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It's that time of year, and despite all the budgetary drama unfolding on Capitol Hill, lawmakers have already finished most of their holiday shopping for their favorite children: Pentagon contractors. Through cryptic "program increases" to the defense budget appropriations for fiscal year 2024, most with no listed author and little to no justification, Congress has added more than $25 billion to the Pentagon's procurement and research accounts for fiscal year 2024. Based on the continuing resolution that Congress passed in November, Congress has until February 2 to either pass another stopgap measure, or pass a final Pentagon spending bill, at which point we should be able to see which program increases make the cut. If history is any indication, almost all of them will be in the final bill.In the meantime, a new database created by Taxpayers for Common Sense reveals each of these program increases, whether they fund projects that weren't funded at all in the Pentagon's budget request, and whether they fund projects requested in Unfunded Priorities Lists (UPLs), extra-budgetary wish lists that Congress requires military service branch and combatant command leaders to submit to Congress each year.The numbersLawmakers on the House Appropriations Committees got to work early, adding 479 program increases for a combined $9.5 billion. When their Senate counterparts got to work, they included 636 program increases in their bill worth nearly $15 billion — so all in all 1,115 program increases. Broken down by bill section, there were 172 increases for procurement between the House and Senate at a cost of $14 billion, and 943 for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) at a cost of $10.5 billion. When the House version of the Defense Appropriations bill came to the floor, lawmakers added 11 more program increases for procurement, and another 90 for RDT&E, for a combined $1.1 billion.While these kinds of adds are nothing new, their numbers do seem to be growing, particularly in the RDT&E category. In fact, the number of RDT&E top-ups has grown by 72% in the past four years, from 600 for FY2021, to 776 for FY2022, to 996 for FY2023, up to 1,033 for FY2024. More troubling still is that 1,010 of the total 1,216 increases, or $14.5 billion of the $25.7 billion lawmakers have added to these accounts, are for projects the Pentagon didn't fund at all in its budget request.Are they earmarks?According to Congress, these increases aren't earmarks, but in practice, they often serve the same purpose and are not subject to transparency reforms traditional earmarks have faced since 2007.Traditional earmarks, rebranded by Congress as "congressionally directed funding" or "community project funding," support projects that fund a specific entity for a specific purpose in a specific place. This made them a favored tool for lawmakers to funnel taxpayer dollars into their district or state. But these earmarks come with rules, requiring members to put their names on them, and in the House's case, requiring members to list their earmarks on their websites. Program increases are not bound by these rules. They have no name attached (apart from amendments, which list their sponsors) and generally lack any accompanying justification. In the Senate Appropriations Committee report on the Pentagon spending bill, a section on "funding increases" stipulates that "funding increases shall be competitively awarded, or provided to programs that have received competitive awards in the past." So Congress seems to differentiate these increases from earmarks on the basis that they're competitively awarded, unlike traditional earmarks. In practice, that rationale breaks down.Next-gen earmarksOne program increase allocates $2 million for "urban subterranean mapping technology," a fancy name for tunnel detection. This increase has appeared in every Pentagon spending bill since FY2020, for a total of $17 million over five years, but there's almost no publicly available information about this project. That is other than Sen. Joe Manchin's (D-W.Va.) regular celebrations of funding for West Virginia-based Marshall University to research urban subterranean mapping technology in press release after press release after press release after press release, all of which were published before the funds they celebrate were formally awarded.Some adds are even more blatantly noncompetitive. In the House, someone added $7 million for "Omniblast water sensor technology." If that sounds weirdly specific, it's because it is. The Omniblast water sensor is a trademarked product, owned by a company called Advanced Materials and Devices (AMAD), Inc. It goes without saying that program increases for patented products can only be fulfilled by the patent owners, so AMAD Inc. is more than a shoe-in for any "competitive" award process. And while AMAD Inc. was awarded a contract for "a wearable underwater blast sensor" in 2022, it was the only bidder, suggesting a not so competitive process in the past.As to whether this funding, like an earmark, is meant to serve the political interests of a specific lawmaker, we can't know for sure without knowing the author. But AMAD Inc. is based in Reno, Nevada, in the district of Rep. Mark Amodei's (R-Nev.), who sits on the House Appropriations Committee. While AMAD Inc. hasn't made any political contributions to Rep. Amodei's campaigns, it did spend $150,000 on lobbying in 2022, and $120,000 on lobbying in the first three quarters of 2023, expenses paid to a lobbying firm called Cornerstone Government Affairs. Cornerstone donated $3,000 to Rep. Amodei so far in the 2024 election cycle, its first time contributing to any of his campaigns.Unjustified adds, unjustifiable secrecyAsked about these program increases, a Senate Appropriations Committee staffer pointed to the unfunded priorities they fund as a justification. But there are two problems with that argument. One is that Unfunded Priorities Lists (UPLs) are just that: unfunded, meaning the Pentagon didn't find them important enough to include in its $826 billion request. Almost by definition, items on these UPLs are non-priorities for the Pentagon. The second problem is that UPLs only accounted for about $1.9 billion of the $25.7 billion lawmakers added to the Pentagon's request for procurement and RDT&E. The staffer also argued that the Pentagon sometimes "relies upon congressional increases to keep production lines open or to sustain readiness of the military." This tack obfuscates the fact that for a lot of the funds Congress adds, it subtracts funds from elsewhere in the Pentagon budget. While the offsets for the committee adds are as opaque as their authors, the offsets listed in amendments overwhelmingly raid the Pentagon's Operations and Maintenance account. That's Congress' prerogative, but lawmakers can't raid O&M to pay for procurement and research adds and then say with a straight face that those adds are about supporting military readiness.All this isn't to say that none of these projects are worth funding. There's more than 1,200 of them, so surely some are. But with the lack of transparency for who requests and approves them, whether the funds are competitively awarded, and whether they align with any cogent national security strategy, who's to say? If lawmakers think cramming another $25 billion for procurement and research into a $826 billion budget of an agency that just failed its sixth audit is worthwhile, they should at least let us know who's adding what and to what end.

As Congress starts its last scheduled workweek of 2023, observers are becoming increasingly concerned that U.S. aid for Ukraine will at least temporarily run out.The reality of the situation is starting to set in both in Washington and Kyiv. The Biden administration announced recently that aid will run out before the end of the year, and Joe Biden himself argued last week that a cutoff in funding could lead to a direct Russia-NATO conflict.These stark warnings led Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to make a surprise visit to the United States this week for emergency meetings with the White House and congressional leadership. It remains unclear whether his pitch will prove convincing to Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.), who now poses the largest obstacle to continued aid.So what actually happens if U.S. support for Ukraine dries up? While Kyiv could likely weather a short gap in funding, a longer delay or even permanent cutoff would force the Ukrainians to substantially cut back their military operations, raising the possibility that Russia could reverse Ukraine's hard-won gains in the country's east. The sudden move would also make it substantially harder to reach a negotiated solution in the short term, according to George Beebe of the Quincy Institute."[T]hose tempted to believe that the United States could end the war by simply ending its aid to Ukraine should think hard" about how such a move would affect Kyiv's leverage in talks, Beebe argued in RS."The United States should not remove cards from its hand by ending aid to Ukraine unilaterally or playing them prematurely," he wrote. "But unless it moves quickly to complement aid with diplomacy, it may find that the opportunity to play its cards has suddenly disappeared."Playing the numbers gameOne important factor complicating discussions about future aid is the widespread uncertainty about exactly how much cash the U.S. still has left to burn. Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) said in October that even Congress has struggled at times to get a straight answer on a deadline for new funding.
As of last month, the White House said it had spent roughly 96% of the more than $100 billion Congress has allocated for Ukraine. A Pentagon accounting error left the Department of Defense with several billion dollars of extra "presidential drawdown authority," which allows the Biden administration to send equipment from U.S. stockpiles. But there is only about $1 billion in funding left to replace those weapons, and the White House has so far been reluctant to send arms without promises to replace them, according to Mark Cancian of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The impact of a cutoff in funding would not be immediately apparent, especially given the slow pace of fighting during the winter, but would lead to a progressive reduction in Ukrainian operations, Cancian told RS. In his estimation, the pace of aid is "already declining" when compared with the early days of the war, though a steady stream of weapons deliveries will continue for years given the timeline needed to produce new arms.
"As that flow declines, then Ukraine's military capability will decline with it," Cancian said. "At some point, probably in January, they would be unable to launch a full-scale counteroffensive, and then maybe in February they'd be unable to do any attacks at all."
"Maybe later in the spring, Ukraine would be hard-pressed to hold the Russians off," he continued. "It's not that they won't have any [weapons], but they won't have the flow that's needed to maintain operations at a high level."
Biden's supplemental request would allocate about $59 billion in funds related to Ukraine. One third of that goes to humanitarian aid and direct economic support, while the majority goes to various military funding needs.
Of the $38.7 billion in military aid, roughly $30 billion is earmarked for purchasing weapons to send Ukraine or drawing down U.S. stockpiles. The remaining $8 billion would support the expanded U.S. troop presence in Europe in response to the Ukraine war, with a small portion of funds going to aid oversight.
Cancian noted that much of this funding should be understood as an investment in the U.S. economy given how much of it will be directed to American contractors. This argument, which the Biden administration has also made, has drawn criticism from opponents of increased military spending, who note that defense dollars produce fewer jobs than many other forms of government spending.On the economic front, a sudden cutoff in U.S. funding would be less drastic than an end to military spending given that much of Ukraine's budgetary aid comes from the European Union. Though even that funding could be blocked by Hungary, which, under right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has often frustrated its European partners. (Zelensky and Orban appeared to get into a heated argument on the sidelines of the presidential inauguration in Argentina this past weekend.)Political reverberationsAn end to U.S. aid would be a sharp rebuke of the Biden administration, which has long argued that American support for Ukraine will last as long as it takes for Kyiv to achieve its stated aim of retaking all of its territory, including Crimea.
Many believe that European states would also pull back their funding if American support ends, according to Cancian. "The logic is the same as in the U.S.," he explained. "They have elements that are opposing, on both the left and the right, the high costs and the lack of success. If the United States stops, then many of their critics will point to this and say, 'The United States is stopping. Why are we sending money for a failing effort?'"
As the possibility of an aid cutoff grows, some analysts have argued that it's time for the Biden administration to shift its approach to the war and set more realistic objectives — a move that could tamp down concerns in Europe while also responding to the White House's domestic critics, who argue that the president has no clear strategy for the war.
"[T]he White House should seek to build a new narrative: that this is a war of defence for Ukraine, and a strategic defeat for Russia, and that the US can support Ukraine while also acknowledging that there are other national security priorities that might need to take precedence," Emma Ashford of the Stimson Center argued in The Guardian. "This narrative is less aspirational, but more pragmatic.""[M]ost importantly, if the Biden administration is re-elected in November, this approach would place them in a much stronger position to pursue armistice negotiations in late 2024," Ashford wrote.

