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Disinformation Manipulates Discontent Francophone West Africa's six military seizures of power since 2020 were underpinned by waning popular support for democracy in the region. The coups—two in Burkina Faso (both in 2022), two in Mali (2020 and 2022), one in Guinea (2021), and the most recent in Niger (2023)—have often been celebrated by local populations, despite elected leaders in some instances being forcefully replaced. While citizens may prefer democracy, they also desire governments that address legitimate frustrations. Democratically elected governments in West Africa have failed to support citizens and enabled some officials to build riches from corrupt practices. Leaders claim to be democratic to maintain legitimacy but act in their self-interest to consolidate power and manipulate electoral systems, making their countries democratic in name only. Moreover, West African populaces have increasingly grappled with the insecurity of militant Islamist insurgencies that threaten lives and livelihoods, as well as more than a decade of unsuccessful domestic and international—namely French—military interventions in response. In this light, citizen support for coups can be understood. Citizens celebrate new hope for long-overdue and much-needed change while their immediate security needs trump overarching democratic values. What makes less sense, however, is the sustained support for coup leaders—even as security and economic conditions worsen under junta leadership—and how this support lends itself to further approval of Russia's destabilizing actions across the region. Russian disinformation operations across West Africa have led to an unprecedented rise in popular support for Russia, citizen demands for Russian interventions, and, in some cases, new military partnerships between African countries and Russia.Burkina Faso is an illustrative example. In 2014, the country emerged from a 27-year authoritarian government. Since then, Burkina Faso experienced political reforms and democratic gains. Until recently, Reporters Without Borders called the country "one of Africa's success stories regarding freedom of the press." Then, in 2022, the security situation proved too difficult for Burkina Faso's democratic institutions to handle, and the country experienced two coups in nine months. The coups followed protests demanding democratically-elected President Kaboré's resignation and holding him accountable for the country's deteriorating security. Traoré—the second and current post-coup leader—has suspended the country's constitution and implemented a transitional charter, which cannot be revised without his approval. Both post-coup leaders justified their takeovers by claiming they had acted to respond to the preceding leader's failure to address a strengthening jihadist insurgency. Both promised to restore security. Instead, the security and humanitarian situations in Burkina Faso have greatly worsened. The number of people killed by jihadist groups has nearly tripled since the coup, and more than 2.1 million Burkinabe have been forcibly displaced. Approximately one in four schools are not operating, increasing the vulnerability of young Burkinabe who already face an uncertain future. Adding to the jihadist threat to civilians, Burkina Faso's military has also faced credible accusations of human rights abuses, such as extrajudicial killings of children and a military-linked massacre of at least 156 civilians. Traoré issued an emergency law allowing him to take any necessary measures to counter the insurgency, including requisitioning people and restraining civil liberties. Since then, he has been accused of conscripting journalists, civil society activists, and opposition party members. However, Traoré has not yet faced widespread backlash despite a worsening security situation under his rule. Instead, popular calls have been supportive of the coup leaders and, in general, in support of authoritarianism: "No to France, yes to Russia." Complexly situated in this backdrop of domestic and French military failures against jihadist insurgencies, poverty, underdevelopment, and legitimate unanswered citizen grievances, Russia has effectively seized opportunities to manipulate citizen frustrations through disinformation campaigns. Russian disinformation operations across West Africa have led to an unprecedented rise in popular support for Russia, citizen demands for Russian interventions, and, in some cases, new military partnerships between African countries and Russia. In Burkina Faso, Russian-generated disinformation has encouraged democratic backsliding, fostered coups, and increased support for repressive regimes (domestically and abroad) regardless of their human rights records. ...there are well-documented examples of Russian disinformation campaigns across West Africa and the continent. Russia's disinformation campaign in Burkina Faso builds off the legitimate fears and frustrations of the Burkinabe population while reaffirming their concerns. Disinformation manipulates discontent, blaming France for Burkina Faso's challenges, presenting Russia as a savior, and embracing authoritarian leaders like Traoré who stand ready to partner with Russia. This disinformation takes a variety of identifiable forms. Russian operatives employ inauthentic social media accounts and pretend to be Africans with a genuine interest in Burkina Faso. These accounts play on common frustrations and place blame on France's military failures and the West more broadly. They glorify Russian President Vladimir Putin, overstate the successes of the Wagner Group, and advocate for closer relationships between Burkina Faso and Russia. Burkinabe supporters of these accounts are invited to join private messaging groups that spread more radical propaganda that authorities might otherwise censor as disinformation. In early Russian disinformation campaigns, Russia struggled to make its content look legitimate. Over time, however, Russia has recruited local African political players and influencers to form and legitimize messaging, making campaigns more credible and resonant with local populations. Russian operatives have further developed fake news sources to spread disinformation or impersonate or buy legitimate accounts to ensure a spread of information favorable to Russia. In some cases, disinformation campaigns have also sought to delegitimize dissent. In response to journalists' unfavorable investigations into Burkina Faso's military, for example, accounts and sites associated with the Wagner group began attacking the journalists to discredit them and halt their work. Unfortunately, Burkina Faso is not alone, as there are well-documented examples of Russian disinformation campaigns across West Africa and the continent. Russia's successful disinformation campaigns have resulted in greater citizen support for Russia in Burkina Faso, which is increasingly vital for Russia and the coup leaders as they move the Burkinabe-Russian partnership from rhetoric to reality, as seen with the recent reopening of the Russian embassy in Burkina Faso, the arrival of Russian military personnel, and Russian-sponsored plans to build a nuclear power plant. Russian disinformation and its influence empower leaders like Traoré because it helps legitimize coup leaders in places where the West and the United States will not engage local leadership. Instead, it is Russia that provides aid, military support, and even personal protection to coup leaders. While this is not to argue that the United States should provide material and political assistance to leaders like Traoré, it does illuminate a fundamental problem: the US response to coup leaders cannot be simply silence and sullenness. Such a response leads Traoré and the citizenry into the hands of Russia, pushing the country further from the path of democracy building and into humanitarian and insecurity crises that threaten the entire region. While Russian disinformation may play up citizen grievances, the Russian partnership does not prioritize Burkinabe citizens nor adequately address the country's worsening security situation. Russia's primary goal is to extract resources and spread influence and military power in the region. It is not interested or capable of addressing the underlying causes of Burkina Faso's economic malaise and instability. Values-based US Policy A 2021-2022 study by Afrobarometer in 36 African countries showed that two-thirds of Africans polled prefer democracy over any other system of government, and 80% rejected one-man rule. However, only 38% of respondents said they were satisfied with how democracy works in their country. These results indicate a growing perspective of skepticism toward democracy in Burkina Faso and across the continent. While most Africans want democracy, they have yet to see their countries' current democratic systems delivering on what is expected of them. Suppose the United States is to counter Russia's growing and nefarious influence in Burkina Faso and across Africa. In that case, the United States must focus on these shared values and aspirations with Africans: democracy, human rights, and the ability and vision through development efforts to support communities in addressing their root causes of instability and conflict. After all, these root causes of citizen discontent are also the basis through which disinformation takes hold. ...the US response to coup leaders cannot be simply silence and sullenness.This analysis is not to oversimplify the complexities and difficult circumstances that countries like Burkina Faso face. Instead, its goal is to underscore the way out of crisis and instability and away from actors like Russia who are fueling it. Through creative, adaptable, innovative solutions that address the underlying causes of extreme poverty and instability, the United States will succeed in these efforts. US policy must focus on root causes and prioritize people. Such an approach benefits from sustainable partnerships between the United States and local communities in ways that empower citizens and increase their resistance to jihadist recruitment. Success requires greater and longer-lasting investment in civil society organizations and social services development to improve the resilience, opportunities, and well-being of people throughout the country. Moreover, an independent, free press will be key to directly addressing disinformation. Increased support for independent media should be a foreign policy priority, considering the key role of reliable information and transparency in functioning democracies. In the short term, the United States can support local media through political support and help them develop fact-checking services in response to disinformation. In the long-term support of local media, capacity building, economic security, legitimacy, and empowerment are vital. This could include public diplomacy efforts that engender democratic values and build local media capacity. Torianna Eckles is the communications intern with the Wilson Center Africa Program. Previously, she was a staff intern (Director's Office) with the Stafford Capacity Building Internship with the Africa Program for the Fall 2023 term. She is a senior at The George Washington University, double majoring in Peace and Conflict Resolution and Political Science. The opinions expressed on this blog are solely those of the authors. They do not reflect the views of the Wilson Center or those of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Wilson Center's Africa Program provides a safe space for various perspectives to be shared and discussed on critical issues of importance to both Africa and the United States.

