Suchergebnisse

In autumn 2022, the electoral victory of the right-centre coalition led by Giorgia Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia (FdI, Brothers of Italy) and the subsequent establishment of her government caused scepticism and apprehension among international commentators. Concerns stemmed not only from it being the first administration in the history of post-war Italy whose majority partner, FdI, is rooted in the post-fascist tradition; more concretely, the inclusion within the coalition of parties such as Matteo Salvini's Lega (League) and Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia (Come on Italy), which had entertained political and personal relations with Vladimir Putin's Russia prior to the invasion of Ukraine, raised doubts about Italy's continuing support for Kyiv and the Western coalition. In reality, unwavering Atlanticist and pro-Ukraine views were repeatedly voiced by Meloni during the election campaign already, and – apart from a few unfortunate remarks by single individuals – this stance has been unambiguously upheld by the new government since it took office, as sealed by the Prime Minister's visit to Kyiv in February and to Washington in July 2023.[1]
A more complex picture emerges regarding relations with the European Union and European partners. Historically, in the post-war period, European integration has been a crucial dimension of Italy's foreign policy, along with Atlanticism and strong support for multilateralism. Rome was one of the founders of the European communities, and European integration was long seen by ruling and opposition parties alike as key to Italy's economic, cultural and social modernisation. Since the 1990s, however, criticism of the European project began to emerge in Italy, especially among the new centre-right parties, which developed a so-called "Euro-realist" approach when in government, whereby Italy's national interest would not necessarily coincide with deeper European integration.[2] Outright Euroscepticism became more apparent since the Eurozone and migration "crises" of the 2010s, leading to the emergence of so-called "sovereigntist" narratives depicting the EU as an "antagonist", which found resonance especially among populist parties.[3] This narrative, however, lost momentum as a result of the unprecedented level of funding granted to Italy through the NextGenerationEU programme in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. In the aftermath of the 2022 election, managing relations with Europe was thus a crucial task for the newly elected Italian government.Meloni the Eurorealist
Against this backdrop, Meloni's approach to Europe was centred on the vindication of Italy's "national interests" but within the framework of European integration and with a self-declared ambition to play a protagonist role. In the run-up to the 2022 election, FdI's electoral programme jettisoned some populist tones of the past (especially regarding the euro). Instead, the emphasis was placed on the need for Italy to "return as a protagonist in Europe" and to "relaunch the system of European integration, for a Europe of homelands, founded on peoples' interests".[4] In a similar vein, in her inaugural address to the Chamber of Deputies, Meloni stressed the desire for Italy to stand "with head high" in Europe and the other international fora, "with a constructive spirit, but without subordination or inferiority complexes". The emphasis on the "national interest" was accompanied by the acknowledgement of "a common European and Western destiny" – as well as of the importance of a frank dialogue within the European institutions, taking a "pragmatic" approach.[5] As a matter of fact, Meloni's first mission abroad as Italy's prime minister was to Brussels.
In its first months of government, the Meloni administration adopted a Eurorealist stance in line with that of previous centre-rights governments from the early 2000s. While expressing a strong preference for an intergovernmental view of Europe, the Italian government acted within the framework of EU rules and governance. Meloni tried to bring forward, with mixed results, the Italian point of view on the main issues under discussion in European fora – from energy to migration. In terms of economic policy, despite a few contentious measures, the 2023 budget law on the whole met Brussels' expectations.[6] The management of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan funds and related reforms was instead more troubled, marked by sluggish implementation, delays and subsequent requests for revision by the Italian government.[7]Migration and the economy: Dark clouds ahead
One year after the establishment of Giorgia Meloni's government, dark clouds are gathering on the horizon of Italy–EU relations. In the realm of policy, Rome is faced with increasing challenges, although these have often been concealed, belittled or even denied in the past months. This is especially true for two key areas: migration and the economy.
On migration, while unauthorised arrivals to Italy through the Central Mediterranean route were soaring, in June, Meloni tried to put on a good face by declaring that Europe was eventually addressing the external dimension of migration, which according to her had previously been "unthinkable".[8] However, as the agreement reached between the EU and Turkey in 2016 at the height of the "migration crisis" shows,[9] there is actually nothing new in this approach. For many years now, the Union has systematically failed to address the migration issue in a holistic way – that is, considering the internal, external and border management dimensions together – and has instead tried to shift the responsibility onto countries of origin and transit through a transactional approach – with the latter being called upon to keep, readmit or repatriate migrants in exchange for economic support.[10] Agreements reached on paper, however, amount to very little when the counterparts do not duly implement them. The memorandum of understanding between the EU and Tunisia signed amid great optimism on 16 July seems to be a case in point: arrivals from the North African country to Italy increased by almost 60 per cent in the eight weeks after the agreement, while a group of members of European Parliament who wanted to monitor the situation in the country was recently refused entry.[11] The reality is that Meloni is focusing on the external dimension of EU migration policies because, while migration flows are on the rise under her government, Italy has so far failed to achieve anything on the internal dimension. This is true even for the bland agreement on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum reached at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in early June, which – in spite of Meloni's failed mediation efforts – has been strongly opposed by her supposed allies in Poland and Hungary.[12]