The shock election of a self-proclaimed "libertarian liberal," the chainsaw-wielding eccentric Javier Milei as Argentina's president has attracted a flurry of attention globally. Most of it was focused on the radicalism of Milei's economic proposals to cure Argentina's chronic ills — chief among them an annual inflation at the rate of 143% and the poverty that has engulfed over 40% of Argentines, and all that with an outstanding debt of $43 billion owed to the International Monetary Fund. Milei's remedies include liquidating Argentina's central bank, dropping the national currency — the peso — in favor of the U.S. dollar, privatizing state assets and slashing public expenditures, including subsidies for the most vulnerable individuals and communities. The chainsaw that he adopted as his icon during the election campaign symbolized his intention to demolish the state, which, according to Milei, is at the root of Argentina's relative decline in the 20th and 21st centuries.While some libertarians, notably in the U.S., welcomed his election as the latest and best chance to advance their long-cherished beliefs and a future inspiration for the U.S., their enthusiasm may be misplaced. Milei's main focus may be on the economy, but, as president, he'll also have to steer Argentina's foreign policy. This is not an area in which he has displayed much interest or knowledge to date, but someone like Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), a standard bearer of libertarianism in the U.S., would hardly recognize himself in the positions embraced by Milei. In fact, Milei's foreign policy views, to the extent they exist, are far closer to neoconservative than libertarian. His views would easily find home in hawkish Washington D.C. think tanks and parts of the mainstream of both the Republican and Democratic parties. This is not to be underestimated, as Argentina is a member of the G-20, the third largest economy in Latin America, and has recently been invited to join BRICS, a grouping that comprises China, Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa.Milei's foreign policy views, as expressed repeatedly during the election campaign, are starkly Manichean — they divide the world into democracies and "communist autocracies." Counter-intuitively for a self-proclaimed champion of free trade, he promised to sever ties with two of Argentina's main trade partners — China and Brazil (combined, both account for around 25% of the total of Argentinian exports) — on the grounds that both are ruled by "communists." China was an object of particular scorn, with Milei dubbing the country at one point "an assassin."Milei is a staunch supporter of Ukraine, in contrast to a more moderate position espoused by the outgoing center-left Peronist administration which, while condemning Russia's aggression of Ukraine, was also reluctant to sever ties with Moscow, which grew closer during the pandemic when Argentina acquired Russian vaccines, with results generally deemed acceptable.Perhaps on no issue Milei's neoconservative credentials are more on display than in his fervid embrace of Israel. While Argentina, under different governments, has generally enjoyed good relations with Israel, those were traditionally balanced by Buenos Aires' engagement with Arab countries and, at times, even Iran. That balancing act did not prevent Argentina from declaring Hezbollah a terrorist organization for its alleged role in the notorious 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. Milei's defeated opponent, Sergio Massa, promised to similarly add Palestinian Hamas to Argentina's terrorist list if he had been elected. Milei, however, wants to go much further. He declared that his first international trips as president-elect will be to Israel and the U.S. He also promised to move Argentina's embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Such a one-sided reorientation would represent a major break in Argentina's traditional foreign policy consensus.Milei is also opposed, on ideological grounds, to Argentina joining the BRICS, despite the invitation issued by the existing members, reportedly the result of heavy lobbying by Brazil on Buenos Aires' behalf. While the prospect of joining the group that represents more than 40% of the world's population and 31% of global GDP (and also a destiny of some 30% of total Argentine exports) is seen as an opportunity by many Argentine businesspeople and politicians, for Milei BRICS represents little more than a dictators' club.The president-elect is also remarkably skeptical about Mercosur, a South American trade bloc which includes, besides Argentina, also Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Milei dismissed it as merely a "low-quality customs union that distorts commerce." Such a position raises fresh questions about the prospects for a long-delayed trade deal between Mercosur and the European Union.There is always a chance that the realities of governing (among them, the fact that his party holds relatively few seats in the National Congress) would temper some of the most radical ideas Milei spouted during an election campaign. After all, the former president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, with whom Milei professes a mutual admiration also started as a fierce critic of China, only to significantly soften his position while in office. But during the presidential debate, Milei displayed a worrying ignorance of how international relations work. While no longer calling for a complete severance of ties with China and Brazil, he insisted that any such interaction should be left entirely to the private sector, apparently oblivious to the fact that it is governments that negotiate international trade frameworks and agreements, including tariffs, phyto-sanitary rules, and other measures.That is especially true in the case of China, where the weight of the public sector in the country's external economic activity is preponderant. Currently, alongside many smaller projects, China is involved in building two hydroelectric dams in Argentina which, when completed, would cover the daily electricity consumption of 1.5 million Argentine households, cut oil and gas import expenses, and even allow to export electricity to the neighboring countries. Milei's simplistic vision of economic relations as mere exchanges between private actors sows doubts about the future of these projects. Worse, their cancellation would risk seriously undermining Argentina's credibility with international partners, even from ideologically more "compatible" countries.The likely appointment of Diana Mondino, an economist, as the future minister of foreign affairs, has so far failed to assuage concerns about Milei's policies. As evidenced in a pre-election debate organized by the Argentine Council on Foreign Relations, Mondino, who has spent her entire professional life in private sector, seems to share her future boss' ideological view of international relations, as well as a penchant for hyperbole. A few days before the elections, she likened Milei's possible victory to the fall of the Berlin Wall 34 years ago, as if the modern-day Argentina were in any way comparable to Soviet-backed communist dictatorships.It is obviously too early to tell how the Milei presidency will unfold, but based on his rhetoric it may be a bumpy road ahead for foreign policy in Argentina.

As the war between Israel and Hamas rages on, with horrifying humanitarian toll for the civilians in Gaza, the United States is continuing its unwavering support for Israel: it is not only sending Israel arms and shielding it from criticisms at the United Nations, but also boosting the deterrence against the so-called "axis of resistance," which includes Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.The U.S. moves to show solidarity with Israel are understandable. However, unless they are complemented by a credible diplomatic strategy in pursuit of a comprehensive stabilization in the Middle East, not only will they fail to bring the U.S. any benefits, but, to the contrary, they would risk entangling it in a wider regional war. To prevent such a dire scenario, Washington should, in addition to its existing contacts in the region, launch a direct channel to Tehran and seek serious talks about the future not only of Gaza and Palestine, but the broader Middle East.Since the war started on October 7, following Hamas's terrorist attack on Israel, Washington reportedly warned Tehran, through third parties, against expanding, either directly or through allies, the front against Israel. To deter Iran, Biden sent an attack submarine to the Persian Gulf, in addition to two aircraft carriers with warplanes and other military assets already dispatched to the region in the immediate aftermath of Hamas's attack.The usual suspects in Washington were quick to jump on the war's bandwagon to push for their favorite obsession: make it all about Iran. Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.), true to form, threatened military action to target Iran's oil infrastructure. United Against Nuclear Iran, hawkish advocacy group, painted doomsday scenarios of impending multi-front "Iranian escalation" against Israel. And others like the Atlantic Council's Matthew Kroenig fell back on a tired cliché of Iran and its allies being the principal source of all instability in the Middle East.Making the Israel-Hamas war being all about Iran not only completely denies Palestinians' own agency and conditions under the occupation. It also misreads actual Iranian policies, as opposed to the rhetoric.As usual, Tehran presents a mix of ideology and pragmatic pursuit of national interest. Top officials, starting with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while expressing full support for Hamas, clearly emphasized that Iran had no operational role in the attack of October 7. Iran is not willing to confront Israel or the U.S. directly as such a conflict would be too destructive for it and its most prized assets in the region, like the Lebanese Hezbollah. Hence, Tehran insists that the "resistance front" has autonomy in its actions against Israel and the U.S.Another factor that the rulers in Tehran need to take into account is that the Iranian population on the whole cares far more about the difficult economic conditions in their own country rather than Gaza. With the regime hard-liners doubling down on divisive policies, such as insistence on mandatory hijabs for women, the gap between the establishment and significant portion of the Iranian population is growing. Since the commitment to Palestine is one of the Islamic Republic's enduring identity badges, it is not surprising that a growing disaffection with the system translates into a weaker support for Iran's involvement in what many Iranians consider a foreign conflict.The fact that Iran is compelled to act, so far, in a restrained fashion, opens a window of opportunity for some bold, creative diplomacy on the U.S. side. A true diplomatic effort should go far beyond sending warnings to Tehran through third parties like Qatar, Oman, or Iraq. It should include direct talks not only about how to end the war in Gaza, but also the outlines of a broader order in the Middle East.Given the entrenched enmity between the U.S. and Iran, it may seem like a tall order. Yet, as international relations scholar Stephen Walt reminds us, some of the roots of the current situation could be traced to the Madrid peace conference on the Middle East in 1991 and subsequent Oslo agreements on Palestine. While crediting then-President George H.W. Bush and his secretary of state James Baker with a serious effort to bring peace to the Middle East, Walt points to a fatal flaw of the Madrid/Oslo process: the exclusion of Iran and the whole "rejectionist" front from the discussions, which only incentivized Iran to act as a spoiler against a regional order that was being shaped explicitly against its interests.Importantly, that happened at a time when Iran, exhausted by the long, brutal war with Iraq and under the pragmatic presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was showing signs of moderation and willingness to re-engage with the U.S. Rebuffed, Iran turned to Islamic Jihad and other extremist Palestinian groups that contributed to a collapse of the peace process.As the U.S. and its allies ponder their next steps, they should avoid repeating the same fatal mistake. The costs of non-relationship between Washington and Tehran are already highlighted by the almost daily attacks by the Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq on U.S. military assets in those countries. The U.S. retaliates in what it claims to be "self-defense strikes" against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the absence of a meaningful diplomatic track and de-escalation mechanisms, these exchanges could easily spiral out of control and lead to a direct military confrontation between the U.S. and Iran.In such a scenario the U.S. would have little regional support as the Arab and Islamic world is focused on ending Israel's war in Palestine, not joining a new one against Iran. It is highly meaningful that it was the war in Gaza that provided the context for the first visit of Iran's president Ebrahim Raisi to Saudi Arabia after years of hostility — for a joint meeting of the League of Arab States and Organization Islamic Conference. A handshake between Raisi and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman in Riyadh would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.The U.S. should encourage these regional reconnections and establish its own direct dialogue with Iran. The alternative — dividing the region neatly into the moderates (such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Jordan) and pariahs (Iran and its allies and proxies) — has been tried and failed abysmally. The consequences of this failure are being tragically played out in Gaza. Establishing direct talks with Iran will not solve all of the region's problems. It may also carry domestic political risks for Biden in the pre-election year. But doubling down on the strategy of exclusion of Iran from any solution in Gaza and future security configuration in the Middle East is guaranteed to perpetuate the cycles of violence in the region.

