Cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan has skyrocketed since the Taliban were toppled in 2001such that Afghanistan now supplies 92 percent of the world's illicit opium. The expanding opium trade is threatening to destabilize the Afghan government and turn the conflict-ridden country back into a safe haven for drug traffickers and terrorists. This paper examines the nature of the opium problem in Afghanistan and analyzes the allied strategy to counter this growing crisis. In analyzing the current counternarcotics strategy, it points out pitfalls including the counterproductive aspects of opium eradication. Finally, changes to the strategy are proposed, which include increasing troop levels and eliminating national restrictions, substantially increasing financial aid, deemphasizing opium eradication, focusing on long-term alternative livelihoods, aggressively pursuing drug kingpins and corrupt government officials, and exploring the possibility of Afghanistan's entry to the licit opium market. ; "October 2007." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 14-18). ; Background -- Afghanistan's opium economy -- Problems with Afghanistan's opium economy -- Renewed Taliban/insurgency -- Current counternarcotics strategy -- Problems with current counternarcotics strategy -- Recommendations -- Conclusion. ; Cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan has skyrocketed since the Taliban were toppled in 2001such that Afghanistan now supplies 92 percent of the world's illicit opium. The expanding opium trade is threatening to destabilize the Afghan government and turn the conflict-ridden country back into a safe haven for drug traffickers and terrorists. This paper examines the nature of the opium problem in Afghanistan and analyzes the allied strategy to counter this growing crisis. In analyzing the current counternarcotics strategy, it points out pitfalls including the counterproductive aspects of opium eradication. Finally, changes to the strategy are proposed, which include increasing troop levels and eliminating national restrictions, substantially increasing financial aid, deemphasizing opium eradication, focusing on long-term alternative livelihoods, aggressively pursuing drug kingpins and corrupt government officials, and exploring the possibility of Afghanistan's entry to the licit opium market. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Russia and the West have avoided renewed confrontation despite many post Cold War crises, but illiberal trends in Russia rule out any prospect of developing a mutual agenda for closer integration. Russian engagement with the leading Euro-Atlantic institutions on a special, but still subordinate, nonmember basis remains a clever yet suboptimal substitute. Such relationships, as this monograph about Russia and the European Union explains, tend to produce shallow collaboration, symbolic summitry and costly standoffs. Closer cooperation is blocked by an ongoing dispute over terms, which is rooted in asymmetries in power, ambivalent preferences, uncertainty about the distributional costs and benefits of deeper engagement, and Russia's continued unwillingness or inability to lock-in the liberal domestic structures necessary to make credible commitments. Moscow's renewed self-confidence and geopolitical ambitions, bolstered by sustained economic growth and high energy prices, complicate the bargaining and further strain these special relationships which persist for lack of a realistic, superior alternative. ; "February 2007." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 108-133). ; The roots of special relationships: bargaining problems -- Partial integration vs. full integration -- International and domestic incentives to reform: the successful European integration model -- Prospects for anchoring post-Communist neighbors outside the EU -- The framework of relations: building a special relationship in lieu of Russia's membership in EU -- Russia's approach to partnership: underlying commitment problems -- Russia-EU partnership under Putin: tactical success and strategic stalemate -- The long and winding road to nebulous common spaces -- Economic asymmetries and energy interdependence -- Mutual ambivalence about the Europeanization and integration of Russia -- Russia's multi-vector strategy and the mixes appeal of "Euro-east" -- Integration with the West: an idea whose time keeps coming -- Conclusions. ; Russia and the West have avoided renewed confrontation despite many post Cold War crises, but illiberal trends in Russia rule out any prospect of developing a mutual agenda for closer integration. Russian engagement with the leading Euro-Atlantic institutions on a special, but still subordinate, nonmember basis remains a clever yet suboptimal substitute. Such relationships, as this monograph about Russia and the European Union explains, tend to produce shallow collaboration, symbolic summitry and costly standoffs. Closer cooperation is blocked by an ongoing dispute over terms, which is rooted in asymmetries in power, ambivalent preferences, uncertainty about the distributional costs and benefits of deeper engagement, and Russia's continued unwillingness or inability to lock-in the liberal domestic structures necessary to make credible commitments. Moscow's renewed self-confidence and geopolitical ambitions, bolstered by sustained economic growth and high energy prices, complicate the bargaining and further strain these special relationships which persist for lack of a realistic, superior alternative. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 2 21