Disinformation Manipulates Discontent Francophone West Africa's six military seizures of power since 2020 were underpinned by waning popular support for democracy in the region. The coups—two in Burkina Faso (both in 2022), two in Mali (2020 and 2022), one in Guinea (2021), and the most recent in Niger (2023)—have often been celebrated by local populations, despite elected leaders in some instances being forcefully replaced. While citizens may prefer democracy, they also desire governments that address legitimate frustrations. Democratically elected governments in West Africa have failed to support citizens and enabled some officials to build riches from corrupt practices. Leaders claim to be democratic to maintain legitimacy but act in their self-interest to consolidate power and manipulate electoral systems, making their countries democratic in name only. Moreover, West African populaces have increasingly grappled with the insecurity of militant Islamist insurgencies that threaten lives and livelihoods, as well as more than a decade of unsuccessful domestic and international—namely French—military interventions in response. In this light, citizen support for coups can be understood. Citizens celebrate new hope for long-overdue and much-needed change while their immediate security needs trump overarching democratic values. What makes less sense, however, is the sustained support for coup leaders—even as security and economic conditions worsen under junta leadership—and how this support lends itself to further approval of Russia's destabilizing actions across the region. Russian disinformation operations across West Africa have led to an unprecedented rise in popular support for Russia, citizen demands for Russian interventions, and, in some cases, new military partnerships between African countries and Russia.Burkina Faso is an illustrative example. In 2014, the country emerged from a 27-year authoritarian government. Since then, Burkina Faso experienced political reforms and democratic gains. Until recently, Reporters Without Borders called the country "one of Africa's success stories regarding freedom of the press." Then, in 2022, the security situation proved too difficult for Burkina Faso's democratic institutions to handle, and the country experienced two coups in nine months. The coups followed protests demanding democratically-elected President Kaboré's resignation and holding him accountable for the country's deteriorating security. Traoré—the second and current post-coup leader—has suspended the country's constitution and implemented a transitional charter, which cannot be revised without his approval. Both post-coup leaders justified their takeovers by claiming they had acted to respond to the preceding leader's failure to address a strengthening jihadist insurgency. Both promised to restore security. Instead, the security and humanitarian situations in Burkina Faso have greatly worsened. The number of people killed by jihadist groups has nearly tripled since the coup, and more than 2.1 million Burkinabe have been forcibly displaced. Approximately one in four schools are not operating, increasing the vulnerability of young Burkinabe who already face an uncertain future. Adding to the jihadist threat to civilians, Burkina Faso's military has also faced credible accusations of human rights abuses, such as extrajudicial killings of children and a military-linked massacre of at least 156 civilians. Traoré issued an emergency law allowing him to take any necessary measures to counter the insurgency, including requisitioning people and restraining civil liberties. Since then, he has been accused of conscripting journalists, civil society activists, and opposition party members. However, Traoré has not yet faced widespread backlash despite a worsening security situation under his rule. Instead, popular calls have been supportive of the coup leaders and, in general, in support of authoritarianism: "No to France, yes to Russia." Complexly situated in this backdrop of domestic and French military failures against jihadist insurgencies, poverty, underdevelopment, and legitimate unanswered citizen grievances, Russia has effectively seized opportunities to manipulate citizen frustrations through disinformation campaigns. Russian disinformation operations across West Africa have led to an unprecedented rise in popular support for Russia, citizen demands for Russian interventions, and, in some cases, new military partnerships between African countries and Russia. In Burkina Faso, Russian-generated disinformation has encouraged democratic backsliding, fostered coups, and increased support for repressive regimes (domestically and abroad) regardless of their human rights records. ...there are well-documented examples of Russian disinformation campaigns across West Africa and the continent. Russia's disinformation campaign in Burkina Faso builds off the legitimate fears and frustrations of the Burkinabe population while reaffirming their concerns. Disinformation manipulates discontent, blaming France for Burkina Faso's challenges, presenting Russia as a savior, and embracing authoritarian leaders like Traoré who stand ready to partner with Russia. This disinformation takes a variety of identifiable forms. Russian operatives employ inauthentic social media accounts and pretend to be Africans with a genuine interest in Burkina Faso. These accounts play on common frustrations and place blame on France's military failures and the West more broadly. They glorify Russian President Vladimir Putin, overstate the successes of the Wagner Group, and advocate for closer relationships between Burkina Faso and Russia. Burkinabe supporters of these accounts are invited to join private messaging groups that spread more radical propaganda that authorities might otherwise censor as disinformation. In early Russian disinformation campaigns, Russia struggled to make its content look legitimate. Over time, however, Russia has recruited local African political players and influencers to form and legitimize messaging, making campaigns more credible and resonant with local populations. Russian operatives have further developed fake news sources to spread disinformation or impersonate or buy legitimate accounts to ensure a spread of information favorable to Russia. In some cases, disinformation campaigns have also sought to delegitimize dissent. In response to journalists' unfavorable investigations into Burkina Faso's military, for example, accounts and sites associated with the Wagner group began attacking the journalists to discredit them and halt their work. Unfortunately, Burkina Faso is not alone, as there are well-documented examples of Russian disinformation campaigns across West Africa and the continent. Russia's successful disinformation campaigns have resulted in greater citizen support for Russia in Burkina Faso, which is increasingly vital for Russia and the coup leaders as they move the Burkinabe-Russian partnership from rhetoric to reality, as seen with the recent reopening of the Russian embassy in Burkina Faso, the arrival of Russian military personnel, and Russian-sponsored plans to build a nuclear power plant. Russian disinformation and its influence empower leaders like Traoré because it helps legitimize coup leaders in places where the West and the United States will not engage local leadership. Instead, it is Russia that provides aid, military support, and even personal protection to coup leaders. While this is not to argue that the United States should provide material and political assistance to leaders like Traoré, it does illuminate a fundamental problem: the US response to coup leaders cannot be simply silence and sullenness. Such a response leads Traoré and the citizenry into the hands of Russia, pushing the country further from the path of democracy building and into humanitarian and insecurity crises that threaten the entire region. While Russian disinformation may play up citizen grievances, the Russian partnership does not prioritize Burkinabe citizens nor adequately address the country's worsening security situation. Russia's primary goal is to extract resources and spread influence and military power in the region. It is not interested or capable of addressing the underlying causes of Burkina Faso's economic malaise and instability. Values-based US Policy A 2021-2022 study by Afrobarometer in 36 African countries showed that two-thirds of Africans polled prefer democracy over any other system of government, and 80% rejected one-man rule. However, only 38% of respondents said they were satisfied with how democracy works in their country. These results indicate a growing perspective of skepticism toward democracy in Burkina Faso and across the continent. While most Africans want democracy, they have yet to see their countries' current democratic systems delivering on what is expected of them. Suppose the United States is to counter Russia's growing and nefarious influence in Burkina Faso and across Africa. In that case, the United States must focus on these shared values and aspirations with Africans: democracy, human rights, and the ability and vision through development efforts to support communities in addressing their root causes of instability and conflict. After all, these root causes of citizen discontent are also the basis through which disinformation takes hold. ...the US response to coup leaders cannot be simply silence and sullenness.This analysis is not to oversimplify the complexities and difficult circumstances that countries like Burkina Faso face. Instead, its goal is to underscore the way out of crisis and instability and away from actors like Russia who are fueling it. Through creative, adaptable, innovative solutions that address the underlying causes of extreme poverty and instability, the United States will succeed in these efforts. US policy must focus on root causes and prioritize people. Such an approach benefits from sustainable partnerships between the United States and local communities in ways that empower citizens and increase their resistance to jihadist recruitment. Success requires greater and longer-lasting investment in civil society organizations and social services development to improve the resilience, opportunities, and well-being of people throughout the country. Moreover, an independent, free press will be key to directly addressing disinformation. Increased support for independent media should be a foreign policy priority, considering the key role of reliable information and transparency in functioning democracies. In the short term, the United States can support local media through political support and help them develop fact-checking services in response to disinformation. In the long-term support of local media, capacity building, economic security, legitimacy, and empowerment are vital. This could include public diplomacy efforts that engender democratic values and build local media capacity. Torianna Eckles is the communications intern with the Wilson Center Africa Program. Previously, she was a staff intern (Director's Office) with the Stafford Capacity Building Internship with the Africa Program for the Fall 2023 term. She is a senior at The George Washington University, double majoring in Peace and Conflict Resolution and Political Science. The opinions expressed on this blog are solely those of the authors. They do not reflect the views of the Wilson Center or those of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Wilson Center's Africa Program provides a safe space for various perspectives to be shared and discussed on critical issues of importance to both Africa and the United States.

If you have not been paying attention, our government has decided that all electric vehicles are the solution to the climate problem. At least as long as they are made in the US with union labor and benefits. California has committed to banning the sale of anything else. In today's post, a few tidbits from my daily WSJ reading on the subject. From Holman Jenkins on electric cars:  If the goal were to reduce emissions, the world would impose a carbon tax. Then what kind of EVs would we get? Not Teslas but hybrids like Toyota's Prius. "A wheelbarrow full of rare earths and lithium can power either one [battery-powered car] or over 90 hybrids, but, uh, that fact seems to be lost on policymakers," a California dealer recently emailed me.[Note: that wheelbarrow of rare earths comes from multiple truckloads of actual rocks. Also see original for links.] ...The same battery minerals in one Tesla can theoretically supply 37 times as much emissions reduction when distributed over a fleet of Priuses.This is a shock only to those who weren't paying attention. It certainly isn't lost on government. Chris Atkinson, the Ohio State University sustainable transportation guru whose slogan I've cited before—"the best use of a battery is in a hybrid"—was a key official in the Obama Energy Department.Our policies don't exist to incentivize carbon reduction, they exist to lure affluent Americans to make space in their garages for oversized, luxurious EVs so Tesla can report a profit and so other automakers can rack up smaller losses on the "compliance" vehicles they create in obedience to government mandates.Actually, I vote GMC's 9,000 lb, 1,000 hp. 0-60 in 3 seconds $110,000 electric Hummer the prize for most conspicuous mis-use of Chinese lithium and its associated carbon emissions.  