Suchergebnisse

Bis zum Sturz des Schahs 1979 galt Iran als zuverlässiger strategischer Verbündeter der USA im Persischen Golf. Der Verlust dieses Verbündeten hat starke Beachtung gefunden, weniger der Entscheidungsprozeß, der dazu führte. Die vorliegende Untersuchung konzentriert sich auf diesen Entscheidungsprozeß und führt zu folgenden Ergebnissen: Das Scheitern der Carterschen Politik gegenüber Iran ist nicht einfach Folge eines Konflikts zwischen nationalem Sicherheitsberater und Außenminister, vielmehr war der Entscheidungsprozeß schlecht angelegt und führte zu einer zwiespältigen, ineffektiven Behandlung der Krise. Dem Schah wurde keine Orientierungshilfe gegeben: (1) Unkritisch und zu schnell waren sich die Berater des Präsidenten einig, daß der Schah lediglich die Liberalisierung seines Regimes vorantreiben solle; (2) aus einem bürokratischen Kompromiß zwischen gegensätzlichen Positionen (liberale Berater vs. Sicherheitsberater) konnte keine klare Politik formuliert werden; (3) die Diskussion unterschiedlicher Optionen der amerikanischen Politik wurde unterlassen. (AuD-Hng)

Vergleichende Betrachtung beider Aufstände im Hinblick auf Rolle und Einfluß der palästinensischen Führung, den Charakter des Aufstands und seine soziale Basis, die islamische Dimension sowie den Verlauf und die Auswirkungen. Für den Ausgang der noch andauernden Intifada werden im Vergleich zu 1939 größere Chancen auf eine Verhandlungslösung als 1939 prognostiziert. (DÜI-Hns)

An American envoy and a Bahraini academic posed for the camera at a Washington hotel in October 2020, grinning ear to ear. They held a copy of an agreement between the U.S. State Department and the King Hamad Global Center for Peaceful Coexistence to combat antisemitism in Bahrain. Ellie Cohanim, then the U.S. assistant special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism, called it "a model for a society that actively espouses religious freedom, tolerance and diversity of peoples."Thousands of miles away, in Bahrain itself, Sheikh Zuhair Jasim Abbas was sitting in a solitary confinement cell. His family had not heard from him since July. They would not again for several more months. According to a UN panel, the Shi'a Muslim cleric was allegedly beaten, starved, sleep-deprived, chained, attacked with water hoses, forbidden from using the bathroom, threatened with execution, and prevented from practicing his religious rituals.The Abraham Accords, the diplomatic agreements between Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, have been hailed as a victory for religious tolerance. The image of Muslims and Jews dancing together has convinced American policymakers from both parties that peace is breaking out across the Middle East. The Biden administration is reportedly offering the Saudi government a huge bribe — perhaps even a commitment to go to war on the kingdom's behalf — to get Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords as well.New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman seems to sum up the Biden administration's logic: that a Saudi-Israeli agreement would "open the way for peace between Israel and the whole Muslim world" and "dramatically reduce the Muslim-Jewish antipathy born over a century ago with the start of the Jewish-Palestinian conflict."But the Abraham Accords are attached to a social order that is deeply unequal, divided along ethnic and religious lines. While Israel allows foreign Muslims to visit Jerusalem, it rules over millions of Palestinians against their will. (That conflict is more about nationalism in the here and now than "Muslim-Jewish antipathy.") And while some monarchies in the Persian Gulf are beginning to embrace foreigners of different religions, those same states — especially Bahrain — treat their native Shi'a Muslims as a potential fifth column.For the past few years, some of the Gulf monarchies have been engaged in a project to replace Israel with Iran as the main enemy of the Arab masses. On one hand, these countries have repressed pro-Palestine activism and promoted an image of Palestinians as parasitic ingrates. On the other hand, they have encouraged fears of Iranian power, often conflating Iran with Shi'a Muslims as a whole. Israel has encouraged both prejudices as part of its outreach to Middle Eastern publics. Rather than a victory for religious tolerance, the Abraham Accords are the culmination of an attempt by Israel and its new Gulf allies to rearrange their official enemy lists.In 2018, as Israel was beginning direct talks with Emirati and Bahraini diplomats, Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee turned into a fountain of anti-Shi'a incitement. Quoting medieval Sunni scholars, Adraee claimed on video that Shi'a Muslims are "fundamentally hypocrites and liars who invent falsehoods to ruin Islam." A few months later, he complained that Iran is "transforming citizens into Shi'a" across the Arab world.After the Abraham Accords were signed, Adraee ranted that Sunni Palestinians who prayed alongside Shi'a were leaving the fold of Sunni Islam: "How do these 'believers' justify praying behind those who stab the back of the Sunni world?" The spirit of Muslim-Jewish reconciliation, with its emphasis on interfaith photo ops, clearly does not apply to Sunni-Shi'a relations.It's worth noting that, although Iran is the largest Shi'a-majority state, most Shi'a Muslims live outside of Iran, in India, Pakistan, and the Arab world. And religious Shi'a have been at the forefront of resisting the Iranian theocracy, both inside and outside Iran. However, casting all Shi'a as Iranian agents serves a political purpose. Unrest in areas like eastern Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, where the majority of the population is Shi'a, can be dismissed as foreign terrorism, rather than a case of Arab citizens demanding equal rights. In the words of one Saudi commentator, Arabs who embrace Shi'a identity politics "have sadly become Persian."While trying to terrify Sunnis about the Iranian menace, the Israeli government has also worked to turn Iranians against Palestinians. Last year, when a few Iranian protesters were filmed stomping on a Palestinian symbol, the Israeli foreign ministry loudly promoted that image. The ministry's Persian-language account is filled with sarcastic jokes about the "oppressed Palestinians," along with claims that "they teach hatred and violence" to their children.As the Abraham Accords were finalized, the Gulf states that moved closer to Israel also began to take more of an anti-Palestinian line. Americans celebrated, and rightfully so, when Saudi television or the Emirati school system presented a more sympathetic view of Jews. At the same time, however, Saudi and Emirati media figures got louder about what they considered Palestinian "treachery." In the words of a Saudi soap opera character, the average Palestinian is an ingrate who "doesn't appreciate you standing by him, who curses you day and night — more than the Israelis." Given the heavy censorship that Saudi and Emirati media are subject to, this change in tone must have reflected official policy. Just as political concerns led Gulf states to tone down anti-Jewish prejudice, different political concerns could lead them to tone down other prejudices. At times when Israeli authorities aggressively asserted their sovereignty over Islamic holy sites — especially under the ultra-nationalist Israeli government elected in 2022 — the Gulf has returned to a more pro-Palestine tone. After Saudi Arabia mended ties with Iran earlier this year, Saudi authorities loosened restrictions on Shi'a pilgrims, and prominent Saudi propagandist Hussain al-Ghawi embraced Shi'a as his Muslim brothers. Ironically, American media did not celebrate the Saudi-Iranian pact as the dawn of religious harmony, but instead raised the alarm that Washington was losing its influence in the region.The American cultural understanding of the Middle East is centered on Israel, and anti-Palestinian racism is normalized in U.S. politics. On the other hand, Washington views Sunni-Shi'a sectarianism as a geopolitical game. During the occupation of Iraq and the decades of war that followed, U.S. policymakers treated "Sunni" and "Shi'a" like pieces on a chessboard, debating which side to favor at any given time. Instead of seeing this sectarianism as a terrible policy failure, U.S. politicians blamed Muslims' own attachment to "tribalism" and "conflicts that date back millennia," as former President Barack Obama put it.And so the Abraham Accords help flatter American elites. Israel and its Gulf allies can make a big show of overcoming Muslim-Jewish tensions — which Americans see as the central moral question of the Middle East — with U.S. support. The other prejudices involved in maintaining the system simply don't register on Americans' radar.Other states are starting to appeal to the West through the same strategy. Azerbaijan is fighting a brutal ethnic conflict against Armenia. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani government has made a big show of hosting foreign Christian and Jewish delegations. Those guests often go on to praise Azerbaijan as an oasis of Muslim tolerance — rather than a secular nationalist dictatorship whose ethnic hatred of Armenians outweighs any religious concern.It's noble to want American diplomats to resolve conflicts and promote harmony between religions. But the Abraham Accords are intentionally misleading in that regard. Under the guise of peacemaking, the alliance helps authoritarian governments maintain divisions, albeit among communities that U.S. elites don't care about. The real path to peace comes through justice and mutual respect, not simply rearranging enemy lists.

