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EU enlargement, by extending the boundaries of Europe's single market, calls for a reconsideration of the preconditions and prospects for transnational coordination of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining still remains nationally-based, but after enlargement two features are prominent. First, there is the extent of the gap in labour costs between the old and new Member States. This is providing powerful incentives both for the movement of capital eastwards (relocation of production sites) and for movement of self-employed workers westwards (displacing local labour). Secondly, there is now a group of countries with single-employer bargaining systems: multi-employer bargaining is no longer the EU norm. The resulting pressures are reinforcing developments in sectoral agreements, such as 'hardship clauses', which themselves undermine the vertical coordination on which successful cross-border coordination must rest. This paper analyses the implications of these developments and concludes that sector-based cross-border bargaining coordination remains trade unions' best available response to pan-European market integration; that differentiated approaches are required as between sectors; that unions need to develop effective means of coordination across companies within sectors; and that, under single-employer bargaining regimes, boosting union organisation and hence the coverage of collective bargaining is paramount.

The autonomous role of Swedish journalists has been won after centuries of bitter struggle since the first laws on liberties for the printed press was legislated in 1766. Sweden is well repudiated for this professional culture, which implies an independent and impartial social role for mass media, free from state censorship, open to investigative reporting and critical debate; in other words autonomous media able to sustain impartial reporting. Efforts to create a similar position for the media in post-conflict or transition states are countered by strong political and economic forces, by a path dependency of older rules and norms and also by lack of professionalism and investigative resources. In these statesthere is limited or legal protection ofcriticaljournalismandlack ofacivil society thatplaces demands onthose in powerand constitutesa counter-forceagainst oppression andarbitrarinessin the community. In several states, especially those who previously lacked democratic mass media, there has emerged a plethora of new media which are independent in form but not in content. They are not functioning as correctives to power and offer no room for impartial journalism. Instead, they have become a megaphone for special interests. The question is why this development has taken place and which strategies internal and external actors apply to change the situation. Currently there are extensive studies of journalism in war, conflict and change phases. But there is very limited research on the development of journalism in subsequent periods. The chapter addresses the points of departure for future research on the conditions for journalism in states after crisis, open conflict and substantial social transitions. Studies in states such as Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrate that international actors, companies and aid agencies have acted inconsistent and ended up in the role-conflicts which frustrated efforts to create autonomous and impartial journalism. .

Responds to Amitai Etzioni's (2003) opening essay in a critical forum, arguing for a specific socioeconomics discipline & proposing a new paradigm for such a field. The necessity for a socioeconomic academic discipline is questioned, & Etzioni's endorsement of a modified neoclassical paradigm is challenged as well, especially as the paradigm would close off the very debate to which Etzioni so interestingly contributes. A more promising alternative would be to develop curricula that foster student examination of interdisciplinary concerns across the social sciences. K. Coddon

Abstract
For decades, proponents of the Internet have promised that it would one day provide a seamless way for everyone in the world to communicate with each other, without introducing new boundaries, gatekeepers, or power structures. What happened? This article explores the system-level characteristics of a key design feature of the Internet that helped it to achieve widespread adoption, as well as the system-level implications of certain patterns of use that have emerged over the years as a result of that feature. Such patterns include the system-level acceptance of particular authorities, mechanisms that promote and enforce the concentration of power, and network effects that implicitly penalize those who do not comply with decisions taken by privileged actors. We provide examples of these patterns and offer some key observations, toward the development of a general theory of why they emerged despite our best efforts, and we conclude with some suggestions on how we might mitigate the worst outcomes and avoid similar experiences in the future.

SUMMARY OPEC's success in raising oil prices has very special ingredients—the high degree of producer dependence, the high cost of stock piling and limited possibilities of substitution or re‐cycling, the producers' control over cheaply exploitable reserves, their substantial foreign exchange balances and low dependence on import. Producer cartels for other commodities are unlikely to enjoy such advantages and would require a greater willingness to subordinate immediate interest for long‐term gain. The basic power imbalance between the developed and developing countries probably makes commodity agreements more hopeful than producer cartels.RESUMEN Los Prerrequisitos del Poder ProductorEl éxito de la OPEP en subir los precios del petróleo tiene ingredientes muy especiales : la alta dependencia respecto de los productores, el alto costo de almacenamiento y las reducidas posibilidades de substitución y re‐uso, el control de los productores sobre reservas de explotación barata, sus grandes reservas en moneda dura y su poca dependencia en materia de importaciones. Los carteles de productores en otros productos primarios dificilmente van a gozar de esas ventajas y requieren una mayor voluntad de subordinar los intereses inmediatos a las ganancias de largo plazo. El desequilibrio de poder básico entre los países desarrollados y en desarrollo hace que los convenios sobre productos primarios sean probablemente más promisorios que los carteles de productores.RESUME Conditions préalables à l'emprise des producteursLe succès dont jouit l'OPEP en raison de la majoration des prix pétroliers repose sur la situation très subordonnée des producteurs; le prix élevé de stockage, lié à l'insuffisance de substituts ou possibilités de recyclage; le contrôle qu'exercent les producteurs sur les exploitations à ressources peu coûteuses, leurs importantes recettes en devises étrangères, et le degré insignifiant dont ils dépendent des importations. D'autres cartels, ayant trait à d'autres produits de base, ne seraient guère aussi favorisés et seraient plutôt disposés à renoncer aux intérêts immédiats en faveur de bénéfices à long terme. Les inégalités, sur le plan du pouvoir, des pays industrialisés et en développement font paraître plus souhaitables les accords sur les produits de base que les cartels de producteurs.

This article evaluates the prospects for democratic transition in Myanmar by looking at the environment under which dissident leader Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995 and 2002. It argues that while her release in 1995 was mainly based on the regime's overconfidence in its future political stability and Myanmar's economic prosperity, the absence of these expected outcomes in the early 2000s has forced the military government to develop a more conciliatory position toward the opposition leader. This analysis draws broader implications from current political and economic affairs and assesses their impact on Myanmar's transition to democracy.