The article examines alternative legal institutions for the regulation of financial relations, the causes of which are, on the one hand, a change in the principles of the international financial system and the need to counter geopolitical risks, and on the other hand, the imperfection of the mechanism of financial and legal regulation, including the inconsistency of financial and legal norms, as well as the firm opinion that the Financial Law does not have its own legal instruments, etc. By alternative legal constructions, the authors of the article understand the action of legal instrument, the use of which is dictated by non-standard or not foreseen situations in the course of legal regulation of financial relations. Without excluding the possibility of using alternative legal regulation in some situations, the authors formulate a conclusion that the application of this approach should not cause the invariance of the actions of the law enforcer: the choice between legal and semi-legal regulation of financial relations. The alternative approach should be seen as restorative and subsidiary to the mainstream legal regime
1.Austerity makes reduction of the public sector deficit the principal economic goal, pursued mainly through cuts in public expenditure. Shrinkage of the public sector is meant not just to reduce the deficit, but also to stimulate the private sector. 2.There is however an alternative and very different analysis of the modern economy. Government must develop a coherent investment strategy, to re-build the UK's economic capacity, as a 'post-industrial' low-carbon economy. It must mobilise the energies and talents of all sections of society: and we are more likely to pull together if the distribution of rewards is less unequal. It must also decide whether budget surpluses should be used to reduce taxes and national debt or to invest in future economic capacity. The last of these must be given priority. 3.The burden of austerity has fallen disproportionately upon the poor and the young. We need a new social contract which provides security to all; invests in everyone's capabilities and provides decent jobs; and supports vibrant local communities, as places of learning and creativity for all. This would leave the market where it properly belongs, as the servant of the community not its master. If the social changes of the 21st Century are to be managed successfully and with public consent, they need this new social contract to underpin them. 4.High public and private R&D expenditure tend to go together. The fruits of capitalist progress are not therefore the reward for private enterprise alone. Government has a key role to play, investing in infrastructure, human capital and the science base. Today it is imperative to shift to a low-carbon economy. New regulatory regimes will be needed, to secure the public good. The rhetoric of austerity serves however to undermine popular support for active and benign government and to leave capitalist enterprise unquestioned. 5.The globalisation of the world economy reduces what can be done by individual countries. While international banks and corporations bestride national boundaries, governments are left trying to cope from within irrelevant national jurisdictions. What therefore is needed is a set of reforms to the international order that will enable national governments – working both individually and in concert – to retrieve some control and leverage over their economic and social destinies. This includes the taxation of footloose multi-national corporations. 6.In the Eurozone, the same economic orthodoxy evokes balanced budgets, low inflation, stable currencies and support for business. This ignores Keynes' analysis of the relationship between public investment, economic growth and the public deficit. It also ignores the interconnections of the European crisis, with Germany enjoying a 'virtuous circle' of exports, investment and productivity growth, alongside the weakening of the economies of the European periphery. This is likely to be politically destabilising. 7.In 2008, much of Europe's financial system lay in ruins, its economy and employment under grave threat. Public funds were used to prop up the financial system: spending on public services was cut. Recent decades have also however seen vigorous calls for public and private investment in Europe's knowledge economy, in the social cohesion of its diverse peoples and the solidarity of its regions, whatever their different stages of social and economic development. Without these, Europe is likely to face stagnation for the rest of this decade.8.The austerity debate connects to a much wider range of policy debates. The choices we make will shape our societies through much of this century: their cohesion, their prosperity, their democratic institutions and their global influence.
THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS A THEORY OF REGULATION BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF REGULATORY COMMISSION PERSONNEL AND THE RESOURCES AT THEIR DISPOSAL. THE THEORY GENERATES SEVERAL INTERRELATED HYPOTHESES, WHICH ARE TESTED USING COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS DETERMINING THE STATE REGULATORY COMMISSION POLICY CONCERNING ELECTRIC RATES. THE RESULTS PROVE CONSISTENT WITH RECENT STUDIES CHALLENGING KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ONCE-DOMINANT "CAPTURE" THEORY OF REGULATION. AN EXPLANATION OF THE POLICIES OF STATE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS IS FOUND TO REQUIRE CONSIDERATION OF TWO OBJECTIVES OF COMMISSIONERS: (1) IMPLEMENTING THE DOMINANT "NONPECUNIARY" GUIDE FOR POLICY CHOICE AMONG REGULATORY OFFICIALS: THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE MAJOR DETERMINANT OF REGULATED UTILITY RATES SHOULD BE THE COST OF PROVIDING SERVICE; AND (2) THE GOAL OF "SURVIVAL," I.E., REMAINIG IN OFFICE AND MAINTAINING SUFFICIENT ORDER AND POLITICAL SUPPORT TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS. BUT THE ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT COMMISSION PROFESSIONALISM AND INFORMATION ARE IMPORTANT RESOURCES, THE LEVELS OF WHICH AFFECT THE ABILITY OF REGULATORY PERSONNEL TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE PRESENCE AT REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERVENOR REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC INFLUENCE REGULATORY POLICY BY AFFECTING THE INCENTIVES OF COMMISSION PERSONNEL AND WIDENING THE INFORMATION RESOURCPY: 1984
The EU proposals for regulating so‐called alternative investment funds (AIFs) are intended to give investors more protection and to mitigate risks to the rest of the financial system, while further integrating markets inside the EU. Unfortunately, many of the provisions seem more likely to achieve the opposite of what is intended, reducing competition, reducing investor choice and increasing systemic risk. They also involve significant compliance costs. The proposals for regulating credit rating agencies seem unnecessary and are likely to be counterproductive. It would be far better to allow free competition by agencies of all kinds operating under a variety of different funding models.
In a futuristic scenario a look is taken at the possible political and legal responses to new communication technologies, in particular DBS. The previous fronts in the international discussion of transnational broadcasting and its regulation will probably break down. In the wake of the international distribution of the programmes of commercial broadcasters, hitherto existing external services will lose their special role. Internationally distributed programmes financed by advertising will trigger a new brand of problems for recipient countries. These, especially the developing countries, are advised to prepare their populations as soon as possible for the confrontation with these programmes, and to ensure that they possess independent broadcasting systems.
The complexity of the mammalian brain requires highly specialized protein function and diversity. As neurons differentiate and the neuronal circuitry is established, several mRNAs undergo alternative splicing and other posttranscriptional changes that expand the variety of protein isoforms produced. Recent advances are beginning to shed light on the molecular mechanisms that regulate isoform switching during neurogenesis and the role played by specific RNA binding proteins in this process. Neurogenesis and neuronal wiring were recently shown to also be regulated by RNA degradation through nonsense-mediated decay. An additional layer of regulatory complexity in these biological processes is the interplay between alternative splicing and long noncoding RNAs. Dysregulation of posttranscriptional regulation results in defective neuronal differentiation and/or synaptic connections that lead to neurodevelopmental and psychiatric disorders. ; The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by Grants from the European Union (ITN-608027 "CardioNext," ITN-289600 "CardioNeT") and from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (SAF2015-65722-R) to E.L-P. The CNIC is supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and the Pro-CNIC Foundation and is a Severo Ochoa Center of Excellence (MINECO award SEV-2015-0505). ; Sí
Most people assume that markets require a strong set of government rules and regulations to eliminate problems associated with transparency and fraud. Commonly overlooked is the fact that stock exchanges did, and to a large extent still do, provide a set of private rules and regulations. One modern stock exchange that relies heavily on private rather than government regulation is the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Founded in 1995, AIM is an exchange regulated market in which private regulators, called Nominated Advisors or Nomads, oversee individual firms and decide whether they can list their shares. This system of private regulation reduces regulatory barriers and has attracted many new firms. But rather than being 'a race to the bottom' in which anything goes, the private regulators work to put their stamp of approval only on firms that warrant trading. The market has attracted a lot of investment, and the survival rate of IPOs is in line with that of other more regulated markets.
