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Yes ; The global economy has experienced considerable turbulence since 2007. The financial crisis has been viewed as the trigger for a prolonged period of economic decline. This decline remains an issue for all member states of the European Union, the eurozone and beyond. We argue genesis of this crisis lies in the integration negotiations of 1991, ratified in 1992. These produced a flawed economic model within the eurozone. Given the seeds of decay were planted at origin; we argue the solution can be found through a reconstructed eurozone via looser integration, where countries less equipped to deal with the realities of closer integration will be economically independent.

Autor w artykule przedstawia tezę, że kryzys strefy euro państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej nie został przezwyciężony i nadal należy liczyć się z jego potencjalnymi zagrożeniami. Autor w swojej analizie skoncentrował się na przyczynach kryzysu, podejmowanych środkach ratunkowych i obecnie trwającej dyskusji na temat metod jego zwalczania. Wskazując na dużą rolę Niemiec w tym zakresie, autor postuluje szereg konkretnych środków, które powinny zostać powzięte (m.in. budowa unii politycznej, unia bankowa, ścisłe powiązanie polityki gospodarczej z polityką monetarną), które pomogą przywrócić zaufanie do europejskiego pieniądza i strefy euro. ; The author of the paper claims that the crisis of euro zone member states has not been overcome and continues to pose potential threats. The analysis is focused on the reasons for the crisis, the emergency measures applied and the current discussion on the methods to overcome it. The author emphasises the role of Germany in this respect and presents a range of concrete measures that should be applied (such as the gradual emergence of a political union, banking union and developing a tight relation between economic and monetary policy) to restore trust in the European currency and the euro zone.

Autor w artykule przedstawia tezę, że kryzys strefy euro państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej nie został przezwyciężony i nadal należy liczyć się z jego potencjalnymi zagrożeniami. Autor w swojej analizie skoncentrował się na przyczynach kryzysu, podejmowanych środkach ratunkowych i obecnie trwającej dyskusji na temat metod jego zwalczania. Wskazując na dużą rolę Niemiec w tym zakresie, autor postuluje szereg konkretnych środków, które powinny zostać powzięte (m.in. budowa unii politycznej, unia bankowa, ścisłe powiązanie polityki gospodarczej z polityką monetarną), które pomogą przywrócić zaufanie do europejskiego pieniądza i strefy euro. ; The author of the paper claims that the crisis of euro zone member states has not been overcome and continues to pose potential threats. The analysis is focused on the reasons for the crisis, the emergency measures applied and the current discussion on the methods to overcome it. The author emphasises the role of Germany in this respect and presents a range of concrete measures that should be applied (such as the gradual emergence of a political union, banking union and developing a tight relation between economic and monetary policy) to restore trust in the European currency and the euro zone. ; 8 ; 7 ; 17 ; 1 ; Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej

Published online: 28 Apr 2017 ; The question of whether European democracy is in crisis is not new, but is posed in a new way in the shadow of the euro crisis. In the tradition of the studies of democratic support and disaffection and based on data from the European Social Survey 2012, this article analyses the conceptions and evaluations of democracy in the different regions of Europe under the impact of the euro crisis. It shows that the perceived poor performance of the economy and of the government in the crisis, indeed, leads citizens across Europe to evaluate the way their national democracy works more critically – especially in the hard hit regions of Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe, and in authoritarian countries. However, it also shows that this critical evaluation of democracy does not undermine the citizens' support for democracy. Quite to the contrary: democratic principles are actually strengthened by the dissatisfaction of the citizens with the economic and political performance of their countries in the crisis. ; ERC POLCON project funded.

Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Dedication -- Table of contents -- List of boxes -- List of figures -- List of tables -- List of abbreviations -- Preface- How many unions? -- Acknowledgments -- Part I Institutionalization of multiple unions -- 1 From Rome to the Lisbon Treaty -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The institutionalization of the single market -- An elite-driven peace pact -- The institutional foundations -- From a common to a single market -- 1.3 Maastricht and the new critical juncture -- 1.4 Maastricht's multiple compromises -- 1.5 Maastricht to the Lisbon Treaty -- 1.6 Conclusion -- 2 The Lisbon Treaty and the euro crisis -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The supranational Lisbon Treaty -- 2.3 The intergovernmental Lisbon Treaty: foreign policy -- 2.4 The intergovernmental Lisbon Treaty: economic policy -- 2.5 The euro crisis and the European Council -- 2.6 Conclusion -- 3 Institutionalization and constitutional divisions -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 A constitutional regime without a constitution -- 3.3 Divisions on national sovereignty -- 3.4 Divisions on democratic legitimacy -- 3.5 Divisions on interstate relations -- 3.6 Conclusion -- Part II Main perspectives on the European Union -- 4 The perspective of the economic community -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Regional economic organizations -- 4.3 Economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region -- 4.4 Economic cooperation in the Americas -- 4.5 Comparing regional economic organizations -- 4.6 Conclusion -- 5 The perspective of intergovernmental union -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Intergovernmentalism as a political system -- 5.3 The political constellation of intergovernmentalism -- 5.4 Dilemmas of the intergovernmental union -- 5.5 The post-euro crisis intergovernmental union -- 5.6 Conclusion -- 6 The perspective of parliamentary union -- 6.1 Introduction.

Which European Union actors are most powerful in the governance of the euro crisis? The euro crisis has reignited the classic debate between intergovernmentalists, who tend to stress the coercive power of dominant member states in the European Council, and supranationalists, who maintain that through the use of institutional power, the Commission, and the European Central Bank turned out the "winners" of the crisis. This article argues that euro crisis governance is best understood not just in terms of one form of power but instead as evolving through different constellations of coercive, institutional, and ideational power that favored different EU actors over the course of the crisis, from the initial fast-burning phase (2010–2012), where the coercive and ideational power of Northern European member states in the European Council was strongest, to the slow-burning phase (2012–2016), when greater influence was afforded supranational actors through the use of ideational and institutional power.

Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.