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PurposeThis paper examines the role of location‐specific (L) advantages in the spatial distribution of multinational enterprise (MNE) R&D activity. The meaning of L advantages is revisited. In addition to L advantages that are industry‐specific, the paper emphasises that there is an important category of L advantages, referred to as collocation advantages.Design/methodology/approachUsing the OLI framework, this paper highlights that the innovation activities of MNEs are about interaction of these variables, and the essential process of internalising L advantages to enhance and create firm‐specific advantages.FindingsCollocation advantages derive from spatial proximity to specific unaffiliated firms, which may be suppliers, competitors, or customers. It is also argued that L advantages are not always public goods, because they may not be available to all firms at a similar or marginal cost. These costs are associated with access and internalisation of L advantages, and – especially in the case of R&D – are attendant with the complexities of embeddedness.Originality/valueThe centralisation/decentralisation, spatial separation/collocation debates in R&D location have been mistakenly viewed as a paradox facing firms, instead of as a trade‐off that firms must make.

Abstract
A global economy cannot be driven in a consistent way by national competition laws. Both the liberalization of markets and the revolution in information and communication have triggered an unprecedented degree of interrelations of national economies. This leads to the internationalization of restrictive business practices. Despite of the WTO efforts and some agreements inside it related with antitrust, global markets have no competition rules. There are a number of economic arguments addressed to take real steps in order to establish a global framework for competition policy. Currently, the international system of competition policy seems gradually ill-suited for dealing with transnational restrictive business practices. The issue is now which organizational form and what degree of decentralization would be optimal for a multilevel system of international competition policy. Depending on the goals of the project, different degrees of decentralization would be more or less desirable.

Abstract
Over the past several decades, airlines have formed and participated in international alliances to seek competitive advantages. However, it is still unclear whether airlines obtain substantial competitive advantages through an international alliance and how to measure the competitive advantages of alliances and airlines. This study presents a critical literature review as a contribution to comprehensive and novel empirical researches in the future.

As transnational capital continues to seek fair access to all international markets and increasingly, a global level playing field, so competition policy has emerged as a highly salient issue. This article sets out specifically to explore the international dimension of competition policy. Although it readily accepts the economic and trade rationale for some form of common international rules, and to this end briefly accounts for earlier attempts and current strategies of policy coordination within international bodies from the G7, the WTO and the European Union, it raises doubts as to its immediate attainability. Competition policy not only remains a complex issue, but any efforts to establish some form of global regime necessitates consideration of the process and likelihood of policy convergence, and crucially demands that issues of governance including accountability and transparency are openly discussed. As a regional entity it is argued that the EU represents the best model for an international accord on competition policy.