Acknowledgments Research reported in this publication was supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the University of Melbourne, Public Health England, the Norwegian Institute of Public Health, the National Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health (award P30AG047845), and the National Institute of Mental Health of the National Institutes of Health (award R01MH110163). Aruna M Kamath is funded by the National Institutes of Health (T32GM086270). The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation or the National Institutes of Health. Lucas Guimarães Abreu acknowledges Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - Brasil (CAPES) - Código de Financiamento 001, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) (404710/2018-2 and 310797/2019-5), Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa de Minas Gerais (FAPEMIG), and Pró-Reitoria de Pesquisa (PRPq) of Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. Olatunji O Adetokunboh was supported by the National Research Foundation, and Department of Science and Innovation, South Africa. Syed Mohamed Aljunid would like to acknowledge the Department of Health Policy and Management, Faculty of Public Health, Kuwait University, Kuwait and International Centre for Casemix and Clinical Coding, Faculty of Medicine, National University of Malaysia, Malaysia for the approval and support to participate in this research project. Marcel Ausloos, Adrian Pana, and Claudiu Herteliu are partially supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNDS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P4-ID-PCCF-2016-0084. Claudiu Herteliu and Adrian Pana are partially supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNDS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P2-2.1-SOL-2020-2-0351. Derrick A Bennett receives support from the Oxford National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Biomedical Research Centre. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the National Health Service (NHS), the NIHR, or the Department of Health and Social Care. Felix Carvalho and Eduarda Fernandes acknowledge UID/MULTI/04378/2019 and UID/QUI/50006/2019 support with funding from FCT/MCTES through national funds. Joao Conde acknowledges the European Research Council, ERC starting grant agreement No 848325. Vera Marisa Costa acknowledges her grant (SFRH/BHD/110001/2015), received by Portuguese national funds through Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT), IP, under the Norma Transitória DL57/2016/CP1334/CT0006. Sagnik Dey acknowledges the support of the Centre of Excellence for Research on Clean Air (CERCA) and IIT Delhi for the institute chair position. Santosh Gaihre acknowledges the GCRF SAFEWATER Project, Ulster University, Northern Ireland. Sheikh Mohammed Shariful Islam acknowledges support from fellowships and funding from NHMRC and National Heart Foundation of Australia. Oommen John is recipient of an UIPA scholarship through University of New South Wales (UNSW), Sydney, Australia. Md Nuruzzaman Khan acknowledges the support of Jatiya Kabi Kazi Nazrul Islam University, Mymensingh, Bangladesh. Yun Jin Kim was supported by the Research Management Centre, Xiamen University Malaysia, Malaysia (XMUMRF/2020-C6/ITCM/0004). Sindhura Lakshmi Koulmane Laxminarayana acknowledges support provided by Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Manipal, India. Kewal Krishan is supported by the UGC Centre of Advanced Study (CAS II), awarded to the Department of Anthropology, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India. Manasi Kumar would like to acknowledge NIH/FIC k43 tw010716-04. Ben Lacey acknowledges support from UK Biobank, the NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre, and the BHF Oxford Centre of Research Excellence. Iván Landires is a member of the Sistema Nacional de Investigación (SNI), which is supported by the Panama's Secretaría Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación (SENACYT). John J McGrath has been supported by the Danish National Research Foundation (Niels Bohr Professorship), and is employed by The Queensland Centre for Mental Health Research which receives core funding from the Queensland Health. Stefania Mondello acknowledges support from the Italian Ministry of Health (grant number GR-2013-02354960). Jonathan F Mosser acknowledges funding from BMGF (OPP1182474). Bruno Ramos Nascimento was supported in part by CNPq (Bolsa de produtividade em pesquisa, 312382/2019-7), by the Edwards Lifesciences Foundation (Every Heartbeat Matters programme 2020), and by FAPEMIG (grant APQ-000627-20). Shuhei Nomura acknowledges support from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan (MEXT). Oluwakemi Ololade Odukoya was supported by the Fogarty International Center of the National Institutes of Health under award number K43TW010704. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health. Alberto Ortiz was supported by FIS/Fondos FEDER (PI18/01366, PI19/00588, PI19/00815, DTS18/00032, ERA-PerMed-JTC2018 (KIDNEY ATTACK AC18/00064 and PERSTIGAN AC18/00071, ISCIII-RETIC REDinREN RD016/0009), Sociedad Española de Nefrología, FRIAT, Comunidad de Madrid en Biomedicina B2017/BMD-3686 CIFRA2-CM. Jagadish Rao Padubidri acknowledges the Manipal Academy of Higher Education Mangalore, Mangalore, India for their constant support. George C Patton is supported by an NHMRC senior principal research fellowship. Alberto Raggi is supported by a grant from the Italian Ministry of Health (Ricerca Corrente, Fondazione Istituto Neurologico C. Besta, Linea 4 Outcome Research: dagli Indicatori alle Raccomandazioni Cliniche). Bhageerathy Reshmi acknowledges support from Manipal College of Health Professions, Manipal, India. Daniela Ribeiro acknowledges the financial support from the European Union [FEDER funds through COMPETE, POCI-01-0145-FEDER-029253). Abdallah