesta situació de privilegi que ha estat un fet fins el moment actual, ha canviat amb l'entrada en vigor de diferents lleis d'estrangeria estatals, i pot modificar-se, també, amb el desenvolupament del Tractat d'Amsterdam. Actualment, a un treballador turc li perjudica, més que no beneficia el sistema de terminis que per accedir a un lloc de treball preveu la Decisió 1/80. Els treballadors turcs que formen part del mercat regular de treball d'un Estat membre haurien de quedar protegits pel règim jurídic que els sigui més beneficiós, amb independència de que aquest sigui l'intern de l'Estat d'acollida, el comunitari previst a l'Acord d'Associació i el seu posterior desenvolupament, o el que derivi de les futures directives quan entrin en vigor. Si bé aquestes disposicions dels Acords d'Associació varen ser positives, actualment hauran de ser objecte de modificació, la qual cosa no implica la seva desaparició. El seu contingut haurà de tendir a ressaltar l'especificitat de les relacions que es volen establir amb un tercer Estat concret, establint en aquest sentit un tractament preferent als seus nacionals enfront als altres immigrants, i reconeixent el seu dret de residència com derivat del permís de treball. De tota manera, amb l'entrada en vigor de la directiva relativa a l'estatut dels residents de llarga durada, aquest règim privilegiat només afectarà als immigrants residents legals a l'Estat d'acollida durant els primers 5 anys, és a dir, abans de que se'ls concedeixi el citat estatut. ; La tesis doctoral pretende determinar el estatuto jurídico de los trabajadores extracomunitarios, tomando como modelo de referencia la situación jurídica que el ordenamiento comunitario otorga a los trabajadores turcos que forman parte del mercado de trabajo regular de un Estado miembro de la Unión Europea, y comparando su situación con la de los trabajadores provenientes de los países del Magreb y de Europa Central y Oriental regulada en los correspondientes acuerdos Euromediterráneos y Europeos. Los dos primeros capítulos se destinan al análisis de las posibles bases jurídicas a utilizar por la Comunidad Económica Europea en su momento, y la actual Comunidad Europea y la unión Europea para definir el alcance de los derechos que se atribuyen al colectivo de trabajadores extracomunitarios. Debido a la estrecha relación entre el estatuto jurídico de este colectivo y el estatuto jurídico general de los immigrantes, las medidas relativas a las condiciones de acceso también son objeto de atención, aunque solamente con la finalidad de contribuir a la concreción del objetivo fundamental de la tesis. Des estea primera parte de la tesis, se desprende que el principal instrumento jurídico utilizado hasta la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Amsterdam han sido los acuerdos concluidos por la Comunidad y sus Estados miembros por una partey un Tercer Estado por otra, a su análisis se dedica la segunda parte de la tesis doctoral. A fin de interpretar correctamente las disposiciones de los acuerdos externos relativas a los trabajadores inmigrantes, en el tercer capítulo se lleva a cabo un estudio comprativo de los objetivos, etapas, instituciones, y desarrollo de los diversos acuerdos, así como de las características de estas disposiciones y de las decisiones que se desarrollan. El capítulo cuarto se destina a las nociones conceptuales que se utilizan, determinando sus semejanzas y diferencias con los conceptos comunitarios. Este capítulo sirve de base para el siguiente destinado a la interpretación que, de las diversas disposiciones de los acuerdos, ha llevado a cabo el Tribunal de Justicia. ; The aim of the thesis is centred on the definition, within European Community regulations, of the current statutory juridical status of employed workers who are from outside the European Community who form part of the employment market in a European Community state. The workers from non-European Community states, who form part of the regular employment market of a member state, as well as the members of their families, possess a fragmentary judicial statute: their rights are variable depending on the regulation which they are subject to. In this sense the situation varies and is dependent on the internal laws of the receiving state, the absence of bilateral agreements between the receiving state and the state of origin and the procedures and regulations of Community law. This situation will also vary depending on the existence and the content of an external agreement made by the Community and its member states and the country of origin of the immigrant. This study focuses on this aspect. The agreements which are analysed here are those which, along with economic aspects, contain provisions relating to the workers which have been adopted, taking as its juridical base the current article 310 European Community Treaty (ECT), with countries which border geographically with the European Union. Amongst them, the model to be followed is the Agreement of Association with Turkey, which foresees broader objectives, such as the creation of a customs union, in line with the area of free trade envisioned by other agreements, and which has been developed in the decisions adopted by its Council of Association. This aforementioned agreement has been the object of abundant jurisprudence relating to the application and interpretation of its provisions, in the European Court in order to define the scope of the provisions of the agreement and also asses whether we are dealing with a privileged status in contrast with other workers coming from countries outside the European Union. These provisions will be compared with those affecting the countries of Magreb, by which we mean Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria and the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In order to clarifying the juridical status of workers from outside the European Community other aspects directly relating to this statute must be considered. These include the conditions of access and residence in a state, subjects which until the application of the Treaty of Amsterdam were the exclusive province of each one of the member states. However, this is not a comparative study of different areas of internal legislation regarding immigration, given that the area of analysis is restricted to European Community regulations and not to internal regulations. The thesis is structured in two different parts, which correspond, in the first case, to the first two Chapters and, in the second, to the remaining three Chapters. In the first two Chapters the criteria are chronological, beginning with the Treaty of Rome and ending with the Treaty of Nice. In these Chapters the original juridical bases which could have been utilised, as well as the co-operation exercised by the member states, both within and outside the European Union are analyzed, in relation to the measures adopted and destined to the regulation of access and the juridical status of immigrant workers. The implementation, on 1st May 1999, of the Treaty of Amsterdam has signified an important step forward towards the attribution of jurisdictional competence in the Community on matters relating to immigration which remain linked to the new objective of creating an area of freedom, safety and justice. From this point on, the free movement of people is assumed as an aim. This requires the regulation of border controls, of asylum, of immigration and co-operation in the struggle to prevent delinquency. This is specified in the comunitarization of a part of the Third Pillar regarding visas, asylum and immigration, excluding the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, and in the integration of "acquis" Schengen in the structure of the European Union albeit at the cost of excluding the United Kingdom and Ireland. An area of co-operation has been created, sui generis, complete with juridical engineering solutions, which, while signifying an advance, break the unity and homogeneity of Community law. Despite all the technical complexities that derive from the Treaty of Amsterdam, the new article 63 and clauses, 3 and 4 enable the Community to assume areas of common interest linked to the phenomenon of immigration through co-ordination and harmonisation. Amongst these, there is the possibility of formulating a common statute for workers who are not members of the European Community. The legislative initiatives which have been presented since the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam show the acceleration in the formulation and development of a community policy of immigration, integrated within some common objectives. For the first time, it seems realistic to envision the adoption of a sole juridical statute for the non-community worker who is a long-term resident. Despite the fact that this statute might be characterised as a minimum standard of protection, I believe that the adoption of such a statute would constitute a great step forward in the clarification of the rights of this collective of workers. The remaining three chapters form the second part of the thesis which is dedicated to analysing the present status of workers from other states outside the European Community. This status is characterised by its fragmentary nature, which derives from the diversity of the provisions contained in external agreements. The objectives, structure antecedents and development of the agreements formulated in agreement with Turkey with the countries of the Magreb and with the countries of east and central Europe (PECO's) were analyzed by means of a comparative study. The content of the objectives of the said agreements alleges that we find ourselves facing three different models that reflect a gradual diminishing of the European commitment to safeguarding the status of the immigrant worker. The Court of Justice in its jurisprudence has manifested that both those external agreements adopted by the Community, as well as the decisions taken by the organs which develop them, form part of the juridical regulations of the community. It is the Court of Justice which is the organ most competent to interpret these provisions, contributing to the clarification of the content of these juridical instruments. This perspective will be complemented with the analysis of the notions which take into account external agreements. The aim of this study is to clarify whether the same term has the same content in each agreement and if, despite the diversity of the juridical instruments used, they have the same interpretation in jurisprudence. In order to do this, it has been necessary, for the Court of Justice to determine the scope of the different concepts employed and to clarify whether it applies to the workers of the community or if differs significantly. The drawing up of the agreements studied reflects a privileged juridical status for Turkish workers in comparison with other immigrants. The immigrants who come from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Magreb can improve their current situation in as far as the provisions of their respective agreements are developed in the future. However, this privileged situation which has been a fact to date, has changed with the implementation of immigration laws in different states. These may be modified in addition to and following on from the development of the Treaty of Amsterdam. At present, a Turkish worker is affected adversely rather than benefiting from the system of quotas to gain access to a job in accordance with Decision 1/80. The Turkish workers who form part of the regular employment market in a member state should be protected by the juridical ruling which is most beneficial to them, independent of the fact that this may be the internal ruling of the receiving state, the community member foreseen in the Agreement of Association and its latter development, or that which is derived from future directives when they are in force. If the provisions from agreements of association were initially positive they should have be the object of modification, which should not imply their disappearance. Their content should stress the specificity of the relationships which they wish to establish with a third state, in this sense establishing favourable treatment for these nationals as opposed to other immigrants and recognising their right of residence as well as their right to obtain a work permit. However, with the implementation of the directive regarding the status of immigrants who are long term residents, this privileged status only affects those immigrants who are legally resident in the receiving state for the first five years, that is to say before they are given the cited statute.