If the Italian government has already failed in migration policy, the key area of economic policy looks increasingly troubled too. Having very little fiscal room for manoeuvre, Italy is unable to benefit from any relaxation of state aid rules; hence, Rome supported the establishment of a new European sovereignty fund as the backbone for an EU-wide industrial policy.[13] Many member states are sceptical,[14] though, and Italy's apparent troubles in spending existing NextGenerationEU funds provides a very good argument against it. Indeed, for the time being, ambitions for a new fund have been scaled back drastically, with a "platform" on strategic technologies being established instead. Added to this are the dilemmas in the negotiation of the new Stability and Growth Pact. Germany, in particular, is stonewalling on the European Commission's proposal, which would significantly benefit Italy by bringing greater flexibility to the old rules. Indeed, Italy's priority should be the creation of a common front along the lines of the Commission's proposal, which may well include member states such as Spain and France. But some postures of the Italian government are instead weakening Italy's credibility and negotiating strength: so far, it has been unable to compose an internal quarrel over the ratification of the European Stability Mechanism (already ratified by all other Eurozone states), while its campaign for excluding certain types of public investment from EU deficit targets is unlikely to be successful. There is a real risk that, in the end, the new Pact will be well below Italian expectations and needs.[15]Italy's true national interest: A stronger Europe
The coming months will most likely see Meloni intensify her efforts to prepare the ground for a change of majority at the European level after the June 2024 election, working towards a coalition inclusive of conservative and nationalist forces. However, the political cohesion of a supranational alliance between movements, leaders and governments whose watchword is the vindication of their respective national interests "first and foremost" would be likely put to the test over and over again. Even domestically, in the run up to next year's European Parliament elections, Meloni now faces increasing opposition from within her own government, pushed to run a populist-nationalist race against Matteo Salvini. Whatever affinities European conservatives and nationalists may find in the realm of values, the extent to which they would be able to find common ground on issues pertaining, among others, to migration – as has already been evidenced in the past months – or economic governance seems uncertain, to say the least.
There's the rub: an international context riven by multiple crises and increased competition, even assuming that one follows the logic of merely protecting the national interest, for a country like Italy – with the second-highest government debt-to-GDP ratio in the European Union and the highest old-age dependency ratio of all EU member states[16] – the priority should be further promoting European integration, advancing Italian demands in a frank and constructive manner within strengthened EU fora and institutions. National ambitions must always confront international realities. An overestimation of one's own means, any attempts to water down the system of supranational governance, or a resurfacing confrontational attitude would damage not only the European project, but Italy first and foremost.Nathalie Tocci is Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Honorary Professor at the University of Tübingen. Leo Goretti is Head of the Italian Foreign Policy programme at IAI.[1] Nona Mikhelidze, "Italy's Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|06 (February 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/16643.[2] Lucia Quaglia, "The Role of Italy in the European Union: Between Continuity and Change", in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 2 (August 2007), p. 133-148, DOI 10.1080/14613190701414426.[3] Fabrizio Coticchia, "A Sovereignist Revolution? Italy's Foreign Policy under the 'Yellow–Green' Government", in Comparative European Politics, Vol. 19, No. 6 (December 2021), p. 739-759, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00259-0.[4] Fratelli d'Italia, Il programma. Pronti a risollevare l'Italia. Elezioni politiche 25 settembre 2022, August 2022, point 25, https://www.fratelli-italia.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Brochure_programma_FdI_qr_def.pdf.[5] Italian Government, President of the Council of Ministers Giorgia Meloni's Parliamentary Address on the Government Programme, 25 October 2022, https://www.governo.it/en/node/21000.[6] Nicoletta Pirozzi, "I rapporti Italia-Ue", in Ferdinando Nelli Feroci and Leo Goretti (eds), L'Italia dal governo Draghi al governo Meloni. Rapporto sulla politica estera italiana. Edizione 2022, Roma, IAI, January 2023, p. 25-31, https://www.iai.it/en/node/16471.[7] Giuseppe Fonte, "Italy Struggling to Meet Reform Policy Targets Agreed for EU for Post-COVID Funds", in Reuters, 8 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-struggling-meet-reform-policy-targets-agreed-eu-post-covid-funds-2023-06-08.[8] Italian Government, President Meloni's Doorstep Following the European Council Meeting of 29-30 June, 30 June 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/23062.[9] European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, http://europa.eu/!Uv88TM.[10] Luca Barana and Asly Okyay, "Shaking Hands with Saied's Tunisia: The Paradoxes and Trade-offs Facing the EU", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|40 (August 2023), node/17362.[11] Alessandra Ziniti, "L'intesa flop con la Tunisia, sbarchi aumentati del 60%. Salvini: è un atto di guerra", in Repubblica, 14 September 2023; Lisa O'Carroll, "MEPs Refused Entry to Tunisia Two Months after Signing of Migration Deal", in The Guardian, 14 September 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/p/zq9me.[12] "Meloni 'Not Disappointed' with Poland, Hungary over Migrant Deadlock", in Ansa, 30 June 2023, https://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2023/06/30/migrants-meloni-not-disappointed-with-poland-hungary_ec2352bb-02d2-4860-97bc-04780f6d58ba.html.[13] Italian Government, President Meloni's Introduction at Her Press Conference following the Special European Council Meeting, 10 February 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/21805.[14] Jan Strupczewski, "Seven EU Countries Oppose New EU Funding as Response to U.S. Subsidy Plan – Letter", in Reuters, 27 January 2023, http://reut.rs/3Jgftt6.[15] Ferdinando Nelli Feroci, "L'incrocio pericoloso fra legge di bilancio e riforma del Patto di Stabilità", in AffarInternazionali, 29 August 2023, https://www.affarinternazionali.it/?p=104942.[16] Eurostat, "Government Debt Down to 91.2% of GDP in Euro Area", in Euro Indicators, No. 83/2023 (21 July 2023), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-21072023-ap; Eurostat, Half of EU's Population Older than 44.4 Years in 2022, 22 February 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/DDN-20230222-1.