Tesla's new "cyber truck" comes close. I can't wait to see those driving around Palo Alto. Mining the required minerals produces emissions. Keeping the battery charged produces emissions. Jenkins is a pretty good economist. There is supply and demand:  Only if a great deal of gasoline-based driving is displaced would there be net reduction in CO2. But who says any gasoline-based driving is being displaced? When government ladles out tax breaks for EVs, when wealthy consumers splurge on a car that burns electrons instead of gasoline, they simply leave more gasoline available for someone else to consume at a lower price.Stop just a minute and digest this one, if you have not already. If you use less gas, someone else uses more. EV subsidies just shift who uses the gas. The same supply just goes somewhere else. One has to subsidize electrics so much that the price of gas goes down, permanently, so that it's not worth bringing out of the ground. And the price and demand are global. Lower prices encourage Indians and Africans to finally get cheap gas powered cars.  This may be a secret to you, the public. It's not to economists.Well, some economists. Alas my beloved profession is as open to virtue signaling as everyone else so I don't see a loud "stop subsidizing battery only EVs and banning everything else" from economists. The problem here is the problem with any plan to subsidize our way to emissions reduction. Humans are perfectly capable of consuming both renewable and dirty energy in ever-growing quantities if the price is right. The emissions data prove as much....By incorporating carbon taxes into its tax systems, global society might at least slow the rate of CO2 emissions while simultaneously improving the efficiency of its tax codes. It still seemed unlikely, but it wasn't clear why. After all, politicians enact plenty of taxes. Governments have been advised for decades to adopt consumption taxes as a way to fund their welfare states without destroying the possibility of growth. Cramming a lot into one delicious column, Jenkins wonders at human nature: How to explain, along the way, the coevolution of the climate empty gesture with climate rhetoric that increasingly shouts the unfounded claim that climate change threatens human survival? I explain it this way: When it became clear nobody was going to do anything about climate change, it became safe to engage in hysterical rhetoric about climate change....As David Burge put it (thanks to an anonymous colleague for this delicious tidbit)"To help poor children, I am going to launch flaming accordions into the Grand Canyon.""That's stupid.""WHY DO YOU HATE POOR CHILDREN?"Climate change is real. Climate change matters. Addressing it is expensive. Other environmental problems clamor for resources too. Europe has stopped growing, and the US is headed the same way. We don't have trillions to waste. California as always leads the way on the beau geste: ... in California, ... drayage trucks, which carry containerized cargo to and from ports and rail centers, face a looming deadline. The state will require any new drayage trucks added to fleets starting next year to run on electric batteries or hydrogen fuel cells. California also plans to phase out sales of new gasoline-powered passenger cars, pickup trucks and SUVs by 2035 and require all new medium- and heavy-duty truck sales be zero-emissions by 2036. ... Trucks represent 6% of the vehicles on California's roads, but a quarter of the state's on-road greenhouse-gas emissions,.... California plans to spend $1.7 billion for medium- and heavy-duty infrastructure for zero-emission vehicles by 2026.$1.7 billion, for state-provided "infrastructure," on top of the costs to industries... for a benefit of...?  The central problem: How are they going to recharge those trucks? [Truck operators] They position trucks near highways, rail or ports, not available power. As fleets add trucks they may need to draw an additional 6 to 8 megawatts of power or more. "That's about 1,000 homes," said Steve Powell, chief executive of utility Southern California Edison. "We may need a new substation or something like that and a line to be built." It has not been built, and the truck deadline is now. So what do operators do?  A mobile charging system in California runs on natural gas. PHOTO: PROLOGIS MOBILITY, from Wall Street JournalSouthern California Edison has come across some fleets powering chargers using diesel generators...so that new EV trucks don't sit unused. Another solution: more batteries. [Pacific Drayage Services President] Gillis is installing a system of chargers paired with battery storage. It can discharge power to trucks even during times of grid stress. The battery storage itself can recharge at a time of day when electricity prices are the cheapest. There is an important point here on just how many batteries are needed for the "transition."  Don't just count the batteries in the trucks. Count the batteries in the charging stations too. And the utility. Even California knows that it does no good to electrify and then power the grid with coal and natural gas. The plan is for solar and wind electricity, but that needs utility scale battery backup. A week or more of power. The sources of my last post only added up the batteries needed for the cars. That's too low by many multiples.  He is also hedging—Gillis tripled his usual order of new diesel trucks from 30 to 100, which will arrive by year-end, just beating the deadline before California phases them out.I get the idea. Build it and they will come. Put the trucks in place now, so what if at huge cost, and so what if we burn coal to power them. Then when solar and wind and utility scale storage arrive, the users will be there. But trucks don't last that long. By 20 years when all that infrastructure finally has its permits, today's electric trucks will be long gone. Covering Kerry's trip to China, a reminder that climate is all about how China and India develop, not which car San Franciscans use to drive up to Tahoe. The Climate Action Tracker says that between 2015 and 2022 China's greenhouse gas emissions increased nearly 12%, while U.S. emissions declined some 5%. China's methane emissions rose about 3% from 2015 to 2021, the latest year with good data, while the U.S. cut them by 5%.... China's "coal production reached record levels in 2022 for the second year running," and "coal is set to remain the backbone" of China's energy system. No kidding: Between 2020 and 2022, China added some 113 gigawatts of new coal-fired power plants, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. The entire world managed to retire some 187 gigawatts of coal plants between 2017 and 2022.As of January China had some 306 coal-fired power stations proposed, permitted or under construction, according to Global Energy Monitor, a nonprofit that tracks worldwide coal-fired power projects of 30 megawatts or more. When finished those plants would generate some 366 gigawatts, or about 68% of the world's total coal capacity under development.As of April China also had 180 new coal mines or mine expansions proposed, permitted or under construction, the nonprofit reported.In a lovely article  Aatish Taseer reminds us there are 1.3 billion people in India (as well as 1.4 billion in China). It's hot, just like it is in Texas. When they reach middle income, they will want air conditioning, just like in Texas. This doesn't make the virtue-signaling tour because there is no easy answer. If China and India don't think they can grow based on solar, wind, and nuclear, just what can we do about it? Send more diplomats? It does not help that the US is now deciding to "disengage" and fight some sort of battle for economic supremacy via industrial policy trade restrictions and tariffs. Even Taiwan on a silver platter isn't going to get China to change. Even if the US shuts down, de-growths, and goes back to subsistence farming, China will spew CO2. I guess the argument is go first to establish a moral example. But if that moral example is obviously self-defeating, pointless, and just money down ratholes to entrenched interests, I doubt it will shame China to much action. A carbon tax, and a Manhattan project to drive down the cost of nuclear would make a whole lot more sense.  (Half the Manhattan project is technical, the other half is to rewrite the regulatory rule book on a wartime schedule.) Think what you could do with the trillion or so dollars going to various subsidies and mandates. Update Read "Old Eagle Eye" excellent July 19 comment below. Boiling it all down to a nutshell, our policy path now is going to produce energy with a lot more materials -- rocks, steel, concrete, batteries, aluminum, carbon fibre -- and energy to produce those materials, relative to fossil fuels or nuclear. Producing those materials also produces more carbon now, with a hoped for savings later.  That the 1970s environmental movement ends up with a huge increase in making stuff from rocks, rather than a service-oriented economy with small impact power, first natural gas and then nuclear, and a light touch upon the earth, is a bit of a paradox.   Also, in addition to spending our trillion dollars and industrial policy wonks on making nuclear cheap and abundant, if a warming climate really is an economic and environmental problem, and given the current policy path is both ineffective and hugely expensive, why should we not even speak or research geoengineering? It's not ideal, but nothing is ideal. 

"Green cities" offer a systematic approach to a significant part of the nowadays urban complexity. The concept dovetails in the "healthy city" idea launched by the World Health Organization, but is equally associated with "sustainable" and "smart cities". During the past decades planning for "green cities" shifted, incorporating new ideas as sustainable development and IT-driven management instruments for smart cities. Contemporary cities continue to face major environmental challenges. Replying to this dynamic context is a main task for cities during the coming decades of the millennium. As most of the (major) cities worldwide are located at the edge of the continents, supporting water-bound activities, they show a significant "blue economy" aspect. This paper reviews the historical context of the science aspects of "green cities" and the related approaches. Four main challenges for livable (coastal) cities today are discussed, taking into account the continuous changes and the almost permanent transition cities face. Climate change effects as sea level rise and extreme weather conditions, affect directly coastal cities; providing enough drinking water is a long standing and increasing problem; ports face particular and specific environmental problems which are in need of a tailored management; and sufficient accessible green areas remain of primary concern for any green city. Cross cutting through these issues are among others mobility and sustainable urban design.These major challenges will necessitate new processes of decision making. Long term planning is essential. This includes among others green infrastructure, systematic investment in natural areas (both on land and in the marine environment), cleaner technology innovations (on water treatment, low carbon emission technology, advanced waste prevention and treatment management, green roofs, and (artificial) wetlands), and the use of smart, IT-driven solutions.References Akcin M., Kaygusuz A., Karabiber A., Alagoz S., Alagoz B.B., Keles C., 2016. Opportunities for energy efficiency in smart cities. Smart grid congress and fair (ICSG), Istanbul, Turkey. IEEE Xplore document DOI:10.1109/SGCF.2016.7492425. Avin U., Holden D., 2000. Does your growth smart? Planning 66(1), 26-29. Bosh O., Nguyen Nam, Nguyen Van Thanh, 2016. Systems thinking for everyone. The journey from theory to making an impact in Vietnam, pp.126. Syspac PTY Ltd., Australia. Boulos, J., 2016. Sustainable Development of Coastal Cities-Proposal of a Modelling Framework to Achieve Sustainable City-Port Connectivity. 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Dasgupta S., Lapla B., Murray S., Wheeler D., 2009. Sea-level rise and storm surges: A comparative analysis of impacts in developing countries. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (42) WPS4901. World Bank, Washington DC. De Las Heras A., 2014. Sustainability science and technology. An introduction, 322pp. CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, Boca Roca, Fl. Diaz P., Stanek P., Frantzeskaki N., Yeh D., 2016. Shifting paradigms, changing waters: Transitioning to integrated urban water management in the coastal city of Dunedin, USA. Sustainable Cities and Society 26, 555-567. Do Thi Thu Huong, Tran Dinh Lan, 2014. Da Nang Ports. In: Environmental management of seaports in Vietnam. Tran Dinh Lan, Luc Hens, Cao Thi Thu Trang, Do Thi Thu Huong Eds., pp.316. Publishing House for Science and Technology, Hanoi, Vietnam. Duhem B., 2005. Introduction. In: Green structure and urban planning. Final report, pp.13-14.A.C. Werquin, B. Duhem, G. Lindholm, B. Oppermann, S. Pauleit, S. 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Mnowlton K., Lynn R., Goldberg R.A., Hogrefe C., Rosenthal J., Kinney P.L., 2007. Projecting health-related mortality impacts under a changing climate in the New York City region. Am. J. Public Health 07, 2028-2034. MONRE-Ministry of Natural resources and Environment, 2012. Climate change and sea level rise scenarios for Vietnam. Hanoi, Vietnam. MONRE-Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 2015. State Report of Environment 2011-2015, Hanoi, Vietnam. Mueller N., Rojas-Rueda D., Basagana X., Cirach M., Cole-Hunter T., Dadvand P.,Donaire-Gonzalez D., Foraster M., Gascin M., Martinez D., Tonne C., Triguero-Mas M., Valentin A., Niewenhijsen M., 2016. Urban and transport planning related exposures and mortality: A health impact assessment for cities. Environmental Health Perspectives. DOI:10.1289/EHP220. Also available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/eph220/. Neirott P., De Marco A., Cagliano A.C., Mangano G., Scorrano F., 2014. 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Accessibility and use of peri-urban green space for inner-city dwellers: A comparative study. Landscape and Urban Planning, in press.