Part 1. Global -- 1. International Boundaries, Biological Borders, and the Public Governance of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Are we Entering a Whole New Era? (Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly) -- 2. Pandemic Geopolitics in the Anthropocene (Simon Dalby) -- 3. COVID-19 and the Science of where (Michael F. Goodchild) -- 4. Coronavirus and Conservation: Environmental Repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic (Helen D. Hazen) -- 5. Pandemic Geopolitics and the Bordering of COVID-19: Academic and Lay Geographies of the Pandemic and Policies to Contain and Mitigate the Novel Coronavirus (Virginie Mamadouh) -- 6. Rethinking Distance and Presence Conceptions in Times of COVID-19 and post-COVID-19: The Search for a New Educational Literacy (Paulo Quadros) -- Part 2. States, Cities and COVID-19 -- 7. The Swedish COVID-19 Enigma/Exception (Sebastian Abrahamsson and Richard Ek) -- 8. Insularity in a Connected World? The COVID-19 Pandemic in Iceland (Karl Benediktsson, Benjamin D. Hennig, Anne-Cécile Mermet, and Sigríður Haraldsdóttir) -- 9. Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on a Small Island: The Isle of Man Case Study (Sharon C. Cobb) -- 10. Medical Philately and the World of COVID-19 Postage Stamps: Issues of Truth, Health and Wealth (Stanley D. Brunn) -- 11. The COVID-19 Pandemic in Ukraine: A Mosaic of Regional Patterns and Voices of Social Disparity (Eugenia Maruniak and Olena Dronova) -- 12. COVID-19 Policy in Uzbekistan: Slipping Back Toward Authoritarianism? (Reuel Hanks and Dilshod Achilov) -- 13. The Pandemic in Belarus in 2020-21: COVID-19 in the Shadow of Politics (Ales Kirkevich and Alena Makouskaya) -- 14. COVID-19, the Stay-Home Discourse and a 'New' Geographic Haven (Mohamed Salah Eddine Madiou) -- 15. COVID-19 Geopolitics in Southeast Asia: Regional and National Health (in)Securities in Times of Pandemic (Carl Grundy-Warr) -- 16. Three Challenges Facing Guatemala's COVID-19 Crisis: Mobility, Violence and Governance (Trudy Mercadal) -- 17. COVID-19 Waves and Politics in Costa Rica (Ivan Molina) -- 18. Societal Perceptions of the Saudi Government's Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic (Mark C. Thompson) -- 19. Tackling Challenges of COVID-19: An Assessment of the Convergence-Divergence Debates from the Global South-India (M. Satish Kumar and Aditya Singh) -- 20. Health Geography of COVID-19: An Exploratory Analysis of the Pandemic During its First Phase in the Compact Cities of Barcelona and Madrid, Spain (Montserrat Pallares-Barbera, Simón Sánchez-Moral, Rafael Vicente-Salar, and Alfonso Arellano) -- 21. Three impacts of COVID-19 in Pakistan society: Home Confinement, Social Survey Data and Maps Showing Diffusion (Tahir Awan, Tehreem Raza Ch, and Mavia Mumtaz) -- Part 3. Political impacts: Laws, Borders, Diplomacy, Elections, Peacekeeping -- 22. Peacekeeping Operations: Challenges and Opportunities in the Midst of Health Crises (Jessica Di Salvatore) -- 23. Travel Restrictions and Border Security Measures on the Canada–U.S. Border During the COVID-19 Pandemic—Does Law Matter in a Crisis? (Roger S. Fisher) -- 24. Forgotten Ones: Rhetoric of Migration and Tourism Governance in South Africa in the Sedentary Epoch of COVID-19 (Samuel Umoh Uwem and Oyewo Adetola Elizabeth) -- 25. From European Union Student Mobility to Lockdown: "Virtual Study Mobility" in the COVID-19 Era and a Case Study of Transnational Law in an International Classroom Delivered Online (Cherry James, John Koo, and Emmanouela Mylonaki) -- 26. Vaccination Nation: Vaccine Diplomacy and the U.S. Vaccine Rollout (Shaun J. Johnson) -- 27. Changing COVID-19 Border Restrictions and Borderland Resilience: The Finnish-Swedish Border Case (Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola and Juha Ridanpää) -- 28. Free Movement of Persons and Goods in the European Union During COVID-19 (Lehte Roots) -- 29. Intertwined Geographies of the Pandemic and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2020: COVID-19 Prevalence and Donald Trump (Ryan Weichelt, J. Clark Archer, Robert Shepard, Robert Watrel, and Jill Archer) -- Part 4. Communication, Branding and the Media -- 30. Affective Immediately: Reading the Semiotic Landscape of COVID-19 in Lincoln, Nebraska (James E. Baker) -- 31. Local Newspaper Coverage of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Two Major Texas Cities: A Visual Comparison of Houston and El Paso (Sarah A. Blue and Mary Stycos) -- 32. COVID-19 as the Great (un)equalizer: The Framing of Women in Media Coverage in China, the Middle East, and the U.S. (Mari A. DeWees and Amy C. Miller) -- 33. Place-Branding for Immigrant and Refugee Integration and Receptivity Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic: Responses of U.S. Cities in the "Welcoming America" Network (Paul N. McDaniel, Rajit H. Das, and Darlene Xiomara Rodriguez) -- 34. Lost in Translation: Reporting About COVID-19 Pandemic by Community Vernacular Radio Stations in Rural Kenya (Lilliane Atieno Oloo and Daniel Ochieng' Orwenjo) -- 35. Examining Effective Communication during COVID-19 Through Prime Minister's Speeches: The Case of Malaysia (Teresa Wai See Ong) -- 36. Trump and the Coronavirus: The Triumph of Incompetence (Barney Warf) -- Part 5. Communications: Websites, Social Media -- 37. Presenting, Representing, and Misrepresenting COVID-19 in the five Central Asian States: The Political Underpinnings of Official State Coronavirus Websites in Authoritarian Regimes (Ryan P. Cabana) -- 38. The Role of User-Generated Content Data for Collaborative Learning: Identifying Tourism Hot Topics During the Pandemic (Nuria Recuero Virto) -- 39. The Impact of COVID-19 and use of Geo-Tagged User Data in Territories without Planning: The Case of São Tomé and Príncipe (Nagayamma Aragão and Carlos Smaniotto Costa) -- 40. Social Distancing and Politeness: Hungarian Emailing Practices During the Coronavirus Epidemic (Ágnes Domonkosi and Zsófia Ludányi) -- 41. Application of GIS in Vaccine Distribution During COVID-19 (Jing Wu) -- Part 6. Cartoons and Cartooning -- 42. More than a Message: Public Health Advocacy, Political