Suchergebnisse

In studying Hoodia patent law struggles, I am interested in how sovereign power, in the service of neoliberal bioeconomies, values some forms of knowledge over others. I examine how techniques of governmentality such as patent law, benefit sharing contracts, bioprospecting permits, and prior informed consent agreements are being used to structure inequitable forms of citizenship based upon whose knowledge and intellectual labor matters more to the neoliberal project of the nation-state. In particular, I ask how relevant social actors make claims for rights, benefits, and protection under the law based upon a vulnerability to their processes and ways of knowing in order to participate more fully within global market economies. In addition, I examine how social actors articulate, position, and rework concepts of nature and culture as they describe their practices related to the plant in order to secure rights under patent law and benefit sharing legislation.

Purpose
Applying the stimulus-organism-response (S-O-R) theory in a wine museum context, this paper aims to examine how and why experience design characteristics influence visitor satisfaction, particularly investigating the role of epistemic (learning) and hedonic (having fun) values as the underlying mechanisms of this relationship.

Design/methodology/approach
The authors collected field survey data from 652 visitors at a world-leading wine museum. The authors tested the research model on ten modules of the museum using path analysis and a bootstrap approach; the authors further conducted mediation analyses to test how the design of the museum's modules influenced perceived value and satisfaction.

Findings
Content comprehensibility and surprise, as well as interactivity and ease of use, are core design characteristics that drive visitor satisfaction. More significantly, hedonic and epistemic values play a significant mediating role in influencing the relationship between design characteristics and visitor satisfaction.

Practical implications
The authors provide clear and actionable recommendations to help managers design museums that provide educational, entertaining and satisfying visitor experiences.

Originality/value
To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to apply the S-O-R theory in a wine museum context. The significance of this study lies in demonstrating how and why experience design characteristics support the creation of an edutainment visitor experience that drives visitor satisfaction.

AbstractFundamental epistemic values are values that best explain some epistemic evaluations. But there are, I argue, no epistemic evaluations which are best explained by positing truth as an epistemic value. So truth is not a fundamental epistemic value.

"This book addresses current threats to citizenship and democratic values posed by the spread of post-truth communication. The contributors apply research on moral, civic, and epistemic virtues to issues involving post-truth culture. The spread of post-truth communication affects ordinary citizens' commitment to truth and attitudes toward information sources, thereby threatening the promotion of democratic ideals in public debate. The chapters in this volume investigate the importance of helping citizens improve the quality of their online agency and raise awareness of the risks social media poses to democratic values. The book moves from two initial chapters that provide historical background and overview of the present post-truth malaise, through a series of chapters that feature mainly diagnostic accounts of the epistemic and ethical issues we face, to the complexities of virtue-theoretic analyses of specific virtues and vices. Virtues, Democracy, and Online Media will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in virtue ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, and media studies"--

This article introduces the term "epistemic boomerang" to describe a distinctive pattern of activism in which activists, frustrated by exclusion from national politics, attempt to mobilize expert advice in support of social goals. Using expertise as leverage can be a desirable option for activists when political authorities favor technocratic decision making. Epistemic boomerang formation is possible when expert organizations encourage citizen participation in agenda setting and spaces are made for encounters between experts and activists. These processes are evident in the contentious politics of genetically engineered maize in Mexico. In this case, maize producers and community activists mobilized to confront an expert advisory group assembled by the tri-national Commission for Environmental Cooperation. As a result, the values and perspectives of many of the protesters were conveyed in the expert report and recommendations. This article examines the political outcomes of this epistemic boomerang and considers its implications for the study of social movements. Adapted from the source document.

How do "international" epistemic communities shape regulatory contests between transnational firms and civil society organizations in the Global South? With the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), member states committed to basing trade-restrictive national regulations on science-based "international" standards set by "international" standard-setting bodies. Yet we know little about how the WTO regime has shaped the operation of epistemic communities within standard-setting bodies and, in turn, how standard-setting bodies articulate with national policy-making processes in the Global South. Building on work in the new political sociology of science, I argue that neoliberal globalization and the establishment of the WTO have created incentives for Western epistemic communities to at once cast themselves as "international" under the WTO regime and orient their scientific agendas toward the priorities of transnational firms. Moreover, this transformation of epistemic communities has created opportunities for transnational firms facing contentious policy environments in the Global South to effectively outsource regulatory decision-making to "international" epistemic communities that can claim legal status under the WTO regime. Empirically, I focus on the case of one Western epistemic community—the Association of Analytical Communities International—and its claim to epistemic jurisdiction over pesticide residue standards for soft drinks in India.

