Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper investigates how institutional environments, especially the contractual hazard and the political hazard, affect foreign investors' share ratios in joint‐venture enterprises in China. We build a model combining Transaction Cost Economics and Property Rights Theory to describe the tradeoff that foreign investors face between choosing a larger share ratio and a smaller one. We argue that when the contractual hazard increases, foreign investors request larger shares to avoid being held up by their domestic partners, and when the political hazard increases, they hold smaller shares to circumvent the local government's grabbing hand. Moreover, the effect of the contractual hazard is channeled through enterprises' asset specificity. These theoretical predictions are verified by studying the relationship between the ownership structure of Chinese manufacturing joint‐venture enterprises and the provincial‐level institutions they are embedded in.

This book features China's newly emergent transnational management culture. It uses established and new methodologies to analyze how different types of Sino-foreign joint enterprises manage cultural differences between various layers of managers and employees, while negotiating strategies that contain conflicts, uncertainties and frustrations. Much of the book focuses on the relations among personnel and management within Sino-foreign businesses. It highlights how new elements have been introduced in the daily practices of management at the work floor and in the managerial offices, specifically in relation to improving human resource development and resolving conflicts. The book also examines how these transnational firms function in the broader context of Chinese society and politics. In providing freshly researched cases and methodological studies by experienced researchers in the field, the book suggests alternative pathways toward innovative business management in China, thus making it attractive to academics and business managers alike