Global Governance has been increasingly used in the study of International Relations which, thanks to its versatility and utility, has generated an expansion of its conceptual, methodological, and practical scope. Regional governance is a useful derivation because it makes it easier to understand, from a more precise perspective, how global issues with local repercussions are solved. In this sense, the article shows that security governance in Latin America is characterized by enduring balance of power practices, geopolitics, and mistrust between different parties. At the same time there is coexistence between the historical intention to establish security communities, to find resolutions to controversies, and to solve disputes through institutional instruments, principles, and values that favor peaceful means. In other words, in the region we are in the presence of a hybrid security governance, with practices that evolve over time in accordance with three key factors: the behavior of States and other agents, the capacity of institutions to overcome structural and conjunctural challenges, and finally, the effects of changes in perceptions of organized crime and other ideological and political challenges. Therefore, this article consists of three parts. In the first, the definitions and scope of global governance will be reviewed. Subsequently, its utility will be validated for the comprehension of regional orders and the characteristics that are forged there. Finally, it will be used to expose the hybrid characteristics in Latin America throughout the 21st century. Traditionally, since its inception as a scientific discipline, the explanations provided by International Relations,have been the subject of multifaceted debates. In fact, it was through these great debates, sometimes theoretical and in other cases methodological, that the discipline grew in terms of academic and research production, as well as in the political scope for decision-making. This led to the creation of a true field of study, which took as its initial object of study the area of war and peace between nations, before later moving on to cooperation, the environment, and other issues of the contemporary international agenda. Likewise, governance has been an ideal vehicle to give greater scope and heterogeneity to explanations of processes and empirical events, ones which go beyond traditional theoretical approaches such as realism, institutional liberalism or constructivism. Along the same lines, this progressive academic production has stimulated the specialization and concentration of governance in regional orders, since it allows a clearer reflection on the historical patterns of behavior among the members. This offers a more nuanced explanation of the challenges present,the responses required for structural or conjunctural issues, and the eventual emergence of distinctive elements between different groups. Security governance has mainly focused on four challenges to solve. First, the expansion of the research agenda to specific contexts; second, the greater attention that academic production should give to the relationship between intergovernmental organizations and other non-state actors in defined spaces; third, the predominance of explanations on security in the Euro-Atlantic region and, finally, the need to further link the security governance agenda to debates on region and regionalism. In the same way, the construction and specific behaviors developed in the regions cannot be detached from global dynamics. In this sense, regardless of the geographical character of a region such as Europe or South America, these are mainly political factors, as Hurrell well recognizes, that regional dynamics are a historical social construction, which has been politically contested and criticized. with the intention of recognizing patterns of continuity and transformation, which facilitate the identification of dynamics that particularize and distinguish between them. In this sense, Latin America has not neglected the use of governance, as a concept and as a valid analysis methodology to understand the distinctive characteristics that have made up a particular set of elements that, on the one hand, endure over time and, on the other hand, have recently changed. When referring to security, the opposing points of view show the emergence and incipient development of a heterogeneous, incomplete, and controversial governance. The main objective of this article, based on a hybrid and eclectic approach, will be to understand the evolution of the concept of governance and establish the characteristics of security for Latin America. Thus, in matters of security governance, this article highlights the hybrid character from two lines of argument; on the one hand, there are defenders of a vision based on geopolitics, the balance of power and the latent tension between states; and on the other, there is one more oriented to analyze security characteristics from a constructivist, associative and cooperative perspective. Indeed, Adler and Greve presented an interesting initial reflection on the subject, in the sense that both are necessary for the holistic understanding of the movements, not always ascending, that states carry to equip themselves