Cartooning and COVID-19 Challenges in Pakistan (Ayesha Ashfaq and Joseph Russomanno) -- 43. What's so Funny about COVID-19? How some Comic Strip Artists have Approached or Avoided a Sensitive Subject (Thomas L. Bell) -- 44. Visualizing the Unspeakable in Thought: A Multi-Model Discourse Analysis of Cartoons as a Device for Communicating (Maxwell Mpotsiah) -- Part 7. Maps and Mapping -- 45. One Year of COVID-19: Mapping the Spread of a Global Pandemic (Benjamin D. Hennig) -- 46. Mapping Silenced Spaces During Increased Overdose and COVID-19: Opportunities for Danger and Harm Reduction in Southern Appalachia (Lesly-Marie Buer, Bayla Ostrach, Sam Armbruster, and Erin Major) -- 47. COVID-19 in Tunisia: Mapping and Documenting the Impacts on those on the Margins (Betty Rouland and Marouen Taleb) -- 48. Mapping the COVID-19 Spatial Behaviors and Narratives of Women in an Architecture School in the Midwest USA" (Mania T. Taher) -- 49. Increased use of Maps During the COVID-19 pandemic: An example from Morocco (Abdallah Zouhauri) -- Part 7. Cultures: Diffusion and Social Well-Being) -- 50. The Way from the Leading Position to the Last: Geodemographic Analysis of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Czechia (Dagmar Dzúrová, Klára Hulíková Tesárková, Pavlína Netrdová, and Lukáš Brůha) -- 51. COVID-19 Deaths in México: A Spatiotemporal Analysis (Oscar Gerardo Hernández-Lara, José R. Díaz-Garayúa, and Kevin A. Butler) -- 52. Impacts of COVID-19 on Nigerian Culture (Ibrahim Badamasi Lambu) -- 53. Research Frontiers on COVID-19 Issues in Brazilian Context (Paulo Quadros) -- 54. Geography, Factors and Consequences of COVID-19 Diffusion in Russia (Stepan Zemtsov and Vyacheslav Baburin) -- Part 9. Mobility and Immobility -- 55. Effects of COVID-19 on Urban Mobility and Public Space use in Kumasi, Ghana (Clifford Amoako, Kwasi Kwafo Adarkwa, and Michael Poku-Boansi) -- 56. Impact of COVID-19 on Nepal's Labour Migration (Sadikshya Bhattarai and Jeevan Baniya) -- 57. Voting with their Feet: Coronavirus Pandemic Refugees and the Future of American Cities (James H. Johnson, Jr.) -- 58. Exploring Human Mobilities in the COVID-19 Era in Urban and Rural Canada (K. Bruce Newbold, Curtis Towle, and Kaylah Vrabic) -- 59. Rearranging Mobilities and Immobilities and Placeremaking During COVID-19: Governing the Pandemic Situation through (im)mobilities in South Korea (HaeRan Shin) -- Part 10. Inequalities and Divides) -- 60. Pandemic and Education: Persistent Deepening of Educational Inequalities in Argentina as a Consequence of COVID-19 (Gustavo Javier Annessi and Paola Demirta) -- 61. COVID-19 and the Comorbidities of Spatial Inequality and Colonial Legacy: Two Caribbean Cases – Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago (April K. Baptiste and Hubert Devonish) -- 62. Digital Inequalities in Times of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Israel and Germany (Elisabeth Sommerlad and Yossi David) -- Part 11. Marginalized Groups: Refugees, Silences, Gender, Racism, Survival -- 63. Beyond the Ecumene: Roma Genesis, Community and Survival in the COVID-19 World (Krasimir Asenov) -- 64. Ethnic Minorities in Poland in the Face of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Threats, Stigma and Forms of (in)visibility (Bartłomiej Chromik, Joanna Maryniak, and Justyna Olko) -- 65. Everyday Morbid Geography: Street life and COVID-19 State Regulation in Manila and Hanoi (José Edgardo A. Gomez, Jr., Redento B. Recio, Ha Minh Hai Thai, and Phuong Thu Nguyen) -- 66. Undocumented Migrants and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Similar and Dissimilar COVID-19 Stories Comparing Finland and Iran (Jussi S. Jauhiainen and Davood Eyvazlu) -- 67. 'If I don't Sell Food, How Would I eat?' Negotiating Street Vendor Livelihoods in the Context of COVID-19 Lockdowns in Urban Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos (Jennifer C. Langill, Binh N. Nguyen, and Sarah Turner) -- 68. Impact of COVID-19 on Local Planning Practices: Focusing on Tactical Urbanism, Slow Streets and low-Income Communities in Oakland, Los Angeles, San Francis.

International audience ; El Magrib apareix com un soci permanent de França i dels països del Mediterrani occidental, notablement Espanya i Catalunya. El que passa aquí des de fa segles i el que podria succeir aviat té un gran interès per a historiadors, antropòlegs, lingüistes i polítics.Quins mecanismes específics de creació de les identitats socials, culturals i lingüístiques podem identificar? Com es va establir aquesta part del món en una «francophonie» sovint apassionada però de vegades rebutjada?En aquest treball, s'esmenten regularment els espais occità, català i espanyol per tal de comprendre millor la dinàmica històrica dels contactes en un espai geo-històric situat entre el golf del Lleó i el nord d'Àfrica. De la mateixa manera, un moment d'observació de la llengua maltesa és necessari i això permet entendre com es formen i es transmeten les identitats i les pràctiques lingüístiques en aquesta part del món. ; Der Maghreb (oder Nordafrika) ist ein ständiger Partner Frankreichs und der Anrainerstaaten des westlichen Mittelmeers. Was hier seit Jahrhunderten passiert und was bald passieren könnte, ist von großem Interesse für Historiker, Anthropologen, Linguisten und Politiker.Welche spezifischen Mechanismen zur Schaffung sozialer, kultureller und sprachlicher Identitäten können wir identifizieren? Wie hat sich dieser Teil der Welt in einer «Frankophonie» etabliert, die oft leidenschaftlich, aber manchmal abgelehnt wird?Auf jeden Fall enthüllt dieser Subkontinent sehr alte Kontakte, die uns viel darüber lehren, wie Sprachidentitäten gebildet und weitergegeben werden.Aus diesem Grund werden regelmäßig die okzitanischen, katalanischen und spanischen Räume erwähnt, um die historische Dynamik der Kontakte in einem Raum zwischen dem Golf von Lion und Nordafrika besser zu verstehen. In diesem Zusammenhang erhält die maltesische Sprache auch einen strategischen und heuristischen Platz. ; Just a stone's throw from Europe, the Maghreb (or North-Africa) has been a permanent partner of France, Spain and Italy. What ...

