Suchergebnisse

Bill introduced by the Texas House of Representatives relating to energy savings performance contracts.

This article examines how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients. Our work pays particular attention to how contract requirements shape relationships between manager and line staff and their treatment of clients. We argue that contract design, coupled with bottom-level management efforts to meet contractual obligations, leads to a performance paradox-the same actions taken to achieve contractual results ironically produce negative program practice and poor client outcomes. Thus, rigidly constructed legal agreements between the government and private service providers can distort incentive structures, causing programmatic conflicts between management and staff, and do little to reduce long-term welfare use and diminish recipients' poverty. Adapted from the source document.

national hearing This paper aims to define the conditions under which a specific performance contract can solve the hold-up problem. We continue to show two results. First, in a very general environment the efficient solution is achieved only with Renegotiation design. Second, in a specific environment where the valuation functions satisfy a separability condition, the efficient solution is implemented only because there is an equivalence between this condition and a state independence. This means that a specific performance contract is unecessary since a voluntary contract is also capable of achieving efficiency. ; National audience This paper aims to define the conditions under which a specific performance contract can solve the hold-up problem. We mainly show two results. First, in a very general environment the efficient solution is achieved only with renegotiation design. Second, in a specific environment where the valuation functions satisfy a separability condition, the efficient solution is implemented only because there is an equivalence result between this condition and a state independence assumption. This implies that a specific performance contrat is unecessary since a voluntary contract is also able to achieve efficiency.

The primary purpose of this study was to determine the proportion with which major types of economic clauses differ in collective bargaining contracts in the private, public and health organizations. The sample comprised 96 randomly drawn union members from the private, public and health organizations who completed a short-structured questionnaire. The results revealed that differences existed among the 96 contracts in the degree to which they contained the four cohort economic contract clauses. The highest percentage of union members ranked "early retirement and noncontributory pension programs" as the most important contract economic clause, and the vast majority of the union members were not satisfied with their unions' performances. The study concludes that the union members' low rating of unions' performances is attributed to the disparity between major economic contract clauses contained in contracts and the items members perceived as important.