Suchergebnisse

A discussion of changing relations between Russia & Venezuela notes that Russia's ties to Cuba have cooled while its relationship with Venezuela has become more amicable. It is contended that President Vladimir Putin's warmth toward Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez is based more on economic factors, especially Venezuela's oil wealth, than shared anti-American interests. Future prospects for the Putin-Chavez relationship are discussed.

The expansion of Pakistani-Russian ties to include a significant arms relationship appears to depend on a deterioration in the Russian-Indian relationship that Moscow will not initiate and desperately wants to avoid.

"Compared to neighboring Saudi Arabia, there is very little press coverage on Oman. And unlike the many stories about how bad things are in the kingdom, the little reporting done on the sultanate is generally positive. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from Oman's glowing press coverage that all is well there. Oman, in fact, is experiencing some very difficult problems that are likely to get worse in coming years."(.)

Since the 2003 visit of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to Moscow, relations between Russia and Pakistan have improved. However, there is a natural limit to how close the two nations can become: Russia will not risk its current relatively close ties with India for better relations with Pakistan. The relationship between the two nations, which are connected to arms sells, are complicated by the ever-changing balance in the relationships between the United States and India, the U.S. and Russia, the U.S. and Pakistan, and the relationship of Pakistan, Russia, and the United States to Afghanistan. Although it is possible that Russia and Pakistan may become much closer in the future, such a rapprochement is likely only to occur as a consolation prize to Russia if it "loses" New Delhi.

This article argues that Russia, no longer regarded as a threat by most countries, is unable to get what it wants through persuasion & cooperation, & that President Vladimir Putin's solution to this problem has been to exploit situations where Russia, despite its diminished circumstances, can take actions that affect the balance between opposing sides, thus giving one or even both an incentive to court Moscow. The article addresses the questions of how successful Putin's strategy has been, & what, if anything, Moscow has gained from its attempts to exploit rivalries between other states. These questions are explored through a series of brief case studies that compare what Putin hoped to gain with what he actually achieved or appears likely to achieve in each situation. First, though, is a general discussion of the costs & benefits of pursuing a foreign policy that exploits rivalries between other states, which develops some criteria for assessing Putin's success at this type of diplomacy. T. K. Brown

Russian foreign policy-makers seem convinced that playing both sides against the middle with other nations is a clever way to advance Moscow's interests. It may take many more foreign policy setbacks before they are persuaded otherwise.