Not distributed to depository libraries. ; "October 2007." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-32). ; A clean sweep of the remains: transforming under fire -- The Polish campaign: the wrong army at the right time -- Considerations for current policymakers. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Terrorist groups operating in Sub-Saharan Africa failed states have demonstrated the ability to avoid the scrutiny of Western counterterrorism officials, while supporting and facilitating terrorist attacks on the United States and its partners. The potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists makes terrorist groups operating from failed states especially dangerous. U.S. counterterrorism strategies largely have been unsuccessful in addressing this threat. A new strategy is called for, one that combines both military and law enforcement efforts in a fully integrated counterterrorism effort, supported by a synthesis of foreign intelligence capabilities with intelligence-led policing to identify, locate, and take into custody terrorists operating from failed states before they are able to launch potentially catastrophic attacks. ; "April 2006." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-36). ; Introduction -- Defining state failure -- Case study methodology -- Networks, nodes and hubs: a model for terrorism in failed states -- Liberia and Sierra Leone: the diamond-terror nexus -- Somalia: nodes and hubs since 9/11 -- Raising the stakes: the nuclear dimension of the terrorist threat -- The U.S. response: current strategies and their limitations -- Finding synergy in military and law enforcement efforts: an alternative approach -- Conclusion. ; Terrorist groups operating in Sub-Saharan Africa failed states have demonstrated the ability to avoid the scrutiny of Western counterterrorism officials, while supporting and facilitating terrorist attacks on the United States and its partners. The potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists makes terrorist groups operating from failed states especially dangerous. U.S. counterterrorism strategies largely have been unsuccessful in addressing this threat. A new strategy is called for, one that combines both military and law enforcement efforts in a fully integrated counterterrorism effort, supported by a synthesis of foreign intelligence capabilities with intelligence-led policing to identify, locate, and take into custody terrorists operating from failed states before they are able to launch potentially catastrophic attacks. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The difficulty of achieving a multilateral consensus in the NATO Alliance can create more of a crisis than does the difficulty of generating an effective UN response to threats to international peace and security. NATO was supposed to be America's prime multilateral institution for obtaining legitimation and support of military action when the UN Security Council was paralyzed because of the veto. But as it has turned out Washington's ability to obtain a Brussels imprimatur for U.S-led multilateral military operations has become almost as hard as (and in some cases even harder than) obtaining UN endorsement. And whereas proposals to change the UN Security Council's voting rules have become a matter for open discourse among statespersons, such discourse with respect to the North Atlantic Council is shied away from as subversive of the ethos of the Alliance. ; "March 2006." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-43). ; Introduction -- Multilateralism: its scope and variety -- The benefits and costs of multilateralism -- Multilateralism in the post-unipolar world: the impact of polyarchy -- The impact of military transformation -- Conclusion: toward a modular multilateralism -- Recommendations. ; The difficulty of achieving a multilateral consensus in the NATO Alliance can create more of a crisis than does the difficulty of generating an effective UN response to threats to international peace and security. NATO was supposed to be America's prime multilateral institution for obtaining legitimation and support of military action when the UN Security Council was paralyzed because of the veto. But as it has turned out Washington's ability to obtain a Brussels imprimatur for U.S-led multilateral military operations has become almost as hard as (and in some cases even harder than) obtaining UN endorsement. And whereas proposals to change the UN Security Council's voting rules have become a matter for open discourse among statespersons, such discourse with respect to the North Atlantic Council is shied away from as subversive of the ethos of the Alliance. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Although the United States will continue to utilize overseas military bases in the next decade, the acquisition and improvement of long-range missiles by several potential aggressors will pose new operational and strategic problems for U.S. forces. Several states will likely attain a credible capability to threaten U.S. bases within their respective regions, despite the sophistication of U.S. missile defenses. Strategically, there are uncertainties about whether the United States can deter some of these new missile-capable actors. Deterrence problems will create new risks to U.S. deployed forces: if deterrence fails, U.S. troops will be at a higher level of exposure. Alternately, missiles will grant states some leverage to dissaude the United States from actually using overseas forces, as well as a means to coerce host states into denying access to the United States. Though several factors will mitigate these concerns, the question remains: How reliable will alliance-derived "tripwires" and other deployments be in the overall U.S. strategy of engagement? Alterations in force structure, tailored to these threats, will likely be needed. ; "January 2005." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 50-68). ; Although the United States will continue to utilize overseas military bases in the next decade, the acquisition and improvement of long-range missiles by several potential aggressors will pose new operational and strategic problems for U.S. forces. Several states will likely attain a credible capability to threaten U.S. bases within their respective regions, despite the sophistication of U.S. missile defenses. Strategically, there are uncertainties about whether the United States can deter some of these new missile-capable actors. Deterrence problems will create new risks to U.S. deployed forces: if deterrence fails, U.S. troops will be at a higher level of exposure. Alternately, missiles will grant states some leverage to dissaude the United States from actually using overseas forces, as well as a means to coerce host states into denying access to the United States. Though several factors will mitigate these concerns, the question remains: How reliable will alliance-derived "tripwires" and other deployments be in the overall U.S. strategy of engagement? Alterations in force structure, tailored to these threats, will likely be needed. ; Mode of access: Internet.
