Suchergebnisse

This article investigates electoral irregularities in the 1990 to 2005 Bundestag elections of unified Germany. Drawing on the Second Digit Benford Law (2BL) by Mebane (2006), the analysis consists of comparing the observed frequencies of numerals of candidate votes and party votes at the precinct level against the expected frequencies according to Benford's Law. Four central findings stand out. First, there is no evidence for systematic fraud or mismanagement with regard to candidate votes from districts where fraud would be most instrumental. Second, at the state level (Bundesland), there are 51 violations in 190 tests of the party list votes. Third, East German states are not more prone to violations than Western ones. This finding refutes the notion that the East's more recent transition to democracy poses problems in electoral management. Fourth, a strong variation in patterns of violation across Bundeslander exists: states with dominant party control are more likely to display irregularities. The article concludes by hypothesizing and exploring the notion that partisan composition of nominees involved in the counting may produce a higher likelihood of violation and be a cause of Lander variation. This may especially be the case when a party dominates in a Bundesland or opponents to the former socialist regime party are involved in the counting. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

This article investigates electoral irregularities in the 1990 to 2005 Bundestag elections of unified Germany. Drawing on the Second Digit Benford Law (2BL) by Mebane (2006), the analysis consists of comparing the observed frequencies of numerals of candidate votes and party votes at the precinct level against the expected frequencies according to Benford's Law. Four central findings stand out. First, there is no evidence for systematic fraud or mismanagement with regard to candidate votes from districts where fraud would be most instrumental. Second, at the state level (Bundesland), there are 51 violations in 190 tests of the party list votes. Third, East German states are not more prone to violations than Western ones. This finding refutes the notion that the East's more recent transition to democracy poses problems in electoral management. Fourth, a strong variation in patterns of violation across Bundeslander exists: states with dominant party control are more likely to display irregularities. The article concludes by hypothesizing and exploring the notion that partisan composition of nominees involved in the counting may produce a higher likelihood of violation and be a cause of Lander variation. This may especially be the case when a party dominates in a Bundesland or opponents to the former socialist regime party are involved in the counting. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

AbstractWhen faced with the necessity of reforming welfare states in ageing societies, politicians tend to demand more solidarity between generations because they assume that reforms require sacrifices from older people. Political economy models, however, do not investigate such a mechanism of intergenerational solidarity, suggesting that only age‐based self‐interest motivates welfare preferences. Against this backdrop, this article asks: Does the experience of intergenerational solidarity within the family matter for older people's attitudes towards public childcare – a policy area of no personal interest to them? The statistical analysis of a sample with individuals aged 55+ from twelve OECD countries indicates that: intergenerational solidarity matters; its effect on policy preferences is context‐dependent; and influential contexts must – according to the evidence from twelve countries – be sought in all societal spheres, including the political (family spending by the state), the economic (female labour market integration) and the cultural (public opinion towards working mothers). Overall, the findings imply that policy makers need to deal with a far more complex picture of preference formation toward the welfare state than popular stereotypes of 'greedy geezers' suggest.

When faced with the necessity of reforming welfare states in ageing societies, politicians tend to demand more solidarity between generations because they assume that reforms require sacrifices from older people. Political economy models, however, do not investigate such a mechanism of intergenerational solidarity, suggesting that only age-based self-interest motivates welfare preferences. Against this backdrop, this article asks: Does the experience of intergenerational solidarity within the family matter for older people's attitudes towards public childcare - a policy area of no personal interest to them? The statistical analysis of a sample with individuals aged 55+ from twelve OECD countries indicates that: intergenerational solidarity matters; its effect on policy preferences is context-dependent; and influential contexts must - according to the evidence from twelve countries - be sought in all societal spheres, including the political (family spending by the state), the economic (female labour market integration) and the cultural (public opinion towards working mothers). Overall, the findings imply that policy makers need to deal with a far more complex picture of preference formation toward the welfare state than popular stereotypes of 'greedy geezers' suggest.

How do national models of solidarity shape public support for distinctive policy responses to social and economic crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic? We analyze American and German policy responses from March 2020 to June 2021 across a number of economic and social policy domains and identify path-dependent institutional contingencies in both countries despite the same crisis experience. Drawing from 10 different sources of public opinion data, we then triangulate the pandemic's effects on public support for individualized and collectively oriented policy responses. Aside from emotional rally-to-the-flag effects, the policy-specific public reactions are consistent with institutional and normative predicates of the two political economies: the German public seems to be supportive of aggressive policies to combat inequality, though in ways that privilege established social collectivities and groups, whereas in the U.S., we only see moderate evidence of support for time-limited and individually-focused measures designed to remain in place only for the duration of the crisis.