Suchergebnisse

We analyze a small, new credit facility of a Spanish state-owned bank during the crisis, using its continuous credit scoring system, its firm-level scores, and the credit register. Compared to privately-owned banks, the state-owned bank faces worse applicants, (softens) tightens its credit supply to (un)observed riskier firms, and has much higher defaults, especially driven by unobserved ex-ante borrower risk. In a regression discontinuity design, the supply of public credit causes: large positive real effects to financially-constrained firms (whose relationship banks reduced substantially credit supply); crowding-in of new private-bank credit; and positive spillovers to other firms. Private returns of the credit facility are negative, while social returns are positive. Overall, our results provide evidence on the existence of significant adverse selection problems in credit markets.

We analyze the impact of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit. Monetary policy affects both loan supply and demand, thus making identification a steep challenge. We therefore analyze a novel, supervisory dataset with loan applications from Spain. Accounting for time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand, we find that tighter monetary and worse economic conditions substantially reduce loan granting, especially from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios; responding to applications for the same loan, weak banks are less likely to grant the loan. Finally, firms cannot offset the resultant credit restriction by applying to other banks. (JEL E32, E44, E52, G21, G32)

We analyze new lending to firms by a state-owned bank in crisis times, the potential adverse selection faced by the bank, and the causal real effects associated to its lending. For identification, we exploit: (i) a new credit facility set up in Spain by its state-owned bank during the credit crunch of 2010-2012; (ii) the bank s continuous scoring system, together with firms' individual credit scores and the threshold for granting vs. rejecting loan applications; (iii) the rich credit register matched with firm- and bank-level data. We show that, compared to privately-owned banks, the state-owned bank faces a worse pool of applicants, is tighter (softer) in lending to firms with observable (unobservable) riskier characteristics, and has substantial higher loan defaults. Using a regression discontinuity approach around the threshold, we show that the supply of credit causes large positive real effects on firm survival, employment, investment, total assets, sales, and productivity, as well as crowding-in of new credit by private banks.

We show that Quantitative Easing (QE) stimulates investment via a corporate-bond lending channel. Fed's large-scale asset purchases of MBS and treasuries through QE creates a vacuum of safe assets, prompting safer firms to invest more by issuing relatively "safe" bonds. Using micro-data around QE, we find that QE increases firm-level investment by 7.4 percentage points for firms with bond market access. This growth is financed with senior bonds. We find no evidence of higher shareholders' payouts associated to QE. The robust findings are consistent with a model in which reducing the supply of government debt lowers "safe" corporate bond yields, stimulating investment

We show that loan origination time is crucial for bank lending standards over the credit cycle, as well as for ex-post loan-level defaults and bank-level failures. We use the credit register in Spain for the business loans over the 2002-15 period focusing on the time of a loan application and its granting. When VIX is low (proxying for good times) banks shorten the time to originate a loan, particularly to less-capitalized (riskier) firms. Bank moral hazard incentives are a key mechanism. Shorter loan origination time to ex-ante riskier firms in good times is especially stronger for: (i) banks with less capital (proxying for moral hazard problems between bank owners and taxpayers/debtholders); (ii) non-listed banks (proxying for moral hazard problems between bank management and shareholders); (iii) loans to firms in geographical areas which do not form the bank's main market and experience a real estate bubble (proxying for moral hazard problems between local loan officers and the bank headquarter), mainly if those areas have more bank competition; or, relatedly, stronger effects on loans granted to firms operating in industries which the bank is not most specialized at, proxying for moral hazard problems between different parts within the bank. Moreover, shorter origination time is associated with higher ex-post defaults at the loan-level, and aggregated at the bank-level, with higher likelihood of bank failure or other strong bank distress events, overall consistent with lower screening (time). ; This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S).

We show that Quantitative Easing (QE) stimulates investment via a corporate-bond lending channel. Fedâ s large-scale asset purchases of MBS and treasuries through QE creates a vacuum of safe assets, prompting safer firms to invest more by issuing relatively "safe" bonds. Using micro-data around QE, we find that QE increases firm-level investment by 7.4 percentage points for firms with bond market access. This growth is financed with senior bonds. We find no evidence of higher shareholdersâ payouts associated to QE. The robust findings are consistent with a model in which reducing the supply of government debt lowers "safe" corporate bond yields, stimulating investment.