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Preface. 1. Introduction. Part I: The "Problem" of Judicial Review. 2. The Inevitability of American Judicial Review. 3. The Democracy Worry. Part II: Discretion and Judgment. 4. How to Think About Discretion. 5. Reason and Relevance. 6. The Anatomy of Judgment. Part III: Precedent as a Safeguard. 7. Respect for Precedent. 8. Explaining Precedent. Part IV: Process Safeguards. 9. Deliberation and Multiple Decision-makers. 10. Transparency. 11. Incrementalism. Part V: Internalized Safeguards. 12. Professionalism and the Selection Process. 13. The Role of the Legal Academy. Part VI: Cas

This title is an appraisal of the impact of multiculturalism on legal scholarship. Far from making society more humane and less oppressive, radical multiculturalism is destructive of dialogue and community. Worse, the authors contend, radical multiculturalism has deep structural links to anti-Semitism and other forms of racism

Should we impose term limits on Supreme Court justices? Many people, of varying political views, have suggested that we should. They argue that requiring justices to step down after a fixed term – the most common suggestion is 18 years – would give all presidents an equal opportunity to nominate justices, depoliticize the confirmation process and ensure that the Supreme Court is never too far out of step with the views of the American public. Whether adopting term limits would accomplish all of these goals is, of course, disputed. But is there any reason not to try it? In "Term Limits and Turmoil: Roe v. Wade's Whiplash," forthcoming in the Texas Law Review, we argue that there is a very serious potential downside to limiting justices to 18-year terms. A Supreme Court that welcomes a new justice every two years, and turns over entirely over the course of every 18 years, could wreak havoc on doctrinal stability. Under the current constitutionally mandated system of life tenure, the court changes slowly. Most justices serve at least 20 years and many serve 30 years or more; no new justices joined the court at all between 1994 and 2005. This longevity and stability means that doctrine changes slowly and incrementally. A constantly changing court, on the other hand, might make sudden and radical changes in doctrine.

Last April, Professors Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry published a critique in these pages of the legal storytelling movement. Their legal position has been the subject of several responses, including an essay by Professor William Eskridge in this issue. In reply, Professors Farber and Sherry challenge their critics' reliance on postmodern views such as social constructionism. Social constructionism, according to Farber and Sherry, embraces forms of community that would be destructive to the scholarly enterprise. It also risks conflating scholarship with politics in ways harmful to both. More generally, Farber and Sherry contend, postmodernism lacks any clear lessons for legal scholarship and possesses at best a contingent connection with progressive change.

What to expect in law school -- The language of the law -- The structure of government and the structure of law -- The structure of the American legal system -- Fundamental legal concepts -- How to look and be smarter in the classroom and beyond -- Looking beyond the first year.

Professors Heald and Sherry argue that the language of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, the Intellectual Property Clause, absolutely constrains Congress's legislative power under certain circumstances. Their analysis begins by looking at other limits on the legislative power that the Court has found in the Bankruptcy Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and Article III. Then by examining the history and structure of the Intellectual Property Clause and relevant precedent, they distill four principles of constitutional weight- the Suspect Grant Principle, the Quid Pro Quo Principle, the Authorship Principle, and the Public Domain Principle. These principles inform the Court's jurisprudence in cases involving the Intellectual Property Clause, acting as implied and absolute limits on Congress's exercise of its legislative power. Finally, Professors Heald and Sherry apply these principles to recent pieces of legislation and evaluate the constitutionality of several proposed and recently enacted laws.

Liberal education and politics / Giorgi Areshidze and Paul O. Caresse -- Why we need more judicial activism / Suzanna Sherry -- Legal realism, innate morality, and the structural role of the Supreme Court in the U.S. constitutional democracy / Karl Coplan -- Is judicialization good for democracy? : a comparative discussion / Ayse Zarakol -- If there's a right, is there a remedy? : the federal courts' role in remedying constitutional violations / Barbara Kritchevsky -- The necessary and the good in Lincoln's wartime reconstruction policy / Sean Mattie -- Progress, return, and the constitution / C. Kevin Marshall -- Ideas meet institutions and the people rise up : four classic ideas and the strange century of health reform / James A. Morone -- The polis, the state, and the constitution / James R. Stoner, Jr -- Adam Smith's invisible hands / Peter Minowitz -- The Founders and the conditions of popular deliberation / David R. Upham -- Tocqueville on liberal democracy and the philosophy of moderation / Paul Carrese -- John Rawls and EU multiculturalism : is post-enlightenment Rawlsian liberalism sustainable? / Giorgi Areshidze -- Publications by Murray P. Dry

--A newly revised and updated version of the 2008 revised edition with updated introduction, four new chapters. --The editors were encouraged to update this edition with issues of diversity in mind. They have done so by including the expertise of more women and people of color. Also includes suggestions for further reading. --The audience for the work is primarily scholarly, though the work does lend itself to classroom discussion and course adoption as well. Readers would include legal scholars, legal anthropologists, and those who work in issues of modern rights and social justice.

The law is full of stories, ranging from the competing narratives presented at trials to the Olympian historical narratives set forth in Supreme Court opinions. How those stories are told and listened to makes a crucial difference to those whose lives are reworked in legal storytelling. The public at large has increasingly been drawn to law as an area where vivid human stories are played out with distinctively high stakes. And scholars in several fields have recently come to recognize that law's stories need to be studied critically.This notable volume-inspired by a symposium held at Yale Law School-brings together an exceptional group of well-known figures in law and literary studies to take a probing look at how and why stories are told in the law and how they are constructed and made effective. Why is it that some stories-confessions, victim impact statements-can be excluded from decisionmakers' hearing? How do judges claim the authority by which they impose certain stories on reality?Law's Stories opens new perspectives on the law, as narrative exchange, performance, explanation. It provides a compelling encounter of law and literature, seen as two wary but necessary interlocutors.ContributorsJ. M. BalkinPeter BrooksHarlon L. DaltonAlan M. DershowitzDaniel A. FarberRobert A. FergusonPaul GewirtzJohn HollanderAnthony KronmanPierre N. LevalSanford LevinsonCatharine MacKinnonJanet MalcolmMartha MinowDavid N. RosenElaine ScarryLouis Michael SeidmanSuzanna SherryReva B. SiegelRobert Weisberg