Suchergebnisse

In the case of MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v CSARS the High Court of Appeal ruled that income "received by" a taxpayer from illegal gains will be taxable in the hands of the taxpayer. This article explores whether or not the decision in the MP Finance-case (and preceding cases on the taxation of illegal receipts) can be applied to determine if illegal transactions are subject to VAT and moreover if a trader in illegal goods and services should register as a VAT vendor. Although strictly speaking no analogy can be drawn between the charging provisions for income tax and VAT, it is clear that in the determination of the taxability of illegal income, the courts applied the principle of tax neutrality. In terms of the principle of tax neutrality, taxes are not concerned with the legality or illegality of a transaction, but rather with whether the transaction complies with the requirements for it to be taxed or not. That said, the European Court of Justice has a different approach in applying this principle. According to the European Court of Justice where the intrinsic nature of the goods excludes it from the commercial arena (like narcotic drugs) it should not be subject to VAT, but where the goods compete with a legal market it must be subject to VAT. Charging VAT on illegal transactions might give the impression that government benefits from criminal activities. However, if illegal transactions are not subject to VAT the trader in illegal goods will benefit as his products will be 14% cheaper than his rival's. Is this necessarily a moral dilemma? In conclusion three arguments can be deduced on the question if illegal transactions should be subject to VAT: 1. Illegal transactions should not be taxed at all. Illegal goods or services fall outside the sphere of the application of the charging provision in section 7(1) of the VAT Act. Moreover, taxing illegal transactions lends a quasi-validity to the contract and gives the impression that government benefits from crime. 2. The intrinsic nature of the goods concerned should determine the VAT-ability thereof. Where the nature of the goods excludes it from the commercial sphere, like narcotics, it should not be subject to VAT. Where the illegal goods compete with a legal market the goods should be subject to VAT to eliminate unjust competition. 3. The principle of tax neutrality makes it clear that the illegality of a transaction has no influence on its taxability. The charging provision in terms of section 7(1) of the VAT act is not concerned with the legality of the transaction. If the transaction complies with the requirements for it to be taxed, it should be subject to VAT.

This paper examines the impact of international remittances on both the level and the instability of government tax revenue in receiving countries. It investigates in particular whether the presence of a value added tax (VAT) system increases the benefit of the inflows of remittances in terms of high and less volatile tax revenue ratio. This is supported by the fact that remittances are largely used for consumption purposes and contribute to smoothing private consumption. Using a large sample of developing countries observed over the period 1980-2006, and even after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances and VAT adoption, the results highlight that remittances significantly increase both the level and the stability of government tax revenue ratio in receiving countries that have adopted the VAT.

In the case of MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v CSARS the High Court of Appeal ruled that income "received by" a taxpayer from illegal gains will be taxable in the hands of the taxpayer. This article explores whether or not the decision in the MP Finance–case (and preceding cases on the taxation of illegal receipts) can be applied to determine if illegal transactions are subject to VAT and moreover if a trader in illegal goods and services should register as a VAT vendor. Although strictly speaking no analogy can be drawn between the charging provisions for income tax and VAT, it is clear that in the determination of the taxability of illegal income, the courts applied the principle of tax neutrality. In terms of the principle of tax neutrality, taxes are not concerned with the legality or illegality of a transaction, but rather with whether the transaction complies with the requirements for it to be taxed or not. That said, the European Court of Justice has a different approach in applying this principle. According to the European Court of Justice where the intrinsic nature of the goods excludes it from the commercial arena (like narcotic drugs) it should not be subject to VAT, but where the goods compete with a legal market it must be subject to VAT. Charging VAT on illegal transactions might give the impression that government benefits from criminal activities. However, if illegal transactions are not subject to VAT the trader in illegal goods will benefit as his products will be 14% cheaper than his rival's. Is this necessarily a moral dilemma? In conclusion three arguments can be deduced on the question if illegal transactions should be subject to VAT: 1. Illegal transactions should not be taxed at all. Illegal goods or services fall outside the sphere of the application of the charging provision in section 7(1) of the VAT Act. Moreover, taxing illegal transactions lends a quasi–validity to the contract and gives the impression that government benefits from crime. 2. The intrinsic nature of the goods concerned should determine the VAT–ability thereof. Where the nature of the goods excludes it from the commercial sphere, like narcotics, it should not be subject to VAT. Where the illegal goods compete with a legal market the goods should be subject to VAT to eliminate unjust competition. 3. The principle of tax neutrality makes it clear that the illegality of a transaction has no influence on its taxability. The charging provision in terms of section 7(1) of the VAT act is not concerned with the legality of the transaction. If the transaction complies with the requirements for it to be taxed, it should be subject to VAT.

