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Due primarily to transport improvements, commodity prices in Britain and the United States tended to converge between 1870 and 1913. Heckscher and Ohlin, writing in 1919 and 1924, thought that these events should have contributed to factor-price convergence. It turns out that Heckscher and Ohlin were right: a significant share of the Anglo-American real-wage convergence was due to commodity-price convergence. It appears that this late nineteenth-century episode was the dramatic start of world-commodity and factor-market integration that continues today.

Explores the nineteenth- and twentieth-century spread of modern industry to the global periphery to understand the economic, historical, and political implications of how, in the twenty-first century, economies in Asia, Latin America and even sub-Saharan Africa are converging on the historically-wealthy economies of Europe and North America.

This volume explores the 19th- and 20th-century spread of modern industry to the global periphery to understand the economic, historical, and political implications of how, in the 21st century, economies in Asia, Latin America and even sub-Saharan Africa are converging on the historically-wealthy economies of Europe and North America

Ever since the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, industrialization has been the key to modern economic growth. The fact that modern industry originated in Britain, and spread initially to northwestern Europe and North America, implied a dramatic divergence in living standards between the industrial North (or 'West') and a non-industrial, or even de-industrializing, South (or 'Rest'). This nineteenth-century divergence, which had profound economic, military, and geopolitical implications, has been studied in great detail by many economists and historians. Today, this divergence between the 'West' and the 'Rest' is visibly unravelling, as economies in Asia, Latin America, and even Sub-Saharan Africa converge on the rich economies of Europe and North America. This phenomenon, which is set to define the twenty-first century, both economically and politically, has also been the subject of a considerable amount of research. Less appreciated, however, are the deep historical roots of this convergence process, and in particular of the spread of modern industry to the global periphery. This book fills this gap by providing a systematic, comparative, historical account of the spread of modern manufacturing beyond its traditional heartland, to Southern and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America, or what we call the poor periphery. It identifies the timing of this convergence (fastest in the inter-war and import-substituting post-Second World War years, not the more recent 'miracle growth' years), and identifies which driving forces were common to all periphery countries, and which were not.

Unlike most existing textbooks on the economic history of modern Europe, which offer a country-by-country approach, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe rethinks Europe's economic history since 1700 as unified and pan-European, with the material organised by topic rather than by country. This first volume is centred on the transition to modern economic growth, which first occurred in Britain before spreading to other parts of western Europe by 1870. Each chapter is written by an international team of authors who cover the three major regions of northern Europe, southern Europe, and central and eastern Europe. The volume covers the major themes of modern economic history, including trade; urbanization; aggregate economic growth; the major sectors of agriculture, industry and services; and the development of living standards, including the distribution of income. The quantitative approach makes use of modern economic analysis in a way that is easy for students to understand

Unlike most existing textbooks on the economic history of modern Europe, which offer a country-by-country approach, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe rethinks Europe's economic history since 1700 as unified and pan-European, with the material organized by topic rather than by country. This second volume tracks Europe's economic history through three major phases since 1870. The first phase was an age of globalization and of European economic and political dominance that lasted until the First World War. The second, from 1914 to 1945, was one of war, deglobalization, and depression and the third was one of growing integration not only within Europe but also between Europe and the global economy. Leading authors offer comprehensive and accessible introductions to these patterns of globalization and deglobalization as well as to key themes in modern economic history such as economic growth, business cycles, sectoral developments, and population and living standards

AbstractThis paper asks whether history should change the way in which economists and economic historians think about populism. We use Müller's definition, according to which populism is 'an exclusionary form of identity politics, which is why it poses a threat to democracy'. We make three historical arguments. First, late‐nineteenth‐century US Populists were not populist. Second, there is no necessary relationship between populism and anti‐globalization sentiment. Third, economists have sometimes been on the wrong side of important policy debates involving opponents rightly or wrongly described as populist. History encourages us to avoid an overly simplistic view of populism and its correlates.

AbstractThis article provides a centennial overview of the Irish economy in the one hundred years following partition and independence. A comparative perspective allows us to distinguish between those aspects of Irish policies and performance that were unique to the country, and those which mirrored developments elsewhere. While Irish performance was typical in the long run, the country under‐performed prior to the mid‐1980s and over‐performed for the rest of the twentieth century. Real growth after 2000 was slow. The mainly chronological narrative highlights the roles of convergence forces, trade and industrial policy, and monetary and fiscal policy. While the focus is mostly on the South of the island, we also survey the Northern Irish experience during this period.

This article explores the impact of the 'Voyages of Discovery' on European spice markets, asking whether the exploits of Vasco da Gama and others brought European and Asian spice markets closer together. To this end we compare trends in pepper and fine spice prices before and after 1503, the year when da Gama returned from his financially successful second voyage. Other authors have examined trends in nominal spice prices, but this article uses relative spice prices, that is, accounting for inflation. We find that the Voyages of Discovery had a major impact on European spice markets, and provide a simple model of monopoly and oligopoly to decompose the sources of the Cape route's impact on European markets. Finally, we offer some speculations regarding the impact of the Cape route on intra‐European market integration.