with instruments and mechanisms that enable them. They allow you to live together in a more harmonious and peaceful way. First, some authors situate regional governance in mainly realistic terms, in which the dynamics of balance of power between states continue to prevail two hundred years after independence. They underline, for example, realities of ungovernability, while a series of specific variables, among which at least five stand out: first, the old geopolitical tensions between states continue to determine situations of conflict and mistrust; secondly, the competencies of individual and personal leaders in provision of common goods and dispute resolution stand out. Third, regional disputes have continued to be fueled both by internal competition - that is, between the states of the region - and, at the same time, by permissiveness in the face of the influence of external powers; Fourth, the importance of the quality of democracy for the countries of the region, which facilitates internal governance processes and strengthening the rule of law and, finally, the link between security and the economy in terms of economic development, that is, the effect of economic independence and economic autonomy in strengthening state security. Second, there is the most interpretive line of reflection on reality, highlighting that beyond the instruments of power and geopolitical, political processes and new ideological realignments must be understood, in which the following variables can be highlighted: first, the internal factors that condition or reinforce the international action of the States; second, the regional redefinition based on the creation of alternative multilateral forums, beyond the OAS, such as CELAC, UNASUR or ALBA, in which there are also components not only of trade and integration, but also of security and, finally, the little regional cooperation in security with low institutional, political and budgetary density. ; La gobernanza global es un enfoque que se incorpora con mayor interés en el estudio de las Relaciones internacionales. Su versatilidad y utilidad amplían el alcance conceptual, metodológico y práctico de la disciplina, lo cual permite investigar y explicar las interacciones y procesos en ocasiones poco claros que se producen entre actores de distinta naturaleza. Desde esta aproximación, la Gobernanza se ha erigido como una herramienta que amplía las explicaciones de los enfoques conceptuales y metodológicos tradicionalmente utilizados, en otras palabras, la gobernanza es un enfoque multidisciplinario y reflexivo que logra desvanecer fronteras interpuestas por los lentes teóricos convencionales y adicionalmente genera nuevas comprensiones entre lo global y lo local. Con base en lo anterior, se ha abierto y estimulado la utilización de la gobernanza al estudio de los órdenes regionales, pues aquellos se encargan de gestionar la agenda internacional, variada y compleja, ubicándose en un punto medio entre dinámicas globales y afectaciones locales. En ese sentido, ha contribuido a fortalecer una comprensión holística de los patrones históricos de comportamiento entre los miembros que los conforman, otorgándole mayor profundidad, ampliación y reflexividad a los procesos y desafíos allí presentes, así como a las respuestas requeridas a disyuntivas estructurales y coyunturales que evolucionan o emergen. En ese sentido, América Latina ha vivido en los últimos veinte años importantes transformaciones en la forma en la que se relacionan los estados y otros actores. La agenda de seguridad no ha sido ajena al fenómeno, por el contrario, el estudio de la gobernanza de seguridad se ha insertado como una categoría adicional de estudio. Así las cosas, la seguridad contemporánea emerge de una combinación entre estructuras políticas, sociales y culturales, que reflejan tendencias históricas, así como nuevos marcos de comprensión analítica, generando un espacio gris, híbrido y heterogéneo. El objetivo central de este artículo es establecer aquellas variables teóricas y prácticas necesarias para el estudio de la gobernanza híbrida de seguridad en América Latina a lo largo del siglo XXI a partir de un enfoque metodológico analítico, ecléctico y situado que señale los elementos distintivos y al mismo tiempo disputados o enfrentados que le han dado forma a la región. Se señala entonces que, la gobernanza híbrida seguirá alterando las definiciones tanto de seguridad como de región, conforme se alteren las dinámicas de poder, los principios y valores que guían el comportamiento de los agentes involucrados y la eficacia que tengan las organizaciones regionales para la gestión de los desafíos presentes y futuros. Para lo anterior, este escrito consta de tres partes. En la primera, se hará una revisión exhaustiva de las definiciones y alcance de la gobernanza global para así facilitar la comprensión sobre su utilidad teórica, revisando algunas críticas. Posteriormente se validará su beneficio para formular nuevos marcos de comprensión acerca de los órdenes regionales y las características que allí se forjan y, finalmente, se empleará para mostrar cómo ha consolidado una estructura heterogénea, disputada y conflictiva que no se ha terminado de completar o de desarrollar en América Latina.

