Background: The spectrum of disorders of the brain is large, covering hundreds of disorders that are listed in either the mental or neurological disorder chapters of the established international diagnostic classification systems. These disorders have a high prevalence as well as short- and long-term impairments and disabilities. Therefore they are an emotional, financial and social burden to the patients, their families and their social network. In a 2005 landmark study, we estimated for the first time the annual cost of 12 major groups of disorders of the brain in Europe and gave a conservative estimate of €386 billion for the year 2004. This estimate was limited in scope and conservative due to the lack of sufficiently comprehensive epidemiological and/or economic data on several important diagnostic groups. We are now in a position to substantially improve and revise the 2004 estimates. In the present report we cover 19 major groups of disorders, 7 more than previously, of an increased range of age groups and more cost items. We therefore present much improved cost estimates. Our revised estimates also now include the new EU member states, and hence a population of 514 million people. Aims: To estimate the number of persons with defined disorders of the brain in Europe in 2010, the total cost per person related to each disease in terms of direct and indirect costs, and an estimate of the total cost per disorder and country. Methods: The best available estimates of the prevalence and cost per person for 19 groups of disorders of the brain (covering well over 100 specific disorders) were identified via a systematic review of the published literature. Together with the twelve disorders included in 2004, the following range of mental and neurologic groups of disorders is covered: addictive disorders, affective disorders, anxiety disorders, brain tumor, childhood and adolescent disorders (developmental disorders), dementia, eating disorders, epilepsy, mental retardation, migraine, multiple sclerosis, neuromuscular disorders, Parkinson's disease, personality disorders, psychotic disorders, sleep disorders, somatoform disorders, stroke, and traumatic brain injury. Epidemiologic panels were charged to complete the literature review for each disorder in order to estimate the 12-month prevalence, and health economic panels were charged to estimate best cost-estimates. A cost model was developed to combine the epidemiologic and economic data and estimate the total cost of each disorder in each of 30 European countries (EU27 + Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). The cost model was populated with national statistics from Eurostat to adjust all costs to 2010 values, converting all local currencies to Euro, imputing costs for countries where no data were available, and aggregating country estimates to purchasing power parity adjusted estimates for the total cost of disorders of the brain in Europe 2010. Results: The total cost of disorders of the brain was estimated at €798 billion in 2010. Direct costs constitute the majority of costs (37% direct healthcare costs and 23% direct non-medical costs) whereas the remaining 40% were indirect costs associated with patients' production losses. On average, the estimated cost per person with a disorder of the brain in Europe ranged between €285 for headache and €30,000 for neuromuscular disorders. The European per capita cost of disorders of the brain was €1550 on average but varied by country. The cost (in billion €PPP 2010) of the disorders of the brain included in this study was as follows: addiction: €65.7; anxiety disorders: €74.4; brain tumor: €5.2; child/adolescent disorders: €21.3; dementia: €105.2; eating disorders: €0.8; epilepsy: €13.8; headache: €43.5; mental retardation: €43.3; mood disorders: €113.4; multiple sclerosis: €14.6; neuromuscular disorders: €7.7; Parkinson's disease: €13.9; personality disorders: €27.3; psychotic disorders: €93.9; sleep disorders: €35.4; somatoform disorder: €21.2; stroke: €64.1; traumatic brain injury: €33.0. It should be noted that the revised estimate of those disorders included in the previous 2004 report constituted €477 billion, by and large confirming our previous study results after considering the inflation and population increase since 2004. Further, our results were consistent with administrative data on the health care expenditure in Europe, and comparable to previous studies on the cost of specific disorders in Europe. Our estimates were lower than comparable estimates from the US. Discussion: This study was based on the best currently available data in Europe and our model enabled extrapolation to countries where no data could be found. Still, the scarcity of data is an important source of uncertainty in our estimates and may imply over- or underestimations in some disorders and countries. Even though this review included many disorders, diagnoses, age groups and cost items that were omitted in 2004, there are still remaining disorders that could not be included due to limitations in the available data. We therefore consider our estimate of the total cost of the disorders of the brain in Europe to be conservative. In terms of the health economic burden outlined in this report, disorders of the brain likely constitute the number one economic challenge for European health care, now and in the future. Data presented in this report should be considered by all stakeholder groups, including policy makers, industry and patient advocacy groups, to reconsider the current science, research and public health agenda and define a coordinated plan of action of various levels to address the associated challenges. Recommendations: Political action is required in light of the present high cost of disorders of the brain. Funding of brain research must be increased; care for patients with brain disorders as well as teaching at medical schools and other health related educations must be quantitatively and qualitatively improved, including psychological treatments. The current move of the pharmaceutical industry away from brain related indications must be halted and reversed. Continued research into the cost of the many disorders not included in the present study is warranted. It is essential that not only the EU but also the national governments forcefully support these initiatives.
Rouham,Yamout:American University of Beirut Rita,Giacaman:Community and Public Health ; With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, about 700 000 Palestinians were dispossessed and dispersed, mostly to neighbouring countries. Roughly 100 000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon and now 400 000 are living there, most in refugee camps. Although tolerated by the Lebanese Government and population, with their basic needs supported by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Palestinian refugees are subjected to regulations that hinder their opportunities to seek employment and ownership of property, thereby restricting their integration into society and compromising their wellbeing. In a study of the quality of life and wellbeing of Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territory, a team from Birzeit University, Ramallah, West Bank, investigated classic and war-related indicators of insecurity in the Gaza Strip 6 months after the Israeli war during the winter of 2008—09, using locally developed scales for the measurement of insecurity and individual distress. We assessed the relevance and validity of the two scales as measures of wellbeing for Palestinian refugees living in camps in Lebanon. Methods Researchers from Lebanon undertook six focus group discussions to investigate notions of relevance to the quality of life and wellbeing of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and modified the questionnaire used in the Gaza Strip, without changing its psychometric properties and without modifying the questions in the scales to be studied. In this pilot study, households were selected from four Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon to represent the different areas—north, south, Beirut, and Dbayeh (only functional refugee camp hosting Christian Palestinians, whereas the refugees in the others are Sunni Muslim). Every other household was selected in Beddawi and one in every three households in Burj el-Barajneh and Ein el-Helweh, and all households were approached in Dbayeh. In the camps of Beddawi, Burj el-Barajneh, and Ein el-Helweh, the fieldworkers stopped gathering data when the sample size of 100 individuals was attained, whereas in Dbayeh this number could not be achieved. One adult respondent from every household was randomly selected according to Kish tables, with alternating of men and women—ie, the person answering the door was asked to list the male or female adult members of the household. Indicators of insecurity and individual distress were analysed after application of the cutoffs used in the Gaza Strip study. χ2 and logistic regression analyses were done to identify the association between the dependent variable—reports of high insecurity—with demographic, socioeconomic, and health factors, and with objective and subjective factors related to the political and legal conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This study was approved by the Institute of Community and Public Health Ethical Review Committee, West Bank. Data gatherers obtained verbal informed consent from the household members selected before their participation in the study. Findings 356 (94%) of 378 adults who were approached by the fieldworkers responded—101 in Beddawi, 100 in Burj el-Barajneh, 100 in Ein el-Helweh, and 55 in Dbayeh. All the indictors of insecurity and distress were the same as in the study undertaken in the Gaza Strip, with Chronbach's α showing good internal consistency for the insecurity scale (0·84) and for the individual distress scale (0·86). 134 (38%) respondents reported moderate to high amounts of individual distress and 121 (34%) reported high intensity of insecurity. A first logistic model, including demographic and socioeconomic variables, showed that insecurity was associated with living at Burj el-Barajneh refugee camp (49 [49%] of 100 vs 72 [28%] of 256 living in the other three camps surveyed), displacement of the family from another refugee camp (28 [55%] of 51 vs 92 [30%] of 303 whose families had not been displaced), and the respondents thinking that the camp was overcrowded (86 [43%] of 202 vs 35 [24%] of 148 who did not have a problem with the camp crowding). The results of a second model of all the variables that were significant in the bivariate analysis and adjusted for age, sex, and employment, showed that the odds of individuals reporting high insecurity were significantly higher in Palestinians living in the refugee camp at Burj el-Barajneh than in those living at Dbayeh (49 [49%] of 100 vs eight [15%] of 55, respectively; odds ratio 5·95, 95% CI 2·05—17·29); in individuals whose families had been displaced from another refugee camp than in those who had not been displaced (28 [55%] of 51 vs 92 [30%] of 303, respectively; 5·62, 2·67—11·85); in Palestinians who felt deprived than in those who did not (50 [43%] of 115 vs 69 [29%] of 237, respectively; 2·18, 1·22—3·89); and in individuals who felt estranged from their homeland than in those who did not (95 [41%] of 234 vs 23 [21%] of 109, respectively; 2·41, 1·28—4·53) Interpretation The security and distress measures developed in the Gaza Strip showed good internal consistency when applied to Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon. Furthermore, high intensities of insecurity and distress were noted in Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon, raising questions about the legal, political, and social conditions imposed on these individuals as determinants of their insecurity, life quality, and wellbeing. The results encourage testing and validation of the security and distress scales in Palestinian refugees in other Arab countries, and in other migrants, refugees, and people living in zones affected by war and conflict. Funding Medical Aid for Palestinians. Contributors RY is the principal investigator and drafted the Abstract. SF did the data analysis. NMEAR and RG participated in the concept and design of the study and reviewed the data analysis and the drafts. DH reviewed the consecutive drafts of the Abstract. All authors have read and approved the final Abstract for publication. Conflicts of interest We declare that we have no conflicts of interest.
If ever there were any doubt that Long Island, New York, is home to some of the most fragmented, segregated and unequal school districts in the United States, the January 2009 Long Island Index Report, provides ample evidence that this is indeed the case. The quantifiable inequities across the 125 school districts on Long Island in terms of funding, demographics, and student outcomes highlighted in that report portray how important district boundary lines are, even within relatively small geographic spaces. Building on the Index's presentation of quantitative data, this report offers a more in‐depth examination of district‐level disparities and what they mean in the lives of students, educators and parents across these boundary lines. Although the spatial separation of students across district boundaries has not been the central ‐‐ or even peripheral –focusof education policymakers for the last three decades, we argue that the social science evidence on the consequences of such separation warrants a renewed consideration of these issues. Indeed, in the current era of education reform, with its strong emphasis on standards, accountabilityandmarket‐based policies, little attention has been paid to the relationship between place and opportunity or the way in which "place" is circumscribed by race/ethnicity and poverty to profoundly affect students' educational experiences. Furthermore, even as the policy gaze has drifted away from these issues, research evidence is mounting that separate can never be equal in public education because of the tight connection between public schools and their larger contexts. This is particularly the case when those larger contexts are restricted by boundaries that demarcate different property values, tax rates, public revenues, private resources, working conditions, family income and wealth, parental educational levels and political clout. All of these factors, which are both internal and external to the schools themselves, profoundly affect the day‐to‐day experiences of children. As a result, we cannot lose sight of why we care about issues of segregation by race/ethnicity or socio‐economic status, particularly as the school‐age population in this country becomes increasingly diverse and as more African American, Latino and immigrant families migrate from cities to the suburbs. Arguments for turning our backs on the problems of segregation and the inequality it perpetuates and focusing instead on how to educate children to high standards "where they are" – be that in all‐black and Latino schools with high levels of poverty or in predominantly white and/or Asian schools with high concentrations of wealth – resonate with current conceptions of what is "wrong" with public education and how we can fix it. This report attempts to build a bridge between the plethora of data documenting the high degree of segregation and inequality in places like Long Island and our nation's collective understanding of the "problems" facing public education today. We do this by bringing the voices of more than 75 Long Islanders into the discussion and dialogue about public education and what it looks and feels like across school district dividing lines of race, ethnicity, and class. What we hear in these voices – whether they are privileged, affluent white students in a low‐needs district or educators struggling to provide an "adequate" education for the poorest students of color in a high‐needs district – is how the separateness defines them and their educational opportunities. We have learned that school district boundaries in places like Long Island matter a great deal to the students and educators who toil within them each day and to the parents and other property owners who purchase homes in a housing market that is partly defined by their existence. The strong relationship between the disparate educational experiences of children whose schools and opportunities are divided by these boundaries and the unequal values of the property their parents purchase is perhaps the single most important challenge to the so‐called American Dream that we can document. The fact that these disparities are so starkly defined by race/ethnicity and social class should give us pause in a country that likes to think of itself as "post‐racial" and "colorblind." This report documents the multiple ways in which place and race/ethnicity matter in terms of students' educational opportunities, and how the two combined and intertwined as they are today in districts, schools and classrooms, define students' and educators' sense of possibility and self‐worth in a manner unlikely to ever be undone. These deep‐seated messages become ingrained in the students' identities and in the reputations of their schools, districts and communities – allowing a self‐fulfilling prophecy to play itself out as students matriculate through the educational system with starkly different opportunities, outcomes and connections to higher education. These ingrained differences in identities and reputations, then, become part of the everyday common sense that legitimizes the current fragmented and segregated system. In a vicious cycle, the resulting inequality becomes, for those on the more affluent and privileged side of the divide, the ammunition for their resistance to change the boundaries or even to allow students to cross them. These complex issues are only understood through the kind of qualitative data that this research brings to bear on the subject of school district fragmentation and segregation. Through the eyes of Long Islanders in five disparate school districts we can see these connections and relationships. This analysis, therefore, helps us understand why ‐‐ despite survey data from Long Island showing members of all racial/ethnic groups state that something should be done to break down the barriers across district boundaries ‐‐ those with the most power and privilege preserve the boundaries around their school districts and thus around other districts as well (The Long Island Index, 2009). This form of double consciousness ‐‐ bemoaning inequality while perpetuating the insidious system that maintains it – represents the 21st Century's version of the American Dilemma (see DuBois, 2003; Myrdal, 1946).
