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PurposeHow to foster voice behavior has always been a hot topic in organizational research; however, the mechanism through which performing decent work affects employee voice behavior remains to be fully understood. To address this deficiency, the current study investigates how basic need satisfaction may relate to perceived decent work and voice behavior and the moderating role of gender. Our research draws upon self-determination theory and social information processing theory.Design/methodology/approachThe theoretical model was tested using two-wave investigation data collected from a sample of 349 employees and 85 supervisors in Southwest China.FindingsDecent work perception was positively related to voice behavior, and this relationship was partially mediated by basic need satisfaction. In addition, the relationship between decent work perception and basic need satisfaction as well as the indirect effect of decent work perception on voice behavior via basic need satisfaction was stronger for men than for women.Originality/valueThis study highlights the pivotal roles of basic need satisfaction and gender in the consequences of decent work perception in the workplace. The authors provide new insights into the relationship between decent work perception and voice behavior and inspire scholars to elucidate other explanatory mechanisms in this link.

AbstractUnderpinned by the stimulus–organism–response model, this study explores the underlying mechanism through which green advertising skepticism on social media affects consumer green purchase intention. It also investigates the boundary factors that moderate this indirect relationship. Performing structural equation modeling on data collected from an online survey on Sina Weibo, this study finds that green advertising skepticism on social media negatively affects green purchase intention through the mediation of perceived information utility. Moreover, interdependent self‐construal positively moderates, and independent self‐construal negatively moderates this indirect relationship. These findings suggest that truthful and consumer‐tailored green advertising is crucial to green product marketing.

Abstract
The legitimacy of democratic systems requires the protection of minority preferences while ideally treating every voter equally. During the 2006 student elections at Columbia University, we asked voters to rank the importance of different contests and to choose where to cast a single extra "bonus vote," had one been available — a simple version of Storable Votes. We then constructed distributions of intensities and electoral outcomes and estimated the probable impact of the bonus vote through bootstrapping techniques. The bonus vote performs well: when minority preferences are particularly intense, the minority wins at least one contest with 15-30 percent probability; when the minority wins, aggregate welfare increases with 85-95 percent probability. The paper makes two contributions: it tests the performance of storable votes in a setting where preferences were not controlled, and it suggests the use of bootstrapping techniques when appropriate replications of the data cannot be obtained.

Democratic systems are built, with good reason, on majoritarian principles, but their legitimacy requires the protection of strongly held minority preferences. The challenge is to do so while treating every voter equally and preserving aggregate welfare. One possible solution is storable votes: granting each voter a budget of votes to cast as desired over multiple decisions. During the 2006 student elections at Columbia University, we tested a simple version of this idea: voters were asked to rank the importance of the different contests and to choose where to cast a single extra "bonus vote," had one been available. We used these responses to construct distributions of intensities and electoral outcomes, both without and with the bonus vote. Bootstrapping techniques provided estimates of the probable impact of the bonus vote. The bonus vote performs well: when minority preferences are particularly intense, the minority wins at least one of the contests with 15--30 percent probability; and, when the minority wins, aggregate welfare increases with 85--95 percent probability. When majority and minority preferences are equally intense, the effect of the bonus vote is smaller and more variable but on balance still positive.

Democratic systems are built, with good reason, on majoritarian principles, but their legitimacy requires the protection of strongly held minority preferences. The challenge is to do so while treating every voter equally and preserving aggregate welfare. One possible solution is storable votes: granting each voter a budget of votes to cast as desired over multiple decisions. During the 2006 student elections at Columbia University, we tested a simple version of this idea: voters were asked to rank the importance of the different contests and to choose where to cast a single extra "bonus vote," had one been available. We used these responses to construct distributions of intensities and electoral outcomes, both without and with the bonus vote. Bootstrapping techniques provided estimates of the probable impact of the bonus vote. The bonus vote performs well: when minority preferences are particularly intense, the minority wins at least one of the contests with 15--30 percent probability; and, when the minority wins, aggregate welfare increases with 85--95 percent probability. When majority and minority preferences are equally intense, the effect of the bonus vote is smaller and more variable but on balance still positive.