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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the environmental uncertainty faced by public administrations and their likelihood of disclosing performance information, particularly at municipal level.Design/methodology/approachThe existence of the relationship between environmental uncertainty and performance information disclosure is explored, drawing on organizational information processing theory. The paper describes an empirical quantitative investigation in a sample of 490 Italian municipalities.FindingsMunicipalities facing more uncertainty are more likely to disclose performance information. There is no unique set of factors that can explain the difference in the disclosure activity of Italian municipalities, but this activity appears to be contingent on the level of environmental uncertainty.Originality/valueThe paper explores the under-investigated field of factors influencing the disclosure of performance information by public administrations. It identifies uncertainty as one of the determinants of performance information disclosure. The findings suggest that the use of theories and variables not previously used in this type of study can improve understanding of the phenomenon. The study also suggests that public officials should consider adequate enforcement mechanisms to promote performance information disclosure, especially for organizations with lower incentives to improve information processing capabilities.

Abstract
Firms often invest resources in acquiring scientific evidence to evaluate the actual (more accurate) risk (i.e., the probability of occurrence) of any potential environmental hazards that might result from their own production processes and use this information in taking optimal preventive measures. In a symmetric duopoly where the acquired information about environmental risk is observed privately by the firms, I show that requiring firms to publicly report this information increases the strategic incentive of firms to invest in information acquisition. However, the net expected environmental damage of an investing firm is lower if there is no public disclosure.

Introduction -- Conceptualizing whistleblowing - Who blows whistles? : insiders, outsiders, and their networks -- Dark networks that shed light : the case of the Chronicle of current events -- The curious grapevine in reverse : human rights organizations? : whistleblowing networks -- WikiLeaks's rise, relevance, and power -- The wide world of whistleblowing on the Web -- Exfiltrators -- Conclusion.

The lack of global consensus on how to deal with complex energy governance challenges has led to the emergence of information disclosure initiatives as governance tools in and of themselves. This article assesses the effectiveness of disclosure mechanisms as tools of energy governance by looking at the motivations and desired outcomes behind a series of disclosure-based initiatives in the energy sector, namely: making energy markets work more efficiently; inducing corporations to internalize their climate change externalities; and improving democratic processes that lead to better energy governance outcomes. The disclosure initiatives assessed in this article adopt different strategies to achieve their objectives, mobilizing either users of information or holders of information, with varying effectiveness. Where pressures for secrecy exist, voluntary disclosures without formal sanctions to incentivize compliance have limited impact. Where users of information are primarily mobilized as drivers of change, the disclosures have to be easily understood to have impact; this is no easy task when it comes to the energy sector. Disclosure mechanisms that use a strategy of engagement and building of wide networks have perhaps the best potential to influence (or pressure) holders of information to change their behavior accordingly. However,disclosure mechanisms underpinned by western-influenced values of governmental transparency may not be as effective in countries that lack democratic systems.

We examine voluntary disclosures of information about corporate strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or also to the outside world. We show that managers face a tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose their private information to outsiders. On the one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers become reluctant to change their minds in the future. This may lead them to make inefficient project implementation decisions. On the other hand, information disclosure about corporate strategy provides strong incentives for partners of the firm to undertake strategy‐specific investments.

AbstractWe study information disclosure in a dynamic multi‐agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner‐takes‐all prize (Taylor, 1995). Different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for contest sponsors. We analyze and compare various information disclosure policies in the contest with finite or infinite horizons. With an endogenously chosen prize, the public disclosure policy, where submissions are revealed immediately, implements the sponsor's first‐best research plan and is an optimal policy in the infinite horizon.

Previous research aimed at assessing disclosure practice has made extensive use of postal questionnaire surveys which have been far from successful, achieving relatively low response rates and paying only scant attention to the complex network of information control which is prevalent both within and outside of modern organisations. However, this research has pointed out that the weighting given to information disclosed voluntarily by management for reasons of their own against information which is only provided on request, is of central importance, for it provides a measurement of management's commitment to communicate with employees and can be viewed as an acknowledgement of the rights of employees to corporate information and their representatives' function in defending those rights.

Edward Snowden's leaks exposed fundamental differences in the ways Americans and Europeans approach the issues of privacy and intelligence gathering. Featuring commentary from leading commentators, scholars and practitioners from both sides of the Atlantic, the book documents and explains these differences, summarized in these terms: Europeans should 'grow up' and Americans should 'obey the law'. The book starts with a collection of chapters acknowledging that Snowden's revelations require us to rethink prevailing theories concerning privacy and intelligence gathering, explaining the differences and uncertainty regarding those aspects. An impressive range of experts reflect on the law and policy of the NSA-Affair, documenting its fundamentally transnational dimension, which is the real location of the transatlantic dialogue on privacy and intelligence gathering. The conclusive chapters explain the dramatic transatlantic differences that emerged from the NSA-Affair with a collection of comparative cultural commentary.