Inhaltsangabe: Einleitung: Die US-Immobilienkrise (Subprime), im Kern eine lokale Krise, bezogen auf den US-Wohnungsmarkt der unteren Gesellschaftsschichten, hat wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen weit über die amerikanischen Landesgrenzen hinaus. Durch die weltweite Vernetzung der Finanzindustrie und die Globalisierung der Märkte ist auch der deutsche Immobilienmarkt von der amerikanischen Immobilienkrise betroffen. Bis zum Sommer 2007 wurde der deutsche Gewerbeimmobilienmarkt mit Kapital überschüttet. Die Transaktionsvolumina erreichten Rekordhöhen, die Banken konnten sich günstig refinanzieren und finanzierten Immobilientransaktionen teilweise mit mehr als 95% Fremdkapital. Versicherungsgesellschaften, Pensionskassen und ausländische Kapitalanleger erhöhten stetig ihren Immobilienanteil, im Verhältnis zu Aktien und Renten, um das Risiko zu diversifizieren. Gerade Deutschland profitierte in den Jahren 2005 und 2006 davon, da hier die Immobilienpreise weniger stark als in anderen Märkten gestiegen sind und somit die Preise insbesondere von ausländischen institutionellen Investoren als günstig empfunden wurden. Zahlreiche Fonds mit den unterschiedlichsten Renditezielen wurden aufgelegt. Der Deutsche Immobilienmarkt fand scheinbar grenzenlosen Zufluss an Kapital. Auffallend war, wie stark Private Equity Gelder in den Markt investiert wurden. Opportunistische Fonds mit Renditezielen von weit über 15% waren keine Seltenheit. Angetrieben wurden diese Renditen zum einen durch die niedrigen Fremdkapitalzinsen, zum anderen durch die Bereitschaft der Banken, den hohen Fremdkapitalanteil zu finanzieren. Im Juli 2007 veränderten sich die Marktverhältnisse in der Finanzbranche abrupt. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt vermeldeten US-Banken erhebliche Verluste durch Abschreibungen auf CDOs und ABSs. Diese verbrieften Produkte, deren Basiswerte ein Pool von Hypothekendarlehen an Kreditnehmer in den USA mit schlechter Bonität ist, hatten erheblich an Wert verloren, da die Kreditnehmer aufgrund von Zinsanpassungen ihre Darlehen nicht mehr bedienen konnten. Mit der Krise an den Finanzmärkten ging eine erhebliche Gefahr für die Gesamtwirtschaft einher, denn die Kreditvergabe - als zentrale Stütze für Investitionen und Konsum - kam praktisch zum Erliegen. Die Finanz- und Liquiditätskrise hatte neben den US-Banken insbesondere auch deutsche und schweizerische Geldinstitute getroffen, die stark in die beschriebenen CDOs investiert waren und dadurch Wertberichtigungen in Milliardenhöhe bilden mussten. Zu dieser Zeit stellte sich die Frage im Gewerbeimmobilienmarkt, wie schnell sich der Kapitalmarkt aus der Liquiditätskrise befreien könnte, um wieder ausreichende Fremdkapitalmittel zur Verfügung zu stellen bzw. welche alternativen Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten sich dem Markt böten. Eine weitere wichtige Frage für die Perspektive des Gewerbeimmobilienmarktes war, ob sich die Weltwirtschaft von einer amerikanischen Rezession abkoppeln könnte oder nicht. Anhand des Vergleichs der führenden Research Analysen versucht die Arbeit empirisch Veränderungen im Zeitablauf aufzuzeigen. Tiefergehender werden auch die Veränderungen der Refinanzierungsmöglichkeiten der Banken analysiert, z.B. anhand der Funding Spreads, um zu verstehen, wie hier der Immobilienmarkt von externen Faktoren beeinflusst wurde. Der Untersuchungszeitraum der Arbeit reicht dabei bis in den Herbst des Jahres 2008 und beschreibt die Turbolenzen der Finanzkrise bis zum Abschluss des weltweiten Rettungspakets für Banken durch die führenden Wirtschaftsnationen. Gang der Untersuchung: Die Masterarbeit spannt den Bogen zwischen der lokalen Immobilienkrise in den USA und deren Auswirkungen auf die globalen Kapitalmärkte bis hin zum deutschen Gewerbeimmobilienmarkt. Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei im Kapitel 4, das die veränderte Kapitalsituation des internationalen Gewerbeimmobilienmarktes mit Schwerpunkt Deutschland beschreibt. Das Kapitel unterteilt die Phase vor Ausbruch der Immobilienkrise in den USA bis etwa Mitte des Jahres 2007 und die Phase danach bis in den Herbst des Jahres 2008. Zur Schaffung einer einheitlichen Verständnisgrundlage werden anfangs im 2. Kapitel die wesentlichen Begriffe des Immobilienkapitalmarkts definiert und voneinander abgegrenzt, um die Funktionsweise dieser besser zu verstehen. Hierbei wird insbesondere auf die Vielfältigkeit und Komplexität der Finanzprodukte eingegangen, die von vielen als Ursachen für die Ausbreitung der Subprime-Krise auf andere Märkte gesehen werden. Kapitel 3 beschreibt die Entstehung der US-Immobilienkrise und deren Ausbreitung auf die globalen Volkswirtschaften, insbesondere die weltweiten Kapital- und Immobilienmärkte. Eine Chronologie der Ereignisse schildert den Dominoeffekt, wie sich die US-Immobilienkrise seit Mitte des Jahres 2007 mit zunehmender Geschwindigkeit über die globalen Kapitalmärkte ausbreitete und die weltweiten Volkswirtschaften in eine Rezession stürzte. Die Arbeit schließt mit einer Zusammenfassung der wesentlichen Erkenntnisse ab und erörtert die zukünftigen Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten für den Gewerbeimmobilienmarkt in Deutschland.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Inhaltsverzeichnis: InhaltsverzeichnisI AbbildungsverzeichnisII AbkürzungsverzeichnisIV 1.Einleitung1 1.1Problemstellung1 1.2Gang der Untersuchung2 2.Funktionsweise der Immobilienkapitalmärkte3 2.1Marktteilnehmer3 2.1.1Projektentwickler4 2.1.2Investoren4 2.1.3Banken7 2.1.4Sonstige7 2.2Immobilien Investitionsprodukte8 2.2.1Eigenkapitalmärkte9 2.2.2Fremdkapitalmärkte12 3.US-Immobilienkrise (Subprime)19 3.1Wurzeln der Krise19 3.2Auslöser der Krise20 3.3Beschleuniger der Krise und der Übergriff auf andere Märkte21 4.Veränderung der Kapitalversorgung von Investoren im Zeitablauf28 4.1Vor der Subprime-Krise28 4.2Während der Subprime-Krise44 5.Ausblick und Schlussbemerkung57 LiteraturverzeichnisVITextprobe:Textprobe: Kapitel 4.2, Während der Subprime-Krise: Gorge Soros datierte den Ausbruch der globalen Finanzkrise auf den August 2007. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt mussten die Zentralbanken der USA, der EU und Englands dem Bankenmarkt Liquidität in Milliardenhöhe zuschießen, um dem Kollaps am Geldmarkt zu verhindern. Mit Ausbruch der Subprime-Krise in den USA schlug die Stimmung auch im internationalen Immobilienmarkt um. Die zuvor für den Boom verantwortlich gemachte Globalisierung und der Einsatz moderner Finanzinstrumente wurden nun als Ursache für die globale Ausbreitung der US-Immobilienkrise gesehen. Warren Buffet zitierte Mark Twain schon lange vor dem Ausbruch der Subprime-Krise und schuf den Vergleich von einer Katze am Schwanz zu tragen mit der Erfahrung in Derivate zu investieren, würde gleichermaßen schmerzhaft sein. Investoren, in durch Subprime Immobilien besicherte Investmentpapiere und Derivate, konnten nun nachvollziehen, was Warren Buffet andeutete. Zwar besteht zwischen dem Gewerbeimmobilienmarkt und dem Wohnungs- und Häusermarkt keine direkter Zusammenhang, jedoch ist der Gewerbeimmobilienmarkt abhängig von der Entwicklung der Realwirtschaft. Die durch die Subprime-Krise entstandene Finanzkrise hatte sich negativ auf die allgemeine wirtschaftliche Stimmung durchgeschlagen. Das IFO-Institut meldete im Juni 2008 eine deutliche Abkühlung des Geschäftsklimas in Deutschland mit einem verhaltenen Ausblick für das Gesamtjahr. Analysen des Marktforschungsverbunds Euroconstruct gingen erstmals seit dem Jahr 2002 von schrumpfenden Bauvolumen aus. Dies führten sie auf die Immobilienkrise in den USA zurück und die damit verbundene Finanz- und Liquiditätskrise. Die daraus resultierende restriktivere Kreditpolitik der Banken führte zu steigenden Margen bei den Kreditprodukten. Zudem hatte in Europa aufgrund von Inflationsängsten die EZB die Zinsen nicht wie in den USA gesenkt, sondern im Gegenteil zunächst leicht angehoben. Höhere Refinanzierungssätze plus steigende Margenerwartungen der Banken verteuerten so die Fremdkapitalkosten für die Unternehmen. Dies kombiniert mit der allgemeinen konjunkturellen Abkühlung waren keine guten Vorzeichen für die prozyklische Bauwirtschaft. Dennoch bleibt insgesamt festzuhalten, dass die europäischen Baumaßnahmen im Jahr 2008 und 2009 auf dem Niveau von 2007 verharren dürften. Die Folgen der Krise ließen sich an verschiedenen fundamentalen Fakten für den globalen Immobilienmarkt erkennen. Die Immobilienindices gaben deutlich nach, ohne bis dato einen Boden gefunden zu haben. Die zuvor auf Rekordhöhe gestiegenen Cross-Border Transaktions-volumina brachen massiv ein. Der Verbriefungsmarkt für durch immobilienbesicherte Wertpapiere war von einem Tag auf den anderen praktisch nicht mehr existent. Die Fundingspreads für Finanzierungen in Immobilien, die nicht über Pfandbriefe refinanziert werden konnten, gingen stark in die Höhe und verteuerten damit den Fremdkapitalzins auf ein Niveau, das jeden Businessplan eines Immobilieninvestors oder –Entwicklers zerschlug. Daraus folgte ein deutlich schwierigerer Zugang für Immobilieninvestoren, sowohl zu Eigenkapital als auch Fremdkapital. Der NPI, der amerikanische Index für Gewerbeimmobilien, lieferte in den ersten beiden Quartalen des Jahres 2008 die schlechteste Performance seit dem Jahr 1993 mit nur noch 0,56% Rendite für das 2. Quartal des Jahres 2008. Wie der Abbildung 19 zu entnehmen, ging der Trend in den negativen Bereich, nachdem im Jahr 2005, mit knapp über 20% Jahresrendite, noch ein Rekordjahr erreicht werden konnte. Diesem Abwärtstrend in den Vereinigten Staaten Amerikas schlossen sich auch die europäischen Immobilienindices an. Der monatliche IPD Index, der die Immobilienwertentwicklung für Direktinvestitionen in Gewerbeimmobilien des Vereinigten Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland (UK) misst, zeigte negative Erträge von minus 1,3% per Ende Juli des Jahres 2008. Dieser Rückgang war etwas geringer als im Monat zuvor. Grundsätzlich blieb der weitere Trend negativ, nachdem Gewerbeimmobilien lange zuvor nur positive Erträge einbrachten. In der 12-Monatsbetrachtung hat der Index ein Allzeittief von minus 16,1% erreicht. In der Abbildung 20 kann die Entwicklung der letzten 24 Monate von Juli des Jahres 2006 bis Juli des Jahres 2008, differenziert nach den verschiedenen Arten von gewerblichen Immobilien, abgelesen werden. Verglich man die Entwicklung in den USA und UK direkt miteinander, so konnte man feststellen, dass die Gewerbeimmobilienerträge in UK noch wesentlich stärker und schneller auf die Folgen des Rückgangs des amerikanischen Häusermarktes reagierten. Die Subprime-Krise war noch nicht wirklich ausgerufen, da drehte der UK-Markt schon in den negativen Bereich, während der NPI in den USA selbst im zweiten Quartal 2008 noch leicht positive Erträge aufweisen konnte. Dies bewies, wie eng die Märkte miteinander verflochten waren. Die Marktteilnehmer befürchteten offenbar, dass britische Gewerbeimmobilien stärker von einer sich aus Amerika ausbreitenden Wirtschaftskrise betroffen sein könnten, als Gewerbeimmobilien in den USA selbst. Für den deutschen Markt stand der IPD Index für direkte Investitionen, DIX, zum Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung der Masterarbeit noch nicht zur Verfügung. Ein massiver Abschwung und Vertrauensverlust in die deutsche Immobilienwirtschaft ließ sich an der Kursentwicklung deutscher Immobilienunternehmen trotzdem ablesen. So hatte der Immobilienaktienbarometer IMAB zwischen Juni des Jahres 2007 bis Juli des Jahres 2008 mehr als 50% an Wert verloren. Im Vergleich dazu hatte sich der DAX 30 besser geschlagen mit einem Wertverlust von nur ca. 20% im gleichen Zeitraum. Neben dem zeigt Abbildung 21, dass sich der IBAM bis zum Ausbruch der Subprime-Krise im Sommer des Jahres 2007, seit Dezember des Jahres 2005 besser entwickelte als die deutschen Standardwerte im DAX 30. Die beiden ersten deutschen REIT Unternehmen, Deutsche REIT und Fair Value REIT hatten ca. 50% an Wert verloren von Juli des Jahres 2007 bis Juli des Jahres 2008. Immobilienaktien hatte es durch die Immobilienkrise in den USA besonders hart getroffen. Börsentypische Übertreibungen und die Assoziation der US-Immobilienkrise mit Immobilienaktien generell ließen die Kurse besonders stark fallen im Vergleich zu Wertpapieren aus Industrie und Handel, wie in der Abbildung 21 der Vergleich zwischen IBAM mit dem DAX verdeutlicht. Würde man die stark von der Immobilienkrise betroffenen Bankaktien noch aus dem DAX Portfolio herausrechnen, würde der Unterschied zwischen Immobilienaktien und Wertpapieren aus Industrie und Handel noch deutlicher ausfallen.
