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SSRN
Do Young CEOS Matter for Corporate Digital Transformation? Career Concerns vs. Career Horizons
In: EL57997
SSRN
Directors' Career Concerns and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Majority Voting Legislation
In: CORFIN-D-24-00592
SSRN
The Italian Job: Match Rigging, Career Concerns and Media Concentration in 'Serie A'
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 3745
SSRN
A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns
In: KDI Journal of Economic Policy, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 87-101
Peer Effects on Corporate Environmental Protection: Competition, Information Cascades or Career Concerns?
In: PBFJ-D-22-00814
SSRN
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
In: Journal of political economy, Band 100, Heft 3, S. 468-505
ISSN: 1537-534X
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
In: Journal of political economy, Band 100, Heft 3, S. 468
ISSN: 0022-3808
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
In: NBER Working Paper No. w3792
SSRN
The relationship between career adaptability, person and situation variables, and career concerns in young adults
In: Journal of vocational behavior, Band 74, Heft 2, S. 219-229
ISSN: 1095-9084
The Limited Effects of Internal Career Concerns on Self-Initiative Work Style
In: International Journal of Management Sciences and Business Research, Band 3
SSRN
There is No 'I' in Team: Career Concerns, Risk-taking Incentives and Team Outcomes
In: forthcoming in the Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
SSRN
When Promotion Ladders Seem to End: the career concerns of secondary headteachers
In: British journal of sociology of education, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 37-49
ISSN: 1465-3346
Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 469-490
ISSN: 1756-2171
Firms often augment career concerns incentives with implicit incentive contracts. I formalize the interaction between these two incentives, and highlight its implications on a firm's decision to disclose its workers' productivity information. Disclosure enhances career concerns but inhibits implicit contracts. I show two main results. First, implicit contracts weaken (i.e., substitute) career concerns if the prior belief about the worker's ability is low, and vice versa. Second, when these incentives are substitutes, the optimal disclosure policy follows a cutoff rule: patient firms are opaque, and transparent firms never offer implicit contracts. These results need not hold if the incentives are complements.
CEO compensation structure following succession: Evidence of optimal incentives with career concerns
In: The quarterly review of economics and finance, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 1389-1409
ISSN: 1062-9769