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In the cold war, the United Kingdom government devised a number of public education campaigns to inform citizens about the precautions that they should undertake in the event of a nuclear attack. One such campaign, Protect and Survive, was released to the general public and media in May 1980. The negative publicity this publication received is considered to be a reason why a successor publication was never released despite the increased risk of nuclear attack. Using recently released records from the UK National Archives the paper considers that, aside from this explanation, interlocking institutional objectives, rather than simply inertia, provide an explanation for this hiatus.

Executive summary•Cyber operations have become a reality in contemporary armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is concerned by the potential human cost arising from the increasing use of cyber operations during armed conflicts.•In the ICRC's view, international humanitarian law (IHL) limits cyber operations during armed conflicts just as it limits the use of any other weapon, means or method of warfare in an armed conflict, whether new or old.•Affirming the applicability of IHL does not legitimize cyber warfare, just as it does not legitimize any other form of warfare. Any use of force by States – cyber or kinetic – remains governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant rules of customary international law, in particular the prohibition against the use of force. International disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains.•It is now critical for the international community to affirm the applicability of international humanitarian law to the use of cyber operations during armed conflicts. The ICRC also calls for discussions among governmental and other experts on how existing IHL rules apply and whether the existing law is adequate and sufficient. In this respect, the ICRC welcomes the intergovernmental discussions currently taking place in the framework of two United Nations General Assembly mandated processes.•Events of recent years have shown that cyber operations, whether during or outside armed conflict, can disrupt the operation of critical civilian infrastructure and hamper the delivery of essential services to the population. In the context of armed conflicts, civilian infrastructure is protected against cyber attacks by existing IHL principles and rules, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. IHL also affords special protection to hospitals and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, among others.•During armed conflicts, the employment of cyber tools that spread and cause damage indiscriminately is prohibited. From a technological perspective, some cyber tools can be designed and used to target and harm only specific objects and to not spread or cause harm indiscriminately. However, the interconnectivity that characterizes cyberspace means that whatever has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in the world and that a cyber attack on a specific system may have repercussions on various other systems. As a result, there is a real risk that cyber tools are not designed or used – either deliberately or by mistake – in compliance with IHL.•States' interpretation of existing IHL rules will determine the extent to which IHL protects against the effects of cyber operations. In particular, States should take clear positions about their commitment to interpret IHL so as to preserve civilian infrastructure from significant disruption and to protect civilian data. The availability of such positions will also influence the assessment of whether the existing rules are adequate or whether new rules may be needed. If States see a need to develop new rules, they should build on and strengthen the existing legal framework – including IHL.

Abstract
Decision-makers rely on intelligence to make targeting decisions that comply with international humanitarian law (IHL), yet the relationship between intelligence and the law is not frequently discussed. This article explores crucial elements of intelligence and intelligence analysis that decision-makers should understand to increase their compliance with IHL, focusing on three crucial decision points: (1) the determination of whether a potential target is a military objective, (2) proportionality in attack analysis, and (3) the taking of effective precautions.

AbstractMilitary medical personnel and objects, as well as wounded and sick combatants, are protected against direct attack under the principle of distinction in international humanitarian law. However, some authors argue that they are not covered by the principles of proportionality and precautions. This opinion note explains that military medical objects constitute civilian objects under the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. It also demonstrates that, in view of the object and purpose of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, expected incidental casualties of military medical personnel and wounded and sick combatants must be included among the relevant incidental casualties under the principles of proportionality and precautions. This stems in particular from the interpretation of the obligation 'to respect and protect' as the overarching obligation of the special protection afforded to all medical personnel and wounded and sick. Support for this conclusion can be found in a number of military manuals and in the Additional Protocol's preparatory work and Commentaries. This conclusion also reflects customary law.

The U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD) new Law of War Manual has generated serious debate about its treatment of a variety of issues including human shields, the status of journalists, cyber operations, the precautions to be taken prior to attacks and even the role of honor in war. Although this article does not purport to be a comprehensive response to every critique of the Manual and, indeed, cites opportunities for its improvement, it nevertheless concludes that on balance the Manual provides an excellent, comprehensive and much-needed statement of DoD's view of the lex lata of the law of war.

After the attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan told press that the United Nations had been aware of the dangerous situation in Iraq. At the same time the UN also had hoped that the occupying powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, would take the necessary precautions to enable the UN staff in Iraq to exercise their mandate in a safe environment. This comment raises the fundamental question of the nature and extent of the protection duties of an occupying power under international law.(SWP Comments / SWP)

The essential need for security is apparent to organizations, government and individuals. Whether it is to secure a company's assets, abide by a law, or guard an individual's privacy, it has become evident that all are vulnerable to one form of electronic attack or another and that in order to protect sensitive information, all possible security precautions must be taken to limit any form of authorized access to electronic records or computer-related equipment. In this security-conscious era, we spend huge sums on technology to protect our computer networks and data. As IT security spending has increased so also has the number of successful attacks. This paper has been developed to highlight the fact that we all have an 'electronic life' which is been hunted by social engineers, and provides a solution on how this life can be protected. The purpose is to provide organizations and individual a simple solution for increasing security awareness against social engineering attacks towards their critical information. Keywords: Social Engineering, Electronic Life, Human Factor, Hacking, Information Security, Security Policy, Identity Theft

AbstractThe use of armed escorts to humanitarian convoys delivering humanitarian assistance potentially increases the targeting of these convoys, yet so far this use has not been examined from the perspective of international humanitarian law (IHL). This article attempts to determine whether the resort to armed escorts is in line with the principle of passive precautions under IHL, how the principle of proportionality could apply in cases of attack against the escort, and whether the convoy turns into a military objective when escorted. Finally, the article tackles the limitations of such a framework in order to define the situations it covers.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the event which hurled the United States into the throes of the Second World War, convinced many military strategists that precautions should be taken to guard the West Canst against possible invasion. The erection of a formidable defense system along the coast was complicated by the fact that 110,000 Japanese lived in Washington, Oregon, and California, a situation that could be hardly ignored by a suspicious public who rapidly formed the opinion that most Japanese-Americans harbored disloyal attitudes and would prove to be a menace to the war effort unless measures were immediately taken to restrict their activities.