Der irische Buchmarkt als Teil des englischsprachigen Buchmarktes ist stark von der Geschichte des Landes geprägt. Die Fremdbestimmung im Rahmen des Commonwealth unterdrückte eine eigenständige Verlagslandschaft bis weit ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein. Mit der Unabhängigkeit des irischen Staates stieg die Anzahl der Verlage langsam aber stetig an. In den 70er Jahren kam die irische Verlagslandschaft zu einem fast explosionsartigen Erblühen. Die Gründung des Verlegerverbandes Clé war einer von vielen Schritten, um den nationalen Buchmarkt von der Dominanz britischer Bücher in Buchhandlungen und Bibliotheken zu emanzipieren. Die Nachfrage nach Irish-Interest-Titeln ist im Inland hoch. Britische Verlage hatten bis dato diesen Bedarf übersehen, und so füllten irische Verlage diese Nische. Die Einführung eines von Großbritannien unabhängigen Lehrplans führte zur Etablierung eines eigenständigen Schulbuchmarktes, inklusive Lehrwerke zur irischen Sprache bzw. Titel auf Irisch. Irische Verlage sind in ihrem Programm größtenteils breit aufgestellt und selten spezialisiert. Sie sind erstaunlich häufig unabhängige mittelständische Unternehmen. Nur wenige Verlage sind staatlich geführt oder gehören ausländischen Konzernen an. Auch der stationäre Buchhandel ist überwiegend eigenständig, da die – vor dem Wirtschaftsboom wenig kaufkräftige - Republik von den expandierenden britischen Buchhandelsketten vernachlässigt wurde. Erst nach dem Wirtschaftsboom und dem damit verbundenen soziokulturellen Wandel von einer traditionellen Agrar- hin zu einer modernen Informationsgesellschaft stiegen die Umsätze mit Büchern stark an. Sobald der Buchmarkt eine nennenswerte wirtschaftliche Größe erreichte, eröffneten britische Buchhandlungen Filialen in irischen Städten. Sie vermochten jedoch nicht, die Sortimentsvielfalt der irischen Buchhandelslandschaft zu zerstören. Die fehlende Buchpreisbindung ist keine Bedrohung der Titelvielfalt, da Handelsformen wie Buchclubs, Supermärkte und Internethandel – die mit teils aggressivem Preismarketing arbeitenden Nebenmärkte – hier nur eine Randexistenz führen. In diesem Fall wandelt sich die geringe (Umsatz-) Größe und damit Attraktivität des Buchmarktes zum Vorteil. Die staatliche Kulturförderung ist ein bedeutender Beitrag zum Verlegen von Literatur, die wirtschaftlich gerechnet keine Daseinsberechtigung hätte. Irische Verleger mit relativ geringem Budget sind nicht in der Lage, solche unökonomischen Titel mit dem finanziellen Erfolg eines Bestsellers in Mischkalkulation aufzufangen. Hier greift die staatliche Unterstützung. Die Subventionierung von Titeln über die irischen Sprache bzw. von Literatur auf Irisch führte zur Herausbildung eines Marktsektors, der vor der Staatsgründung nicht existierte. Die Übersetzungsförderung verstärkt die Verbreitung von bis dato unbekannter irischer Literatur im Ausland und stimuliert das Lizenzgeschäft. Die aktuelle staatliche Kulturpolitik setzt ihren Schwerpunkt auf Marketing, PR sowie Nachfolgeregelung und fördert so nachhaltig statt bloß in Form einer kurzlebigen Titelsubvention. Eine noch mehr in die Zukunft gerichtete Förderung würde genauso wie die Unterstützung von Fortbildungsmaßnahmen zu besseren wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen führen. Auch wenn die nationale Verlagsszene im Aufschwung begriffen ist, befindet sich der irische Buchmarkt insgesamt in fester Hand der britischen Verlagsproduktion. Der britische Buchmarkt mit seinen multinationalen und finanzkräftigen Verlagen lebt vom Export. Aus Sicht von Großbritannien ist heutzutage der Nachbar Irland, einst Teil des britischen Buchmarktes, einer der besten Kunden. Dieser Aspekt bezieht sich nicht nur auf die langjährig entwickelten Handelsbeziehungen. In kulturellen Aspekten orientiert sich Irland stark am britischen Vorbild: Ein britischer Bestseller wird fast immer auch ein Bestseller in Irland. Lediglich Irish-Interest-Titel durchbrechen diesen Automatismus. Während Irish Interest im Inland hohe Umsätze vorweist, sind diese Titel im Ausland lediglich ein Nischenprodukt. Zusätzlich müssen irische Verlage außerhalb des Landes mit britischen und US-amerikanischen Verlagen in Konkurrenz treten, die ebenfalls Irish-Interest-Titel für die irische Diaspora anbieten. Es besteht daher nur eine geringe Chance, erfolgreich am globalen englischsprachigen Buchmarkt mitzuwirken. Bis dato haben Versuche, dem irischen Buchmarkt durch Export zu Umsatzwachstum zu verhelfen, keinen nennenswerten Erfolg gebracht. Lediglich auf dem Gebiet der populären Literatur und in Form von Kooperationen mit britischen Verlagskonzernen vermögen irische Verlage, am internationalen Buchhandel teilzuhaben. ; The Irish book market as a part of the trade network of the English language book market is significantly influenced by the history of the country. The British dominance suppressed an autonomous publishing industry until far into the 20th century. With the independence of the Irish state the numbers of publishers grew slowly but surely. In the seventies the publishing market came to an almost explosive unfolding. The founding of the Publishers' Association Clé was one step of many in emancipating from British dominated taste and British books in book shops and libraries. The demand for Irish interest books in the population was great and British publishers so far had missed covering that need. This enabled young Irish publishers to build up a profile in this field. The construction of an educational system independent from the British syllabus offered the chance of establishing a school book market of its own, and books on the Irish language became a special publishing sector. More or less, Irish publishing houses are all-rounders not differing much through specialisation. They are astonishingly independent; only a few of them are owned by the state or foreign companies. The whole book trade is quite independent as well, because this small republic – characterized by low consumption before the economic boom – was neglected by the expanding British book chains. After the boom and the changeover of the population from a traditional agricultural to a modern information society, the sales of books grew stronger. As the book trade prospered, British chains automatically entered Irish retail but they weren't able to destroy the network of indigenous book shops. The missing system of fixed book prices is no threat because trade forms like book clubs, supermarket and internet bookshops – all of them working with massive price reductions – only lead a minor existence in Ireland; in this case a small book market does have its advantages. The governmental support of culture is a meaningful contribution to publishing that sort of literature which wouldn't make sense economically. Publishers without a solid financial background, not being able to compensate those uneconomic titles with the financial success of bestsellers, are supported by state agencies. In the case of Irish language books the state support even enabled the growth of a publishing sector which didn't really exist before the foundation of the republic. The subvention of translation works vigorously for the spreading of unknown Irish literature abroad and therefore stimulates sales in licences. The current state policy focuses on marketing, PR and succession and enables therefore a forwardlooking support of publishers besides a merely ephemeral title subvention. An even more forward-looking funding, as well as better training facilities, would achieve better economical conditions. Although the Irish publishing scene itself is thriving, the Irish book market on the whole is in the tight grip of the British publishing industry. The British book industry with its multinational and wealthy publishing houses lives from export. Today, neighbouring Ireland, once part of the British book market, is automatically one of Britain's most important customers. This aspect not only applies to traditional trade networks; even in cultural aspects Ireland is focused on the British model: a bestseller in Britain almost always becomes one in Ireland as well. This situation only doesn't apply for books of Irish interest. While books on those subjects generate high sales turnover in the republic, they are just a niche product abroad. Additionally, outside Ireland Irish publishers have to compete with British and US publishers offering books of Irish interest as well. The chance of being a successful participant in the English language book market therefore is slim. So far attempts of pushing the growth of the Irish book industry through international trade connections has not brought huge success. Only in the field of popular fiction and in the form of cooperation with big British publishing groups Irish publishers are able to take part in the international trade.
Iam pleased to know that Vilnius University is publishing a volume containing papers presented at the 2nd Indology conference for the Central and Eastern European region held at Vilnius University on the 24–26 August 2006. There is no doubt that the Indology Department at Vilnius University acted as a wonderful host for the conference and contributed immensely to strengthening the academic and scholarly ties of departments of Indology all over Central and Eastern Europe. The Indology Department in Vilnius can proudly claim to have strengthened the long-lasting relationship between India and Lithuania.The departments of Indology in Central and Eastern Europe have not only facilitated the spread of Indian studies in their respective countries but also reinvigorated and strengthened ties between India and Central and Eastern Europe. They have helped in the widespread dissemination of knowledge about India and expanded scholarly and academic interactions between departments of Indology throughout this region. Today these departments boast of several eminent scholars whose knowledge of Indian subjects, including languages and literature and history and culture, is of a high standard.The study of Indology directly contributes to the importance of India—its history, civilisation and culture—in today's globalised world. India, and therefore Indology, is also important in the study of the economy, science and technology and for technological exchanges in today's context. India remains the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity. The Indian economy is currently growing at the rate of nearly 9 per cent per annum, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world. India's foreign trade in 2006–7 is expected to surpass US $200 billion, as compared US $30 billion in the early 1990s. The country's foreign exchange reserves reached a healthy US$196 billion in March 2007. India is one of the most favoured destinations for foreign direct investment—close to US $12 billion a year. For knowledge processing industries, as well as back office processing, India has emerged as a major hub of global research and development analysis and scientific inventions. The strengths of India in the new economy—which consists of information technology, bio-technology, nanotechnology and material sciences—are now known all over the world. Indian manufacturing strength is now coming to fruition and these strengths are visible also in the Central and East European market. Several important investments from India have taken place in the steel, electronics, automobile, pharmaceutical, packaging and information technology sectors, to namea few. It is quite evident that this trend will strengthen in the future. Similarly, trade between India and Central and Eastern Europe is increasing between 20–30 per cent a year and is expected to flourish in the near future as more countries from Central and Eastern Europe join the European Union. India has warmly welcomed the recent accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union.All this makes India not only a viable subject of study for its history and culture but also fascinating for its growing economic, scientific and technological strength. These new developments require added attention. It is essential for the course curriculum of Indology studies to be standardised across Central and Eastern Europe as far as is feasible on the basis of cooperation between the universities of the region. I am glad that a website and a network for this purpose have been set up and are functional, with funding from the Embassy of India in Warsaw. The course curriculum for Indology needs to be updated. The knowledge imparted at the Indology centres needs to be well-rounded and contemporary; this will provide the necessary additional tools to the students to understand not only India's past glories but also its present strengths and future prospects. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR ) and the government of India are convinced that this is the course that centres for Indology studies should follow in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in other regions of the world. India is no longer a country known only for its ancient literature, drama and complex society. It is a nation on the move. Studies on ancient India and modern India should be complementary. I certainly hope that those who impart the knowledge of Indology will themselves catch up with modern developments to be able to contribute to the betterment of the students, who, in all fairness, deserve up-to-date information and knowledge of India.The papers published in the volume cover diverse areas and they are well researched and documented and could become a useful source of reference material for various institutions who offer courses on India. The organisation of the conference in Vilnius has already given exposure to the strength of Indian studies in Lithuania and Central and Eastern Europe. It is remarkable that during this conference a Central and Eastern European Network of Indian Studies (CEENIS) was founded with the participation of institutions at universities from 10 countries in this region.I would sincerely like to thank the faculty and staff, particularly Prof. Audrius Beinorius, the head of the department, for organising the conference and for publishing this volume. I also wish to place on record sincere appreciation to contributions made by a number of other scholars and professors at the Indology Department in Vilnius, as well as to the scholars from other countries, some of whom participated in the conference, for spreading Indian studies in Central and Eastern Europe over the pastfew decades. I am certain that the tradition of Indian studies in Central and Eastern Europe will become stronger over the years to come and prove beneficial for Indian and Central and Eastern European relations as well as for the teachers and students engaged in Indian studies in the region. My best wishes are with the faculty, staff, and students of Indian studies all over Central and Eastern Europe. HE Anil WADHWA, Ambassador of India to the Republics of Poland and Lithuania31 March 2007