Riassunto della Tesi di Emebet Molla Demisea L'immigrazione dall'Africa sub sahariana verso l'Italia La tesi analizza alcuni aspetti dei flussi migratori dall' Africa Sub Sahariana che spostano verso l'Italia. I migranti sub sahariani utilizzano diversi percorsi: via terra, mare e aerea per raggiungere le loro destinazioni prima in Nord Africa e poi in Europa. Le politiche di immigrazione sempre più restrittive dell'UE hanno portato i migranti ad una crescente dipendenza dalle vie terrestri. Infatti, molti migranti sub sahariani per arrivare in Europa via mare devono attraversare prima il deserto del Sahara. Questo deserto unisce l'Africa sahariana ai Paesi del Maghreb, è in particolare, luogo di transito dei migranti economici (provenienti dall'Africa occidentale) e dei richiedenti asilo (in gran parte del Corno d'Africa). Però, la traversata del Sahara è colma di pericoli: per sperare di avere una possibilità di giungere alla meta, i migranti sono costretti ad affidarsi a organizzazioni criminali che gestiscono il passaggio da un confine all'altro. Le rotte verso l'Italia sono varie ma possiamo citare le tre più interessanti: la prima rotta è quella che parte da Dakar ( Senegal) attraversa il Niger seguendo l'antico tragitto carovaniero che passa per Agadez, Dirkou e Madama per arrivare in Libia e poi per proseguire a Lampedusa. Questa rotta è stata percorsa anche dal giornalista Fabrizio Gatti, egli nel suo libro Bilal narra così: ad ogni città di transito i passeggeri vengono derubati e spesso picchiati violentemente dalle forze armate per estorcergli denaro: oltre al costo del viaggio già enorme, si aggiungono, le c.d. pesanti tangenti. L'impossibilità per alcuni migranti di aver sufficienti risorse per superare le varie stazioni di sosta crea il fenomeno delle cosiddette "oasi degli schiavi": luoghi in cui i migranti rimangono bloccati e non possono neanche a ritornare nel loro paese d'origine. Per non morire di fame lavorano gratis. Solo dopo mesi di fatica il padrone gli lascia andare, pagando finalmente il biglietto per la Libia . La seconda via è quella che raduna gli immigranti provenienti dall'Africa occidentale attraversa lo stato del Mali per arrivare in Algeria e poi per giungere in Sardegna; in questa via da Agadez la rotta migratoria si biforca in due direzioni: verso nord-est all'oasi di Sebha (attraverso l'oasi di Dirkou) e verso nord-ovest a Tammanrasset nel sud dell'Algeria. Nella Libia meridionale dall'oasi di Sebha i migranti riprendono la loro strada verso Tripoli e altre città costiere, per poi imbarcarsi in piccole barche direte verso Lampedusa, e anche Sardegna. La terza rotta è percorsa dai migranti originari del Corno d'Africa (eritrei, etiopi somali e sudanesi) che attraversano il Sudan per raggiungere il deserto Libico, passando per le oasi di Kufrah. Il biglietto si acquista nei mercati di Khartoum. Da lì si parte sui fuoristrada pick-up che trasportano una media di trenta persone. Il viaggio per la Libia salvo imprevisti dura un paio di settimane. Arrivati in Libia, vengono venduti dai trafficanti sudanesi ai loro "colleghi" libici. La Libia ha tradizionalmente gestito la forza lavoro immigrata secondo il modello condiviso dagli altri stati arabi oil-rentier, aprendo all'immigrazione, ma chiudendo ogni forma d'integrazione e di stabilizzazione ai lavoratori stranieri. La politica panafricanista di Gheddafi negli anni '90 spingeva i lavoratori provenienti dal territorio sub sahariano a venire a lavorare in Libia. Una volta arrivati in Libia, però le speranze di una vita migliore per i rifugiati e i migranti vengono indebolite. Essi vivono in un clima di paura, perché temono di esser trattenuti indefinitamente in campi e in centri di detenzione sovraffollati, e rimpatriati, dove li aspettano persecuzioni e torture. I campi sono la forma per confinare chi non appartiene a quell'ordine statuale. Di campi sono disseminati tutti i paesi confinanti con l'area di Shengen: dalla Polonia alla Romania, dalla Bulgaria alla Libia i migranti non assimilabili o non desiderabili sono rinchiusi in spazi senza diritti. I primi campi furono costruiti nelle varie colonie d'oltremare: in Cuba, Sudafrica, Namibia e Libia. E' proprio nelle colonie che nasce l'idea di un'umanità in eccesso da riterritorializzare. I centri di detenzione per i migranti irregolari in Libia sono costruiti per trattenere gli stranieri che entrano illegalmente nel territorio libico, e per quelli che sono espulsi dall'Europa. Alcuni centri sono costruiti con finanziamento dell'Italia e altri con finanziamento dell'Unione Europea. I centri di detenzione più noti: El-Fellah, Misuratah, Zeliten, Kufrah, Sebha questi ultimi 3 centri invece sono stati finanziati dall'Italia. Vediamo come sono costruiti ed organizzati alcuni di questi centri di detenzione. Il centro detenzione di El-Fellah è collocato nel cuore di Tripoli. Un carcere blindato, sorvegliato da uomini armati, Intorno a un cortile sale una struttura quadrata su due piani e un seminterrato. Su ogni piano 6 camerati senza porte, suddivise ciascuna in 8 celle di 5 metri per 3. Porte di ferro, finestre alte e sbarrate. In questo centro finiscono gli immigrati clandestini sorpresi in territorio libico; anche quelli sbarcati a Lampedusa e rispediti "in Libia". In questo luogo soldi, preziosi e telefonini vengono confiscati prima dell'arresto dai poliziotti. Qui gli stranieri sono nudi, e sono spogliati tutto quello che avevano con sé. Il centro di detenzione di Kufrah, è si trova in pieno deserto al confine con il Sudan. Questo luogo è uno dei punti più sensibili per lo smistamento dei clandestini. In passato, ha rappresentato uno snodo importante per le carovane di mercanti che arrivavano dal Ciad per raggiungere la costa mediterranea. Attualmente a Kufrah giungono soprattutto i migranti irregolari che partono dai paesi del Corno d'Africa. In questo luogo vengono internati sia migranti alla loro entrata nel paese che quando stanno per essere deportati al di là dei confini di terra con il Sudan e l'Egitto. La struttura Misuratah invece è chiamata "campo", addirittura "campo profughi", perché qui finiscono in maggioranza i respinti dall'Italia. Questa struttura è divenuta anche un centro specializzato prevalentemente per rifugiati e richiedenti asilo eritrei ed altri individui di interesse per l'Unhcr. I clandestini vengono trattenuti per oltre 3 anni. A differenza di quanto avviene in altre località meno controllate, al "campo" di Misratha dal 2007 ha accesso la delegazione Unhcr e la sua organizzazione. Zleitan si trova vicino a Tripoli, in questo luogo i trafficanti di esseri umani hanno modificato le rotte della traversata per evitare il controllo congiunto italo-libico. Invece venire direttamente in Italia prima vanno verso le coste greche, e voltano in direzione della Sicilia allungano il tempo e i rischi della navigazione. Il centro di detenzione di Zleitan situato nell'omonimo porto a est di Tripoli, dove vengono portati alcuni dei migranti che non riescono a partire. Infine Zuwara città portuale e noto punto di partenza dei migranti, confine con la Tunisia, è un centro della tratta di essere umani. Il centro detenzione di Zwara è uno dei posti dove vengono portati i migranti dei barconi respinti dall' Italia a partire dal maggio 2009. Tutti questi non sono centri di detenzione sono veri carceri. Spesso sono vecchi magazzini adibiti alla funzione detentiva e sorvegliati dalla polizia. Per quanto riguarda le situazioni delle donne nei centri di detenzione è terrificante; ragazze stuprate e giovani donne picchiate, umiliate sotto gli occhi dei mariti. Per avere un'idea di quanti siano i bambini e i ragazzi a passare per la detenzione basti pensare che solo nel 2011 sono sbarcati a Lampedusa quasi 4.500 ragazzini non accompagnati. Per loro la fuga e il rischio della morte in mare è sempre