UPDATE: 10/9: Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and a bipartisan delegation of Senators met with Chinese President Xi Jinping today in Beijing. Among the issues addressed: the U.S. fentanyl crisis, human rights and "economic reciprocity" between the two countries. The meeting was overshadowed however, according to Bloomberg News, by Schumer's stated disappointment with China's response to the Hamas attacks on Israel over the weekend. China called for a ceasefire and for a two-state solution, with an independent state for Palestinians. A bipartisan senate delegation led by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) touched down in Shanghai on Sunday, the first stop in a diplomatic mission that also includes Japan and South Korea."We are prepared to compete but we do not seek to conflict," Schumer told a Chinese official, reflecting the Biden administration's continued attempts to strike a balance between engagement and competition with Beijing even as relations between the world's two leading powers have sharply declined over the past several years.In an earlier statement this week, China said it hoped the visit would "contribute to a more objective understanding of China in the U.S. Congress."The high-level talks are accompanied by fresh affirmations from the White House that there is tentative agreement on a Biden-Xi summit in San Francisco, with officials adding that plans for the meeting will take a more concrete form after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's upcoming visit to Washington. "It's pretty firm" that there will be a face-to-face meeting between the two leaders, an administration official told the Washington Post. The Senate delegation trip comes on the heels of Secretary of State Antony Blinken's meeting with Xi earlier this summer. The Blinken-Xi talks, which were followed by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen's four-day visit to China in July, are part of an ongoing effort by the Biden administration to stabilize U.S.-Chinese relations amid mounting military tensions over Taiwan, U.S. allegations of Chinese human rights abuses, and simmering frustration that China's booming trade with Russia is hobbling the Western sanctions regime established in response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The Biden administration has tried to balance its mounting competition with Beijing by seeking out areas of bilateral cooperation, particularly including a suite of climate change initiatives being championed by John Kerry, U.S. special envoy on climate change. The full scope of the Senate delegation's mission to China has not been revealed. Senator Bill Cassidy (R- La.), one of the group's republican members, reiterated hopes that the delegation will be able to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, clarifying that such a meeting has not been scheduled. "If the talks proceed well, there is the possibility that President Xi will meet Schumer," said Wang Yiwei, director of the Institute of International Affairs at Renmin University of China, to the Associated Press. "If their meeting is realized, the chances for a Xi-Biden meeting will become greater."The senators are widely expected to raise thorny issues of human rights and what U.S. officials have described as deadly inflows of fentanyl from China. There is little to suggest that the delegation's Chinese interlocutors will reciprocate positively on either issue. Beijing has vigorously rebuffed accusations of systemic abuses carried out against China's Muslim Uyghur population in the northwestern Xinjiang region, with top Chinese officials previously denouncing such claims as malicious slander. Attempts by Blinken to broach the human rights issue at a 2021 bilateral summit in Anchorage, Alaska prompted a "lecture" from Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi. "The United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength," Yang said, adding that it is "important for the United States to change its own image and to stop advancing its own democracy in the rest of the world." Beijing has adopted a similarly defensive posture on "fentanyl-related issues," dismissing them as a smear against China and a pretext for "illegal sanctions on Chinese counter-narcotics institutions" in a heated response to recent Justice Department charges against China-based companies accused of being involved in the fentanyl trade."They are fueling the fentanyl crisis that is poisoning communities across the United States," said Schumer, referring to the Chinese producers in question. "Every one of us knows families who have lost young men and women to fentanyl."China has forcefully and consistently rejected Washington's positions on human rights and fentanyl issues; there is nothing to suggest that the upcoming Senate delegation can yield a different result. An aide to Schumer said the senators plan to "raise concerns related to global competition and what many of them considered China's unfair business and trade practices," according to The New York Times. Here, too, the two sides are unlikely to find common ground, as successive waves of new U.S. export controls --with similar measures being considered by the EU — auguring an expanding trade war between Washington and Beijing. The Senate delegation will also visit Japan and South Korea, key players in East Asia that have found themselves increasingly at odds with Beijing in recent months. The agenda for these two stops is less clear, but they come amid attempts by the White House to corral Tokyo and Seoul into a regional bloc with the purpose of thwarting Chinese ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.Beijing has previously responded to what it sees as grievous missteps by U.S. officials and politicians by cutting off bilateral contacts, as it did shortly following former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. Stable channels of military communication between Washington and Beijing have still not been restored despite repeated appeals by Blinken, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, and President Joe Biden. There is scant basis for anticipating, nor has Schumer or any delegation member promised, concrete bilateral agreements or other propitious developments from the senators' upcoming China trip. It is, however, easy to see how bilateral relations could further deteriorate, with Beijing in no hurry to restore diplomatic contacts or to work with Washington in the few remaining areas where cooperation still seems feasible. The White House, meanwhile, is increasingly coming under fire from congressional Republicans arguing that the administration has little to show for its efforts to calm tensions with China. The delicate balancing act between competition and engagement with Beijing appears increasingly difficult to sustain in the absence of clear diplomatic results. It is unclear if the upcoming senate delegation will prove to be a step in the direction of breaking the emerging diplomatic impasses that exist between the two countries, or make it worse.

The vitriolic dispute between Poland and Ukraine brings out some aspects of the West's approach to the war in Ukraine that the Ukrainian government would do well to study carefully.

The dispute originated in charges by Poland and other central European governments that Ukraine's greatly increased grain exports to Europe — a consequence of the Russian closure of the Black Sea to Ukrainian maritime trade — were flooding European markets and depressing prices for Polish and other farmers.

The relaxation of EU limits on Ukrainian shipments was supposed to allow Ukraine to resume exports to Egypt and other countries where vulnerable populations are suffering from increased prices as a result of the war. A considerable proportion has in fact gone to the EU itself instead. The EU imposed a temporary ban, which, however, it refused to lift when it expired on September 15th. Poland, Hungary and Slovakia have however continued the ban, in defiance of EU rules.

The Ukrainian government has brought charges against Poland at the World Trade Organization, and alleged that the Polish move has been motivated chiefly by the government's desire to hold onto farmers' votes in next month's Polish general elections. Speaking to the United Nations, President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Poland and other countries of engaging in theatrics and "making a thriller out of grain." Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki hit back ferociously:

"I want to tell President Zelensky never to insult Poles again, as he did recently during his speech at the U.N. The Polish people will never allow this to happen, and defending the good name of Poland is not only my duty and honor, but also the most important task of the Polish government."

Polish President Andrzej Duda added:

"Ukraine is behaving like a drowning person clinging to anything available. A drowning person is extremely dangerous, capable of pulling you down to the depths…and drowning its rescuer."

In a move widely interpreted as retaliation for Ukraine's protests against the grain ban, moreover, Poland has halted arms shipments to Ukraine, insisting that it will now concentrate on equipping its own armed forces to defend Poland.

What makes this so extraordinary is that Poland has long portrayed itself as Ukraine's greatest friend in the West, and has accused other Western governments of cowardice for not doing more to arm and support Ukraine.

The first lesson to be learned from all this is that even in countries whose populations are most supportive of Ukraine, that support will have limits when it imposes high and visible costs on themselves, and that politicians will inevitably exploit the resulting political backlash. This has implications in particular for Ukraine's chances of joining the European Union.

In the case of Poland and other former Communist states of Central Europe, their path to EU membership was helped by copious amounts of EU financial assistance. The EU's Regional Development Fund continues to support depressed areas of Poland and its neighbors. Supporting Ukraine to the point where it could enter the EU will, however, be a task of a different order of magnitude. Even before the Russian invasion, Ukraine was one of the poorest countries in Europe, with an average GDP per capita in 2021 of only $4,828 (compared to an EU average of $38,436) and its chances of joining the EU in the foreseeable future were considered vanishingly small.

Moreover, EU countries (in Western as well as Central Europe) were always fearful of cheap Ukrainian food imports. Ukraine's Association Agreement with the EU explicitly barred most Ukrainian grain exports as part of the EU's strategy of defending European farmers through its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This ban was removed by Brussels only in response to the Russian invasion and blockade. Poland has now restored it.

In March of this year, the World Bank estimated the cost of postwar reconstruction up until then at around $411 billion, and that cost will of course increase further the longer the war goes on. The whole of EU spending on depressed areas within the EU in the seven years from 2014 to 2021 was $200 billion. To judge by Poland's latest moves, it seems improbable that a future Polish government would ask its voters to pay Poland's share of such costs; and if Poland won't, who will?

The other thing to which Ukrainians should pay attention is that, as dramatized by Poland's latest actions, hatred for Russia and real sympathy for Ukraine are not at all the same thing and may even contradict each other. Concerning Polish hatred of Russia, there can be no doubt; but underlying the remarkably harsh rhetoric of recent days has been the fact that historically speaking, Poles and Ukrainians also used to be bitter enemies.
The Polish kingdom, and the Polish republic between 1919 and 1939, sought to Polonize their Ukrainian subjects just as the Russians tried to Russify theirs. Ukrainian revolts against Polish rule massacred Poles along with Jews. Political struggles between Poles and Ukrainians for control of Galicia helped undermine the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the years before 1914. After 1918, Poland annexed the Ukrainian areas of Galicia by force, and held them until they were transferred to Soviet Ukraine by Josef Stalin as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - which is why they are in Ukraine today, and not in Poland.
During and immediately after the Second World War, Ukrainian nationalist partisans massacred tens of thousands of ethnic Poles, and Ukrainians serving in the 1st Galician Division of the Waffen SS participated in ruthless German operations against the Polish resistance. In recent years, both Kyiv and Warsaw have sought to play down this history, but memories of it continue to flow very close to the surface on both sides.

This history is peculiar to Poland and Ukraine; but with regard to the United States too, Ukrainians should ask themselves how much of U.S. support for Ukraine is motivated by real sympathy for them, and how much is devoted to killing as many Russians as possible and weakening Russia as much as possible, no matter how many Ukrainians die and how much Ukraine is weakened in the process — as some statements by U.S. politicians and officials have tended to suggest. Thus Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky) recently boasted, "We are destroying the Russian army without losing a single American soldier."

Other hawkish U.S. commentators have argued that it is necessary to defeat Russia in Ukraine in order to weaken China - which is not why Ukrainian soldiers think they are fighting and dying.
An indefinite war with no clear victor will indeed weaken Russia; but it will also ruin independent Ukraine — something that now appears to be a key Russian war aim; and a ruined Ukraine will never be able to join the EU. If this is the case, then Western promises and declarations about Ukraine's Western path will ultimately count for nothing. Ukraine will remain — as it was for most of history — an impoverished borderland between Poland and Russia.That is not an outcome that the West should be working towards, however much Russia may also be hurt in the process.

Adam N. Michel


I recently testified before the House Ways and Means Tax Subcommittee on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Two Pillar proposal to increase corporate tax rates on multinational businesses.
You can read my full written testimony here and watch my opening statement here.
In my remarks, I explain how the OECD has lost its way in advocating for higher and more complicated taxes and detail the economic costs of its proposals. I conclude with thoughts on how U.S. policy should respond.
Two topics that came up in the hearing deserve additional attention. It was regularly asserted by Democrats and implied by some Republicans that the only path forward is continued engagement in the OECD process so that U.S. interests are fully represented. This strategy makes two poor assumptions. First, if the OECD's inclusive framework successfully redistributes taxing rights, it will likely embolden future destabilizing unilateral actions. Second, the underlying motivation of the project—to increase global taxes—is at odds with U.S. interests and pro‐​growth policy.
New Forms of Instability
The administration's witness, Michael Plowgian, claimed that the Two Pillar solution is necessary to ensure stability in the international tax system. In response to a question from Representative Randy Feenstra, Professor Mindy Herzfeld and I explained why the OECD project is instead likely to further destabilize the international tax system.
The Two Pillar framework gained steam when in the spring of 2019, the OECD released a work program outlining an accelerated rewrite of the international tax rules to address growing concerns over the taxation of the digital economy and unilateral digital services taxes (DSTs). France and a handful of other countries implemented or threatened to implement these taxes that were not so subtly designed to hit U.S. technology firms. The French DST is a 3 percent levy on revenue from sales of user data, digital advertisements, and online platforms run by companies with more than €750 million in global revenues.
President Trump threatened tariffs on French exports, and the DST‐​implementing countries used the resulting threat of escalating retaliatory tax and trade measures to move the OECD international tax rewrite forward. The success of using unilateral DSTs as a cudgel to force action at the OECD creates an unfortunate precedent that will likely encourage future destabilizing unilateral actions. Pillar One is intended to replace many DSTs, although the enforcement mechanism for such as agreement is uncertain.
The OECD's proposal redistributes the global tax base so that some countries will end up with more revenue and others with less. Without the protection of physical presence and the arms‐​length standard—which both pillars undermine—there is no logical end to how best to divvy up corporate income among the 140 inclusive framework signatories. Now every country has a greater incentive and proven strategy to agitate for a larger share of the global tax base.
A Seat at the Table
Throughout the hearing, it was asserted that withdrawing from the two‐​pillar process would be a mistake because we would lose a seat at the table. The seat at the table is only valuable if policymakers think it is worthwhile to support the goals of the OECD project as pursued by the Biden administration's negotiators.
If Congress is skeptical of the premise of the project—which I argue they should be—then the only possible role the U.S. can have as an active participant is 1) to give the process additional legitimacy, ensuring the project moves forward, and 2) to plead with the OECD to make their tax increases slightly less bad for American companies.
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has been clear that the administration's goal is to advance to the OECD process as far as possible before 2025, when other U.S. tax expirations create a forcing mechanism for congressional adoption. The recent transition rule for UTPR facilitates this strategy. Treasury's strategy at the OECD, to force their policy agenda forward without consulting Congress, gives members of Congress intent on setting their own policy only one choice: rescind U.S. participation in the OECD, removing Treasury's authority to pursue their international tax deal.
As I noted at the hearing, the successive pleading of the Ways and Means members with Mr. Plowgian to protect the U.S. R&D credit through OECD guidance illustrates the broader structural problem of the OECD process, which cuts Congress out of the policymaking process.
Without U.S. participation, it is more likely that the project does not move forward. This may lead to some additional unliteral actions by other countries, but as described above, the OECD project is not likely to end these actions either.
If other countries decide to move forward without the U.S., they will primarily hurt their domestic economies by increasing the costs of locating in their country. Congress can increase the relative attractiveness of the U.S. by lowering our corporate tax rate and moving to a full territorial system that disregards income earned and taxes paid overseas. If necessary, Treasury can address violations of existing tax treaties if other countries attempt to tax the active U.S. income of U.S.-based multinationals.
As I've written before, the problem with the OECD proposals is more than just that GILTI was not grandfathered in or that UTPR will erode the U.S. tax base (although these are both legitimate problems). Simply fixing these oversights should not be Congress' only goal.
The underlying problem is the last two decades of OECD tax work to end international competition on tax rates. Pillar Two is just the most recent iteration. The OECD's tax work no longer primarily coordinates tax systems to eliminate double taxation. Instead, it proposes ever more complicated tax increases and reporting requirements to raise taxes at the expense of international investment.
Working with other countries through the OECD to lower tax and trade barriers is worthwhile and welfare‐​enhancing for all parties involved. When the goal is to collude with other countries in a scheme to increase taxes and reduce global investment, a seat at the table will only make the U.S. complicit in a destructive policy process.
My written testimony also addresses other key issues at the hearing, including how Pillar Two will shift tax competition from tax rates to subsidies and the myth of the "race to the bottom."
In addition to raising effective tax rates, increasing compliance burdens, and reducing U.S. revenues, the OECD framework is likely to further destabilize the international tax system. Keeping our seat at the table only ensures the OECD project will continue full steam ahead. Instead, Congress should focus on improving our domestic laws to support investment and economic growth. We should encourage other countries to do the same.

