Brazil is a land of contrasts; at the same time that it is emerging as a global economic power, it is also one of the most unequal countries in Latin America. When "Lula" Da Silva and his Workers' Party ("PT") won the 2002 election, they intended to pay a historical debt to the poor. Lula envisioned a country with inclusive growth, where redistribution and poverty reduction were seen as prerequisites for economic growth, and not as competing policy objectives (Leubolt, 2013: 76). In doing so, his government not only changed the content of social policies, but also the very policy-making process. Lula's Fome Zero strategy takes a comprehensive approach to reducing hunger in Brazil. Fome Zero is an umbrella framework that includes programs aimed at increasing access to food, strengthening family agriculture, fostering income generating activities, and supporting partnership promotion and civil society mobilization.This brief presents an analysis of the Fome Zero policy targeting family agriculture, the Food Purchase Program (Programa de Aquisicao de Alimentos, "PAA"). In Brazil 30% of rural enterprises are family farms. They produce 38% of the agricultural value and employ over 70% of rural workers (Rocha, 2009: 58). On the other hand, in 2003 rural poverty was as high as 41%. Accordingly, PAA seeks to tackle rural poverty and food insecurity by guaranteeing demand in local markets for small producers through local government purchases of agricultural products. The first section of this brief presents the context in which PAA was conceived, followed by a summary of the implementation process. The following section presents an evaluation of the policy results. Finally, the analysis concludes with lessons learned and proposed changes.As previously mentioned, the PT election can be seen as the catalyst that propitiated the introduction of PAA. However, the formulation of social policies in Brazil started after the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1985. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution set in motion the decentralization process that empowered municipalities. Then, the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) focused on strengthening democratic institutions and economic growth. In addition, in the early 1990s municipalities across different states devised conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes that benefited the poor. Moreover, during the FHC administration (1995-2002) the federal government launched CCTs at the national level (Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentacao).The PT created a positive environment that enabled the formulation of Fome Zero, with elements that legitimized such social policies as PAA. First, with the transition to democracy social protection policies began to be seen as investments to further development and not as drainage of public resources. Second, the provision of social services had experienced a switch from a universalist model to one that prioritizes targeting vulnerable populations, i.e. CCTs. The third factor was the current economic growth, since the government would not have been able to establish redistributive programs without it. The fourth element was the country's poor social indicators. Despite experiencing growth, Brazil had high social exclusion and inequality because the rapid economic development was elusive to the poor. Finally, the fifth source of legitimacy was the PT election. Lula based his presidential campaign on a discourse of inclusive growth. He promised to eradicate poverty and to redistribute wealth in the country, while reaffirming his commitment to continue with the orthodox liberal monetary policies introduced in previous administrations.Rural poverty and food insecurity were the problems that drove the creation of the PAA policy. The PT designed the framework to address these issues through Fome Zero and the National Food and Nutritional Security Policy ("PNSAN"). However, it deliberately democratized and decentralized the policy debate. In a nutshell, Fome Zero is the articulation of a web of social protection policies and ministries and agencies and its, and PAA's, success relied on creating partnerships with key stakeholders (local governments, businesses and civil society organizations). The federal government created the Social Development Ministry ("MDS") to manage Fome Zero and its subsidiary policies. During the policy formulation process, the MDS organized meetings, workshops and symposia with a multiplicity of stakeholders. These encounters granted non-governmental organizations the possibility to exert influence in the policy process. Social movements also played a key role in the formulation of the National Law for Food and Nutrition Security ("LOSAN"). Furthermore, this law granted civil society participation through the newly created National Council for Food and Nutrition Security ("CONSEA"), which is present at the national, regional and local levels.It was important that the new policy aimed at reducing rural poverty avoid compromising the pro-export production model that had transformed Brazil into one of the world's largest food exporters. Policy-makers considered several traditional options, three of which were discarded for various reasons. An extensive agrarian reform redistributing land to the landless and small farmers would have reduced food outputs. A second alternative, to take no action, would assume that market forces would provide opportunities for poor peasants. The third scenario was to formulate several policies, scattered across different ministries without coordination. The selected policy option implemented by the PT followed a multi-sectoral approach. It sought to increase poor families' income through CCTs, (Bolsa Familia), aimed at feeding the vulnerable population via school meals, community kitchens and popular restaurants, and at strengthening family agriculture through credit and food purchase via PRONAF and PAA. Ultimately, this integral overarching policy focuses on guaranteeing food availability, improving food access and increasing food supply.Successful implementation of such a policy demanded a new policy model that articulates the different dimensions of the policy, while also facilitating the participation of multiple stakeholders. In short, CONSEA, MDS and the Inter-Ministerial Chamber on Food and Nutritional Security ("CAISAN") established the policy system. In such policy system, the national, state and municipal executive powers have the ability to adapt the policy to their local context. The system is crafted after receiving feedback from within the political structure, as well as from the civil society. The following diagram illustrates how the food security policy process works.Created by Law 10.969 in 2003, PAA is administered by MDS and the Ministry of Agricultural Development ("MDA"). PAA guidelines are defined by the Grupo Gestor ("Managing Group"), which is comprised of six ministries: MDS; MDA; Economy; Planning and Budgeting; Agriculture; and Education. The execution has two stages; first, at the national level in partnership with the National Supply Agency (CONAB), and second, decentralized execution involving the participation of state and municipal governments. These latter partnerships are crucial for PAA because the MDS and MDA budget are directed exclusively towards agricultural products procurement, while it is the local governments who ensure the system is operable to allow for the purchases.PAA includes four programs: Purchase for Immediate Donation, Incentives for Milk Consumption and Production, Direct Purchase and Stock Formation. The first two programs aim at buying produce and milk to redistribute among the vulnerable population. Between 2003 and 2010 they represented 39% and 37% of PAA budget, respectively. The objectives of Direct Purchase and Stock formation are to facilitate resources for the promotion of public and individual's stock formation that can guarantee food availability and fair prices for family farmers.PAA intends to benefit two groups of people: food producers and food consumers. The food producers are family farmers including fish farmers, fishermen, extractors, indigenous farmers, quilombolaand family farmers settled during the land reform. The food consumers group comprises people and families under social vulnerability, with imminent risk of nutritional and food insecurity, people assisted by national food and nutrition security programs, and children in public schools.The follow paragraph summarizes the main policy outputs. By the end of 2011 the program had reached over 204,000 small farmers, which is only 3.28% of the rural farmer population. PAA's target for 2013 is to buy products from 445,000 farmers. PAA is present in 2,300 municipalities across the country and targets the country's poorest regions. For instance, the Northeastern region receives 50% of PAA budget. In terms of resources, the MDS and MDA budget has risen from $52 million in 2003 to $585 million in 2013. In terms of food production, food purchases more than tripled between 2003 and 2010, from 135,800 to 426,400 tons. On average, PAA serves 25,000 institutions that feed over 15 million people.PAA has produced both intended and unintended outcomes. First, the program has increased rural farmers' income through food purchases. Now, local farmers produce and sell to local schools and hospitals. Moreover, PAA pays an extra 30% above the regular price for organic products, boosting local economies as a result. Second, producers not covered by PAA are indirect beneficiaries because they also enjoy higher local prices. Third, food stocks have also helped control price fluctuations. Fourth, there is greater diversity of products since PPA purchases more than 330 different items. Fifth, PAA has played an important role in the strengthening of associations and cooperatives. It also provides the stimulus to establish small agro-industries so that associations can process and add value to their production output.Two unintended outcomes attributable to PAA are an increase in price for some staple foods and the expansion of neo-patrimonial institutions, such as political corruption, patronage and clientelism at the local level. Thus, we can assume that the policy "winners" are MDS, CONAB, CONSEA, civil society organizations, farmers, vulnerable population benefited by PAA, local level authorities and local institutions (i.e. schools). On the other hand, three policy "losers" are those corporations in charge of selling food products to the government, farmers who cannot meet the PAA criteria, and low- and middle-income urban populations who must pay higher prices. Although negatively impacted by PAA, these groups do not threaten the viability of the policy. Corporations and big businesses still sell food products to the government because PAA cannot meet the food demand. Despite the fact that they cannot sell to PAA, farmers have a suitable environment that provides easy access to credit and encourages production. Finally, even though prices increased, so did the salaries of the middle-income population.PAA is an innovative policy because of its participatory model during the formulation process, which allows it to enjoy support from its beneficiaries and civil society organizations. Also, PAA's administration is notable since, given its multi-sectoral approach, six different ministries form the managing unit. Finally, the regular control and oversight done by social movements and the impending need to improve coordination among ministries make policy evaluation a necessary priority for PAA's success.In a short amount of time, PAA has already undergone three evaluation rounds (2005, 2008 and 2010). Each evaluation improves the policy and guarantees more popular support. For instance, after the last evaluation the government enacted Law 12.512/2011 and Decree 7.775/2012, which aims at facilitating coordination among the implementing bodies. It also raised the maximum farmer benefits from $1,250 in 2003, to $2,400 in 2006, to $4,100 in 2012. In addition, it encourages organic production by paying 30% above regular price. More importantly, the last policy redesign includes a gender component by establishing that at least 5% of PAA purchases must come from women's associations. Finally, it guarantees a quota of 30% of institutional purchases (schools and hospitals, among others) for small farmers.However, despite the iterative evaluation and redesign process, there is still room for improvement in the policy. Most importantly, PAA does not reach the poorest of the poor. Although the registration process is very efficient because it is based on another social program (PRONAF), the poorest farmers lack land titles, thus cannot be part of PRONAF or PAA. The policy could be improved with provisions enabling the inclusion of this group.PAA is helping with the national goals of poverty alleviation, however redefining its goals and incorporating strategic planning in rural development could improve PAA. More specifically, PAA should reconsider its strategy towards associativism and cooperativism. The policy could enhance further rural development by supporting associations and cooperatives in becoming artisanal industries that add value to their products.In conclusion, PAA intends to solve a social problem by addressing both the supply and demand sides. On one hand, PPA's objective is to eliminate hunger by guaranteeing food availability, improving food access and increasing food supply. On the other hand, PAA reduces rural poverty by providing opportunities to small farmers with market access and better prices. The policy has demonstrated positive results and has been constantly improved through iterative evaluations. With further strategic planning on how to help associations becoming the leaders of rural development the policy could achieve optimal positive impact.Sobre el autorMA International DevelopmentSchool of International ServiceAmerican UniversityLicenciado en Estudios InternacionalesUniversidad ORT - Uruguay
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
As Ukraine entered the third year of the full-scale war, the situation appeared to have reached a stalemate, despite heavy fighting at different points on the front lines. In mid-February, with Ukrainian supply routes targeted and the troops running short of ammunition, Ukrainian forces had to withdraw from Avdiivka, the scene of some of the most intense fighting in the past half year. However, the Ukrainian army did succeed in destroying much of the Russian Black Sea fleet and airplanes. Ukrainian security services launched successful attacks on Russian oil refineries deep inside Russia, and Russian volunteers fighting on the side of Ukraine continued to conduct military operations in the regions along the border with Ukraine. Russia ramped up its disinformation campaign in Ukraine and Europe, striving to sow doubt among Ukrainians and distrust in the Ukrainian government both domestically and internationally. In late March it renewed its massive attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, causing serious damage. It also intensified attacks on civilian residential buildings. Future military aid to Ukraine remained a major topic of discussion with Ukraine's international partners. Nonetheless, during the quarter Ukraine signed security cooperation agreements with G-7 members and other states, and the European states made concerted efforts to provide critically necessary artillery rounds to the Ukrainian army.1. ROLLOUT OF THE WARIn February 2024, Ukraine entered the third year of combating Russia's wide-scale invasion, marking ten years of war since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, later unleashing war in the Donbas. The war has changed the country and its economy drastically, though the changes that have occurred over the decade of war differ from those experienced in the two years of the full-scale war. General Developments during January–MarchIn the first quarter of 2024, heavy fighting continued, but without notable changes to the front line. Throughout the quarter the Russian Air Force (RuAF) continued its intense offensive in all directions, expanding on bombing campaigns it had started in October of last year. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) shifted to defensive actions to exhaust the Russian forces. However, the Ukrainian army had to withdraw from some positions because of a lack of weapons and intense pressure from the RuAF.Russia used phosphorus and chemical weapons during several hard-fought battles. The fiercest Russian attacks were directed at Avdiivka, Donetsk oblast, where the situation resembled the one in Bakhmut last year. In mid-February, lacking ammunition and seeing their supply routes being cutting off, the Ukrainian forces stepped back from their positions in Avdiivka. One month later, the UAF command reported that the situation in the country's East had stabilized. Ukraine stepped up efforts to fortify three major defensive lines.Sea and air operations advances. Though facing a deadlock in land operations, Ukraine realized significant advances in destroying Russia's Black Sea Fleet and shot down several Russian military planes over Ukraine. During the quarter, Ukrainian forces sank five Russian military ships, including three landing ships. As of the end of March, Russia had lost almost all landing ships in the Black Sea. More than a third of the Russian fleet has been disabled, including a submarine. Ukrainian-designed kamikaze sea drones have become the main weapons used in attacking the Russian fleet. To save its Black Sea Fleet, Russia started withdrawing its major vessels from ports in occupied Crimea.Ukraine also shot down Russian military jets that were bombing regions close to the front lines. To illustrate Ukraine's advances in this arena, during just two weeks in late February and early March, Ukrainian forces downed fourteen Russian military airplanes. In addition to Su-34 bombers (used to attack frontline settlements with guided aerial bombs) and modern Su-35 fighter jets, Russia lost two A-50 planes, which together cost about $700 million (they are outfitted with an airborne early warning and control system, designed to detect air defense systems and coordinate targets for Russian fighter jets). Russia had only a few of these planes before the invasion, so the loss of two represents a setback. The RuAF is probably ready to tolerate high losses to maintain the offensive.Russian refineries under attack. In the first quarter of the year, more than a dozen Russian oil refineries deep inside the country came under drone attack by Ukraine (some of the targets were located as far as 560 miles from the border with Ukraine) The Security Service of Ukraine formally admitted to the attacks, defending them on the grounds that refineries are legitimate targets because they provide resources to run the Russian war machine. (Russia's income from oil sales remains high despite international sanctions.) Ukraine also attacked Russian factories producing weapons. Analysts have described the strikes on Russian oil facilities as a new phase of the war. The attacks have affected Russia's refining capabilities. Although Russia has not provided official statistics, the country is believed to have lost about 10 percent of its refining capacity. Because Russia's domestic gas supplies are now diminished, Russia is considering importing gas from Belarus.Contributions of Russian volunteers to the war effort. Russian volunteers fighting on the side of Ukraine under the corps names Freedom of Russia, the Siberian Battalion, and the Russian Volunteer Corps started military operations on the border regions with Ukraine, in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts. Similar operations took place in May 2023, but now the scale of the military actions is bigger and their duration longer. The operations began before the elections in Russia and continued after them. The anti-Kremlin volunteer military units clashed with Russian servicemen and even claimed to have captured some Russian troops.Russia intensified its attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure, especially in the frontline regions, notably Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. This may be an attempt to increase pressure on Ukraine while the delivery of military aid and supplies to Ukraine is slowed or suspended, especially the delivery of supplies from the United States. In addition to drones and missiles, Russia started using its new Zircon hypersonic missiles and 1,500-kg (3,300-pound) aerial bombs to target Ukrainian cities. The lack of ammunition, especially air defense missiles, may play a critical role in Ukraine's ability to protect the frontline areas and critical infrastructure across the country; a continuation of massive Russian attacks, in particular attacks using North Korean missiles and Iranian drones, could plunge Ukraine into a new stone age.Engagement of Russia's AlliesAt the beginning of the year, it became evident that North Korea was supplying Russia with missiles, including ballistic missiles. Kyiv said that as of mid-March, Russia had used about fifty of these against Ukraine. The DPRK-origin missiles were found to contain U.S. and European parts. The North Korean defense minister said the country might also supply tactical guided missiles to Russia. According to the official, the country's military factories are working at full capacity. Russia uses DPRK artillery shells. Since September 2023, North Korea has delivered more than 10,000 containers of munitions or munitions-related materials to Russia. Russia started supplying oil to the DPRK in exchange for weapons.Russia is negotiating with Iran as well to receive ballistic missiles. Foreign media have reported that Iran delivered hundreds of these missiles, but Ukrainian intelligence denies this.Belarus earlier was a key supplier of ammunition to support Russia's war. Though its stocks are probably exhausted by now, it remains one of Russia's important allies. Belarus is now building a new military town twenty-five miles from the border with Ukraine that will house both Russian and Belarusian troops. The combined forces started joint training in the Belarusian facility in March. Though Russia relies heavily on ammunition supplies from its allies, the country is still capable of producing its own weapons. For instance, one of the Russian missiles that hit Kyiv in 2024 was made in the summer of 2023. Russia is also pouring money into developing its own drone systems, with the combat drone Okhotnik-B expected to go into production in Novosibirsk later this year.Russian Disinformation Campaigns and CyberattacksRussia continued its disinformation campaign in Ukraine, hoping to undermine trust in the government and sow suspicions abroad. The clear goal is to weaken international support for Ukraine. These efforts are likely to ramp up in 2024 because many countries are holding elections, and policies regarding aid for Ukraine and the reception of Ukrainian refugees could shift drastically. Under normal conditions, Ukraine would also be holding elections. The curtain continues to be pulled back on Russia's disinformation efforts. The Washington Post published material on Russia's huge campaign to spread distrust of the government and societal despair in Ukraine, and the German Marshall Fund issued a report on Russia's use of Polish media to spread the Kremlin's lies about Ukraine. According to Security and Defense Secretary Oleksii Danilov, Russia has significantly stepped up its disinformation campaigns, issuing or spreading 166 million disinformation posts every week about Ukraine on social media in a global effort to manipulate thinking on Ukraine.According to Ukrainian intelligence sources, Russia is engaged in a massive disinformation campaign code-named Maidan-3 and designed to promote antiwar protests and destabilize the country, with the ultimate goal of removing President Zelensky from his leadership role. The campaign is expected be most active during March–May, and persons inside Ukraine are believed to be involved.Deep-fake videos play a prominent role in Russian propaganda. For instance, a deep-fake video of former president Petro Poroshenko allegedly making incendiary statements about President Zelensky was targeted to Ukrainian soldiers. Videos allegedly showing Russians attacking Ukrainian military training camps or Ukrainian special forces shooting civilians are widely circulated; such misrepresentations are unfortunately becoming commonplace.Russia has also continued cyberattacks against Ukrainian media, authorities, and critically important companies, including one of the biggest banks, the biggest state-owned oil and gas company, Naftogaz, POW Coordination Headquarters, Ukraine's Education Ministry website, and so on. Hackers have been sending Ukrainian soldiers messages containing malware. In 2023, the number of cyberattacks against Ukrainian organizations increased by 15.9 percent compared to 2022, reaching an overall number of 2,543 documented cases.Even though ISIS took responsibility for the terrorist shooting in Moscow's Crocus concert hall in March, and Western intelligence said it has proof that Ukraine did not organize it, Russian top officials, including Vladimir Putin, tried to link it to Kyiv, while constantly changing the narrative. The media reported that some in Putin's circle do not see any link to Ukraine. It's possible the Kremlin will try to capitalize on the attack to mobilize Russian society against Ukraine. The head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) blamed the United States, the UK, and Ukraine as instigators and enablers of the attack.Energy Terrorism and Other Attacks on Critical InfrastructureFrom mid-September 2023 to the end of the year, Russia did not succeed in damaging Ukraine's energy infrastructure, though not for lack of trying. The number of drones Russia launched during October–December 2023 broke records since the invasion. Most were brought down by Ukrainian air defense units before they could inflict damage, so we do not know their intended targets.This picture changed with the new year. Starting in early 2024, Russia focused on attacking energy infrastructure in the frontline regions, which are generally the easiest to reach. Despite the damage this caused, the power systems continued to operate in a relatively stable mode. On the night of March 22, Russia launched a massive attack on the Ukrainian power system, using drones and ballistic and cruise missiles. The largest such attack since the start of the full-scale invasion, it involved sixty Shahed drones and almost ninety missiles of various types. Power production and transmission facilities in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, and Dnipro were targeted. Russians hit the biggest Ukrainian hydropower plant, DniproHES, and the dam of its water reservoir on the Dnipro river in Zaporizhzhia oblast; two other big hydropower plants were damaged in the following days.The biggest private-owned Ukrainian energy company, DTEK, reported that 80 percent of its capacities had been damaged during the attacks by the end of March. In Kharkiv, all thermal power plants and substations were destroyed in the last week of March. The state-owned Centrenergo lost its biggest power plant in Kharkiv oblast. The major attack was followed by attacks in ensuing days. Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civilian InfrastructureIn the first quarter of the year, Ukraine faced more Russian drone and missile strikes on multi-block residential buildings, with many civilians injured and killed—in some cases dozens in a single attack. Occasionally multiple cities were attacked simultaneously. Big city targets included Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Sumy. In addition, civil infrastructure in the regions under Ukrainian control and well inside the front lines was regularly attacked, sustaining damage. Since March 11, Russia has been shelling the borders of Sumy oblast, mostly using guided aerial bombs, artillery, and Lancet attack drones.In general, from the start of the year, Ukraine has seen an increased number of civilians killed or wounded in air strikes. Fuel depots and fueling stations have been attacked, leading to civilian casualties and environmental damage. It is now commonplace for Russia to target a wide range of civil infrastructure with air strikes and artillery shelling.One of the numerous air attacks on Odesa happened during the visit of the prime minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis. A missile exploded extremely close to the location of Mitsotakis and President Zelensky. Russia has continued committing crimes against civilians in the occupied territories: torturing civilians, forcing them to participate in Russian presidential elections, bugging residents, expropriating apartments, and resettling Russian transplants from deep inside the country in the occupied territories. POW ExchangesPOW exchanges, which had been suspended for a while, were renewed at the beginning of the year, with the largest number of Ukrainians returning home since the start of the wide-scale invasion. On January 24, a few days before the planned POW exchange, a cargo aircraft was shot down in Russia. Moscow blamed Ukraine for downing the plane, claiming it was carrying sixty-five prisoners to be exchanged. However, Russia did not provide any proof that the plane was in fact carrying POWs, and Kyiv said there were no Ukrainian POWs on the plane.Two more POW exchanges took place after the incident, in late January and again in February. 2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSPresident Zelensky's Diplomatic ToursIn the first quarter of 2024, President Zelensky undertook several diplomatic tours, hoping to consolidate support for Ukraine. This mission was especially critical in light of the slowing of aid from the United States, and the number of agreements Ukraine reached during this period is testament to the success of these efforts.In January, President Zelensky made a diplomatic trip to the Baltic states, Lithuania,Estonia, and Latvia, which are among the strongest supporters of Ukraine. Zelensky met with the countries' leaders and political elites and expressed gratitude for their support during the ten years of war. They discussed Ukraine's European integration and future cooperation in electromagnetic warfare and military drone production. The three countries remain strong Ukraine's allies of Ukraine in 2024, providing military and humanitarian aid and political support. Ukraine and Latvia signed an agreement on technical and financial cooperation and a memorandum on cooperation on defense and security.President Zelensky left the Baltics for Switzerland to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he addressed the forum's participants on the war in Ukraine and the need to invest in Ukraine's victory. In Davos, he also met with leaders of different states and the world's finance leaders, seeking to boost investment in Ukraine.In February, President Zelensky visited Germany to give a speech and attend the Munich Security Conference. He met his German and Czech counterparts and discussed joint efforts to produce weapons.Later, he visited Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and to discuss the Ukrainian Peace Formula and ways to repatriate captured and deported Ukrainians. He left Saudi Arabia for Albania to attend the second Ukraine-Balkans forum, where he also met with the leaders of some Balkan states to discuss European integration efforts. On March 8, he visited Turkey to meet with his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Repatriating Ukrainian citizens held in captivity in Russia was among the key topics discussed at the meeting. The two countries signed an agreement to simplify bilateral trade and extended permit-free cargo truck movement at least until the end of the war. Security Cooperation AgreementsFrom early 2024, Ukraine began signing agreements on security cooperation with other states. The G-7 states intended to sign these during the NATO summit in Vilnius on July 12, 2023. Later, twenty-four more states expressed their intention to join this format. The UK was the first country to sign, on January 12, followed by Germany, France. Denmark, Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands. Many countries are in dialogue, negotiating the text of the agreements to be signed. Some agreements stipulate commitments and plans to provide military aid in upcoming years.In Ukraine, these are often called "agreements on security commitments." However, they are more like framework agreements on security and defense cooperation; they do not have the force of a contract and do not spell out specific guarantees or steps the signatories should take to ensure Ukraine's sovereignty. Many experts in Ukraine have criticized the agreements because they do not provide Ukraine with hard security guarantees.Relations with NATOIn January, the NATO-Ukraine Council held a meeting at Ukraine's request after Russia launched massive air strikes against Ukraine at the beginning of the year. The allies reaffirmed their commitment to bolster Ukraine's defenses further and to provide Ukraine with major military, economic, and humanitarian assistance. In March, a NATO military delegation visited Kyiv for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion.Relations with the United States and CanadaPolitical differences in the U.S. Congress remained an obstacle to achieving consensus on the future of military aid to Ukraine. In March the United States announced the first $300 million security assistance package for Ukraine this year, as supplemental funding was blocked in Congress. Funds for the package came from unanticipated cost savings in existing Pentagon contracts. Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau arrived in Kyiv on the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to demonstrate his solidarity. Canada joined the drones coalition for Ukraine and allocated $1.5 billion in aid to finance Ukraine's budget deficit.Relations with the EU and the European StatesIn February the EU approved €50 billion in financial support for Ukraine, to run through 2027. Later the EU approved $5.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine for 2024. The EU planned to supply Ukraine by the end of March with half of the one million artillery rounds it has promised to supply by the end of the year. Joint European Efforts to Arm UkraineArtillery rounds to be provided by the Czech Republic. In February, Czech president Petr Pavel said that the country had found a way to acquire 800,000 artillery rounds for Ukraine, but it needed funding. Earlier, the Czech Republic had proposed buying ammunition for Ukraine outside the EU. Almost twenty countries, some outside Europe, joined the initiative and contributed to the fund to buy artillery rounds: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and others. In March, Prague reported it was ready to deliver the first batches of ammunition and that it had found 700,000 shells of other types that could be bought with additional funds.Long-range missiles coalition. In late February, President of France Emmanuel Macron announced a coalition to send Ukraine long-range missiles. On March 15, following a "Weimar Triangle" format meeting in Berlin, the leaders of Germany, France, and Poland agreed on new initiatives in support of Ukraine, including more weapons purchases and a future formation of a coalition on long-range rocket artillery. The initiative includes purchasing more weapons for Ukraine on global markets and expanding military production.Drone coalition. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in February said that allies had established a drone coalition for Ukraine, committing to supplying one million drones. The UK and Latvia will lead an international coalition to develop vital drones for Ukraine.Cybersecurity support. In February, the IT Coalition for Ukraine signed an agreement to enhance Ukraine's defense capabilities in communications and cybersecurity—an important step in light of Russia's use of IT in conducting the war. The coalition was established in September 2023. It is led by Estonia and Luxembourg and includes Ukraine, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands.France was the key newsmaker regarding Ukraine and its defensive fighting against Russia. Except for the agreement on security guarantees between the two countries, President Macron was the first leader to observe publicly that troops might have to be sent to Ukraine if Russia continued its advances. The statement caused a heated discussion with the leaders of other states, but Macron insisted it was not an off-the-cuff remark but a well-considered, realistic view. He referred to Russia's war as an existential threat to France and Europe. French foreign minister Stephane Sejourne visited Kyiv in January, reassuring Ukraine of longlasting support. Later, France announced new military aid to Ukraine, including artillery and air defense systems, drones, guided bombs, and other important pieces. France is considering expanding military aid programs for Ukraine, and President Macron called on Europe to be ready to compensate for reduced U.S. support. The UK, Germany, and the Netherlands continued to be among the biggest European supporters in providing military aid and economic assistance.Relations with Hungary remained strained. The country blocked the EU's €50 billion aid initiative for a few months, and also blocked the EU's joint statement commemorating the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale war. Pressure from the European Parliament probably encouraged Hungary to change its position. Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba met his Hungarian counterpart in January to discuss a potential visit by Zelensky to Budapest aimed at improving bilateral relations. Later, Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó explained that such a meeting between Viktor Orbán and Zelensky would be impossible until Kyiv restored the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority as they had existed before 2015.The prime ministers of Ukraine and Slovakia met in Ukraine and signed a joint statement to strengthen bilateral relations "based on mutual trust and respect." The Slovak prime minister promised not to obstruct Ukraine's purchases of weapons from Slovak companies and said that Bratislava would support the EU providing €50 billion in financial aid to Ukraine.The border blockade by farmers was a key issue in bilateral relations with Poland and remained contentious throughout the quarter. At different times, farmers and truck drivers have thrown up blockades, affecting almost all of Ukraine's border crossings.Polish farmers are demanding restrictions on imports from Ukraine, in the belief that their market prices have fallen because of competition. Poland had earlier banned food imports from Ukraine, allowing transit only. Polish officials confirmed that Ukrainian grain was not imported but merely transiting the country to destinations beyond. Kyiv says that now only 5 percent of Ukrainian food exports go through Poland, with most grain exports to be shipped by sea. Farmers are also protesting the EU's climate change policies and blocking other border crossings, including some on the border with Germany. Polish haulers on strike demanded the restoration of permits for Ukrainian carriers, a ban on the issuance of licenses to non-EU transport companies, and a waiver for empty Polish trucks to register through the Ukrainian electronic queue when returning to Poland from Ukraine. However, the blockade by haulers was much shorter this quarter.The blockade lasted the entire quarter, though not with the same sustained intensity. The blockade may be politically inspired, especially if one considers that the country will hold local elections in April. Farmers even tried to block railway connections with Ukraine and passenger transportation. The European Commission expressed concern regarding the blockade. The Polish government's attempts to settle the issue were unsuccessful, though it is unclear how robust those efforts were.The blockades created long lines at the borders, complicating the importation of even critically important goods such as military equipment. During the protests, Polish farmers from time to time dumped Ukrainian grain that was transiting Poland to other states, causing tension and tight-lipped reactions in Ukraine. It should be noted once again that one of the protest organizers is Rafał Mekler, a member of the Polish far-right National Movement Party, also known as the Confederation Party, which is skeptical about the EU and less friendly toward Ukraine. Mekler's role is important because Russia is seeking to take advantage of domestic Polish discontent by spreading its anti-Ukrainian narratives in Poland. Polish prime minister Donald Tusk said he would not tolerate anti-Ukrainian sentiments in his government. Tusk visited Kyiv in January to announce a new aid package for Ukraine. At the same time, Poland continues to import grain and fuel from Russia and Belarus without any protests taking place on Poland's border with those states. Polish police detained Ukrainian journalists who investigated the import of goods at the border with Belarus. Other Ukrainian journalists were later similarly detained and deported from Poland while investigating trade with Russia. In late March, the Ukrainian and Polish prime ministers met in Warsaw to discuss the dispute. The parties have made some progress, but the problem remains. In mid-January, farmers in Romaniaagain started a blockade. However, the Romanian government quickly negotiated with the protesters, and the blockade was dissolved in early February. Ukrainian exports through Romania rose by 50 percent while those through Poland, formerly the biggest transit country, decreased.JapanIn February, Japan hosted a conference on Ukraine's restoration. The event brought together about 200 Japanese and Ukrainian companies, which signed fifty-six agreements and memorandums of cooperation. Japan allocated more than $12 billion in aid to Ukraine and will spend €1.25 billion to support investments in Ukraine.Debates on Transferring Frozen Russian Assets for UkraineIn the first quarter of 2024, Ukraine's allies continued to debate the use of frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine's needs during the war. A group of international law experts and practitioners concluded that it would be lawful, under international law, to transfer Russian state assets as compensation for the damage that has resulted directly from Russia's unlawful conduct. There was a debate in the EU about whether these funds should be held for future use in reconstructing Ukraine or be spent now on weapons. High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell supported the idea of using 90 percent of the revenue generated by frozen Russian assets to purchase weapons for Ukraine. Among the EU member states, Hungary and Austria expressed opposition to using these funds for weapons.The Fighter Jet Coalition DevelopmentsWhen the allies agreed to provide Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets, the craft were expected to arrive in early 2024. At the beginning of the year, the media reported that delivery of the first jet might be delayed to mid-2024. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that the delivery date will depend on when Ukrainian pilots will be ready to fly them after training.The first group of Ukrainian pilots will complete F-16 training by the summer. But probably only six F-16s will have been delivered out of about forty-five fighter jets that European allies have promised. The Netherlands decided to send six more F-16 jets to Ukraine in addition to the eighteen the country promised to supply in late 2023. 3. INTERNAL AFFAIRSReshufflesOne of the most shocking internal events in Ukraine was the dismissal of Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi. President Zelensky appointed General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who had previously served as commander of Ukraine's Land Forces, the new commander-in-chief and gave him wide latitude to make personnel changes. Zelensky explained his decision by citing the need to reboot management of the military command and to change the military strategy. However, Zaluzhnyi had made clear his frustration with the progress of the war on international media, and there are political tensions between the two men, with Zaluzhnyi's trust rating among survey respondents higher than Zelensky's.In February the government appointed a new head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Viktor Pavlushchyk, as the previous head, Oleksandr Novikov, had completed his four-year term in the position. Pavlushchyk was selected as the head of the agency by a competition. In late March, President Zelensky dismissed the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Oleksiy Danilov, and appointed Oleksandr Lytvynenko, a former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, to the position. Danilov later was appointed ambassador to Moldova. The Economic SituationUkraine's economy remained relatively stable in the first quarter of 2024. However, the government experienced difficulty covering budget expenditures with a drop in foreign financial aid: in the first two months of 2024, Ukraine received only 10 percent of the planned financial aid from its allies.Slowing inflation led the National Bank to decrease its key rate to 14.5 percent. At the same time, the IMF expects the economic shock to begin in the second quarter of 2024 with the intensification of the war. Ukrainian agencies expect lower economic growth for 2024 as well.The Energy SituationDuring January and February 2024, Russia attacked Ukraine's energy facilities, mostly in regions close to the front. The power system continued to operate normally, however, and electricity exports to the EU in early March broke records since the start of the wide-scale invasion. The situation rapidly reversed after the attacks in late March, and Ukraine became deeply dependent on electricity imports from Europe, realizing record-high volumes of imports. Ukraine got through the winter just passed using domestically produced gas only. This was possible in part because the demand for natural gas has fallen since the start of the wide-scale invasion.4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIESPlan of Reforms for the Ukraine Facility Funding ProgramIn March, the government approved a Plan of Reforms for 2024–2027. The plan addresses reform of the public administration and judicial system and strengthening the battle against corruption; economic reforms, such as management of public assets and creating an attractive environment for investment; and sectoral reforms (energy, transport agriculture, critical raw materials, small business, IT, and environment). It provides a basis for funding the Ukraine Facility, the EU's financial support program for Ukraine, which is expected to provide €50 billion over four years. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal submitted the plan to the European Commission for approval. The first tranche of funding was released on March 20.Oscar Award for 20 Days in Mariupol DocumentaryThe Ukrainian film 20 Days in Mariupol won the Best Documentary award at the 96th Academy Awards. It is the first film made by a Ukrainian director to have won an Oscar. The film records the atrocities committed during Russia's months-long siege of the city of Mariupol in 2022. The documentary was put together by a team of Ukrainian journalists from the Associated Press and included the film director, Mstyslav Chernov. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
As Ukraine entered the third year of the full-scale war, the situation appeared to have reached a stalemate, despite heavy fighting at different points on the front lines. In mid-February, with Ukrainian supply routes targeted and the troops running short of ammunition, Ukrainian forces had to withdraw from Avdiivka, the scene of some of the most intense fighting in the past half year. However, the Ukrainian army did succeed in destroying much of the Russian Black Sea fleet and airplanes. Ukrainian security services launched successful attacks on Russian oil refineries deep inside Russia, and Russian volunteers fighting on the side of Ukraine continued to conduct military operations in the regions along the border with Ukraine. Russia ramped up its disinformation campaign in Ukraine and Europe, striving to sow doubt among Ukrainians and distrust in the Ukrainian government both domestically and internationally. In late March it renewed its massive attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, causing serious damage. It also intensified attacks on civilian residential buildings. Future military aid to Ukraine remained a major topic of discussion with Ukraine's international partners. Nonetheless, during the quarter Ukraine signed security cooperation agreements with G-7 members and other states, and the European states made concerted efforts to provide critically necessary artillery rounds to the Ukrainian army.1. ROLLOUT OF THE WARIn February 2024, Ukraine entered the third year of combating Russia's wide-scale invasion, marking ten years of war since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, later unleashing war in the Donbas. The war has changed the country and its economy drastically, though the changes that have occurred over the decade of war differ from those experienced in the two years of the full-scale war. General Developments during January–MarchIn the first quarter of 2024, heavy fighting continued, but without notable changes to the front line. Throughout the quarter the Russian Air Force (RuAF) continued its intense offensive in all directions, expanding on bombing campaigns it had started in October of last year. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) shifted to defensive actions to exhaust the Russian forces. However, the Ukrainian army had to withdraw from some positions because of a lack of weapons and intense pressure from the RuAF.Russia used phosphorus and chemical weapons during several hard-fought battles. The fiercest Russian attacks were directed at Avdiivka, Donetsk oblast, where the situation resembled the one in Bakhmut last year. In mid-February, lacking ammunition and seeing their supply routes being cutting off, the Ukrainian forces stepped back from their positions in Avdiivka. One month later, the UAF command reported that the situation in the country's East had stabilized. Ukraine stepped up efforts to fortify three major defensive lines.Sea and air operations advances. Though facing a deadlock in land operations, Ukraine realized significant advances in destroying Russia's Black Sea Fleet and shot down several Russian military planes over Ukraine. During the quarter, Ukrainian forces sank five Russian military ships, including three landing ships. As of the end of March, Russia had lost almost all landing ships in the Black Sea. More than a third of the Russian fleet has been disabled, including a submarine. Ukrainian-designed kamikaze sea drones have become the main weapons used in attacking the Russian fleet. To save its Black Sea Fleet, Russia started withdrawing its major vessels from ports in occupied Crimea.Ukraine also shot down Russian military jets that were bombing regions close to the front lines. To illustrate Ukraine's advances in this arena, during just two weeks in late February and early March, Ukrainian forces downed fourteen Russian military airplanes. In addition to Su-34 bombers (used to attack frontline settlements with guided aerial bombs) and modern Su-35 fighter jets, Russia lost two A-50 planes, which together cost about $700 million (they are outfitted with an airborne early warning and control system, designed to detect air defense systems and coordinate targets for Russian fighter jets). Russia had only a few of these planes before the invasion, so the loss of two represents a setback. The RuAF is probably ready to tolerate high losses to maintain the offensive.Russian refineries under attack. In the first quarter of the year, more than a dozen Russian oil refineries deep inside the country came under drone attack by Ukraine (some of the targets were located as far as 560 miles from the border with Ukraine) The Security Service of Ukraine formally admitted to the attacks, defending them on the grounds that refineries are legitimate targets because they provide resources to run the Russian war machine. (Russia's income from oil sales remains high despite international sanctions.) Ukraine also attacked Russian factories producing weapons. Analysts have described the strikes on Russian oil facilities as a new phase of the war. The attacks have affected Russia's refining capabilities. Although Russia has not provided official statistics, the country is believed to have lost about 10 percent of its refining capacity. Because Russia's domestic gas supplies are now diminished, Russia is considering importing gas from Belarus.Contributions of Russian volunteers to the war effort. Russian volunteers fighting on the side of Ukraine under the corps names Freedom of Russia, the Siberian Battalion, and the Russian Volunteer Corps started military operations on the border regions with Ukraine, in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts. Similar operations took place in May 2023, but now the scale of the military actions is bigger and their duration longer. The operations began before the elections in Russia and continued after them. The anti-Kremlin volunteer military units clashed with Russian servicemen and even claimed to have captured some Russian troops.Russia intensified its attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure, especially in the frontline regions, notably Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. This may be an attempt to increase pressure on Ukraine while the delivery of military aid and supplies to Ukraine is slowed or suspended, especially the delivery of supplies from the United States. In addition to drones and missiles, Russia started using its new Zircon hypersonic missiles and 1,500-kg (3,300-pound) aerial bombs to target Ukrainian cities. The lack of ammunition, especially air defense missiles, may play a critical role in Ukraine's ability to protect the frontline areas and critical infrastructure across the country; a continuation of massive Russian attacks, in particular attacks using North Korean missiles and Iranian drones, could plunge Ukraine into a new stone age.Engagement of Russia's AlliesAt the beginning of the year, it became evident that North Korea was supplying Russia with missiles, including ballistic missiles. Kyiv said that as of mid-March, Russia had used about fifty of these against Ukraine. The DPRK-origin missiles were found to contain U.S. and European parts. The North Korean defense minister said the country might also supply tactical guided missiles to Russia. According to the official, the country's military factories are working at full capacity. Russia uses DPRK artillery shells. Since September 2023, North Korea has delivered more than 10,000 containers of munitions or munitions-related materials to Russia. Russia started supplying oil to the DPRK in exchange for weapons.Russia is negotiating with Iran as well to receive ballistic missiles. Foreign media have reported that Iran delivered hundreds of these missiles, but Ukrainian intelligence denies this.Belarus earlier was a key supplier of ammunition to support Russia's war. Though its stocks are probably exhausted by now, it remains one of Russia's important allies. Belarus is now building a new military town twenty-five miles from the border with Ukraine that will house both Russian and Belarusian troops. The combined forces started joint training in the Belarusian facility in March. Though Russia relies heavily on ammunition supplies from its allies, the country is still capable of producing its own weapons. For instance, one of the Russian missiles that hit Kyiv in 2024 was made in the summer of 2023. Russia is also pouring money into developing its own drone systems, with the combat drone Okhotnik-B expected to go into production in Novosibirsk later this year.Russian Disinformation Campaigns and CyberattacksRussia continued its disinformation campaign in Ukraine, hoping to undermine trust in the government and sow suspicions abroad. The clear goal is to weaken international support for Ukraine. These efforts are likely to ramp up in 2024 because many countries are holding elections, and policies regarding aid for Ukraine and the reception of Ukrainian refugees could shift drastically. Under normal conditions, Ukraine would also be holding elections. The curtain continues to be pulled back on Russia's disinformation efforts. The Washington Post published material on Russia's huge campaign to spread distrust of the government and societal despair in Ukraine, and the German Marshall Fund issued a report on Russia's use of Polish media to spread the Kremlin's lies about Ukraine. According to Security and Defense Secretary Oleksii Danilov, Russia has significantly stepped up its disinformation campaigns, issuing or spreading 166 million disinformation posts every week about Ukraine on social media in a global effort to manipulate thinking on Ukraine.According to Ukrainian intelligence sources, Russia is engaged in a massive disinformation campaign code-named Maidan-3 and designed to promote antiwar protests and destabilize the country, with the ultimate goal of removing President Zelensky from his leadership role. The campaign is expected be most active during March–May, and persons inside Ukraine are believed to be involved.Deep-fake videos play a prominent role in Russian propaganda. For instance, a deep-fake video of former president Petro Poroshenko allegedly making incendiary statements about President Zelensky was targeted to Ukrainian soldiers. Videos allegedly showing Russians attacking Ukrainian military training camps or Ukrainian special forces shooting civilians are widely circulated; such misrepresentations are unfortunately becoming commonplace.Russia has also continued cyberattacks against Ukrainian media, authorities, and critically important companies, including one of the biggest banks, the biggest state-owned oil and gas company, Naftogaz, POW Coordination Headquarters, Ukraine's Education Ministry website, and so on. Hackers have been sending Ukrainian soldiers messages containing malware. In 2023, the number of cyberattacks against Ukrainian organizations increased by 15.9 percent compared to 2022, reaching an overall number of 2,543 documented cases.Even though ISIS took responsibility for the terrorist shooting in Moscow's Crocus concert hall in March, and Western intelligence said it has proof that Ukraine did not organize it, Russian top officials, including Vladimir Putin, tried to link it to Kyiv, while constantly changing the narrative. The media reported that some in Putin's circle do not see any link to Ukraine. It's possible the Kremlin will try to capitalize on the attack to mobilize Russian society against Ukraine. The head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) blamed the United States, the UK, and Ukraine as instigators and enablers of the attack.Energy Terrorism and Other Attacks on Critical InfrastructureFrom mid-September 2023 to the end of the year, Russia did not succeed in damaging Ukraine's energy infrastructure, though not for lack of trying. The number of drones Russia launched during October–December 2023 broke records since the invasion. Most were brought down by Ukrainian air defense units before they could inflict damage, so we do not know their intended targets.This picture changed with the new year. Starting in early 2024, Russia focused on attacking energy infrastructure in the frontline regions, which are generally the easiest to reach. Despite the damage this caused, the power systems continued to operate in a relatively stable mode. On the night of March 22, Russia launched a massive attack on the Ukrainian power system, using drones and ballistic and cruise missiles. The largest such attack since the start of the full-scale invasion, it involved sixty Shahed drones and almost ninety missiles of various types. Power production and transmission facilities in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, and Dnipro were targeted. Russians hit the biggest Ukrainian hydropower plant, DniproHES, and the dam of its water reservoir on the Dnipro river in Zaporizhzhia oblast; two other big hydropower plants were damaged in the following days.The biggest private-owned Ukrainian energy company, DTEK, reported that 80 percent of its capacities had been damaged during the attacks by the end of March. In Kharkiv, all thermal power plants and substations were destroyed in the last week of March. The state-owned Centrenergo lost its biggest power plant in Kharkiv oblast. The major attack was followed by attacks in ensuing days. Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civilian InfrastructureIn the first quarter of the year, Ukraine faced more Russian drone and missile strikes on multi-block residential buildings, with many civilians injured and killed—in some cases dozens in a single attack. Occasionally multiple cities were attacked simultaneously. Big city targets included Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Sumy. In addition, civil infrastructure in the regions under Ukrainian control and well inside the front lines was regularly attacked, sustaining damage. Since March 11, Russia has been shelling the borders of Sumy oblast, mostly using guided aerial bombs, artillery, and Lancet attack drones.In general, from the start of the year, Ukraine has seen an increased number of civilians killed or wounded in air strikes. Fuel depots and fueling stations have been attacked, leading to civilian casualties and environmental damage. It is now commonplace for Russia to target a wide range of civil infrastructure with air strikes and artillery shelling.One of the numerous air attacks on Odesa happened during the visit of the prime minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis. A missile exploded extremely close to the location of Mitsotakis and President Zelensky. Russia has continued committing crimes against civilians in the occupied territories: torturing civilians, forcing them to participate in Russian presidential elections, bugging residents, expropriating apartments, and resettling Russian transplants from deep inside the country in the occupied territories. POW ExchangesPOW exchanges, which had been suspended for a while, were renewed at the beginning of the year, with the largest number of Ukrainians returning home since the start of the wide-scale invasion. On January 24, a few days before the planned POW exchange, a cargo aircraft was shot down in Russia. Moscow blamed Ukraine for downing the plane, claiming it was carrying sixty-five prisoners to be exchanged. However, Russia did not provide any proof that the plane was in fact carrying POWs, and Kyiv said there were no Ukrainian POWs on the plane.Two more POW exchanges took place after the incident, in late January and again in February. 2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSPresident Zelensky's Diplomatic ToursIn the first quarter of 2024, President Zelensky undertook several diplomatic tours, hoping to consolidate support for Ukraine. This mission was especially critical in light of the slowing of aid from the United States, and the number of agreements Ukraine reached during this period is testament to the success of these efforts.In January, President Zelensky made a diplomatic trip to the Baltic states, Lithuania,Estonia, and Latvia, which are among the strongest supporters of Ukraine. Zelensky met with the countries' leaders and political elites and expressed gratitude for their support during the ten years of war. They discussed Ukraine's European integration and future cooperation in electromagnetic warfare and military drone production. The three countries remain strong Ukraine's allies of Ukraine in 2024, providing military and humanitarian aid and political support. Ukraine and Latvia signed an agreement on technical and financial cooperation and a memorandum on cooperation on defense and security.President Zelensky left the Baltics for Switzerland to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he addressed the forum's participants on the war in Ukraine and the need to invest in Ukraine's victory. In Davos, he also met with leaders of different states and the world's finance leaders, seeking to boost investment in Ukraine.In February, President Zelensky visited Germany to give a speech and attend the Munich Security Conference. He met his German and Czech counterparts and discussed joint efforts to produce weapons.Later, he visited Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and to discuss the Ukrainian Peace Formula and ways to repatriate captured and deported Ukrainians. He left Saudi Arabia for Albania to attend the second Ukraine-Balkans forum, where he also met with the leaders of some Balkan states to discuss European integration efforts. On March 8, he visited Turkey to meet with his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Repatriating Ukrainian citizens held in captivity in Russia was among the key topics discussed at the meeting. The two countries signed an agreement to simplify bilateral trade and extended permit-free cargo truck movement at least until the end of the war. Security Cooperation AgreementsFrom early 2024, Ukraine began signing agreements on security cooperation with other states. The G-7 states intended to sign these during the NATO summit in Vilnius on July 12, 2023. Later, twenty-four more states expressed their intention to join this format. The UK was the first country to sign, on January 12, followed by Germany, France. Denmark, Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands. Many countries are in dialogue, negotiating the text of the agreements to be signed. Some agreements stipulate commitments and plans to provide military aid in upcoming years.In Ukraine, these are often called "agreements on security commitments." However, they are more like framework agreements on security and defense cooperation; they do not have the force of a contract and do not spell out specific guarantees or steps the signatories should take to ensure Ukraine's sovereignty. Many experts in Ukraine have criticized the agreements because they do not provide Ukraine with hard security guarantees.Relations with NATOIn January, the NATO-Ukraine Council held a meeting at Ukraine's request after Russia launched massive air strikes against Ukraine at the beginning of the year. The allies reaffirmed their commitment to bolster Ukraine's defenses further and to provide Ukraine with major military, economic, and humanitarian assistance. In March, a NATO military delegation visited Kyiv for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion.Relations with the United States and CanadaPolitical differences in the U.S. Congress remained an obstacle to achieving consensus on the future of military aid to Ukraine. In March the United States announced the first $300 million security assistance package for Ukraine this year, as supplemental funding was blocked in Congress. Funds for the package came from unanticipated cost savings in existing Pentagon contracts. Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau arrived in Kyiv on the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to demonstrate his solidarity. Canada joined the drones coalition for Ukraine and allocated $1.5 billion in aid to finance Ukraine's budget deficit.Relations with the EU and the European StatesIn February the EU approved €50 billion in financial support for Ukraine, to run through 2027. Later the EU approved $5.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine for 2024. The EU planned to supply Ukraine by the end of March with half of the one million artillery rounds it has promised to supply by the end of the year. Joint European Efforts to Arm UkraineArtillery rounds to be provided by the Czech Republic. In February, Czech president Petr Pavel said that the country had found a way to acquire 800,000 artillery rounds for Ukraine, but it needed funding. Earlier, the Czech Republic had proposed buying ammunition for Ukraine outside the EU. Almost twenty countries, some outside Europe, joined the initiative and contributed to the fund to buy artillery rounds: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and others. In March, Prague reported it was ready to deliver the first batches of ammunition and that it had found 700,000 shells of other types that could be bought with additional funds.Long-range missiles coalition. In late February, President of France Emmanuel Macron announced a coalition to send Ukraine long-range missiles. On March 15, following a "Weimar Triangle" format meeting in Berlin, the leaders of Germany, France, and Poland agreed on new initiatives in support of Ukraine, including more weapons purchases and a future formation of a coalition on long-range rocket artillery. The initiative includes purchasing more weapons for Ukraine on global markets and expanding military production.Drone coalition. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in February said that allies had established a drone coalition for Ukraine, committing to supplying one million drones. The UK and Latvia will lead an international coalition to develop vital drones for Ukraine.Cybersecurity support. In February, the IT Coalition for Ukraine signed an agreement to enhance Ukraine's defense capabilities in communications and cybersecurity—an important step in light of Russia's use of IT in conducting the war. The coalition was established in September 2023. It is led by Estonia and Luxembourg and includes Ukraine, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands.France was the key newsmaker regarding Ukraine and its defensive fighting against Russia. Except for the agreement on security guarantees between the two countries, President Macron was the first leader to observe publicly that troops might have to be sent to Ukraine if Russia continued its advances. The statement caused a heated discussion with the leaders of other states, but Macron insisted it was not an off-the-cuff remark but a well-considered, realistic view. He referred to Russia's war as an existential threat to France and Europe. French foreign minister Stephane Sejourne visited Kyiv in January, reassuring Ukraine of longlasting support. Later, France announced new military aid to Ukraine, including artillery and air defense systems, drones, guided bombs, and other important pieces. France is considering expanding military aid programs for Ukraine, and President Macron called on Europe to be ready to compensate for reduced U.S. support. The UK, Germany, and the Netherlands continued to be among the biggest European supporters in providing military aid and economic assistance.Relations with Hungary remained strained. The country blocked the EU's €50 billion aid initiative for a few months, and also blocked the EU's joint statement commemorating the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale war. Pressure from the European Parliament probably encouraged Hungary to change its position. Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba met his Hungarian counterpart in January to discuss a potential visit by Zelensky to Budapest aimed at improving bilateral relations. Later, Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó explained that such a meeting between Viktor Orbán and Zelensky would be impossible until Kyiv restored the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority as they had existed before 2015.The prime ministers of Ukraine and Slovakia met in Ukraine and signed a joint statement to strengthen bilateral relations "based on mutual trust and respect." The Slovak prime minister promised not to obstruct Ukraine's purchases of weapons from Slovak companies and said that Bratislava would support the EU providing €50 billion in financial aid to Ukraine.The border blockade by farmers was a key issue in bilateral relations with Poland and remained contentious throughout the quarter. At different times, farmers and truck drivers have thrown up blockades, affecting almost all of Ukraine's border crossings.Polish farmers are demanding restrictions on imports from Ukraine, in the belief that their market prices have fallen because of competition. Poland had earlier banned food imports from Ukraine, allowing transit only. Polish officials confirmed that Ukrainian grain was not imported but merely transiting the country to destinations beyond. Kyiv says that now only 5 percent of Ukrainian food exports go through Poland, with most grain exports to be shipped by sea. Farmers are also protesting the EU's climate change policies and blocking other border crossings, including some on the border with Germany. Polish haulers on strike demanded the restoration of permits for Ukrainian carriers, a ban on the issuance of licenses to non-EU transport companies, and a waiver for empty Polish trucks to register through the Ukrainian electronic queue when returning to Poland from Ukraine. However, the blockade by haulers was much shorter this quarter.The blockade lasted the entire quarter, though not with the same sustained intensity. The blockade may be politically inspired, especially if one considers that the country will hold local elections in April. Farmers even tried to block railway connections with Ukraine and passenger transportation. The European Commission expressed concern regarding the blockade. The Polish government's attempts to settle the issue were unsuccessful, though it is unclear how robust those efforts were.The blockades created long lines at the borders, complicating the importation of even critically important goods such as military equipment. During the protests, Polish farmers from time to time dumped Ukrainian grain that was transiting Poland to other states, causing tension and tight-lipped reactions in Ukraine. It should be noted once again that one of the protest organizers is Rafał Mekler, a member of the Polish far-right National Movement Party, also known as the Confederation Party, which is skeptical about the EU and less friendly toward Ukraine. Mekler's role is important because Russia is seeking to take advantage of domestic Polish discontent by spreading its anti-Ukrainian narratives in Poland. Polish prime minister Donald Tusk said he would not tolerate anti-Ukrainian sentiments in his government. Tusk visited Kyiv in January to announce a new aid package for Ukraine. At the same time, Poland continues to import grain and fuel from Russia and Belarus without any protests taking place on Poland's border with those states. Polish police detained Ukrainian journalists who investigated the import of goods at the border with Belarus. Other Ukrainian journalists were later similarly detained and deported from Poland while investigating trade with Russia. In late March, the Ukrainian and Polish prime ministers met in Warsaw to discuss the dispute. The parties have made some progress, but the problem remains. In mid-January, farmers in Romaniaagain started a blockade. However, the Romanian government quickly negotiated with the protesters, and the blockade was dissolved in early February. Ukrainian exports through Romania rose by 50 percent while those through Poland, formerly the biggest transit country, decreased.JapanIn February, Japan hosted a conference on Ukraine's restoration. The event brought together about 200 Japanese and Ukrainian companies, which signed fifty-six agreements and memorandums of cooperation. Japan allocated more than $12 billion in aid to Ukraine and will spend €1.25 billion to support investments in Ukraine.Debates on Transferring Frozen Russian Assets for UkraineIn the first quarter of 2024, Ukraine's allies continued to debate the use of frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine's needs during the war. A group of international law experts and practitioners concluded that it would be lawful, under international law, to transfer Russian state assets as compensation for the damage that has resulted directly from Russia's unlawful conduct. There was a debate in the EU about whether these funds should be held for future use in reconstructing Ukraine or be spent now on weapons. High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell supported the idea of using 90 percent of the revenue generated by frozen Russian assets to purchase weapons for Ukraine. Among the EU member states, Hungary and Austria expressed opposition to using these funds for weapons.The Fighter Jet Coalition DevelopmentsWhen the allies agreed to provide Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets, the craft were expected to arrive in early 2024. At the beginning of the year, the media reported that delivery of the first jet might be delayed to mid-2024. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that the delivery date will depend on when Ukrainian pilots will be ready to fly them after training.The first group of Ukrainian pilots will complete F-16 training by the summer. But probably only six F-16s will have been delivered out of about forty-five fighter jets that European allies have promised. The Netherlands decided to send six more F-16 jets to Ukraine in addition to the eighteen the country promised to supply in late 2023. 3. INTERNAL AFFAIRSReshufflesOne of the most shocking internal events in Ukraine was the dismissal of Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi. President Zelensky appointed General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who had previously served as commander of Ukraine's Land Forces, the new commander-in-chief and gave him wide latitude to make personnel changes. Zelensky explained his decision by citing the need to reboot management of the military command and to change the military strategy. However, Zaluzhnyi had made clear his frustration with the progress of the war on international media, and there are political tensions between the two men, with Zaluzhnyi's trust rating among survey respondents higher than Zelensky's.In February the government appointed a new head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Viktor Pavlushchyk, as the previous head, Oleksandr Novikov, had completed his four-year term in the position. Pavlushchyk was selected as the head of the agency by a competition. In late March, President Zelensky dismissed the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Oleksiy Danilov, and appointed Oleksandr Lytvynenko, a former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, to the position. Danilov later was appointed ambassador to Moldova. The Economic SituationUkraine's economy remained relatively stable in the first quarter of 2024. However, the government experienced difficulty covering budget expenditures with a drop in foreign financial aid: in the first two months of 2024, Ukraine received only 10 percent of the planned financial aid from its allies.Slowing inflation led the National Bank to decrease its key rate to 14.5 percent. At the same time, the IMF expects the economic shock to begin in the second quarter of 2024 with the intensification of the war. Ukrainian agencies expect lower economic growth for 2024 as well.The Energy SituationDuring January and February 2024, Russia attacked Ukraine's energy facilities, mostly in regions close to the front. The power system continued to operate normally, however, and electricity exports to the EU in early March broke records since the start of the wide-scale invasion. The situation rapidly reversed after the attacks in late March, and Ukraine became deeply dependent on electricity imports from Europe, realizing record-high volumes of imports. Ukraine got through the winter just passed using domestically produced gas only. This was possible in part because the demand for natural gas has fallen since the start of the wide-scale invasion.4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIESPlan of Reforms for the Ukraine Facility Funding ProgramIn March, the government approved a Plan of Reforms for 2024–2027. The plan addresses reform of the public administration and judicial system and strengthening the battle against corruption; economic reforms, such as management of public assets and creating an attractive environment for investment; and sectoral reforms (energy, transport agriculture, critical raw materials, small business, IT, and environment). It provides a basis for funding the Ukraine Facility, the EU's financial support program for Ukraine, which is expected to provide €50 billion over four years. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal submitted the plan to the European Commission for approval. The first tranche of funding was released on March 20.Oscar Award for 20 Days in Mariupol DocumentaryThe Ukrainian film 20 Days in Mariupol won the Best Documentary award at the 96th Academy Awards. It is the first film made by a Ukrainian director to have won an Oscar. The film records the atrocities committed during Russia's months-long siege of the city of Mariupol in 2022. The documentary was put together by a team of Ukrainian journalists from the Associated Press and included the film director, Mstyslav Chernov. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
From a certain relevance in the second half of the 20th century, albeit episodic and with a domestic focus, subnational diplomacy in the United States has moved with the new millennium towards fresh, more complex and sophisticated, multi-actor frameworks that have greater potential impact. They are frameworks in which certain philanthropic organisations, the private sector, highly influential think tanks and academia carry considerable weight.Today, Ambassador Nina Hachigian, US special representative for city and state diplomacy, leads a strategy looking to gain influence in the State Department and thus make subnational governments key components of the United States' diplomatic machinery. It remains to be seen how the strategy will evolve, all the more so with the prospect of Donald Trump on the horizon.At a moment strongly marked by a reshaping of the global order and by fierce competition between the United States and China, subnational diplomacy is taking on an increasingly significant role. In a world that is urbanising at breakneck speed, especially in the Global South, cities play a key role in addressing some of the main economic and social transformations underway. We cannot understand the processes of green and digital transition, the reconfiguration of the model of production or new inequalities without placing cities at the centre of the equation.Today metropolises like New York, Paris, London, Tokyo or Shanghai are among the planet's biggest economies. We cannot understand Latin America without São Paulo, Mexico City or Buenos Aires; Africa without Johannesburg, Cairo or Lagos; the Asia Pacific region without Seoul, Sidney or Singapore; North America without Los Angeles, Chicago or Toronto; or Europe without Berlin, Amsterdam, Vienna or Barcelona. Cities amass political and economic power, creativity and talent; their governments have growing regulatory capacity, they promote rights and drive solutions in critical areas such as mobility, housing or tackling multiple forms of inequality or fragmentation.All that has positioned them as recognised and increasingly visible actors in the system of international relations. Dynamic and innovative actors that – even on a stage still monopolised by nation states – foster alliances and join forces to influence international agendas, reach out in search of economic opportunities, create spaces for the exchange of knowledge or build solidarity networks in complex environments. Mayors and their teams interact by networking to meet the common challenges ahead of them.The transformative potential of cities and their capacity to link up globally has not gone unnoticed by the world's major powers. In Europe, the cradle of the international municipal movement, the European Union (EU) has forged an alliance with local governments over decades. It has served to open spaces of collaboration and exchange in practically every region of the world. Since the 1990s, Brussels has promoted various financial programmes to accompany cities in some of the main challenges they face, boosting their capabilities and recognising them as key actors for sustainable development. Yet, and while in recent months there has been talk of the need to localise the Global Gateway,1 European support for the various expressions of subnational diplomacy appears to be losing steam (Fernández de Losada and Galceran-Vercher, 2023).Several analysts have also turned the spotlight on the growing importance of cities and urbanisation processes in China's global outreach (Curtis and Klaus, 2023). Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the cornerstone of the Asian giant's expansionism, has found clear expression in many cities around the world. The huge investments made by China to develop critical infrastructure in urban environments of Asia, Africa and Latin America – in Europe too – are testament to that. At the same time, Chinese subnational diplomacy is increasingly dynamic and forges ties in every region of the planet, while it is securing a major presence in some of the main networks operating globally.Given the situation, the United States has been trying to position itself in the global urban ecosystem for some years now. Although it has not always been the case, as we shall see in this paper, the big US cities and some of the states today boast a strong international footprint. It is a presence marked by globalisation, by high impact agendas like the climate or migration and by an inrush of certain hugely influential philanthropic organisations. US subnational diplomacy is built on a well-crafted narrative, on instruments aimed at strengthening its capabilities and on a connection to the country's foreign policy that it is hoped will only grow stronger.Trade diplomacy and "municipal foreign policy"For many years, the weight of US subnational diplomacy has not matched the clout the country has wielded and continues to wield in the global order. In the second half of the 20th century, in the period from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, the frames of reference guiding the action of the country's subnational governments were essentially domestic. Local and national affairs prevailed over the foreign outlook within a mindset that could be described as insular. Yet an analysis of the external action of the country's subnational governments through those years provides some clues that should be taken into consideration. We can observe activity that might be defined as episodic and which, while significant in some periods, remained on the relative margins of the dynamics of the international municipal movement of the day. Cities and states forged external ties, but the focus was on matters of local importance such as trade and attracting foreign investors or promoting values that were important to the community like peace, safeguarding human rights and solidarity.While the US municipal movement can be traced to the first expressions of international municipalism in the 1920s, the country's first subnational diplomacy milestone came in 1956 with the launch of the Sister Cities International (SCI) platform. Spearheaded initially by President Eisenhower, since its inception the initiative has promoted the establishment of thousands of bilateral cooperation relations between US cities and counties and their counterparts in countries around the globe. SCI facilitates technical cooperation missions and exchange and promotes human rights and peace projects, as well as community ties and volunteer programmes. The organisation operates in a domestic framework, however, and has little connection with similar bodies in other regions of the world.By the 1980s, a good many US states and cities had dispatched trade delegations and representatives for attracting foreign investment. Cities such as Tokyo (with 19 delegations in 1982), London, Brussels or Frankfurt hosted over 60 permanent offices run by 33 states and some cities, like New York, in more than 70 countries around the world (Duchacek, 1984). According to the National Governors' Association,2 in 1981 American states invested more in promotional activity than the federal government's own Department of Commerce. Municipal associations joined the push, mounting promotional campaigns and events like those organised by the US Conference of Mayors in Zurich and Hong Kong in 1982 and 1983, respectively, under the slogan "Invest in America's Cities" (ibid.).Arguably the standout subnational diplomacy initiative in the latter stages of the last century, however, was what the Center for Innovative Diplomacy (CID) based in Irvine, California, called "municipal foreign policy". From the late 1970s through the 1980s and into the early 1990s, several US cities and states challenged the federal government's policies in Central America or South Africa or aligned with global movements against nuclear proliferation. Cities such as Burlington, New Jersey; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; or Rochester, New York, mobilised against the Reagan administration's support for the anti-communist and counterrevolutionary forces operating in Central America. They did so by aligning with significant sectors of their own communities, raising funds to help twinned cities and offering the thousands of Central American refugees living across the US a safe place (Leffel, 2018), a movement that formed the root of the sanctuary cities.At the same time, and given the federal administration's apparent indifference, a significant number of US cities took a stand against the South African government's apartheid policies. As many as 59 cities, and some states and counties, passed legislation banning investment in South Africa, which had an impact calculated at over $450bn (Spiro, 1986). Likewise, the 160 or more cities that declared themselves Nuclear Free Zones (NFZ) mobilised against the federal government, legislating to ban the manufacture of nuclear weapons components in their areas. It was a matter of conviction, but also a reaction to the Reagan administration's decision to divert federal funds initially earmarked to support local policies to the defence budget in order to step up the nuclear race with the Soviet Union (Leffel, 2018).Despite the notable, though episodic, dynamism of US subnational diplomacy, however, there was a glaring absence of the big cities from some of the main debates and processes taking place within the international municipal movement. They had only a minor presence at what were considered key events like the Earth Summit, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, or the Habitat II conference, held in Istanbul in 1996, where the first World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities (WACLA) was also staged. Moreover, they carried no weight in the organisations comprising what was known as the G4+,3 formed at the time to ensure communication with the United Nations in the process of implementing the agreements reached in the Turkish capital. This irrelevance goes some way to explaining the inability to halt the veto that the United States imposed, along with China and other countries, on the World Charter of Local Self-Government.4Similarly, they were also inconspicuous in the key organisations of the day. While the National League of Cities and the US Conference of Mayors formed part of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), the country's big cities were not with their counterparts around the world in the main platforms that brought them together: the World Federation of United Cities (FMCU),5 Summit6 or Metropolis. Moreover, although they did join the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) six years after its establishment in 1990, they played no part in the process that developed into the founding in 2004 of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG),7 the world's main municipal organisation, the president of which at the time was the mayor of Paris and whose first executive bureau included the mayor of South Bay, a municipality of 4,700 inhabitants in Florida. Globalisation, climate activism and philanthropy as catalysts of a subnational diplomacy for the 21st centuryAs numerous authors have noted (Sassen, 2005; Curtis, 2018), the process of neoliberal globalisation following the fall of the Berlin Wall positioned global cities as connecting nodes of a new world order, with the United States as the hegemonic power. Cities such as New York, Los Angeles or Chicago, along with their counterparts around the world, burst onto the international scene as key components of the machine driving flows of capital, goods, services and knowledge. They were also integral to some of the main challenges that globalisation presented.Against this backdrop, the climate emergency arose as a global challenge with major urban implications and a huge capacity to mobilise the international community. The challenge reshaped the frameworks through which urban diplomacy operated to a large extent, pivoting it towards a multistakeholder, more complex and sophisticated structure with greater potential impact. Indeed, the fight against climate change prompted an alliance between the major cities of the world and some of the biggest (and chiefly US) philanthropic organisations and think tanks. The alliance partly explains the rise of US subnational diplomacy. It has also brought the international municipal movement closer to the prevailing political, economic, social and cultural frames of reference in America.In 2005, the then mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, championed the creation of C40, an alliance among big cities across the globe that decided to share strategies for combating climate change. The organisation, a key component of US urban diplomacy,8 has a considerable capacity to influence the global climate agenda. One of its defining characteristics has been its ability to combine vision, strategy and action not just among mayors, but also with the big US philanthropic organisations and with the private sector. In 2006, the network expanded with the support of the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) and since 2011 it has received continuous backing from Bloomberg Philanthropies. In addition, C40 is strongly committed to encouraging public-private collaboration, putting companies and research centres developing solutions in contact with cities that require them. It has also helped to create new mechanisms connected to today's multiple expressions of multilateralism. A good example of that is the U20, the space that C40 convenes with UCLG through which the world's major cities – US cities too – try to get their priorities on the G20 agenda.Other platforms such as Resilient Cities Network or the Global Covenant of Mayors (GCoM) operate on very similar lines. The former, promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation since 2013, puts the focus on supporting cities in devising their climate resilience plans. It is an issue that concerns cities in the United States, which make up the biggest section of the network with 26 members. The latter, the GCoM, focuses on city leadership in promoting and developing local climate action and energy transition plans. It brings together thousands of cities from across the world, 185 of which are in the US. It also introduces a new factor by combining the leadership of an executive board made up of mayors, co-chairs resulting from an alliance between the European Commission and the philanthropist and former mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg, and representatives of the chief United Nations agencies working in this field and the main city networks. Over the years, however, the multi-partner approach has moved beyond climate action to other areas in which US cities are very active. A good example of that is the Mayors Migration Council, a platform funded by Open Society Foundations, among others, comprising over 200 cities throughout the world, 40 of which are in the United States. Its goal is to position them in the global debates on migration.Today, cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Houston or Boston are among the most dynamic global urban diplomacy operators. They have ties with cities throughout the world, they are present in the major urban multilateralism spaces and they participate in the main networks. On this latter point, however, it is worth noting that US municipalism continues to have a very limited presence in the traditional European-rooted networks, those that have their origins in the municipal movement of the 20th century. It is almost exclusively committed to the new, multi-stakeholder spaces. It is also worth pointing out that the transition of US and global urban diplomacy to these new formats has been partnered by a cohort of research centres and think tanks largely based in Washington DC and other US cities. The Brookings Institution, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs the German Marshall Fund or, more recently, the Truman Center for National Policy have shown exceptional vision in crafting a narrative that justifies and accompanies the country's cities in their international action. Today, the United States and its academia set the standard and lead the production of knowledge – applied knowledge too – in the field of subnational diplomacy. US State Department support: much ado about nothing?A good part of this narrative constructed at the desks of some of the country's main think tanks has prompted the federal government to step up and accompany cities and states in their diplomatic efforts. The aim is not only to boost their capacity to make an impact, but also to harness all their assets and potential to complement US foreign and security policy, which is now more inclusive and diverse, though also more complex. But this is not a new strategy. In 1978, during the Carter administration, an office was created and tasked with managing ties with local and state governments in the Department of State. Led by Ambassador at Large W. Beverly Carter Jr, the office was short-lived and scrapped in January 1981, following Ronald Reagan's election as president. Its functions were passed from department to department and sidelined for over 30 years until 2010, during the first Obama administration, when the State Department once again committed to forging closer ties with cities and states through the Office of the Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs, headed by Reta Jo Lewis.The approach had a clear logic. A significant number of the agreements the US government adopts in the United Nations and other multilateral agencies require other stakeholders such as civil society organisations, the private sector or local authorities in order to be implemented (Klaus and Singer, 2018). The agendas linked to sustainable development promoted between 2012 and 2016 are a good illustration of that, and the State Department was a committed actor. The US government played a prominent role in key fora for cities such as COP21 in 2015, where the Paris Agreement on climate change was reached, or the Habitat III Conference that took place in Quito in 2016, when the New Urban Agenda was approved. The election of Donald Trump at the end of that year, however, put an end to the United States' engagement with the United Nations, multilateralism, the climate agenda and cities. In fact, it ushered in an era marked by climate denial, international isolationism and confrontation with the urban world and progressive elites. Given this backdrop, it is significant that various operators, from think tanks to members of Congress, continue to advocate for reconnecting with subnational diplomacy and institutionalising it through legislative action to safeguard it against subsequent political changes.Institutions as important as the Council on Foreign Relations or the Truman Center for National Policy are of that opinion. The former released a paper in 2017 advising the Trump administration to reinstate a specialised office and tap the full potential of the country's subnational diplomacy. The latter, for its part, convened a high-level group of experts which published a report in 2022 that not only called for the re-establishment of an office, but also backed mapping assets, expanding the capacity of cities and states to make an impact abroad and strengthening the alliances with think tanks and philanthropic organisations that had proven so successful. President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken were receptive and that same year they named Nina Hachigian as Special Representative for City and State Diplomacy. It was no anodyne appointment. Apart from being a career ambassador, she was deputy mayor for international relations for the city of Los Angeles, a beacon of US urban diplomacy. The appointment has not gone unnoticed in the international community, with the ambassador cutting a visible and recognisable figure. She has attended high-level fora, both in the field of multilateralism (such as COP28 held in Dubai, the High-Level Political Forum in New York or the Munich Security Conference, all in 2023) and in the sphere of international municipalism in its multiple expressions. She has also reinforced ties with the country's main cities and states, as well as with the diplomatic corps, multilateral bodies, philanthropic organisations, think tanks, specialised research centres and the private sector.Yet, and despite the launch of such significant initiatives as the Cities Summit in Denver, bringing together mayors from across the Western Hemisphere in 2023 in an excellent exercise of political dialogue, or the Cities Forward programme, a nascent though promising support instrument for technical cooperation among cities, the reality is that Special Representative Hachigian works with very limited budgetary and professional resources and still occupies a periphery position in the State Department. Her team belongs to the Office of Global Partnerships and has yet to achieve full recognition. In fact, the legislative initiative on subnational diplomacy presented in 20199 and in 202110 in Congress has failed to prosper, despite multiple and significant shows of support. Concluding remarksUS subnational diplomacy has certainly grown in stature over the last few years. The intermittent, episodic and domestic-focused trajectory that characterised it in the second half of the 20th century has developed into an experience that is gradually consolidating and opting for new formats and a weighty agenda. It is an agenda that ties in with some of the chief challenges of globalisation and which connects it to emerging actors that wield considerable influence in the global context. What is more, the narrative underpinning it is a robust one, which places it in the big debates that combine urban issues and global concerns.Yet, despite the efforts and leadership of the special representative, the actual support the State Department lends to cities and states in their external action appears to be more symbolic than effective. The federal government allocates limited resources and the commitment to subnational diplomacy largely relies on major philanthropists. Thus, against a backdrop of competition for leadership of the global order in which urban issues continue to have considerable importance, advancing and deepening the initial commitment expressed by President Biden and Secretary Blinken makes perfect sense and could bring many rewards. China is on it. Europe was, though it now appears to have turned its attention elsewhere. It remains to be seen where the United States will go, particularly with the prospect of Donald Trump on the horizon. ReferencesCurtis, Simon. "Global Cities and the Ends of Globalism". New Global Studies, no. 12 (2018), p. 75-90.Duchacek, Ivo D. "The International Dimension of Subnational Self-Government". Publius, vol. 14, no. 4 (1984), p. 5-31. Federated States and International Relations, Oxford University Press.Fernández de Losada, Agustí and Galceran-Verché, Marta. "¿Una Europa a contracorriente? La invisibilidad de las ciudades en las relaciones UE – CELAC". Revista TIP, year 12, no. 2 (2023), p. 26-38.Klaus, Ian and Singer, Russell. The United Nations. Local Authorities in Four Frameworks. Penn Institute for Urban Research, 2018.Leffel, Benjamin. "Animus of the Underling: Theorizing City Diplomacy in a World Society". The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, no. 13 (2018), p. 502-522.Sassen, Saskia. "The Global City: Introducing a Concept". Brown Journal of World Affairs, no. 11 (2005), p. 27-43.Spiro, P.J. "State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs". Virginia Law Review, vol. 72, no. 4 (1986), p. 824 Notes:1- The Global Gateway is the EU's main foreign investment strategy.2- "Committee on International Trade and Foreign Relations, Export Development and Foreign Investment: The Role of the States and its Linkage to Federal Action". Washington, DC: National Governors' Association (1981), p. 1.3- Consisting of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), the World Federation of United Cities, Metropolis, the Summit of the World's Major Cities (Summit) and other regional organisations.4- "Follow-up to The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II): Local Implementation of the Habitat Agenda, including The Role Of Local Authorities". HS/C/18/3/Add.1 23 (November 2000).5- Founded in 1957 in Aix-les-Bains, France, and made up of twinned cities throughout the world.6- Summit Conference of Major Cities of the World (Summit). New York was the only US city in this network established in 1985 and which ceased to exist in 2005.7- UCLG came about from the merger of the IULA and the FMCU.8- The United States is home to 14 of the 96 cities that comprise the C40. US mayors have also chaired this platform on two occasions: Michael Bloomberg, mayor of New York (2010-2013) and Eric Garcetti, mayor of Los Angeles (2019-2021). 