I am currently in the most wonderful Helsinki airport, waiting to go back to Berlin.  I have been in Helsinki to study the Finnish case for the Phil/Ora/Steve book on Defense Agencies.  It has been a great albeit cold and mostly wet week.  Definitely glad we have this case in the book, and, yes, it is making it imperative to go to Sweden to see how NATO membership is a common process with perhaps not entirely common politics.First, the joy of Helsinki before I discuss what I have learned for the book project.   It is on the Baltics, so when the wind blows, brrrrr.  Yes, we got some snow here last night, deep into April.  Makes me feel like I am back in Canada, except Ottawa has more sun and not as much cold winds. This is only my second time here, and the first one hardly counts as it was a brief layover between Leningrad (that tells you how long ago it was) and NY.  I got used to tramming around town, never using the metro as everyone was very well located in the center except a couple of interviews--one requiring a bus ride to beyond Helsinki and one or two requiring cab rides.  Two parliament buildingsand funky sculpture One of my fave new experiences for interviewing was that they had a conference center where folks could hold meetings with far less security and inconvenience than going out to the ministries.  I still did manage to go to the Ministry of Interior, which was not far away, and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was a 20 minute walk or 15 minute tram ride.  The Parliament buildings were not just huge (everyone kept reminding me this is a small country with a small population, but their parliament buildings suggest otherwise), but also had more security than any other legislative building I can recall.  Sure, everyone has a front entrance with thick windows, x-ray scanners, etc, but to get from point a to b inside, my escort had to badge the doors every five or ten steps.  And, yeah, my escort in was the counsel to the defense committee, and on the way out ... a parliamentarian who was recently the chief of defense!  They don't have much of a history, by the way, of senior ex mil leaders serving in parliament but Ukraine changed that.  More on that below.reindeer on potatoI am not a huge fan of fish, so I tended to look for non-Finnish food (not all Finnish food is fish, to be clear), so I had Chinese, Italian, Mideast, and Georgian.  Pretty sure that was my first time having Georgian food, but the waitress didn't understand my order, so I didn't get the classic big bread thing dish, so I will have to try that in Berlin (I found a Georgian place near my apartment).  The people were very friendly, even though I have no Finnish.  They all understand that no one speaks Finnish besides Finns, so they all speak Swedish (there is a sizable Swedish minority and the Swedes used to run the place), and English.  Some folks remarked that the kids these days are less interested in learning Russian.  So much for Russia's soft power....Yes, Russia loomed large here, as the Finns have a strong memory of the trauma of the Winter War--their fight with the Russians during World War II.  Apparently, the Ukraine war hit the old folks very hard.   I did wonder where the bunkers are, as  I had heard that civil defense is a big thing here.  I didn't recognize the signs apparently, as I was told that pretty much all of Helsinki has underground facilities.  The difference between old US bomb shelters and Finnish bunkers--the latter are used on a daily basis--parking lots, swimming pools, gyms, etc that are underground.  This keeps them fresh, their air good, and also, most importantly, has the Finns comfy with going to these places.  The economy is not doing well, and it may or may not have much to do with the fact that the Finns have pretty much cut off most trade with Russia.  The whole of government thing Canadians and others have a problem doing?  Finland has whole of society, comprehensive security.  In its history, it has always been alone until ... the last year.  So, they are ready to mobilize the entire society if the Russians attack.  This means a draft (just for men [all young men including one NBA player], women can join the military but their conscription is voluntary [holy oxymoron]), an extensive reservist system so that the small army can swell to 280,000 and then 900,000, coordination of all parts of society to respond to an attack.  The drafted are paid about 5 Euros a day.... which does not go far in super expensive Helsinki.  Decorations inside Parl buildingThe military has been running a month-long defense course 4x/year for a long, long time, where they create cohorts of 50 people, elites from across society, to learn about the military and the rest of comprehensive security.  This is a hell of a public diplomacy effort--it is not cheap although some companies provide the food and booze and such for free.  Companies apparently don't have a big problem with losing an employee for a month.  To provide a comparison, the army exercise I did in 2019 was one day.  This experience is really important as it came up in almost all of the interviews and mostly without my prompting.In ye old comparative politics, the phrase is war made the state.  While not entirely true, the idea is that societies developed more and more extensive political institutions in order to fight and win or survive in international relations.  It may be the case that NATO membership has the same but smaller impact.  That joining NATO has caused Finland has to dramatically enlarge and perhaps empower its very small Ministry of Defense.  NATO requires meetings, document vetting, preparation, the sending of personnel to NATO hq's in Brussels, Mons, and elsewhere.  AND most NATO policy is made by civilians even though NATO is far more an organization about military stuff than civilian stuff (hence why much of the effort to build an Afghan government was run by separate national governments (foreign affairs, development agencies) rather than by NATO.  The relevance of this is that it gives the MoD a greater role in making defense policy than in the past.  That is, the Finnish defense forces made much of the policies but that may be changing now.  Oh, and it was the first EU country I have been in where the NATO flags easily outnumber the EU ones.In terms of the project, Finland is an interesting case with a largely autonomous military, that their number two in the MoD is always a retired senior military officer, their MoD is tiny (150 now, swelling recently thanks to NATO), their President is commander in chief which means the military can try to sideline the MoD and the PM by insisting that the President is the one who oversees them, the President and PM have tiny foreign/security offices, and that conscription deeply shapes everything.  Sweden will be a fun case to compare since the Swedes had a draft, dropped it, and have recently started it again while also joining NATO recently. Random things I heard along the way:five different Baltic pipelines have had "accidents" since the war in Ukraine started!Finland has reached 2% of GDP on defense because it frontloaded the cost of buying the F35s, which means that when that goes through the system, Finland may have a hard time procuring enough to keep at 2%.  Womb chairs!  Multiple waiting rooms in govt buildings reminded me of Oberlin's library way back in the day.  I do love my job even if it requires me to transcribe my interview notes.  I have many more countries to visit and I still have to do some work to figure out the German case as well as write up the Finish case.  All I know is that comparative civ-mil relations has been mighty good to me.Next week, Mrs. Spew hits Europe, so we drive through Germany and then fly to Italy.  So, a very different bit of fieldwork ahead.  Much more focused on comparative cuisine.  

The topic of shrinking cities has been one of the most important urban issues in the past three decades. Couch and Cocks (2013) reviewed studies on the outcomes of recent shrinking cities: (1) rapid out-migration from post-socialist countries such as the movement from East Germany to West Germany in the 1990s; (2) economic -decline as an additional trigger for out-migration such as in old industrial areas in Northern England and the Rust Belt of the United States; and (3) rapid demographic changes such as low fertility and longevity-led ageing of the society leading to shrinking regions in the European countries and Japan. Although many studies have been conducted in East Germany, the old industrial cities, and the aging European countries (Nordvik and Gulbrabdsen 2009, Hoekstra et al. 2018, Hollander 2018), little is known about shrinkage in Japanese cities. Over recent decades, the debates on shrinking cities have been widely studied; these studies can be classified into three categories: (1) studies to understand the background reasons that caused shrinkage, (2) those to analyze the effects or outcomes of shrinkage (e.g., increase in housing vacancies or vacant lots, growth of crime rate or political challenges), and (3) those to propose policy implications or practical solution strategies to overcome shrinkage (Hollander and Nemeth 2011). First, Hollander (2018) and other studies identified the relationship between the neighborhood life cycle (Hoover and Vernon 1959, or studies by the Chicago schools) and urban shrinkage, with regards to old industrial cities such as those in the Rust Belt of the United States and erstwhile mining towns in North England. Hoover and Vernon (1959) proposed that a neighborhood follows a five-stage cycle, comprising the stages of development, transition, downgrading, shrinkage, and renewal; this five-stage model is linked to the discriminative housing policies from the 1930s until the 1970s in the United States (Metzger 2000). In addition to these neighborhood cycles, other factors such as economic decline, outmigration and population loss, demographic changes (Nordvik and Gulbrabdsen 2009, Couch and Cocks 2013), social transition, globalization and neo-liberalization have transformed housing, welfare, and family relations in many countries (Yui et al. 2017, Ronald and Lennarts 2018). In East Germany, housing oversupply during the post-socialist shrinking periods acted as a catalyst to form a new residential segregation pattern in Leipzig (Grobmann et al. 2015). Some neighborhood conditions can lead to an increase in the number of housing abandonments or long-term housing vacancies in specific neighborhoods, as demonstrated by various studies mentioning oversupply of housing during the housing bubble periods and longitude low demand neighborhoods in the United States (Molloy 2016), the high ratio of poverty (Immergluck 2016), and the conditions of the surrounding neighborhoods (Morckel 2014). Second, the population loss caused by massive out-migration and a rise in housing abandonment or housing vacancies were the most common outcomes of urban shrinkage. Out-migration was triggered by the movement to seek better job opportunities or quality of life, urban life cycles with growth and decline (Couch and Cocks 2013), and the longitudinal decline process of population (Alves et al. 2016). Nordvik and Gulbrandsen (2009) analyzed aging-led shrinkage with a case study in Norway and found a spatial characteristic of shrinkage that occurs more often in suburbs than in city-centers, and the positive relation between the rise in the vacant property ratio and an increase in the elderly population in a region. The out-migration of the younger generation, arising from the desire to move away from parental homes in suburbs, and the deaths among the parental generation that have occurred in the last 30 to 50 years have led to a gradual increase in vacant housing in the suburb in Norway (Nordvik and Gulbrabdsen 2009). Apparently, the Japanese suburban neighborhoods have experienced the rise in housing vacancies and ageing population through the similar mechanism with that in Norway, but the reality and spatial patterns of shrinking-related problems vary reflecting the urban and housing policies, housing market characteristics, and embedded relationship between housing and family in society. According to Couch and Cocks (2013), the rise in housing vacancies in a region arises due to several factors, as follows. The first factor is that of short-term vacancies for which there is no demand in the local housing market; this issue can be resolved through public intervention in terms of reinvestment in inner-city social housing, such as in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. The second factor is that of oversupply of housing as compared to the housing demand in a region; this is caused by lower satisfaction among residents in their residential environment or inequality in public investment and access to private financial resources by local residents. Moreover, shrinking cities with a high ratio of long-term housing vacancies tend to experience an increase in crime such as burglary. This is because the rise in housing vacancies causes a decline in neighbourhood vitality required to protect social disorder; vacant housing is used to store stolen goods or sell drugs, and there is a "broken window effect" with regard to abandoned housing vacancies (Jones and Pridemore 2016). There have recently been more meaningful discussions on how to handle the problems of shrinking cities. As Hoekstra et al. (2018) mentioned, there have been two main approaches in these discussions: one approach has focused on increasing the population in shrinking cities again, whereas, the other accepts longitudinal shrinkage patterns and aims to increase the quality of life of present and future residents (Hollander and Nemeth 2011). The former approach advocates entrepreneurial policies to attract new residents, resulting in an increase in inequality within a region, unsold housing, and a lack of affordable housing (Hoekstra et al. 2018). The latter approach employs methodologies such as selective demolition of abandoned housing to control the housing stock of a region, promoting down-sizing or right-sizing to meet the changes in the housing demands of residents, or densification of urban buildings to recreate walkable neighborhoods (Hoekstra et al. 2018). Hollander and Nemeth (2011) proposed smart decline strategies based on the concept of social justice, with an emphasis on the following aspects: accepting voices from diverse actors, utilizing different types of technology to share information about citizens to problematize uneven power structure, transparent decision-making processes with clear evaluation, and paying attention to the scale of decision making (e.g., the total planning burden is shared among regional levels, and the required interventions are conducted at local levels). Compared to the rich accumulation of literature on shrinking cities in Western countries, the Japanese situation has not been discussed sufficiently and there is an absence of strategies to resolve the issues in Japan. Research on shrinkage and housing has clarified that factors related to housing, welfare, and family relations are embedded in the social fabric, and the relationships vary by region or by country (Ronald and Lennerts 2018). Therefore, it is necessary to obtain deeper understanding of the housing challenges in shrinking and aging Japanese cities. The present study aims to review the above-mentioned three categories of shrinking city debates in Japan, to propose practical countermeasures for shrinking and aging Japanese cities. First, we review the reasons that caused the shrinkage in Japanese cities. Second, we analyze the increase in housing vacancies as an outcome of this shrinkage. Third, we examine the political countermeasures that have been adopted in Japan and evaluate their efficacy in the Japanese situation. Finally, through these analyses, we propose policy implications to deal with the problems of aging and shrinking cities in Japan. The major findings of the study are as follows: First of all, existing systems that had been established during the economic and urban growth periods of Japan are not suitable to address the new demands of the shrinking and aging era. Therefore, a great divide in terms of residential environments has occurred within a metropolitan area or between cities. Lesser access to financial resources to reinvest in old suburban neighborhoods or local cities accelerates the divide or inequality in terms of residential environments. Second, an increase in housing vacancies can decrease the quality of life of older adults in these shrinking neighborhoods. Third, these problems could be resolved by adopting a strategy of smart decline, with selective investment to control housing stock, and by accepting aging in place in shrinking neighborhoods. We discuss the challenges in implementing these possible solutions in Japanese cities.