Romina Boccia and Dominik Lett


The Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) latest 30‐​year budget projections forecast rising debt, deficits, and interest costs. Rising spending on old‐​age entitlement programs, primarily Medicare and Social Security, is mostly to blame. Legislators should act now to make gradual changes to achieve a sustainable budget policy and avert a future fiscal catastrophe.
The Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA), which suspended the debt limit until 2025, has been championed by President Biden and House Speaker McCarthy as a major success. Its primary achievement is a far cry from adopting a sustainable fiscal policy. The deal averted a self‐​imposed debt limit crisis but did so with a budget sleight of hand, as side deals and loose spending caps will undermine the FRA's modest deficit reduction. Even assuming CBO's charitable score of $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction from full implementation of the FRA, federal debt is still projected to exceed historic highs within this decade.
CBO warns that "high and rising debt would slow economic growth, push up interest payments to foreign holders of U.S. debt, and pose significant risks to the fiscal and economic outlook." Lawmakers should heed CBO's warnings and adopt a credible fiscal plan that will keep U.S. publicly held debt below the size of the economy. Annual spending is projected to grow from more than $6 trillion to $23 trillion (before adjusting for inflation) over the next 30 years. Without fiscal reforms, the government will accumulate $119 trillion in additional deficits and end 2053 with debt at 181 percent of GDP. To avoid more painful and likely more chaotic austerity in the future, policymakers should correct course by restraining entitlement spending growth today.
Here are key highlights from CBO's 30‐​year forecast report:
Debt grows to 181 percent of GDP by 2053











As a percentage of the country's yearly economic output, federal public debt (the debt borrowed from credit markets) is currently 98 percent of GDP—about $96,000 for every person in America. In just six years, public debt is projected to surpass its all‐​time World War II high of 106 percent. By 2033 (ten years from now), public debt will reach 115 percent of GDP. By 2053 (30 years from now), public debt is projected to surpass 180 percent of GDP. Such high debt levels have never before been recorded in U.S. history.
Interest costs triple to 6.7 percent of GDP by 2053
Between 2023 and 2053, interest costs are projected to grow from 2.5 percent to 6.7 percent of GDP. Interest costs are projected to grow more rapidly than most other budget categories. By 2047, net interest payments will be larger than all discretionary spending combined. In other words, interest costs will exceed combined government spending on defense, education, transportation, agriculture, energy, and more. For these projections, CBO assumes an average 4 percent interest rate on 10‐​year Treasury notes—the projected rate for 2023 is 3.9 percent. Were interest rates just one point higher than projected in 2053, interest costs that year would rise to 8.4 percent of GDP—an increase of $1.4 trillion for that year.
Entitlement spending drives unsustainable growth in federal debt
Between 2023 and 2053, total federal spending will increase from 24.2 percent to 29.1 percent of GDP. That's nearly one‐​third higher than the 30‐​year historical spending average (21 percent of GDP), spanning 1992–2022. Major entitlements, like Social Security and Medicare, are almost entirely responsible for non‐​interest spending growth. In 2023, Social Security's and Medicare's combined contribution to the deficit was 2.1 percent of GDP. By 2053, their annual deficit contribution will be 5.4 percent of GDP. That's more than half or 54 percent of the total deficit in 2053 due to spending on Social Security and Medicare (assuming additional borrowing past trust fund exhaustion and no other policy changes).
Obvious solutions to restrain excess entitlement spending growth include reducing retirement and health care subsidies for wealthier individuals, adjusting eligibility ages for old‐​age entitlements with improvements in health and life span, and preserving current benefits by adjusting for inflation while stopping excess benefit growth.
Social Security's Old‐​Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Medicare's Part A Hospital Insurance (HI) trust funds—which are more akin to financial ledgers than funds with real assets—are both projected to exhaust their borrowing authority in less than 10 years. Medicare's HI trust fund will be depleted by 2035 (other estimates place the exhaustion date at 2031). For Social Security's OASI, scheduled benefits can continue uninterrupted up to 2033. After borrowing authority is exhausted, Medicare and Social Security benefits would be indiscriminately cut by 11 and 23 percent, respectively, if Congress fails to act. Waiting until the 11th hour will leave legislators with few options to avoid steep benefit cuts and harmful tax increases.
Congress and the President must work together to stabilize spending and debt
Given that debt is projected to grow by 85% (nearly doubling) over the next 30 years as a percentage of GDP, the savings from the 2023 debt limit deal are a drop in the bucket. The FRA adopted spending limits governing less than 30 percent of the federal budget. As Rep. Womack (R‑AR) points out, "70% of this whole federal budget is on autopilot right now."
More than $8 trillion in savings will be necessary to stabilize the debt over the next 10 years. Political considerations over entitlement changes and how these will play out electorally have delayed inevitable reforms for far too long. Americans in and near retirement age are the most active at the voting booth, and they also stand to be hurt the most should Congress allow indiscriminate benefit cuts to take place over the next 10 years.
One promising proposal is to establish a BRAC‐​like fiscal commission to empower an independent body of experts to put forth policies to stabilize the federal debt. A well‐​designed commission will be composed of independent experts with diverse viewpoints, who are tasked with a clear goal, such as stabilizing the public debt at no more than 100% of GDP over the next 10 years, and whose recommendations will be self‐​executing in Congress through a similar fast‐​track mechanism that allowed the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission to be successful. A BRAC process can overcome political gridlock by providing legislators with cover from delegating entitlement reform to outside experts.
If policymakers continue to put serious fiscal reform on the back burner, the severity and scope of necessary reforms will grow. High and rising debt causes a significant drag on the economy and threatens America's fiscal and economic future. Delay is costly and risky. Congress and the President should act soon.

Jeffrey A. Singer


Last weekend the American Medical Association House of Delegates passed a resolution tacitly claiming that the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) is likely anti‐​competitive and a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. The resolution concluded:
RESOLVED, That our American Medical Association study alternatives to the current residency and fellowship Match process which would be less restrictive on free market competition for applicants. (Directive to Take Action)

This is quite surprising, given that the AMA was a co‐​defendant, along with the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), the American Hospital Association (AHA), and several teaching hospitals in a 2002 antitrust class action lawsuit brought by Dr. Paul Jung (Jung v. AAMC) on behalf of current and former residents.
As Eastern Virginia Medical School Professor Bryan Carmody explains in his blog and this very well‐​produced video, the NRMP system established in the 1950s has since been the only way that medical school graduates may seek positions in residency programs. The program was established by the AAMC and National Student Internship Committee and supported by the AMA. It provides a centralized application process that matches applicants with residency programs using a mathematical algorithm designed to maximize the preferences of both parties. The NRMP eliminated and replaced the process where medical school graduates negotiated residency positions and salaries at various institutions. The NRMP ended any negotiation process. Each residency program participating in the NRMP pays all its residents in all specialties the same salary. Medical school graduates have no other options for seeking residency positions outside the NRMP.
Dr. Jung and co‐​plaintiffs argued that all this violates antitrust law. Many legal scholars believed the plaintiffs had a strong case as their lawsuit moved forward. As the defendants' prospects of acquittal began to fade, the AMA and the NRMP engaged in a public relations campaign to "save the match." Eventually, the AAMC, AHS, and the AMA lobbied successfully to get Congress to attach a last‐​minute rider–without debate–to the 2004 Pension Funding Equity Act, co‐​sponsored by Senators Edward Kennedy (D‑MA) and Judd Gregg (R‑NH). The rider, entitled "Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical Resident Matching Programs," exempted the NRMP from the Sherman Antitrust Act:
It is the purpose of this section to—
(A) confirm that the antitrust laws do not prohibit sponsoring, conducting, or participating in a graduate medical education residency matching program, or agreeing to do so; and
(B) ensure that those who sponsor, conduct or participate in such matching programs are not subjected to the burden and expense of defending against litigation that challenges such matching programs under the antitrust laws.

Every state and the District of Columbia require medical school graduates to complete at least one year of a residency program (residency programs range from 3 to 7 years) and pass Step 3 of the standardized national licensing exam (USMLE for MDs and COMLEX for DOs) to get a license to practice as a general practitioner. As Cato Research Associate Spencer Pratt and I detail in our recent policy brief:
Since the early 1950s, hospitals and medical centers that offer postgraduate training (residency) programs have been participating in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), which matches graduating medical students with available residency programs. Many medical school graduates do not match with positions in accredited programs because the number of residency slots available has not increased at the same rate as the number of medical students. The graduates are stuck in limbo, unable to apply the knowledge and clinical skills acquired with their doctorate degrees to care for patients while also being unable to further hone and develop those clinical skills with postgraduate training. According to the American Medical Association, in 2021, roughly 7 percent of doctor of medicine graduates and 10 percent of doctor of osteopathy graduates found themselves in that state of limbo.

