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In this article on the example of the historical process of formation and modern functioning of the press in the USA an attempt to differentiate between the notions of «elite press» and «high-quality press» have been made, the essence of each of these concepts was clarified, features of «high-quality» and «elite» press were distinguished, as well as the objectives in the use of these concepts, the parameters of the delineation of high-quality and elite press are elaborated and the definitions of each of them are proposed. To this aim, basing on the works of USA scholars the origin of the elite press in the USA was analyzed and it was found that the magazine occupies prominent place in it, basing on the reader's criteria classification of high-quality and elite press is proposed and their common features were revealed.It was ascertained that the auditory of elite press consists of two parts: first includes highest ranks of the public – ones who try to fulfill their life with elite, status attributes, the second consist of those society members who make efforts to succed the lifestyle of wealthy ones although they do not pertain to the rich. It has been proved that the term «elite», mentioned toward press implies the characteristics of the subject, who sets high demands to the press they read as well as to their activity, rest, etc. In the same time the term «quality press» regards to the object as quality is the key demand to journalistic activity. Quality press is red by politicians and other ones who influence political and business life, as well as by those who has not such a direct influence, but who are interested in this category of topic. All mentioned in the article let us make a conclusion that quality press primarily consists of dailies and weeklies, their typical theme is general political, this category of press is appointed to politicians and intellectuals. Elite press put high demands to its quality, therefore it will not be a mistake to name the elite press as the quality press.The main parameters for elite and quality press delineation is periodicity, issues that are elucidated on its pages, auditory and aim.Key words: elite press, quality press, elite, quality, auditory, magazine. ; У статті на прикладі історичного процесу становлення та сучасного функціонування преси у США зроблено спробу розмежувати поняття «елітарна преса» та «якісна преса», з'ясовано сутність кожного з цих понять, виокремлено ознаки «якісної» та «елітарної» преси, виявлено закономірності в уживанні цих понять, напрацьовано параметри розмежування якісної та елітарної преси та запропоновано визначення кожної з них. З цією метою на основі праць учених США проаналізовано генезу елітарної преси у США, виявлено, що чільне місце у ній посідає журнал, запропоновано класифікацію елітарної і якісної преси на основі читацького критерію.Ключові слова: елітарна преса, якісна преса, еліта, якісність, аудиторія, журнал.

Elite Forces Handbook: Mental Endurance examines what it takes to be asmentally fit as a special forces soldier. It is equally important to focus on diet, restpatterns and mental discipline as it is to concentrate on push-ups, sit-ups and otherphysical exercises. Using simple steps, the book shows the reader how they can buildup their endurance over a matter of weeks and months, and how their quality of lifewill benefit. Elite Forces Handbook: Mental Endurance demonstrates how you cangain the psychological edge over your opponent

This thesis comprises four individual essays and deals with the question of how international financial integration may influence quality of economic institutions in developing countries. While the first three essays provide theoretical models of different channels, through which financial integration may affect institutional quality, the last work is an empirical investigation into the influence of liberalization of the financial account on institutional development. The first essay "Financial Integration in Autocracies: Greasing the Wheel or More to Steal?" analyzes the influence of financial integration on institutional quality in an autocratically ruled economy. The essay provides a dynamic political-economic model in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate the general population. Although financial integration reduces capital costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private sector, the elite may counteract this effect by increasing the rate of expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic resources, financial integration also has long run consequences for the distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class. The second essay "Autocracies, Structure of the Economy, and Expropriation" also develops a model on elite's behavior in autocratically ruled economies. In contrast to the previous model, the ruling elite is also involved in the economic production process. The elite imposes a distortive tax on the entrepreneurial income in order to i) extract rents and ii) to influence the factor prices of the input factors increasing thereby its own economic profits. The structure of the economy is captured by the degree of complementarity between the production inputs provided by the general population and determines the extent of expropriation. The less dependent the elite is on the entrepreneurial activity, the higher is the equilibrium rate of expropriation. The results also show that a rise in the entrepreneurs' productivity, ...

Why do some former authoritarian elites return to power after democratization through reelection or reappointment to political office, or by assuming board positions in state-owned or major private enterprises, whereas others do not and still others face punishment? This article investigates this question using an original data set on constitutional origins and the fate of the upper echelon of outgoing authoritarian elites across Latin America from 1900 to 2015. I find that authoritarian elites from outgoing regimes that impose a holdover constitution that sticks through democratization are more likely to regain political or economic power—especially through national positions where the potential payoffs are largest—and less likely to face severe or nominal punishment. I also find a positive role for political capital among former elites. These results are robust to alternative explanations of authoritarian elites' fate and using instrumental variables to address potential endogeneity. The findings have important implications for democratic consolidation and quality.

AbstractAfter decades of authoritarianism and a twelve-year civil war ended by a negotiated peace agreement in 1992, El Salvador is a markedly different country. Despite important changes, however, public institutions have remained largely unresponsive, acute social exclusion persists and violent crime has soared. Rather than the possibly inevitable by-products of a post-conflict situation, these and other developments are the consequences of a regression from an incipient electoral democracy to electoral authoritarianism. The elite-controlledAlianza Republicana Nacionalista(ARENA) party had more to gain from the preservation of the status quo than from democratic changes and only accepted a politically inclusive system to restore the oligarchy's dominant position through electoral politics. Uncommitted to democratic consolidation, successive ARENA administrations maintained an institutional façade of democracy to reproduce authoritarian governance and defend elite interests.

published_or_final_version ; Politics and Public Administration ; Master ; Master of Public Administration

Recent research has provided broad accounts of what high institutional quality is; bureaucrats should be impartial and recruited on merit, public power should not be used for private gain, there should be rule of law, and property rights should be secure. Many scholars argue the reason why, in spite of this knowledge, recent institutional reforms have had limited success is that improvements are not in the interest of incumbent elites. Constraining elites is, therefore, crucial for institutional improvements. In this article, I argue that economic diversification functions as one such constraint on elite behavior, affecting their ability to form collusive coalitions. When the economy is concentrated to a few sectors, elite interests are more uniform making it easier for them to organize. However, as the economy becomes more diverse, collusion becomes harder and elites must settle for impartial institutions more often. I test the theory using cross-national time series data covering the last 25 years; the results corroborate the theory, as the economy of a country becomes more diverse, institutions become more impartial.