The topic of shrinking cities has been one of the most important urban issues in the past three decades. Couch and Cocks (2013) reviewed studies on the outcomes of recent shrinking cities: (1) rapid out-migration from post-socialist countries such as the movement from East Germany to West Germany in the 1990s; (2) economic -decline as an additional trigger for out-migration such as in old industrial areas in Northern England and the Rust Belt of the United States; and (3) rapid demographic changes such as low fertility and longevity-led ageing of the society leading to shrinking regions in the European countries and Japan. Although many studies have been conducted in East Germany, the old industrial cities, and the aging European countries (Nordvik and Gulbrabdsen 2009, Hoekstra et al. 2018, Hollander 2018), little is known about shrinkage in Japanese cities. Over recent decades, the debates on shrinking cities have been widely studied; these studies can be classified into three categories: (1) studies to understand the background reasons that caused shrinkage, (2) those to analyze the effects or outcomes of shrinkage (e.g., increase in housing vacancies or vacant lots, growth of crime rate or political challenges), and (3) those to propose policy implications or practical solution strategies to overcome shrinkage (Hollander and Nemeth 2011). First, Hollander (2018) and other studies identified the relationship between the neighborhood life cycle (Hoover and Vernon 1959, or studies by the Chicago schools) and urban shrinkage, with regards to old industrial cities such as those in the Rust Belt of the United States and erstwhile mining towns in North England. Hoover and Vernon (1959) proposed that a neighborhood follows a five-stage cycle, comprising the stages of development, transition, downgrading, shrinkage, and renewal; this five-stage model is linked to the discriminative housing policies from the 1930s until the 1970s in the United States (Metzger 2000). In addition to these neighborhood cycles, other factors such as economic decline, outmigration and population loss, demographic changes (Nordvik and Gulbrabdsen 2009, Couch and Cocks 2013), social transition, globalization and neo-liberalization have transformed housing, welfare, and family relations in many countries (Yui et al. 2017, Ronald and Lennarts 2018). In East Germany, housing oversupply during the post-socialist shrinking periods acted as a catalyst to form a new residential segregation pattern in Leipzig (Grobmann et al. 2015). Some neighborhood conditions can lead to an increase in the number of housing abandonments or long-term housing vacancies in specific neighborhoods, as demonstrated by various studies mentioning oversupply of housing during the housing bubble periods and longitude low demand neighborhoods in the United States (Molloy 2016), the high ratio of poverty (Immergluck 2016), and the conditions of the surrounding neighborhoods (Morckel 2014). Second, the population loss caused by massive out-migration and a rise in housing abandonment or housing vacancies were the most common outcomes of urban shrinkage. Out-migration was triggered by the movement to seek better job opportunities or quality of life, urban life cycles with growth and decline (Couch and Cocks 2013), and the longitudinal decline process of population (Alves et al. 2016). Nordvik and Gulbrandsen (2009) analyzed aging-led shrinkage with a case study in Norway and found a spatial characteristic of shrinkage that occurs more often in suburbs than in city-centers, and the positive relation between the rise in the vacant property ratio and an increase in the elderly population in a region. The out-migration of the younger generation, arising from the desire to move away from parental homes in suburbs, and the deaths among the parental generation that have occurred in the last 30 to 50 years have led to a gradual increase in vacant housing in the suburb in Norway (Nordvik and Gulbrabdsen 2009). Apparently, the Japanese suburban neighborhoods have experienced the rise in housing vacancies and ageing population through the similar mechanism with that in Norway, but the reality and spatial patterns of shrinking-related problems vary reflecting the urban and housing policies, housing market characteristics, and embedded relationship between housing and family in society. According to Couch and Cocks (2013), the rise in housing vacancies in a region arises due to several factors, as follows. The first factor is that of short-term vacancies for which there is no demand in the local housing market; this issue can be resolved through public intervention in terms of reinvestment in inner-city social housing, such as in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. The second factor is that of oversupply of housing as compared to the housing demand in a region; this is caused by lower satisfaction among residents in their residential environment or inequality in public investment and access to private financial resources by local residents. Moreover, shrinking cities with a high ratio of long-term housing vacancies tend to experience an increase in crime such as burglary. This is because the rise in housing vacancies causes a decline in neighbourhood vitality required to protect social disorder; vacant housing is used to store stolen goods or sell drugs, and there is a "broken window effect" with regard to abandoned housing vacancies (Jones and Pridemore 2016). There have recently been more meaningful discussions on how to handle the problems of shrinking cities. As Hoekstra et al. (2018) mentioned, there have been two main approaches in these discussions: one approach has focused on increasing the population in shrinking cities again, whereas, the other accepts longitudinal shrinkage patterns and aims to increase the quality of life of present and future residents (Hollander and Nemeth 2011). The former approach advocates entrepreneurial policies to attract new residents, resulting in an increase in inequality within a region, unsold housing, and a lack of affordable housing (Hoekstra et al. 2018). The latter approach employs methodologies such as selective demolition of abandoned housing to control the housing stock of a region, promoting down-sizing or right-sizing to meet the changes in the housing demands of residents, or densification of urban buildings to recreate walkable neighborhoods (Hoekstra et al. 2018). Hollander and Nemeth (2011) proposed smart decline strategies based on the concept of social justice, with an emphasis on the following aspects: accepting voices from diverse actors, utilizing different types of technology to share information about citizens to problematize uneven power structure, transparent decision-making processes with clear evaluation, and paying attention to the scale of decision making (e.g., the total planning burden is shared among regional levels, and the required interventions are conducted at local levels). Compared to the rich accumulation of literature on shrinking cities in Western countries, the Japanese situation has not been discussed sufficiently and there is an absence of strategies to resolve the issues in Japan. Research on shrinkage and housing has clarified that factors related to housing, welfare, and family relations are embedded in the social fabric, and the relationships vary by region or by country (Ronald and Lennerts 2018). Therefore, it is necessary to obtain deeper understanding of the housing challenges in shrinking and aging Japanese cities. The present study aims to review the above-mentioned three categories of shrinking city debates in Japan, to propose practical countermeasures for shrinking and aging Japanese cities. First, we review the reasons that caused the shrinkage in Japanese cities. Second, we analyze the increase in housing vacancies as an outcome of this shrinkage. Third, we examine the political countermeasures that have been adopted in Japan and evaluate their efficacy in the Japanese situation. Finally, through these analyses, we propose policy implications to deal with the problems of aging and shrinking cities in Japan. The major findings of the study are as follows: First of all, existing systems that had been established during the economic and urban growth periods of Japan are not suitable to address the new demands of the shrinking and aging era. Therefore, a great divide in terms of residential environments has occurred within a metropolitan area or between cities. Lesser access to financial resources to reinvest in old suburban neighborhoods or local cities accelerates the divide or inequality in terms of residential environments. Second, an increase in housing vacancies can decrease the quality of life of older adults in these shrinking neighborhoods. Third, these problems could be resolved by adopting a strategy of smart decline, with selective investment to control housing stock, and by accepting aging in place in shrinking neighborhoods. We discuss the challenges in implementing these possible solutions in Japanese cities.

This thesis is an attempt to gain a better understanding of how institutions ; whether formal or informal ; influence individual- and societal-level economic choices ; especially in the Muslim-majority countries. It consists of six research papers that contribute to the economic analysis of institutions. The first paper ; published in the Journal of World Intellectual Property in 2011 ; investigates the relationship between intellectual property piracy and religiosity in several Muslim-majority countries. The second paper ; published in Constitutional Political Economy in 2013 ; focuses on the future of constitutionalism in Arab Spring countries by analyzing a unique Islamic constitution from a rule of law perspective. Another paper published in a collective volume tackles the relationship between business ethics and economic systems in Muslim-majority countries. The fourth paper is a novel application of economic analysis to Islamic criminal law ; as it analyzes the marginal deterrence in Islamic criminal law of theft. The fifth paper ; which is currently under second round review from Journal of Economics and Statistics ; empirically investigates the relationship between the religiously induced internalized values of individuals in 78 countries and their specific attitudes toward corruption using World Value Survey data. In the sixth and final paper of my dissertation ; I empirically investigate the long-term relationship between the legacy of slavery and contemporary violent crime in USA. Paper 1 (with Nora El-Bialy): "Can Shari'a be a Deterrent for Intellectual Property Piracy in Islamic Countries?" examines the stance of Islamic legal traditions (Shari'a) towards intellectual property (IP) piracy. Although Muslims may differ on what Shari'a dictates ; most of them view Shari'a as God's law and as a main ingredient of Islamic belief system. Since piracy rates in Muslim-majority countries are considerably high in light of existing formal IPR laws ; it becomes essential to test if Shari'a has any relation with such phenomenon. Our hypothesis is that ; although Muslim countries have formal institutions or laws that protect intellectual property rights (IPR) ; little attention is given to informal institutions ; or human morals ; regarding IPR piracy ; which negatively affects the enforcement level of IPR laws in these countries. Muslims may not be convinced that IPR violations ; although illegal ; are unethical or forbidden by Islamic Shari'a. In order to test the level of adherence of Muslims to Shari'a to support our hypothesis ; we develop a "religious loyalty" index (RLI). Comparing adherence of followers of different religions with those of Islam ; Muslim countries have the highest religiosity level ; positively affecting obedience level to Shari'a. Consequently ; an investigation of how Shari'a views IPR piracy is conducted. As Islam generally prohibits IPR piracy ; the study concludes by offering a set of policy recommendations that can effectively help in minimizing IPR piracy in Muslim countries. Paper 2: "Islamic Constitutionalism and Rule of Law: A Constitutional Economics Perspective" investigates the relationship between constitutionalism from an Islamic perspective and the concept of rule of law. Al Azhar ; one of the oldest and most respected Sunni religious institutions in the world ; developed an Islamic constitution with the purpose of making it "available to any country that wishes to model itself after the Islamic Shari'a". Facing the differences among Islamic sects ; Al-Azhar's constitution preamble states that "the principles laid down in this constitution agree with those shared between the Islamic schools of law to the utmost extent possible". Since its completion in 1978 ; this Islamic constitution received little attention from policy makers in Muslim-majority countries as well as legal scholars worldwide. Only after the January 25 uprising did Islamic political movements in