This paper examines the impact of international remittances on both the level and the instability of government tax revenue in receiving countries. It investigates in particular whether the presence of a value added tax (VAT) system increases the benefit of the inflows of remittances in terms of high and less volatile tax revenue ratio. This is supported by the fact that remittances are largely used for consumption purposes and contribute to smoothing private consumption. Using a large sample of developing countries observed over the period 1980-2006, and even after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances and VAT adoption, the results highlight that remittances significantly increase both the level and the stability of government tax revenue ratio in receiving countries that have adopted the VAT.

This paper examines the impact of international remittances on both the level and the instability of government tax revenue in receiving countries. It investigates in particular whether the presence of a value added tax (VAT) system increases the benefit of the inflows of remittances in terms of high and less volatile tax revenue ratio. This is supported by the fact that remittances are largely used for consumption purposes and contribute to smoothing private consumption. Using a large sample of developing countries observed over the period 1980-2006, and even after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances and VAT adoption, the results highlight that remittances significantly increase both the level and the stability of government tax revenue ratio in receiving countries that have adopted the VAT.

1. Shifting to Consumption as a Federal Tax Base: An Overview -- 2. If, When You Say "Value-Added Tax," You Mean... -- 3. Who Bears the Burden of Consumption Taxes? -- 4. Implications of the Form of VAT on Incidence and Other Factors -- 5. Preferential Treatment: The Implications for Horizontal Equity Among Companies -- 6. Problems of Transition to a Value-Added Tax -- 7. International Implications of Value-Added Taxes -- 8. Value-Added Taxation of Financial Services -- 9. The Sectoral Impacts of a Value-Added Tax -- 10. Macroeconomic Effects of a Consumption-Based Tax -- 11. Administration and Compliance -- About the Contributors.

This paper analyses the impact of adopting a value‐added tax (VAT) on the size of the informal sector across different activities. Under VAT, formal traders desire to purchase their inputs from formal suppliers for a deduction in their tax bill. I model this 'self‐enforcement' feature of VAT on an input–output economy and quantify it among different activities using a forward linkage index. The administration can reduce the size of the informal economy by reallocating the audits to activities with higher backward linkages and final consumption. Empirical evidence from the Indian services sector justifies the theoretical results and shows a significant increase in the tax compliance of forwardly linked activities following the VAT adoption in 2003.

This paper examines the impact of Value Added Tax (VAT) on poverty in Sri Lanka, by considering the amount of VAT paid by the household on the consumption of food items. The study based on Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) data of Sri Lanka in 2012/13 and Ordered Probit model was applied for empirical estimation. The results confirm that, despite VAT contributes to national tax revenue significantly, it essentially increases the probability of being extreme poor, poor and vulnerable non-poor by 0.0061%, 0.4942% and 1.4760% respectively, while reducing the probability of being non-poor by 1.9764%. Apart from that, the recent hike in VAT rate of Sri Lanka from 11% to 15% increases probabilities of being extreme poor, poor and vulnerable non-poor by 0.017%, 1.39% and 4.16% respectively, while decreasing the probability of being non-poor by 5.57%. Thus, the study recommends to rationalize and continue VAT exemptions, introduce a twin VAT rate for essential and luxury goods and services along with a gradual shift from indirect to direct taxes in order to lessen VAT burden on lower income groups while ensuring higher tax revenue for the government.