The Baltic Sea basin is one of the busiest areas in Europe in terms of the passenger transport and is considered as a domestic sea of the European Union, very important for the development and prosperity of all citizens. A high number of ferries connections along with exclusive cruise ships, visiting the Baltic countries, make the sea very busy. At the same time the security of lines of communications has become the highest priority, especially that a possibility of terrorist attacks still poses a serious threat. Although terrorism has been being fought intensively since 11th September, terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, are still able to attack. The article considers the threat of organizing a terrorist attack posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters returning home to the Baltic countries. Due to the fairly high number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in some countries around the Baltic Sea, very intense passenger traffic in the area, and the appeals which have been proclaimed by Al-Qaeda and Islamic State leaders, there is a possibility of a terrorist attack occurrence in the near future. Cited facts lead to the conclusion that some precautions should be taken both in terms of technical and organizational measures to make passenger traffic secure.

This article examines how lawmakers respond through law reform to the prospect of further terrorist attacks after September 11. The first part examines ways of conceptualizing the terrorist threat, drawing upon notions of risk, fear, catastrophe, and precaution. The concept of the Precautionary Principle is introduced and explored as a tool for making sense of, and improving, law reform processes in counterterrorism. The second part deploys these concepts through two case studies of counterterrorist law reform: Canada and Australia. What constitutes expertise in this area is considered, as is the capacity of legislators to scrutinize the arguments of necessity and prognoses of dire threat put forward by executive government.

İnsanlık tarihi kadar eski olan terör çeşitli süreçlerden geçerek günümüze kadar gelmiştir. Avrupalı devletler güvenliklerini sağlamak adına ekonomik ve siyasi olarak bütünleşmeye gitmiştir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda hem ekonomik hem siyasi olarak birçok adım atılmış, atılan adımlardan en önemlisi ise Avrupa Birliği'nin kurulması olmuştur. Avrupa Birliği'nin kurulması ile birlikte terörle mücadele adına birçok çalışma yürütülmüş fakat birlik beklenen başarıyı yakalayamamıştır. 11 Eylül saldırılarının da gerçekleşmesiyle Avrupa'da güvenlik zafiyetinin üst seviyede olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Terörle mücadele adına çeşitli önlemler alınmış, 2004 Madrid ve 2005 Londra saldırıları ile de bu önlemler daha da arttırılmıştır. Küreselleşme ile birlikte IŞİD'in doğuşu, yabancı savaşçı ve radikalizmle mücadeleyi de beraberinde getirmiştir. Radikalleşme ve terör hukuki, kurumsal önlemlerin yanısıra psikolojik, sosyal ve ekonomik boyutlarıyla da değerlendirilmelidir. Alınan tüm önlemlere rağmen 2015'te Fransa'da Charlie Hebdo dergisine yapılan saldırı ile birlikte İslami radikalizm daha da tırmanmış ve terör ideolojik boyut kazanmıştır. Bunun sonucunda Avrupa'da İslamofobi artarak daha da tartışılır hale gelmiştir. ; Terror, which is as old as the history of humanity, has passed through various processes and has survived until today. European states have gone into economic and political integration in order to provide their security. To this end, many steps have been taken both economically and politically, and the most important one has been the establishment of the European Union. With the establishment of the European Union, many studies have been carried out in the name of combating terrorism, but the European Union has not achieved the expected success. With the September 11 attacks, the security weakness in Europe was observed to be at the highest level. Various precautions have been taken in the name of combating terrorism and these precautions have been increased with the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks. With the globalization, the rise of ISIS brought along the fight against foreign fighters and radicalism. Radicalization and terrorism should be evaluated in terms of psychological, social and economic dimensions as well as legal, institutional measures. Despite all the measures taken in 2015, with the attack on Charlie Hebdo in France, Islamic radicalism escalated, and terror gained an ideological format. As a result, Islamophobia has become increasingly debatable in Europe.

This contribution argues that autonomous weapon systems may have advantages from the perspective of ensuring better respect for international humanitarian law (IHL), if they are one day capable of perceiving the information necessary to comply with IHL, then to apply IHL to that information, and if it can be ensured that they will not do what humans who created them did not want them to do. In view of the author, targeting decisions do not imply subjective value judgements, a machine would be unable to make. However, to respect IHL by using such autonomous systems, agreement must be found on how to interpret certain IHL rules discussed in this contribution properly when a machine executes autonomously attacks according to parameters established by human beings. In particular, the accountability of those who produce and program such systems must be clarified; the sytem must be constantly updated with information on the military advantage to enable it to determine what is a military objective and to apply the proportionality principle; parameters must be established for comparing the performance of autonomous weapon systems with that of human beings in carrying out attacks; and the feasibility of precautions must be redefined in relation with attacks using such systems.