Suchergebnisse

L'élection de Bassirou Diomaye Faye à la présidence du Sénégal le 24 mars 2024, après un processus électoral mouvementé, reflète la résilience des institutions démocratiques du Sénégal. C'est l'occasion de renforcer la gouvernance transparente et de lutter contre les inégalités. C'était la première fois depuis l'indépendance du Sénégal de la France en 1960 qu'un candidat de l'opposition gagnait déjà au premier tour des élections présidentielles. Les médias occidentaux ont tenté de montrer que Faye, présenté comme un "panafricaniste de gauche", souhaitait promouvoir une culture africaine authentique pour rompre avec l'influence occidentale postcoloniale. Cependant, l'orientation politique du duo Faye-Sonko correspond à celle des "Patriotes du Sénégal pour le travail, l'éthique et la fraternité" (Pastef), une organisation fondée par Sonko en 2014. Bien que leurs formulations paraissent radicales, leur principal objectif est de renforcer l'indépendance nationale du pays. Faye, diplômé de la célèbre école d'élite ENA, aime se considérer comme l'héritier de deux penseurs sénégalais a priori diamétralement opposés: Léopold Sédar Senghor et Cheikh Anta Diop. Ils avaient un objectif commun: rendre le Sénégal et les autres pays africains indépendants et autonomes. Cette orientation nationaliste rapprochera également le nouveau gouvernement de Dakar des juntes militaires voisines qui gouvernent la Guinée, le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger. Paris, qui a toujours eu à cœur de préserver sa présence postcoloniale, notamment ses bases militaires, le franc CFA et la langue française, est désormais contraint de suivre les événements. Faye et Songo ont promis de renégocier les termes de la monnaie CFA, soutenue par la France, ainsi que les contrats pétroliers et gaziers avec des sociétés étrangères. Cependant, le gouvernement de Dakar devra bientôt s'adapter à la dure réalité des inégalités économiques. Il doit tenir ses promesses électorales de lutter contre la corruption, donner la priorité aux intérêts économiques nationaux et créer des emplois pour la population du pays, notamment pour les jeunes chômeurs. Environ 60% des chômeurs ont moins de 25 ans. L'écart entre le potentiel économique et les niveaux de pauvreté alimente la frustration. Il existe un sentiment d'exclusion parmi les jeunes, ce qui les rend vulnérables au recrutement par des groupes extrémistes. Le nouveau président entend également renégocier les accords de pêche et développer la production locale tant alimentaire qu'industrielle afin d'assurer la sécurité alimentaire tout en réduisant les importations coûteuses. Cependant, les subventions probables aux biens essentiels pourraient conduire à des conflits avec le FMI sur la mise en œuvre du programme. En ce qui concerne la création d'une monnaie souveraine, il est logique de mettre en œuvre les plans existants visant à remplacer le franc CFA au sein de la CEDEAO au profit de la monnaie indépendante, "l' éco".

For many Africans, water is not only the source of life, but also a means of purification and a centre of regeneration. Water rituals and cults, such as 'Mami Wata', lead their followers to liberation of body and spirit. But customary rites can also cause harm. For example, the ancestral use of irrigation reduces contemporary female labour participation and female property rights. It is crucial to consider gender in resource management in the context of climate change, environmental degradation and population growth, which will exacerbate conflicts over scarce resources such as arable land, water, fishing and hunting. Poor governance leads to the alienation and exploitation of the majority and growing inequality, especially when water is scarce and people's livelihoods are threatened. Sub-Saharan Africa is the continent most affected by climate change, population growth and food insecurity. Yet African states, where water ecosystems are strategic resources, are more inclined to regional conflict than cooperation. In the past, climaterelated shocks have fuelled violent conflict in West Africa. Land pressure and water scarcity are causing increasingly acute crises. Traditional institutions of water and land management are often destabilised by modern irrigation techniques and massive inflows of foreign capital. Modernisation is driven by a Western-centred utilitarianism that cannot be universalised. The intensification of conflicts over water has revealed a general crisis that is likely to worsen, given the dynamics at work. Environmental degradation is one of the undesirable by-products of agricultural productivity growth, but customary institutions cannot provide adequate regulation to mitigate its effects. But even in West African regions where water is plentiful, the resource curse links the abundance of natural resources to higher levels of conflict. The commercialisation of water, including land and water grabbing, can even lead to interstate conflict through the effects of greed or grievances. Ultimately, however, conflicts are often not so much about access to scarce resources such as water, food or land, but rather about changing the political institutions through which resources are distributed. Water scarcity puts pressure on people, resulting in migration, displacement, food insecurity and impoverishment, which can lead to further conflict.

