Suchergebnisse

Charter '88 has called for a Bill of Rights as part of a written constitution in which the powers of the legislature are subject to review by the Courts. It is acknowledged that the present system could be improved but reference to the American experience suggests one form of dominant authority may simply be replaced by another. (SJK)

In Section 9 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, Congress authorized a study of the feasibility of establishing an environmental court which would have exclusive jurisdiction over environmental matters. This mandate was devoid of any hint as to the shape and functions of the proposed court, and made no attempt to define the contours of an "environmental issue". An examination of the legislative history of the Act is no more helpful in illuminating the Congressional intent. The study was carried out by the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Justice Department which, because of the absence of concrete guidelines and of a definition of an environmental issue in the statute, was given the responsibility for transforming the broad, abstract mandate into concrete form. Unfortunately, the study itself, although it does present guidelines for the court, never defines an environmental issue; and the lack of such a definition remains a central problem in understanding and analyzing the findings of the report. The remainder of this article will deal with the results of that study, summarizing the methods employed as well as the specific findings. Since the study does not recommend a separate environmental court as a solution, an alternative approach aimed at sharpening the contours of environmental law through education of the judiciary will be discussed briefly. It is not the aim of this article to present a full-blown conceptual alternative to the idea of an environmental court, but rather to suggest further areas for consideration.

The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges' independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers' pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as a consequence of the reinforcement of its president's powers and transfers a substantial part of its former competences to the Executive power. It is a deliberate setback to the pre-constitutional way of governing the judiciary: a genuine Counter-Reform. ; El Consejo General del Poder Judicial ha sido ineficaz en su misión constitucional de ayudar a defender la independencia de jueces y tribunales frente a presiones de los demás poderes, dignificados o eficientes. La forma en que se designa a sus integrantes y el modo en que éstos eligen luego a los principales cargos judiciales ha puesto de manifiesto su dependencia de los partidos políticos. Pero la reforma de 2013 no resuelve estos problemas, incumple previsiones constitucionales de pluralismo en su composición y de colegialidad y añade otros nuevos como consecuencia de su presidencialismo y transfiere una parte sustancial de sus poderes al Ejecutivo. Supone un retroceso deliberado hacia el sistema de gobierno preconstitucional: una genuina Contrarreforma.The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges' independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers' pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as ...