9- S.4426 - City and State Diplomacy Act. 116th Congress (2019-2020). Sponsor: Sen. Cristopher Murphy.10- H.R.4526 - City and State Diplomacy Act. 117th Congress (2021-2022). Sponsor: Rep. Ted Lieu All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/302/en ISSN: 2013-4428
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
From a certain relevance in the second half of the 20th century, albeit episodic and with a domestic focus, subnational diplomacy in the United States has moved with the new millennium towards fresh, more complex and sophisticated, multi-actor frameworks that have greater potential impact. They are frameworks in which certain philanthropic organisations, the private sector, highly influential think tanks and academia carry considerable weight.Today, Ambassador Nina Hachigian, US special representative for city and state diplomacy, leads a strategy looking to gain influence in the State Department and thus make subnational governments key components of the United States' diplomatic machinery. It remains to be seen how the strategy will evolve, all the more so with the prospect of Donald Trump on the horizon.At a moment strongly marked by a reshaping of the global order and by fierce competition between the United States and China, subnational diplomacy is taking on an increasingly significant role. In a world that is urbanising at breakneck speed, especially in the Global South, cities play a key role in addressing some of the main economic and social transformations underway. We cannot understand the processes of green and digital transition, the reconfiguration of the model of production or new inequalities without placing cities at the centre of the equation.Today metropolises like New York, Paris, London, Tokyo or Shanghai are among the planet's biggest economies. We cannot understand Latin America without São Paulo, Mexico City or Buenos Aires; Africa without Johannesburg, Cairo or Lagos; the Asia Pacific region without Seoul, Sidney or Singapore; North America without Los Angeles, Chicago or Toronto; or Europe without Berlin, Amsterdam, Vienna or Barcelona. Cities amass political and economic power, creativity and talent; their governments have growing regulatory capacity, they promote rights and drive solutions in critical areas such as mobility, housing or tackling multiple forms of inequality or fragmentation.All that has positioned them as recognised and increasingly visible actors in the system of international relations. Dynamic and innovative actors that – even on a stage still monopolised by nation states – foster alliances and join forces to influence international agendas, reach out in search of economic opportunities, create spaces for the exchange of knowledge or build solidarity networks in complex environments. Mayors and their teams interact by networking to meet the common challenges ahead of them.The transformative potential of cities and their capacity to link up globally has not gone unnoticed by the world's major powers. In Europe, the cradle of the international municipal movement, the European Union (EU) has forged an alliance with local governments over decades. It has served to open spaces of collaboration and exchange in practically every region of the world. Since the 1990s, Brussels has promoted various financial programmes to accompany cities in some of the main challenges they face, boosting their capabilities and recognising them as key actors for sustainable development. Yet, and while in recent months there has been talk of the need to localise the Global Gateway,1 European support for the various expressions of subnational diplomacy appears to be losing steam (Fernández de Losada and Galceran-Vercher, 2023).Several analysts have also turned the spotlight on the growing importance of cities and urbanisation processes in China's global outreach (Curtis and Klaus, 2023). Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the cornerstone of the Asian giant's expansionism, has found clear expression in many cities around the world. The huge investments made by China to develop critical infrastructure in urban environments of Asia, Africa and Latin America – in Europe too – are testament to that. At the same time, Chinese subnational diplomacy is increasingly dynamic and forges ties in every region of the planet, while it is securing a major presence in some of the main networks operating globally.Given the situation, the United States has been trying to position itself in the global urban ecosystem for some years now. Although it has not always been the case, as we shall see in this paper, the big US cities and some of the states today boast a strong international footprint. It is a presence marked by globalisation, by high impact agendas like the climate or migration and by an inrush of certain hugely influential philanthropic organisations. US subnational diplomacy is built on a well-crafted narrative, on instruments aimed at strengthening its capabilities and on a connection to the country's foreign policy that it is hoped will only grow stronger.Trade diplomacy and "municipal foreign policy"For many years, the weight of US subnational diplomacy has not matched the clout the country has wielded and continues to wield in the global order. In the second half of the 20th century, in the period from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, the frames of reference guiding the action of the country's subnational governments were essentially domestic. Local and national affairs prevailed over the foreign outlook within a mindset that could be described as insular. Yet an analysis of the external action of the country's subnational governments through those years provides some clues that should be taken into consideration. We can observe activity that might be defined as episodic and which, while significant in some periods, remained on the relative margins of the dynamics of the international municipal movement of the day. Cities and states forged external ties, but the focus was on matters of local importance such as trade and attracting foreign investors or promoting values that were important to the community like peace, safeguarding human rights and solidarity.While the US municipal movement can be traced to the first expressions of international municipalism in the 1920s, the country's first subnational diplomacy milestone came in 1956 with the launch of the Sister Cities International (SCI) platform. Spearheaded initially by President Eisenhower, since its inception the initiative has promoted the establishment of thousands of bilateral cooperation relations between US cities and counties and their counterparts in countries around the globe. SCI facilitates technical cooperation missions and exchange and promotes human rights and peace projects, as well as community ties and volunteer programmes. The organisation operates in a domestic framework, however, and has little connection with similar bodies in other regions of the world.By the 1980s, a good many US states and cities had dispatched trade delegations and representatives for attracting foreign investment. Cities such as Tokyo (with 19 delegations in 1982), London, Brussels or Frankfurt hosted over 60 permanent offices run by 33 states and some cities, like New York, in more than 70 countries around the world (Duchacek, 1984). According to the National Governors' Association,2 in 1981 American states invested more in promotional activity than the federal government's own Department of Commerce. Municipal associations joined the push, mounting promotional campaigns and events like those organised by the US Conference of Mayors in Zurich and Hong Kong in 1982 and 1983, respectively, under the slogan "Invest in America's Cities" (ibid.).Arguably the standout subnational diplomacy initiative in the latter stages of the last century, however, was what the Center for Innovative Diplomacy (CID) based in Irvine, California, called "municipal foreign policy". From the late 1970s through the 1980s and into the early 1990s, several US cities and states challenged the federal government's policies in Central America or South Africa or aligned with global movements against nuclear proliferation. Cities such as Burlington, New Jersey; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; or Rochester, New York, mobilised against the Reagan administration's support for the anti-communist and counterrevolutionary forces operating in Central America. They did so by aligning with significant sectors of their own communities, raising funds to help twinned cities and offering the thousands of Central American refugees living across the US a safe place (Leffel, 2018), a movement that formed the root of the sanctuary cities.At the same time, and given the federal administration's apparent indifference, a significant number of US cities took a stand against the South African government's apartheid policies. As many as 59 cities, and some states and counties, passed legislation banning investment in South Africa, which had an impact calculated at over $450bn (Spiro, 1986). Likewise, the 160 or more cities that declared themselves Nuclear Free Zones (NFZ) mobilised against the federal government, legislating to ban the manufacture of nuclear weapons components in their areas. It was a matter of conviction, but also a reaction to the Reagan administration's decision to divert federal funds initially earmarked to support local policies to the defence budget in order to step up the nuclear race with the Soviet Union (Leffel, 2018).Despite the notable, though episodic, dynamism of US subnational diplomacy, however, there was a glaring absence of the big cities from some of the main debates and processes taking place within the international municipal movement. They had only a minor presence at what were considered key events like the Earth Summit, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, or the Habitat II conference, held in Istanbul in 1996, where the first World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities (WACLA) was also staged. Moreover, they carried no weight in the organisations comprising what was known as the G4+,3 formed at the time to ensure communication with the United Nations in the process of implementing the agreements reached in the Turkish capital. This irrelevance goes some way to explaining the inability to halt the veto that the United States imposed, along with China and other countries, on the World Charter of Local Self-Government.4Similarly, they were also inconspicuous in the key organisations of the day. While the National League of Cities and the US Conference of Mayors formed part of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), the country's big cities were not with their counterparts around the world in the main platforms that brought them together: the World Federation of United Cities (FMCU),5 Summit6 or Metropolis. Moreover, although they did join the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) six years after its establishment in 1990, they played no part in the process that developed into the founding in 2004 of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG),7 the world's main municipal organisation, the president of which at the time was the mayor of Paris and whose first executive bureau included the mayor of South Bay, a municipality of 4,700 inhabitants in Florida. Globalisation, climate activism and philanthropy as catalysts of a subnational diplomacy for the 21st centuryAs numerous authors have noted (Sassen, 2005; Curtis, 2018), the process of neoliberal globalisation following the fall of the Berlin Wall positioned global cities as connecting nodes of a new world order, with the United States as the hegemonic power. Cities such as New York, Los Angeles or Chicago, along with their counterparts around the world, burst onto the international scene as key components of the machine driving flows of capital, goods, services and knowledge. They were also integral to some of the main challenges that globalisation presented.Against this backdrop, the climate emergency arose as a global challenge with major urban implications and a huge capacity to mobilise the international community. The challenge reshaped the frameworks through which urban diplomacy operated to a large extent, pivoting it towards a multistakeholder, more complex and sophisticated structure with greater potential impact. Indeed, the fight against climate change prompted an alliance between the major cities of the world and some of the biggest (and chiefly US) philanthropic organisations and think tanks. The alliance partly explains the rise of US subnational diplomacy. It has also brought the international municipal movement closer to the prevailing political, economic, social and cultural frames of reference in America.In 2005, the then mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, championed the creation of C40, an alliance among big cities across the globe that decided to share strategies for combating climate change. The organisation, a key component of US urban diplomacy,8 has a considerable capacity to influence the global climate agenda. One of its defining characteristics has been its ability to combine vision, strategy and action not just among mayors, but also with the big US philanthropic organisations and with the private sector. In 2006, the network expanded with the support of the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) and since 2011 it has received continuous backing from Bloomberg Philanthropies. In addition, C40 is strongly committed to encouraging public-private collaboration, putting companies and research centres developing solutions in contact with cities that require them. It has also helped to create new mechanisms connected to today's multiple expressions of multilateralism. A good example of that is the U20, the space that C40 convenes with UCLG through which the world's major cities – US cities too – try to get their priorities on the G20 agenda.Other platforms such as Resilient Cities Network or the Global Covenant of Mayors (GCoM) operate on very similar lines. The former, promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation since 2013, puts the focus on supporting cities in devising their climate resilience plans. It is an issue that concerns cities in the United States, which make up the biggest section of the network with 26 members. The latter, the GCoM, focuses on city leadership in promoting and developing local climate action and energy transition plans. It brings together thousands of cities from across the world, 185 of which are in the US. It also introduces a new factor by combining the leadership of an executive board made up of mayors, co-chairs resulting from an alliance between the European Commission and the philanthropist and former mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg, and representatives of the chief United Nations agencies working in this field and the main city networks. Over the years, however, the multi-partner approach has moved beyond climate action to other areas in which US cities are very active. A good example of that is the Mayors Migration Council, a platform funded by Open Society Foundations, among others, comprising over 200 cities throughout the world, 40 of which are in the United States. Its goal is to position them in the global debates on migration.Today, cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Houston or Boston are among the most dynamic global urban diplomacy operators. They have ties with cities throughout the world, they are present in the major urban multilateralism spaces and they participate in the main networks. On this latter point, however, it is worth noting that US municipalism continues to have a very limited presence in the traditional European-rooted networks, those that have their origins in the municipal movement of the 20th century. It is almost exclusively committed to the new, multi-stakeholder spaces. It is also worth pointing out that the transition of US and global urban diplomacy to these new formats has been partnered by a cohort of research centres and think tanks largely based in Washington DC and other US cities. The Brookings Institution, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs the German Marshall Fund or, more recently, the Truman Center for National Policy have shown exceptional vision in crafting a narrative that justifies and accompanies the country's cities in their international action. Today, the United States and its academia set the standard and lead the production of knowledge – applied knowledge too – in the field of subnational diplomacy. US State Department support: much ado about nothing?A good part of this narrative constructed at the desks of some of the country's main think tanks has prompted the federal government to step up and accompany cities and states in their diplomatic efforts. The aim is not only to boost their capacity to make an impact, but also to harness all their assets and potential to complement US foreign and security policy, which is now more inclusive and diverse, though also more complex. But this is not a new strategy. In 1978, during the Carter administration, an office was created and tasked with managing ties with local and state governments in the Department of State. Led by Ambassador at Large W. Beverly Carter Jr, the office was short-lived and scrapped in January 1981, following Ronald Reagan's election as president. Its functions were passed from department to department and sidelined for over 30 years until 2010, during the first Obama administration, when the State Department once again committed to forging closer ties with cities and states through the Office of the Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs, headed by Reta Jo Lewis.The approach had a clear logic. A significant number of the agreements the US government adopts in the United Nations and other multilateral agencies require other stakeholders such as civil society organisations, the private sector or local authorities in order to be implemented (Klaus and Singer, 2018). The agendas linked to sustainable development promoted between 2012 and 2016 are a good illustration of that, and the State Department was a committed actor. The US government played a prominent role in key fora for cities such as COP21 in 2015, where the Paris Agreement on climate change was reached, or the Habitat III Conference that took place in Quito in 2016, when the New Urban Agenda was approved. The election of Donald Trump at the end of that year, however, put an end to the United States' engagement with the United Nations, multilateralism, the climate agenda and cities. In fact, it ushered in an era marked by climate denial, international isolationism and confrontation with the urban world and progressive elites. Given this backdrop, it is significant that various operators, from think tanks to members of Congress, continue to advocate for reconnecting with subnational diplomacy and institutionalising it through legislative action to safeguard it against subsequent political changes.Institutions as important as the Council on Foreign Relations or the Truman Center for National Policy are of that opinion. The former released a paper in 2017 advising the Trump administration to reinstate a specialised office and tap the full potential of the country's subnational diplomacy. The latter, for its part, convened a high-level group of experts which published a report in 2022 that not only called for the re-establishment of an office, but also backed mapping assets, expanding the capacity of cities and states to make an impact abroad and strengthening the alliances with think tanks and philanthropic organisations that had proven so successful. President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken were receptive and that same year they named Nina Hachigian as Special Representative for City and State Diplomacy. It was no anodyne appointment. Apart from being a career ambassador, she was deputy mayor for international relations for the city of Los Angeles, a beacon of US urban diplomacy. The appointment has not gone unnoticed in the international community, with the ambassador cutting a visible and recognisable figure. She has attended high-level fora, both in the field of multilateralism (such as COP28 held in Dubai, the High-Level Political Forum in New York or the Munich Security Conference, all in 2023) and in the sphere of international municipalism in its multiple expressions. She has also reinforced ties with the country's main cities and states, as well as with the diplomatic corps, multilateral bodies, philanthropic organisations, think tanks, specialised research centres and the private sector.Yet, and despite the launch of such significant initiatives as the Cities Summit in Denver, bringing together mayors from across the Western Hemisphere in 2023 in an excellent exercise of political dialogue, or the Cities Forward programme, a nascent though promising support instrument for technical cooperation among cities, the reality is that Special Representative Hachigian works with very limited budgetary and professional resources and still occupies a periphery position in the State Department. Her team belongs to the Office of Global Partnerships and has yet to achieve full recognition. In fact, the legislative initiative on subnational diplomacy presented in 20199 and in 202110 in Congress has failed to prosper, despite multiple and significant shows of support. Concluding remarksUS subnational diplomacy has certainly grown in stature over the last few years. The intermittent, episodic and domestic-focused trajectory that characterised it in the second half of the 20th century has developed into an experience that is gradually consolidating and opting for new formats and a weighty agenda. It is an agenda that ties in with some of the chief challenges of globalisation and which connects it to emerging actors that wield considerable influence in the global context. What is more, the narrative underpinning it is a robust one, which places it in the big debates that combine urban issues and global concerns.Yet, despite the efforts and leadership of the special representative, the actual support the State Department lends to cities and states in their external action appears to be more symbolic than effective. The federal government allocates limited resources and the commitment to subnational diplomacy largely relies on major philanthropists. Thus, against a backdrop of competition for leadership of the global order in which urban issues continue to have considerable importance, advancing and deepening the initial commitment expressed by President Biden and Secretary Blinken makes perfect sense and could bring many rewards. China is on it. Europe was, though it now appears to have turned its attention elsewhere. It remains to be seen where the United States will go, particularly with the prospect of Donald Trump on the horizon. ReferencesCurtis, Simon. "Global Cities and the Ends of Globalism". New Global Studies, no. 12 (2018), p. 75-90.Duchacek, Ivo D. "The International Dimension of Subnational Self-Government". Publius, vol. 14, no. 4 (1984), p. 5-31. Federated States and International Relations, Oxford University Press.Fernández de Losada, Agustí and Galceran-Verché, Marta. "¿Una Europa a contracorriente? La invisibilidad de las ciudades en las relaciones UE – CELAC". Revista TIP, year 12, no. 2 (2023), p. 26-38.Klaus, Ian and Singer, Russell. The United Nations. Local Authorities in Four Frameworks. Penn Institute for Urban Research, 2018.Leffel, Benjamin. "Animus of the Underling: Theorizing City Diplomacy in a World Society". The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, no. 13 (2018), p. 502-522.Sassen, Saskia. "The Global City: Introducing a Concept". Brown Journal of World Affairs, no. 11 (2005), p. 27-43.Spiro, P.J. "State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs". Virginia Law Review, vol. 72, no. 4 (1986), p. 824 Notes:1- The Global Gateway is the EU's main foreign investment strategy.2- "Committee on International Trade and Foreign Relations, Export Development and Foreign Investment: The Role of the States and its Linkage to Federal Action". Washington, DC: National Governors' Association (1981), p. 1.3- Consisting of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), the World Federation of United Cities, Metropolis, the Summit of the World's Major Cities (Summit) and other regional organisations.4- "Follow-up to The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II): Local Implementation of the Habitat Agenda, including The Role Of Local Authorities". HS/C/18/3/Add.1 23 (November 2000).5- Founded in 1957 in Aix-les-Bains, France, and made up of twinned cities throughout the world.6- Summit Conference of Major Cities of the World (Summit). New York was the only US city in this network established in 1985 and which ceased to exist in 2005.7- UCLG came about from the merger of the IULA and the FMCU.8- The United States is home to 14 of the 96 cities that comprise the C40. US mayors have also chaired this platform on two occasions: Michael Bloomberg, mayor of New York (2010-2013) and Eric Garcetti, mayor of Los Angeles (2019-2021). 9- S.4426 - City and State Diplomacy Act. 116th Congress (2019-2020). Sponsor: Sen. Cristopher Murphy.10- H.R.4526 - City and State Diplomacy Act. 117th Congress (2021-2022). Sponsor: Rep. Ted Lieu All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/302/en ISSN: 2013-4428
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
