Suchergebnisse

In recent years sanctions have become an increasingly popular tool of foreign policy, not only at the multilateral level (at the UN), but also regionally (the EU in particular) and unilaterally. The nature of the measures imposed has also changed: from comprehensive sanctions regimes (discredited since Iraq in the 1990s) to 'targeted' or 'smart' sanctions, directed at specific individuals or entities (through asset freezes and travel bans) or prohibiting particular activities (arms embargoes and export bans). Bringing together scholars, government and private practitioners, Economic Sanctions and International Law provides an overview of recent developments and an analysis of the problems that they have engendered. Chapters examine the contemporary practice of the various actors, and the legality (or otherwise) of their activities. Issues considered include the human rights of persons targeted, and the mechanisms established to challenge their listing; as well as, in cases of sanctions imposed by regional organisations and individual states, the rights of third States and their nationals. The book will be of interest to scholars and practitioners of international law and politics.

Peter van Bergeijk brings together 40 leading experts from all continents to analyze state-of-the-art data covering the sharp increase in (smart) sanctions in the last decade. Original chapters provide detailed analyses on the determinants of sanction success and failure, complemented with innovative research on the impact of sanctions. This timely Research Handbook provides both a thorough discussion of methodology as well as evidence-based policy advice on the efficient application of boycotts, embargoes, and targeted sanctions, including trade, travel and financial sanctions. The use of case studies from Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Russia illustrate developments and demonstrate new methods, including stochastic frontier analysis, comparative quantitative analysis and meta-analysis. Providing crucial information, this Research Handbook will be an excellent resource for academic researchers in international political economy and international relations as well as policy makers within national and global institutions. It will also provide obligatory reading for students also studying within these fields.

Economic sanctions have long occupied the attention of both scholars and policy makers. Despite the widespread use of sanctions, many observers have concluded that the inherent problems associated with imposing sanctions involving multiple senders substantially limit their effectiveness. This article reviews two books that analyze the factors that influence cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions. These books indicate that international institutions can do much to promote cooperation of this sort. However, this essay argues that the extent to which international institutions facilitate cooperation among senders of sanctions is likely to depend on the domestic politics of members, the type of institution being used for this purpose, the nature of the strategy being pursued, and the distribution of power among members. Although these books make significant contributions to our understanding of the factors that promote cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions, they examine the factors that promote the effectiveness of sanctions in only a peripheral manner. One potential influence on the effectiveness of sanctions that are organized by an international institution, however, is the likelihood that the institution will be captured by member states or by interest groups within them. Additional research that investigates the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be captured and the implications of institutional capture for their performance may therefore prove useful to scholars of international relations and economic statecraft.

Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial evaluation of the sender state's resolve, much less than when a military challenge is observed. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

Pierce challenges the argument that economic sanctions are always morally preferable to the use of military force. His analysis shows that economic sanctions also inflict great pain, suffering, and physical harm on the innocent population of noncombatants and that small-scale military operations are sometimes preferable. Lori Fisler Damrosch's framework for ethical analysis, Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars, and the case of Haiti are used to support his argument.

Abstract: Premised on the consideration of the household as a key site of social reproduction, where the dislocating effects of sanctions and austerity are felt, this article explores the impact of the Trump administration's 2018 reimposition of punitive sanctions on Iran. The focus on the household, and the myriads of mundane everyday acts which sustain and reproduce it, renders central the study of gender relations and the gendered character of social reproduction. Drawing on the experiences of middle-class women in Tehran, I focus on the ways in which sanctions become manifested in the coping practices developed by those they affect and sketch the contours of what I call "depleted households."