AbstractAudre Lorde's account of the erotic is one of her most widely celebrated contributions to political theory and feminist activism, but her explanation of the term in her brief essay "Uses of the Erotic" is famously oblique and ambiguous. This article develops a detailed, textually grounded interpretation of Lorde's erotic, based on an analysis of how Lorde's essay brings together commitments expressed across her work. I describe four integral elements of Lorde's erotic: feeling, knowledge, power, and concerted action. The erotic is a way of feeling in the work a person does, which makes possible new knowledge about the self and the social environment—particularly to counteract epistemic oppression imposed by an unjust society. The erotic is a source of power by providing vision and energy for actions integrating a person's multiple commitments and political interests. It facilitates concerted action and coalition by enhancing a person's appreciation of their interests and values, while fostering embodied, personal connections that build trust based on shared vulnerability. Thus, the erotic helps build coalitions where genuine differences of perspective and experience can be examined, in resistance against an oppressive society's epistemic distortions.

Participatory forms of policy-making have often been criticized for insufficiently theorizing the coproduction of publics and matters of concern. This paper seeks to investigate this relationship further by analyzing how the concept of civic epistemologies (CEs) can provide insights for understanding how political contexts shape both publics and contestable debates. Presenting fieldwork on cyclone governance in Odisha, India, based on the analysis of interviews with vulnerable fishing communities and state actors, the article shows how CEs influence the interdependent formation of vulnerable fisher and state subjectivities on one hand with representations of risk located in external biophysical atmospheric gases on the other, thereby sustaining reductive roles and futures. At the same time, the paper develops the concept of CEs by examining them as performative acts carried out by marginalized communities and state actors at the subnational level of a nonindustrialized country, thereby indicating sites at which epistemic agency can be increased and governed. Participatory knowledge production needs to understand how it is affected by CEs if it is to generate effective expertise for transformative futures in the face of increasing climatic risks.

The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of the epistemic justification of democracy and the best theoretical framework for harmonizing political and epistemic values. I also inquire whether the proposed division of epistemic labour and the inclusion of experts can indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without jeopardizing political justification. More specifically, I argue in favour of three theses. First, not only democratic procedures but also the outcomes of democracy, as a social system, need to be epistemically virtuous. Second, democracy's epistemic virtues are more than just a tool for achieving political goals. Third, an appropriate division of epistemic labour has to overcome the limitations of both individual and collective intelligence. ; Novo i vibrantno područje epistemologije demokratije ili istraživanje epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije kao društvenog sistema procedura, institucija i praksi nužno, kao interdisciplinarni poduhvat, povezuje epistemologe i filozofe politike. Uprkos mogućim prigovorima da ovakva vrsta diskusije ili nije dovoljno epistemološka ili da nije dovoljno filozofsko-politička, ovaj pristup upravo obeležava nakana usklađivanja političkog i epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije. U ovom se članku bavim nekim temeljnim izazovima vezanim uz prirodu epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije kao i pitanjem koji je najbolji teorijski okvir za usklađivanje političkih i epistemičkih vrednosti. Takođe, posebno važnim smatram pitanje može li predložena podela epistemičkog posla i uključivanje stručnjaka doista poboljšati epistemički kvalitet odlučivanja bez pretnje za političko opravdanje. U članku argumentujem u prilog tri teze; (i) ne samo procedura, već i ishodi demokratije, kao društvenog sistema, treba da budu epistemički vredni, (ii) epistemička vrlina demokratije više je od prikladnog sredstva za političke ciljeve, (iii) podela epistemičkog posla u demokratiji treba da nadiđe kako ograničenja individualne i kolektivne inteligencije.

The rise of social media coupled with declining trust in major social institutions (e.g., business, government) has arguably intensified the challenges young people face in developing their beliefs and identity. Our exploratory study used in-depth, semi-structured interviews with nineteen young adults (14 female, 5 male, 17 aged 18–23, and 2 aged 24–30) to explore how young adults navigate the diverging viewpoints and competing truth claims encountered from friends, family, and social media. A cluster analysis of interview responses revealed three groups: Relativistic Explorers, marked by high openness to views without judging them; Differentiated Committers, who displayed strong commitments to specific views or values; and Precipitated Explorers, who shared a common history of social and/or familial rejection, and thus an involuntary launch into belief exploration. Results underscore both the developmental challenges facing young adults in our modern, media-saturated society and some of the strategies they adopt to navigate the current epistemic landscape.