This report summarizes preliminary results from the Farm Behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek Integrated Modeling Project (STC Project) which is being undertaken as part of the Watershed Evaluation of BMPs (WEBs) Program. WEBS is a partnership between Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (DUC) established to evaluate the economic and environmental performance of BMPs for water quality at the watershed scale. Water draining from South Tobacco Creek eventually enters to Lake Winnipeg which is degraded from the cumulative effects of nutrient loading, particularly phosphorous. Many jurisdictions across the world, including Canada, use payments programs to encourage land owners to change land management practices in order to reduce non-point source pollution. BMP incentive programs in Canada, such as Greencover, rely on fixed payment schemes which pay producers a set amount for BMPs, regardless of costs or benefits. In order to improve the performance of the Farm Behavior component of the STC project is to examine the performance of various types of payment programs for BMPs relative to reducing phosphorous loads from STC. Theoretical and empirical evidence from conservation auctions suggest that the performance of auctions depends on several factors which affects the bidding behavior of producers during the auction, and therefore the cost-effectiveness of auctions over other types of payment programs. In particular, some producers actually benefit from BMPs, however under certain auction rules these producers would be paid the same amount as high cost producers; alternatively, producers with low costs of adopting BMPs may not always provide the greatest benefits in terms of pollution abatement depending on their location in the watershed, and physical features of their land. We assessed the relative performance of different payment programs by developing producer response functions for adoption of Beneficial Management Practices (BMPs). Producer adoption responses under different incentive schemes were tested using experiments with student subjects and limited trials with producers. We examined four BMPs: construction of holding ponds, riparian management, forage conversation, and conservation till. The results of the adoption response experiments conducted under WEBs were used to draw preliminary observations on BMP policy design and form the basis for recommendations for further research. The farm behavior project focuses on addressing the following two questions: 1. Does BMP adoption at a given farm make the individual farm household better or worse off from an economic perspective? 2. How much will it cost the government to get farms to adopt BMPs under different payment programs? Since producer heterogeneity is key to understanding the performance of conservation auctions, we examined the costs and benefits of BMPs at the individual farm level and developed on-farm costs for each BMP for each producer in the watershed. The basic components of the model are described below, however the details including underlying assumptions regarding baseline farm behavior, are outlined within the body of the report. We used the on-farm cost model to generate aggregate cost functions for BMPs for the watershed and to parameterize the policy experiments related to conservation auctions. Preliminary estimates of environmental benefits of individual BMP adoption were provided by Dr. Wanhong Yang using results from a SWAT model developed under a separate component of the South Tobacco Creek WEBS project. Based on this information, we were able to evaluate the performance of various auction formats in terms of cost effectiveness, distribution of payments amongst producers, and environmental benefit. The results from the Farm behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek project are preliminary, and are currently being refined. Therefore it is difficult to draw generalized conclusions at this point. Further experiments are being conducted to complete the data collection during FY 08-09 through Interim WEBS funding. Nonetheless main findings to date are summarized below: 1. The four BMPs assessed differ in terms of their cost as well as their ability to deliver environmental benefits. Unfortunately, there is no BMP that dominates across farms at all abatement levels. Farms have heterogeneous costs in terms of BMPs, and some farms are cost effective at supplying abatement using one BMP, but not another. 2. This suggests that if water quality benefits (e.g. phosphorous reduction) can be qualified through modeling by BMP and by farm, then water quality should be the contracting unit for the auction rather than the BMP. This would allow producers to select the most effective BMP for supplying water quality benefits, and then decision makers could allocate contracts based on ranking the costs of abatement. 3. At the next stage of the research we will test for synergies between farms -- ie, whether the joint production function for water quality between farms differs from the sum of individual production functions. This will have implications for how the payment scheme should be designed. 4. Incorporating 'fairness' types of allocation rules for conservation dollars, such as maximum participation in conservation programs is inefficient in terms of cost and environmental benefits. If fairness, or using conservation payments as a form of extension to learn about on farm costs of BMPs is the goal of the auction, then fixed payment programs which are open to everyone may be more desirable. 5. The performance of the auction depends on the shape of the cost function for BMPs and/or pollution abatement, as well as whether uniform (pay everyone the highest bid) or discriminatory pricing (pay everyone their own bid) rules are applied. In future research we will be investigating to what extent we can generalize results about the performance of uniform versus discriminatory pricing rules in this context. In conclusion, this research has allowed us to investigate individually the performance of incentive payments for individual BMPs. The results of the analysis provide us with a baseline of information by which we can begin to assess more complex conservation program issues, such as how to optimally select multiple BMPs within the watershed, and whether/how to spatially target BMPs.
This report summarizes preliminary results from the Farm Behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek Integrated Modeling Project (STC Project) which is being undertaken as part of the Watershed Evaluation of BMPs (WEBs) Program. WEBS is a partnership between Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (DUC) established to evaluate the economic and environmental performance of BMPs for water quality at the watershed scale. Water draining from South Tobacco Creek eventually enters to Lake Winnipeg which is degraded from the cumulative effects of nutrient loading, particularly phosphorous. Many jurisdictions across the world, including Canada, use payments programs to encourage land owners to change land management practices in order to reduce non-point source pollution. BMP incentive programs in Canada, such as Greencover, rely on fixed payment schemes which pay producers a set amount for BMPs, regardless of costs or benefits. In order to improve the performance of the Farm Behavior component of the STC project is to examine the performance of various types of payment programs for BMPs relative to reducing phosphorous loads from STC. Theoretical and empirical evidence from conservation auctions suggest that the performance of auctions depends on several factors which affects the bidding behavior of producers during the auction, and therefore the cost-effectiveness of auctions over other types of payment programs. In particular, some producers actually benefit from BMPs, however under certain auction rules these producers would be paid the same amount as high cost producers; alternatively, producers with low costs of adopting BMPs may not always provide the greatest benefits in terms of pollution abatement depending on their location in the watershed, and physical features of their land. We assessed the relative performance of different payment programs by developing producer response functions for adoption of Beneficial Management Practices (BMPs). Producer adoption responses under different incentive schemes were tested using experiments with student subjects and limited trials with producers. We examined four BMPs: construction of holding ponds, riparian management, forage conversation, and conservation till. The results of the adoption response experiments conducted under WEBs were used to draw preliminary observations on BMP policy design and form the basis for recommendations for further research. The farm behavior project focuses on addressing the following two questions: 1. Does BMP adoption at a given farm make the individual farm household better or worse off from an economic perspective? 2. How much will it cost the government to get farms to adopt BMPs under different payment programs? Since producer heterogeneity is key to understanding the performance of conservation auctions, we examined the costs and benefits of BMPs at the individual farm level and developed on-farm costs for each BMP for each producer in the watershed. The basic components of the model are described below, however the details including underlying assumptions regarding baseline farm behavior, are outlined within the body of the report. We used the on-farm cost model to generate aggregate cost functions for BMPs for the watershed and to parameterize the policy experiments related to conservation auctions. Preliminary estimates of environmental benefits of individual BMP adoption were provided by Dr. Wanhong Yang using results from a SWAT model developed under a separate component of the South Tobacco Creek WEBS project. Based on this information, we were able to evaluate the performance of various auction formats in terms of cost effectiveness, distribution of payments amongst producers, and environmental benefit. The results from the Farm behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek project are preliminary, and are currently being refined. Therefore it is difficult to draw generalized conclusions at this point. Further experiments are being conducted to complete the data collection during FY 08-09 through Interim WEBS funding. Nonetheless main findings to date are summarized below: 1. The four BMPs assessed differ in terms of their cost as well as their ability to deliver environmental benefits. Unfortunately, there is no BMP that dominates across farms at all abatement levels. Farms have heterogeneous costs in terms of BMPs, and some farms are cost effective at supplying abatement using one BMP, but not another. 2. This suggests that if water quality benefits (e.g. phosphorous reduction) can be qualified through modeling by BMP and by farm, then water quality should be the contracting unit for the auction rather than the BMP. This would allow producers to select the most effective BMP for supplying water quality benefits, and then decision makers could allocate contracts based on ranking the costs of abatement. 3. At the next stage of the research we will test for synergies between farms -- ie, whether the joint production function for water quality between farms differs from the sum of individual production functions. This will have implications for how the payment scheme should be designed. 4. Incorporating 'fairness' types of allocation rules for conservation dollars, such as maximum participation in conservation programs is inefficient in terms of cost and environmental benefits. If fairness, or using conservation payments as a form of extension to learn about on farm costs of BMPs is the goal of the auction, then fixed payment programs which are open to everyone may be more desirable. 5. The performance of the auction depends on the shape of the cost function for BMPs and/or pollution abatement, as well as whether uniform (pay everyone the highest bid) or discriminatory pricing (pay everyone their own bid) rules are applied. In future research we will be investigating to what extent we can generalize results about the performance of uniform versus discriminatory pricing rules in this context. In conclusion, this research has allowed us to investigate individually the performance of incentive payments for individual BMPs. The results of the analysis provide us with a baseline of information by which we can begin to assess more complex conservation program issues, such as how to optimally select multiple BMPs within the watershed, and whether/how to spatially target BMPs.
The purpose of the paper is to present a short summary of the current situation in the Lithuanian forestry sector, to identify the importance of the sector to the economy of the country, evaluate the main competitive advantages and to discuss the possible expansion trends for the nearest decade. The practical relevance of the research is related to the problem of Lithuanian timber and furniture industry development. The forestry sector occupies a significant part in the economy, therefore its role is very important to Lithuania. Timber industry and forestry are recognized by the Lithuanian government to be the priority sectors of the economy, therefore it is important to analyse the further development perspectives and the possible enhancement of their competitiveness. The Lithuanian forestry sector supplies important products and services to society and contributes towards the overall welfare and development. Forests comprise 7.5% of Lithuanian national property and occupy 1/3 of the territory; they supply the renewing and growing timber resources.The study was conducted using the following methods: systemic analysis and synthesis of scientific literature and statistical data sources and comparative analysis of forestry enterprises' activity. In order to identify the main problems and perspectives of the sector, an interpretation of the secondary data sources was carried out using the economic statistical analysis and expert evaluation methods.The paper starts with describing the relevance of the topic, identifying the role of the forestry sector in the economy of Lithuania, and presenting the methods applied in the research. The current state of the forestry, timber and furniture industry as well as wood energy is presented.The forest area in Lithuania is growing from the middle of the 20th century. On 1 January 2006, Lithuania possessed 2014 thous. ha of forests (32.5% of the territory of the country) with 401.1 mill. m3 of wood. 7.6 mill. m3 of timber with bark is harvested in Lithuania every year; it comprises 58% of the total wood increment. Part of timber (about 0.1 mill. m3) is left as a post-harvesting waist on site. In the 3rd and 4th forest groups, utilisation of wood increment comprises 67%. Analysis of governmental forest inspection data suggests that Lithuania does not exploit significant reserves (about 2-2.5 mill. m3 of timber per year) to increase the supply of local timber for the industry and energy sectors. About 1.5 mill. m3 of timber per year is not delivered only from the forest reserved for the restoration of the ownership rights (which comprises 300,000 ha or 15.6% of forest area). Lithuanian industry suffers a loss of potential timber because no activity is performed in the areas until property is returned to the owners.The forestry sector produces 4% of the Lithuanian GDP. Timber industry contributes 10% to industrial value added in Lithuania. The sector involves 220 thous. private forest owners and 52 thous. workers of forestry and timber industry. This industry is among the fastest growing areas of the Lithuanian economy with a positive export-import balance (more than 60% of products are exported). The further development of the timber industry is also related to the growth of export.The second part of the paper describes the competitive advantages identified in the course of the analysis. The main competitive advantage of the timber and furniture industry is local raw materials. The producers of timber slabs are able to satisfy the growing demand of the national furniture industry. The project of vertical integration uniting producers of timber slabs and furniture components was executed successfully. Qualified human resources, experience in the field, knowledge obtained from cooperation with worldclass enterprises, as well as a strong financial capability and funding sources are promising for the growth of international competitiveness.The paper is finalised by presenting conclusions about priority business development areas and opportunities for the Lithuanian forestry sector in the next decade. It is indicated that import pressure from lower cost countries forces to review the business models: in order to increase competitiveness, producers are involved into the vertical integration from raw material supply to the end-user product (e.g., furniture supplied with wooden houses). It is forecasted that the competitive position of Lithuanian forestry sector will be enhanced by the further integration between timber raw materials and end-user products, i.e. between producers of soiled timber. wooden houses and components as well as between producers of timber slabs and furniture. A significant reorganisation is pending in the sawmill industry: old inefficient sawmills are expected to be replaced by modem sawmills that will be integrated into the production chain of value added wooden products. Advanced forestry forms are expected to be adopted in the supply of raw materials. The supply of timber raw materials will be enhanced in order to meet the increasing demands of the industry and energy sectors. The goal is to increase the supply of timber from 6.4 mill. m3 in 2005 to the level of 7.5 mill. m3 by 2010 and no less than 9.5 mill. m3 by the year 2030. In order to produce additional wood fuel, a more efficient collection of harvesting waist on site will need to be organised. In addition to the traditional forestry methods, it is suggested to apply a new, non-traditional growth system in the short turnover and plantation forests. It is concluded that the importance of the forestry sector will grow, and this is documented in a number of strategic documents adopted by the EU. ; Straipsnio tikslas - glaustai įvertinti Lietuvos miškų sektoriaus dabartinę būklę, jo reikšmę šalies ekonomikai, pagrindinius turimus konkurencinius pranašumus ir tuo remiantis aptarti galimas plėtros kryptis artimiausiam dešimtmečiui. Straipsnio pradžioje apibūdinamas temos aktualumas, miškų sektoriaus vaidmuo Lietuvos ekonomikai, tyrimo metodai, atskirai pristatoma miškininkystės, medienos ir baldų pramonės, medienos energetikos esama būklė. Kitoje straipsnio dalyje aptariami tyrimo metu atliktos sektoriaus analizės dėka išryškėję konkurenciniai pranašumai. Straipsnis baigiamas išvadomis apie ateinančiu dešimtmečiu prioritetines Lietuvos miškų sektoriams verslo plėtros kryptis ir galimybes.
