Nach einer allgemeinen Darstellung des Befähigungsansatzes setzen sich die Autoren mit seinen Stärken auseinander und vergleichen ihn mit anderen Ansätzen. In diesem Kontext wird auch die Rolle der externen Ressourcen thematisiert. Aus einer solchen vergleichenden Perspektive werden die Zielsetzungen der Ausbildung analysiert. Die einzelnen formalen, nicht-formalen und informellen Dimensionen der Ausbildung und die relevanten Praxisfelder werden zu einem Modell zusammengefügt, das die Konturen der Erforschung der personalen Entwicklung markieren soll. (ICG)
Few would dispute that the well-being of individuals is one of the most desirable aims of human actions. However, approaches on how to define, measure, evaluate, and promote well-being differ widely. The conventional economic approach takes income (or the power to acquire market goods) as the most important indicator for well-being, and the utility function as the formal device for positive and normative analysis. However, this approach to well-being has been questioned for being seriously limited and other approaches have arisen. The capability approach to well-being, which has been developed during the last two decades by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and the Happiness Approach to well-being, championed by Richard Easterlin, both provide an alternative. Both approaches come from different traditions and have developed independently, but nevertheless aim to overcome the rigid boundaries of the conventional economic approach to well-being. Given these common aims, it is surprising that little comparative work has been undertaken across these approaches.This book aims to correct this by providing the reader with contributions from leading names associated with both approaches, as well as contributions which evaluate the approaches and contrast one with the other
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Few would dispute that the well-being of individuals is one of the most desirable aims of human actions. However, approaches on how to define, measure, evaluate, and promote well-being differ widely. The conventional economic approach takes income (or the power to acquire market goods) as the most important indicator for well-being, and the utility function as the formal device for positive and normative analysis. However, this approach to well-being has been questioned for being seriously limited and other approaches have arisen. The capability approach to well-being, which has been developed during the last two decades by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and the Happiness Approach to well-being, championed by Richard Easterlin, both provide an alternative. Both approaches come from different traditions and have developed independently, but nevertheless aim to overcome the rigid boundaries of the conventional economic approach to well-being. Given these common aims, it is surprising that little comparative work has been undertaken across these approaches. This book aims to correct this by providing the reader with contributions from leading names associated with both approaches, as well as contributions which evaluate the approaches and contrast one with the other.
China has the most extensive and most practised cyber-warfare capabilities in Asia. This article describes the development of these capabilities since the mid-1990s, the intelligence and military organisations involved, and the particular capabilities that have been demonstrated in defence exercises and in attacks on computer systems and networks in other countries. It notes that it is often very difficult to determine whether these attacks have originated with official agencies or private �Netizens?. It argues that China?s own computer systems and networks are replete with vulnerabilities, of which Chinese officials are well aware. It concludes that this appreciation of China?s deficiencies and vulnerabilities has led to the adoption of a pre-emptive strategy, as practiced in People?s Liberation Army exercises, in which China?s very destructive but relatively unsophisticated cyber-warfare capabilities are unleashed at the very outset of prospective conflicts.
China has the most extensive and most practised cyber-warfare capabilities in Asia. This article describes the development of these capabilities since the mid-1990s, the intelligence and military organisations involved, and the particular capabilities that have been demonstrated in defence exercises and in attacks on computer systems and networks in other countries. It notes that it is often very difficult to determine whether these attacks have originated with official agencies or private �Netizens?. It argues that China?s own computer systems and networks are replete with vulnerabilities, of which Chinese officials are well aware. It concludes that this appreciation of China?s deficiencies and vulnerabilities has led to the adoption of a pre-emptive strategy, as practiced in People?s Liberation Army exercises, in which China?s very destructive but relatively unsophisticated cyber-warfare capabilities are unleashed at the very outset of prospective conflicts.
Women in much of the world lack support for fundamental functions of a human life. Unequal social & political circumstances give women unequal human capabilities. This paper critiques other approaches to these inequalities & offers a version of the capabilities approach. The central question asked by the capabilities approach is not, "How satisfied is this woman?" "How much in the way of resources is she able to command?" It is, instead, "What is she actually able to do & to be?" The core idea seems to be that of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the world in the manner of a flock or herd animal. The basic intuition from which the capabilities approach begins, in the political arena, is that human abilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed. Capability, not functioning, is the appropriate political goal. Adapted from the source document.
This article analyses the relationship between rights and capabilities in order to get a better grasp of the kind of consequentialism that the capability theory represents. Capability rights have been defined as rights that have a capability as their object (rights to capabilities). Such a definition leaves the relationship between capabilities and rights to a great extent underspecified since nothing is said about the nature of those rights. Hence, it is not precluded that they are mere negative liberties, something that capability theorists deny. On the other hand, to say that all capability rights are substantive in the sense that they themselves are capabilities (rights as capabilities) will in a significant number of cases fail to match well with our intuitions. This article presents an account of the relationship between rights and capabilities that avoids these problems of underspecification and of plausibility, respectively. First, it is argued that to take the idea of capability rights seriously, three new 'list issues' need to be addressed. Second, developing a point made by Nussbaum, it is argued that capability rights are to be defined as being purely instrumental. Whereas the resulting analysis of capability rights solves the problems of underspecification and plausibility, it raises doubts about the claim that the capability approach gives more importance to rights than do traditional forms of consequentialism.
This article analyses the relationship between rights and capabilities in order to get a better grasp of the kind of consequentialism that the capability theory represents. Capability rights have been defined as rights that have a capability as their object (rights to capabilities). Such a definition leaves the relationship between capabilities and rights to a great extent underspecified since nothing is said about the nature of those rights. Hence, it is not precluded that they are mere negative liberties, something that capability theorists deny. On the other hand, to say that all capability rights are substantive in the sense that they themselves are capabilities (rights as capabilities) will in a significant number of cases fail to match well with our intuitions. This article presents an account of the relationship between rights and capabilities that avoids these problems of underspecification and of plausibility, respectively. First, it is argued that to take the idea of capability rights seriously, three new 'list issues' need to be addressed. Second, developing a point made by Nussbaum, it is argued that capability rights are to be defined as being purely instrumental. Whereas the resulting analysis of capability rights solves the problems of underspecification and plausibility, it raises doubts about the claim that the capability approach gives more importance to rights than do traditional forms of consequentialism. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
The global war on terrorism has validated the need for accelerating military transformation. The national security strategy directed to process to examine how enemies may fight, rather than where and when, reaffirming a shift from threat-based to capabilities-based planning. Moreover the Secretary of Defense instructed the Armed Forces to first "pursue the global war on terrorism" and second "strengthen joint warfighting capabilities." Those capabilities are critical in deterring and defeating enemies that rely of surprise, deception and asymmetric warfare. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
