Pacific Islanders experience enduring and growing poverty in the United States, yet our understanding of their financial distress and needs is limited. Financial institutions, government agencies, and community-based organizations in areas with large Pacific Islander communities need better information with which to develop tailored programs, improve outreach and education, and improve economic security for these and other underserved populations. This paper describes the results from a unique in-language survey that asked detailed questions regarding the financial knowledge, status, and needs of Pacific Islanders, including poverty and wealth questions beyond those in the Census, in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego counties of Southern California.
Pacific Islanders experience enduring and growing poverty in the United States, yet our understanding of their financial distress and needs is limited. Financial institutions, government agencies, and community-based organizations in areas with large Pacific Islander communities need better information with which to develop tailored programs, improve outreach and education, and improve economic security for these and other underserved populations. This paper describes the results from a unique in-language survey that asked detailed questions regarding the financial knowledge, status, and needs of Pacific Islanders, including poverty and wealth questions beyond those in the Census, in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego counties of Southern California.
Purpose The study aims to explore the impact of ownership concentration (OC) on bank financial distress (FD). Furthermore, the bank's financial stability levels determine the association between the two.
Design/methodology/approach Bank data of 33 Indian commercial banks are procured for ten years (2013–2022). The panel data econometrics is applied for empirical estimations. The quantile regression approach is used to determine the association between OC and FD at different quantiles of the FD. Non-normalcy of the data is checked and ensured before applying the quantile regression.
Findings Surprisingly, it is found that promoters have a nonlinear impact on the firm's stability. The inverted U-shape result implies that as promoters cross a threshold level, the benefit of increasing promoters' stake takes a beating and a further increase in promoters' stakes adversely impacts the stability of the banks. Moreover, this threshold value increases while moving from low to high levels of stability in a quantile regression application.
Research limitations/implications This study uses promoters as the proxy for OC. Other existing definitions of OC are not used in the study, which can further improve the robustness of the results. Additionally, the use of the type of ownership (private, public or foreign) is also not adopted in the present study. Both the limitations can be the study's future scope on the topic.
Practical implications The high OC is supposed to influence corporate governance adversely. Therefore, policymakers recommend low OC for better governance. However, the present study finds evidence that a higher OC (high threshold of OC as the stability increases) would be better for financial stability. This situation demands a trade-off between governance and financial stability regarding OC.
Originality/value The authors do not observe any study having the nonlinear impact of OC on financial stability (opposite of FD). Moreover, the threshold of OC for the optimum level of financial stability increases as stability goes high. This evidence using quantile regression and finding the turning point using a quadratic equation is also not seen in the literature.
This study examines whether negative book equity (BE) firms are in financial distress by analyzing their operating performance, financial characteristics, distress risk, and survivability when they first report negative BE. Firms with small magnitude of negative BE (SNBE firms) suffer from persistent negative earnings and financial distress, while firms with large magnitude of negative BE (LNBE firms) experience a temporary non-distress related earnings shock. LNBE firms report consecutive years of negative BE, but have lower distress risk and failure rate than both SNBE and control firms. However, all negative BE stocks have abysmal returns subsequent to their first report of negative BE.