From a certain relevance in the second half of the 20th century, albeit episodic and with a domestic focus, subnational diplomacy in the United States has moved with the new millennium towards fresh, more complex and sophisticated, multi-actor frameworks that have greater potential impact. They are frameworks in which certain philanthropic organisations, the private sector, highly influential think tanks and academia carry considerable weight.Today, Ambassador Nina Hachigian, US special representative for city and state diplomacy, leads a strategy looking to gain influence in the State Department and thus make subnational governments key components of the United States' diplomatic machinery. It remains to be seen how the strategy will evolve, all the more so with the prospect of Donald Trump on the horizon.At a moment strongly marked by a reshaping of the global order and by fierce competition between the United States and China, subnational diplomacy is taking on an increasingly significant role. In a world that is urbanising at breakneck speed, especially in the Global South, cities play a key role in addressing some of the main economic and social transformations underway. We cannot understand the processes of green and digital transition, the reconfiguration of the model of production or new inequalities without placing cities at the centre of the equation.Today metropolises like New York, Paris, London, Tokyo or Shanghai are among the planet's biggest economies. We cannot understand Latin America without São Paulo, Mexico City or Buenos Aires; Africa without Johannesburg, Cairo or Lagos; the Asia Pacific region without Seoul, Sidney or Singapore; North America without Los Angeles, Chicago or Toronto; or Europe without Berlin, Amsterdam, Vienna or Barcelona. Cities amass political and economic power, creativity and talent; their governments have growing regulatory capacity, they promote rights and drive solutions in critical areas such as mobility, housing or tackling multiple forms of inequality or fragmentation.All that has positioned them as recognised and increasingly visible actors in the system of international relations. Dynamic and innovative actors that – even on a stage still monopolised by nation states – foster alliances and join forces to influence international agendas, reach out in search of economic opportunities, create spaces for the exchange of knowledge or build solidarity networks in complex environments. Mayors and their teams interact by networking to meet the common challenges ahead of them.The transformative potential of cities and their capacity to link up globally has not gone unnoticed by the world's major powers. In Europe, the cradle of the international municipal movement, the European Union (EU) has forged an alliance with local governments over decades. It has served to open spaces of collaboration and exchange in practically every region of the world. Since the 1990s, Brussels has promoted various financial programmes to accompany cities in some of the main challenges they face, boosting their capabilities and recognising them as key actors for sustainable development. Yet, and while in recent months there has been talk of the need to localise the Global Gateway,1 European support for the various expressions of subnational diplomacy appears to be losing steam (Fernández de Losada and Galceran-Vercher, 2023).Several analysts have also turned the spotlight on the growing importance of cities and urbanisation processes in China's global outreach (Curtis and Klaus, 2023). Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the cornerstone of the Asian giant's expansionism, has found clear expression in many cities around the world. The huge investments made by China to develop critical infrastructure in urban environments of Asia, Africa and Latin America – in Europe too – are testament to that. At the same time, Chinese subnational diplomacy is increasingly dynamic and forges ties in every region of the planet, while it is securing a major presence in some of the main networks operating globally.Given the situation, the United States has been trying to position itself in the global urban ecosystem for some years now. Although it has not always been the case, as we shall see in this paper, the big US cities and some of the states today boast a strong international footprint. It is a presence marked by globalisation, by high impact agendas like the climate or migration and by an inrush of certain hugely influential philanthropic organisations. US subnational diplomacy is built on a well-crafted narrative, on instruments aimed at strengthening its capabilities and on a connection to the country's foreign policy that it is hoped will only grow stronger.Trade diplomacy and "municipal foreign policy" For many years, the weight of US subnational diplomacy has not matched the clout the country has wielded and continues to wield in the global order. In the second half of the 20th century, in the period from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, the frames of reference guiding the action of the country's subnational governments were essentially domestic. Local and national affairs prevailed over the foreign outlook within a mindset that could be described as insular. Yet an analysis of the external action of the country's subnational governments through those years provides some clues that should be taken into consideration. We can observe activity that might be defined as episodic and which, while significant in some periods, remained on the relative margins of the dynamics of the international municipal movement of the day. Cities and states forged external ties, but the focus was on matters of local importance such as trade and attracting foreign investors or promoting values that were important to the community like peace, safeguarding human rights and solidarity.While the US municipal movement can be traced to the first expressions of international municipalism in the 1920s, the country's first subnational diplomacy milestone came in 1956 with the launch of the Sister Cities International (SCI) platform. Spearheaded initially by President Eisenhower, since its inception the initiative has promoted the establishment of thousands of bilateral cooperation relations between US cities and counties and their counterparts in countries around the globe. SCI facilitates technical cooperation missions and exchange and promotes human rights and peace projects, as well as community ties and volunteer programmes. The organisation operates in a domestic framework, however, and has little connection with similar bodies in other regions of the world.By the 1980s, a good many US states and cities had dispatched trade delegations and representatives for attracting foreign investment. Cities such as Tokyo (with 19 delegations in 1982), London, Brussels or Frankfurt hosted over 60 permanent offices run by 33 states and some cities, like New York, in more than 70 countries around the world (Duchacek, 1984). According to the National Governors' Association,2 in 1981 American states invested more in promotional activity than the federal government's own Department of Commerce. Municipal associations joined the push, mounting promotional campaigns and events like those organised by the US Conference of Mayors in Zurich and Hong Kong in 1982 and 1983, respectively, under the slogan "Invest in America's Cities" (ibid.).Arguably the standout subnational diplomacy initiative in the latter stages of the last century, however, was what the Center for Innovative Diplomacy (CID) based in Irvine, California, called "municipal foreign policy". From the late 1970s through the 1980s and into the early 1990s, several US cities and states challenged the federal government's policies in Central America or South Africa or aligned with global movements against nuclear proliferation. Cities such as Burlington, New Jersey; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; or Rochester, New York, mobilised against the Reagan administration's support for the anti-communist and counterrevolutionary forces operating in Central America. They did so by aligning with significant sectors of their own communities, raising funds to help twinned cities and offering the thousands of Central American refugees living across the US a safe place (Leffel, 2018), a movement that formed the root of the sanctuary cities.At the same time, and given the federal administration's apparent indifference, a significant number of US cities took a stand against the South African government's apartheid policies. As many as 59 cities, and some states and counties, passed legislation banning investment in South Africa, which had an impact calculated at over $450bn (Spiro, 1986). Likewise, the 160 or more cities that declared themselves Nuclear Free Zones (NFZ) mobilised against the federal government, legislating to ban the manufacture of nuclear weapons components in their areas. It was a matter of conviction, but also a reaction to the Reagan administration's decision to divert federal funds initially earmarked to support local policies to the defence budget in order to step up the nuclear race with the Soviet Union (Leffel, 2018).Despite the notable, though episodic, dynamism of US subnational diplomacy, however, there was a glaring absence of the big cities from some of the main debates and processes taking place within the international municipal movement. They had only a minor presence at what were considered key events like the Earth Summit, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, or the Habitat II conference, held in Istanbul in 1996, where the first World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities (WACLA) was also staged. Moreover, they carried no weight in the organisations comprising what was known as the G4+,3 formed at the time to ensure communication with the United Nations in the process of implementing the agreements reached in the Turkish capital. This irrelevance goes some way to explaining the inability to halt the veto that the United States imposed, along with China and other countries, on the World Charter of Local Self-Government.4Similarly, they were also inconspicuous in the key organisations of the day. While the National League of Cities and the US Conference of Mayors formed part of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), the country's big cities were not with their counterparts around the world in the main platforms that brought them together: the World Federation of United Cities (FMCU),5 Summit6 or Metropolis. Moreover, although they did join the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) six years after its establishment in 1990, they played no part in the process that developed into the founding in 2004 of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG),7 the world's main municipal organisation, the president of which at the time was the mayor of Paris and whose first executive bureau included the mayor of South Bay, a municipality of 4,700 inhabitants in Florida. Globalisation, climate activism and philanthropy as catalysts of a subnational diplomacy for the 21st centuryAs numerous authors have noted (Sassen, 2005; Curtis, 2018), the process of neoliberal globalisation following the fall of the Berlin Wall positioned global cities as connecting nodes of a new world order, with the United States as the hegemonic power. Cities such as New York, Los Angeles or Chicago, along with their counterparts around the world, burst onto the international scene as key components of the machine driving flows of capital, goods, services and knowledge. They were also integral to some of the main challenges that globalisation presented.Against this backdrop, the climate emergency arose as a global challenge with major urban implications and a huge capacity to mobilise the international community. The challenge reshaped the frameworks through which urban diplomacy operated to a large extent, pivoting it towards a multistakeholder, more complex and sophisticated structure with greater potential impact. Indeed, the fight against climate change prompted an alliance between the major cities of the world and some of the biggest (and chiefly US) philanthropic organisations and think tanks. The alliance partly explains the rise of US subnational diplomacy. It has also brought the international municipal movement closer to the prevailing political, economic, social and cultural frames of reference in America.In 2005, the then mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, championed the creation of C40, an alliance among big cities across the globe that decided to share strategies for combating climate change. The organisation, a key component of US urban diplomacy,8 has a considerable capacity to influence the global climate agenda. One of its defining characteristics has been its ability to combine vision, strategy and action not just among mayors, but also with the big US philanthropic organisations and with the private sector. In 2006, the network expanded with the support of the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) and since 2011 it has received continuous backing from Bloomberg Philanthropies. In addition, C40 is strongly committed to encouraging public-private collaboration, putting companies and research centres developing solutions in contact with cities that require them. It has also helped to create new mechanisms connected to today's multiple expressions of multilateralism. A good example of that is the U20, the space that C40 convenes with UCLG through which the world's major cities – US cities too – try to get their priorities on the G20 agenda.Other platforms such as Resilient Cities Network or the Global Covenant of Mayors (GCoM) operate on very similar lines. The former, promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation since 2013, puts the focus on supporting cities in devising their climate resilience plans. It is an issue that concerns cities in the United States, which make up the biggest section of the network with 26 members. The latter, the GCoM, focuses on city leadership in promoting and developing local climate action and energy transition plans. It brings together thousands of cities from across the world, 185 of which are in the US. It also introduces a new factor by combining the leadership of an executive board made up of mayors, co-chairs resulting from an alliance between the European Commission and the philanthropist and former mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg, and representatives of the chief United Nations agencies working in this field and the main city networks. Over the years, however, the multi-partner approach has moved beyond climate action to other areas in which US cities are very active. A good example of that is the Mayors Migration Council, a platform funded by Open Society Foundations, among others, comprising over 200 cities throughout the world, 40 of which are in the United States. Its goal is to position them in the global debates on migration.Today, cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Houston or Boston are among the most dynamic global urban diplomacy operators. They have ties with cities throughout the world, they are present in the major urban multilateralism spaces and they participate in the main networks. On this latter point, however, it is worth noting that US municipalism continues to have a very limited presence in the traditional European-rooted networks, those that have their origins in the municipal movement of the 20th century. It is almost exclusively committed to the new, multi-stakeholder spaces. It is also worth pointing out that the transition of US and global urban diplomacy to these new formats has been partnered by a cohort of research centres and think tanks largely based in Washington DC and other US cities. The Brookings Institution, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs the German Marshall Fund or, more recently, the Truman Center for National Policy have shown exceptional vision in crafting a narrative that justifies and accompanies the country's cities in their international action. Today, the United States and its academia set the standard and lead the production of knowledge – applied knowledge too – in the field of subnational diplomacy. US State Department support: much ado about nothing?A good part of this narrative constructed at the desks of some of the country's main think tanks has prompted the federal government to step up and accompany cities and states in their diplomatic efforts. The aim is not only to boost their capacity to make an impact, but also to harness all their assets and potential to complement US foreign and security policy, which is now more inclusive and diverse, though also more complex. But this is not a new strategy. In 1978, during the Carter administration, an office was created and tasked with managing ties with local and state governments in the Department of State. Led by Ambassador at Large W. Beverly Carter Jr, the office was short-lived and scrapped in January 1981, following Ronald Reagan's election as president. Its functions were passed from department to department and sidelined for over 30 years until 2010, during the first Obama administration, when the State Department once again committed to forging closer ties with cities and states through the Office of the Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs, headed by Reta Jo Lewis.The approach had a clear logic. A significant number of the agreements the US government adopts in the United Nations and other multilateral agencies require other stakeholders such as civil society organisations, the private sector or local authorities in order to be implemented (Klaus and Singer, 2018). The agendas linked to sustainable development promoted between 2012 and 2016 are a good illustration of that, and the State Department was a committed actor. The US government played a prominent role in key fora for cities such as COP21 in 2015, where the Paris Agreement on climate change was reached, or the Habitat III Conference that took place in Quito in 2016, when the New Urban Agenda was approved. The election of Donald Trump at the end of that year, however, put an end to the United States' engagement with the United Nations, multilateralism, the climate agenda and cities. In fact, it ushered in an era marked by climate denial, international isolationism and confrontation with the urban world and progressive elites. Given this backdrop, it is significant that various operators, from think tanks to members of Congress, continue to advocate for reconnecting with subnational diplomacy and institutionalising it through legislative action to safeguard it against subsequent political changes.Institutions as important as the Council on Foreign Relations or the Truman Center for National Policy are of that opinion. The former released a paper in 2017 advising the Trump administration to reinstate a specialised office and tap the full potential of the country's subnational diplomacy. The latter, for its part, convened a high-level group of experts which published a report in 2022 that not only called for the re-establishment of an office, but also backed mapping assets, expanding the capacity of cities and states to make an impact abroad and strengthening the alliances with think tanks and philanthropic organisations that had proven so successful. President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken were receptive and that same year they named Nina Hachigian as Special Representative for City and State Diplomacy. It was no anodyne appointment. Apart from being a career ambassador, she was deputy mayor for international relations for the city of Los Angeles, a beacon of US urban diplomacy. The appointment has not gone unnoticed in the international community, with the ambassador cutting a visible and recognisable figure. She has attended high-level fora, both in the field of multilateralism (such as COP28 held in Dubai, the High-Level Political Forum in New York or the Munich Security Conference, all in 2023) and in the sphere of international municipalism in its multiple expressions. She has also reinforced ties with the country's main cities and states, as well as with the diplomatic corps, multilateral bodies, philanthropic organisations, think tanks, specialised research centres and the private sector.Yet, and despite the launch of such significant initiatives as the Cities Summit in Denver, bringing together mayors from across the Western Hemisphere in 2023 in an excellent exercise of political dialogue, or the Cities Forward programme, a nascent though promising support instrument for technical cooperation among cities, the reality is that Special Representative Hachigian works with very limited budgetary and professional resources and still occupies a periphery position in the State Department. Her team belongs to the Office of Global Partnerships and has yet to achieve full recognition. In fact, the legislative initiative on subnational diplomacy presented in 20199 and in 202110 in Congress has failed to prosper, despite multiple and significant shows of support. Concluding remarksUS subnational diplomacy has certainly grown in stature over the last few years. The intermittent, episodic and domestic-focused trajectory that characterised it in the second half of the 20th century has developed into an experience that is gradually consolidating and opting for new formats and a weighty agenda. It is an agenda that ties in with some of the chief challenges of globalisation and which connects it to emerging actors that wield considerable influence in the global context. What is more, the narrative underpinning it is a robust one, which places it in the big debates that combine urban issues and global concerns.Yet, despite the efforts and leadership of the special representative, the actual support the State Department lends to cities and states in their external action appears to be more symbolic than effective. The federal government allocates limited resources and the commitment to subnational diplomacy largely relies on major philanthropists. Thus, against a backdrop of competition for leadership of the global order in which urban issues continue to have considerable importance, advancing and deepening the initial commitment expressed by President Biden and Secretary Blinken makes perfect sense and could bring many rewards. China is on it. Europe was, though it now appears to have turned its attention elsewhere. It remains to be seen where the United States will go, particularly with the prospect of Donald Trump on the horizon. ReferencesCurtis, Simon. "Global Cities and the Ends of Globalism". New Global Studies, no. 12 (2018), p. 75-90.Duchacek, Ivo D. "The International Dimension of Subnational Self-Government". Publius, vol. 14, no. 4 (1984), p. 5-31. Federated States and International Relations, Oxford University Press.Fernández de Losada, Agustí and Galceran-Verché, Marta. "¿Una Europa a contracorriente? La invisibilidad de las ciudades en las relaciones UE – CELAC". Revista TIP, year 12, no. 2 (2023), p. 26-38.Klaus, Ian and Singer, Russell. The United Nations. Local Authorities in Four Frameworks. Penn Institute for Urban Research, 2018.Leffel, Benjamin. "Animus of the Underling: Theorizing City Diplomacy in a World Society". The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, no. 13 (2018), p. 502-522.Sassen, Saskia. "The Global City: Introducing a Concept". Brown Journal of World Affairs, no. 11 (2005), p. 27-43.Spiro, P.J. "State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs". Virginia Law Review, vol. 72, no. 4 (1986), p. 824 Notes:1- The Global Gateway is the EU's main foreign investment strategy.2- "Committee on International Trade and Foreign Relations, Export Development and Foreign Investment: The Role of the States and its Linkage to Federal Action". Washington, DC: National Governors' Association (1981), p. 1.3- Consisting of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), the World Federation of United Cities, Metropolis, the Summit of the World's Major Cities (Summit) and other regional organisations.4- "Follow-up to The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II): Local Implementation of the Habitat Agenda, including The Role Of Local Authorities". HS/C/18/3/Add.1 23 (November 2000).5- Founded in 1957 in Aix-les-Bains, France, and made up of twinned cities throughout the world.6- Summit Conference of Major Cities of the World (Summit). New York was the only US city in this network established in 1985 and which ceased to exist in 2005.7- UCLG came about from the merger of the IULA and the FMCU.8- The United States is home to 14 of the 96 cities that comprise the C40. US mayors have also chaired this platform on two occasions: Michael Bloomberg, mayor of New York (2010-2013) and Eric Garcetti, mayor of Los Angeles (2019-2021). 9- S.4426 - City and State Diplomacy Act. 116th Congress (2019-2020). Sponsor: Sen. Cristopher Murphy.10- H.R.4526 - City and State Diplomacy Act. 17th Congress (2021-2022). Sponsor: Rep. Ted LieuAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/302/en
Author's introductionThis review of recent feminist analyses and theorizing of labor markets uses a global lens to reveal the forces shaping gender inequality. The first section introduces the key words of globalization, gender and work organization. Next, I examine gender as embodied labor activity in globalized worksites, and the effects of globalization on gendered patterns of work and life. Putting gender at the center of globalization discourses highlights the historical and cultural variability of gender relations intersecting with class, race and nationality, and highlights the impact of restructuring on workers, organizations and institutions at the local, national and regional as well as transnational levels. Then I turn to look at labor market restructuring through commodification of care, outsourcing of household tasks and informalization of employment to show how these processes shape the complexity of relationships between and the interconnectedness of social inequalities transnationally and in global cities. Place matters when analyzing how service employment alters divisions of labor and how these labor market changes are gendered. Global restructuring not only poses new challenges but also creates new opportunities for mobilization around a more robust notion of equality. The final section explores the development of spaces for collective action and the rise of new women's and feminist movements (e.g., transnational networks, non‐governmental agencies). The study of globalization, gender and employment has broad importance for understanding not only the social causes but also the social consequences of the shift to a post‐industrial society.Author recommendsAcker, Joan 2004. 'Gender, Capitalism and Globalization.'Critical Sociology 30, 1: 17–41.Feminist scholarship both critiques gender‐blind globalization discourses and an older generation of women and development theories. By tracing the lineage of current feminist literature on globalization to women and development research, Joan Acker shows both the continuities and distance traveled from the previous terrain of debate. New feminist scholarship on globalization owes a debt to these important, albeit limited, studies of women at work in Latin America, Africa and Asia, but acknowledges the need to go beyond the category of women to analyze specific forms and cultural expressions of gendered power in relationship to class and other hierarchies. One of the major advances in feminist theory comes under the microscope of Acker's keen analysis when she excavates how gender is both embodied and embedded in the logic and structuring of globalizing capitalism. This extends the case she made in her earlier pioneering research on gender relations being embedded in the organization of major institutions. For the study of globalization, Acker posits that the gendered construction (and cultural coding) of capitalist production separated from human reproduction has resulted in subordination of women in both domains. Acker uncovers the historical legacy of a masculine‐form of dominance associated with production in the money economy that was exported to and embedded in colonialist installation of large‐scale institutions. By the late 20th Century large‐scale institutions promoted images and emotions that expressed economic and political power in terms of new articulations of hegemonic masculinity. As an article outlining debates on the nature of globalization and of gender, it serves as a good introduction to the topic.Chow, Esther Ngan‐Ling 2003. 'Gender Matters: Studying Globalization and Social Change in the 21st Century.'International Sociology 18, 3: 443–460.Chow's introduction to the special issue on 'Gender, Globalization and Social Change in the 21st Century' in International Sociology (2003) reviews the literature on gender and globalization and provides an excellent overview of 'gender matters.' Her definition of globalization captures salient features of the current era. This definition encompasses the economic, political cultural and social dimensions of globalization. Further, she offers a framework for studying the 'dialectics of globalization', as 'results of conflicting interaction between the global and local political economies and socio‐cultural conditions…' A dialectics of globalization is a fruitful approach for studying transformative possibilities. This article could serve as background reading or as part of an introductory section.Arlie Russell Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2003. 'Love and Gold.' Pp. 15–30 in Global Women: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy, edited by Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild. Metropolitan Books.Hochschild's chapter in Global Women examines the transfer of traditional women's work to migrant women. Women in rich countries are turning over care work (nannies, maids, elder care) to female migrant workers who can be paid lower wages with few or no benefits and minimal legal protections. This global transfer of services associated with a wife's traditional role extracts a different kind of labor than in prior migrations based on agricultural and industrial production. Emotional, sexual as well as physical labor is extracted in this current phase of globalization; in particular, emotional labor and 'love is the new gold'. Women migrate not only to escape poverty, but also to escape patriarchy in their home countries by earning an independent income and by physical autonomy from patriarchal obligations and expectations. Many female migrants who leave poor countries can earn more money as nannies and maids in the First World than in occupations (nurses, teachers, clerical workers) if they remained in their own country. Thus, migration can be seen as having contradictory effects on women's well‐being and autonomy. This chapter can be used in a section dealing with the specific topic of globalization and care work or in a section introducing the topic of gendered labor activities.McDowell, Linda, Diane Perrons, Colette Fagan, Kath Ray and Kevin Ward. 2005. 'The Contradictions and Intersections of Class and Gender in a Global City: Placing Working Women's Lives on the Research Agenda.'Environment and Planning A 37, 441–461.This group of prominent social geographers from the UK collaborates to great effect in a welcome addition to the literature theorizing the complex articulations of gender and class in global cities. Their detailed research comparing three localities in Greater London is a corrective to the oft‐cited multi‐site study of global cities by Saskia Sassen. They find that Sassen underestimates gains and losses for both men and women in the 'new' economy. Place makes a difference when assessing the impact of women's increased rates of labor market participation on income inequality and patterns of childcare. The article outlines a new research agenda by 'placing' working women's lives at the center of analysis.Parrenas, Rhacel Salazar 2008. The Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalization. New York: New York University Press.Rhacel Salazar Parrenas brings together her influential research on Filipina migrants and extends her path‐breaking ethnographic analysis to include Filipina domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles and entertainers in Tokyo. David Eng incisively captures the importance of Parrenas's analysis when he states, 'Extracted from home and homeland only to be reinserted into the domestic spaces of the global north, these servants of globalization exemplify an ever‐increasing international gendered division of labor, one compelling us to reexamine the neo‐liberal coupling of freedom and opportunity with mobility and migration'. The book is well suited to illuminate discussions of domesticity and migration, transnational migrant families, the impact of migration laws in 'home' and 'host' countries, and transnational movements among migrant women.Walby, Sylvia. 2009. Globalization and Inequalities: Complexity and Contested Modernities. London: Sage.This book introduces new theoretical concepts and tests alternative hypotheses to explain variation in trajectories of gender relations cross‐nationally. It synthesizes and reviews a vast literature, ranging from the social sciences to the natural sciences to construct a new approach to theorizing the development of gender regimes in comparative perspective. Sylvia Walby seeks to explain the different patterns of inequalities across a large number of countries. The analysis differentiates between neo‐liberal and social democratic varieties of political economy, and makes explicit the gender component of institutions and their consequences. The project builds on Walby's pioneering work on comparative gender regimes, and extends the research by operationalizing empirical indicators for a range of key concepts, and by analyzing links between a wide set of institutions (including economy, polity, education and violence) and how these are gendered in specific ways. As in the past, Walby is not afraid to tackle big questions and to offer new answers. Throughout the book, like in her previous body of research, Walby takes on the question of social inclusion/exclusion and critically interrogates concepts of democracy, political participation, equality and rights. Walby uses a comparative lens to examine the democratic 'deficit' in liberal and social democratic countries, and how migration restructures patterns of inequality and the consequent reconstitution of national and ethnic relations within countries. There is more to the book than abstract theoretical debates. Walby poses and assesses alternative political projects for achieving equality. The book is an original contribution that will likely influence sociology in general and theories of social change in particular.Online resourcesStatus of women in the world: United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) http://www.unifem.orgUNIFEM was established at the United Nations in order to foster women's empowerment through innovative programs and strategies. Its mission statement summarizes UNIFEM's goals as follows: 'Placing the advancement of women's human rights at the center of all of its efforts, UNIFEM focuses on reducing feminized poverty, ending violence against women; reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS among women and girls; and achieving gender equality in democratic governance in times of peace as well as war'. The website includes information on global initiatives such as zero tolerance of violence against women, the impact of the economic crisis on women migrant workers, and strategizing for gender proportionate representation in Nigeria. Primary documents relevant to women's advancement appear on the website; these include the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. UNIFEM publishes monographs assessing the progress of women around the world. One notable example is the 2005 publication on Women, Work & Poverty by Martha Chen, Joann Vanek, Francie Lund, James Heintz with Renana Jhabvala and Christine Bonner. http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/PoWW2005_eng.pdf Gender equity index http://www.socialwatch.org/en/avancesyRetrocesos/IEG_2008/tablas/valoresdelIEG2008.htm Social Watch produces an up‐to‐date gender equity index composed of three dimensions and indicators: empowerment (% of women in technical positions, % of women in management and government positions, % of women in parliaments, % of women in ministerial posts); economic activity (income gap, activity rate gap); and education (literacy rate gap, primary school enrollment rate gap, secondary school enrollment gap, and tertiary education enrollment gap). These separate indicators in addition to the gender equity index are arrayed by country. There are 157 countries, representing 94% of the world's population, in the sample. Mapping these indicators across countries presents a comparative picture of the absolute and relative standing of women and gender equity in the world.Focus QuestionsKey words: Globalization1. What is meant by globalization?
