Suchergebnisse

AbstractFamily forms that have historically been considered "nontraditional" and even "transgressive" are becoming increasingly accepted in the United States, bringing the United States into greater conformity with other western nations. The United States is still unique, however, in that religion continues to play an exceptionally powerful role in shaping Americans' perceptions of and engagement in non‐traditional families. Focusing our attention on same‐sex and interracial families specifically, we consider the recent work on how religion serves to stimulate and justify opposition or (in a minority of instances) support for such families. We contend that studies typically limit their focus to the cognitive aspects (beliefs, ideologies, identities, schemas, salience, etc.) of religion, while often ignoring the influence of religion's more structural aspects in shaping Americans' relationship to non‐traditional families. Given that religion impacts Americans' approaches to family formation at the micro, meso, and macro levels, we propose a more Durkheimian perspective on the topic, one that synthesizes social psychological and structural frameworks in future studies, thus allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of religion's evolving role in American family formation. We also call for more attention to how religion shapes the functioning of non‐traditional families.

How do overlapping social identities shape Americans' views toward contemporary social and moral issues? Drawing upon national-level data and employing the theoretical construct of social identity complexity, we examine the link between Christian nationalism–representing a convergence of national and religious identities–and Americans' views toward same-sex marriage and civil unions. Multivariate analyses reveal that greater adherence to Christian nationalism is strongly and negatively related to support for both same-sex marriage and civil unions, even after controlling for political ideology, religious controls, attribution of homosexuality, and other relevant correlates. We argue that Christian nationalists, who by definition internalize a high degree of overlap between political and religious identities, are more likely to see gays and lesbians as out-groups and same-sex unions as a threat to their sense of self and community. We conclude by discussing the implications of this study for future research on political and religious identities and intolerance toward socially marginalized populations.

This article examines the relative impact of religious factors on Americans' attitudes toward adoption by same-sex couples. Drawing upon national survey data, we fit logistic regression models and compute standardized logistic regression coefficients to estimate the relative net effects of religious tradition, practices, and beliefs about the Bible on support for same-sex adoption. Findings reveal that religious factors are among the strongest predictors of opposition to same-sex adoption, but that religious tradition has no significant effect on support for same-sex adoption once frequency of religious practice and beliefs about the Bible are held constant. Americans who more frequently engage in practices such as religious service attendance and sacred text reading are less supportive of same-sex adoption, and compared to biblical literalists, those who believe the Bible requires interpretation, contains human error, or is a book of history/legends are all more likely to support same-sex adoption. Findings suggest that religious affiliations matter less for predicting same-sex adoption attitudes than how Americans practice and hold their faith.

AbstractMental health professionals must be familiar with medical aspects of AIDS in order to understand its emotional and physical consequences for patients and their social networks.

Hearing aid and cochlear implant (CI) users often struggle to locate and segregate sounds. The dominant sound-localisation cues are time and intensity differences across the ears. A recent study showed that CI users locate sounds substantially better when these cues are provided through haptic stimulation on each wrist. However, the sensitivity of the wrists to these cues and the robustness of this sensitivity to aging is unknown. The current study showed that time difference sensitivity is much poorer across the wrists than across the ears and declines with age. In contrast, high sensitivity to across-wrist intensity differences was found that was robust to aging. This high sensitivity was observed across a range of stimulation intensities for both amplitude-modulated and unmodulated sinusoids and matched across-ear intensity difference sensitivity for normal-hearing individuals. Furthermore, the usable dynamic range for haptic stimulation on the wrists was found to be around four times larger than for CIs. These findings suggest that high-precision haptic sound-localisation can be achieved, which could aid many hearing-impaired listeners. Furthermore, the finding that high-fidelity across-wrist intensity information can be transferred could be exploited in human-machine interfaces to enhance virtual reality and improve remote control of military, medical, or research robots.

AbstractFor decades now and particularly during the 2020 presidential campaign, American conservatives have stressed the need to protect "religious freedom." Building on research documenting a connection between Trump‐support, a desire to privilege conservative Christianity, and perceptions that conservative Christianity is persecuted due to its anti‐LGT (lesbian, gay, or transgender) views, we theorise such factors were the ideological driving force behind prioritising "religious freedom" in the 2020 presidential election. Drawing on national survey data from just after the November election, we find Christian nationalism and perceptions of anti‐Christian discrimination are strong predictors that (1) Americans feel "religious freedom" was an important factor influencing their vote and (2) that they ranked it the single greatest factor influencing their vote. In contrast, the perception that LGT persons are not discriminated against also predicts viewing religious freedom as important, as does a perception of anti‐Semitism, but never perceptions of anti‐atheist or anti‐Muslim discrimination. Findings suggest conservative Christian supremacism, fear of (Judeo‐)Christian persecution and belief that LGT persons are privileged are ideological antecedents of votes for "religious freedom."