M Samy acknowledges the support from the Egyptian Fulbright Mission Program, and being a member of the Egyptian Young Academy of Sciences and Technology. Davide Sattin and Silvia Schiavolin acknowledge support by a grant from the Italian Ministry of Health (Ricerca Corrente, Fondazione Istituto Neurologico C Besta, Linea 4 Outcome Research: dagli Indicatori alle Raccomandazioni Cliniche). Francesca Giulia Magnani acknowledges support by a grant from the Italian Ministry of Health GR2016-02365049. Feng Sha and Bingyu Li acknowledge support by the Shenzhen Social Science Fund (Grant No SZ2020C015) and the Shenzhen Science and Technology Program (Grant KQTD20190929172835662). Aziz Sheikh acknowledges the support of the Health Data Research UK BREATHE Hub. João Pedro Silva acknowledges support from grant number UIDB/04378/2020 from the Applied Molecular Biosciences Unit (UCIBIO), supported through Portuguese national funds via FCT/MCTES. David A Sleet acknowledges support from the James F and Sarah T Fries Foundation, The Bizzell Group. Mohammad Reza Sobhiyeh acknowledges support from the Clinical Research Development center of Imam Reza Hospital Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences, Iran. Joan B Soriano acknowledges support from the Centro de Investigación en Red de Enfermedades Respiratorias (CIBERES), Instituto de Salud Carlos III (ISCIII), Madrid, Spain. Gizachew Assefa Tessema is a recipient of the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) investigator grant (APP1195716). Riaz Uddin is supported by an Alfred Deakin Postdoctoral Research Fellowship. Bhaskaran Unnikrishnan acknowledges Katurba Medical College, Mangalore, India. Charles Shey Wiysonge is supported by the South African Medical Research Council. Sojib Bin Zaman received a scholarship from the Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) in support of his academic career. Yunquan Zhang acknowledges the Science and Technology Research Project of Hubei Provincial Department of Education (grant number Q20201104) and Middle Aged Technology Innovation Team Project of Hubei Provincial Department of Education (grant number T2020003). ; Peer reviewed ; Publisher PDF

ABSTRAKLingkungan hidup merupakan tempat tinggal semua makhluk hidup yang harus dijaga dan dilestarikan. Kurangnya kepedulian masyarakat dalam melestarikan alam dapat menyebabkan pencemaran lingkungan dan banyaknya sampah berserakan. Hadirnya bank sampah menjadi salah satu upaya guna mewujudkan lingkungan yang bersih, asri dan sehat. Dalam sistem operasionalnya, bank sampah menerapkan nilai-nilai pada maqashid syariah yang kemudian diwujudkan melalui green economy pada bank sampah. Tujuan dari studi ini adalah untuk menganalisa nilai maqashid syariah sekaligus green economy yang terkandung pada Bank Sampah Induk Surabaya. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif deskriptif dengan strategi studi kasus guna memberikan gambaran detail terkait sistem operasional pada Bank Sampah Induk Surabaya. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan adanya penerapan nilai maqashid syariah pada sistem operasional Bank Sampah Induk Surabaya melalui ketetapan, pengadaan kegiatan, dan peraturan yang ditetapkan serta mewujudkan 10 prinsip pada konsep green economy yang sekaligus mendukung tiga program pada Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Bersesuaian dengan ulasan sebelumnya mulai dari tujuan, metode penelitian dan hasil maka saran yang relevan dengan studi adalah perlu perhatian khusus bagi pengelolaan Bank Sampah Induk Surabaya agar penerapan nilai maqashid syariahnya lebih dioptimalkan sehingga mampu memberikan manfaat lebih banyak bagi masyarakat selain aspek ekonomi.Kata Kunci: Bank Sampah, Maqashid Syariah, Green Economy, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). ABSTRACTThe living environment is a home for all living things that should be protected and preserved. Lack of environmental awareness can cause environmental pollution and waste problems. The presence of waste banks becomes an attempt to create a clean, beautiful, and healthy environment. In its operational system, waste banks apply the values of maqashid sharia that is called green economy. The purpose of this study was to analyze the values of maqashid sharia and green economy which were applied by the Central Waste Bank of Surabaya. This study used a descriptive qualitative method with a case study strategy to provide a detailed description of the operating system at the Central Waste Bank of Surabaya. The results showed that the application of maqashid sharia values in the Central Waste Bank of Surabaya was applied through stipulations, procurement activities, and established regulations as well as realizing 10 principles in the green economy program concepts which also supported three programs in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). According to the findings of this study, the relevant suggestion is that the management of the Central Waste Bank of Surabaya requires special attention so that the application of maqashid sharia values can be optimal. The optimization of maqashid sharia values will benefit the community, not limited to the economic aspect.Keywords: Waste Bank, Maqashid Sharia, Green Economy, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).REFERENCESAlfarisyi, A. T., & Fauzi, R. M. Q. (2020). Peran pemberdayaan bank sampah dalam Islam (Studi kasus pada bank sampah induk Surabaya). Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah Teori dan Terapan, 6(3), 541. https://doi.org/10.20473/vol6iss20193pp541-554Antasari, D. W. (2020). Implementasi green economy terhadap pembangunan berkelanjutan di kota Kediri. Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan STIE Muhammadiyah Palopo, 5(2), 80–88. https://doi.org/10.35906/jep01.v5i2.402Arifah, S. R., & Zaki, I. (2020). 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