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AbstractIt is now widely recognized that regulatory failures contributed to the onset of the global financial crisis. Redressing such failures has, thus, been a key policy priority in the post‐crisis reform agenda at both the domestic and international levels. This special issue investigates the process of post‐crisis financial regulatory reform in a number of crucial issue areas, including the rules and arrangements that govern financial supervision, offshore financial centers and shadow banking, the financial industry's involvement in global regulatory processes, and macroeconomic modeling. In so doing, the main purpose of this special issue is to shed light on an often understudied aspect in regulation literature: the variation in the dynamics of regulatory change. Contributors examine the different dynamics of regulatory change observed post‐crisis and explain variations by accounting for the interaction between institutional factors, on the one hand, and the activity of change agents and veto players involved in the regulatory reform process, on the other.

Abstract:  Over time, international organizations have adopted different strategies to redress their legitimacy deficits. Among them, two strategies stand out: expanding participation of relevant stakeholders and improving output. By analyzing the application of these strategies in the European Union (EU) and in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that these efforts at legitimization have not been satisfying because they have been implemented as supplements, rather than complements, of representation. Interestingly, then, the most recent efforts at legitimizing the two international bodies have started emphasizing the issue of representation. We illustrate our argument by reviewing and comparing the legitimacy‐enhancing strategies that have been adopted in the EU and the IMF.

This study investigates whether and to what extent political factors drive disagreement within the allegedly consensual monetary committee of the European Central Bank. Absent voting data, the article assesses disagreement based on the semantic distance between the policy positions publicly articulated by the European Central Bank President and the central banks of Eurozone member states. The empirical analysis shows that the disagreement articulated by national central bankers is affected by the ideological inclinations of the governments of the countries they represent. Our findings thus suggest that central bankers' position-taking is shaped not only by economic conditions but also by domestic political considerations. This result challenges the European Central Bank's projected image of itself as an institution whose members are impermeable to domestic political pressures as a way to defend the independence of the institution to which they belong.