Economic science as ideology The management science as a viatic of the shareholder Eric Brunat and Jacques Fontanel Revue marché et Organisations No 41 2021 Since the generalisation of the market economy, economic science has stalled the political economy. In this context, the market was ubiquitous and the State had to concentrate its activities on the organisation of a region-wide area, often fluctuating and rather regressive according to private interests. Management science itself provided businesses with tools in an economic system which advocated individual interest as a determining objective for each of the economic actors. Today, with the COVID-19 pandemic, the analyses of liberal economists are becoming obsolete in the face of a deep economic and social crisis. The economy is now showing its eminently political character. The international, national and local public sectors organise the fight against the crisis in the market economy. The state is once again the central player in the management of the national economy, and it is then called upon to make political choices that reshape the country's economic and social structures, particularly in the face of major multinational firms and the ambitions of other nations. The deeply political and social nature of a globalised economy is highlighted by this crisis, which is characterised by violent relations between states and between citizens. ; International audience Since the generalisation of the market economy, economic science has sounded the death knell for political economy. In this context, the market was omnipotent and the State had to concentrate its activity on the organisation of a regalian domain, often fluctuating and rather regressing according to private interests. Management science itself gave tools to companies within the framework of an economic system that advocated individual interest as the determining objective for each of the economic actors. Today, with the Covid-19 pandemic, the analyses of liberal economists are becoming obsolete in ...

International audience This paper presents a novel approach to measure the human development, progress and growth of any country. The authors have developed an alternative index to the conventional 'HDI', named as 'Composite Development Index (CDI)' and have also presented an original approach to evaluate it quantitatively. The CDI integrates all the three (social, economic and environmental) aspects of sustainable development, along with peace and happiness. As proposed, the CDI is based on four parameters, i.e. Inequality adjusted HDI (IHDI), Scaled Green Index, Scaled Peace Index and Scaled Happiness Index, evaluated from globally accepted standard databases. Hence, the CDI is much more comprehensive and rational than the conventional HDI or GDP. The CDI values have been evaluated quantitatively for 126 countries of the world. Further, comparative assessment of the CDI has been done with the HDI for all the 126 nations. The results obtained have been startling as no country was even able to have a CDI score of 0.8 on a scale of 0.1 to 1. Switzerland had the highest CDI of 0.767. A country like Norway with the highest HDI of 0.953 had a CDI of only 0.742. On the other hand, countries like Costa Rica, Romania and Uruguay are in the top 20 nations in the CDI Ranking, much ahead of the countries like United Kingdom, France, and USA. The CDI can act as a single point of reference for policy-makers, governments and other development agencies, as it presents a consolidated picture of a country's development. Future course of action on the basis of the concept of CDI are also proposed. It can be concluded that efforts to have a high CDI (in comparison to a high GDP or HDI only) will pave the way forward for sustainable development and holistic progress for all the countries of the world. JEL Classifications: 011, 015 Additional disciplines (besides field of economics reflected in JEL classifications): sociology; ecology and environment.

The central question of this thesis is how fiscal policy could be used for development finance purposes. Indeed, we identify and investigate pathways through which developing states can mobilize resources to improve sustainable development. For this purpose, we conduct policy-oriented researches (using suitable statistical and econometrical tools) and provide advices for developing countries. The first part of the dissertation addresses the issue of external resources mobilization in developing countries (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). In Chapter 1, we investigate the effects of public expenditures on sovereign bond spreads in emerging market countries. We show that developing countries could have a better access to international financial market by supporting public investment and reducing current spending. Specifically, spending on human capital (education and health) and other public infrastructures significantly reduce bond spreads. They should also improve the quality of governance since financial markets award well-governed countries with better borrowing conditions. We examine, in Chapter 2, the strength of fiscal rules in terms of improving financial markets access for developing countries. We find that the adoption of fiscal rules reduces sovereign bond spreads and consequently improve financial market access. Indeed, this result is explained by the credibility of fiscal policy channel: more credible governments are rewarded in the international financial markets with low sovereign bond spreads and high sovereign debt ratings. Our findings confirm that the adoption and sound implementation of fiscal rules is an instrument for policy makers to improve developing countries' financial market access. The second part of the dissertation focuses on what developing countries could do to improve internal resources mobilization (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). As a matter of fact, we explore the relationship between fiscal rules and inequality (Chapter 3) and find that fiscal rules adoption contributes to reduce inequality ...