a. To what extent is globalization new? Or is globalization another phase of a long historical process? b. Can we differentiate inter‐national (connections between) from the global (inter‐penetrations)?
Feminism and globalization
How do feminist interventions challenge globalization theories (for example the presumed relationship between globalization and homogenization and individualization)? How do different feminisms frame and assess the conditions of globalization around the world?
Gender and globalization
What role do women, and different women, play in the global economy? Are patriarchal arrangements changing as a result of greater economic integration at the world level?
Migration and mobilities
What does Parrenas mean by partial citizenship?
How does it relate to the case of Philippine migrant workers? What is the relationship between 'home' and 'host' nations? How important is a vehicle like the Tinig Filipino in forging 'imagined communities' and new realities?
What is the mix of choice and compulsion in the different migrations mobilities of men and women?
Globalization and politics
Are women subject to the same kinds of legal protections (and regulations) that evolved in earlier periods? Do new flexible production processes and flexible work arrangements undercut such legal protections?
Globalization and collective mobilization
Does globalization open spaces for new women's movements, new solidarities, new subjectivities and new forms of organizing?
Sample syllabusCourse outline and reading assignments Conceptualizing the 'Global' and 'Globalization' Dicken, Peter, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell. 1997. 'Unpacking the Global.' Pp. 158–166 in Geographies of Economies, edited by Roger Lee and Jane Willis. London: Arnold.Amin, Ash and Nigel Thrift. 1996. 'Holding Down the Global.' Pp. 257–260 in Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe, edited by Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Acker, Joan. 2004. 'Feminism, Gender and Globalization.'Critical Sociology 30: 17–42.Background Reading:Gottfried, Heidi. 2006. 'Feminist Theories of Work.' Pp. 121–154 in Social Theory at Work, edited by Marek Korczynski, Randy Hodson, Paul Edwards. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Peterson, V. Spike. 2008. 'Intersectional Analytics in Global Political Economy.' in UberKeruszungen, edited Cornelia Klinger and Gudrun‐Axeli Knapp. Munster: Wesfalisches Dmpfboot.Chow, Esther Ngan‐Ling. 2003. 'Gender Matters: Studying Globalization and Social change in the 21st Century.'International Sociology 18 (3): 443–460.Walby, Sylvia. 2009. Globalization and Inequalities: Complexity and Contested Modemities. London: Sage. Gender and Globalization Gottfried, Heidi. Forthcoming. 'Gender and Employment: A Global Lens on Feminist Analyses and Theorizing of Labor Markets.'Sociology CompassFernandez‐Kelly, Patricia and Diane Wolf. 2001. 'Dialogue on Globalization.'Signs 26: 1243–1249.Bergeron, Suzanne. 2001. 'Political Economy Discourses of Globalization and Feminist Politics.'Signs 26: 983–1006.Freeman, Carla. 2001. 'Is Local: Global as Feminine: Masculine? Rethinking the Gender of Globalization.'Signs 26:1007–1037. Theorizing Politics and Globalization Sassen, Saskia. 1996. 'Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy.'Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 4: 7–41.Parrenas, Rhacel Salazer. 2001. 'Transgressing the Nation‐State: The Partial Citizenship and 'Imagined (Global) Community' of Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers.'Signs 26:1129–1154.Bosniak, Linda. 2009. 'Citizenship, Noncitizenship, and the Transnationalization of Domestic Work.' Pp. 127–156 in Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Judith Resnik. New York: New York University Press.Background Reading:Benhabib, Seyla and Judith Resnik. 2009. 'Introduction: Citizenship and Migration Theory Engendered.' Pp. 1–46 in Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Judith Resnik. New York: New York University Press. Migrations, Mobilities and Care Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2003. 'Love and Gold.' Pp. 15–30 in Global Women: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy, edited by Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild. Metropolitan Books.Hondagneu‐Sotelo, Pierrette. 2001. Domestica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring the Shadows of Affluence. Berkeley: University of California Press.Parrenas, Richard Salazar. 2008. The Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalization. New York: New York University Press.Pyle, Jean 2006. 'Globalizations, Transnational Migration, and Gendered Care Work.'Globalizations 3(3): 283–295.Qayum, Seemin and Raka Ray. 2003. 'Grappling with Modernity: India's Respectable Classes and the Culture of Domestic Servitude.'Ethnography 4: 520–555. Restructuring and Gender Inequality in Global Cities McDowell, Linda, Diane Perrons, Colette Fagan, Kath Ray and Kevin Ward. 2005. 'The Contradictions and Intersections of Class and Gender in a Global City: Placing Working Women's Lives on the Research Agenda.'Environment and Planning A 37: 441–461.McDowell, Linda. 1997. 'A Tale of Two Cities? Embedded Organizations and Embodied Workers in the City of London.' Pp. 118–129 in Geographies of Economies, edited by Roger Lee and Jane Willis. London: Arnold.Bruegel, Irene. 1999. 'Globalization, Feminization and Pay Inequalities in London and the UK.' Pp. 73–93 in Women, Work and Inequality, edited by Jeanne Gregory, Rosemary Sales and Ariane Hegewisch. New York: St. Martin's Press. Embodiment and Restructuring Halford, Susan and Mike Savage. 1997. 'Rethinking Restructuring: Embodiment, Agency and Identity in Organizational Change.' Pp. 108–117 in Geographies of Economies, edited by Roger Lee and Jane Willis. London: Arnold.Gottfried, Heidi. 2003 'Temp(t)ing Bodies: Shaping Bodies at Work in Japan.'Sociology 37: 257–276. Gender in the Global Economy: Post‐Socialist and Emerging Economies Salzinger, Leslie. 2004. 'Trope Chasing: Engendering Global Labor Markets.'Critical Sociology 30: 43–62.Kathryn Ward, Fahmida Rahman, AKM Saiful Islam, Rifat Akhter and Nashid Kama. 2004. 'The Nari Jibon Project: Effects on Global Structuring on University Women's Work and Empowerment In Bangladesh.'Critical Sociology 30: 63–102Otis, Eileen. 2007. 'Virtual Personalism in Beijing: Learning Deference and Femininity at a Global Luxury Hotel. Pp. 101–123 in Working in China: Ethnographies of Labor and Workplace Transformation, edited by Ching Kwan Lee. Routledge.Background Reading:Ferguson and Monique Mironesco (eds.). 2008. Gender and Globalization in Asia and the Pactific: Method, Practice, Theory. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Globalization and Policy Developments Lenz, Ilse. 2004. 'Globalization, Gender and Work: Perspectives on Global Regulation.' Pp. 29–52 in Equity in the Workplace: Gendering Workplace Policy Analysis, edited by Heidi Gottfried and Laura Reese. Lexington Press.Woodward, Alison. 2004. 'European Gender Mainstreaming: Promises and Pitfalls of Transformative Policy.' Pp. 77–100 in Equity in the Workplace: Gendering Workplace Policy Analysis, edited by Heidi Gottfried and Laura Reese, Lexington Press.Fraser, Nancy. 2007. 'Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World.' in Global Inequality, edited by David Held and Ayse Kaya. Polity. Gender and the New Economy Walby, Sylvia, Heidi Gottfried, Karin Gottschall and Mari Osawa. 2006. Gendering and the Knowledge Economy: Comparative Perspectives, Palgrave, See chapters by Sylvia Walby, Mari Osawa, and Diane Perrons.Ng, Cecelia. 2004. 'Globalization and Regulation: The New Economy, Gender and Labor Regimes.'Critical Sociology 30: 103–108. Globalization and Transnational Organizing Ferree, Myra Marx. 2006. 'Globalization and Feminism: Opportunities and Obstacles for Activism in the Global Area.' Pp. 3–23 in Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights, edited by Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp. New York: New York University Press.Yuval‐Davis, Nira. 2006. 'Human/Women's Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics.' Pp. 275–295 in Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights, Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp. New York: New York University Press.Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 2006. "Under Western Eyes" Revisited: Feminist Solidarity Through Anti‐Capitalist Struggles.' Pp. 17–42 in Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity, edited by Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
John M. Hobson on Eurocentrism, Historical Sociology and the Curious Case of Postcolonialism
International Relations, it is widely recognized, is a Western discipline, albeit one that claims to speak for global conditions. What does that mean are these regional origins in and by themselves a stake in power politics? This Eurocentrism is often taken as a point of departure for denouncing mainstream approaches by self-proclaimed critical and postcolonialist approaches to IR. John Hobson stages a more radical attack on Eurocentrism, in which western critical theories, too, are complicit in the perpetuation of a dominantly western outlook. In this extensive Talk, Hobson, among others, expounds his understanding of Eurocentrism, discusses the imperative to historicize IR, and sketches the outline of possible venues of emancipation from our provincial predicament.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
In my view, there are two principal inter-related challenges that face IR. The first is the need to deal with the critique that the discipline is constructed on Eurocentric foundations. This matters both for critical and conventional IR. The latter insists that it works according to value-free positivistic/scientifistic principles. But if it is skewed by an underlying Western-centric bias, as I have contended in my work, then the positivist mantra turns out to constitute a smokescreen or veil behind which lies the dark Eurocentric face of conventional IR. And of course, if Eurocentrism in various forms infects much of critical IR, then it jeopardizes its critical credentials and risks falling back into problem-solving theory. For these reasons, then, I feel that the critique of Eurocentric IR and international political economy (IPE) poses nothing short of an intellectually existential challenge to these disciplines.
The second inter-related challenge is that if we accept that the discipline is essentially Eurocentric then we need to reconstruct IR's foundations on a non-Eurocentric basis and then advance an alternative non-Eurocentric research agenda and empirical analysis of the international system and the global political economy. This is a straightforward challenge vis-à-vis conventional IR/IPE theory but it is more problematic so far as critical IR/IPE is concerned (which is why my answer is somewhat extended). The more postmodern wing of the discipline would view with inherent skepticism any attempt to reconstruct some kind of (albeit alternative) grand narrative. And the postmodern postcolonialists would likely concur. It is at this point that the thorniest issue emerges in the context of postcolonial IR theory. For however hard this is to say, I feel that simply proclaiming the Eurocentric foundations of the discipline does not hole its constituent theories deep beneath the waterline; a claim that abrades with the view of most postcolonialists who view Eurocentrism as inherently illegitimate either because it renders it imperialist (which I view as problematic since there are significant strands of anti-imperialist Eurocentrism and scientific racism) or because they conflate Eurocentrism with the unacceptable politics of (scientific) racism (which I also find problematic notwithstanding the point that there are all manner of overlaps and synergies between these two generic Western-centric discourses, all of which is explained in my 2012 book, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics). The key point—one which will undoubtedly get me into a lot of trouble with postcolonialists—is that I feel we need to recognize that in the end Eurocentric IR (and IPE) theory constitutes a stand-point approach, just like any other, and its merits or de-merits can ultimately only be evaluated against the empirical record, past and present (notwithstanding the points that I find Eurocentrism to be deeply biased and that what I find so deeply galling about it is its dismissive 'put-down' modus operandi of all things non-Western, wherein all non-Western achievements are dismissed outright, alongside the simultaneous (re)presentation of everything that the West does as progressive and/or pioneering).
So the second principal challenge facing the discipline—one which will no less get me into trouble with many postmodern/poststructuralist thinkers—is the need to reconstruct an alternative non-Eurocentric set of disciplinary foundations, which can then generate fresh empirical narratives of the international system and the global political economy. For my view is that only by offering an alternative research agenda and empirical analysis of the world economy can IR and IPE be set free from their extant Eurocentric straitjackets and the Sisyphean prison within which they remain confined, wherein IR and IPE scholars simply re-present or recycle tired old Eurocentric mantras and tropes in new clothing ad infinitum. For if nothing else, the absence of an alternative reconstruction and empirical analysis means that IR and IPE scholars are most likely simply to default to, or retreat back into, their Eurocentric comfort zone. Accordingly, then, the battle between Eurocentrism and non-Eurocentrism needs to be taken to the empirical field and away from the high and rarified intellectually mountainous terrain of metanarratival sparring contests.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
Another way of asking this question would be: what influenced you to become a non-Eurocentric thinker? I get asked this question a lot, especially by non-white people. A good deal of this is related to my life-experience, much of which is sub-conscious of course and both too personal and too detailed to openly reflect upon here (sorry!) More objectively, the initial impetus came around 1999 when I came across a book on Max Weber by the well-respected Weberian scholar, Bryan Turner, in which he argued inter alia that Weber's sociology had Orientalist properties; none of which had occurred to me before. Following this up further I became convinced that Weber was indeed Eurocentric, as was Marx. More importantly, I came to see this as a huge problem that infected not just Marx and Weber but pretty much all of historical sociology (which was reinforced in my mind when I came to read James Blaut's books, The Colonizer's Model of the World (find it here), and Eight Eurocentric Historians). So I set out to develop an alternative non-Eurocentric approach to world history and historical sociology as a counter (which resulted in my 2004 book, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation).
Two further key IR texts that I became aware of were L.H.M. Ling's seminal 2002 book, Postcolonial International Relations and Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney's equally brilliant 2004 book International Relations and the Problem of Difference, both of which led me to explore further the Eurocentric nature of IR and later IPE. But it would be remiss of me not to mention the influence of Albert Paolini; a wonderful colleague whom I had the pleasure to know at La Trobe University in Melbourne back in the early 1990s before his exceedingly unfortunate and premature death (and who, I must say, was way ahead of the game compared to me in terms of developing the critique of Eurocentrism in IR (see his book, Navigating Modernity (1997)). However, it would be unfair to the many others who have influenced me in countless ways to single out only these books and writers, though I hope you'll forgive me for not mentioning them so as to avoid providing yet another overly extended answer!
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
This is an excellent but very challenging question and I want to try and make a succinct answer (though I shall build on it in some of the answers I will provide later on). The essential argument I make about 'thinking inter-culturally' is that while the more liberal side of the discipline thinks that its cosmopolitanism does just this, its Eurocentrism actually prevents it from fulfilling this. Because ultimately, cosmopolitanism wants to impose a Western standard of civilization upon the world, thereby advancing cultural monism rather than cultural pluralism. And this is merely the loudest expression of a spectre that haunts much of the discipline. But I guess that in the end, to achieve genuine cultural pluralism and to think inter-culturally requires us to take seriously how other non-Western peoples think of what their cultures comprise and what it means to them, and how their societies and states work along such lines. Dismissing them, as Eurocentrism always does, as inferior, backward and regressive denies this requirement outright. Interestingly, my great grandfather, J.A. Hobson flirted with this idea in his book, Imperialism: A Study (though this has largely escaped the notice of most people since few have read the more important second part of that book where all this is considered). But this is merely a first step, for as I will explain later on in the interview, ultimately thinking inter-culturally requires an analysis of the dialogical inter-connections and mutual co-constitutive relations between West and non-West which, in turn, presupposes not merely the presence of Western agency but also that of non-Western agency in the making of world politics and the global political economy.
All of which is clearly a massive challenge and I am certainly not advocating that the discipline of IR engage in deep ethnographical study and that it should morph into anthropology. And in any case I think that there are things we can do more generally to transcend Eurocentrism while learning more about the other side of the Eurocentric frontier without going to this extreme. I shall talk about such conceptual moves later on in this interview. One such theoretical move that I talk about later is the need to engage historical sociology (albeit from a non-Eurocentric perspective) or, more precisely global historical sociology. Again, though, I'm not advocating that the discipline should morph into historical sociology. And I'm aware that one of the biggest obstacles to IR making inroads into historical sociology is the sheer size of the task that this requires. It has always come naturally to me because that is where I came from before I joined the IR academic community. But there is quite a bit of historical sociology of IR out there now so I do think it possible for new PhD students to enter this fold. All of this said, though, I'm unsure if I have answered your question adequately.
The west is often seen as the source of globalization and innovation, which have historically radiated outwards in a process without seeming endpoint. What is wrong with this picture, and, perhaps more interestingly, why does it remain so pervasive?
In essence I believe this familiar picture—one which is embraced by conventional and many critical IR/IPE and globalization theorists—is wrong because this linear Western narrative brackets out all the many inputs that the non-West has made (which returns me to the point made a moment ago concerning the dialogical relations that have long existed between West and non-West). In my aforementioned 2004 book I argued that the West did not rise to modernity as a result of its own exceptional rational institutions and culture but was significantly enabled by many non-Western achievements and inventions which were borrowed and sometimes appropriated by the West. In short, without the Rest there might be no modern West. Moreover, while the West has been the principal actor in globalization since 1945, the globalization that preceded it (i.e., between 1492 and c.1830) was non-Western-led (as was the process of Afro-Eurasian regionalization that occurred between c.600 and 1492 out of which post-1492 globalization emerged). And even after 1945 I believe that non-Western actors have played various roles in shaping both globalization and the West, all of which are elided in the standard Eurocentric linear Western narrative of globalization.
But why has this image remained so persistent? This is potentially a massive question though it is a very important one for sure. Conventional theorists are most likely to disagree outright with my alternative picture in part because they are entirely comfortable with the notion that the 'West is best' and that the West single-handedly created capitalism, the sovereign inter-state system and the global economy. Critical theorists are rather more problematic to summarize here. But one that springs to mind is the type of argument that Immanuel Wallerstein (Theory Talk #13) made in a1997 article, in which he insisted that it be an imperative to hold the West accountable for everything that goes on in the world economy so that we can prosecute its crimes against the world. Arguments that bring non-Western agency in, as I seek to do, he dismisses as deflecting focus away from the West and thereby diluting the nature of the crimes that the West has imparted and therefore serves merely to weaken the case for the critical prosecution. I fundamentally disagree with him for reasons that I shan't go into here (but will touch upon below). But in my view it is (or should be) a key debate-in-the-making not least because I suspect that many other critical theorists might agree with him and, more importantly, because it brings fundamentally into question of what Eurocentrism is and of what the antidote to it comprises. Either way, though, critical theorists, at least in my view, often buy into the Western linear narrative, albeit not by celebrating the West but by critiquing it. All of which means that both conventional and many critical IR scholars effectively maintain the hegemony of Eurocentrism in the discipline though for diametrically opposed reasons; and which, at the risk of sounding paranoid, suggests a deeply subliminal conspiracy against the introduction of non-Eurocentrism.
