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Cover -- Contents -- List of Boxes, Figuresand Tables -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Political economy to economics -- The emergence of rational choice ( 1950- 1970) -- The take- off to growth ( 1970- 1994) -- A difficult decade ( 1994- 2004) -- Major combat operations are over? ( 2004-) -- Chapter 2 James M. Buchanan and ConstitutionalPolitical Economy -- Setting the stage: the state as an escapefrom Hobbesian anarchy -- Exchange and the constitutional framework -- Choice within rules versus choice among rules -- The Calculus of Consent -- Covenants without the sword -- Assessment -- Chapter 3 Anthony Downs and the Spatial Theory of Party Competition -- Setting the stage: the demands of democracy -- The precursors of party competition -- The median voter theorem -- Qualifying the argument: accounting for divergence -- Assumption 1: there are only two parties -- Assumption 2: political space is one- dimensional -- Assumption 3: parties can move to and occupyany point in this one- dimensional space -- Assumption 4: parties are vote- maximizers -- Assumption 5: voters vote for the party closestto them in political space -- Assumption 6: there is perfect information -- Assumption 7: voters' preferences are fixed -- Assessment -- Chapter 4 William Riker and the Theoryof Coalitions -- Setting the stage: choosing a voting system -- Riker and the theory of the minimal- winningcoalition -- Policy- seeking parties -- The portfolio- allocation model -- The transaction costs of policy agreements -- Assessment -- Chapter 5 Kenneth Arrow and Social Choice Theory -- Setting the stage: democracy and the public will -- The precursors of social choice theory -- Arrow: social choice and individual values -- Riker: liberalism against populism -- The possibility of social choice -- Assessment -- Chapter 6 Mancur Olson and the Logic of Collective Action.

Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor compare banking systems in the U.S. and UK to those of Canada and Australia and explain why the system imploded in the former but not the latter. Canadian and Australian banks were able to make profits through traditional lending practices, unlike their competition-driven, risk-taking U.S. and UK counterparts.

Several problems plague contemporary thinking about governance. From the multiple definitions that are often vague and confusing, to the assumption that governance strategies, networks and markets represent attempts by weakening states to maintain control. Rethinking Governance questions this view and seeks to clarify how we understand governance. Arguing that it is best understood as 'the strategies used by governments to help govern', the authors counter the view that governments have been decentred. They show that far from receding, states are in fact enhancing their capacity to govern by developing closer ties with non-government sectors. Identifying five 'modes' of government (governance through hierarchy, persuasion, markets and contracts, community engagement, and network associations), Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor use practical examples to explore the strengths and limitations of each. In so doing, they demonstrate how modern states are using a mixture of governance modes to address specific policy problems. This book demonstrates why the argument that states are being 'hollowed out' is overblown

AbstractThe theory of quiet politics has two propositions; first, that business interests prefer to engage with governments in 'quiet' arenas shielded from the media and the day-to-day political fray, and second that business interests exert power over governments in quiet politics. We counter the second proposition, arguing that business generally exercises influence rather than power in quiet politics. One precondition for the successful exercise of influence is the acceptance by business of certain protocols of behavior in interactions with governments. In this paper we underline the importance of such protocols by exploring the dynamics of a conflict between the east coast gas industry and the federal government in Australia amidst steep rises in domestic gas prices and supply restrictions in 2022. The gas industry behaved badly in the economy and in politics and did not abide by the relevant protocols of engagement with the government. The government responded aggressively and quiet politics failed. The paper underlines the importance of the behavioral pre-conditions for business influence in quiet politics and what can go wrong if this fails.

AbstractWe argue that the everyday language distinction drawn between power and influence is meaningful and significant. There is good reason to believe that much corporate lobbying activity which is currently described under the heading of business power is better understood as attempts to secure negotiated agreements based on exerting influence rather than power and that the latter is usually used only when attempts to use influence have failed. We develop an analytical distinction between influence, understood as successful efforts at persuasion, and power using Keith Dowding's work on power. Drawing upon findings from interviews with corporate professionals operating at the coalface of business and government interaction in Australia, we show that lobbyists generally seek "quiet" behind-the-scenes accommodations with governments via attempts to exert influence rather than power.

Since the Second World War, the Labour Party has alternated between periods in which it has been positioned further to the left and others when it has been further to the right. The standard explanation for those oscillations is electoral–ideological. Labour moves to the right (towards the political centre) when it prioritises electoral considerations, usually after a period in opposition. It moves to the left when it prioritises ideology, usually after periods in government. Against this we propose a political economy–policy explanation. Labour moves to the right and a redistributive economic strategy when the economy is performing reasonably well. It moves to the left and adopts a structural economic reform programme when the economy is perceived to be in crisis. We argue that the political economy–policy explanation offers a more satisfactory account of when and why Labour has changed its spatial policy positioning in this period. By acknowledging the role of what we term 'policy reasoning' in the processes by which political parties (and the public) adopt and change spatial policy positions, our approach provides an alternative to the mechanistic models deriving from Downsian rational choice theory. It suggests that, contrary to general expectation, the Labour Party under Keir Starmer does not need to react to its 2019 election defeat by shifting significantly to the right.

This article describes and explains a significant tightening in bank capital regulation in the United Kingdom since the 2008 financial crisis. The banks fiercely resisted the new capital regulations but in a novel theoretical contribution we argue that the structural power of business was reduced due to the changing ideas of state leaders, by changing institutional arrangements within the state and by wider open politicisation of banking reform.

Bankers and financiers in the US and UK modified institutions and revolutionised the banking industry prior to the 2007-8 crisis. These agents were however heavily constrained and eventually overwhelmed by institutional pressures and wider structural forces that encouraged high-risk leveraged trading and which generated systemic risk. To account for this, institutional theory needs to incorporate a broader canvas of conditioning contexts, particularly the impact of structural or systemic forces on agents and the way in which these are actualised as a form of 'ecosystem power'. Adapted from the source document.