Our brief discusses how Missouri lawmakers addressed this problem by licensing a new category of health care practitioner called Assistant Physician (AP). Already having received their doctorates in medicine, these graduates are essentially apprentice physicians. They work under the supervision of collaborating licensed medical doctors. Missouri launched this innovation in 2017. Missouri allows APs to annually renew their licenses without limits.
Since then, several other states have followed Missouri's lead by enabling APs to render primary care services to patients. Unfortunately, unlike Missouri, under intense lobbying from state chapters of the American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) and the American Medical Association, lawmakers in those states have limited the number of times an AP may renew a license. In some cases the AP license is only good for one year. The AAFP and AMA have convinced many state lawmakers that an AP should only serve as a "bridge year" to allow medical school graduates an opportunity to gain experience and income while waiting to enter the next year's match. Idaho, for example, only grants a one‐​year, non‐​renewable license to APs.
The recent AMA resolution calls for the organization to study alternatives to the current matching system that "would be less restrictive on free market competition for applicants."
We agree. In the "Recommendations" section of our policy brief, Spencer Pratt and I state:
State lawmakers should enable medical school graduates to use their experience as APs as an alternative pathway to unrestricted licensure as GPs. If one or two years of residency plus passing Step 3 of the USMLE qualifies physicians in most states to practice medicine as GPs, then three or more years of experience as an AP and passing the same exam should suffice as well.
The AP to GP alternative pathway could lead to innovations in how specialty boards certify clinicians. For example, GPs who wish to specialize nowadays apply to specialty residency training programs. When they complete residency training, they take standardized specialty examinations and seek certification from specialty boards such as the American Board of Internal Medicine, the American Board of Family Medicine, the American Board of Pediatrics, and the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. Thus, increasing the number of GPs might incentivize some certifying organizations to develop alternative pathways to certification that place greater emphasis on real‐​world experience. Certifying organizations might even develop various levels of certification based on applicants' backgrounds and experience.
Increasing the supply of APs and, in turn, GPs, while promoting innovation in specialty certification would increase primary health care access and choice.

If the AMA seriously seeks redemption from its past anti‐​competitive transgressions, supporting this alternative pathway would be a good place to start.

Relevance of the research topic. Various social cataclysms of the twentieth century and recent decades, such as the two world wars, the hybrid wars, the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, have led to the emergence of the concept of "social security" in the twentieth century. The latter, given the socialization of all spheres of human life, plays a key role in the entire national security system. In a democratic society, the interests of social security of the individual and the state as a whole must be reconciled and harmoniously balanced. In the legal field of Ukraine there is no official definition of the category "social security", and the term "social security" has recently entered into scientific and political circulation. In Ukraine, a new stage of legislative regulation of relations in the sphere of pension provision began with the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine. Only the laws of Ukraine define the basis of social protection, forms and types of pension provision (paragraph 6 of Article 85). Article 46 of the Constitution provides for the right of citizens to social protection, to ensure them in case of full, partial or temporary loss of working capacity, loss of the employer, unemployment from circumstances beyond their control, as well as in old age and other cases provided for by law [1]. Article 46 of the Constitution provides for the right of citizens to social protection, to provide them in case of complete, partial or temporary disability, loss of breadwinner, unemployment due to circumstances beyond their control, as well as in old age and in other cases provided by law [1]. Since the right to a pension can arise throughout a person's life, starting from birth, replacing lost income with a pension is important for the well-being and prevention of poverty of certain categories of the population. As the de jure three-tier pension system de facto remains only two-tier with a predominant share of first-tier pension benefits, it remains relevant to study the level of pension provision from the solidarity system, which is built on the principle of intergenerational solidarity. Problem solving. The need for a comprehensive study of the issue of pension provision, conceptual definition of its mechanisms (instruments) from different levels of the pension system, especially in the conditions of aging of the nation, is conditioned by the need to improve practice and raise the level of pension provision in Ukraine as a guarantee of social security of the person. Analysis of recent research and publications. The issues of functioning of the pension system, functioning of its components, including the solidarity pension system, as well as reform of the latter have found their coverage in the works of both domestic and foreign scholars. The works of well-known foreign scientists – Otto von Bismarck, D. Wittas, E. Atkinson, K. Bateman, W. Beveridge, R. Disney, K. Clark, K. Conrad, P. Laroc, T. Marshall, G. Rudolf and others. Among the researchers of the domestic pension system, the mechanisms of its financial support should be mentioned first of all L. Barannyk, N. Bolotin, O. Vrublevska, V. Grushka, I. Gnibidenko, O. Dmitriev, O. Zaletov, O. Kurilo, E. Libanov, N. Lavrukhin, O. Paliya, A. Fedorenko, V. Yatsenko and others. The results of their own research on the problem of pensions are given in [10, 13, 14]. The allocation of the investigated parts of the general problem. Despite the current work on the issue of pension provision of the population, further research in terms of social security of the person requires the content and practice of pension reform during the last 20 years, ways and possibilities of raising the level of pension provision of the population of Ukraine, especially in the conditions of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Setting of the task, objectives of the research. The object of the study is the level of pension provision as a guarantee of social security of the person, and the subject is practical aspects of pension provision from the first level of the pension system in Ukraine, the Pension Fund of Ukraine and the issue of its imbalance. The objective of the article is to assess the financial capacity of the solidarity pension system as a guarantee of social security of the person by analyzing the structure of sources of financing of the Pension Fund and the amount of expenditures for pension provision from the state budget. Method and methodology of the study. Statistical, comparative and system methods are used in the study to develop statistical data of PFCs. The results of analysis in the form of tables and graphs were executed by means of graphical and tabular methods and generalization of data. The structural-functional method is used to detect the impact of PFU revenues on expenditure volumes. Field of application of results. The obtained conclusions and results can be used for development and implementation of practical measures to improve the pension system, in the scientific field, in the educational process of higher education institutions in training specialists in major 8.18010014 "Management of financial and economic security", in the social component of economic state security, in particular, social security. The practical relevance of scientific results will contribute to achieving a higher level of social protection, meeting the needs of people who have reached the retirement age. Conclusions. Today, the welfare of almost one third of the population of Ukraine depends on the financial capacity of the pension system. Funding for pension provision should be directed at achieving the main goal – realization of constitutional rights of all citizens to receive financial support in case of loss of the operator, disability, disability, disability, disability, old age and other cases established by the legislation [11]. In Ukraine, for almost 20 years, they are trying to implement pension reform, but effective and effective results have not yet been achieved. The current state of the solidarity system of pension provision is characterized by the "fear" of the population of the retirement age and chronic deficit of the Pension Fund. This is evidence of low social security for people of retirement age, according to international estimates of poverty, at which the cost of daily consumption is set at $ 5 (up to UAH 4,300 per month). That is, 85.4% of Ukrainian pensioners as of January 1, 2021 received a pension in the amount lower or at the level of this limit (up to UAH 5,000). The annexation of Crimea, the fighting in the East and almost 2 million IDPs, Russia's large-scale war against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, gave rise to the concept of "sudden poverty".

We thank all EPIC participants and staff for their contribution to the study. We also thank staff from the EPIC-CVD coordinating centres for sample preparation and data handling. This research has been conducted using the UK Biobank Resource (application number 29916). Data on coronary artery disease have been contributed by CARDIoGRAMplusC4D investigators and have been downloaded from www.CARDIOGRAMPLUSC4D.ORG.I Sluijswas supported by a personal Dr. Dekker postdoctoral grant (2015T019) from the Netherlands Heart Foundation. NGF and FI acknowledge core Medical Research Council Epidemiology Unit support (MC_UU_12015/5) and NGF acknowledges NIHR Biomedical Research Centre Cambridge: Nutrition, Diet, and Lifestyle Research Theme (IS-BRC-1215-20014). The InterAct project was funded by the EU FP6 programme (grant number LSHM_CT_2006_037197) and provided the biomarker data in the sub-cohort that was used in the current study. These analyses were supported by Cancer Research UK (C8221/A19170). The coordination of EPIC is financially supported by the European Commission (DG-SANCO) and the International Agency for Research on Cancer. The national cohorts are supported by Danish Cancer Society (Denmark); German Cancer Aid, German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), Deutsche Krebshilfe, Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum and Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Germany); Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro-AIRC-Italy and National Research Council (Italy); Dutch Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS), Netherlands Cancer Registry (NKR), LK Research Funds, Dutch Prevention Funds, Dutch ZON (Zorg Onderzoek Nederland), World Cancer Research Fund (WCRF), Statistics Netherlands (The Netherlands); Health Research Fund (FIS) PI13/00061 (EPIC-Granada) and PI13/01162 (EPIC-Murcia), Regional Governments of Andalucia, Asturias, Basque Country, Murcia and Navarra, ISCIII Health Research Funds RD12/0036/0018 (cofounded by FEDER funds/European Regional Development Fund ERDF) (Spain); Swedish Cancer Society, Swedish Research Council and County Councils of Skane and Vasterbotten (Sweden); Cancer Research UK (14136 to EPIC-Norfolk; C570/A16491 and C8221/A19170 for EPIC-Oxford), Medical Research Council (1000143 to EPIC-Norfolk, MR/M012190/1 to EPIC-Oxford) (UK). EPIC-CVD has been supported by the European Commission Framework Programme 7 (HEALTH-F2-2012-279233), the European Research Council (268834), the UK Medical Research Council (MR/L003120/1), the British Heart Foundation (RG13/13/30194 and RG/18/13/33946) and the National Institute for Health Research (Cambridge Biomedical Research Centre at the Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust). The MEGASTROKE project received funding from sources specified at http://www.megastroke.org/acknowledgments.html. L.E.T.V.analysed the data and drafted the manuscript. L. E. T. V., I. S. and Y. T. vdS. had access to all data for this study. L. E. T. V., I. S., Y. T. vdS., S. B., N. G. F., H. F., F. I., T. K. N., F. R., E. W., K. A., C. D., A. P. C., M. B. S., T. Y. N. T. and A. S. B. contributed to study conception, design and interpretation of data. All authors contributed to critical revision of the manuscript and approval of version to be published. ; Higher milk intake has been associated with a lower stroke risk, but not with risk of CHD. Residual confounding or reverse causation cannot be excluded. Therefore, we estimated the causal association of milk consumption with stroke and CHD risk through instrumental variable (IV) and gene-outcome analyses. IV analysis included 29 328 participants (4611 stroke; 9828 CHD) of the European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition (EPIC)-CVD (eight European countries) and European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition-Netherlands (EPIC-NL) case-cohort studies. rs4988235, a lactase persistence (LP) SNP which enables digestion of lactose in adulthood was used as genetic instrument. Intake of milk was first regressed on rs4988235 in a linear regression model. Next, associations of genetically predicted milk consumption with stroke and CHD were estimated using Prentice-weighted Cox regression. Gene-outcome analysis included 777 024 participants (50 804 cases) from MEGASTROKE (including EPIC-CVD), UK Biobank and EPIC-NL for stroke, and 483 966 participants (61 612 cases) from CARDIoGRAM, UK Biobank, EPIC-CVD and EPIC-NL for CHD. In IV analyses, each additional LP allele was associated with a higher intake of milk in EPIC-CVD (beta = 13 center dot 7 g/d; 95 % CI 8 center dot 4, 19 center dot 1) and EPIC-NL (36 center dot 8 g/d; 95 % CI 20 center dot 0, 53 center dot 5). Genetically predicted milk intake was not associated with stroke (HR per 25 g/d 1 center dot 05; 95 % CI 0 center dot 94, 1 center dot 16) or CHD (1 center dot 02; 95 % CI 0 center dot 96, 1 center dot 08). In gene-outcome analyses, there was no association of rs4988235 with risk of stroke (OR 1 center dot 02; 95 % CI 0 center dot 99, 1 center dot 05) or CHD (OR 0 center dot 99; 95 % CI 0 center dot 95, 1 center dot 03). Current Mendelian randomisation analysis does not provide evidence for a causal inverse relationship between milk consumption and stroke or CHD risk. ; Netherlands Heart Foundation 2015T019 ; UK Research & Innovation (UKRI) Medical Research Council UK (MRC) ; European Commission MC_UU_12015/5 ; NIHR Biomedical Research Centre Cambridge: Nutrition, Diet, and Lifestyle Research Theme IS-BRC-1215-20014 ; European Commission LSHM_CT_2006_037197 ; Cancer Research UK C8221/A19170 ; European Commission European Commission Joint Research Centre ; International Agency for Research on Cancer ; Danish Cancer Society ; Deutsche Krebshilfe German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ) (Germany) ; Federal Ministry of Education & Research (BMBF) ; Deutsche Krebshilfe Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum (Germany) ; Federal Ministry of Education & Research (BMBF) ; Fondazione AIRC per la ricerca sul cancro Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR) ; Netherlands Government Netherlands Government ; World Cancer Research Fund International (WCRF) ; Netherlands Government ; Instituto de Salud Carlos III PI13/00061 PI13/01162 ; Junta de Andalucia Regional Government of Asturias (Spain) Regional Government of Basque Country (Spain) Regional Government of Murcia (Spain) Regional Government of Navarra (Spain) ; ISCIII Health Research Funds (FEDER funds/European Regional Development Fund ERDF) (Spain) RD12/0036/0018 ; Swedish Cancer Society Swedish Research Council County Council of Skane (Sweden) County Council of Vasterbotten (Sweden) ; European Commission Framework Programme 7 HEALTH-F2-2012-279233 European Research Council (ERC) European Commission 268834 ; UK Research & Innovation (UKRI) Medical Research Council UK (MRC) MR/L003120/1 British Heart Foundation RG13/13/30194 RG/18/13/33946 National Institute for Health Research (Cambridge Biomedical Research Centre at the Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust) UK Research & Innovation (UKRI) Medical Research Council UK (MRC) 1000143 MR/M012190/1 Cancer Research UK C8221/A19170 14136 C570/A16491