Deutschland hat bei der Initiierung von integrierten Stadtteilentwicklungsprogrammen in der Vergangenheit nicht gerade Pionierarbeit geleistet. Mittlerweile lässt sich jedoch erkennen, dass sich dieser experimentelle Planungsansatz mit der Zeit durchzusetzen vermag (vgl. GAWRON 2005: 184f.). Dies kann als Reaktion darauf verstanden werden, dass sich das klassische Element der Städtebauförderung mit seinen traditionellen und sektoralen Programmstrukturen zunehmend als inadäquat herausstellt. Gründe dafür sind in erster Linie in den komplexeren und sich schneller wandelnden gesellschaftlichen Problemkonstellationen zu suchen, welche einen umfassenderen Programmaufbau und eine effektivere Programmsteuerung erfordern. Die Bundesregierung hat im Jahr 1999 auf die sich verschärfenden Bedingungen und die daraus erwachsenden Notwendigkeiten in den Städten reagiert. Sie hat mit dem Programm "Soziale Stadt – Stadtteile mit besonderem Entwicklungsbedarf" (kurz: "Soziale Stadt") einen gebietsbezogenen, integrierten und integrativen Planungsansatz aufgelegt, der die Lebenssituation der Quartiersbewohner in benachteiligten Stadtquartieren verbessern und eine nachhaltig wirkende Stadtteilentwicklung fördern soll. Zentrale Elemente sind dabei die ämterübergreifende Steuerung und das Zugehen auf die Bewohner, die – im Sinne des aktivierenden Staates und im Zusammenhang mit den unter dem Stichwort "Good-Local-Governance" oder "Bürgerkommune" bekannten lokalen Ansätzen – stärker als bisher mit einbezogen und damit in die Verantwortung genommen werden. Vor dem Hintergrund der veränderten Rahmenbedingungen und enger werdender finanzieller Spielräume der öffentlichen Hand besteht nach Meinung zahlreicher Wissenschaftler, politischer Entscheidungsträger und administrativer Akteure die Notwendigkeit darin, in Bezug auf das Programm "Soziale Stadt" entsprechende Formen der prozessbegleitenden und abschließenden Evaluation zur Überprüfung der Wirkung und Zielerreichung einzusetzen. Das heißt, mit dem Beratungs- und Bewertungsinstrument der Evaluation soll die Effektivität des Programms auf den Prüfstand gestellt werden. Auf europäischer Ebene sind Evaluierungen der Strukturförderprogramme schon seit geraumer Zeit zwingender Zusatz bei der Implementation von Programmen. Hingegen wird aufgrund der unzureichend ausgebildeten deutschen Evaluationstradition die "Soziale Stadt" bisher – von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen – ohne eine langfristige und methodisch abgesicherte Evaluation in Angriff genommen. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, dieses wissenschaftsdisziplinen-übergreifend beklagte Evaluationsdefizit in diesem Politikfeld anzugehen. Hieraus ergeben sich drei konkrete Fragen, die im Weiteren erörtert werden sollen: 1. Wie muss ein Evaluationsdesign aussehen, welches – zugeschnitten auf ein benachteiligtes Gebiet – eine fundierte Wirkungsanalyse zulässt? 2.Welche Gesichtspunkte sind aus der Perspektive der ersten Evaluationsergebnisse für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung dieses Programmgebietes entscheidend? 3.Welche Aussagen lassen sich aufgrund der Evaluationsergebnisse über eine weitergehende Förderung der "Sozialen Stadt" treffen? Verlässliche Antworten auf diese Fragen kann nur eine Evaluation liefern, die sich einem Programmgebiet von Anfang an widmet, das heißt, von den vorbereitenden Untersuchungen über die Zielformulierung bis hin zu einer kontinuierlichen Begleitung der Implementations-Phase. Eine solche Vorgehensweise bildet die Grundlage dieser Arbeit. Untersuchungsgebiet ist die Pliensauvorstadt in Esslingen am Neckar. Die vorliegende "interaktive Evaluation" (WIDMER/BINDER 1997: 219) strebt danach, das Programm "Soziale Stadt" in der Pliensauvorstadt in der hohen Komplexität der Strukturen, Abläufe, Verfahren und Kontextsituationen sowie der Eigendynamik zu erfassen, und es mit Hilfe der Akteure im Praxistest zu interpretieren. Um diesem Vorhaben gerecht werden zu können, muss ein längsschnittartig, multimethodisch und modellhaft angelegtes Evaluationsdesign konzipiert werden. Indikatoren, welche den Stand der Implementation sowie die Zielerreichung dreier großer Untersuchungsfelder messen, sollen eine fundierte Bewertung ermöglichen – und zwar im Verlauf der Programmimplementation als Instrument der Qualitätssicherung und zu deren Abschluss im Sinne einer Bilanz. Die erwähnten Untersuchungsfelder sind: "Kinder und Jugendliche", "Gesellschaftliche und politische Teilhabe" sowie "Image und Identität". Sie bilden den Schwerpunkt des empirischen Teils der Analyse. Das Design und die aus den qualitativen und quantitativen Indikatorensets gewonnene umfangreiche und vielfältige Materialbasis erlauben es, die Multidimensionalität der Fragestellung und die Vielfalt der Perspektiven nach zwei Jahren Laufzeit angemessen zu analysieren sowie relevante prozess- und steuerungsoptimierende Informationen bereitzustellen. ; In the past, Germany has not been a frontrunner in the initiation of integrated district development programmes. Since then, however, this new experimental planning approach is gaining more and more acceptance (GAWRON 2005: 184f). This can be interpreted as a result of the increasing inadequacy of the classical element of urban development with its traditional and sectoral programme structures. Reasons for this can mainly be found in the nowadays more complex social constellations. Problems arise from these fast changing constellations, causing a need for a wider-range programme development and a more effective programme control. In 1999, the German Federal Government reacted to these intensified conditions and the new necessities accompanying them by presenting the programme "The Socially Integrative City – Districts with Special Development Needs" (in short: Socially Integrative City). The Socially Integrative City programme contains an area-specific, integrated, and integrative planning approach designed to improve the living conditions in disadvantaged urban districts and to ensure urban development with lasting effects. All institutions work closely together and encourage the local inhabitants to be personally involved in the project. This new approach ("Good Local Governance") provides people with a sense of responsibility for their neighbourhood and the possibility of playing an active role in its reorganisation. Considering these new conditions along with the decrease of public funding, numerous scientists, politicians, and administrative officials see a necessity to establish corresponding means for a final evaluation of the Socially Integrative City programme. This evaluation of advice and assessment is to show the programme's effectiveness and achievement of objectives. At European level, evaluations of structural policy programmes have been an imperative addition in the implementation of programmes for some time now. However, due to the lack of an evaluative tradition, the Socially Integrative City in Germany has, apart from a few exceptions, mainly been launched without a long-term and methodically secured evaluation. The author of this thesis wants to offer solutions to this evaluation deficiency problem that is lamented in numerous scientific fields. Three specific questions occur which will be closely examined: 1. What kind of evaluation design – designed for one specific disadvantaged district – leads to a sound analysis of the effects? 2. Which results gained from the first evaluation are crucial for a lasting development of this programme district? 3. What do these results say about the ongoing support for the Socially Integrative City? Reliable answers to these questions can only be obtained by an evaluation that accompanies the programme district from the beginning, i.e. it must include preparatory examinations, a formulation of objectives as well as constant monitoring of the implementation phase. This method is the foundation of this thesis, the area examined is the district of Pliensauvorstadt in Esslingen/Neckar. The method of "interactive evaluation" (WIDMER/BINDER 1997: 219) used here wants to understand the Socially Integrative City programme of Pliensauvorstadt in the context of the district's complex structures, processes, and inherent dynamism, and to interpret it with the help of the actors taking part in the practical part of the programme. In order to achieve these objectives, a longitudinal, multimethodical, exemplary evaluation design has to be drafted. The sound evaluation will be ensured by indicators that monitor the state of implementation as well as the achievement of objectives in three important fields examined. This will take place in the course of programme implementation as a means of quality assessment and as an analysis of its outcome. The three aforementioned fields will be "children and adolescents", "social and political participation", and "image and identity" and will form the main focus of the empirical part of the analysis. After two years, the design together with the extensive material base gained from the qualitative and quantitative indicator sets now allow a thorough analysis of the multidimensionality of questions and the variety of perspectives as well as providing relevant information for the optimisation of process and control.
This report takes a preliminary look at the behaviour of the tobacco industry in New Zealand. It is based on a series of literature searches, interviews with key informants, and on the examination of internal tobacco industry documents, many of which have been released by court orders in the United States. The report considers the tobacco industry activities in the context of a suggested framework for a responsible industry. The framework assumes that where the available evidence indicates that a consumer product poses a significant health hazard, then there are a number of appropriate responses that a business should undertake. These include warning the public, ceasing to promote the product and modifying the product to reduce harm. We found internal tobacco industry documents that appeared to show that advisers to the industry in New Zealand believed that smoking caused cancer, at a period when the industry was denying this link in statements to Parliament. Other documents showed that the industry took some credit for the decision in 1994 to end the Public Health Commission. The industry believed that they had slowed the adoption of new health warnings about tobacco during the 1990s. The documents show that the industry was assisted in their opposition to tobacco control activity by major New Zealand law firms, and by lawyers that included Sir Geoffrey Palmer, an ex-Prime Minister of New Zealand. The behaviour of the tobacco industry in particular areas is summarised below. The industry and the direct health effects of smoking: The available evidence suggests that the tobacco industry in New Zealand has been irresponsible in its prolonged delay in admitting the health risks posed by its products. Instead, it has attempted to falsely reassure the public and has been obstructive regarding the placement of health warnings on its products. When the industry has started to admit to the health risks from smoking, it has done so in a vague and disingenuous way. It has failed to substantively and appropriately communicate the health risk of its products to its customers and the public. The industry and the addictiveness of nicotine: The tobacco industry in New Zealand has been irresponsible in not informing its customers that its products are addictive. It has tried to provide reassurance to the public by defining smoking as merely a "habit". Furthermore, the industry has been obstructive about the placement of health warnings with the word "addiction" on its products. Even though internal industry documents have showed that British American Tobacco and Philip Morris have known for several decades that nicotine is addictive, the companies have still not actively and explicitly acknowledged the severity of the dependence created. The industry and second-hand smoke: The tobacco industry in New Zealand has consistently failed to warn the New Zealand public or the consumers of its products about the health risks from second-hand smoke. Furthermore, it has attempted to reassure the public and smokers that these risks are not real. These industry activities have been undertaken while the parent companies of some of the New Zealand companies knew of the risks posed by second-hand smoke (as shown by their internal documents). The irresponsible actions of the industry in New Zealand are similar to the approach taken by the industry elsewhere. Industry misuse of product design and opposition to harm reduction: The tobacco industry in New Zealand appears to have misused the design of tobacco products, particularly its use of additives. Many of the design changes may have been for marketing purposes rather than for harm reduction. The industry has also opposed the removal of fire accelerants from cigarettes. The apparent focus on marketing issues and lack of concern about significantly reducing harm to consumers is consistent with the policies of the industry's parent companies and of other overseas tobacco companies. Industry opposition to tobacco control initiatives: The available evidence suggests that the tobacco industry in New Zealand has opposed all substantive measures to help reduce tobacco consumption, to prevent the uptake of smoking by youth, and to protect the population from second-hand smoke. In particular, they have opposed restrictions on tobacco promotion (advertising and sponsorship) and smokefree environment regulations. They have also opposed the organisations involved in tobacco control and the compensation of those harmed by tobacco use. This irresponsible pattern of behaviour is highly consistent with that of the parent companies overseas and of other international tobacco companies. A responsible industry? It appears that the tobacco industry in New Zealand has behaved in a highly irresponsible manner over the last four decades. The industry's activities would appear to conflict with the societal values embodied in consumer protection legislation such as New Zealand's Fair Trading Act. Controlling the industry: We argue that given the extensive harm to New Zealanders from tobacco use, and the chronically irresponsible behaviour of the tobacco industry, there is a need for the New Zealand Government to more intensely regulate this particular industry. We suggest that the desired end point for Government policy is a smoking prevalence and exposure to second-hand smoke as near as possible to zero, while still permitting smoking to be legal. A wide range of tobacco control interventions should be used to achieve these end points. We consider that essential elements of a more effective tobacco control programme would include regular tobacco taxation increases and a much tighter regulatory environment. In particular, there is a need to severely constrain the way tobacco is sold and to control the composition of cigarettes. Publicising irresponsible tobacco industry activities and facilitating legal action against the industry appear to be valuable aspects that could be introduced to New Zealand Government tobacco control activities. An effective long-term programme for a virtually smokefree New Zealand would need to be carefully planned. It may need to be conducted by a focused, independent agency with secure funding. Without such measures the irresponsible behaviour of the tobacco industry in New Zealand will continue to impose a major burden on the health and welfare of its customers and on the public of New Zealand.