The central question of this thesis is how fiscal policy could be used for development finance purposes. Indeed, we identify and investigate pathways through which developing states can mobilize resources to improve sustainable development. For this purpose, we conduct policy-oriented researches (using suitable statistical and econometrical tools) and provide advices for developing countries. The first part of the dissertation addresses the issue of external resources mobilization in developing countries (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). In Chapter 1, we investigate the effects of public expenditures on sovereign bond spreads in emerging market countries. We show that developing countries could have a better access to international financial market by supporting public investment and reducing current spending. Specifically, spending on human capital (education and health) and other public infrastructures significantly reduce bond spreads. They should also improve the quality of governance since financial markets award well-governed countries with better borrowing conditions. We examine, in Chapter 2, the strength of fiscal rules in terms of improving financial markets access for developing countries. We find that the adoption of fiscal rules reduces sovereign bond spreads and consequently improve financial market access. Indeed, this result is explained by the credibility of fiscal policy channel: more credible governments are rewarded in the international financial markets with low sovereign bond spreads and high sovereign debt ratings. Our findings confirm that the adoption and sound implementation of fiscal rules is an instrument for policy makers to improve developing countries' financial market access. The second part of the dissertation focuses on what developing countries could do to improve internal resources mobilization (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). As a matter of fact, we explore the relationship between fiscal rules and inequality (Chapter 3) and find that fiscal rules adoption contributes to reduce inequality ...

The central question of this thesis is how fiscal policy could be used for development finance purposes. Indeed, we identify and investigate pathways through which developing states can mobilize resources to improve sustainable development. For this purpose, we conduct policy-oriented researches (using suitable statistical and econometrical tools) and provide advices for developing countries. The first part of the dissertation addresses the issue of external resources mobilization in developing countries (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). In Chapter 1, we investigate the effects of public expenditures on sovereign bond spreads in emerging market countries. We show that developing countries could have a better access to international financial market by supporting public investment and reducing current spending. Specifically, spending on human capital (education and health) and other public infrastructures significantly reduce bond spreads. They should also improve the quality of governance since financial markets award well-governed countries with better borrowing conditions. We examine, in Chapter 2, the strength of fiscal rules in terms of improving financial markets access for developing countries. We find that the adoption of fiscal rules reduces sovereign bond spreads and consequently improve financial market access. Indeed, this result is explained by the credibility of fiscal policy channel: more credible governments are rewarded in the international financial markets with low sovereign bond spreads and high sovereign debt ratings. Our findings confirm that the adoption and sound implementation of fiscal rules is an instrument for policy makers to improve developing countries' financial market access. The second part of the dissertation focuses on what developing countries could do to improve internal resources mobilization (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). As a matter of fact, we explore the relationship between fiscal rules and inequality (Chapter 3) and find that fiscal rules adoption contributes to reduce inequality ...

National audience The creation of girls' secondary schools in 1880 by the Camille sée Act works in favour of graduates in the sense that one of the few managerial positions open to women before the Second World War is de facto reserved for them. At the same time, the broad conception of the Director's role, which is not supported like the predictor by a student, points to a political and institutional will to differentiate and prioritise female and male education. Does gender diversity in the 1960s and 1970s mean that women and men are equally represented in secondary schools and colleges? On the contrary, on the basis of statistical data, there is a male increase in jobs, a phenomenon which is rare in the higher professions and feminised in the second half of the 20th century. How can this decline in teacher participation in school leadership be interpreted? Has the situation reversed in the 2000s when initiatives are being taken to encourage women to apply for managerial positions in national education? We will answer these questions by assuming that the gender balance structure jobs and influences access to functions in this sector as well as in other areas of activity and for both sexes. We will rely on survey materials carried out around 1995 and 2009-2010 per questionnaire, but above all on interviews with management staff, chef.fes and adjoining. This approach makes it possible to understand the professional and social characteristics of staff, their career aspirations and the difficulties faced by women. While the overall feminisation rate tends to rise to the 'senior management' category, internal divisions and inequalities remain at the beginning of the 21st century. ; National audience La création des lycées de filles en 1880 par la Loi Camille Sée joue en faveur des diplômées au sens où l'une des rares fonctions d'encadrement ouverte aux femmes avant la seconde guerre mondiale leur est de fait réservée. En même temps, la conception large du rôle de la directrice qui n'est pas secondée comme le ...

