Suchergebnisse

Scholars have offered different explanations for administrative procedures. One general approach stresses the importance of normative theory as a determinant of institutional choice, while two other perspectives emphasize the interests and political influence of pressure groups and legislators. To test these models, this study uses comparative state data to predict the adoption of three types of administrative procedures‐legislative rule review, procedural requirements opening up the rulemaking process to public participation, and economic impact analysis. The findings suggest that factors associated with the adoption of one kind of administrative requirement may not be associated with the use of others. The analysis also suggests that, while ideology, political culture, and party competition intermittently affect the adoption of particular administrative procedures, they do not always have the kinds of effects that are suggested by the traditional state policy making literature.

Presidential nominees for executive office are almost always confirmed by the Senate. There is considerable disagreement in the literature about what accounts for this Senate behavior. Some scholars argue that the high degree of presidential success reflects a norm of senatorial deference to presidential wishes. Other scholars argue that while senators may say that it is desirable for the Senate to defer to the president's choices for administrative office, their behavior in the confirmation process betrays an intense interest in the nominee's policy views. In this paper we present a model of the appointment process which is based on senatorial and presidential policy preferences. This model is able to account for several major aspects of presidential success in the appointment process. It also provides a framework for further study of other aspects of appointments.

Do states act as laboratories for reform? Are state administrative agencies likely to adopt policy innovations? This study analyzes the adoption of environmental policy innovations by state administrative agencies in the area of hazardous waste regulation. Four explanations are developed to explain the factors that affect innovation adoption: the severity of the problem, the importance of institutional factors, the role played by interest groups, and contextual factors. Institutional factors, such as state wealth and administrative professionalism, are important determinants of innovation adoption. State agencies are also likely to adopt innovations to deal with problems created by hazardous waste contamination. In addition, state environmental managers are not directly influenced by interest groups, and the inclusion of all stakeholders is likely to lead to greater support for new policy initiatives. Implications for practitioners are drawn based on the study's findings.