In this paper we discuss to what extent the declining difference between interest rates and growth rates (r-g) pointed out recently by Olivier Blanchard (2019) for the case of the US also characterizes the economic situation in Europe. We show that r-g has been positive on average but declining over the last decades in Europe as well. But r-g differs across considerably across European countries, and a continuation of current fiscal policies even under existing conditions would increase the debt ratios further in some countries. We conclude that the current low levels of r-g should be used to make progress in fiscal consolidation in countries with high debt levels. At the same time it would be desirable to benefit from the currently low interest rates to boost one time investment projects.
Reforming the Eurozone is a top priority on the European policy agenda. France and Germany are expected to launch a joint initiative to reform the institutions of the currency union. To be successful, this initiative will have to be acceptable not only to Germany and France, but to all member states including those plagued by high debt levels and sluggish economic growth. The issue of market discipline in national fiscal policy and sovereign debt restructuring dominates the debate over Eurozone reform. While the German government emphasizes the role of market discipline and the no-bailout-rule, the French government is more skeptical, arguing that sovereign debt restructuring may give rise to financial instability. Public debt levels are high (over 130 percent of GDP in Italy, for example), banks are holding large quantities of government debt, and their ability to absorb losses from a debt restructuring is limited. In this situation, reforms that make debt restructuring more likely could undermine investor confidence and trigger a financial crisis. There is nevertheless a growing awareness that fiscal governance in the Eurozone will not work without credible forms of public debt restructuring. Such restructuring can only be avoided with far reaching mutualization of government debt. This, however, would be incompatible with preserving national sovereignty in fiscal policy. European control over national fiscal policies is weak and will remain so for the fore-seeable future. At the same time, the no-bailout-rule and plans for public debt restructuring can only remain credible if their implementation does not lead to a financial crisis. Highly-indebted countries are unlikely to support fiscal policy reforms dominated by market discipline either, especially if they massively raise debt servicing costs or make it harder to roll over existing debt. Two years ago, EconPol network economists Clemens Fuest (ifo Institute) and Friedrich Heinemann (ZEW) published a proposal for a new form of government bonds called Accountability Bonds aimed at reviving market discipline into the Eurozone without endangering fiscal and financial stability. This paper revisits their concept of accountability bonds in the light of current developments and responds to criticism of it.
The design of the tax system matters for economic growth. During times of economic crisis, tax instruments such as temporary tax cuts can be used to soften adverse effects on the economy by stimulating private and corporate spending. However, empirical evidence suggests that the overall impact of short term tax policies is limited. In the long run, the structure of the tax system is essential to building up an investment friendly and innovation-stimulating environment, which will promote sustainable economic growth.
In this study, we analyze the cyclicality of fiscal policies in China during the period 1978-2013. We find that the cyclicality of local government spending in China significantly affects the cyclicality of total government spending. By employing both time-series and province-level panel data, we show that local budgetary government spending was strongly procyclical during the 1980s, but it became counter-cyclical with respect to nationwide output fluctuations and acyclical with respect to region-specific output shocks since the mid-1990s. We argue that these are likely to be consequences of the 1994 fiscal reform, which revamped the fiscal relations between the central and local governments, reduced the procyclicality of local government budgetary revenue and brought in counter-cyclical intergovernmental transfers. Findings of this study contribute to the debate on how developing and emerging countries, in particular those with federal fiscal structures, could reduce the procyclicality of their fiscal policies.
In this study, we analyze the cyclicality of fiscal policies in China during the period 1978-2013. We find that the cyclicality of local government spending in China significantly affects the cyclicality of total government spending. By employing both time-series and province-level panel data, we show that local budgetary government spending was strongly procyclical during the 1980s, but it became counter-cyclical with respect to nationwide output fluctuations and acyclical with respect to region-specific output shocks since the mid-1990s. We argue that these are likely to be consequences of the 1994 fiscal reform, which revamped the fiscal relations between the central and local governments, reduced the procyclicality of local government budgetary revenue and brought in counter-cyclical intergovernmental transfers. Findings of this study contribute to the debate on how developing and emerging countries, in particular those with federal fiscal structures, could reduce the procyclicality of their fiscal policies.
The view is widespread that there are just two options for the future of the Eurozone – either it is complemented by a fiscal union, or it will fall apart. In this paper, we discuss five possible elements of a fiscal union, of which three are in the centre of the current debate on fiscal union in the Eurozone. Second, we argue that the fiscal union will only work if political integration in Europe goes significantly beyond the current state of affairs. Third, we suggest an alternative approach, which places less emphasis on centralised fiscal policy coordination and focuses on financial sector reform, decentralised responsibility for government debt and sovereign debt restructurings in the case of fiscal crises.
In recent years tax havens and offshore financial centres have come under increasing political pressure to cooperate with other countries in matters of taxation and efforts to crowd back tax evasion and avoidance. As a result many tax havens have signed tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). In order to comply with OECD standards tax havens are obliged to sign at least 12 TIEAs with other countries. This paper investigates how tax havens have chosen their partner countries. We ask whether they have signed TIEAs with countries to which they have strong economic links or whether they have systematically avoided doing this, so that information exchange remains ineffective. We analyse 555 TIEAs signed by tax havens in the years 2008-2011 and find that on average tax havens have signed more TIEAs with countries to which they have stronger economic links. Our analysis thus suggests that tax havens do not systematically undermine tax information exchange by signing TIEAs with irrelevant countries. However, this does not mean that they exchange information with all important partner countries.
The increasing importance of multinational firms raises the question as to whether and how governments should tax repatriated profits, i.e. affiliate profits returned to the headquarters. The answer to this question is especially relevant for profit repatriations within the European Union where multinational firm investment is substantial and tax competition is supposed to be of rising intensity. This paper reviews the criticism of the standard view (the 'old view') of foreign profit taxation, which goes back to Peggy Musgrave. The 'new view' of international taxation is based on recent empirical studies and favours a system in which foreign profits are exempt from tax. The debate between old view and new view proponents is critically discussed and, finally, the two are confronted with a 'pragmatic view' on foreign profit taxation which crucially incorporates compliance and tax administration costs.