Tutkimuksen tehtävänä oli selvittää, voivatko valtionhallinnon alueille tuomat uudet instituutiot tukea omaehtoista alueellista kehittämistä ja, jos voivat, niin miten. Instituutioilla tutkimuksessa tarkoitettiin alueellista kehittämistoimintaa ohjaavia, tietoisesti luotuja sääntöjä ja menettelyjä tai käytännön toiminnan myötä kehittyneitä toimintamalleja. Omaehtoisella kehittämisellä taas tarkoitetaan sellaista alueellista kehittämistä, joka lähtee liikkeelle tietyllä alueella asuvista ihmisistä ja siellä toimivista organisaatioista sekä perustuu ennen kaikkea alueen omiin tarpeisiin ja voimavaroihin. Esimerkkeinä valtionhallinnon luomista uusista alueellisen kehittämisen instituutioista oli toimintaryhmätyö Suomesta sekä alueellinen kehittämissuunnittelu ja aluemanagement Saksan Baijerista. Toimintaryhmätyö on paikallisten kehittäjäryhmien ja näiden yhteistyökumppaneiden tekemää alueellista kehittämistyötä. Baijerin aluemanagement tarkoittaa puolestaan erilaisten toimijoiden yhteistyöhön perustuvan alueellisen kehittämisprosessin johtamista. Tutkimuksessa analysoitiin kahden suomalaisen ja kahden baijerilaisen esimerkkialueen kehittämisprosesseja noin neljän vuoden ajanjaksolla. Tärkeimmät metodit tutkimusaineiston keruussa olivat osallistuva havainnointi ja kehittämisprosessien toimijoille tehdyt puolistrukturoidut haastattelut. Tutkimus osoitti, että valtionhallinto voi uusien instituutioiden avulla tukea omaehtoista alueellista kehittämistä. Uusiin instituutioihin tulee tällöin sisältyä osallistavia suunnittelumetodeja ja hanketoiminnan koulutusta, malleja, kannustimia ja ongelmanratkaisuvälineitä paikallisille kumppanuuksille, joustavia rahoitusvälineitä, tukijaviranomaisten kumppanuutta sekä tukea verkostoitumiselle. Uusilla instituutioilla on kuitenkin myös piirteitä, jotka haittaavat omaehtosta kehittämistä. Tällaisia ovat normatiivinen säätely, tiettyjen toimijoiden aseman korostuminen, asiantuntijavetoinen tai liian kiireinen suunnittelu sekä kiinnittyminen sektorihallintoon. Uusien instituutioiden mahdollisuudet vakiintua alueille riippuvat puolestaan siitä, miten ne tehdään tunnetuksi, olemassa olevista instituutioista, uudelta instituutiolta odotettujen julkisten hyötyjen ja paikallisten intressien yhteensopivuudesta sekä toiminnan laajenemisesta ja kehittymisestä alueella. Tutkimusasetelma on ajankohtainen eurooppalaisessa alueellisessa kehittämisessä ja maaseutupolitiikassa, joissa uusia instituutioita parhaillaan luodaan ja kokeillaan. Aiempiin tutkimuksiin verrattuna tutkimus tuo uutta erityisesti analysoimalla rinnakkain kahden, lähtökohdiltaan suuresti toisistaan poikkeavan maan hyvin erilaisia instituutioita. Tutkimuksen tuloksia voidaan hyödyntää alueellisen kehittämispolitiikan suunnista ja toimenpiteistä päätettäessä. Tuloksia voivat hyödyntää myös erilaiset paikalliset yhteisöt tai kunnat halutessaan viedä eteenpäin omaehtoista kehittämistä alueellaan. Aiheellisia jatkotutkimuksen kohteita ovat uusien instituutioiden sekä omaehtoista kehittämistä tukevat että haittaavat elmentit. ; New Institutions Supporting Endogenous Development The recent changes in regional development in Europe were the starting point of the study. The European Union and the national governments of many European countries have reacted to new challenges of regional development by creating and launching special institutions to support endogenous regional and local development. Both Finland and the German state of Bavaria have responded in this way. An example in Finland is the activity of the local action groups consistent with the model of the EU LEADER programme, which has been extended through the national rural development programme for local endogenous development (POMO programme). In Bavaria, the Ministry of State Development and Environmental Affairs has created and launched institutions of regional development planning and regional management. The objective of the study was to determine whether these new institutions launched from outside are able to support endogenous development processes in the regions, and if they are, how do they do it. Answers were sought by analysing how the various elements of the new institutions influence the process of endogenous development in its different stages. Also, the influence of the launching practice was analysed. Four qualitative case studies were carried out: two in Finland and two in Bavaria. In Finland the case studies were carried out in two regions where the POMO programme was being implemented. In Bavaria two relatively rural regions were chosen where a sub-regional plan was made and was being implemented through regional management. The conditions for establishment of the new institutions in the regions are discussed in the study. The theoretical framework of the study is built around the terms regional development, endogenous development and institutions. Institutions are here understood as formal and informal systems of rules that guide the assignment of meanings and so the action. The institutions of regional development supply the framework for the regional and local development. The conclusion that can be drawn from the recent discussion of regional development thinking and practices in Europe is that new models of thinking and acting supporting endogenous development have emerged. Such models include strategic thinking and programming, networking and partnership, and communicative planning. These models have been incorporated in the new institutions of regional development created and launched by central authorities. Finland and Bavaria have different institutional backgrounds for the new institutions and these backgrounds have influenced the aims and forms of the new institutions. The institution of the activity of the local action group in Finland supports endogenous development on the basis of local partnerships. The institutions of regional development planning and regional management in Bavaria are intended to support endogenous development based above all on a partnership of municipalities. The influence of the new institutions on regional development processes depends on the characteristics of the elements of the new institution, how the institution was launched and on pre-existing institutions in the region. The rational incentives offered by the new institutions, together with the values and the beliefs taken for granted of the pre-existing institutions, are playing a central role. There are also other factors peculiar to the region and the actors that influence the development process. The main question of the study - whether the new institutions can support endogenous development processes - can be answered in the affirmative. The supporting characteristics of the new institutions are participatory planning methods and training for project management, models, incentives and ways of problem solving for local partnerships, flexible funding instruments, partnership with supporting authorities and support to networking. However, the new institutions also have characteristics unfavourable to endogenous development. These include normative rules, emphasis on the position of certain actors, expert planning or too hasty planning and attachment to sectorial government structures. The possibilities of the new institutions to root themselves in the region depend on the mode of launching, on the pre-existing institutions, on the compatibility of expected public benefits with the interests of local actors and on the expansion of the activity and development of the practices in the region.
The Agbiotech Bulletin Volume 4 Issue 11 November 1996 Published by AG-WEST BIOTECH INC. Code Number: NL96022 Sizes of Files: Text: 52.6K Graphics: No associated graphics files Ag-West to Focus on Commercialization "Commercialization is the key challenge facing the agbiotech industry in Saskatchewan," according to Dr. William Riley, President of Ag-West Biotech. In his address to the company's 6th Annual General Meeting, Riley stated that Saskatoon's agbiotech research sector has reached critical mass for self- sustaining growth. "There are now enough companies and public institutions gathered here to foster the exchange of ideas and resources that will stabilize our industry and provide the base for its further growth." Current Issues in Intellectual Property Rights: A Public Sector Perspective (This is the second in a series of articles on key Intellectual Property Rights issues.) The key function of intellectual property (IP) rights is to encourage investment in the development of new technologies and ensure their dissemination. This is most applicable to private enterprise, but is becoming increasingly significant in the public sector as proprietary technologies are used as a means to generate research funding. News Alliances Key to NRC Vision: Carty Business, academic, and government and community alliances are the key to driving economic development through innovation into the next century, according to Dr. Arthur Carty, President of Canada's National Research Council. Carty was speaking on "NRC's Vision to 2001" at an agbiotech networking luncheon presented by the Regional Economic Development Authority in Saskatoon. Saskatchewan Researchers Participate in Microcosm Validation Project Soil microbiologist Jim Germida reports that the University of Saskatchewan is cooperating in a series of small-scale experimental field tests of a genetically engineered microorganism, Pseudomonas aureofaciens. The purpose of the tests is to examine the ability of a simple laboratory procedure to accurately predict the survival of a microorganism in the field. Essay Contest Proves Popular The Agbiotech Essay Contest sponsored by Ag-West Biotech has proved popular with Grade 12 Saskatchewan students. More than 100 students entered an essay on the topic of "Biotechnology, Agriculture, and Our Future." Philom Bios Takes Over Marketing Role Philom Bios Inc. of Saskatoon has assumed all responsibility for the marketing of Provide, N-prove, and Tandem, its biological products line. The marketing of these products was previously handled by DowElanco Canada Inc. Flax Council Funds Research Canadian flax growers could reap the benefits from results of a three-year project looking at simple changes in management practices to improve production. The Flax Council of Canada is providing the primary funds for a Matching Investment Initiative project at the Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) Brandon Research Centre that could lead to increases in flax yield through improvements in fertilizer management and weed control. Ginseng Cloning Opens Door to Crop Improvement New Developments in Animal Biotech Scientists at the Dairy and Swine Research Centre at Lennoxville, Quebec are using a new process called microsatellite technology to mark genes responsible for desirable traits such as growth rate and carcass quality. Transgenic Papaya Two lines of genetically-engineered papaya that are resistant to papaya ringspot virus (PRSV) have been introduced by Cornell University and the University of Hawaii. New Fermentation Facility at N.C. State N.C. State University (NCSU) has set up a new $270,000 fermentation facility, complete with a 150-liter industrial fermenter, that will enable scientists to produce large amounts of biological substances needed to advance several biotech projects. Brewing and Biotechnology Australian scientists have identified genes in barley which can control qualities of beer such as haziness. The scientists have identified genes that prevent barley from making tannins, the major cause of haze, and have improved a gene transfer mechanism into barley. Regulatory Environment Canada at Odds with Status Quo According to an article by Jim Romahn in Manitoba Cooperator, Environment Canada and its Minister Sergio Marchi are refusing to go along with the federal cabinet, which supports the status quo with regard to regulating products of biotechnology. New Cost Recovery Fees Detailed New fees covering product registrations, product approvals, and other regulatory services provided by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) to feed and fertilizer manufacturers are in effect. Food Inspection Agency Legislation Introduced New legislation to create the Canadian Food Inspection Agency has been introduced in the House of Commons by Ralph Goodale, Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. Canada Accedes to Budapest Patent Treaty Canada has joined the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purpose of Patent Procedure. Legal Notes Patent for Roundup-Resistant Corn Patent on Herbicide-Tolerant Plants Events Formulation of Biocontrol Products Quantitative Genetics and Biotech Trends Accumulation of Trace Elements Studied Trace elements occur naturally in all soils. They are taken up by plants to varying degrees and can ultimately affect human health. New Materials for Environmental Control Glass has been used for more than a century to build controlled environments for horticulture. Growers are now adding a variety of new low-cost materials and techniques to extend environmental controls, including controls on temperature, moisture, weeds, and pests. Alliances Incyte Pharmaceuticals/Monsanto Golden Harvest Seeds/Monsanto/DeKalb Calgene/Kirin Brewery Co TechTransfer Gene Makes Aspens Red Bioreactor Licensed Finance Crop Development Centre Good Money in Transgenic Cotton Issues Controversial Tests Trace Adulterants in Fruit Juice US Organic Standards Exclude Biotech Draft Xenotransplantation Guidelines Available Vermont BST Law Suspension Risks Associated with Satellite RNA Genetically-Modified Foods Targeted in Europe Resources Ernst & Young Biotech Reports Available Canadian Biotech Newsletter for US Market US Biotech Information On-Line Antibody Purification Service New Publications on Biotech Ethics People Watch College of Veterinary Medicine Pulse Crop Development Board Alpha Chemical and Biomedical Saskatchewan Wheat Pool We Welcome Your Input Credits
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There are a lot of moving parts to the MMT program. I want to focus on one of these parts today: the relation between monetary and fiscal policy. One thing I find appealing about MMT scholars is their attention to monetary history and institutional details. I've learned a lot from them in this regard. But as is often the case with details, one has to worry about whether they help shed light on a specific question of interest, or whether they sometimes let us not see the forest for the trees. And in terms of the broader picture, since I grew up in that branch of macroeconomics that tries to take money, banking, and debt seriously (i.e., not standard NK theory), I sometimes have a hard time understanding what all the fuss is about. Much of standard monetary theory (SMT) seems perfectly consistent with some of the ideas I seen discussed in MMT proponents; see, for example, The Failure to Inflate Japan.
This post is devoted to better understanding a contribution by Eric Tymoigne. Eric is one of the people I go to whenever I want to learn more about MMT (if you're interested in MMT, you should follow him on Twitter @tymoignee). In this post, I discuss his article "Modern Monetary Theory, and Interrelations Between the Treasury and Central Bank: The Case of the United States." (JEI 2014). Passages quoted from his paper are highlighted in blue. The working paper version of the paper can be found here. Eric has kindly agreed to respond to my comments and let me post our conversation. We had to some editing, hopefully this did not disrupt the flow too much. In any case, I hope you find it interesting. And, as always, feel free to join in on the conversation in the comments section below. -- DA
One of the main contributions of modern money theory (MMT) has been to explain why monetarily sovereign governments have a very flexible policy space. Not only can they issue their own currency to spend and to service their public debt denominated in their own unit of account, but also any self-imposed constraint on budgetary operations can be easily bypassed.
I'm curious to know what the contribution is here relative to standard monetary theory (SMT). In SMT, the government can also issue its own currency to spend and to service the public debt denominated in its own unit of account. So this degree of "flexibility" is already accounted for. As for "self-imposed constraints on budgetary operations," SMT takes several approaches to this issue, depending on the purpose of the analysis. One approach is to take these constraints as given and then to study their implications. But it is also common to consolidate the central bank, treasury and government into a single authority, which implies no self-imposed constraints on budgetary operations.
