Suchergebnisse

In this paper, we examine whether a political budget cycle exists in municipal governments that fall under tight financial and institutional regulation by senior orders of government. For other levels of government, there is evidence that politicians initiate popular programs in election years and delay the unpopular tax increases after the election. Using a sample of 444 Ontario municipalities, with few exceptions, no such evidence was found. The results are the same regardless of the length of the term (three or four year), municipal size (small, medium, or large), and the governance system (one or two-tier). The paper concludes with possible explanations as to why there are no opportunistic manipulations of municipal budgets.

Abstract
Against the background of the implementation of the EU Youth Strategy (2010–2018) in Germany, the article explores the question of how European youth policy can be anchored at the municipal level. The article discusses (1) federal and regional efforts to incorporate the municipal level in implementing European youth policy, (2) arising challenges and (3) the significance of European policy for national, regional and municipal youth policy. Results suggest that although the involved actors stipulate the importance of municipal level involvement in designing the implementation of the EU Youth Strategy in Germany, the Strategy is actually implemented as a top-down strategy in which the municipal level receives impulses from other levels, rather than being incorporated in policy development. The article concludes that, in order to successfully strengthening European impulses in sub-national youth welfare discourses, mutual understanding and dialogue between levels is just as necessary as a content-related rather than process-related discussion.

"In a well ordered city every man flies to the assemblies:
under a bad government no one cares to stir a step to get
to them, because no one is interested in what happens
there, because it is foreseen that the general will will not
prevail, and lastly because domestic cares are allabsorbing.
Good laws lead to the making of better ones;
bad ones bring about worse. As soon as man says of the
affairs of the State What does it matter to me? the State
may be given up for lost. (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1950:
93)." (author's abstract)

This study aims to determine the orientation of the budget in the process of preparing and determining local government budgets. The research was conducted by the local government of Gorontalo City. Habermas's communicative action theory approach as part of the critical approach was chosen as the method in this research to capture the reality of budget orientation in the preparation and determination of local government budgets. Data collection techniques were carried out through in-depth interviews, observation, and documentation. The informants in this study were from BAPPEDA, members of BANGGAR, and several officials from offices related to regional finance as many as 10 people.This study finds that the act of compromise in the communication pattern of local government administration on budget policies is motivated by political interests. Budget policy decisions are dominated by the power possessed by actors to determine budget priorities. Communication practice is characterized by negotiation and compromise and ignores the value of honesty as a prerequisite for validity to fulfill comprehensive aspects of communication competence (truth, accuracy, honesty). Communication that is built only because of interest as the cause of communicative action is not effective. The results of the study show that the shackles of communication harmony are the basis for consideration for making policy changes by prioritizing rationality to gain legitimacy and trust from the public to government administrators.

This article is based on a survey of budget directors' views concerning control. Responsible for control on a daily basis, the budget director knows its many components first hand. Budget directors in all municipalities with populations from 100,000 to 1,000,000 received a mail questionnaire in June 1981. Of the 158 directors surveyed, 127 or 80 percent responded. The discussion which follows is organized into the five key areas covered in the survey: functions of control, time commitment and degree of difficulty in performing the control function, relationship between control and other aspects of management, current control techniques, and recent developments affecting control.

Democratic political institutions and interjurisdictional competition both put pressure on local elected officials to respond to the tax and spending preferences of residents. But the electoral success of California's Proposition 13 in 1978 and of similar property tax limitations in other states suggests that local expenditures and taxes in many jurisdictions are higher than those preferred by the median voter. I argue that this upward bias in expenditures is greater in communities where interjurisdictional competition is weak and local political institutions provide incentives for rent seeking. Using data from the 1997 Census of Governments and 1996 International City Manager Association (ICMA) Form of Government Survey, I find evidence that municipalities facing weaker competition tend to have higher spending, and political institutions mediate the marginal effect of competition on city expenditures.

"Updates and expands the assessment of the long-term budgetary outlook, addressing such issues as the collapse of the congressional budgetary process and the threat posed by the termination of discretionary spending caps. Concludes with a look at how the nation's deficit will affect America now and in the future"--Provided by publisher

AbstractThis paper presents a unique database that explores how industrialisation affected municipalities' incomes, expenditures and education spending. Using the importance of the mines and steelworks in Biscay in northern Spain between 1860 and 1910 as indicators of industrialisation, the findings show that there was a positive relationship between these dimensions and towns' incomes, which was indirectly transmitted to municipalities' expenditures, showing that municipalities were able to benefit from industrialisation. However, the thriving mining and metallurgy sectors did not support an increase in education spending. The lack of short-term results from spending on education may have led town councils to divert the revenues of industrialisation into more urgent areas, or those that could deliver faster results.