meglio dell'incubo di una vita in Libia. Si può affermare che i flussi migratori tra l'Africa sub sahariana e la Libia hanno contribuito a modificare la geografia del Sahara. Le città nelle quali i migranti fanno tappa come Agadez, Kufrah e Sebha hanno conosciuto lo sviluppo di un'economia di transito che è diventata anche il motore dello sviluppo locale. Sono dunque tre gli aspetti sotto i quali le migrazioni contribuiscono alla trasformazione dello spazio sahariano modellato dallo Stato: quello dell'ambiente abitativo, quello delle attività economiche e quello della costruzione di un'identità urbana. Negli anni '90, i flussi migratori africani hanno messo in discussione il riferimento spaziale del Sahara, così come quello etnico e religioso, e la relazione diretta tra emigrazione dal Sahel e immigrazione in Libia. Questa dicotomia si riflette in modo evidente nei paesaggi urbani: sono moltiplicati i villaggi di rifugiati alla periferia delle città del Sahara libico, i villaggi sono travolti dal rapido sviluppo dell'edilizia abitativa informale . I modelli abitativi prevalenti sono tre: il 1° è " ksar": antichi villaggi fortificati e abbandonati. Grazie a questi immigrati sub sahariani in villaggi si assiste la ripopolazione dei paesi; il 2° modello è quello che consiste nel vivere sul luogo di lavoro; il 3° i "ghetti" sono oltre che degli alloggi, anche dei luoghi dove ritrovare dei connazionali che potranno facilitare l'inserimento dei nuovi arrivi in Libia. Per la sua posizione geografica, l'Italia rappresenta uno dei punti d'ingresso in Europa per la migrazione africana. Le partenze si concentrano lungo le coste tra Zuwarah e Tripoli. Si può affermare che l'Italia è un ponte "fisico" fra Europa e Africa piazzato nel mezzo del Mediterraneo. Questo mare viene attraversato su imbarcazioni di fortuna: vecchi pescherecci, gommoni stracariche. Il viaggio dalla Libia a Lampedusa che, potrebbe durare poco più di un giorno e può prolungarsi per diverse settimane. Le tre principali fasi del traffico di migranti per mare: la raccolta dei migranti; il carico e viaggio per mare; lo sbarco ed eventuale proseguimento del viaggio. Sebbene esistano viaggi auto organizzati dagli stessi migranti, la maggior parte delle partenze è controllata da alcune organizzazioni, ognuna dei quali si occupa del passaggio d'una frontiera. Ogni nazionalità ha i suoi connection man, che mettono in contatto il candidato all'emigrazione clandestina con il passeur e con la rete di persone che lo ospiterà e lo trasporterà al luogo d'imbarco. Sconti particolari vengono fatti a chi si offre volontario per guidare le imbarcazioni, e spesso affidate a capitani senza nessuna esperienza di mare. Anche per questo aumentano le vittime nel Mar Mediterraneo. Attraversare il mare rappresenta l'unica via per tentare la salvezza. Prendere il mare può vuol dire andare a ingrossare le fila delle quasi 20.000 vittime che giacciono sui fondali del Mediterraneo. Il 2014 si conferma l'anno più mortale di sempre con 4.077 vittime accertate nel mondo di cui 3.072 nel "Mediterraneo ". La maggior parte delle persone decedute (30%) è di origine sub sahariana. Ma il mar Mediterraneo detiene anche un altro primato, perché il 75% di tutti i decessi avvenuti nel globo durante il 2014, sono stati contati qui. L'Italia, uno tra gli Stati membri dell'Unione Europea che ha passato da paese di emigrazione a paese di immigrazione. Dalla metà degli anni '80 alla metà degli '90 seguì la fase che potremmo dire dell'emergenza. Negli anni '90 si aprì una fase di approfondimento che, dopo un percorso tormentato, portò all'approvazione di una legge organica sull'immigrazione detta legge Turco-Napoletano (1998). Proprio con questa legge venne proposta anche la creazione dei Cpt (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea per gli stranieri). Che cosa sono questi centri? Per "centri di detenzione" sono quelle strutture che stabili o improvvisate nell'emergenza, sono spazi racchiusi all'interno di un confine materiale (mura, filo spinato, sbarre). Ciò che differenzia questi luoghi dalle istituzioni penali è soprattutto il loro aspetto amministrativo. Sono luoghi in cui le persone vengono internate sulla base di ciò che sono, della loro nazionalità del paese da cui provengono, del loro status di migranti, rifugiati, e in generale viaggiatori non autorizzati. I Centri di Permanenza Temporanea (CPT) furono creati per custodire gli stranieri clandestini in attesa di identificazione e di espulsione. Innanzitutto espellere uno straniero non è una faccenda semplice: ci sono questioni di carattere normativo: l'accompagnamento alla frontiera è una misura limitativa della libertà personale. Vi sono poi difficoltà economiche: rimpatriare i clandestini ha costi non uguale, e poi l'espulsione comporta notevoli difficoltà relative alla riammissione dei migranti nei loro paesi di origine., I Cpt prima di diventare luoghi di detenzione, erano appunto dei centri di accoglienza. Nel 1998 il governo italiano istituiva i CPTA (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenza) nei quali lo straniero, per il quale non poteva essere eseguita immediatamente l'espulsione, doveva essere trattenuto il tempo strettamente necessario ai fini dell'espulsione (massimo 20 giorni) più eventuali altri 10 giorni, nella imminenza del rimpatrio. Il primo Centro ad essere istituito è il "Serraino Vulpitta" di Trapani, a cui ne seguono altri in Sicilia, in Puglia e nel resto d'Italia, a Milano, Torino, Trieste. Gli edifici sono dislocati per lo più in zone periferiche, circondati spesso da alti muri e dotati di sbarre, recinti e filo spinati, somigliano alla tradizionale "prigione. Attualmente il sistema dei centri di accoglienza e detenzione per stranieri è costituito da: CPSA (Centri di Primo Soccorso e Accoglienza); CDA (Centri D'Accoglienza); CARA (Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo) e CIE (Centri di Identificazione ed Espulsione). Se analizziamo 1 dei questi centri come sono organizzati e costruiti, il CDA di Lampedusa è un emblematico ha l'aspetto di un vero carcere: filo spinato corre lungo il perimetro del Centro, Polizia ed Esercito ne controllano i confini. I CARA sono strutture istituite nel 2008 con il decreto legge 25/2008 dove viene inviato lo straniero richiedente asilo privo di documenti di riconoscimento. I CARA derivano dai CDI (Centri di Identificazione) Gli stranieri accolti in questi Centri si trovano in una condizione "semi-detentiva" in quanto possono lasciare le strutture durante il giorno, ma devono farvi ritorno per la notte. I CARA e i CDA, con dimensioni enormi, si trovano in zone periferiche, isolati dal resto del territorio e circondati da poderose recinzioni, assumendo facilmente la connotazione di "luoghi speciali". Da un punto di vista strutturale, la funzione di contenimento e sorveglianza appare spesso predominante rispetto a quella dell'accoglienza. I centri che assolvono entrambe le funzioni di CDA e CARA sono: Bari Palese, Area aeroportuale, Brindisi, Loc. Restinco, Caltanissetta, Contrada Pian del Lago ecc.). A Caltanissetta c'e anche il CIE che si trova a Contrada Pian del Lago a circa 6–7 Km dal centro abitato. Il centro polifunzionale CDA/CARA/CIE può accogliere 552 persone in totale, mentre il CIE ha una capienza massima di 96 posti. Le nazionalità più rappresentate sono in genere Tunisia, Marocco, Nigeria ed Algeria. Per quanto riguarda i CIE prima denominati centri di permanenza temporanea (CPT), sono strutture previste dalla legge Bossi-Fini istituite per trattenere gli stranieri "sottoposti a provvedimenti di espulsione e o di respingimento. Il funzionamento dei CIE è di competenza del Prefetto, che affida i servizi di gestione della struttura a soggetti privati, responsabili del rapporto con i detenuti e del funzionamento materiale del centro. Vediamo come sono costruiti e gestiti alcuni Cie in Italia: il centro di espulsione di Torino era in funzione dal 1999. Si trovava nell'area di una vecchia caserma del genio ferroviario, tra Corso Brunelleschi e via Santa Maria Mazzarello. Dal maggio del 2008, i container del vecchio centro erano stati rottamati e sostituiti da 3 sezioni in muratura appositamente progettati per la detenzione. 