Perhaps what is meant is that MMT shows how existing self-imposed constraints on budgetary operations can be (or are) bypassed in reality. This leads us to question, however, concerning what those self-imposed constraints are doing there in the first place. Are they there by design and, if so, why? Or are they there by accident (and, if so, how in the world did this happen)?
ET: Yes consolidation is not unique to MMT as we have said repeatedly. Not only is it used quite commonly in the economic literature, but also it is a common rhetorical tool in economic talks, discourse, etc.
DA: Right, so everyone understands this (at least, they should)--it's perfectly consistent with standard monetary theory. So far, so good.
ET: Most economists, politicians and the public don't understand this or its implications. They will interpret the above as saying that it is obvious that the government can create money but it is not a normal way to proceed and it is inflationary. MMT just pushes consolidation to its logical conclusions and shows that institutional details do back those conclusions. In a consolidated framework, the federal government can only implement spending by creating money, this is not abnormal and it is not inflationary by itself. There is no other way to find the necessary dollars to spend. Here is what consolidation means in terms of balance sheets:
For the federal government, taxes destroy currency (L1 falls) and claims on non-fed sectors falls (A1 falls) (an alternative offsetting operation is net worth of government rises). When US spends, it credits accounts (L1 rises). Similarly, bond issuance does not lead to a gain of any asset for the government; all it does is replace a non-interest earning government liability (monetary base) with an interest-earning government liability (Treasury securities).
DA: I am not going to argue against your accounting. As for bond-issuance, in SMT, an open-market operation is modeled as a swap of zero-interest reserves for interest-bearing treasuries. The interest on treasuries is explained by their relative illiquidity (another self-imposed constraint). The economic consequences of such a swap depends on a host of factors, which I'm sure you're familiar with.
ET: Sure, in addition, self-imposed financial constraints (e.g. debt ceiling, no direct financing by the Fed, no monetary power for treasury) have been put in place at various times with the argument that they impose discipline in public finances. MMT argues, these financial constraints are not necessary and are bypassed routinely through Treasury-Central Bank coordination.
DA: Sure, the standard view is that these self-imposed constraints are designed to impose discipline in public finance. The proposition that these financial constraints are or are not necessary, however, must be based on a set of assumptions that may or may not be satisfied in reality. (The fact that these constraints may be bypassed through Treasury-Central Bank coordination does not seem relevant to me -- the conflict emphasized by SMT is between an "independent" central bank and the legislative authority (e.g., the Fed and Congress, not the Fed and Treasury). I'm not sure why a new theory is needed here. We know, for example, that if the legislative branch of government fully trusts itself (and future elected representatives) to behave in a fiscally responsible manner, the notion of an "independent" central bank (and other self-imposed constraints) makes little sense.
ET: Remember that MMT emphasizes the irrelevance of financial/nominal constraints for monetarily sovereign governments (bond vigilantes, risk of insolvency of social security, etc.). One can do that by using the consolidated government (taxes don't finance, bonds don't finance, government spends by crediting accounts, etc.) or by using the unconsolidated government (the central bank helps the Treasury, the Treasury helps the central bank). The second method conforms to actual federal government operations but it is much less easy to use rhetorically and it waters down the core point: government finances are never a financial issue as long as monetary sovereignty applies.
Given that point, as you note, financial constraints are not only irrelevant, but also disruptive and used for political games. MMT wants to make government financial operations as smooth and flexible as possible. Once society has decided how, and to what degree, government should be involved in solving socioeconomic problems, finding the money should not be an issue when monetary sovereignty prevails. That means demystifying and eliminating financial barriers to government operations so the political debate can focus on solving real issues (environment issues, socio-economic issues, etc.). Fearmongering about the public debt and fiscal deficits makes for poor political debates and policy prescriptions.
There is a view, expressed by Paul Samuelson, that if we tell policymakers and the public that there are no financial limits to government spending, policymakers will spend like mad; therefore, economists need to lie to policymakers and the public (and themselves). This is nonsense. We ought to discuss policy choices not on the basis of Noble Lies but rather on the basis of sound and informed premises. Economists needs to make sure that policymakers focus on resource constraints.
In addition, political constraints on government should be geared toward improving the transparency and participatory aspects of government (e.g. limit role of big money in elections, limit wastes, etc.). We already have a government that passes a budget (it needs to do so for transparency and accountability purposes), we already have an auditing process, and we already have some (limited) democratic process, so aim at improving these aspects. MMT proponents are not naive, we know that some politicians are self-interested, we know that policy implementation may lead to mistakes, we know people may try to game the system ("free riders"); however we trust that a transparent and democratic government can (and does) get through these issues. MMT does not see financial constraints as helping in any ways, rather they inhibit the democratic process.
Of course, MMT proponents also have a policy agenda (Job guarantee, financial regulation based on Minsky, etc.) because we do not see market mechanisms as self-promoting full employment, price stability and financial stability. As such, as you said, MMT proponents favor alternative means to achieve these goals through direct government intervention. We don't see the central bank as an effective means to promote price stability. The central bank should focus on financial stability through interest-rate stabilization and financial regulation (an area where the Fed has not performed well).
Finally, yes independence of the central bank is seen as a big deal but MMT disagrees for two reasons. First, MMT emphasizes the lack of effectiveness of monetary policy in managing the business cycle and, second, and probably more importantly, MMT notes that central-bank independence in terms of interest-rate setting and goal settings does not mean independence from the financial needs of the Treasury.
DA: I think it's fair to say most people want to see government operations run smoothly, and would welcome a sober debate over the issues at hand without the fear-mongering that some like to promote. The broad objective seems the same--the debate is more over implementation--how monetary and fiscal policy is to be coordinated--given human frailties.
Having said this, I think you go too far by asserting that "government finances are never an issue as long as monetary sovereignty applies." Of course, technical default on nominal debt is not an issue (we all understand this). But SMT also recognizes the importance of economic default on nominal debt. True, a government can always print money to satisfy its nominal debt obligation, but if money printing dilutes the purchasing power of money, this is a de facto default.
On a related issue, SMT asks "what are the limits to seigniorage?" The fact that a government can print money does not give it the power to command resources without constraint. People can (and do) find substitutes for government money (they may also substitute out of taxed activities into non-taxed activities). SMT treats the limits to seigniorage as a financial constraint. Maybe MMT has a different label for this constraint? Perhaps it is related to what I hear MMT proponents call an "inflation constraint." Maybe one way to reconcile MMT with SMT on this score is by recognizing that SMT usually assumes (sometimes incorrectly) that the inflation constraint is always binding. If this is the case, a monetarily-sovereign government does have a financial constraint, even according to MMT.
ET: Yes, ability to create a currency does not mean ability to command resources because there may not be a demand for the currency. That is where tax liabilities and other dues owed to the government become important (cf. the chartalist theory of money, a component of MMT). That's also why taxes, monetary creation and bond issuance are not conceptualized by MMT as alternative financing means but rather as complementary. The government imposes a tax liability, spends by issuing the currency necessary to pay the tax liability, then taxes and issues bonds. Spending may be inflationary indeed and so there is an inflation constraint; but it is not a financial constraint, it is a resource constraint.
About the "printing" of money by government, inflation and economic default. Regarding the first two, there is no evidence of an automatic relation between money and inflation. In a consolidated view, government always spends by monetary creation but controls the impact on inflation via taxes and the impact on interest rates via bond issuance. In an unconsolidated view, the central bank routinely finances and refinances the Treasury by helping some of the auction bidders and by participating in the auction.
Finally, regarding economic default, governments routinely "default" in that sense with no problems. I don't see that as a relevant concept unless someone can show that economic default raises interest rates or generates rising inflation (it does not); here again, there is no automatic link between inflation and interest rates. That link depends on how the central bank reacts; if it does not then market participants don't either.
DA: Let me return to the manner in which the Fed/Treasury/Congress are consolidated (or not) in SMT and why this matters, in your view. In some SMT treatments, Congress decides spending and taxes, which implies a primary deficit. It's up to the Treasury to finance that deficit, with the Fed playing a supporting role (by determining interest rate and issuing reserves for treasury debt). What's wrong with this approach?
ET: That goes in the right direction with an understanding that the government really has no control over its fiscal position. All this, which relates to the implementation of monetary sovereignty, helps understand why the financial crowding out is not operative, why monetary financing is not by definition inflationary, why i > g is normal. It helps explain why the hysterical rhetoric surrounding the public debt and deficits in nonsense. I recently wrote a piece for Challenge Magazine on that topic. Surpluses are celebrated, governments implement austerity during a recession to "live within our means", Social Security needs to be fixed to avoid bankrupting it, governments need to save more, etc. All of this is incorrect.
DA: I'm not sure why you claim SMT leads to the idea of i > g. The case i < g is perfectly consistent with SMT (see Blanchard's 2019 AEA Presidential address, and also my posts here and here). The correct criticism (I think) is that mainstream economists have assumed i > g as being the empirically relevant case (it is not).
ET: That is what I meant. MMT links that to monetary sovereignty.
DA: I think that's correct. I should like to add that mainstream economists (apart from a small set of monetary theorists) have not appreciated the role of high-grade sovereign debt as an exchange medium in wholesale financial markets and as a global store of value, which in my view likely explains a lot of the "missing inflation." But as for "surpluses being celebrated," you are now talking about individual viewpoints and not SMT per se. There were plenty of calls out there for countercyclical fiscal policy based on standard macroeconomic principles. But I do agree virtually all mainstream economists are (perhaps overly) concerned about "long-run fiscal sustainability." The view is that at the end of the day, stuff has to be paid for -- and that having the ability to print money, while granting an extra degree of flexibility, does not get around this basic fact.
DA: I'd like to ask you about this statement you make:
In (the unconsolidated) case, the Treasury collects taxes and issues securities before it can spend. However, federal taxes and bond offerings also serve another highly important function that is overlooked in standard monetary economics. Specifically, federal taxes and bond offerings result in a drainage of funds from the banking system, and MMT carefully analyzes the implication of this fact. From that analysis, MMT argues that federal taxes and bond offerings are best conceptualized as devices that maintain price and interest-rate stability, respectively (of course, the tax structure also has some important role to play in terms of influencing incentives and income distribution; something not disputed by MMT).
DA: Well, yes, taxes serve both as a revenue device (permitting the government to gain control over resources that would otherwise be in control of the private sector) and as a way to control inflation. I'm not sure about the idea of the Treasury offering bonds for the purpose of achieving interest-rate stability (though this may happen to some extent when the treasury determines which maturity to offer). I don't think this is the way things work in the U.S. today.
ET: Taxes and issuance of treasuries drain reserves and so raise the overnight rate. Hence, on a daily basis, a fiscal surplus raises the overnight rate and a fiscal deficit lowers it. There has been significant Treasury-Fed coordination to smooth the impact of taxes (and treasury spending) on the money market.
DA: Fine, but so what? We all understand "coordination" between Fed and Treasury exists at the operational level.
ET: I think you are too kind to other economists and policymakers. On taxes as price-stabilizing factors, there is indeed some similarities here. On the role of treasuries for interest-rate stability, it does work like this today. It may not be obvious because of the current emphasis on treasuries as Treasury's budgetary tools, but Treasury has issued securities for other purposes than its budgetary needs. In the US, this occurred most recently during the 2008 crisis (SFP bills). In Australia, in the early 2000s, the Treasury issued securities while running surpluses in order to promote financial stability.
DA: But even if this is not the way things actually work (in my view, it's the Fed that stabilizes interest rates, possibly through OMOs involving U.S. Treasuries), I'm not sure what point is being made. I think we can all agree that monetary and fiscal policy can be thought of as being consolidated in some manner. What would be good to know is how a specific MMT consolidation matters (relative to other specifications) for a specific set of questions being addressed. There is nothing in the abstract or introduction of this paper that suggests an answer to this question.
ET: The point being made is that in a consolidated government, tax and bond issuance lose the financial purpose they have for the Treasury but keep their price and interest-stability purposes.
DA: In standard monetary theory, tax and bond issuance keeps its funding purposes for the government and at the same time can be used to influence the price-level (inflation) and interest rates. Is this wrong? I don't think so. At some level, taxes (a vacuum cleaner sucking up money from the private sector) must have some implications for the ability of government to exert command over real resources in the economy. What we label this ability (whether "funding" or ''finance" or whatever, seems inconsequential).
ET: Ok here comes the crucial difference between financial and real sides of the economy. In financial terms, taxes do not increase the capacity of the government to spend, i.e. the government does not earn any money from taxing; taxes destroy the currency. In financial terms, there is no reason to fear a fiscal deficit; deficits are the norm, are sustainable and help other sectors grow their financial net wealth. As such, it is not because a government wants to spend more that it must tax more or lower spending somewhere else. That is the PAYGO mentality. This mentality makes policymakers think of spending and taxing in terms of how they impact the fiscal balance instead of their impact on employment, inflation, incentives, etc. While deficits may have negative consequences, they are not automatic. If one takes a look at the evidence, deficits have no automatic negative impacts on interest rates, tax rates, public-debt sustainability, or inflation.
In real terms, the necessity to increase tax rates to prevent inflation, and so move more resources to the government, depends on the state of the economy and the permanency of the increase in government spending relative to the size of the economy. In an underemployed economy, the government can spend more without raising tax rates. In a fully employed economy, shifting resources to the government without generating inflation does require raising tax rate and/or putting in place other measures such as rationing, price controls, and delayed private-income payment. Here Keynes's "How to Pay for the War" provides the roadmap. Standard economics is full-employment economics so opportunity costs are always present. MMT follows Kalecki, Keynes and the work of their followers (have a look at Lavoie's "Foundations of Post Keynesian Economic Analysis") and note that capitalist economies are usually underemployment and economic growth is demand driven. Put in a picture, the economy is usually at point a.