Negotiations for a multilateral tax treaty are ongoing, even as the pandemic diverts political energy and provides pretext for delay. Can countries cobble together a consensus, and in what ways will agreement be meaningful?

The benefits of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank have outweighed the costs and they are working well with their older counterparts to promote Asian development. But more needs to be done.

In this paper, we seek to investigate the extent of financial inclusion achieved in India based on the latest available data. We analyse latest empirical trends across all states (rural and urban) for various financial instruments, outreach of financial institutions and the changes in the enabling institutions which actively promote financial deepening in India. The financial instruments that we study include bank accounts, credit outreach, insurance products, pension and payments. The financial institutions that we study include banks (ATMs, branches), the postal system, microfinance institutions and Self Help Groups as well as new institutions such as small banks and payment banks. We also analyse the role of expanding enabling institutions, specifically Aadhaar and the telecommunication network across India, which has helped facilitate the growth of financial inclusion across the country.

The 2018 Lowy Institute Poll reports the results of a nationally representative telephone and online survey conducted on behalf of the Lowy Institute by the Social Research Centre between 5 and 25 March 2018 with a sample size of 1200 Australian adults. The maximum sampling variance ('error margin') is approximately +/- 2.8%

Mongolia's finance sector, despite several improvements, is still very fragile. The economy's heavy reliance on the mining sector exposes the finance sector to risks from global price fluctuations in commodities. Risks have been rising and the finance sector currently suffers from a high level of nonperforming loans. This is preventing banks from making new loans necessary for economic recovery. Many improvements have been made in terms of the capacity and range of financial products and public services, and the strength of the financial framework. But challenges exist in improving financial access, ensuring financial support for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and further enhancing sound regulatory oversight.

This report analyzes the administrative frameworks, functions, and performance of revenue bodies in 28 economies in Asia and the Pacific. It is the third in a series of publications that aims to share knowledge about important developments and trends in tax administration practice and performance. Governments and revenue officials are also encouraged to identify opportunities to enhance the operation of tax systems. The series is part of ADB's regional capacity development technical assistance project for Strengthening Tax Policy and Administration Capacity to Mobilize Domestic Resources.

Asia and the Pacific continues to embrace financial technology advances that are reshaping the traditional banking and financial services industry. This is being done through the digitalization, decentralization, and disintermediation of economic transactions. This report tracks the progress of financial innovation in the region, and discusses its implications for financial inclusion and stability as well as its challenges. It also identifies key policy issues for central banks, financial regulators, and international financial institutions.

Small, and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are important in many developing countries, including the Philippines. However, this sector remains much less productive than their large counterparts. One factor that can help SMEs achieve higher productivity is internationalization by connecting them to global value chains (GVCs). However, participating in GVCs is not easy for SMEs as they face a host of obstacles in doing so. This paper attempts to determine the challenges and enablers of connecting small and medium businesses to global value chains. It uses data from a survey of SMEs in Metro Manila and a set of key informant interviews of SME owners and of officials of government agencies tasked to assist SMEs. Findings show that Philippine SMEs are weakly linked to GVCs. The challenges and enablers can be grouped into five themes: 1) competition in ASEAN and East Asia; 2) international standards, regulatory requirements, and local institutions; 3) role of the government; 4) international market demand and inputs supply; and 5) entrepreneurial mindset. Based on the results, some policy implications were formulated.