Suchergebnisse

This article explores how to better deliver technical advice to high-level decision makers, as means to better deal with emerging threats that are enabled by the rapid innovation and proliferation of scientific knowledge throughout the world. Over the next twenty years, accelerating scientific and technical developments will spawn immense changes to society that can be both crucially beneficial and tragically destructive. This trend, principally occurring outside of government control, is both helping the United States to improve defense and economic security and producing threats to national security. To deal with these increasingly technical issues, the nation's leadership needs to be armed with considerable scientific and technological acumen. Hence, the United States should explore the creation of a national security science and technology (S&T) strategy that improves: (1) scientific analysis available to decision makers; (2) understanding of the S&T needed to maintain national security; (3) coordination and collaboration among S&T providers; (4) control of dangerous technologies; (5) technology prioritization and acquisition processes; and (6) the dialog on enhancing the application of the products of private sector and foreign research for American national security purposes. Policies that address these issues will have to achieve the difficult balance between government and scientists' influence over research and development (R&D). This article explores how to better deliver technical advice to high-level decision makers, as a means to better deal with emerging threats that are enabled by the rapid innovation and proliferation of scientific knowledge throughout the world.

The claim that the ending of the Cold War signifies the triumph of Western liberalism - irrespective of whether this is celebrated or deplored - overlooks the extent to which the liberal tradition, as commonly understood, incorporated radical differences within it. These often shaped the major political cleavages of the time: between Whigs and radicals, Girondins and Jacobins, the liberalism of privilege versus the liberalism of egalitarian democracy. Similar tensions can be identified today: between the liberalisms of 'globalisation from above' and 'globalisation from below', the liberalism of international business and finance and that of radical social movements, the liberalism of privilege and that of human rights in the full sense. Not all these espouse the same liberal principles, but they can be seen as contending over which of the rival liberalisms should be accorded legitimacy in the post-Cold War world.

A number of recent developments have prompted a revival of interest in liberal theories of international relations, among them the spread of democratic institutions, economic liberalisation and the increasing significance of international institutions in many aspects of life. This paper argues that liberal international relations theory, overimpressed by developments such as these, risks becoming an apologia for a narrow version of liberalism currently promoted by Western governments. The challenge of rethinking the meaning of liberalism in a 'globalising' world characterised by extreme economic inequality, social upheavals and the reassertion of cultural differences—and the questions whether and how liberal values can at all be realised in such a world—have been left to political theorists, whose struggles with these issues attract little interest in an international relations discipline still largely committed to the idea of a purely empirical social science. The paper suggests that a different, 'critical' conception of liberalism offers a way of relating pressing liberal normative concerns to empirical research, instead of seeking to keep the two entirely separate. It presents a critique of current liberal international relations theory and outlines an alternative approach.

This paper examines the reasons why it is commonly held that the underlying conditions which shape world politics at the present time are highly favourable to the avoidance of major war, and inquires into the implications of this thesis for the Asia-Pacific region. It suggests that arguments relating to democracy and peace, and the changing attitude to war in modern industrial societies, are inconclusive in the regional context, but that arguments concerning the changing costs and benefits of major war, and the effects of interdependence and globalisation, are more persuasive. Nonetheless, the prospects for peace depend also on policy choices: the paper argues that the most familiar approaches to policy, power balancing and the construction of cooperative security institutions, are of limited value and that greater weight should be placed on diplomacy, both in responding to crises and in promoting constructive relationships.

Still close to the events, this paper attempts an assessment of the foreign policy of the Hawke–Keating governments. It argues that, within the constraints which any government was bound to observe, the Australian Labor Party government responded creatively to the new security environment arising from the ending of the Cold War, especially in its wholehearted regional engagement but also with respect to arms control. Its reversal of Australia's traditional protectionism and its thoroughgoing support for free trade internationally signified a more radical break with the past but its overall policy mix amounted to a high-risk strategy for reforming the Australian economy. Its espousal of the 'good citizen' role enabled Australia to make constructive contributions to the new 'world order' agenda, but it missed the opportunity to challenge some of the more oppressive features of the emerging order. Nonetheless, on balance the ALP government's foreign policy served Australia's national interests well, setting a high standard for its successor.

'Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on Human Rights' by Carolyn Evans is reviewed.

Violence (broadly defined to include collective as well as individual violence) associated with the recent rise of newer religious groups or "cults," as well as longer-term minority religions, is examined, using a conflict orientation. The interactional nature of such violence is discussed, with accusations of violence concerning minority & newer religions placed in a conflict perspective that stresses the interdependency of religious groups & their opponents. Special attention is given to allegations of (1) violence derived from group teachings & practices, with a focus on major recent tragic events involving religious groups; & (2) violence directed against members & groups by others, including private individuals & organization, as well as governmental entities. Adapted from the source document.

The claim that the ending of the Cold War signifies the triumph of Western liberalism — irrespective of whether this is celebrated or deplored — overlooks the extent to which the liberal tradition, as commonly understood, incorporated radical differences within it. These often shaped the major political cleavages of the time — between Whigs and radicals, Girondins and Jacobins, the liberalism of privilege versus the liberalism of egalitarian democracy. Similar tensions can be identified today — between the liberalisms of `globalization from above' and `globalization from below', the liberalism of international business and finance and that of radical social movements, the liberalism of privilege and that of human rights in the full sense. Not all these espouse the same liberal principles, but they can be seen as contending over which of the rival liberalisms should be accorded legitimacy in the post-Cold War world.