Nevertheless one final but rather obvious point remains. For the biggest reason why Eurocentrism persists is because it makes Westerners feel good about themselves. And at the risk of sounding like sour grapes (notwithstanding very decent sales for my non-Eurocentric books), I have been struck by the fact that there seems to be an insatiable appetite—particularly among the Western public readership—for high profile Eurocentric books that celebrate and glorify Western civilization; though, to be brutally frank, many of these rarely add anything new to that which has been said countless times in the last 50 years, if not 200—notwithstanding Ricardo Duchesne's recent avowedly Eurocentric book The Uniqueness of Western Civilization as constituting a rare exception in this regard. All of which means that writing non-Eurocentric books is unlikely to get your name onto the bestseller list (though granted, the same is true for many of the Eurocentric books that have been written!)
International theory and political theory originates mainly from Europe, but makes universal claims about the nature of politics. How does international theory betray its situated roots and how do these roots matter for how we should think about theory?
I'm not sure that I can answer this question in the space allowed but I'll try and get to the broad-brush take-home point. I guess that when thinking about modern IR theory we can find those theorists who in effect advocate a normative Western imperialist posture even if they claim to be doing otherwise. Robert Gilpin's work on hegemonic stability theory is perhaps the clearest example in this respect. Anglo-Saxon hegemony, he claims, is non-imperialist because it always seeks to help the rest of the world, not exploit it. But the exercise of hegemony, it turns out, returns us to the old 19th century trope of the civilizing mission where Western practices and principles are transferred and imposed on non-Western societies in order to culturally convert them along Western lines. And this in turn issues from the assumption that the British and American interests are not selfish but are universal. This mantra is there too in Robert Keohane's (Theory Talk #9) book, After Hegemony, where cultural conversion of non-Western societies to a neoliberal standard of civilization by the international financial institutions through structural adjustment is approved of; an argument that is developed much more expansively in his later work on humanitarian intervention. And this trope forms the basis of cosmopolitan humanitarian interventionist theory more generally, where state reconstruction, which is imposed once military intervention has finished, is all about re-creating Western political and economic institutions across the world. I don't doubt for a moment the sincerity of the arguments that these authors make. But they can make them only because they believe that the Western interest is truly the universal. In such ways, then, IR betrays its roots.
Ultimately, Western IR theory constructs a hierarchical conception of the world with the West standing atop and from there we receive an image of a procession or sliding scale of gradated sovereignties in the non-Western world. For much of IR theory that has neo-imperialist normative underpinnings, it is this construction which legitimizes Western intervention in the non-Western world, thereby reproducing the legal conception of the (imperialist) standard of civilization that underpinned late 19th century positive law. Nevertheless, there has been a significant strand of anti-imperialist Eurocentrism within international theory (and before it a strand of anti-imperialist scientific racism, as in the likes of Charles HenryPearson and LothropStoddard). But once again, as we find in Samuel Huntington's famous 1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations—which comprises a modern equivalent of Lothrop Stoddard's Eugenicist texts, The Rising Tideof Color (1920) and Clashing Tides of Color (1935)—the West is held up as the highest expression of civilization, with non-Western societies viewed as socially inferior such that the West's mandate is not to imperially intervene across the world but to renew its uniquely Western civilized culture in the face of regressive and rampant non-Western regions and countries (particularly Middle Eastern Islam and Confucian China). Hedley Bull's anti-imperialist English School argument provides a complementary variant here because, he argues, it is the refusal of non-Western states to become Western wherein the source of the (unacceptable) instability of the global international society ultimately stems. All of which, as you allude to in your question, rests on the conflation of the Western interest with the universal. It is for this reason, then, that the cardinal principle of critical non-Eurocentrism comprises the need to undertake deep (self) reflexivity and to remain constantly vigilant to Eurocentric slippages.
In turn, this returns me to the point I made before: that IR theory does not think inter-culturally because it denies the validity of non-Western cultures. Because it does so, then it ultimately denies the full sovereignty of non-Western states. For one of the trappings of sovereignty is what Gerry Simpson usefully refers to as 'existential equality', or 'cultural self-determination'. It seems clear to me that the majority of IR theory effectively denies the sovereignty of non-Western states because it rejects cultural pluralism and hence cultural self-determination as a function of its intolerant Eurocentric monism. The biggest ironies that emerge here, however, are two-fold; or what I call the twin self-delusions of IR. First, while conventional IR theory proclaims its positivist, value free credentials that sit comfortably with cultural pluralist tolerance, nevertheless as I argued in my answer to your first question, this positivist mantra turns out to constitute a smokescreen or veil behind which lies the face of intolerant Eurocentric cultural monism. And second, it means that while IR proclaims that its subject matter comprises the objective analysis of the international system which focuses on anarchy and the sovereign state, nevertheless it turns out that what it is really all about is narrating an analysis of Western hierarchy and the 'hyper-sovereignty' of Western states versus the 'conditional sovereignty/gradated sovereignty' of non-Western states.
Linking your work to Lizée's as a critique of extrapolating 'universals' on the basis of narrow (Western) experiences, Patrick Jackson (Theory Talk #44) wrote as follows: 'Perhaps the cure for the disease that Hobson and Lizée diagnose is a rethinking of what "theory" means beyond empirical generalizations, so that future international theorists can avoid the sins of the past.' What is your conception of what theory is or should be?
As noted already, I am all in favor of developing non-Eurocentric theory. To sketch this out in the most generic terms I begin with the proposition that Eurocentric IR/IPE theory is monological, producing a reductive narrative in which only the West talks and acts. It is essentially a 'winner/loser' paradigm that proclaims the non-West as the loser or is always on the receiving end of that which the West does, thereby ensuring that central analytical focus is accorded to the hyper-agency of the Western winner. And its conception of agency is based on having predominant power. We find this problem particularly within much of critical IR theory, where because the West is dominant so it qualifies as having (hyper) agency while the subordinate position of the non-West means that it has little or no agency. In turn, particularly within conventional IR and IPE we encounter a substantialist ontology, where the West is thought to occupy a distinct and autonomous domain. From there everything else follows. And even in parts of critical IR and IPE where relationalism holds greater sway we often find that the West still occupies the center of intellectual gravity in the world.
My preference is for a fully relationalist approach which replaces the monologism of Eurocentrism and its reification of the West with the aforementioned conception of dialogism that brings the non-West into the discussion while simultaneously focusing on the mutually constitutive relations between Western and non-Western actors. It also allows for the agency of the non-West alongside the West's agency (even though clearly after c.1830 the West has been the dominant actor). This in effect replaces Eurocentrism's either/or problematique with a both/and logic, enabling us to reveal a space in which non-Western agency plays important roles without losing focus of Western agency, even when it takes a dominant form as it did after c.1830. In this way then, to reply to Wallerstein's argument discussed earlier, one does not have to dilute the critique of the West when bringing non-Western agency in for both can be situated alongside each other. While I could of course say much more here, these conceptual moves are paramount to me and inform the basis of my empirical work on the international system and the global political economy.
All in all, IR theory needs to take a fully global conception of agency much more seriously; structuralist theory in its many guises is necessary but is ultimately insufficient since it diminishes or dismisses outright the prospect or existence of non-Western agency. Moreover, I seek to blend materialism and non-materialism, which means that neither constructivism nor poststructuralism can quite get us over the line. Even so, blending materialism and non-materialism is not an especially hard task to achieve though IR's preferred ontologically reductionist stance certainly makes this a counter-intuitive proposition.
You combine historical sociology with international relations. What promises does this interdisciplinary approach hold? Why do we need historical sociologies of IR?
Following on from my previous answer I argue that a relationalist non-Eurocentric historical sociology of IR is able to problematize the entities that IR takes for granted—states, anarchy (as well as societies and civilizations)—in order to reveal them, to quote from the marvelous introduction that Julian Go and George Lawson have written for their forthcoming edited volume Global Historical Sociology, as 'entities in motion'. Indeed such entities are never quite complete but change through time. Here it is worth quoting Go and Lawson further, where they argue that
'social forms are "entities-in-motion": they are produced, reproduced, and breakdown through the agency of historically situated actors. Such entities-in-motion, whether they are states, empires, or civilizations often appear to be static entities with certain pre-determined identities and interests. But the relational premise, and perhaps promise, of GHS is its attempt to denaturalize such entities by holding them up to historical scrutiny'.
It is precisely this global historical sociological problematique that underpins the approach that I develop in a forthcoming book, provisionally entitled Reorient International Political Economy where inter alia, I show how many of the major processes of the global economy are never complete but are constantly mutating as they are shaped by the multiple interactions of Western and non-Western actors. To take the origins of capitalism or globalization as an example, I show how these have taken not a Western linear trajectory but a highly discontinuous path as West and non-West have interacted in complex ways.
A good number of IR historical sociologists have focused specifically on particular historical issues—especially that of the rise of the sovereign state in Europe. Such analyses have in my view proven to be extremely valuable because they allow us to puncture some of the myths that surround 'Westphalia' that populate standard or conventional IR reportage (particularly that found in undergraduate text-books). But ultimately I feel that the greatest worth of the historical sociology of IR project lies in using history (understood in historical-sociological terms rather than according to traditional historians' precepts) as a means of problematizing our understanding of the present international system and global political economy. Thus, for me, historical sociology is ultimately important because it can disrupt our understanding and explanations of the present. And I believe that this kind of inter-disciplinarity can bear considerable fruit (notwithstanding the difficulty that this task poses for IR scholars).
You famously criticized IR's Eurocentrism and argued for the need for inter-cultural thinking. What is inter-cultural thinking and how can it benefit IR?
As I already discussed what inter-cultural thinking is a bit before, I shall consider how it might benefit IR and indeed the world in various ways. First, if the rise of the West into modernity owes much of this achievement to the help provided by non-Western ideas, institutions and technologies, then acknowledging this debt could go a long way to healing the wounds that the West has inflicted upon the non-West's sense of self-esteem. Moreover, the hubristic claim ushered in by Eurocentrism, that the West made it to the top all by itself and that the very societies which helped it get there are then immediately denounced as inferior and uncivilized, significantly furnishes the West with the imperialist mandate to intervene and remake non-Western societies in the image of the West. So in essence, the help that the once-more advanced non-Western societies that the West benefited from is rewarded by 150 years of imperial punishment! Of course, IR scholars do not really study the rise of the West, but it is implicit in so much of what they write about. So acknowledging this debt could challenge the West's self-appointed mandate to remake the world in its own image as well as problematize many of the historical assumptions that lie either explicitly or implicitly within IR.
Second, and flowing on from the previous point, thinking inter-culturally means recognizing the manifold roles that the non-West has played in shaping the rise of Western capitalism and the sovereign state system as well as the global economy, as I have just argued, but also appreciating their societies and cultures on their own terms rather than simply dismissing them as unfit for purpose in the modern world. Less Western Messianism and Western hubris, more global understanding and empathy, is ultimately what I'm calling for. But none of this is possible while Eurocentrism remains the go-to modus operandi of IR and IPE. And this is important for IR not least because significant parts of it have informed Western policy, most especially US foreign policy.
Third, a key benefit that inter-cultural thinking could bring to IR is that while the discipline presumes that it furnishes objective analyses of the international system, the upshot of my claim that the discipline is founded on Eurocentrism is that all the discipline is really doing is finding ways to reaffirm the importance of Western civilization in world politics, defending it and often celebrating it, rather than learning or discovering new things about the world and world politics. I believe that only a non-Eurocentric approach can deliver that which IR thinks it's doing already but isn't.
You've said that 'what makes an argument [institutionally] Eurocentric…lies with the nature of the categories that are deployed to understand development. And these ultimately comprise the perceived degree of 'rationality' that is embodied within the political, economic, ideological, and social institutions of a given society.' In order to think inter-culturally, does IR needs new conceptions of rationality, or standards other than rationality altogether?
What an extremely interesting and perceptive question which has really got me thinking! Again, it's something that I've been aware of in the recesses of my mind but have never really thought through. Certainly the essence of Eurocentrism lies in the reification of Western rationality (or what Max Weber called Zweckrationalität) and its simultaneous denial to non-Western societies. But what with all the revelations that have happened in Britain in the last decade, where a seemingly never ending series of fraudulent practices have been uncovered within British public life—whether it be MPs' expenses scandals, banking scandals, newspaper scandals and the like—then one really wonders about the extent to which the West operates according to the properties of Zweck-rationality that Weber proclaimed it to have. Corruption and fraud happen in the West but clearly they are much more hidden than in those instances where it occurs in non-Western countries (notwithstanding the revelations mentioned a moment ago). But if one were to open the lid of many large Western companies, for example, and delve inside one might well find all sorts of 'rationality-compromising' or 'rationality-denial' practices going on. To mention just two obvious examples: first, promotions are often tainted by personal linkages rather than always founded on merit; and second, managers often mark out and protect their own personal position/territory even when it (frequently) goes against the 'rational' interests of the said organization.
To return to your question, then, one could conclude that many Western institutions are far less rational than Eurocentrism proclaims, which in turn would challenge the foundations of Eurocentrism. Of course, corruption and fraud are not unique to the West, but it is the West that proclaims its unique 'rational standard of civilization'. Whether, therefore, we need to abandon the term (Zweck) rationality on the grounds that it is an impossibly conceived ideal type remains the question. Right now I don't have an answer though I'll be happy to mull over this in the coming years.
You've written that engaging with the East 'creates a genuinely global history' and articulate a 'dream wherein the peoples of the Earth can finally sit down at the table of global humanity and communicate as equal partners'. Do you consciously operate with an 'ontology' of 'peoples' and 'civilizations' as opposed to 'individuals'? How do you conceive of the relationship between global humanity and plural peoplehood? Is there an underlying philosophical or anthropological view that you are drawing on in these and similar passages?
Certainly I prefer to think of peoples and even of civilizations rather than individuals and states, though I'll confess right now that dealing theoretically with civilizations and articulating them as units of analysis is extraordinarily challenging. At the moment I leave this side of things to better people than me, such as Peter Katzenstein (Theory Talk #15) and his recentpioneering work on civilizations. The term 'global humanity' concerns me insofar as it is often a politically-loaded term, particularly within cosmopolitanism, where its underbelly comprises the desire to define a single civilizational identity (i.e., a Western one) for 'global humanity'. In essence, cosmopolitanism effectively advances the conception of a 'provincial (i.e., Western) humanity' that masquerades as the global. So I prefer the notion of plural peoplehood, so as to allow for difference. I wouldn't say that I am operating according to a particular philosophical view although it strikes me that such a notion is embodied in Johann Gottfried Herder's work which, on that dimension at least, I am attracted to. But to be honest, this is generally something that I have not explored though it is something that I've thought that I'd like to research for a future book (notwithstanding the point that I'll need to finish the book that I have started first!).
In your reply toErik Ringmar, you draw on psychoanalytic metaphors to discuss the benefits of overcoming Eurocentrism, writing that, 'Eurocentrism leads to the repression and sublimation of the Other in the Self. Thus, doing away with Eurocentrism can end the socio-psychological angst and alienation that necessarily occurs through such sublimation.' How do you envision what we now call the West (or Europe) after its socio-psychological transformation? What does a world after angst and alienation look like? Is it possible, and is that the goal you think IR theory should aim at?
Another massively challenging and fascinating question, let me have a go. Since you raised the issue of socio-psychological/psycho-analytical theory (though it is something that I am no expert on), it has always struck me that Eurocentrism itself is not simply a construct designed to advance Western power and Western capitalist interests in the world. This seems too mechanistic. For recall that it was a series of largely independent sojourners, travel-writers, novelists, journalists and others rather than capitalists who played such an important role in constructing Eurocentrism. Something more seems to be at play. One can think of the battles between 'Mods and Rockers' or Skinheads and heavy metal fans in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, who detested each other simply because they held different identities and prized different cultural values. Most importantly, I feel, the constant need to denounce, put down and dismiss the Other as inferior seems reminiscent of those kinds of people we sometimes meet who, in constantly putting down others to falsely elevate themselves to a position of superiority, ultimately reveals merely their own insecurities. The same issues, of course, underpin racism and Eurocentrism. The West rose to prominence in my view as a late-developer and having got to the top it very quickly came to view its duty as one of punishing all others for being different – all done, of course, in the name of helping or civilizing the very 'global humanity' that had done so much to help the West rise to the top in the first place! And to want to culturally convert everyone in the world according to the Western standard of civilization seems to be symptomatic of a deeply insecure mindset. A secure person or society for that matter does not feel threatened by, but openly embraces, difference.
Can we move beyond this stand-off given that such a mentality has been hard-wired within Western culture for at least three centuries? And ten if you count the sometimes terse relations between Europe and Middle Eastern Islam that emerged after 1095! We need to move beyond an identity that is based only on putting others down. It's 'bad karma' and, like all bad karma, damages the Western self, not just the non-Western other. But to transcend this identity-formation process requires us to do away with logocentrism; clearly a very big task. Nevertheless, that is exactly what my writings are all about. And it is something that I think IR theory needs to strive to achieve. Because IR theory is to an extent performative then I live in the hope, at least, that such a mentality might, just might somehow seep into international public life, though if it were to happen I strongly suspect that I would not be around to see it. Still, your question—what would a world beyond Eurocentrism look like?—though very important is nevertheless perhaps too difficult to answer without seeming like a hopeless idealist… other than to say that it could be rather better than the current one.
You write that 'IPE should aim to be an über-discipline, drawing on a wide range of disciplines in order to craft a knowledge base that refuses to become lost in disciplinary over-specialization and the depressing academic narcissism of disciplinary methodological differentiation and exclusion.' Why do you prefer that IPE should be the überdiscipline, instead of IR (or something else altogether), with IPE as a subset?
My degree was in Political Economy, my Masters in Political Sociology and my PhD in Historical Sociology and (International) Political Economy. Despite the fact that the majority of my academic career to date has been in IR research, I have always returned at various points to my old haunting ground, IPE (as I have most recently). I have always found IR a little alienating for its reification of politics, divorced from political economy. I'm not a Marxist, but I share in the view that political economy, if not always directly underpinning developments and events in the international system is, however, never far away.
The quote that you took for this question came from the end of my 2-part article that came out in the 20th anniversary edition of Review of International Political Economy. This was partly responding to Benjamin Cohen's (Theory Talk #17) 2008 seminal book, International Political Economy: A Intellectual History. One of the challenges that I issued to my IPE readership, echoing Cohen, is the need for IPE to return to 'thinking big' (in large part as a reaction to the massive contraction of the discipline's boundaries that has been effected by third wave American IPE, which labors under the intellectual hegemony of Open Economy Politics). In that context, then, I argued that IPE needs to expand its boundaries outwards not only to allow big or macro-scale issues to return to the discipline's research agenda but also to incorporate insight from other disciplines. For in my view IPE has the potential to blend the insights of many other disciplines that can in turn transcend the sometimes myopic or tunnel-vision-based nature of their particular constituent specialisms.
One of the implications of 'thinking big' is that IPE should be able to cover much of that which IR does… and more. Like Susan Strange, who expressed her exasperation with IR for its exclusion of politico-economic matters, so I feel that the solution lies not with IR colonizing IPE (which is not likely for the foreseeable future!) but with IPE expanding its currently narrow remit. If it could achieve this it could become the 'über-discipline', or the 'master discipline', of the Social Sciences, notwithstanding the point that my postcolonial and feminist friends will no doubt upbraid me for using such terrible terms!
Final question. Beyond the East outside the West, Greece is now being remade as the 'East' within the West, with a range of measures applied to it that had hitherto been the preserve for the 'East' or Global South. How can your work help to make sense of the stakes?
Your question reminds me of a similar one that I was asked in an interview for Cumhurieyet Strateji Magazine concerning Turkey's ongoing efforts to join the EU, the essence of my answer comprising: 'be careful what you wish for'. One of the things that I have felt uneasy about is the way, as I see it (and I might not be quite right in saying this), that European Studies (as a sub-discipline) sometimes appears as rather self-affirming, thereby reflecting the core self-congratulatory modus operandi of the EU. I am not anti-European or in any way ashamed to be Western (as some of my critics might think). But I'm deeply uneasy about the EU project, specifically in terms of its desire to expand outwards, not to mention inwards as we are seeing in the case of Greece today. For this has the whiff of the old civilizing mission that had supposedly been put to rest back at the time of the origins of the European Economic Community. Although Greece is a member of the EU (notwithstanding its non-European roots), it seems clear that what is going on today is a process of intensified internal colonization under the hegemony of Germany, wherein Greece is subjected to the German standard of civilization. All of which brings into question the self-glorification of the self-proclaimed 'socially progressive' EU project. And to return to my discussion of Turkey I recognize that candidate countries have their reasons for wanting to join the EU. But I guess that what my work is ultimately about is restoring a sense of dignity to non-Western peoples, in the absence of which they will continue to self-deprecate and live in angst in the long cold shadow of the West. All of which brings me back to the answers I made to quite a few of the earlier questions. So I would like to close by saying how much I have enjoyed answering your extremely well-informed questions and to thank you most sincerely for inviting me to address them.
Professor Hobson gained his PhD from the LSE (1991), joined the University of Sheffield as Reader and is currently Professor of Politics and International Relations. Previously he taught at La Trobe University, Melbourne (1991–97) and the University of Sydney (1997–2004). His main research interest concerns the area of inter-civilizational relations and everyday political economy in the context of globalization, past and present. His work is principally involved in carrying forward the critique of Eurocentrism in World History/Historical Sociology, and International Relations.
