How General are Risk Preferences? Choices Under Uncertainty in Different Domains
In: NBER Working Paper No. w15686
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w15686
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In: American economic review, Band 102, Heft 6, S. 2606-2638
ISSN: 1944-7981
We analyze the extent to which individuals' choices over five employer-provided insurance coverage decisions and one 401(k) investment decision exhibit systematic patterns, as would be implied by a general utility component of risk preferences. We provide evidence consistent with an important domain-general component that operates across all insurance choices. We find a considerably weaker relationship between one's insurance decisions and 401(k) asset allocation, although this relationship appears larger for more "financially sophisticated" individuals. Estimates from a stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to 30 percent of our sample makes choices that may be consistent across all 6 domains. (JEL D12, D14, D81, G22, J33)
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In: American economic review, Band 110, Heft 12, S. 3836-3870
ISSN: 1944-7981
We analyze selection into screening in the context of recommendations that breast cancer screening start at age 40. Combining medical claims with a clinical oncology model, we document that compliers with the recommendation are less likely to have cancer than younger women who select into screening or women who never screen. We show this selection is quantitatively important: shifting the recommendation from age 40 to 45 results in three times as many deaths if compliers were randomly selected than under the estimated patterns of selection. The results highlight the importance of considering characteristics of compliers when making and designing recommendations. (JEL I12, I18, J16)
In: NBER Working Paper No. w26162
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Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w23090
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Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w17802
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In: American economic review, Band 103, Heft 1, S. 178-219
ISSN: 1944-7981
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogenous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to overestimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option. (JEL D82, G22, I13, J32)
In: NBER Working Paper No. w16969
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Working paper