Egypt announce their desire to use this constitution as their proposed model for the upcoming Egyptian constitution. Having this in mind ; this study uses this constitution as a model of Islamic constitutionalism ; whereby its stance regarding rule of law is examined using six main principles: (1) separation of powers ; (2) clear and stable laws ; (3) judicial independence and judicial review ; (4) equal access to justice ; (5) the state is bound by the law ; and (6) protection of basic human rights. I find the Al-Azhar's constitution to be incompatible with essential concepts of rule of law. For example ; the powers vested in the head of the Islamic state are enormous ; making the executive branch of government far superior to the legislative and judicial branches. Women and non- Muslims are explicitly discriminated against throughout the constitution. Moreover ; laws stemming from this constitution are not stable since many differences exist among schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Consequently ; we show that state-of-the-art Islamic constitutionalism lacks essential components needed in any constitution based on rule of law. Paper 3 (with Helmut Leipold): "Wirtschaftsethik und Wirtschaftssysteme in islamischen Ländern" investigates if the Islamic ethics related to business and economics could offer a solution to deter future financial crises. For this purpose ; we investigate the principles of Islamic business ethics and Islamic business law. Our analysis shows that the principles of Islamic economic ethics resemble the objectives of the social market economy model. We further comparatively analyze the economic systems of members of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Although Islamic countries have heterogeneous economic structures ; we perceive that they are somewhat homogenous in their lack of democracy and their low levels of rule of law. Moreover ; the majority of Islamic countries can be categorized as rentier states. This is not surprising in countries where religion and state are in close alliance. The paper concludes that the principles of Islamic economic ethics do not offer a specific solution to prevent future financial crises. Paper 4: "Stealing more is better? An Economic Analysis of Islamic Law of Theft" is the very first attempt towards applying economic analysis to Islamic criminal law. Islamic criminal law offers two main punishments regarding theft ; hadd ; a fixed penalty that requires the amputation of the offender's right hand under certain conditions and ta'zir ; a punishment that is left to the discretion of the judge and is less severe than hadd. Deterrence is one of the main objectives for Islamic criminal law. However ; from the viewpoint of marginal deterrence and multiplier principles ; lesser crimes with low social harm are punished severely with hadd while crimes with high social harm are punished with ta'zir. Moreover ; as the probability of detection and sanction is less in crimes of high social harm ; criminals would have better incentive to commit the latter type of crimes. This study implies that if Islamic criminal law is introduced in Arab Spring countries in its current form ; crimes of high social cost are likely to become more frequent. A call for a modern reinterpretation and re-coding of Islamic criminal law of theft is essential for any successful attempt to apply Shari'a in Muslim-majority countries. Paper 5 (with Sang-Min Park): "Religious Loyalty and Acceptance of Corruption" investigates the relationship between religiously-induced internalized values of individuals and their specific attitudes regarding the acceptance of corruption. The dataset on which our study is based was collected by the World Values Survey from 164,209 individuals in 80 countries surveyed during a period of 13 years. We propose that individual attitudes towards corruption and religion are associated given certain societal and institutional contexts. Our results show that although there is a negative and statistically significant effect of religiosity on the acceptance of corruption on the individual level ; this effect is small. We find that there is a threshold value of religiosity below which corruption is more easily accepted by individuals. Our interpretation for this result is simple: individuals with minimal religiosity are generally less constrained by religious norms ; specifically ; religious norms that are opposed to corruption are less binding on these individuals ; resulting in them having a greater propensity to accept corruption. Religiosity ; therefore ; does lower the acceptance of corruption only when it exceeds a certain threshold for a specific individual. Paper 6: "The Long-Term Effect of Slavery on Violent Crime: Evidence from US Counties" is the first to empirically investigate the long-term relationship between slavery and violence in USA. Although qualitative evidence shows that slavery has been a key factor behind the prevalence of violence ; especially in South USA (Cash ; 1941 ; Franklin ; 1956 ; Gastil ; 1971 ; Wyatt-Brown ; 1986) ; no empirical evidence supports this claim so far. I propose that the proportion of slaves in a certain county in 1860 is positively correlated with the rate of violent crimes in 2000. As violence was extensively used to control slaves for hundreds of years ; a culture of violence was formed and persisted through time. Extending Engermann and Sokoloff's hypotheses (1997 ; 2002) ; I empirically examine two hypotheses: (1) slavery has a long-term effect on violent crime. (2) Such long-term effect is mainly transmitted through inequality. The results show that slavery in 1860 is positively associated with violent crime in 2000. Testing the second hypothesis ; I find that land inequality in 1860 has a long-term significant effect on contemporary violent crime.

This report summarizes the results and lessons learned from the Technical Assistance (TA) Support to Rural Sanitation Scale Up under the Philippine National Sustainable Sanitation Plan. The TA was carried out by the World Bank's Water and Sanitation Program from July 2012 to March 2016, and is part of a larger programmatic assistance by the Bank to the Government of the Philippines in framing relevant institutional and financial reforms by key sector agencies and in strengthening the government's capacity to accelerate delivery of basic water and sanitation services particularly to the poor. This synthesis report provides recommendations to consolidate and accelerate the scaling up rural sanitation initiative focusing on priorities for World Bank engagement and alignment with the incoming government's overall strategic direction.

This report on the assessment of land governance in Brazil summarizes and discusses the results of a series of standardized self-assessments of the land governance situation in Brazil, conducted entirely by Brazilian speakers. Therefore, these findings represent the perception of local experts based on their experience of news and data available. The main aim of this report are federal and state authorities directly involved in land governance in the evaluated states and other states. The general objective of the development of this assessment is to measure reliably the skills and the performance of land governance in a cross section of the country. This assessment is highly relevant and timely, as the land and real estate of natural resources linked to the land are the central core of the current competitiveness of Brazil and its strategically valuable position in the changing world economy. The evaluation methodology was the Assessment Framework of Land Governance (LGAF) developed by the World Bank. It focused on five key areas of good land governance and three additional topics. Key areas were: legal, institutional and associated policies to land rights; planning of land use and taxation; identification and ownership of land management of the state; provision of public land information; and dispute settlement. The optional modules used in some evaluations focused on the large-scale acquisition of land, forestry and the regularization of land tenure. Based on the LGAF in related workshops and review of some publications, the review has identified four areas of relative force on the Brazilian land governance. They include the guarantee of property rights, transparency in allocation of public land, public accessibility of information on registered land and transparency of increasing concern emerging from the influence of democratic and social movements. In addressing these and other areas of reform of land governance, the efforts of the newly created Inter-ministerial Working Group on Land Governance (IMWG) will be vital. That is particularly so because some of the reforms depend on the consistency of improving legal and institutional framework for land governance, which is necessarily a collaborative and cross-sector enterprise. This report therefore calls on the IMWG to join the Presidents Office to create an annual and transparent work program, for a period of at least three years with a regular mechanism of agreed reporting to the IMWG Office and Civil Office of the Presidency.

The proposed tobacco settlement agreement, as negotiated by some state attorneys general and the tobacco industry that was made public on June 20, 1997 (Appendix F), raises a complex array of public health, public policy, legal and economic issues. It was intended to be a blueprint for national tobacco control legislation that would end the most important litigation current and potential against the tobacco industry. As with most complex legislation, the deal, after it was announced, underwent a great deal of scrutiny and criticism. Many public health and policy groups analyzed the deal in whole or in part in order to provide guidance for those who wished to distill the essential elements and implications of the deal. While many have pronounced the original deal 'dead' as a result of this criticism, it remains the fundamental framework around which most proposals for federal legislation on tobacco has been based. As a result, a careful analysis of the terms and implications of the original June 20 deal remains a worthwhile effort. This report seeks to provide policy makers and advocates with a context and analysis of the most important aspects of the deal through a series of briefing papers, which can be read independently or collectively. Each paper addresses one aspect of the deal. The papers are organized according to general topics: political issues related to the deal, financial and tax aspects of the deal, regulatory implications of the deal, and civil liability controls in the deal. For those who desire a more technical approach to the issues, we have included five technical appendices to provide additional support regarding the economic analysis of the deal, the economic analysis of the lookback provision, the political analysis of the deal, and the public health analysis of the deal, the legal analysis of the deal. To the extent that the deal is reflected in any legislative proposals that emerge, this analysis will be relevant to that legislation. In the months leading up to the publication of the deal, many commentators discussed the relative merits of entering into a negotiated resolution of the tobacco litigation. The advocates of the deal pointed to the ability to obtain specific relief, the advantages of having a national tobacco policy, and the elimination of the risks to continuing the litigation. Critics of the deal-making process were concerned that making a deal would: guarantee tobacco industry profitability; require Congressional action, which in turn would provide weak proposals because of the influence the tobacco lobby in national politics; preempt stronger state and local regulatory efforts to control tobacco; and preclude broad based public health efforts to control tobacco in the future. Many commentators have described the deal as one in which the tobacco industry accepts strong restrictions in exchange for some limitation of liability. Our analysis reaches just the opposite conclusion: A close reading of the deal reveals that the benefits to the tobacco industry are concrete and substantial whereas the public health benefits are less clear. The Funding Provisions of the Deal Are Inadequate The money in the deal is large in absolute terms but small when compared to the damage done by tobacco products. Even if one takes the more limited view of the deal that its purpose is only to reimburse the states for future Medicaid expenses plus fund the specified public health programs, the payments are not high enough to cover these limited costs. If the deal is designed to reimburse society for all damage done by tobacco, it provides less than 10 cents on the dollar. The financial portions of the deal are structured in such a manner that they will guarantee industry profits. The Taxpayers will Absorb a Substantial Fraction of the Nominal Costs to the Industry All