st discourse, and extremist discourse within it, must be clearly understood. Given the fiscal challenges of the Global War on Terror, the fact that its coordination may be at odds with great power competition, and certainly contes ; Islamist discourse, and extremist discourse within it, must be clearly understood. Given the fiscal challenges of the Global War on Terror, the fact that its coordination may be at odds with great power competition, and certainly contests the interests of smaller states (like Iran), why are we aiming at eradication, rather than containment, and is eradication possible? Differentiating the "true Islam" from the false and destructive aims of such groups is an important response. Each region-based administration has so crafted its anti-terrorist rhetoric, and Muslims, in general, are not willing to view their religion as a destructive, anachronistic entity, so this unfortunately difficult task of ideological differentiation is an acceptable theme. But it is insufficient as a strategy because Islamist insurgencies have arisen in the context of a much broader, polychromatic religious and political "Islamic awakening" that shows no signs of receding. That broader movement informs Muslims sentiment today from Indonesia to Mauritania, and Nigeria to London. Official statements will not diminish recruitment; deeds, not words, are needed. Finally, eradication may be impossible, but containment is philosophically unattractive. A combination of eradication (denial) and ; If America's pursuit of a Global War on Terror is strategically and politically well-grounded, then why are Islamist insurgencies and extremist movements continuing to operate, generating parallel cells that terrify the world with violent attacks from Iraq to London? While analysts debate the intensity and longevity of the latest round of terrorist attacks, we would do well to consider whether U.S. long-term goals in the war on terror -- namely diminishing their presence and denying terrorists the ability to operate, while also altering conditions that terrorists exploit -- are being met. If we are not pursuing the proper strategy or its implementation is not decreasing support for terrorists, then we should adapt accordingly. This monograph addresses these questions and examines the efficacy of proposed or operative strategies in light of the evolution of Islamist jihadist leaders, ideas, and foot-soldier. Jihadist strategy has emerged in a polymorphous pattern over the last 30 years, but many Americans only became aware of the intensity of this problem post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), and through observation of the 2003-05 insurgency in Iraq. The author proposes that extremist (jihadist) Islamist groups are not identical to any other terrorist group. ; "December 2005." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-76). ; st discourse, and extremist discourse within it, must be clearly understood. Given the fiscal challenges of the Global War on Terror, the fact that its coordination may be at odds with great power competition, and certainly contes ; Islamist discourse, and extremist discourse within it, must be clearly understood. Given the fiscal challenges of the Global War on Terror, the fact that its coordination may be at odds with great power competition, and certainly contests the interests of smaller states (like Iran), why are we aiming at eradication, rather than containment, and is eradication possible? Differentiating the "true Islam" from the false and destructive aims of such groups is an important response. Each region-based administration has so crafted its anti-terrorist rhetoric, and Muslims, in general, are not willing to view their religion as a destructive, anachronistic entity, so this unfortunately difficult task of ideological differentiation is an acceptable theme. But it is insufficient as a strategy because Islamist insurgencies have arisen in the context of a much broader, polychromatic religious and political "Islamic awakening" that shows no signs of receding. That broader movement informs Muslims sentiment today from Indonesia to Mauritania, and Nigeria to London. Official statements will not diminish recruitment; deeds, not words, are needed. Finally, eradication may be impossible, but containment is philosophically unattractive. A combination of eradication (denial) and ; If America's pursuit of a Global War on Terror is strategically and politically well-grounded, then why are Islamist insurgencies and extremist movements continuing to operate, generating parallel cells that terrify the world with violent attacks from Iraq to London? While analysts debate the intensity and longevity of the latest round of terrorist attacks, we would do well to consider whether U.S. long-term goals in the war on terror -- namely diminishing their presence and denying terrorists the ability to operate, while also altering conditions that terrorists exploit -- are being met. If we are not pursuing the proper strategy or its implementation is not decreasing support for terrorists, then we should adapt accordingly. This monograph addresses these questions and examines the efficacy of proposed or operative strategies in light of the evolution of Islamist jihadist leaders, ideas, and foot-soldier. Jihadist strategy has emerged in a polymorphous pattern over the last 30 years, but many Americans only became aware of the intensity of this problem post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), and through observation of the 2003-05 insurgency in Iraq. The author proposes that extremist (jihadist) Islamist groups are not identical to any other terrorist group. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Mode of access: Internet from the SSI web site. Address as of 4/6/06: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB636.pdf; current access available via PURL. ; System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Army's Chief of Staff have all stated that the United States is a "Nation at War." The U.S. military faces significant strategic challenges as it continues to transform the force and improve interagency integration into joint operations, all the while engaging in active combat operations associated with the Global War on Terrorism. This collection of outstanding essays--three of which won prestigious writing awards--by the students enrolled in the Army War College's Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) highlight some of these strategic challenges and offer thoughtful solutions. They provide insights that will undoubtedly prove useful to decisionmakers at the highest levels of our national security establishment. ASAP graduates continue to make their mark as outstanding theater strategists in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and Army Staff, and in the Combatant Commands. ; "September 2004." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; 1. Operation Iraqi Freedom: lessons for the future / Williamson Murray -- 2. "Knowledge must become capability": institutional intellectualism as an agent for military transformation / Steven W. Knott -- 3. Swiftly defeat the efforts, then what? The "new American way of war" and the transition from decisive combat operations to post-conflict security operations / John D. Nelson -- 4. Nuclear high altitude electromagnetic pulse: implications for homeland security and homeland defense / Thomas C. Riddle -- 5. Iraq, 2003-4, and Mesopotamia, 1914-18: a comparative analysis in ends and means / James D. Scudieri -- 6. Waging peace: ECLIPSE in postwar Germany and Iraq / Kenneth O. McCreedy -- 7. The Abrahms Doctrine: has it been abused in the global war on terror? / George A. Brinegar -- 8. The Abrams Doctrine: total force foundation or enduring fallacy? / Brian D. Jones -- 9. Secure the victory: is it time for a stabilization and reconstruction command? / Eric L. Ashworth -- 10. Nation building: a bad idea whose time has come? / Burt K. Thompson -- 11. Seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver and their implications for the joint force commander / Stuart L. Dickey -- 12. Is the air component coordination element (ACCE) embedded in the coalition forces land component command (CFLCC) HQ a model for future conflict? / Byron H. Risner -- 13. The national security strategy of the United States: development of grand strategy / Thomas P. Reilly -- 14. The human dimension of transformation / Robert E. Scurlock, Jr. ; The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Army's Chief of Staff have all stated that the United States is a "Nation at War." The U.S. military faces significant strategic challenges as it continues to transform the force and improve interagency integration into joint operations, all the while engaging in active combat operations associated with the Global War on Terrorism. This collection of outstanding essays--three of which won prestigious writing awards--by the students enrolled in the Army War College's Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) highlight some of these strategic challenges and offer thoughtful solutions. They provide insights that will undoubtedly prove useful to decisionmakers at the highest levels of our national security establishment. ASAP graduates continue to make their mark as outstanding theater strategists in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and Army Staff, and in the Combatant Commands. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The author examines America's options regarding the basing of ground troops in Europe and considers three major options available to the United States--complete withdrawal, annual rotations, and restructuring the Alliance to accommodate a smaller U.S. presence. While weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option, he does not lose sight of the ultimate objective of NATO--to provide credible land power for the full spectrum of operations. He introduces a NATO 3-3 Force Structure concept that rests on a smaller NATO ground force adaptive to the capabilities and wealth of member states; increases interoperability (technologically and procedurally); and supports the expeditionary force structure already in progress by the formal establishment of three standing combined joint task forces (CJTF). Additionally, he recommends the adoption of nine division-sized bases in Europe located at key geostrategic points for greater access to the Middle East and Africa. ; "February 2004." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-34). ; The author examines America's options regarding the basing of ground troops in Europe and considers three major options available to the United States--complete withdrawal, annual rotations, and restructuring the Alliance to accommodate a smaller U.S. presence. While weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option, he does not lose sight of the ultimate objective of NATO--to provide credible land power for the full spectrum of operations. He introduces a NATO 3-3 Force Structure concept that rests on a smaller NATO ground force adaptive to the capabilities and wealth of member states; increases interoperability (technologically and procedurally); and supports the expeditionary force structure already in progress by the formal establishment of three standing combined joint task forces (CJTF). Additionally, he recommends the adoption of nine division-sized bases in Europe located at key geostrategic points for greater access to the Middle East and Africa. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 2
"March 2003." ; European interests -- Allaying European fears through action, not talk -- Activating the European forte -- The European hedge -- Implications on the U.S. military in Europe -- Recommendations -- Conclusions. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Adobe Acrobat required.
The author examines three features of the war on terrorism as currently defined and conducted: (1) the administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political, fiscal, and military sustainability. He believes that the war on terrorism--as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda-- lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul. He calls for downsizing the scope of the war on terrorism to reflect concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American military power. ; "December 2003." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 46-56). ; The author examines three features of the war on terrorism as currently defined and conducted: (1) the administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political, fiscal, and military sustainability. He believes that the war on terrorism--as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda-- lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul. He calls for downsizing the scope of the war on terrorism to reflect concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American military power. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 2
