Suchergebnisse

An der Entwicklung einer ganzen Truppengattung der Bundeswehr auf dem Höhepunkt des Kalten Kriegs lässt sich paradigmatisch die komplexe Wirkung, welche die Bundeswehr im Schatten der bundesdeutschen Zivilgesellschaft der 1960er Jahre entwickelte, zeigen. Die Rahmenbedingungen wurden durch die sicherheitspolitischen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen der 1960er Jahre vorgegeben, wobei insbesondere der Wechsel der NATO-Strategie vom Konzept der ""Massive Retaliation"" zur ""Flexible Response"" bedeutsam war. Die Panzergrenadiertruppe dient als markantes Beispiel zur Übe

The entry of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) and Nasr missile into Pakistan military armoury and the development of military strategy thereafter have been considered a major breakthrough to counter India's Cold Start Doctrine or Proactive Military Strategy. The Cold Start Doctrine of India as a Limited Warfare Concept gestates on countering sub-conventional war emanating from Pakistan while remaining below the nuclear threshold. In an effort to regain the balance and offset the doctrinal as well conventional asymmetry available to India, Pakistan considers employment of TNWs to counter India's Cold Start Doctrine. However, the strategic thinking prevailing in India as well as in Pakistan considered to have effectively countered each other's strategies and have conceptual shortfalls. There is a stability/instability paradox and the presupposition that initiation of hostilities by one side may lead towards a nuclear exchange and destruction of both states. In this background, the study evaluates TNWs on a conceptual platform, examines the role of India's Cold Start Doctrine/Proactive Military Strategy and Pakistan's embryonic concept of TNWs in deterrence stability and instability in South Asia, in order to draw pertinent lessons for Pakistan to ensure deterrence stability in the region.

THIS PAPER EXAMINES SOME OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED ISSUES RAISED BY RECENT CHANGES IN WORLD POLITICS. THREE OVERLAPPING POINTS EMERGE. FIRST, U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL PROBABLY HAVE A DIMINISHING PLACE IN THE EVOLVING WORLD ORDER. SECONDLY, THE DETAILS OF U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY ARE LIKELY TO BECOME EVEN LESS RELEVANT TO AMERICAN DIPLOMACY THAN THEY WERE DURING THE COLD WAR. THIRDLY, THE PROSPECTS FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME ARE PROBABLY BRIGHTER THAN IS OFTEN ASSUMED. THIS PROGNOSIS NEEDS TO BE QUALIFIED, HOWEVER, BY AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT IS CONTINGENT ON THE CONTINUATION OF PARTICULAR TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.