payments by the tobacco industry, including those made 'in lieu of' punitive damages, are tax deductible, which results in a decrease in the impact of the deal on the industry and a cost shifting to American taxpayers. Taxpayers will absorb 30-40% of the cost of the deal, which will need to be recovered through increased taxes or spending cuts. The tax subsidy provided to the tobacco industry by the deal, amounting to about $4 billion a year, dwarfs both the current tobacco price support program and the funds that the deal makes available for public health programs. The Industry Will be Protected from Litigation The civil liability protections will strongly protect the tobacco industry. The deal eliminates large-scale suits that are most threatening to the industry and only allows individual cases, which the industry has been successful in defeating. In addition, the deal changes the rules of evidence and civil procedure in ways that will make it more difficult for people with cancer, heart disease, and other smoking-induced problems to win their individual cases. The deal provides the industry financial security by capping exposure. These limitations on litigation will effectively preclude injured smokers from receiving just compensation and perhaps limit future criminal and civil enforcement actions against the tobacco companies. Moreover, the caps eliminate the incentives the civil justice system to improve corporate behavior, by reducing the threat that the tobacco companies will be held fully accountable for their actions. Under the terms of the deal, the industry will avoid about $150-$200 billion in liability at a cost of $6-$7 billion. Eliminating Litigation Will Eliminate a Valuable Public Health Tool The current litigation against the tobacco industry has a discernible benefit to the public health community which will be eliminated should the litigation cease. For example, the litigation provides a ready means to educate the public about the dangers of smoking and misbehavior of the tobacco industry. Without the prosecution of the current lawsuits, a valuable health education opportunity will be lost. In addition, the litigation which the deal seeks to resolve is based upon the enforcement of laws which serve public health interests, such as consumer protection and anti-trust laws. The deal restricts use of these laws in against the tobacco industry. Losing both a timely health education opportunity and the right to fully utilize consumer protection and related laws against the tobacco industry limits the public health tools to combat death and disease related to tobacco. The public health community has an interest in preserving the right to litigation to obtain social justice. The deal compromises the rights of individuals and institutions to sue the tobacco industry without fair compensation. Similarly, the public health community has an interest in fairly allocating the damages related to a particular harm. Societal resources which are currently being expended to remedy the harms related to tobacco could be re-allocated to serve other public health interests. The litigation provides a valuable tool to force the tobacco companies to pay for the damages related to tobacco, leaving societal resources to address other public health problems. The absence of litigation will remove one tool the public health community can use to force the tobacco companies to internalize the costs of the damage tobacco does. The Deal Requires Congress to Preempt Laws in Every State The essential principle behind the deal was the willingness of the Attorneys General, private lawyers, and health officials who negotiated the deal to support substantial limitations on liability of the tobacco industry for its past and future behavior. The deal not only 'legislatively settles' the Medicaid lawsuits brought by the Attorneys General, but also effectively ends most other forms of litigation against the tobacco industry. Since most of this litigation is being brought under state (as opposed to federal) consumer protection, fraud, anti-trust, and other laws, granting the tobacco industry the immunity it seeks will require Congress to preempt these laws in every state and the District of Columbia. In addition to preempting these laws, the deal preempts existing state authority to require ingredient disclosure and may increase the strength of tobacco industry claims that local and state restrictions on tobacco industry marketing practices are illegal. Regulatory Controls are Unnecessary and Insufficient The details of the regulatory provisions in the deal favor the tobacco industry. Rather than recognizing that there are many agencies with jurisdiction over tobacco, the deal concentrates almost exclusively on the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The deal also ignores the fact that most progress in tobacco use has been made at the local and state level. The FDA currently has jurisdiction over tobacco products and is executing its regulatory authority pursuant to its jurisdiction. The few provisions in the deal which are not currently a part of FDA regulations could become so even without the deal, or like the current advertising restrictions, be regulated by another agency. Furthermore, the expectations regarding the benefits attendant with many of the regulatory changes should be small. Even with the advertising restrictions in place, the tobacco industry will still find successful ways to market their products, and tobacco imagery will be ubiquitous. Similarly, the proposed regulations regarding tobacco warnings and restrictions on youth access add little new authority. The deal would essentially codify the law as it currently exists, except that it would also place limitations on future FDA authority. Although the codification of FDA authority may be desirable, the deal would add intensive rollback FDA authority by requiring the FDA to meet additional regulatory hurdles before it can regulate tobacco constituents and restricting how and when it can regulate nicotine. These hurdles will preclude much of the potential for true regulatory reform. Similarly, the secondhand tobacco smoke provisions in the deal represent a rollback of the current ability of the Department of Labor to regulate broadly. The secondhand smoke provisions within the deal accept industry claims that smokefree workplace laws would harm the hospitality industry, which is not true. The Lookback Provision Is Inadequate There are provisions in the deal designed to penalize the industry for not meeting specific targeted reductions in youth smoking. The lookback provision is a good example of how the technical details of the deal have important impacts that are not evident. The lookback provision ties goals in reducing teen smoking to the percentage of teens who are daily smokers. While 75% of smokers have their first cigarette by age 14, 75% do not become daily smokers until they reach age 18 (the cutoff for calculating the lookback penalty). Epidemiological evidence indicates that nicotine is as addictive as cocaine heroin and opiates. Symptoms of addiction begin before the onset of daily smoking. Limiting the measure of youth smoking to daily smokers will allow the tobacco industry to comply with the lookback provision by simply marketing in a way that leads children to begin smoking two years older than they do now; it will continue to recruit new adult smokers by addicting them as youths. By increasing the age of initiation by two years, the transition of most smokers to daily smoking in new smokers will occur after their eighteenth birthday. In addition, the penalty is too small to provide an effective economic incentive for the industry to reduce youth smoking; if the industry were to simply continue its current recruiting of teens, the after-tax cost of the lookback provision would be about a nickel a pack. Furthermore, the penalties are pooled among the industry, which decreases the pressure any one company will have to reform its behavior. The Deal Preserves the Oligopoly Structure of the Industry Throughout the deal there are a number of provisions which increase barriers to market entry and preserve the current profit structure. These provisions will encourage anti-competitive behavior and eliminate any incentive to innovate toward safer products. Furthermore, by closing the market, new companies will find it more difficult to compete. This situation will further guarantee excess profits for the existing companies. The Deal does not Provide for Full Disclosure of Tobacco Industry Wrongdoing One of the most important aspects of the current litigation is the ongoing disclosure of industry wrongdoing. The document disclosure provisions of the deal are weak and would permit the industry to continue to withhold privileged documents, which many believe are the most damaging to the industry. The deal may not be necessary to secure disclosure of these documents, because the Congress has subpoenaed and disclosed some tobacco industry documents, and more are emerging through litigation. Between further Congressional action and the litigation there is likely to be a continuous release of documents without a need for the deal. There are No Barriers Other than a Lack of Political Will to Adopting the Beneficial Provisions of the Deal Tobacco control advocates have successfully enacted legislation that meets many of the goals of the deal at the state and local level without compromise with the tobacco industry. The federal government could do the same. For example, the public health measures of the deal could be enacted and the funds for these programs appropriated out of the general fund or through an increase in the tobacco excise tax. Congress can give the FDA and Department of Labor more direct authority over tobacco products, and it could ensure full funding for their programs. Plaintiffs can enter (and Mississippi, Florida, Texas, San Francisco, and a plaintiffs' class of non-smoking flight attendants have entered) into individual legal settlements with the tobacco industry. The Deal is Silent on International Issues The deal ignores the implications that U.S. tobacco control policy has on international tobacco control efforts. The precedents established by the deal are particularly important because litigation against the tobacco industry is beginning in other countries. The limitations on liability in the deal may compromise the ability of other countries to recover the cost of tobacco-induced illness. The Deal is Based on Several Premises that are no Longer True The original premise behind the deal was that if the Attorneys General, public health advocates, and the tobacco industry could come to an agreement that all found acceptable, such legislation would be enacted into law rapidly. Some public health advocates argued that such a compromise was necessary and appropriate because the power of the tobacco industry in Congress was such that industry acceptance was necessary in order to get legislation enacted. Legislation was seen as necessary because the tobacco industry had never lost nor settled any health-oriented lawsuits against it. Because of this, rather than risking everything in Court, the Attorneys General and other decided that it was better to gain a partial victory in Congress. Since then, the terms of the deal have been declared unacceptable by all elements of the public health community, so the original premise of going to Congress with a partnership between public health and tobacco forces no longer holds. The tobacco industry has maintained that the deal should be enacted as negotiated and has dramatically increased its campaign contributions and lobbying activities in order to see the deal enacted. Tobacco executives have testified in Congress that a grant of immunity for the industry is a condition of industry support for federal tobacco legislation. Public health groups are divided about the wisdom of trading some form of immunity for the tobacco industry in exchange for public policy changes that some believe will reduce tobacco control. Even the forces in the health community who are willing to entertain such a trade, however, have rejected the deal as originally negotiated. As a result, they are now in the position of going into Congress opposed to the tobacco industry, the very situation that the deal was supposed to avoid. Finally, the belief that the tobacco industry would never settle or lose heath-related lawsuits has changed. The industry settled the Mississippi, Florida, and Texas Medicaid suits on favorable public health terms, as well as a case brought by San Francisco over the Joe Camel advertising character and a class action suit on secondhand smoke brought by flight attendants. The industry has also lost several cases brought by individuals. It will be difficult for the industry to return to a no-settlement strategy, particularly in light of documents and other information that have come out of the litigation process and Congressional hearings to date.

