Suchergebnisse

At the turn of the 21st century, we witnessed a civilisational change that resulted in decentralisation and deconcentration of power. As a result, international cooperation between local authorities has increased. This article is to indicate the legal basis for international local government activities, forms of cooperation and their impact on regional development. The legal bases for this cooperation can be classified as follows: 1. Sources of public international law, 2. EU Community law, 3. Sources of national law. Having this in mind, the article will discuss the selected legal bases for international self-government activity in Europe, starting with the acquis of the Council of Europe, then moving on to the activities of the European Union. Finally, an analysis of forms of international cooperation of local government units in Poland are going to be presented. These considerations are largely of a theoretical nature, based in particular on jurisprudential analysis.

Appeared originally in U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. The U.S. Government and the future of international medical research. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations, 1960-61. Pt.2. Health exhibits from official sources, Appendix in overseas medical research and assistance. ; Mode of access: Internet.

A growing literature touts the prominence of international cooperation among substate officials through so-called transgovernmental networks (TGNs). These networks are allegedly faster, cheaper and more flexible than conventional international treaty organizations (ITOs) (e.g. Slaughter, 2004). Yet, TGNs are not evenly distributed, either in terms of geography or issue-area. While some policyareas are characterized by networked cooperation, others continue to be dominated by formal ITOs. How can we explain such variation? I draw on recent network studies in public policy, economics and sociology to theorize the conditions in which states may prefer cooperation through TGNs. I have two main findings: First, TGNs are designed to deal with cooperation problems of a different nature than those addressed by ITOs. ITOs aim to reduce transaction costs, enhance credibility of interstate agreements and solve problems of incomplete contracting. By contrast, the chief benefit of TGNs is to provide policy flexibility and untie the hands of national executives, allowing them to bypass domestic and international constraints on policy. Second, TGNs are not a panacea for international problemsolving. Rather, they are useful tools in situations where states are reluctant to embrace treaty-based cooperation due to sovereignty concerns or environmental uncertainty. The argument is applied against three cases drawn from the ordinarily hierarchical realm of international security cooperation.

AbstractOne challenge for government administration is to reap the benefits of specialization while minimizing its negative side effects. In this article, I study the factors that motivate departments to contribute to the joint formulation of public policies. I derive testable hypotheses that discriminate between two competing motivations for interdepartmental cooperation. If department managers are concerned for the quality of public policy, I expect cooperation to be efficient. If, by contrast, departments compete for administrative turf, I expect cooperation to be inefficient and resources to be wasted. I test those hypotheses by studying all policy proposals adopted and published by the European Commission between 2015 and 2017—a total of approximately 4,000 cases. For politically salient proposals, I find that departments are more likely to contribute if they expect competing departments to become active, too. By contrast, the preparation of technical, non‐salient proposals is left to the most specialized departments. Overall, my findings suggest that interdepartmental cooperation in the European Commission is significantly motivated by DGs' competition for administrative turf.

This article discusses issues associated with the facilitation of higher education accessibility by intensifying university-government cooperation. Existing approaches to measuring the accessibility of the higher education system as a whole and its specific components were analysed. Various aspects of the problem were investigated using the example of higher education institutions in the Russian Far East. The analysis was based on data retrieved from the Russian Federal Statistics Service and the Unified Information System of the Ministry of Education and Science. It is shown that residents in the Russian Far East receive substantial opportunities for accessing higher education as compared to the residents in other Russian federal districts. Nevertheless, the extremely low geographical accessibility of higher education in this part of Russia has a detrimental effect on overall access to higher education. On the basis of the obtained results, a number of recommendations were developed for facilitating cooperation between universities and governmental authorities in order to increase overall accessibility to higher education in this region. It is proposed to compensate for the negative impact of the geographical factor by maximizing the positive effects of other factors, for instance, by increasing the affordability of university education. Thus, students from locations with absent or very few higher education institutions may be reimbursed for their travel expenses, or reimbursement may be offered to those students who are not provided with dormitory accommodation. Universities may keep their tuition fees at the lowest rate as established by the RF legislation. ; Региональная доступность высшего образования и политика взаимодействия университетов с региональными и федеральными властями.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 286-288) and index. ; Mode of access: Internet.

One challenge for government administration is to reap the benefits of specialization while minimizing its negative side effects. In this article, I study the factors that motivate departments to contribute to the joint formulation of public policies. I derive testable hypotheses that discriminate between two competing motivations for interdepartmental cooperation. If department managers are concerned for the quality of public policy, I expect cooperation to be efficient. If, by contrast, departments compete for administrative turf, I expect cooperation to be inefficient and resources to be wasted. I test those hypotheses by studying all policy proposals adopted and published by the European Commission between 2015 and 2017—a total of approximately 4,000 cases. For politically salient proposals, I find that departments are more likely to contribute if they expect competing departments to become active, too. By contrast, the preparation of technical, non‐salient proposals is left to the most specialized departments. Overall, my findings suggest that interdepartmental cooperation in the European Commission is significantly motivated by DGs' competition for administrative turf.