We examined the application of knowledge in land-use planning as epistemic governance and explored how actors wield institutional power while legitimising the use of knowledge. By applying a neo-institutionalist analytical framework of epistemic governance to discourse analysis, we investigated how actors invoke institutions of science and law while constructing a legitimate rationality. Specifically, we asked how new knowledge of underwater marine areas was invited into a marine spatial planning pilot in Finland. We determined that, while legitimising the use of new marine-life knowledge, the actors invoked law and science by granting the new knowledge various and intermingled meanings that disambiguated and depoliticised nature values into tangible measures. Moreover, uncertainties about the new knowledge spurred doubts which facilitated a stronger political approach that applied precautions. We suggest that in the regulative context of planning there is an institutional demand for techno-legal rationality in which the institutional appropriateness of knowledge is crucial. The lack of legitimate ontological authority allows for a political yet institutionally fit-for-purpose interpretation of reality. Thus, our study contributes to the literature on planning as governance and provides insights of the politics of knowledge use in planning as something not necessarily strategic and conscious, but also routine and institutional. ; publishedVersion ; Peer reviewed

Silvia Ivani Values in Science. The role of cognitive and non-cognitive values in Evolutionary Psychology Summary Should scientists value simple theories? Is fruitfulness an important criterion to assess scientific theories? What role moral, social, and political values should have in the assessment of scientific theories? In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of science in studying how cognitive and non-cognitive values influence and should influence the assessment and comparison of scientific theories. While cognitive values (such as simplicity and fruitfulness) are features of scientific theories that are indicative of the truth or empirical adequacy of theories, non-cognitive values are moral, political, social, and economic values. Understanding the roles of values in science is a particularly urgent issue. Clarifying the importance of cognitive values is important in order to be able to make accurate comparisons of scientific theories. Understanding the influence of non-cognitive values on science is crucial because moral, social, and political values are involved in many stages of research, such as decisions on methodologies and allocation of funds. Since these decisions affect all the members of the society (scientists, non-experts, and political institutions), understanding the impact of non-cognitive values on these choices is of primary importance. Although a large body of literature has investigated the roles of cognitive and non-cognitive values in theory appraisal, several questions remain to be analysed. In this dissertation, I address four questions by using two main methods, namely the analysis of case studies from evolutionary psychology and the experimental method. First, while philosophers have clarified the importance and roles in theory appraisal of some cognitive values, little or no attention has been paid to other values. In this dissertation, I have started filling this gap by formulating a clear explication and a simple strategy to be employed in theory appraisal for one of the values that have attracted little attention, namely fruitfulness. I have explicated fruitfulness as the ability of programs to extend their content and suggested considering research questions and discovery heuristics to assess this ability. Moreover, I have used my account to assess the fruitfulness of evolutionary psychology. Second, some philosophers of science argue that cognitive values are desirable and relevant to the assessment of theories because they are indicative of the truth or empirical adequacy of theories. However, why is it so? In my dissertation, I develop a context-sensitive approach to values and I argue that in order to understand the ground for the desirability of cognitive values and make an accurate appraisal of theories, we have to consider specific factors of the context in which theories are assessed, such as the availability of methodologies and the way cognitive values are interrelated to each other in that context. Third, philosophers have traditionally argued that the influence of non-cognitive values on scientific reasoning threatens the epistemic authority of science. I have challenged this view and argued that some non-cognitive values can play a cognitive role in science, i.e., they can be epistemically beneficial to the assessment of scientific theories. On the basis of a case study (the account of human mating in evolutionary psychology), I have argued that feminist values have positively contributed to theory appraisal in various ways, such as by raising sensitivity to evidence that was neglected because of gender bias. Fourth, some philosophers have argued that non-cognitive values play a legitimate role in cases of inductive risk, namely cases in which scientists may wrongly assess scientific hypotheses (e.g. accepting a hypothesis that should be rejected) because of some uncertainty due to mixed results or disagreement on the reliability of methodologies. Mistakes can have consequences that can be morally or economically undesirable and non-cognitive values, some philosophers argue, provide the standards to evaluate and compare these possible consequences. However, little is known on how - specifically - non-cognitive values influence this evaluation. To address this issue, I have conducted an experimental study clarifying how personal features, political values, and specific aspects of a risk (e.g. the chance of incurring Type I vs. Type II errors) determine people's reasoning about cases of inductive risk. On the basis of these results, I have discussed recent institutional calls for the need to align research agendas and technological development to citizens' values, needs, and expectations.