Abstract Background. In modern linguistics there is particular increasing of interest to historical research of language, especially in the field of professional vocabulary and its functioning. Such an analysis of linguistic means is relevant for all humanities and can be explained by the fact that language reflects the most important changes in the worldview and life of the Eastern Slavs, in particular in the form and content of the semantic class of words having general categorical meaning "tax". Problems of taxation and the organization of effective state tax control have interested mankind since ancient times, today they have become the subject of studies of economics and history mainly (R. Bobrynev, M. Boulenger, O. Vasilyk, B. Grekov, L. Larionov, N. Miller, N. Nechay, А. Tolkushkin). There are some researches on the history of the formation of the terminology of the Russian language in the historical aspect (V. Goncharov), however, as far as we know, the nominations that serve to denote taxes have not received comprehensive coverage in the linguistic literature yet. The purpose of our study is to analyze the nominations that form the semantic class of words meaning "tax, duty, levies". Studying the specifics of their semantics and functioning in the vocabulary context will solve a number of issues related to the history of the formation of tax terminology in general. Methods. The main research methods are descriptive and comparative-historical, with the help of which we trace changes in the specified group of lexical units, elements of quantitative analysis are also used. On the basis of 313 lexical items (nominations of taxes, processes and people related to the tax sphere), selected by the method of continuous sampling from dictionaries the historical changes that occurred to this vocabulary in the process of development were analyzed. Chronological boundaries cover the XIth-XVIIth centuries. Results. The study of the history of the tax terminology of the Russian language has both theoretical significance ‑ awareness of how the world and realities are reflected in society under the influence of various factors, as well as practical application, as this layer of vocabulary relates to various spheres of political, cultural, economic life but it is not described well enough by linguists. The nominations analyzed by us, denoting various taxes, levies, duties, units of the tax sphere, names of people and territories taxed and not taxed by tribute, make it possible to distinguish six functional-thematic groups of nominations of the tax terminology. The analysis of each of the groups allows us to conclude that the individual nominations had not one but several terminological meanings (for example, tribute). The names that reflect the genus and species nominations of fees, tributes, fines and others were very numerous. Often these nominations combine two meanings: levies and duties, duties and levies, taxes and fees, which indicates a lack of regulation in the field of tax terminology and the lexical system as a whole. We have represented productive and non-productive ways of word formation of nominations; we have found that the morphological way of creating these words is the most productive. The phenomenon of synonyms and antonyms is recorded in the system of tax terminology. Two-word (compound) names are replaced by one-word nouns. Discussion. Thus, numerous names of the tax terminology are not included in the vocabulary of modern Russian literary language. Only some of them can be found in literary works, which describe similar realities ("Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow" by A. Radishchev, "Dead Souls" by N. Gogol, "Who in Russia to live well" by N. Nekrasov etc); others generally lost the meaning of "tribute, tax". We see prospects in the study of the functional dynamics of the nominations of the tax terminology system, as well as in elucidating their role in the Russian linguistic world view. Keywords: history of language, nominations for tax designation, semantics, vocabulary, word-formation model. ; Резюме Постановка проблеми. У сучасному мовознавстві відчувається посилення інтересу до історичних досліджень мови, особливо в галузі функціонування термінологічної лексики. Подібний аналіз мовних одиниць є актуальним для всіх гуманітарних наук, його значущість можна пояснити тим, що саме в мові відбиваються найважливіші за своїми наслідками зміни, що відбулися у світогляді і житті східних слов'ян, зокрема у формі та змісті семантичного класу слів, об'єднаних загальнокатегоріальним значенням «податок». Проблеми оподаткування й організації ефективного державного податкового контролю цікавили людство з давніх часів, сьогодні вони стали предметом вивчення переважно економічної науки та історії (Р. Бобринев, М. Буланже, О. Василик, Б. Греков, Л. Ларионов, Н. Міллер, Н. Нечай, О. Толкушкін). Є окремі розвідки щодо історії формування терміносистеми російської мови в історичному аспекті (В. Гончаров), однак, наскільки нам відомо, номінації, що слугують на позначення податків, ще не отримали комплексного висвітлення в лінгвістичній літературі. Мета нашого дослідження – аналіз номінацій, що утворюють семантичний клас слів зі значенням «податок, мито, побори». Вивчення специфіки їхньої семантики й функціонування в словниковому контексті дозволить з'ясувати низку питань, пов'язаних з історією формування податкової термінології в цілому. Методологія дослідження. Основними методами дослідження – описовий та порівняльно-історичний, за допомогою яких ми прослідковуємо зміни в означеній групі лексичних одиниць, було застосовано також елементи кількісного аналізу. На матеріалі 313 лексичних одиниць (номінацій на позначення податків та пов'язаних з податковою сферою), відібраних методом суцільної вибірки зі словників проаналізовано історичні зміни, які відбулися із зазначеною лексикою в процесі розвитку. Хронологічні межі охоплюють XI-XVII століття. Основні результати дослідження. Дослідження історії розвитку податкової терміносистеми російської мови має як теоретичне значення – усвідомлення того, як віддзеркалюється навколишній світ і реалії у соціумі під впливом різноманітних факторів, а також і практичне застосування, оскільки цей прошарок лексики стосується різних сфер політичного, культурного, економічного життя й недостатньо описаний лінгвістами. Проаналізовані нами номінації, що позначають різні податки, побори, повинності, одиниці податкової сфери, найменування осіб і територій, оподатковуваних і не оподатковуваних даниною, уможливили виділити шість функціонально-тематичних груп номінацій податкової терміносистеми. Аналіз кожної з груп дозволяє зробити висновки, що окремі номінації мали не одне, а кілька термінологічних значень (наприклад, данина). Багаточисельними виявилися найменування, що відображають родо-видові номінації зборів, данини, пені тощо. Найчастіше ці номінації поєднують два значення: побору і повинності, мита та збору, податку і плати, що засвідчує неврегульованість у сфері податкової термінології і лексичної системи у цілому. Нами репрезентовано продуктивні і непродуктивні способи словотворення номінацій, виявлено, що морфологічний спосіб творення зазначених слів є найбільш продуктивним. В системі податкової термінології зафіксовано явище синонімії та антонімії. Двослівні (складені) назви замінюються однослівними субстантивами (возовое від «мито з воза»; носовоiе «мито з носа судна»). Висновки і перспективи. Отже, численні найменування податкової терміносфери не увійшли до словникового складу сучасної російської літературної мови. Лише деякі з них (дань, оброкъ) можна зустріти в літературних творах, в яких описано подібні реалії («Подорож із Петербурга до Москви» О. Радищева, «Мертві душі» М. Гоголя, «Кому на Русі жити добре» М. Некрасова та інші); інші (дача, даръ) взагалі втратили значення «данини, податку». Перспективи вбачаємо у дослідженні функціональної динаміки номінацій податкової терміносистеми, а також з'ясуванні їхньої ролі у російській мовній картині світу. Ключові слова: історія мови, лексика, номінації на позначення податків, семантика, словотворча модель.