Aerosols play a key role in air quality (health aspects) and climate. In this thesis atmospheric chemistry transport models are used to study the uncertainties in aerosol modelling and to evaluate the effects of emission reduction scenarios on air quality. Uncertainties in: the emissions of gas and aerosol species in the inventories, in meteorological parameters, in the impact of orography on meteorology, all contribute to the uncertainties in gas and aerosol modelling and require high priority in order to estimate better the gas and aerosol concentrations for scientific research and policy making. The overall objectives of this thesis are to identify and quantify a few key uncertainties related to gas and aerosol regional and global scale modelling. These are: I. The impact of using two different emission inventories on gas and aerosol calculated concentrations. II. The role of the temporal and vertical distribution of emissions on gas and aerosol calculations. III. The impact of model resolution on aerosol calculations. IV. The impact of using two different meteorological driver models on gas and aerosol calculations. V. The impact of emission reduction scenarios on calculated air quality. VI. Strategies to evaluate model results with atmospheric measurements. In Chapter 1 an introduction to aerosols and aerosol modelling is given. In the following chapters, the subjects regarding the uncertainties in aerosol modelling are described. The first and the second subject of this thesis, the sensitivity in aerosol modelling to two different emission inventories, injection altitude and temporal variations of anthropogenic emissions, is described in chapter 2. We use the two-way nested global transport chemistry model TM5 focusing on Europe in June and December 2000. Two widely used emission inventories were available for this study. The EMEP inventory is a policy relevant European scale inventory which contains reported emissions by the member countries (http://www/emep.int), with more detailed information on the vertical, temporal and spatial distribution of the emissions. The AEROCOM inventory (Dentener et al., 2006) is a compilation of global scale aerosol and precursor emissions for the year 2000, and was used in the IPCC AR5 assessment report. The simulations of gas, aerosol concentrations and aerosol optical depth (AOD) with the two emission inventories are compared with EMEP gas and aerosol surface based measurements, AERONET sun photometer retrievals and MODIS satellite data. We evaluated the impact of the EMEP and AEROCOM emission inventories on aerosol concentrations and aerosol optical depth (AOD) in Europe for June and December 2000. There are substantial differences between annual emissions included in the two inventories. It also appears that differences are found in the vertical distribution of the SO2 and NOx emissions. Despite these differences, for most aerosol species and aerosol precursor gases TM5 simulates the spatial and temporal distribution over Europe relatively well when compared to observations. Spatial correlations, based on monthly mean surface concentrations, are often quite high (> 0.7) and many EMEP measurement stations show high temporal correlation with the simulations using EMEP and AEROCOM. However, from the comparison with surface observations, we conclude that the AEROCOM inventory overestimates the emissions of aerosol precursor gases SO2 and NOx and NH3 emissions, especially in June. Furthermore, a lack in seasonal varia tion in the AEROCOM inventory and uncertainty in the vertical distribution of emissions (SO2 and NOx), contributes to disagreement of model and surface observations. For NH3 it seems that the inclusion of recent abatement measures in the EMEP inventory indeed leads to a better agreement with measured concentrations. The large differences in surface concentrations between the simulations are not equally reflected in corresponding differences in computed column aerosol and AOD. Model AOD computations using the AEROCOM and EMEP emission inventories reveal good agreement with surface based AERONET sun photometer observations and AOD retrieved from MODIS. Spatial patterns over Europe of AOD differ due to the varying contributions of mineral dust and inorganic aerosol, as observed by satellite and confirmed by model simulations. An evaluation of the impact on aerosol of the temporal distribution (daily, weekly and seasonal) of emissions reveals that the concentrations of most aerosol components are not strongly influenced by introduction of a high temporal resolution of emissions. The exception is aerosol nitrate and its precursor gases NOx, and NH3. However, seasonal temporal variation of the emissions do play an important role for all gas and aerosol calculations, and need to be included to accurately calculate aerosol concentrations and it's influence on air quality and climate change. The third subject of this thesis is to study the model resolution dependency on aerosol calculations, see chapter 3. For this work the mesoscale Transport of Atmospheric Pollutants Model (TAPOM) is used. Firstly, we evaluated the TAPOM performance in calculated aerosol surface concentrations and aerosol optical depth (AOD) values for the greater Milan area in Italy during June 2001. Secondly, we used the model to study scale issues in aerosol modelling at three horizontal resolutions (5x5 km, 10x10 km and 20x20 km) through calculations of AOD and other aerosol properties for the same area and period. Model calculations of sulphate aerosol concentrations on a 5x5 km horizontal resolution show a reasonable agreement with measurements, i.e. within a factor 1.5 of the measurements. A comparison of aerosol optical depth calculated with the model and surface based sun photometer measurements revealed some discrepancies, which can be roughly divided in two clusters: 1. On clear, dry sky days there is a relatively good correlation between model and sun photometer AOD and satellite AOD. 2. A second group of model calculated AOD and measurements appear to be uncorrelated. The discrepancies of model results and measurements are for some days related to the underestimation of PM emissions and the lack of natural dust at the boundaries. Another reason could be related to the presence of cirrus clouds appearing as AOD in the measurements. Model calculations at 5x5 and 10x10 km horizontal resolution show a good internal agreement, whereas a model version using 20x20 km resolution loses some details regarding the spatial distribution of AOD. Daily mean and maximum coinciding model 5x5 km AOD values with MODIS and MISR AOD agree better with the observations than the computed AOD using the 20x20 km resolution. The largest differences in aerosol calculated concentrations between the different resolutions are associated with high RH (relative humidity) conditions leading to large amounts of computed aerosol water and higher AOD values. A further scale related issue is the non-linearity of aerosol formation at especially high relative humidity. These uncertainties are expected to be even more uncertain in large scale models that use fairly simplified parameterization relating relative humidity to cloud formation. Given the uncertainties in cloud screening of the satellite products, the reliability of these satellite products is often questionable and it has turned out to be difficult to make comparisons to model results at the mesoscale (like in this study). This problem is even larger for global scale models, with resolutions higher than 100x100km and less detailed emission inventories, where local and regional information are not taken into account. This study also showed the importance of accurate model boundary conditions for realistic gas, aerosol and AOD computations in regional/urban scale air quality modelling. In chapter 4, the fourth subject of thesis is described, i.e. studying the impact of two different meteorological models (MM5 and WRF) on aerosol and O3 calculations with the chemistry transport model CHIMERE. The area and period of interest is the Po valley region (Italy) for January and June 2005. The meteorological data sets used for the study were created in the frame of the Po valley air quality Model Inter-comparison (POMI) exercise, which is coordinated by the Institute of Environment and Sustainability, JRC, Ispra, Italy (http://aqm.jrc.it/POMI/). First we evaluate for January, June and the whole year the calculated meteorological parameters by MM5 and WRF (temperature, wind speed, wind direction, relative humidity and precipitation) with observations. The analysis shows that the overall performance of both models is similar, however some small differences are still noticeable. On a yearly basis, the temperatures are mainly underestimated (less by WRF) when compared to observations and the values of relative humidity are in general overestimated (less by MM5). WRF output follows better the hourly pattern of relative humidity. We had only two stations available with wind data. The wind speed is well reproduced for Ispra monitoring site (especially by WRF) but for Mantova is largely overestimated by both models (less by MM5). Both models do not reproduce well the wind direction. The rainfall is in general overestimated, however the MM5 output shows lower rainfall values. Secondly, we analyze the impact of using MM5 and WRF on calculated PM10 and O3 concentrations. In general the model underestimates the observed PM10 concentrations with both the MM5 and WRF meteorology, from now on denoted as CHIMERE/MM5, CHIMERE/WRF respectively. The PM10 concentrations for January are a factor 1.6 higher for CHIMERE/MM5 than CHIMERE/WRF. The concentrations of gases and aerosols at ground level strongly depend on the profile of the planetary boundary layer. Therefore we examined the PBL profiles and the latent and sensible heat fluxes which are responsible for the PBL formation. The difference and the larger underestimation in PM10 concentrations by CHIMERE/WRF are related to the differences in heat fluxes and the resulting PBL heights calculated by WRF. In general the PBL height by WRF meteorology is a factor 2.8 higher at noon in January than calculated by MM5. This could result in a better vertical mixing of the aerosols than CHIMERE/MM5, causing lower aerosol concentrations at the surface. Changing the Noah LSM scheme in our WRF pre-processing for the 5-layer soil temperature model, leads to an increase of the calculated PM10 concentrations of 30% for January 2005 when compared to the simulation using Noah LSM. This study also showed that the difference in microphysics scheme has an impact on the profile of cloud liquid water (CLW) calculated by the meteorological driver and therefore on the production and removal of SO4 = aerosol. For June the differences in PM10 concentrations between the model simulations using MM5 and WRF are small. Analyzing the heat fluxes and the diurnal behaviour of the PBL height we observe small differences between the two meteorological models. In the previous chapters, three major uncertainties which contribute to modelled aerosol calculations are described. It is crucial to understand how important these sources of uncertainties contribute to the model outcome, especially when the model results are used for policy relevant studies. In the last chapter of this thesis (chapter 5) we performed a case study to evaluate the impact of emission reduction scenarios on PM2.5 and O3 calculated concentrations for the Po valley area, by using the chemistry transport model CHIMERE. Comparing calculated surface aerosol concentrations by the model for the standard case (no emission reductions) with observations for January and June 2005 shows that the monthly mean PM10 concentrations are in general underestimated by a factor 1.4. To evaluate the impact of emission reduction scenarios we reduced the emissions of NOx, PM2.5, SO2, VOC or NH3 by 50% separately for each component and for different source sectors, together with 5 additional scenarios. The 50% reduction of the emissions corresponds to the application of the current legislation for PM2.5 for Italy which should be met in 2010 in respect to the emissions of the base year 2000 (EURODELTA exercise: http://aqm.jrc.it/eurodelta/, which is carried out in the frame of the Clean Air For Europe programme, CAFE). The most effective scenarios to abate PM2.5 concentration are based on the nonindustrial combustion plants, i.e. domestic heating (SNAP2) and road traffic (SNAP7) sectors, for which the NOx and PM2.5 emissions are reduced by 50%. These scenarios reduce the monthly calculated PM2.5 concentrations for the Po valley area for January on average by 1-6µg/m3. However, these emission reduction scenarios for domestic heating and traffic do not have an effect on lowering the number of days for which the planned European limit value (Directive 2008/50/EC) of 25µg/m3 is exceeded. Only by combining the emission reductions of NOx, PM25, SO2, VOC and NH3 for domestic heating, road traffic and agriculture (SNAP10) results in a larger reduction of PM2.5 calculated concentrations over the larger area in the Lombardy region (~20%), which corresponds with the findings of a similar study performed by APAT (the Italian National Agency for environmental protection and technical services). In the APAT study more than one species was reduced for different activity sectors. Our study also showed that a more effective pollutant reduction (emissions) per tonne of pollutant reduced (concentrations) for the greater Milan area is obtained by reducing the primary PM2.5 emissions for road traffic. The most effective scenario on (secondary) PM2.5 decrease for which precursor emissions are reduced is achieved by reducing SO2 emissions by 50% for road traffic. Our study showed that during summer, the largest reductions in O3 concentrations are achieved for SNAP 7 emission reductions, when volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are reduced by 50%. It appears that around 40% of the PM2.5 concentration for Milan is caused by the emissions from surroundings of the Lombardy region as well as by longrange transport from elsewhere (as reflected as model boundary conditions). Therefore effective abatement of air pollution does need the consideration of the transboundary aspects of air pollution. Our study showed that differences may occur between measurement (ground based and space born) data sets for the same variable and time period. This complicates the use of observations for model evaluation purposes. The main conclusions of this thesis can be summarized as: • The amounts and the temporal and vertical distributions of the emissions are important for gas and aerosol calculations, especially when calculations are compared to surface measurements. • Going to a finer model resolution results in better agreement between calculated aerosol and AOD values and observations. • The PBL height and vertical mixing of the lower troposphere determine to a large extend the surface gas and aerosol concentrations. These boundary layer characteristics are strongly determined by the sensible and latent heat fluxes at the surface. • Local emission reductions result in a local improvement in air quality.Longrange transport is however also very important for reducing local pollution. • Surface and space born measurements of gas phase and aerosol components are crucial for evaluating model results. However inconsistencies in measurement data sets make it complicated for reliable comparisons with model simulations.

Kenya's new Constitution mandates a new era of public participation in government, particularly within the devolved government structure. The new devolved structures can benefit from reviewing the country's prior experience with participation in decentralized funds. The Kenyan government and citizens gained extensive experience in local participatory development through decentralized programs and funds, in particular the local authority transfer fund (LATF) and the constituency development fund (CDF). This paper focuses on the two development funds because participatory initiatives both by the government and the civil society were centered on them. This paper reviews Kenya's past experiences on public participation in local service delivery to highlight practical lessons that county governments can draw from as they design participation mechanisms.

The findings from the study suggest that international pressure for more effective Right to Information (RTI) implementation only goes so far. The development of RTI laws with the encouragement, assistance, or insistence of the international community was a prominent theme throughout the case studies, particularly for EU countries during their accession process. But implementation is a less straightforward task, with many interlocking, moving parts, and international support comes in ad hoc fashion as the process unfolds. A strong implication from these findings is that a national coordinating strategy may be valuable for implementation. This kind of strategy document should take the interdependence of the drivers of effectiveness into account when drafting policies and rules for practice, and can serve as a guiding document when deciding on foreign funding priorities.