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Sufficient conditions for legislative cooperation are identified within the context of a model of repeated legislative interaction. We show that in many environments, cooperation is sustainable even among impatient legislators. Special attention is given to the case of repeated spatial bargaining; we find that when the dimensionality of the policy space is sufficiently large, parameterizations of the model which do not admit cooperation are rare and atypical. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that legislative cooperation is possible in a one-dimensional policy space. The developed theory is applied to address various claims in the substantive literature on legislative parties. Figures, Appendixes, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

When originally published, Charles Vincent's scholarship shed new light on the achievements of black legislators in the state legislatures in post-Civil War Louisiana-a state where black people were a majority in the state population but a minority in the legislature. Now updated with a new preface, this volume endures as an important work that illustrates the strength of minorities in state government during Reconstruction. It focuses on the achievements of the black representatives and senators in the Louisiana legislature who, through tireless fighting, were able to push forward many progressive reforms, such as universal public education, and social programs for the less fortunate. "Charles Vincent's book is a classic in the field of African American history-one of the ground-breaking works that helped pave the way for the scholarship that would follow." -John C. Rodrigue, author of Reconstruction in the Cane Fields: From Slavery to Free Labor in Louisiana's Sugar Parishes, 1862-1880 "Charles Vincent is a widely respected historian whose book remains an important revisionist look at the ways that blacks were not simply pawns or victims during Reconstruction, but shaped the terms of emancipation and the agendas of governments in the post-Civil War South." -Scott P. Marler, University of Memphis.

Der vorliegende Band enthält die Vorträge eines Symposiums, das vom Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht in Zusammenarbeit mit der Internationalen Vereinigung der juristischen Wissenschaft und der Gesellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung veranstaltet wurde. Damit werden die rechtsvergleichenden Studien zur Erforschung der juristischen Methodik fortgeführt.Inhaltsübersicht: Law-Making Today Yuko Nishitani: Law-Making in Japan – Başak Baysal: Law-Making in Turkish Private Law – Andrey M. Shirvindt: Reforming the Russian Civil Code. A Search for Better Law-Making Judicial Decision-Making Today Thomas Coendet: Judicial Decision-Making Today. The Swiss Perspective – Matthew Dyson: Judicial Decision-Making in England and Wales – Agustín Parise: Judicial Decision-Making in Latin America. Unveiling the Dynamic Role of the Argentine Supreme Court Legal Methodology Today Aditi Bagchi: On the Very Idea of Legal Methodology – Jean-Sébastien Borghetti: Legal Methodology and the Role of Professors in France. Professorenrecht is not a French Word! – Helen Scott: The Death of Doctrine? Private-Law Scholarship in South Africa Today

AbstractStudies on the influence of performance information on budgeting decisions have produced contradictory findings. This article offers a framework of the parliamentary context that links performance information to legislators' budgeting decisions. The framework suggests that the impact on politicians' allocations will differ depending on whether performance information is reflected in the budget proposal, whether the allocation issue concerns a politically difficult trade‐off for the decision maker, and whether information falls into a receptive partisan mind. The experimental study uses 57 actual legislators. The results show that the introduction of performance information into legislators' deliberation process leads to stronger deviations from the status quo allocation. This difference occurs because performance information highlights more clearly the expected consequences of budgetary changes and allows for more pronounced reactions. More informed decisions, however, might make compromise among legislators more difficult because individual positions will become more polarized.

Partisan polarization in legislators' roll call voting is well established. In this article, we examine whether partisan and ideological differentiation extends to legislators' agendas (i.e., the issue content of the bills and resolutions they introduce and cosponsor). Our analyses, focusing on the 101st-110th Congresses, reveal that differentiation occurs both across and within parties (e.g., Democrats and Republicans tend to pursue different issues in their legislative activity, as do moderate and more ideologically extreme copartisans), but that these differences are not typically large in magnitude and did not increase between the late 1980s and late 2000s. These findings suggest that the dynamics of polarization differ for roll call voting and agenda activities in ways that have important implications for our assessments of its consequences. In particular, they highlight that the polarization that has occurred is less a result of differing priorities between Democrats and Republicans and more a function of different preferences on those priority issues. This differentiation may bubble up in part from the true preferences of the rank-and-file, but it is also likely a function of the polarized choices that are presented to them on roll call votes. . Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWhy do interest groups lobby allied legislators if they already agree? One possibility is that allies are intermediaries who help persuade unconvinced legislators. To study the role and value of intermediaries, I develop a formal model of persuasive lobbying where interest groups use public cheap talk and provide verifiable information to a strategically selected coalition of legislators. Interest groups face a trade‐off: Lobbying aligned legislators is advantageous as they are more willing to endorse the group's preferred policy, but those who are too aligned cannot persuade a majority of their peers. The model illustrates how intermediaries are especially valuable if interest groups cannot persuade a majority themselves. Counter to previous work, the results demonstrate how a legislature's ideological composition determines the use of intermediaries. Groups may lobby intermediaries even if access to legislators is free and unrestricted.

Why do interest groups lobby allied legislators if they already agree? One possibility is that allies are intermediaries who help persuade unconvinced legislators. To study the role and value of intermediaries, I develop a formal model of persuasive lobbying where interest groups use public cheap talk and provide verifiable information to a strategically selected coalition of legislators. Interest groups face a trade-off: Lobbying aligned legislators is advantageous as they are more willing to endorse the group's preferred policy, but those who are too aligned cannot persuade a majority of their peers. The model illustrates how intermediaries are especially valuable if interest groups cannot persuade a majority themselves. Counter to previous work, the results demonstrate how a legislature's ideological composition determines the use of intermediaries. Groups may lobby intermediaries even if access to legislators is free and unrestricted.