The International Law Commission's Soft Law Influence
In: 13 FIU Law Review (2019), Forthcoming
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In: 13 FIU Law Review (2019), Forthcoming
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In: Völkerrecht und internationale Beziehungen Band 8
In: European journal of risk regulation: EJRR ; at the intersection of global law, science and policy, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 1-6
ISSN: 2190-8249
In: Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Band 56, Heft 1, S. 2023
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In: Boston College Law Review, Band 52, S. 1147
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In: Revista E-Mercatoria, Band 17, Heft 1
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In: Archiv des Völkerrechts: AVR, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 283-305
ISSN: 0003-892X
In: Maastricht journal of European and comparative law: MJ, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 193-199
ISSN: 2399-5548
Das chinesische Arbeitsrecht ist bereits seinem Inhalt nach teilweise "soft-law". Es beinhaltet die Abkehr vom Grundsatz der Festanstellung der Arbeitnehmer und schafft durch befristete Arbeitsverhältnisse und einen nur sehr begrenzten Kündigungsschutz aus der Sicht der Unternehmer hohe Flexibilität, aus der Sicht der Arbeitnehmer einen geringen Arbeitsplatzschutz. Dennoch enthält es in einer Reihe von Punkten (Überstundenvergütung, Beteiligung von Gewerkschaften, Arbeitsschutzbestimmungen etc.) auch eher strikte Regelungen im Interesse der Arbeitnehmer.
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In: European journal of international law, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 499-515
ISSN: 1464-3596
In: International organization, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 421-456
ISSN: 1531-5088
We examine why international actors—including states, firms, and activists—seek different types of legalized arrangements to solve political and substantive problems. We show how particular forms of legalization provide superior institutional solutions in different circumstances. We begin by examining the baseline advantages of "hard" legalization (that is, precise, legally binding obligations with appropriate third-party delegation). We emphasize, however, that actors often prefer softer forms of legalization (that is, various combinations of reduced precision, less stringent obligation, and weaker delegation). Soft legalization has a number of significant advantages, including that it is easier to achieve, provides strategies for dealing with uncertainty, infringes less on sovereignty, and facilitates compromise among differentiated actors.Although our approach is largely interest-based, we explicitly incorporate the normative elements that are central in law and in recent international relations theorizing. We also consider the important role of nonstate actors who, along with states, are central participants in contemporary international legalization. We illustrate the advantages of various forms of international legal arrangements with examples drawn from articles in this special issue and elsewhere.
On November 26, 2017, Elon Musk tweeted: "Got to regulate AI/robotics like we do food, drugs, aircraft & cars. Public risks require public oversight. Getting rid of the FAA wdn't [sic] make flying safer. They're there for good reason." In this and other recent pronouncements, Musk is calling for artificial intelligence (AI) to be regulated by traditional regulation, just as we regulate foods, drugs, aircraft and cars. Putting aside the quibble that food, drugs, aircraft and cars are each regulated very differently, these calls for regulation seem to envision one or more federal regulatory agencies adopting binding regulations to ensure the safety of AI. Musk is not alone in calling for "regulation" of AI, and some serious AI scholars and policymakers have likewise called for regulation of AI using traditional governmental regulatory approaches .
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In: Faculty of Law, Stockholm University Research Paper No. 7
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Working paper