Are we witnessing the decline of liberal democracy and the emergence of alternative forms of democracy? Today, democracy is first and foremost a language of political legitimacy. And more often than not, it serves as a language of self-justification, even self-praise. Almost all existing states—regardless of where they may be located in or beyond the matrix of polyarchy—purport to be democratic in nature. Faced with this situation of democratic inflation, it becomes important to explain and explore (by way of comparison) some of the defining features that distinguish one form from another.In recent years, it has become increasingly commonplace to criticize democracy of the liberal kind that historically emerged in modern Western Europe but eventually spread to the rest of the world by the end of the 20th century. Moreover, emerging countries like China, Russia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and even the Arab Emirates, while considerably less democratic by liberal standards, have become more and more vocal in stressing their own versions of democracy, thus posing some challenges to the liberal view. (Notable exceptions are Brazil, India and South Africa, though the equality component of democracy seems weak in these countries). In response to these challenges as well as to doubts about the meaning, the outreach and even the universality of democracy, there are attempts to explore various ways to improve representation, redistribution, policy-making, and legitimacy, both at state and inter-state levels. Some opt for the deepening of democracy within existing liberal regimes – this is at the roots of lively debates about the "quality of democracy" (vs. "malfunctioning democracy"), "democratic responsiveness", "accountability" and "transparency", as well as "participatory" or "deliberative" democracy. There is even a new quest for "cosmopolitan" democracy. Others seek to combine the demand for enhancing democracy with post-colonialist outlook, thereby claiming that the forms of regimes should match the diversity of political ...

This paper provides evidence of a change in the relationship between individual satisfaction with the state of country's economy and income inequality during transition from a command to market economic system. Using data from a series of extensive and frequent surveys of Polish population, we identify a structural break in this relationship. In the beginning of transition, an increase in income inequality is interpreted by population as a positive signal of increased opportunities; this sentiment is particularly strong among older people and people with right-wing political views. Later in the transition period, increased inequality becomes an important reason for dissatisfaction of the public with the country's economic situation and reforms, as people become more skeptical about the legitimacy of income generation process. We also provide direct evidence from opinion polls of a change in the public sentiment about income inequality. ; Cet article illustre le retournement de la tolérance aux inégalités au cours d'une période de forte croissance et de transformation économique et politique rapide. Il s'appuie sur l'expérience polonaise de transition économique et explore les attitudes subjectives des citoyens recueillies dans des enquêtes répétées, à haute fréquence, de 1992 à 2005. Une rupture entre l'inégalité et la satisfaction est identifiée aux alentours de l'année 1997. Cette évolution coïncide avec la montée, au sein de la population, d'un certain rejet des élites politiques.

This paper provides evidence of a change in the relationship between individual satisfaction with the state of country's economy and income inequality during transition from a command to market economic system. Using data from a series of extensive and frequent surveys of Polish population, we identify a structural break in this relationship. In the beginning of transition, an increase in income inequality is interpreted by population as a positive signal of increased opportunities; this sentiment is particularly strong among older people and people with right-wing political views. Later in the transition period, increased inequality becomes an important reason for dissatisfaction of the public with the country's economic situation and reforms, as people become more skeptical about the legitimacy of income generation process. We also provide direct evidence from opinion polls of a change in the public sentiment about income inequality. ; Cet article illustre le retournement de la tolérance aux inégalités au cours d'une période de forte croissance et de transformation économique et politique rapide. Il s'appuie sur l'expérience polonaise de transition économique et explore les attitudes subjectives des citoyens recueillies dans des enquêtes répétées, à haute fréquence, de 1992 à 2005. Une rupture entre l'inégalité et la satisfaction est identifiée aux alentours de l'année 1997. Cette évolution coïncide avec la montée, au sein de la population, d'un certain rejet des élites politiques.