Keywords: intellectual property right, codification, legislation, The Civil Code ofUkraine This scientific article examines the issue of the need to create aspecial code of intellectual property in Ukraine. For a full-fledged and objective study,an analysis was made of the history of Ukrainian legislation in the field of intellectualproperty, foreign models of legal regulation of intellectual property rights, especiallyEuropean legal experience, were also investigated. The author supports the positionregarding the creation in Ukraine of the Intellectual Property Code, the analogueof which exists in Italy and France. Based on the study of Ukrainian and foreign legalsystems, the author defines the main criteria for creating an intellectual propertycode: Legal and organizational criteria are defined. The author points out the need toimplement the European legislative practice, the jurisprudence of the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union on judicialcases in the field of intellectual property into the code. This vector of implementationwill have a positive meaning for the adaptation of the Ukrainian legislative system toEuropean democratic standards in the field of legal regulation, legal protection of intellectualproperty rights. The author pays special attention to the need to harmonizethe intellectual property code with the Civil Code of Ukraine and procedural legislationin order to level the negative legal consequences in legal practice in the field ofintellectual property; also in the IP Code shall contain the following provision or requirements,which contained universal definitions of legal concepts in the field of intellectualproperty. Based on the conducted scientific analysis, the author points outthe need for the existence of the Ukrainian code of intellectual property and speciallaws in the field of intellectual property. It follows from this that there is a need forlegal regulation of individual legal relations (objects of law) in the field of intellectualproperty law. The author points out that such a legal system corresponds to the modelof legal regulation of the field of intellectual property that exists in the EuropeanUnion. ; Ключові слова: право інтелектуальної власності, кодифікація, законодавство,Цивільний кодекс України Стаття присвячена дослідженню правових та організаційних аспектів кодифікаціїукраїнського законодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. На підставі аналізуісторичного розвитку українського права інтелектуальної власності з наукових пози-цій, аналізу зарубіжних, у тому числі європейських, моделей правового регулюванняінтелектуальної власності визначено основні критерії кодифікації національногозаконодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Вказано на доцільність запровад-ження в українську правову систему спеціального кодексу з інтелектуальної власно-сті, завданням якого буде правове регулювання означеної сфери. Посилання 1. Петрухин И. Л. Правосудие: время реформ. Москва : Наука, 1991. С. 207. 208 с. 2. Конституція України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 3. Про авторське право і суміжні права : Закон України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3792-12/print. 4. Про охорону прав на знаки для товарів і послуг : Закон України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3689-12/print. 5. Цивільний кодекс України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/435-15/print. 6. Іващенок В. А. Розвиток законодавства з інтелектуальної власності в Україні у 2000-х рр. (історико-правовий аспект). Право та державне управління. 2017. № 4 (29). Том 1. С. 19–24. URL : http://www.pdu-journal.kpu.zp.ua/archive/4_2017/tom_1/6.pdf. 7. Шабалін А. В. Актуальні питання захисту права інтелектуальної власності: навчально-практичний посібник. Київ : НДІ ІВ НАПрН України. Київ : Інтерсервіс, 2020. 160 с. 8. Орлюк О. Сфера інтелектуальної власності як предмет правового регулювання: проблема конкуренції законів. Теорія і практика інтелектуальної власності. 2009. № 6 (50). С. 25–33. 9. Угода про асоціацію між Україною, з однієї сторони, та Європейським Союзом, Європейським співтовариством з атомної енергії і їхніми державами-членами. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984_011 (дата звернення: 26.01.2021). 10. Стефанчук Р. О. До питання про кодифікацію законодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Право України. № 11/2016. С. 86–91. 11. Крижна В. Варіанти кодифікації законодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Теорія і практика інтелектуальної власності. № 1. 2010. - С. 110–114. 12. Shabalin, A.V. and all The establishment and development of a system of protection of intellectual property rights in Europe and the USA. Asia Life Sciences. 2020. Issue 1. Pp. 21-38. URL : https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85087558844&origin=resultslist (Shabalin, Andrii V. The establishment and development of a system of protection of intellectual property rights in Europe and the USA. Asia Life Sciences, 2020, (1), стр. 21-38. URL : https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57217735889). 13. Тлумачний словник основних юридичних понять, визначень і термінів URL : http://pidruchniki.ws/19390825/pravo/tlumachniy_slovnik_-osnovnih_yuridichnih_ponyat_viznachen_terminiv. 14. Виборчий кодекс України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/396-20#Text; Земельний кодекс України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/card/2768-14. ================================================== 1. Petrukhyn Y. L. Pravosudye: vremia reform. Moskva : Nauka, 1991. S. 207. 208 s. 2. Konstytutsiia Ukrainy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. URL https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 3. Pro avtorske pravo i sumizhni prava : Zakon Ukrainy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3792-12/print. 4. Pro okhoronu prav na znaky dlia tovariv i posluh : Zakon Ukrainy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. 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Problem setting. During the recently held parliamentary hearings about «Balanced development of human capital in Ukraine: tasks of education and science», event's participants paid attention to the outstanding role of higher education and its quality in ensuring the development of human capital in Ukraine. It is higher education, as well as connected with it scientific and organizational activities, that is considered at the level of one of the conditions for the effective accumulation of the state's national wealth. Such accumulation cannot be imagined without employers' participation in the relevant process, both at the level of direct production process's participants, and at the level of consultants of the administration of higher educational institutions on the content and practice of implementing educational programs. Taking this fact into account, we can say that employers play a significant role in assessing the higher education quality and adjustment of state policy directions in the higher education sphere .Recent research and publications analysis. The issue of higher education quality ensuring is not a fundamentally new direction in organization of the scientific researches, and therefore the level of their scientific studying is quite high. A significant contribution to solution of relevant issues was made by representatives of pedagogical scientific thought, namely: N.G. Batechko, V.Yu.By`kov, G. P. Klimova, V.G. Kremen`, V.I. Lugovy`j, S.M. Nikolayenko, O.G. Romanovs`ky`j, P.I. Sikors`ky`j and many other researchers. In the framework of the sphere of knowledge «Public Administration and management», the phenomenon of the higher education quality was developed in the works of V.M.Babayev, L.M. Gren`, S.M. Dombrovs`ka, T.O. Lukina, V.M. Moroz, A.V. Ozarovs`ka, V.P. Sadkovy`j, N.A. Syerkova I.M. Xmy`rov, S.O. and other scientists. Among foreign scientists, whose focus of scientific attention was the issues of ensuring the educational activities' and higher education quality by institutions of higher education, we should highlight S. Buka, G. Prakash, D. Silva, R. Ulewicz, К.Hadullo and other researches. Despite the scientists' sufficient attention to the higher education quality, some of its questions still need additional research. Among them those are of great importance, content of which is connected with determining of employers' place and role in ensuring of the higher education quality. Paper objective. Basing on the results of the analysis of employers' opinions on the power of influence of the higher education quality's individual factors on its final level, we suggest ways to improve the content and practice of implementing of state policy in the higher education sphere. Paper main body. The survey of employers was held within the framework of one of the planned tasks of the author's non-grant project «Assessment of the higher education quality». In the period from December 2017 to February 2020, 184 respondents (employers) were interviewed, mainly from Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, as well as controlled by Ukraine parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The survey was conducted using a questionnaire method and in-depth interviews with some of the focus group representatives. Among questionnaire's fifteen questions, the focus of direct attention of which was made on one or another aspect of the manifestation of the phenomenon of the higher education quality, there was also one of them, the content of which appealed to the problem of the power of influence of individual determinants on the higher education quality. Among the proposed for respondents' evaluation determinants were also the following ones: material and technical support of the educational process; compliance of the educational programs' content and teaching methods with the requirements of time and labour market demand; the level of internationalization of educational activities; connections of higher education institutions with the real sector of the economy; characteristics of research and teaching staff. The results of the analysis of respondents ' answers to these questions were used as the basis for this publication. Conclusions of the research. Such conclusions were formulated basing on the results of the held research. Importance of each of the higher education quality factors was evaluated by employers on a high level, namely (factors' list is presented in order of reducing strength of their influence on the final level of higher education quality): material and technical support of the educational process-25%; compliance of the educational programs' content and teaching methods with the requirements of time and labour market demand – 22%; the level of educational activities' internationalization – 20%; connections of higher education institutions with the real sector of the economy – 17%; characteristics of research and teaching staff – 16%. In case if we consider proposed for assessment factors through the prism of their actualization at a particular level of assurance of higher education quality, we can talk about the dominance of the organizational level, namely the level of the internal quality assurance system. Actualization of the most of considered by us factors of ensuring of higher education quality is held at the level of the system of ensuring quality of higher education institute's educational activities' and higher education . Taking into account the considerable importance of factor of the internationalization of educational activities, we suggest considering the possibility of its including into the system of criteria for evaluating the educational program quality by the National Agency for higher education quality assurance at the level of a separate (independent) criterion. 4. We consider it appropriate to initiate a discussion on the feasibility of institutionalizing on the first level of higher education of two types of educational programs, namely, educational – professional (such programs are currently typical for The Bachelor's level) and educational-specialized (nowadays existence of such a type of educational programs is not provided by current legislation). The difference between these educational programs can be actualized through the prism of the number foreseen for mastering ECTS credits. We propose to delineate the scope of the varieties of the mentioned above bachelor's degree programs in this form. We propose to distinguish the volumes of the mentioned above varieties of Bachelor's educational programs in the following form: the volume of the Bachelor's program of educational – professional level-240 ECTS credits (4 years of studying); the volume of the Bachelor's program of educational-specialized programs - 180 ECTS credits (3 years of study). ; У статті висвітлено результати опитування роботодавців щодо сили впливу окремих з детермінант якості вищої освіти на її підсумковий рівень. За результатами аналізу відповідей респондентів встановлено, що найбільш значущими серед запропонованих до оцінювання роботодавцями факторів є ті, які пов'язані з матеріально-технічним забезпеченням навчального процесу та відповідністю змісту навчальних програм вимогам ринку праці. Ідентифікована найменша за силою впливу значущість детермінант якості вищої освіти для якісних та кількісних характеристик науково-педагогічних працівників, а також для стану зв'язків закладів вищої освіти (ЗВО) з реальним сектором економіки. Обґрунтовано напрями вдосконалення змісту та практики реалізації державної політики щодо забезпечення ЗВО якості освітньої діяльності та якості вищої освіти.Ключові слова: державна політика у сфері вищої освіти; заклад вищої освіти; якість вищої освіти; фактори впливу на якість вищої освіти; опитування роботодавців; публічне управління якістю вищої освіти.