2 erano per gli uomini e 1 per le donne, ogni sezione consisteva in un area recintata da gabbie metalliche alte 6 metri. Mentre il Cie di Modena è aperto nel novembre del 2002, nasce dopo una vergognosa campagna di raccolta di firme che identifica i "clandestini" dai delinquenti. Inoltre, il Cie di Modena era 1dei centri a 5 stelle. La struttura fu costruita a fianco del carcere, dall'esterno aveva l'aspetto di un albergo su 2 piani. Niente filo spinato, niente mura di cinta. Pero, dal suo funzionamento si è verificato nel tempo numerosi problemi tra i quali l'utilizzo del CIE come contenitore di ex carcerati stranieri insieme a semplici persone irregolari, infiniti casi di autolesionismo fino ad arrivare ai gravissimi episodi dei suicidi. L'Italia ha un rapporto particolare con la Libia, derivante dal periodo coloniale (gli anni 20 del novecento) in cui migliaia di italiani si trasferirono lì per avviare delle attività soprattutto riguardanti l'agricoltura e le attività imprenditoriali. Dopo la rimozione nell'embargo, l'Italia e la Libia avevano terminato un primo accordo nell'estate del 2000 contro terrorismo, criminalità organizzata, traffico di droga e immigrazione illegale. Il trattato più articolato è quello del 30 agosto 2008 siglato a Bengasi, dall'ex premier Berlusconi e Gheddafi con il c.d. "Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione" che mette la parola fine al contenzioso sul passato coloniale italiano in Tripolitania e Cirenaica e apre un'epoca di cooperazione in campo economico soprattutto energetico e di lotta all'immigrazione clandestina. Il trattato di amicizia del 2008 prevede 4 punti sulla mutua cooperazione nel contrasto all'immigrazione: il pattugliamento congiunto in acque libiche, l'intercettamento in alto mare, il finanziamento di un sistema di controllo libico, un sistema congiunto di individuazione dei migranti con rader e satellite. L'intesa bilaterale quella è firmata nel 2007 rappresenta un tentativo di esternalizzare le procedure di detenzione amministrativa e rimpatrio anche alla luce del sovraffollamento del centro di identificazione ed espulsione di Lampedusa. L'esternalizzazione dell'asilo è un tipo di politiche migratorie attuate dai paesi dell'Unione europea consistente nella creazione dei centri per l'esame delle domande di asilo sia nei paesi di transito che nei paesi di origine. In tali strutture dovrebbero essere indotti a fermarsi i profughi prima ancora di raggiungere l'UE, ma rinviati anche quelli che erano già entrati in Europa a chiedere asilo. Inoltre l'esternalizzazione della politica europea d'asilo e d'immigrazione può essere suddivisa in due tendenze principali. L'UE avverte l'esigenza, da un lato, di "delocalizzare" al di fuori del suo territorio; e dall'altro, di far ricadere sui paesi terzi, mediante trasferimento delle responsabilità. Si può affermare che la Libia è parte integrante del sistema europeo di esternalizzazione dei controlli di frontiera per impedire gli arrivi dei migranti in UE. Alla luce di quando detto sin'ora, si può affermare che Lampedusa è diventata peggio di Ellis Island, i trafficanti di uomini del 21° secolo sono più spietati dei negrieri del 1700. La porta più meridionale d'Italia e d'Europa da anni accoglie barconi carichi di disperati. Tutti provengono dalla Libia dopo viaggi della speranza durante i quali vivono in condizioni peggiori dei migranti del 1800 e 1900 che sono partiti per America e persino degli schiavi neri portati via dall'Africa . Di loro si sapeva in quanti sono partiti, ma di immigrati di oggi che vengano via mare dall'Africa si sa poco. Il lavoro comprende anche delle interviste telefonica che ho fatto ad alcuni migranti sub sahariani, ho registrato le esperienze che avevano avuto durante la traversata del deserto del Sahara e del Mediterraneo: il loro viaggio per arrivare in Italia non è stata facile, infatti il racconto di John di origine nigeriano mi ha toccato:" il mare fa meno paura del deserto. Se hai superato il deserto del Sahara rimanendo vivo, è già grande cose. Prendere il largo a bordo di una qualsiasi imbarcazione è il segnale che stai per farcela perché il peggio è ormai alle spalle, che ti sei lasciato l'inferno libico. Il passaggio in mare non è certo una cosa facile. Un immigrato clandestino è costretto anche a bere acqua salata, l'esposizione continua al sole lo sfianca. Ma per me arrivare a Lampedusa era come arrivare alla terra promessa". Bisogna valutare quali prospettive dovrebbero mutare, in ambito europeo, italiano, libico ed africano, per evitare le continue stragi nel Mediterraneo durante le disperate traversate.

The events in Niger over the past few months have been alarming to watch. What began as a military coup now risks spiraling into a wider war in West Africa, with a group of juntas lining up to fight against a regional force threatening to invade and restore democratic rule in Niamey.The junta have explicitly justified their coup as a response to the "continuous deterioration of the security situation" plaguing Niger and complained that it and other countries in the Sahel "have been dealing for over 10 years with the negative socioeconomic, security, political and humanitarian consequences of NATO's hazardous adventure in Libya." Even ordinary Nigeriens backing the junta have done the same. The episode thus reminds us of an iron rule of foreign interference: Even military interventions considered successful at the time have unintended effects that cascade long after the missions formally end.The 2011 Libyan adventure saw the U.S., French and British governments launch an initially limited humanitarian intervention to protect civilians that quickly morphed into a regime change operation, unleashing a torrent of violence and extremism across the region.There was little dissent at the time. As Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's forces battled anti-government rebels, politicians, the press and anti-Gaddafi Libyans painted an overly simplistic picture of unarmed protesters and other civilians facing imminent if not already unfolding genocide. Only years later would a UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report publicly determine, echoing the conclusions of other post-mortems, that charges of an impending civilian massacre were "not supported by the available evidence" and that "the threat to civilians was overstated and that the rebels included a significant Islamist element" that carried out numerous atrocities of its own.Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), and John Kerry (D-Mass.) all called for a no-fly zone. "I love the military ... but they always seem to find reasons why you can't do something rather than why you can," complained McCain. The American Enterprise Institute's Danielle Pletka said it would be "an important humanitarian step." The now-defunct Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) think tank gathered a who's who of neoconservatives to repeatedly urge the same. In a letter to then-President Barack Obama, they quoted back Obama's Nobel Peace Prize speech in which he argued that "inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later."Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reportedly instrumental in persuading Obama to act, was herself swayed by similar arguments. Friend and unofficial adviser Sidney Blumenthal assured her that, once Gaddafi fell, "limited but targeted military support from the West combined with an identifiable rebellion" could become a new model for toppling Middle Eastern dictators. Pointing to the similar, deteriorating situation in Syria, Blumenthal claimed that "the most important event that could alter the Syrian equation would be the fall of Gaddafi, providing an example of a successful rebellion." (Despite Gaddafi's ouster, the Syrian civil war continues to this day, and its leader Bashar al-Assad is still in power).Likewise, columnist Anne-Marie Slaughter urged Clinton to think of Kosovo and Rwanda, where "even a small deployment could have stopped the killing," and insisted U.S. intervention would "change the image of the United States overnight." In one email, she dismissed counter-arguments:"People will say that we will then get enmeshed in a civil war, that we cannot go into another Muslim country, that Gaddafi is well armed, there will be a million reasons NOT to act. But all our talk about global responsibility and leadership, not to mention respect for universal values, is completely empty if we stand by and watch this happen with no response but sanctions."Despite grave and often-stated reservations, Obama and NATO got UN authorization for a no-fly zone. Clinton was privately showered with email congratulations, not just from Blumenthal and Slaughter ("bravo!"; "No-fly! Brava! You did it!"), but even from then-Bloomberg View Executive Editor James Rubin ("your efforts ... will be long remembered"). Pro-war voices like Pletka and Iraq War architect Paul Wolfowitz immediately began moving the goalposts by discussing Gaddafi's ouster, suggesting escalation to prevent a U.S. "defeat," and criticizing those saying Libya wasn't a vital U.S. interest.NATO's undefined war aims quickly shifted, and officials spoke out of both sides of their mouths. Some insisted the goal wasn't regime change, while others said Gaddafi "needs to go." It took less than three weeks for FPI Executive Director Jamie Fly, the organizer of the neocons' letter to Obama, to go from insisting it would be a "limited intervention" that wouldn't involve regime change, to professing "I don't see how we can get ourselves out of this without Gaddafi going."After only a month, Obama and NATO allies publicly pronounced they would stay the course until Gaddafi was gone, rejecting the negotiated exit put forward by the African Union. "There is no mission creep," NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen insisted two months later. Four months after that, Gaddafi was dead — captured, tortured and killed thanks in large part to a NATO airstrike on the convoy he was traveling in.The episode was considered a triumph. "We came, we saw, he died," Clinton joked to a reporter upon hearing the news. Analysts talked about the credit owed to Obama for the "success." "As Operation Unified Protector comes to a close, the alliance and its partners can look back at an extraordinary job, well done," wrote then-U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Ivo Daalder and then-Supreme Allied Commander in Europe James Stavridis in October 2011. "Most of all, they can see in the gratitude of the Libyan people that the use of limited force — precisely applied — can affect real, positive political change." That same month, Clinton traveled to Tripoli and declared "Libya's victory" as she flashed a peace sign."It was the right thing to do," Obama told the UN, presenting the operation as a model that the United States was "proud to play a decisive role" in. Soon discussion moved to exporting this model elsewhere, like Syria. Hailing the UN for having "at last lived up to its duty to prevent mass atrocities," then-Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth called to "extend the human rights principles embraced for Libya to other people in need," citing other parts of the Middle East, the Ivory Coast, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.Others disagreed. "Libya has given [the mandate of 'responsibility to protect'] a bad name," complained Indian UN Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, echoing the sentiments of other diplomats angry that a UN mandate for protecting civilians had been stretched to regime change.It soon became clear why. Gaddafi's toppling not only led hundreds of Tuareg mercenaries under his employ to return to nearby Mali but also caused an exodus of weapons from the country, leading Tuareg separatists to team up with jihadist groups and launch an armed rebellion in the country. Soon, that violence triggered its own coup and a separate French military intervention in Mali, which quickly became a sprawling Sahel-wide mission that only ended nine years later with the situation, by some accounts, worse than it started. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the majority of the more than 400,000 refugees in the Central Sahel were there because of the violence in Mali.Mali was far from alone. Thanks to its plentiful and unsecured weapons depots, Libya became what UK intelligence labeled the "Tesco" of illegal arms trafficking, referring to the British supermarket chain. Gaddafi's ouster "opened the floodgates for widespread extremist mayhem" across the Sahel region, retired Senior Foreign Service officer Mark Wentling wrote in 2020, with Libyan arms traced to criminals and terrorists in Niger, Tunisia, Syria, Algeria and Gaza, including not just firearms but also heavy weaponry like antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. By last year, extremism and violence was rife throughout the region, thousands of civilians had been killed and 2.5 million people had been displaced.Things are scarcely better in "liberated" Libya today. The resulting power vacuum produced exactly what Iraq War critics predicted: a protracted (and forever close-to-reigniting) civil war involving rival governments, neighboring states using them as proxies, hundreds of militias and violent jihadists. Those included the Islamic State, one of several extremist groups that made real Clinton's pre-intervention fear of Libya "becoming a giant Somalia." By the 2020 ceasefire, hundreds of civilians had been killed in Libya, nearly 900,000 needed humanitarian assistance, half of them women and children, and the country had become a lucrative hotspot for slave trading.Today, Libyans are unambiguously worse off than before NATO intervention. Ranked 53rd in the world and first in Africa by the 2010 UN Human Development Index, the country had dropped fifty places by 2019. Everything from GDP per capita and the number of fully functioning health care facilities to access to clean water and electricity sharply declined. Far from improving U.S. standing in the Middle East, most of the Arab world opposed the NATO operation by early 2012.Only five years later, Clinton, once eager to claim credit, distanced herself from the decision to intervene. "It didn't work," Obama admitted bluntly as he prepared to leave office, publicly deeming the country "a mess" and, privately, "a shit show." The New York Times collected the damning verdicts of those involved: "We made it worse"; "Gaddafi is laughing at all of us from his grave"; "by God, if we can't succeed here, it should really make one think about embarking on these kind of efforts."Libya offers numerous cautionary tales about well-meaning U.S. military interventions, from the way they rapidly escalate beyond their initial goals and limited nature, to their penchant for unforeseen knock-on effects that are hard to control and snowball disastrously. As Obama's "success" in the country now threatens to spark a regional war in Niger that could even drag the United States into the fighting, it should remind us that the consequences of military action and rejection of negotiated solutions last much longer than, and look very different years after, the initial period of triumphalism.