This paper provides evidence of a change in the relationship between individual satisfaction with the state of country's economy and income inequality during transition from a command to market economic system. Using data from a series of extensive and frequent surveys of Polish population, we identify a structural break in this relationship. In the beginning of transition, an increase in income inequality is interpreted by population as a positive signal of increased opportunities; this sentiment is particularly strong among older people and people with right-wing political views. Later in the transition period, increased inequality becomes an important reason for dissatisfaction of the public with the country's economic situation and reforms, as people become more skeptical about the legitimacy of income generation process. We also provide direct evidence from opinion polls of a change in the public sentiment about income inequality. ; Cet article illustre le retournement de la tolérance aux inégalités au cours d'une période de forte croissance et de transformation économique et politique rapide. Il s'appuie sur l'expérience polonaise de transition économique et explore les attitudes subjectives des citoyens recueillies dans des enquêtes répétées, à haute fréquence, de 1992 à 2005. Une rupture entre l'inégalité et la satisfaction est identifiée aux alentours de l'année 1997. Cette évolution coïncide avec la montée, au sein de la population, d'un certain rejet des élites politiques.

This paper provides evidence of a change in the relationship between individual satisfaction with the state of country's economy and income inequality during transition from a command to market economic system. Using data from a series of extensive and frequent surveys of Polish population, we identify a structural break in this relationship. In the beginning of transition, an increase in income inequality is interpreted by population as a positive signal of increased opportunities; this sentiment is particularly strong among older people and people with right-wing political views. Later in the transition period, increased inequality becomes an important reason for dissatisfaction of the public with the country's economic situation and reforms, as people become more skeptical about the legitimacy of income generation process. We also provide direct evidence from opinion polls of a change in the public sentiment about income inequality. ; Cet article illustre le retournement de la tolérance aux inégalités au cours d'une période de forte croissance et de transformation économique et politique rapide. Il s'appuie sur l'expérience polonaise de transition économique et explore les attitudes subjectives des citoyens recueillies dans des enquêtes répétées, à haute fréquence, de 1992 à 2005. Une rupture entre l'inégalité et la satisfaction est identifiée aux alentours de l'année 1997. Cette évolution coïncide avec la montée, au sein de la population, d'un certain rejet des élites politiques.

This paper provides evidence of a change in the relationship between individual satisfaction with the state of country's economy and income inequality during transition from a command to market economic system. Using data from a series of extensive and frequent surveys of Polish population, we identify a structural break in this relationship. In the beginning of transition, an increase in income inequality is interpreted by population as a positive signal of increased opportunities; this sentiment is particularly strong among older people and people with right-wing political views. Later in the transition period, increased inequality becomes an important reason for dissatisfaction of the public with the country's economic situation and reforms, as people become more skeptical about the legitimacy of income generation process. We also provide direct evidence from opinion polls of a change in the public sentiment about income inequality. ; Cet article illustre le retournement de la tolérance aux inégalités au cours d'une période de forte croissance et de transformation économique et politique rapide. Il s'appuie sur l'expérience polonaise de transition économique et explore les attitudes subjectives des citoyens recueillies dans des enquêtes répétées, à haute fréquence, de 1992 à 2005. Une rupture entre l'inégalité et la satisfaction est identifiée aux alentours de l'année 1997. Cette évolution coïncide avec la montée, au sein de la population, d'un certain rejet des élites politiques.

This paper provides evidence of a change in the relationship between individual satisfaction with the state of country's economy and income inequality during transition from a command to market economic system. Using data from a series of extensive and frequent surveys of Polish population, we identify a structural break in this relationship. In the beginning of transition, an increase in income inequality is interpreted by population as a positive signal of increased opportunities; this sentiment is particularly strong among older people and people with right-wing political views. Later in the transition period, increased inequality becomes an important reason for dissatisfaction of the public with the country's economic situation and reforms, as people become more skeptical about the legitimacy of income generation process. We also provide direct evidence from opinion polls of a change in the public sentiment about income inequality. ; Cet article illustre le retournement de la tolérance aux inégalités au cours d'une période de forte croissance et de transformation économique et politique rapide. Il s'appuie sur l'expérience polonaise de transition économique et explore les attitudes subjectives des citoyens recueillies dans des enquêtes répétées, à haute fréquence, de 1992 à 2005. Une rupture entre l'inégalité et la satisfaction est identifiée aux alentours de l'année 1997. Cette évolution coïncide avec la montée, au sein de la population, d'un certain rejet des élites politiques.