Put succinctly, the real constraint is conditionally relevant, the financial constraint is irrelevant if monetary sovereignty prevails. That is the proper way to frame the policy debates and to advise policymakers; don't worry about the money, worry about how spending impacts the economy.
ET: Moving to another topic, consolidation of the government brings to the forefront forces that are operating in the current system but that are buried under institutional complications. Namely that a fiscal deficit lowers interest rates and treasuries issuance brings them back up, that spending must come before taxing and treasuries issuance, that monetary financing of the government is not intrinsically unsound and does not mean that tax and treasuries issuance don't have to be implemented.
DA: The statement that "deficit lower interest rates" needs considerable qualification. Among other things, it depends on the monetary policy reaction function. As for the claim that spending *must* come before taxes, this is not a universally valid statement (even if it may be true in some circumstances. But even more importantly, who cares? Mainstream theory does not suggest that monetary financing is intrinsically unsound (seigniorage is fine, if it respects inflation ceiling). As for money, taxes and bonds not being alternative "funding" sources, I worry that this semantics. You can call X a "funding" source or not -- it's just a label. The real question is: what are the macroeconomic implications of X?
ET: Let me emphasize where I agree. Yes, evidence shows the central role of monetary policy for the direction of interest rates, fiscal policy is at best a very small driver. And yes, one ought to focus on the real implications of government spending and we ought to forget about the financial implications. A fiscal deficit is not unsustainable nor abnormal; deficits are the stylized fact of government finances and are financially sustainable if monetary sovereignty is present. So don't try to frame the policy debate and set policy in terms of household finances, bankruptcy, fixing the deficit, etc.
To conclude I see three reasons why the "taxes/bonds don't finance the government" rhetoric is helpful:
1- It is strictly true for the federal government (i.e. consolidation).
2- it brings to the forefront some lesser-known aspects of taxes and treasuries issuance: impacts on money market, role of central bank in fiscal policy, role of treasury in monetary policy.
3- It changes the narrative in terms of policy and political economy: government does not rely on the rich to finance itself, taxes should be set to remove the "bads" not to finance the government (e.g. one should not set tax rates on pollution with the goal of balancing the budget but with the goal of curbing pollution to whatever is considered appropriate, that may lead to much higher tax rates than what is needed to balance the budget), PAYGO is insane, one should focus on the real outcomes of government policies not the budgetary outcomes.
DA:
1. I think this is semantics.
2. Not sure how it helps in this regard.
3. I think all of these positions are defensible without the statement "taxes/bonds don't finance the government", so if this is the ultimate goal (and I think it should be), perhaps we should set aside semantic debates and focus on the real issues at hand.
ET: 1 is not semantic. I know you have in mind taxes as a means to leave resources to the government. MMT makes a clear difference between financial (ability to find the money) and resources constraint (ability to get the goods and services) as explained above. The financial constraint is highly relevant for non-monetarily sovereign governments so it should be noted and clearly separated from the real constraint. Too many policy discussions and decisions by policymakers operating under monetary sovereignty are based on an inexistent inability to find money and the imagined dear financial consequences of budgeting fiscal deficits. 2 helps to understand how monetary sovereignty is implemented in practice. On 3, yes focus on the real issues.
DA: We agree on 3! Thank you for an interesting discussion, Eric. There's so much more to talk about, but let's leave that for another day.
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When Sweden applied for NATO membership on May 22, 2022, it ended two centuries of military non-alignment. Although it was swiftly ratified by most NATO members, Türkiye and Hungary have prolonged the accession process. With ratification from Türkiye in hand, all eyes are on Hungary next, with Sweden set to become the 32nd member of the NATO Alliance in the coming weeks. Sweden has a highly advanced military and is a net contributor to the defensive alliance; its membership represents a considerable boost to NATO capabilities. As a member of NATO, Sweden will provide the Alliance with 1) support from its strong defense industry, 2) high-technological competence, and 3) a significant air force. These contributions will be crucial in preparing the Alliance to combat modern threats, as well as providing a dramatic multiplier to NATO's capacity in two vital regions—the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic. With Sweden's modern and diverse capabilities soon to be added to NATO's toolkit, it is worth taking a look at what the country will contribute to the Alliance, now and in the future. Three Major Benefits of Sweden Joining NATOThere are three main areas where Sweden will be able to contribute tangible benefits. First is Sweden's defense industry, which will boost the Alliance's military-industrial capacity. One of the largest in Europe, Sweden's defense industry amounted to $3 billion in 2022 with exports of defense material totaling over $2 billion. The country's largest defense companies produce some of the most sophisticated equipment on the market, such as Saab's Jas 39 Gripen and BAE System AB's Combat Vehicle 90. Approximately 28,000 people are employed by Sweden's defense industry, a figure likely to rise as the government has announced a considerable increase in its annual defense budget for 2024; nearly double that of its 2020 defense budget. The high demand for defense production, which has struggled to keep up with weapons demands as countries provide armaments to Ukraine in the wake of Russian aggression, is only going to continue for the coming years. The second benefit is the high level of technological competence in Sweden's private sector. Sweden's extensive public-private partnerships, considerable R&D funding, and highly-ranked education system are some of the factors behind its success in high-tech. The government launched a national 'Cybercampus' initiative in 2020 in partnership between the Swedish Defense Forces, public universities, and private companies, and established the Centre for Cyber Defence and Information Security in Stockholm. As NATO expands its ability to counter cyber and hybrid threats, Sweden's technological know-how will help prepare the Alliance to prepare for tomorrow's threats.In addition, with Sweden in NATO, two of the three manufacturers of 5G equipment—Ericsson and Nokia—will be in the same defensive alliance. The country is home to leading high-tech firms, such as Ericsson, the world's second largest network company; Hexagon, a major software company; and Northvolt, one of Europe's largest producers of lithium batteries. Sweden's success in attracting tech startups and in producing unicorns (startups reaching a billion dollar valuation) has led the country to be informally dubbed the 'Silicon Valley of Europe'. Sweden also possesses large quantities of critical minerals—such as iron ore and rare earth metals—which are vital for the defense industry, in the green transition, and for the overall economy. After a recent discovery in the Northern Swedish city of Kiruna, the country now possesses the largest-known deposit of rare-earth metals in Europe. Sweden will provide the Alliance with a crucial opportunity to reduce its critical minerals dependency on China and other authoritarian governments. The third benefit is Sweden's air force. The country's air force is the largest in the Nordics and one of the largest in Europe, possessing at least 100 fighter jets. With many more slated to be delivered in the upcoming years, Sweden is set to dramatically bolster the Alliance's number of fighter jets in the Baltic and Arctic regions. This will reduce the need for other major allies such as the United States to provide air surveillance and air presence in the region, with NATO member states now able to take a larger role in their own region's defense. Although Sweden's air capabilities are significant, it is one of only a few European countries, and the only Nordic country, that flies the Gripen. Sweden, along with the other Nordic countries—Norway, Finland and Denmark—signed the Nordic Air Commander's Intent in March 2023, with the goal of combining air capabilities to better deter Russia. As the individual Nordic air forces seek to unite under a common purpose, Sweden remains the odd one out with its Gripen fighters, the others all use the Lockheed Martin-designed F-16 or F-35. Sweden's commitment to the Gripen has previously put it at odds with the United States, a decision which will likely be discussed more in the upcoming years as Allied cooperation intensifies. A Swedish Air Force Saab Gripen fighter.Image CreditBolstering NATO's Northern CorridorSweden's membership is also beneficial for NATO given Sweden's geostrategic location in the heart of the Nordics. This is the first time all of the Nordic countries have been in the same alliance since 1523—after Finland's accession to NATO in April 2023. With Sweden as a member, the Alliance will gain strategic depth in the Baltic Sea region. Most countries around the Baltic Sea will now be part of the same military alliance, which has led some people to dub the Baltic Sea a 'NATO lake'. Sweden's entry into the Alliance will add three new strategic locations to the Alliance: 1) the strait of Øresund, the main strait connecting the North Sea to the Baltic Sea, which will now be completely controlled by NATO members; 2) Gotland, the largest island in the Baltic Sea, often called an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' due to its central location in the Baltics; and 3) shoreline along the Åland Sea and Gulf of Bothnia will make it easier for the Alliance to defend Åland, a demilitarized region between Finland and Sweden at the entry of the Gulf of Bothnia. Sweden is increasing its military presence in these areas, most notably on Gotland. In recent years, Sweden has relocated a mechanized battalion and anti-aircraft capabilities, as well as put aside specific financing of $163 million for the defense of Gotland. NATO access to Gotland will dramatically increase its force projection capabilities into the Baltic Sea region. Sweden also possesses a world-class submarine fleet—with some of the most advanced submarines in operation—and a wealth of knowledge navigating the shallow Baltic Sea, which it has done since 1904. Sweden's fleet currently consists of three advanced Gotland-class submarines and one older model scheduled to be retired when two new designs are delivered in 2027 and 2028, giving it five submarines by the end of the decade. Critically, the entirety of US submarine capabilities and a major portion of Russia's submarine fleet are unable to operate in the shallow Baltic Sea. Sweden fills a crucial gap in capabilities for NATO in the Baltic Sea region with its long history of submarine expertise and modern capabilities.Sweden's membership will also be a game changer for NATO in the Arctic region. When Sweden joins NATO, seven of the eight Arctic states—all except for Russia—will be part of the same Alliance. With climate change poised to open new sea lanes and possibilities for resource extraction such as hydrocarbons and critical minerals, the region is becoming gradually more important both commercially and militarily. This rising geopolitical interest for the region by Arctic states—especially Russia—will require greater cooperation among NATO members to strengthen deterrence in the region. China too is increasingly interested in the region, and with intensifying Sino-Russian relations, it is potentially a new theater in the ongoing great power competition. Sweden too has noted the importance of the Arctic region and is in a process of enhancing its presence in the Arctic. This is evident from the Swedish government's recent decision to start construction on two new garrisons in northern Sweden. Russia is investing heavily in its Arctic capabilities, so too must NATO invest in its capabilities in the region. Adding Sweden as a member significantly increases NATO's access to Arctic infrastructure, training opportunities, and adds Sweden's expertise operating in the region to the Alliance's capabilities.Increased Cooperation and Bolstered CapabilitiesIn addition to the immediate benefits Sweden will bring to the Alliance, there are also future benefits to realize. Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden has pursued a strategy of increased spending on the military and rearmament. This strategy has been accelerated since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The country's recent decision to increase military spending by 28% for FY2024 will bring military spending above the 2% target six years earlier than planned—showcasing Sweden's commitment to be a trustworthy partner in the Alliance. The increased funding will go towards bolstering some of Sweden's current weaknesses, such as its low number of personnel and reservists. The annual number of recruits will increase from 5,500 to 10,000 and will give Sweden one of the largest reserve forces in the Alliance. It is also planning to reactivate civilian conscription in an effort to bolster its personnel and boost its defensive capabilities. Sweden's NATO membership also opens up new possibilities of defense cooperation, both on the Alliance level and regionally. Sweden's long position of military non-alignment has led it to historically underutilize cooperation with other like-minded partners on defense and security. The upcoming years will therefore provide Sweden and the Alliance many opportunities to deepen cooperation with integration and synergies. There are also numerous opportunities for increased regional cooperation outside of NATO, most notably with bodies such as 1) the Nordic Defense Cooperation (Nordefco), a defense collaboration bringing together the five Nordic countries; 2) the Nordic Council, an inter-parliamentary body for Nordic cooperation (and which has historically not discussed defense due to Sweden and Finland's military non-alignment); 3) and bilateral defense cooperation between Sweden and Finland. A sign of increased cooperation was evident earlier this year, when the air force commanders of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway issued a joint declaration, with a shared goal to operate all Nordic fighter jets as one fleet. This announcement–made during the early days of the Swedish presidency of Nordefco–would result in a joint fleet of at least 250 fighter jets, and possibly as many as 400, although it is difficult to say how many are in active use. A bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed by the Swedish Minister for Defence Pål Jonson and the United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the 5th of December 2023. After the Riksdag approves and implements it, the Agreement should enter into force by late 2024.Image CreditSweden is also in the process of increasing its ties to other partners, including the United States, with whom Sweden concluded negotiating a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in December 2023. This bilateral agreement provides a framework for defense cooperation, outlines the terms for US troops in Sweden, should the need or desire ever arise, and deepens defense relations within NATO. Another important partner is the United Kingdom, with whom Sweden has cooperated more in recent years through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)—a UK-led defense initiative consisting of ten Northern European countries. Sweden in NATO marks all of the JEF countries in both frameworks, enhancing opportunities for multi-domain interoperability in the high north. Additionally, Sweden has committed to sending at least 600 troops to Latvia in 2025 as part of a NATO-led multinational battle group. These forward placed units act as a deterrent to Russia and are a visible sign of Sweden's commitment to be a net contributor to NATO.Sweden's decision to apply for NATO membership and its dramatic reinvestment in its military since the Russian annexation of Crimea represents a profound shift in the Nordic nation's military policy. With a robust defense industry, numerous high-tech companies—including one of the major producers of 5G infrastructure equipment—vital geostrategic location, and a powerful air force that increases force projection into the Baltic Sea and shores up the Northern corridor, Sweden stands to contribute significantly to the alliance from day one as a member. Together with Finland and its Nordic neighbors, Sweden is undertaking a profound integration of air capabilities and a new Nordic dimension to the alliance is emerging. As NATO's newest member, Sweden will join with a profound array of capabilities and dramatically transform the Northern corridor of the Alliance.