Den Umschlag von Einstürzende Altbauten ziert eine Postkartenidylle, wie sie jede*r Portugal-Urlauber*in kennt. Ein enges, sich hochschlängelndes Gässchen, das von Häusern mit Azulejos-Fassaden gesäumt wird. Im Hintergrund erkennt man die Bogenbrücke Ponte Dom Luís I, die die Städte Porto und Vila Nova de Gaia miteinander verbindet. Es sind eindeutig alte Bauwerke, die sich über das gesamte Cover erstrecken. Nun stellt sich die Frage: Warum ist hier kein Theatergebäude abgebildet, wenn dieser Band sechs Dramen beinhaltet? Gibt es in Portugal etwa kein Theater? "In Portugal hat es niemals Theater gegeben; was man Theater nennt, hat es bei uns nie gegeben" (S.9), soll João Baptista de Almeida Garrett (1799–1854), der als Begründer des portugiesischen Nationaltheaters gilt, einst behauptet haben. Um diese provokante Formulierung zumindest für die Gegenwart zu widerlegen, hat sich Henry Thorau, Professor em. für Brasilianische und Portugiesische Kulturwissenschaft an der Universität Trier und ehemaliger Chefdramaturg an der Volksbühne Berlin, zum Ziel gesetzt, deutschsprachigen Theaterwissenschaftler*innen und Regisseur*innen den Zugang zu andernfalls nur auf Portugiesisch erhältlicher zeitgenössischer Dramatik zu erleichtern. Wenn es seltene Ware gibt, dann sind es Dramen aus Portugal in Buchform – ganz unabhängig davon, in welchem Land nach ihnen gesucht wird. Laut Thorau wurde die erste Sammlung Stücke aus Portugal 1978 vom Henschelverlag Kunst und Gesellschaft in Ost-Berlin herausgegeben und beinhaltete vier Theaterstücke, die im Zeichen des sozialistischen Realismus standen. Seit der ersten Anthologie portugiesischer Dramen in deutscher Sprache sind also bereits 43 Jahre vergangen. Den Übersetzungen, die von Marina Spinu, Marianne Gareis und dem Herausgeber stammen, hat dieser ein Vorwort vorangestellt, in dem er – mit einem konzisen Exkurs ins 18. und 19. Jahrhundert– präzisiert, mit welchen Schwierigkeiten natürlichen und politischen Ursprungs sich das portugiesische Theater konfrontiert sah und auf welche Weise die Herausbildung einer nationalen Theatertradition, die unabhängig von höfischen und staatlichen Interessen existiert, immer wieder verzögert wurde. Denn abgesehen von einem verheerenden Erdbeben, das in Verbindung mit einem Tsunami die Stadt Lissabon am 1. November 1755 beinahe zur Gänze zerstörte, geschah es beispielsweise erst 1771, dass der Schauspielerberuf per Dekret institutionalisiert wurde. Dennoch verweigerte die Kirche Schauspieler*innen bis in die 1820er Jahre die Sakramente. Mit dem jungen Friedrich Schiller vergleicht Thorau Almeida Garrett, der sich 1836 im Auftrag der Regierung als Theoretiker, Reformer, Organisator und Politiker der Etablierung eines 'Nationalen Theaters' verschrieb. In Garretts Zuständigkeit fielen der Bau des Staatstheaters D. Maria II, das 1846 eröffnet wurde, die Gründung der Theaterakademie und das Verfassen von Dramen mit nationalem Charakter, von denen besonders das Heimkehrerdrama Frei Luís de Souza aus dem Jahr 1844 bekannt wurde. Darin befürchtet die Protagonistin Dona Madalena de Vilhena, ihr Ehemann könnte doch nicht bei den portugiesischen Kreuzzügen in Nordafrika gefallen sein und nach seiner Rückkehr ihre zweite Ehe vereiteln. Einen besonderen Fokus legt Thorau im Vorwort auf die Zeitspanne unmittelbar nach der Diktatur von António de Oliveira Salazar. Salazar regierte Portugal von 1932 bis 1968 als autoritärer Ministerpräsident und war verantwortlich für ein totalitäres System, das das Land durch kostspielige Kolonialkriege zerrüttete und bis zur sogenannten Nelkenrevolution am 25. April 1974 vom Rest der Welt abschottete. Bei dieser unblutigen Revolution war es die Armee selbst, die die Diktatur beendete – sie verweigerte sich dem Anspruch, sich für Kolonialisierungsbestrebungen als 'Kanonenfutter' zu opfern. Die Nelkenrevolution läutete den Niedergang der portugiesischen 'Überseeprovinzen' und den Beginn der Demokratie ein. Dem Theater kam in dieser historischen Umbruchszeit als Forum für politische Auseinandersetzungen ein hoher Stellenwert zu, auch auf den Bühnen der Städte Porto und Évora. Während des Salazar-Regimes war die Theaterzensur drastisch gegen Kritiker*innen vorgegangen, und ein Großteil der Dramen, die dieser Periode entstammen, wurde nie aufgeführt. Laut Thorau wurden die portugiesischen Bühnen in den post-revolutionären Zeiten von einem immer wiederkehrenden Phänomen heimgesucht: Sie setzten mit Vorliebe auf ausländische Erfolgsdramatik. Zwischen 1976 und 1978 war Bertolt Brecht der meistgespielte ausländische Autor in Portugal. Erst die Bestrebungen des Dramatikers Norberto Ávila, der für vier Jahre die Leitung des Theaterressorts des damals neugegründeten Staatssekretariats für Kultur übernahm, sollen zu einer Wende geführt haben. Ganz neu waren beispielsweise die Einführung einer Subventionsklausel für die Aufführung portugiesischer Stücke und ein Subventionierungsprogramm für freie Theatergruppen. Für tiefgreifende Veränderungen in Portugals Theaterproduktion sorgte schließlich der prominente Regisseur João Lourenço, als der Portugiesische Schriftstellerverband auf seine Initiative hin 1997 Portugals renommiertesten Dramen-Preis, den "Grande Prémio de Teatro Português", begründete. Mit diesem Preis soll unter anderem die Verbreitung zeitgenössischer portugiesischer Dramatik gefördert werden. Zusätzlich zum Preisgeld und der Publikation des Stückes ist die Prämierung mit der Uraufführung am Teatro Aberto in Lissabon verbunden. Einstürzende Altbauten spiegelt die jüngere Schaffensphase von portugiesischen Dramatiker*innen wider. In der Anthologie kommen die Dramen der Gegenwartsautor*innen Almeida Faria, João Santos Lopes, Tiago Rodrigues, Luísa Costa Gomes, Cecília Ferreira und Tiago Correia zur Geltung. Den Autor*innen ist gemein, dass sie dem Staub, der mit der Nelkenrevolution aufgewirbelt wurde, folgen. Sie skizzieren Bilder der historischen, politischen und sozialen Erschütterungen in einem Portugal, das nach 1974 versucht, sich auf seine Zugehörigkeit zu Europa zu besinnen und sich dem Tourismus zu öffnen. In diesen Bildern lassen sich ebenso jene Risse erkennen, die sich seit einer harten Finanzkrise und aufgrund eines aggressiven Immobilienbooms bis heute durch das ganze Land verästeln. Die Autor*innen verbindet außerdem der Umstand, dass sie mit den renommiertesten Literatur- und Theaterpreisen Portugals ausgezeichnet wurden. Faria erhielt u.a. den Aquilino-Ribeiro-Preis der Lissabonner Akademie der Wissenschaften; Costa Gomes bekam den "Prémio Máximo de Literatura" verliehen; Rodrigues wurde mit dem "Prémio Pessoa" prämiert; und Santos Lopes, Ferreira und Correia wurden mit dem "Gránde Prémio de Teatro Português der Sociedade Portuguesa de Autores" geehrt. An den Anfang stellt Thorau das Stück Umkehrung von Almeida Faria, das 1999 publiziert wurde. In diesem Stück werden vier Personen mit sozialen Umwälzungen und mit dem Verfall von gesellschaftlichen Strukturen konfrontiert. Die Lebensläufe eines alten Großknechts, einer Köchin, einer Gutsherrin und deren Sohnes verlaufen unter dem Dach eines Gutes, dessen Konstruktion ins Wanken gerät als es durch die Revolution nach 1974 zu Landreformen und zur Enteignung von Großgrundbesitzern kommt. Verfasst wurde das holzschnitthafte Lehrstück in der stilisierten Sprache eines dramatisierten Poems in zehn Kapiteln. Thorau erkennt in dieser Form eine Anspielung auf das Heldenepos Os Lusíadas von Luís de Camões, das die Geschichte des portugiesischen Königreichs thematisiert und sich ebenso in zehn Gesänge gliedert. Mit Manchmal schneit es im April, das 1997 als erstes Theaterstück den "Grande Prémio de Teatro Português" erhielt, legt der Autor João Santos Lopes die Finger in Portugals offene Wunden. Das macht Santos, indem er mehrere Problematiken, die dem Tabuthema der Rückkehr aus den afrikanischen Kolonien zuzuordnen sind, auf den Körper einer jungen schwarzen Frau projiziert: Es geht unter anderem um gescheiterte Remigration, Alltagsrassismus und kompensatorische Jugendgewalt. Für den Protagonisten Gabriel, der eine Gang von weißen Männern anführt, ist der Tag des Jüngsten Gerichts gekommen, an dem die gekidnappte schwarze Frau als Sündenbock herhalten muss für die Schmach und die Traumata, die Heimkehrende ab 1975 erlitten. Um seine Gang zu Gewalt und einem Krieg zwischen Schwarz und Weiß anzustiften, bedient sich Gabriel rassistischer und faschistischer Rhetorik, die das ganze Stück durchzieht. Die Schonungslosigkeit des Stücks bedürfte eigentlich einer Trigger-Warnung, wie Thorau im Vorwort anmerkt. Arbeitslosigkeit, Pleiten und Finanzkrise – so könnte man die Metaebene von Tiago Rodrigues' bizarrem Jugendstück und Coming-of-Age-Drama Traurig und fröhlich ist das Giraffenleben beschreiben, das 2011 uraufgeführt wurde. In Lissabon, das von diesen Vorkommnissen betroffen ist, versucht Giraffe, ein neunjähriges Mädchen, das für ihr Alter zu groß geraten ist, ihren Platz zu finden. Giraffes Vater hat keinen Job, die Mutter ist verstorben und ihr Teddybär Judy Garland leidet am Tourettesyndrom. Als besonders schlimm empfindet es Giraffe, dass ihr Vater nicht genug Geld für den Discovery Channel hat. Diesen braucht sie, um eine Schularbeit über Giraffen schreiben zu können. Gemeinsam mit Judy Garland beschließt sie, sich davonzumachen, um den Premierminister zu einem Gesetz zu überreden, das jedem ein lebenslanges Abo für den Discovery Channel garantiert. Und spätestens als Judy Garland meint: "Wer weiß schon, wohin sein Weg führt? Keiner, fuck. Wenn sie das Gegenteil behaupten, lügen sie. Wir sind alle verloren. Wir sind alle Schiffbrüchige" (S. 158), lässt sich das Stück als Metapher lesen für wirtschaftliche Aussichtslosigkeit und für das Ende des Discovery Channels, den Portugal jahrhundertelang für die überseeische Expansion abonniert hatte. Genauso wie für Giraffe ist für Portugal der Moment gekommen, sich loszulösen und unabhängig zu machen. Tag für Tag von Luísa Costa Gomes, die zu Portugals prominentesten Theaterautorinnen und Regisseurinnen gehört, katapultiert das Publikum in eine Gefechtszone, in der Immobilienbüros darüber entscheiden, wer obdachlos wird und wer nicht. Im Zentrum dieses Gefechts stehen zwei kaltblütige Maklerinnen, die auf die Waffen der Männer zurückgreifen, um ihr Einflussgebiet zu vergrößern. Messerscharfe Dialoge, brennende Städte und eine morbide Gesellschaft, die apathisch "Pornografie. Witze. Werbung. Weiber. Fußball." (S. 245) konsumiert: Auf diesen Pfeilern kreiert Gomes ein unsentimentales Abbild eines Landes, in dem die Teilnahme am Raubtierkapitalismus zur einzigen Überlebensstrategie wird. Auch die Spuren in die Vergangenheit scheinen verwischt zu sein: "Es gab mal eine Revolution, wusstest du das?", "Wo?", "Hier, in Portugal." […] "Davon hab ich nichts mitbekommen. War wohl vor meiner Zeit." (S. 244f.). Tag für Tag wurde 2011 im Teatro Municipal de São Luiz in Lissabon uraufgeführt. Eine andere weibliche Perspektive auf das Leben eröffnet sich in Cecília Ferreiras Monodrama Die Begleiterin. Ferreira, die 2013 für dieses Stück auch mit dem "Grande Prémio de Teatro Português" ausgezeichnet wurde, lässt darin die Protagonistin Luzia in einem Zimmer, in das sie sich endgültig zurückgezogen hat, Lebensbilanz ziehen. Aus den Monologen geht hervor, dass Luzia unzähligen Männern ihr Leben als Krankenschwester und Sterbebegleiterin gewidmet hat. Die Namen der Männer hat sie in einem Heft notiert, zu jedem Namen gibt es eine Geschichte. Ob sich diese tatsächlich zugetragen haben, bleibt offen. Klar ist: Luzias Biografie ist von Männern geprägt. In ihrem Beruf scheint sie unsichtbar geblieben. Nun ist Luzia allein und müde. Die Begleiterin ist eine Abrechnung mit einem Land, in dem sich feminine Lebensläufe zwischen Patriarchat und Prekariat zerstreuen: "Du bist nicht mehr die liebe Luzia, die den Mühseligen und Beladenen hilft. Du bist ein Stück Scheiße in einem stinkenden, vermüllten Quartier. Wo sind denn deine Auszeichnungen für vorbildliches Arbeitsethos? […] Ich bin eine Art Hure der Toten" (S. 293f.). Hoffnungslosigkeit in einer fremdbestimmten Stadt verspüren auch die Figuren in Tiago Correias Stück Turismo, das die anhaltende Problematik des Turbotourismus in Portugal thematisiert und mit der Uraufführung am 31. Januar 2020 die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Gentrifizierung von Portos Altstadt gelenkt hat. Gehetzt von der Angst, die nächste Miete nicht bezahlen zu können oder überhaupt das Dach über dem Kopf zu verlieren, sehen sich die Protagonist*innen täglich mit einer Aushöhlung ihrer Umgebung konfrontiert, mittendrin klafft der Kontrast zwischen Arm und Reich. Der fehlende Lebensraum bringt alle in Bedrängnis. Ein ausländischer Investor, der für den neuen Flughafen Naturschutzgebiete zubetoniert, navigiert ungetrübt durch das Stadtgebiet, macht verzweifelten Bewohnern unmoralische Angebote und kauft nebenbei das Nationaltheater "für 'n Appel und 'n Ei" (S. 339). Dieses Szenario ist in Wirklichkeit (noch) nicht eingetreten. Portugals Nationaltheater Teatro Nacional Dona Maria II wird seit 2014 von Tiago Rodrigues, dem Autor von Traurig und fröhlich ist das Giraffenleben, geleitet. Rodrigues legt Nachdruck auf die Inszenierung von portugiesischen Dramen sowie Stücken aus der Lusophonie, der Gemeinschaft aller portugiesischsprachigen Länder. Doch solange dieses Bemühen kaum subventioniert wird, fristet das portugiesische Theater ein Nischendasein. Auch ein großflächiger Brand, bei dem das Nationaltheater 1964 bis auf seine Außenwände niederbrannte, war nicht förderlich. Doch "Ruinen verbreiten Hoffnung. Sie regen zum Wiederaufbau an" (S. 23), sagt Luísa Costa Gomes. Einstürzende Altbauten zeigt das neue und firme Gerüst, in das sich portugiesische Gegenwartsdramatik einschreibt.