Hearing aid and cochlear implant (CI) users often struggle to locate and segregate sounds. The dominant sound-localisation cues are time and intensity differences across the ears. A recent study showed that CI users locate sounds substantially better when these cues are provided through haptic stimulation on each wrist. However, the sensitivity of the wrists to these cues and the robustness of this sensitivity to aging is unknown. The current study showed that time difference sensitivity is much poorer across the wrists than across the ears and declines with age. In contrast, high sensitivity to across-wrist intensity differences was found that was robust to aging. This high sensitivity was observed across a range of stimulation intensities for both amplitude modulated and unmodulated sinusoids and matched across-ear intensity difference sensitivity for normal-hearing individuals. Furthermore, the usable dynamic range for haptic stimulation on the wrists was found to be around four times larger than for CIs. These findings suggest that high-precision haptic sound-localisation can be achieved, which could aid many hearing-impaired listeners. Furthermore, the finding that high-fidelity across-wrist intensity information can be transferred could be exploited in human–machine interfaces to enhance virtual reality and improve remote control of military, medical, or research robots.

Despite increasingly frequent mass shootings and a growing dissatisfaction with current gun laws, American opposition to federal gun legislation remains strong. The authors show that opposition to stricter gun control is closely linked to Christian nationalism, a religious cultural framework that mandates a symbiotic relationship between Christianity and civil society. Using data from a national population-based survey, the authors show that Christian nationalism is an exceptionally strong predictor of opposition to the federal government's enacting stricter gun laws. Of all the variables considered, only general political orientation has more predictive power than Christian nationalism. The authors propose that the gun control debate is complicated by deeply held moral and religious schemas that discussions focused solely on rational public safety calculations do not sufficiently address. For the substantial proportion of American society who are Christian nationalists, gun rights are God given and sacred. Consequently, attempts to reform existing gun laws must attend to the deeper cultural and religious identities that undergird Americans' beliefs about gun control.

Abstract
Americans are often split along partisan and religious lines regarding which claims they consider "rights," as well as which of these rights they prioritize over others. Beyond standard political and religious characteristics, we propose that a pervasive ideology that centers conservative religious ethno-culture within America's deep story and future—Christian nationalism—plays a central role in shaping how Americans evaluate "rights." Analyses drawn from a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults show Christian nationalism is a leading predictor that Americans prioritize gun rights, religious freedom, and states' rights, but deprioritize freedom of speech, the press, right to a speedy and fair trial, and protection from unlawful searches or seizures. Further analyses indicate Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor that Americans view voting as a privilege, not a right. Findings suggest Christian nationalism may incline Americans to support rights more suited to the continuance of the current social order and maintenance of power structures, while also making them less likely to support rights traditionally associated with challenging these structures.

Building on the insight that American religion is fundamentally "raced" and "complex," we theorize American religion is so deeply racialized that seemingly "race-neutral" religious claims about national identity are ultimately more oriented toward racial rather than religious considerations. Drawing on recent, nationally representative data, we test how technically "race-neutral" measures of Christian nationalism interact with race to shape how Americans evaluate the national implications of religious and racial diversity. Though Christian nationalism predicts viewing both religious and racial diversity as national hindrances, its association with racial diversity is much stronger. This holds across racial groups, and particularly among Black and Asian Americans. In contrast, interactions show Black Americans diverge from whites in that they become more favorable toward religious diversity as Christian nationalism increases. Combining outcomes into four categories, Americans who score higher on Christian nationalism are more likely to become "Ecumenical Ethno-Pessimists" (viewing religious diversity as a strength, but racial diversity as a hindrance) than pure "Ethno-Nationalists" (viewing both religious and racial diversity as hindrances). This association is especially strong among Black and Asian Americans. Findings demonstrate even with seemingly "race-neutral" measures that would ostensibly target religious heterogeneity as the core national threat, it is racial diversity that threatens national unity.

The recent global pandemic provides a natural experiment "intervention" to examine how differing baseline social dynamics such as gender, education, and politics shaped diverging patterns of well-being during rapidly shifting societal conditions. Using married adults from a nationally representative panel study in the United States from August 2019 to August 2021, discontinuous growth curves reveal a large drop in average married sexual satisfaction in both quality and frequency directly following the pandemic onset. Moreover, sexual satisfaction remained largely suppressed for the subsequent 18 months, apart from a brief "optimism blip" in the fall of 2020. Race, age, income, employment, parenthood, education, and political affiliation all appear as meaningful predictors, but these differ across various phases of the pandemic and by gender. These results reveal evidence of lingering changes in subjective sexual well-being as well as patterns of catastrophe risk and resilience moderated by social location factors.

AbstractChristian nationalist ideology was among the strongest predictors of Americans voting for Trump in 2016 and remained a strong predictor of intent to vote for him prior to the 2020 election. This study uses national data to examine whether Christian nationalism could potentially convert the previously-unconverted to supporting Trump or, conversely, prevent apostatizing from Trump. Among Americans whodid notvote for Trump in 2016, Christian nationalism increased the likelihood that they intended to vote for Trump in 2020, but only those who earlier did not vote at all or voted third party. Conversely, among Americans whodidvote for Trump in 2016, Christian nationalism reduced the likelihood that they planned on voting for a Democratic or third party candidate. Christian nationalism thus potentially inclined Americans who previously did not vote for Trump in 2016 to vote his way in 2020 and inoculated previous Trump-voters from considering other candidates in 2020.