In a previous note on these same pages, we made reference to Obama's unpredictable use of executive power and his tendency to overuse it for certain domestic policies, while deferring to the military and foreign policy establishmenton issues he is ambivalent about, such as the international use of force. We also alluded to his tendency to isolate himself and rely excessively on his own judgment in shaping policy, to the detriment of his relations with staff, cabinet and other leaders. The long-drawn decision to seek Congressional approval before striking Syria is a case study of these proclivities.After resisting calls for intervention in Syria by Senate Republican "hawks"and foreign policy specialists since 2011, a year ago Obama conceded that, in spite of his aversion to intervene in "sectarian struggles",certain actions such as the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against the opposition would constitute a "red line" which, once crossed, would automatically bring about an armed response by the United States. This week he had to face the consequences of his own words.Whenrobust evidence of the use of sarin gas by Bashar Al Assad's forces in rebel occupied territory was produced, the President had no choice but to spendthelast week of the month of Augustfrantically building a case for immediate intervention. Acting simultaneously as Chief Executive, policy shaper and his own spokesman, he used several venues, including an NPR interview, to announce to the American people that the time had come to act.But while Secretary of State John Kerry made a compelling speech on the need to act swiftly to punish the "moral obscenity" committed by the Assad regime, Obama appeared much more circumspect in his appeals to the American people. His early words conveyed both his outrage at the disproportionate actions by Assad as well as his empathy with the war-weary American citizens. In private, he confided he had qualms both about the legality and the political legitimacy of military action. In public, his argument focused on the violation of an international convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and the absolutely unavoidable duty to enforce it. But the fact that UN inspectors had not completed their field report on the attack, coupled with the refusal of the UN Security Council to consider armed action, gave him pause and forced him to confront his own doubts once again.In the meantime, momentum was building in the United States where, according to press reports, it was all but certain there would be a military strike to "punish and deter" the Syrian regime, by Labor Day weekend. GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham were vocal in their support of intervention but demanded more than just a punitive strike and showed some impatience towards the President's pondering an action that should have been decided long ago.Abroad, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia were in favor of the US action. As it is widely known, Russia was against it and that is why the US had to bypass the UN Security Council where Russia has veto power. While NATO allies all offered strong support (indeed, both France and Britain were the first to insist on support for the rebels a year ago), Prime Minister David Cameron was delivered a strong blow when he lost a vote in the House of Commons, with some of his own backbenchers voting against intervention. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, facing a coming election and against the perennial background of German Basic Law constraints, had already told the President that Germany would stand in the sidelines, while offering moral support. The long shadow cast by the Iraqi war around the world once again became evident. But the French President, not required by the Fifth Republic Constitution to consult the legislature, and encouraged by France's recent successful actions in Mali and Libya, remained firm.By Friday, Obama's tortured deliberations came to an end as he abruptly changed courses. Against the advice of his National Security and political advisors team, he made a dramatic announcement from the Rose Garden: his decision on the need for a narrow punitive action against Syria had been made, he said, but he had decided to ask for Congressional authorization first. As Commander in Chief, and in spite of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, he is not obligated to do this. He thus appears to be shifting responsibility onto the legislature while simultaneouslybuying some time to explore diplomatic solutions in the upcoming G-20 summer.The cerebral constitutional law professor and the risk- taking politician in him have made a Faustian bargain. If Congress authorizes the use of force, he will have both legal and political cover for his action while at the same time fulfilling his moral duty of punishing a violator of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of Humanitarian law. If they vote No, he can just blame them for his own lack of action and use all the power of the Presidency on his domestic agenda.It is, in any case, a big gamble, one that has the potential of weakening him and turning him into a lame duck for the rest of his Presidency. The GOP is internally divided on many issues, among them foreign policy, where conservative ideologies run the gamut from minimalist /isolationist to neo-cons/regime- change interventionists and all the shades in-between. And the far left in Obama's own party is against intervention. So there is no guarantee he will get Congressional approval. The cost of losing this vote is enormous: it may set a strong precedent in diminishing Presidential prerogatives.To be fair to the President and his vacillating stance, this is not an easy decision. None of the world leaders have made a compelling public case for a strategic need of intervention in Syria. The proposed limited "punitive" strike will most likely be inconclusive: it will not deter further extreme actions by Assad, who has now been given time to disperse his military assets and capabilities. The strike will not significantly degrade his capacity to fight, and there will be little change in his main goal, namely, to destroy the opposition and regain total control of the country.This is a fight to the end by both sides. If overthrown, Assad and his Alawite supporters (as well as the Christians who have traditionally been under his protection) will be massacred. There are no desirable outcomes in this conflict. The rebels are divided and the biggest group is that ofthe jihadists with strong support of Al Qaeda. While Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel are on the side of the United States and want a moderate alternative to the Assad regime, Iran, to an extent Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon are on the dictator's side (as, incongruously, is Venezuela). The Palestinian group Hamas, previously favoring Assad has now changed sides and is supporting the rebels. So in many ways this is a war by proxy that could become a generalized regional war. There is no indication that the President or anyone else has a political plan or a diplomatic effort in mind for the post-strike scenario.However, US inaction at this time undermines the security of its allies, especially Israel. Even though Netanyahu has adopted a "no comment" stance and hasn't, accordingly, said a word on this issue, other Israeli politicians are worrying out loud about the implications the US lack of resolve will have on other "red lines": Will the United States act when Iran crosses the nuclear threshold? Or will Israel find itself facing Iran alone?They bitterly remind themselves of Obama's speech in Jerusalem, in March this year, when he said in Hebrew: "Atem lo levad" ("You are not alone"). They are very skeptical, now more than ever, that the President will match his lofty rhetoric with action.In the United States the momentum is gone, Congress won't reconvene until September 9, and the President is using the last week of summer to energetically lobby House and Senate leaders and persuade skeptics through intelligence briefings. Urgent issues in the domestic agenda will thus have to be postponed.What no one, either at home or abroad denies, is that the credibility of the Presidency and with it, that of the United States, is at stake. International support for the operation is unlikely to improve. A negative vote by Congress will further weaken the President and may complicate the White House legislative agenda, where he will have to spend all his political capital and still,perhaps, fall short.In a keynote speech to the National Defense University earlier this year, Obama expressed the need to chart a new way in American foreign policy, one that would end the "perpetual wartime footing" that characterized the post 9-11 era, after G.W. Bush got a virtual blank check from Congress in the use of military force and intelligence gathering. So far, Obama has ended two protracted unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is clear he will not engage in regime change. But a new foreign policy strategy has not crystallized yet. There is no Obama doctrine, no overall framework to guide his decisions and give predictability to his actions.His whole approach to the Middle East, the most explosive region in the planet today, is misconceived. His tepid reaction to the Egyptian situation had already given some approximation of how reluctant he is about taking sides in conflicts in the region. Syrian use of chemical weapons has confirmed his ambivalence and exposed his indecision. At the same time, it has provoked a collapse of American credibility abroad, anduncertainty about its reliability as an ally. Regardless of what follows after this week, his hesitancy will have dire consequences for American foreign policy into the future.The larger problem that looms over the heads of world leaders and that few seem to acknowledge is that this is not about Syria or Egypt or Libya or Yemen or Tunisia as separate conflicts; it is a regional conflagration that has to be addressedcomprehensively, within the larger regional and international context. All major actors, whether it is Europe, Russia, or China and of course the United States, have a stake in the region and it is in their interest to define the rules of the game and together find an overall solution to this predicament.

We present a data set on authoritarian regimes' claims to legitimacy that is based on leading experts' assessments of 98 states for the period 1991–2010. The experts assessed these regimes on the basis of six conceptually distinguishable but interlinked claims to legitimacy – namely (1) foundational myth, (2) ideology, (3) personalism, (4) international engagement, (5) procedural mechanisms and (6) performance.
For the survey, we contacted approximately 800 renowned international and local experts. They were selected on the basis of their publication records, their local expertise and their work for high-quality country-based indices, research institutes, and/or high-profile think tanks. 273 online questionnaires were completed. We collected expert assessments for the most recent non-democratic regime (as of 2013, the year of assessment). The survey comprised questions covering the strength of a regime's six legitimation strategies, based on a six-point scale ranging from 0-5. In addition, the dataset includes information regarding the number of experts per country and the experts' average confidence in answering the questions on the respective country.

Die European Values Study (EVS) und die World Values Survey (WVS) sind zwei groß angelegte, länderübergreifende und längsschnittliche Umfrage-Forschungsprogramme. Sie umfassen eine große Anzahl von Fragen zu moralischen, religiösen, gesellschaftlichen, politischen, beruflichen und familiären Werten, die seit Anfang der achtziger Jahre repliziert wurden.

Beide Organisationen vereinbarten, ab 2017 bei der gemeinsamen Datenerhebung zusammenzuarbeiten. Der EVS war verantwortlich für die Planung und Durchführung von Umfragen in europäischen Ländern unter Verwendung des EVS-Fragebogens und der methodischen Richtlinien des EVS. Der WVSA war für die Planung und Durchführung von Umfragen in Ländern außerhalb Europas verantwortlich, wobei der WVS-Fragebogen und die methodischen Richtlinien des WVS verwendet wurden. Beide Organisationen entwickelten ihre Entwürfe für Master-Fragebögen unabhängig voneinander. Die gemeinsamen Items definieren den gemeinsamen Kern beider Fragebögen.

Der Gemeinsame EVS/WVS wird aus den beiden Quellendatensätzen des EVS und des WVS erstellt:
- European Values Study 2017 Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017), ZA7500 Data file Version 5.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.13897 (https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13897).
Haerpfer, C., Inglehart, R., Moreno,A., Welzel,C., Kizilova,K., Diez-Medrano J., M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2024. World Values Survey: Round Seven–Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain & Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute & WVSA Secretariat. Version. 6.0.0, doi:10.14281/18241.24.