Suchergebnisse

AbstractAfter a period of relative overperformance due to the focus on output indicators in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) burden-sharing debate, we ask whether the shift back to input indicators prior to the Ukraine War meant that the smaller NATO allies have returned to their fringe position as NATO underperformers. According to the deterrence model, smaller allies are induced to free ride to a higher degree than mid-sized allies. Utilizing insights from public choice theory, our analysis demonstrates, first, that there is no support to the claim that the size of NATO member state GDP determines the percentage of GDP spent on defence. Second, selective incentives tend to reduce the incentive for small allies to free ride. The relationship between GDP and the percentage of GDP spent on defence capabilities is therefore conditional upon the net gain of the individual member state. Defence capabilities that are characterized as a public good when we control for exposed borders indicate a higher percentage of GDP spent on defence. Our conclusions show that even though small allies continue to free ride, they do so less than expected due to the existence of selective incentives in the period from 2009-2019.

Policy making is a complex issue, as numerous factors should be taken aboard before a political decision is made. To ensure a more holistic approach to policy making, the authors propose to use the tool of foresight to capture the multitude of variables. Using the framework of rational choice theory on an empirical example of the serious security problems that unfolded in Europe in November 2015, the authors demonstrate how foresight, which draws on stakeholder knowledge and available information to connect the dots between fields and scattered information, would lead to more holistic and coordinated joint policy decisions. This would aid in establishing the optimal amount of public goods for which tax-payers' money is to be invested. Currently, Europe stands at an important cross-road as to what its future will be. Some political decisions have been made, and some are still to be made. Not every European citizen is satisfied with all recent political choices, as reflected in the rise of Eurosceptic moods and extremist political parties. Yet, in a democratic society, European citizens, taxpayers and voters have the right to expect sound political decisions. To this end, the authors propose the use of the foresight tool. Such a vision for Europe could further improve future policy making to the benefit of all EU citizens. The success of foresight and stake- holders' groups for making sound decisions where best to invest tax-payers' money, was already piloted in European Commission's Directorate General for Research and Innovation. This was achieved thanks to operating a high-level stakeholder group, the European Forum on Forward Looking Activities (EFFLA), which provided both vision and advice.

AbstractWhy has 'development aid' been donated by so-called developed to under-developed populations since the Second World War? Using discourse analysis, this article provides partial answers to this riddle. First, we suggest that donor motives may be rooted in an ideology of 'being good', which, paradoxically, motivates recipients to be helpless – that is, a Samaritan's dilemma. Second, drawing on journal articles published in 1960–70, we test this theory by tracing a global development discourse and 'goodness ideology' in a Western country such as Denmark – a process that was strongly influenced by the agricultural co-operative movement, which sought to export the 'Danish co-operative model'.

The EU has committed itself to meet an 8% greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction target level following the Kyoto agreement. Therefore, the EU Commission has just proposed a new directive establishing a framework for GHG emissions trading within the European Union. This proposal is the outcome of a policy process started by the EU Commission and its Green Paper from March 2000. The main industrial stakeholders all had the opportunity to comment on the Green Paper and from their positions we will analyse how far they are winners or losers compared to the final directive proposal. Here, we find that the dominant interest groups indeed influenced the final design of an EU GHG market.

How does social trust emerge in a country? By comparing the cases of Denmark and Germany through six historical phases, the authors suggest that a plausible explanation is long run political stability. In Denmark, social trust was arguably allowed to accumulate slowly over time and was probably not destroyed up till the universal welfare state of the 20th century. In Germany, however, political instability since the first German state building hampered the emergence and maintenance of social trust, which is why social trust was never allowed to grow in this country.

"How does social trust emerge in a country? By comparing the cases of Denmark and Germany through six historical phases, the authors suggest that a plausible explanation is long run political stability. In Denmark, social trust was arguably allowed to accumulate slowly over time and was probably not destroyed up till the universal welfare state of the 20th century. In Germany, however, political instability since the first German state building hampered the emergence and maintenance of social trust, which is why social trust was never allowed to grow in this country." (author's abstract)