Related links
Faculty Profile at the University of Sheffield Read Hobson's The Postcolonial Paradox of Eastern Agency (Perceptions 2014) here (pdf) Read Hobson's Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? (Review of International Studies 2007) here (pdf)
0 0 1 6773 38610 Danish Institute for International Studies 321 90 45293 14.0
Brazil grew 2.4 percent per year on average in the last 25 years-somewhat less than Latin America, a good deal less than the world, far less than the emerging countries of Asia in the same period, and indeed far less than Brazil itself in previous decades. If anything stands out favorably in recent Brazilian experience, it is not growth but stabilization and the successful opening of the economy. The purpose of this paper is more modest. It is limited to setting out the authors' particular view of recent efforts to consolidate democracy in Brazil while controlling inflation and resuming economic growth. At the same time the paper presents, as objectively as possible, some thoughts on the limits but also the relevance of action by political leaders to set a course and circumvent obstacles to that process. Here and there, the paper refers to the experiences of other Latin American countries, especially Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, not to offer a full fledged comparative analysis but merely to note contrasts and similarities that may shed light on the peculiarities of the Brazilian case and suggest themes for a more wide-ranging exchange of views.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
When Sweden applied for NATO membership on May 22, 2022, it ended two centuries of military non-alignment. Although it was swiftly ratified by most NATO members, Türkiye and Hungary have prolonged the accession process. With ratification from Türkiye in hand, all eyes are on Hungary next, with Sweden set to become the 32nd member of the NATO Alliance in the coming weeks. Sweden has a highly advanced military and is a net contributor to the defensive alliance; its membership represents a considerable boost to NATO capabilities. As a member of NATO, Sweden will provide the Alliance with 1) support from its strong defense industry, 2) high-technological competence, and 3) a significant air force. These contributions will be crucial in preparing the Alliance to combat modern threats, as well as providing a dramatic multiplier to NATO's capacity in two vital regions—the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic. With Sweden's modern and diverse capabilities soon to be added to NATO's toolkit, it is worth taking a look at what the country will contribute to the Alliance, now and in the future. Three Major Benefits of Sweden Joining NATOThere are three main areas where Sweden will be able to contribute tangible benefits. First is Sweden's defense industry, which will boost the Alliance's military-industrial capacity. One of the largest in Europe, Sweden's defense industry amounted to $3 billion in 2022 with exports of defense material totaling over $2 billion. The country's largest defense companies produce some of the most sophisticated equipment on the market, such as Saab's Jas 39 Gripen and BAE System AB's Combat Vehicle 90. Approximately 28,000 people are employed by Sweden's defense industry, a figure likely to rise as the government has announced a considerable increase in its annual defense budget for 2024; nearly double that of its 2020 defense budget. The high demand for defense production, which has struggled to keep up with weapons demands as countries provide armaments to Ukraine in the wake of Russian aggression, is only going to continue for the coming years. The second benefit is the high level of technological competence in Sweden's private sector. Sweden's extensive public-private partnerships, considerable R&D funding, and highly-ranked education system are some of the factors behind its success in high-tech. The government launched a national 'Cybercampus' initiative in 2020 in partnership between the Swedish Defense Forces, public universities, and private companies, and established the Centre for Cyber Defence and Information Security in Stockholm. As NATO expands its ability to counter cyber and hybrid threats, Sweden's technological know-how will help prepare the Alliance to prepare for tomorrow's threats.In addition, with Sweden in NATO, two of the three manufacturers of 5G equipment—Ericsson and Nokia—will be in the same defensive alliance. The country is home to leading high-tech firms, such as Ericsson, the world's second largest network company; Hexagon, a major software company; and Northvolt, one of Europe's largest producers of lithium batteries. Sweden's success in attracting tech startups and in producing unicorns (startups reaching a billion dollar valuation) has led the country to be informally dubbed the 'Silicon Valley of Europe'. Sweden also possesses large quantities of critical minerals—such as iron ore and rare earth metals—which are vital for the defense industry, in the green transition, and for the overall economy. After a recent discovery in the Northern Swedish city of Kiruna, the country now possesses the largest-known deposit of rare-earth metals in Europe. Sweden will provide the Alliance with a crucial opportunity to reduce its critical minerals dependency on China and other authoritarian governments. The third benefit is Sweden's air force. The country's air force is the largest in the Nordics and one of the largest in Europe, possessing at least 100 fighter jets. With many more slated to be delivered in the upcoming years, Sweden is set to dramatically bolster the Alliance's number of fighter jets in the Baltic and Arctic regions. This will reduce the need for other major allies such as the United States to provide air surveillance and air presence in the region, with NATO member states now able to take a larger role in their own region's defense. Although Sweden's air capabilities are significant, it is one of only a few European countries, and the only Nordic country, that flies the Gripen. Sweden, along with the other Nordic countries—Norway, Finland and Denmark—signed the Nordic Air Commander's Intent in March 2023, with the goal of combining air capabilities to better deter Russia. As the individual Nordic air forces seek to unite under a common purpose, Sweden remains the odd one out with its Gripen fighters, the others all use the Lockheed Martin-designed F-16 or F-35. Sweden's commitment to the Gripen has previously put it at odds with the United States, a decision which will likely be discussed more in the upcoming years as Allied cooperation intensifies. A Swedish Air Force Saab Gripen fighter.Image CreditBolstering NATO's Northern CorridorSweden's membership is also beneficial for NATO given Sweden's geostrategic location in the heart of the Nordics. This is the first time all of the Nordic countries have been in the same alliance since 1523—after Finland's accession to NATO in April 2023. With Sweden as a member, the Alliance will gain strategic depth in the Baltic Sea region. Most countries around the Baltic Sea will now be part of the same military alliance, which has led some people to dub the Baltic Sea a 'NATO lake'. Sweden's entry into the Alliance will add three new strategic locations to the Alliance: 1) the strait of Øresund, the main strait connecting the North Sea to the Baltic Sea, which will now be completely controlled by NATO members; 2) Gotland, the largest island in the Baltic Sea, often called an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' due to its central location in the Baltics; and 3) shoreline along the Åland Sea and Gulf of Bothnia will make it easier for the Alliance to defend Åland, a demilitarized region between Finland and Sweden at the entry of the Gulf of Bothnia. Sweden is increasing its military presence in these areas, most notably on Gotland. In recent years, Sweden has relocated a mechanized battalion and anti-aircraft capabilities, as well as put aside specific financing of $163 million for the defense of Gotland. NATO access to Gotland will dramatically increase its force projection capabilities into the Baltic Sea region. Sweden also possesses a world-class submarine fleet—with some of the most advanced submarines in operation—and a wealth of knowledge navigating the shallow Baltic Sea, which it has done since 1904. Sweden's fleet currently consists of three advanced Gotland-class submarines and one older model scheduled to be retired when two new designs are delivered in 2027 and 2028, giving it five submarines by the end of the decade. Critically, the entirety of US submarine capabilities and a major portion of Russia's submarine fleet are unable to operate in the shallow Baltic Sea. Sweden fills a crucial gap in capabilities for NATO in the Baltic Sea region with its long history of submarine expertise and modern capabilities.Sweden's membership will also be a game changer for NATO in the Arctic region. When Sweden joins NATO, seven of the eight Arctic states—all except for Russia—will be part of the same Alliance. With climate change poised to open new sea lanes and possibilities for resource extraction such as hydrocarbons and critical minerals, the region is becoming gradually more important both commercially and militarily. This rising geopolitical interest for the region by Arctic states—especially Russia—will require greater cooperation among NATO members to strengthen deterrence in the region. China too is increasingly interested in the region, and with intensifying Sino-Russian relations, it is potentially a new theater in the ongoing great power competition. Sweden too has noted the importance of the Arctic region and is in a process of enhancing its presence in the Arctic. This is evident from the Swedish government's recent decision to start construction on two new garrisons in northern Sweden. Russia is investing heavily in its Arctic capabilities, so too must NATO invest in its capabilities in the region. Adding Sweden as a member significantly increases NATO's access to Arctic infrastructure, training opportunities, and adds Sweden's expertise operating in the region to the Alliance's capabilities.Increased Cooperation and Bolstered CapabilitiesIn addition to the immediate benefits Sweden will bring to the Alliance, there are also future benefits to realize. Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden has pursued a strategy of increased spending on the military and rearmament. This strategy has been accelerated since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The country's recent decision to increase military spending by 28% for FY2024 will bring military spending above the 2% target six years earlier than planned—showcasing Sweden's commitment to be a trustworthy partner in the Alliance. The increased funding will go towards bolstering some of Sweden's current weaknesses, such as its low number of personnel and reservists. The annual number of recruits will increase from 5,500 to 10,000 and will give Sweden one of the largest reserve forces in the Alliance. It is also planning to reactivate civilian conscription in an effort to bolster its personnel and boost its defensive capabilities. Sweden's NATO membership also opens up new possibilities of defense cooperation, both on the Alliance level and regionally. Sweden's long position of military non-alignment has led it to historically underutilize cooperation with other like-minded partners on defense and security. The upcoming years will therefore provide Sweden and the Alliance many opportunities to deepen cooperation with integration and synergies. There are also numerous opportunities for increased regional cooperation outside of NATO, most notably with bodies such as 1) the Nordic Defense Cooperation (Nordefco), a defense collaboration bringing together the five Nordic countries; 2) the Nordic Council, an inter-parliamentary body for Nordic cooperation (and which has historically not discussed defense due to Sweden and Finland's military non-alignment); 3) and bilateral defense cooperation between Sweden and Finland. A sign of increased cooperation was evident earlier this year, when the air force commanders of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway issued a joint declaration, with a shared goal to operate all Nordic fighter jets as one fleet. This announcement–made during the early days of the Swedish presidency of Nordefco–would result in a joint fleet of at least 250 fighter jets, and possibly as many as 400, although it is difficult to say how many are in active use. A bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed by the Swedish Minister for Defence Pål Jonson and the United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the 5th of December 2023. After the Riksdag approves and implements it, the Agreement should enter into force by late 2024.Image CreditSweden is also in the process of increasing its ties to other partners, including the United States, with whom Sweden concluded negotiating a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in December 2023. This bilateral agreement provides a framework for defense cooperation, outlines the terms for US troops in Sweden, should the need or desire ever arise, and deepens defense relations within NATO. Another important partner is the United Kingdom, with whom Sweden has cooperated more in recent years through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)—a UK-led defense initiative consisting of ten Northern European countries. Sweden in NATO marks all of the JEF countries in both frameworks, enhancing opportunities for multi-domain interoperability in the high north. Additionally, Sweden has committed to sending at least 600 troops to Latvia in 2025 as part of a NATO-led multinational battle group. These forward placed units act as a deterrent to Russia and are a visible sign of Sweden's commitment to be a net contributor to NATO.Sweden's decision to apply for NATO membership and its dramatic reinvestment in its military since the Russian annexation of Crimea represents a profound shift in the Nordic nation's military policy. With a robust defense industry, numerous high-tech companies—including one of the major producers of 5G infrastructure equipment—vital geostrategic location, and a powerful air force that increases force projection into the Baltic Sea and shores up the Northern corridor, Sweden stands to contribute significantly to the alliance from day one as a member. Together with Finland and its Nordic neighbors, Sweden is undertaking a profound integration of air capabilities and a new Nordic dimension to the alliance is emerging. As NATO's newest member, Sweden will join with a profound array of capabilities and dramatically transform the Northern corridor of the Alliance.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
When the Paris Olympics will open on 26 July 2024, there may – and, in all likelihood, there will – be some Russian and Belarusian athletes attending it. Having postponed the decision on the matter several times in the last year, the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) eventually took its stance on 8 December 2023.[1] Under neutral flag, having met some eligibility conditions, only as individual competitors – and yet, some athletes from the country that has been waging a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine since February 2022 will be allowed entry in the most important event of international sport. Although Russian authorities immediately decried the IOC's announcement as "unacceptable" and "discriminatory",[2] the decision arguably represents a not unexpected yet worrying step forward toward the normalisation of Russia's position within the international community. In light of the IOC decision, Ukrainian leaders should now carefully consider what the best line of action may be in the run-up to next summer's Olympics.Multilateral sanctions against Russia – and their lifting As had already happened with Crimea's annexation in 2014, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 took place amidst the "Olympic truce" called for by the United Nations General Assembly for the duration of the Beijing Games.[3] Unlike 2014, however, the 2022 invasion initially led to an unprecedentedly firm reaction by international sports organisations, prompted and supported by Western governments, sporting bodies and athletes. Within a matter of days, the IOC as well as the majority of international sports federations introduced ad-hoc recommendations that led to the exclusion of Russian and Belarusian athletes from most international events. Although officially aimed at protecting the "integrity" of international sport, these measures de facto were a comprehensive set of multilateral sanctions signalling the international community's condemnation of Moscow's war and Minsk's support for it.[4] Excluding Russian athletes from international sport also denied Vladimir Putin one of its preferred propaganda turf: since the beginning of his Presidency, he has systematically instrumentalised international sport to bolster his leadership, arguing that Russia's sporting achievements would be proof of its restored great power status.[5] As the months went by, however, the IOC started considering options for a possible reintegration of Russian athletes. The main preoccupation of the Olympic Committee was to safeguard the self-professed "unifying" mission of international sport[6] – and, therefore, its role as the chief authority governing it. Indeed, since March 2022, the Russian leadership has repeatedly voiced the idea of hosting its own international events open to "friendly" countries, thus raising fears about a permanent split in global sport.[7] Amidst this debate, of great significance were the concerns expressed by the UN Special Rapporteurs in the field of cultural rights and on contemporary forms of racism, who criticised the decision to ban Russian and Belarusian athletes as a potential form of discrimination based on nationality.[8] While other international law scholars questioned this stance by emphasising the rights of Ukrainian athletes,[9] the IOC directly referred to the UN Special Rapporteurs' opinion to revise its own recommendations in March 2023. International sports federations were now invited to reconsider the ban, allowing the participation of Russian athletes in international events only as individual athletes and under neutral flags. To assuage concerns about the possible inclusion of pro-war or combatant athletes, specific eligibility conditions were included: Russian athletes who "actively support the war" and those "contracted to the Russian or Belarusian military or national security agencies" should not be allowed participation. No decision, however, was taken with regard to Paris 2024.[10] The IOC move tested the reaction of the different parties, with a view to the next year's Games. Ukrainian leaders – including President Volodymir Zelensky himself – were understandably vocal against the new approach. Ukraine's government initially introduced a policy according to which members of Ukrainian national teams would not be allowed to compete in events where Russian "neutrals" are present; the policy was later reverted once it was evident that it would only jeopardise the qualification of Ukrainian athletes to the Paris Olympics.[11] The threat of a boycott of Paris 2024 in case Russian neutrals would be admitted to the event was also raised, looking for a common front with Western allies.[12] While most Western governments reiterated (albeit with different nuances) their support for measures against Russian participation, however, the possibility of a collective boycott was reportedly ruled out during a dedicated meeting in February, with only some Nordic countries explicitly mentioning the intention to join it.[13] For its part, the Russian government was also critical of the IOC's stance, denouncing it as "discriminatory" and a violation of Olympic values. Russian "neutrals", however, were not prohibited from taking part again in international events.[14] In a remarkable statement, IOC President Thomas Bach described criticism from both sides as evidence of the righteousness of his approach[15] – as if standing "middle ground" vis-à-vis a major violation of international law would be the correct course of action.The road to Paris 2024 Several months on from its revised recommendations, the IOC has now extended its policy of "individual neutral" participation to Paris 2024. It motivated it in a rather exhaustive way, referring not only to the UN Special Rapporteurs' opinion, but also the (alleged) view of an "overwhelming majority" of athletes, the communique of the latest Olympic Summit, consultations with relevant stakeholders, the Leaders' Declaration at the G20 in New Delhi as well as the recent UNGA resolution about the Olympic Truce for Paris 2024. It also highlighted that, so far, only eight Russian athletes have qualified for Paris 2024 (compared with over 60 Ukrainians), and that the IOC reaffirms its commitment to supporting Ukrainian athletes through the dedicated Solidarity Fund.[16] Overall, this approach paves the way for a limited participation of Russian athletes without an outright ban. For Russia, there are a few benefits to reap from such a decision. The Kremlin can still lament discrimination and unfairness toward Russian nationals, while having them participate in one of the most watched events globally. The IOC eligibility conditions may look strict at first, but their actual implementation in the past months by international federations has been contested.[17] According to Vladyslav Heraskevych, the Ukrainian skeleton racer who called for "no war in Ukraine" at the Beijing Olympics, among the eight Russian athletes who have already qualified for Paris 2024 are individuals who took part in pro-Putin rallies after 24 February 2022.[18] The extent to which one can reasonably expect Russian athletes to distance themselves from the war is minimal, due to the political situation in the country; and despite the IOC reassurances, propaganda stunts, if not outright anti-Ukraine provocations, cannot be ruled out. For Ukraine, the real question is whether to go ahead with a boycott or not. From a public diplomacy point of view, a boycott may only be beneficial to Ukraine if there were such a wide-ranging front of boycotting countries to substantially undermine the significance of the event and remind the global sporting audience that a murderous war of aggression is still raging on elsewhere in Europe. Instead, as evidenced by the overall unsuccessful policy of Ukrainian non-participation in international events along with Russian "neutrals" in spring 2023, a limited boycott, only involving Kyiv and perhaps a few close Nordic allies, would likely receive little coverage in international media; furthermore, it may leave a propaganda space open for pro-Putin participants on Paris' sporting grounds. Given that the possibility of major Western allies joining a boycott looks quite uncertain now, other options should also be explored. Leveraging the Olympic arena in all possible manners to press forward the message for an end to the Russian aggression – after Heraskevych's own example in Beijing – may be an alternative strategy for Ukraine's sport. True, the IOC has historically acted firmly against any protest gestures (broadly defined) by athletes. At the same time, however, punishing Ukrainian calls for a just peace and against Russia's blatant violations of international law would be detrimental to the IOC's already dented credibility – especially given that the 2024 Olympics will be held in a city where most of the spectating crowds will likely support the Ukrainian cause. Appropriating the Olympic arena for its own good would possibly be the best response that Ukraine's sport may give to the IOC's expediency.Leo Goretti is Head of the Italian Foreign Policy Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Editor of The International Spectator.[1] International Olympic Committee, Strict Eligibility Conditions in Place as IOC EB Approves Individual Neutral Athletes (AINs) for the Olympic Games Paris 2024, 8 December 2023, https://olympics.com/ioc/news/strict-eligibility-conditions-in-place-as-ioc-eb-approves-individual-neutral-athletes-ains-for-the-olympic-games-paris-2024.[2] Karolos Grohmann, "Russians, Belarusians to Participate at Paris Olympics as Neutrals – IOC", in Reuters, 8 December 2023, https://www.reuters.com/sports/russian-belarusian-athletes-participate-paris-olympics-neutrals-ioc-2023-12-08.[3] UN General Assembly (UNGA), Solemn Appeal Made by the President of the General Assembly on 20 January 2022 in Connection with the Observance of the Olympic Truce (A/76/648), 6 January 2022, https://undocs.org/A/76/648. See also UN website: UN and the Olympic Truce, https://www.un.org/en/node/139430.[4] Leo Goretti, "The Sporting Sanctions against Russia: Debunking the Myth of Sport's Neutrality", in IAI Papers, No. 22|09 (May 2022), https://www.iai.it/en/node/15324.[5] Leo Goretti and Sofia Mariconti, "Let's Learn Judo with Putin. Sport, Power and Masculinity in 21st-Century Russia", in IAI Papers, No. 23|03 (January 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/16482.[6] Thomas Bach, "There Is No Peace without Solidarity", in IOC Opinions, 28 September 2022, https://olympics.com/ioc/opinion/there-is-no-peace-without-solidarity.[7] Patrick Burke, "History Repeats Itself as Russia Reveals Plans to Launch World Friendship Games in 2024", in Inside the Games, 3 May 2023, https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1136610.[8] UN Special Rapporteurs Alexandra Xanthaki and E. Tendayi Achiume, Information Received Concerning the Decisions Taken by the Executive Committee of the International Olympic Committee Imposing and Recommending Sanctions on Russian and Belarusian Athletes (AL OTH 90/2022), 14 September 2022, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TmSearch/RelCom?code=OTH%2090/2022.[9] Patricia Wiater, "Peaceful and Neutral Games", in Verfassungsblog, 23 March 2023, https://verfassungsblog.de/?p=71508.[10] International Olympic Committee, Following a Request by the 11th Olympic Summit, IOC Issues Recommendations for International Federations and International Sports Event Organisers on the Participation of Athletes with a Russian or Belarusian Passport in International Competitions, 28 March 2023, https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-issues-recommendations-for-international-federations-and-international-sports-event-organisers.[11] Veronika Melkozerova, "Ukraine Bans Its Athletes from Tournaments where They May Face Russians, Belarusians", in Politico, 14 April 2023, https://www.politico.eu/?p=2913453; Owen Lloyd, "Ukraine Path to Paris 2024 Made Easier after Ban Competing against Russians Lifted", in Inside the Games, 27 July 2023, https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1139280.[12] "Ukraine's 2024 Paris Games Boycott Call against Olympic 'Principles': IOC Chief Bach", in France24, 9 February 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230209-ukraine-led-2024-boycott-call-is-against-olympic-principles-ioc-chief-bach-1.[13] Patrick Burke, "Australia Distances Itself from Calls for Russia and Belarus Ban at Paris 2024", in Inside the Games, 11 February 2023, https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1133568; "Zelensky e il 'no' ai russi alle Olimpiadi: il braccio di ferro con il Cio e l'ombra del boicottaggio. Abodi: 'Ne parlo con Meloni'", in La Stampa, 13 February 2023, https://www.lastampa.it/esteri/2023/02/13/news/zelensky_no_alla_russia_ai_giochi_braccio_di_ferro-12641349.[14] Neil Shefferd, "Russian Sports Minister Matytsin Believes Country's Athletes Have Chance of Featuring at Paris 2024", in Inside the Games, 17 July 2023, https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1138995; Geoff Berkeley, "IOC Accuses Governments of 'Double Standards' in Opposition of Russia Return", in Inside the Games, 13 July 2023, https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1138881.[15] Patrick Burke, "Governments 'Deplorable' for Criticism of IOC's Russia Stance, Bach Says", in Inside the Games, 30 March 2023, https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1135378.[16] International Olympic Committee, Strict Eligibility Conditions in Place, cit.[17] Geoff Berkeley, "EJU Rejects Claims of Allowing Pro-War Russian Athletes at European Championships", in Inside the Games, 23 October 2023, https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1141987.[18] Vladyslav Heraskevych, "The IOC Is Rotting", in Twitter, 9 December 2023, https://twitter.com/heraskevych/status/1733260993206141120. See also Graham Dunbar, "Wrestling Body Explains Why It Let Russian Champions Compete at World Champs Despite Pro-War Rally", in AP News, 20 September 2023, https://apnews.com/article/6cd6d8151996b985f067f261398f2f00.
Since the last Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) meeting, the PA has continued to strengthen its institutions, delivering public services and promoting reforms that many existing states struggle with. The quality of its public financial management (PFM) has further improved. Education and health in the West Bank and Gaza (WB&G) are highly developed, comparing favorably to the performance of countries in the region as well as globally. Ultimately, sustainable economic growth in WB&G can only be underpinned by a vibrant private sector. The latter will not rebound significantly while Israeli restrictions on access to natural resources and markets remain in place, and as long as investors are deterred by the increased cost of business associated with the closure regime. Education and health indicators for WB&G are impressive and reflect extensive coverage of the population, but a focus on improving the quality of these services remains warranted. Similarly, education investments take time to mature. While the PA is already implementing an education sector plan that highlights the importance of improving the quality of education, the relevance of graduates' skills remains an area requiring further attention. This report will therefore reflect on recent growth trends but also on the future trade regime and employability of the WB&G labor force.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Alligator has to be the best University Mascot"What is happening in Florida will not stay in Florida." From the AAUP's Report on FloridaThere is no shortage of critical responses to what is happening to higher education in Florida. There is the report from the AAUP cited above, and the podcast I co-host even dedicated an episode to it. In many, but not all of these cases, these responses have dovetailed with DeSantis' political career, focusing on the person, the policy, and the overall strategy. See for the example the great episode of Know Your Enemy. While there is much to be said about that, I watched the following clip below and was struck by its ability to mobilize and tap into existing frustrations against higher education.Leaving aside, at least for a moment, the attack on DEI, There are three prongs to this attack. The first is on tenure. The attack on tenure can be understood as a kind of negative solidarity, in that job security and protection can seem like an egregious excess for an elite class when so many, even those within academia, are subject to absolute precarity and instability. I have been talking about "negative solidarity" for a long time, ten years (and I did not even coin the term), and one of the things that I focus on in my forthcoming book is that negative solidarity has to be understood as a kind of affective constitution of politics. To cite a passage from that book: "Negative solidarity can be understood as a particular affect, indignation at those who are perceived to not work hard enough, are not engaged in real work, or who rely on political power or corruption (these two things are seen as more or less synonymous) to keep their jobs. This affect, this anger, aimed at everyone from those who benefit from the last remnants of social protection to those public employees who still have union protections, has to be seen as both an exclusion and an inclusion. As much as it excludes those who do not work or who are not perceived as working, it does so in the name of a loose collectivity A popular bumper sticker in the US reads, "Keep Working: Millions of Welfare Depend Upon You," defining a particular kind of indignation. The person affixing such a bumper sticker car is not just angry at the person who is supposedly living off of their labor, but, as it addresses, or interpellates, its imagined audience, it draws them together in shared indignation. There is a sense of a "we," a collectivity of "real" workers, "real Americans," an imagined universality albeit a weak one defined by both work and its ethical norm that is being harmed. This is what puts the solidarity in negative solidarity. There is a unity, a community, albeit loosely defined in and through their shared engagement in work, in productive work. Work that is defined through both its physical difficulty, or at least the stoic fortitude it takes to endure it; its economic centrality, or perceived economic centrality; and ethic of individual commitment, rather than collective protections. The solidarity is negative in the sense it both eschews any collectivity, unions are seen as the deviation rather than the expression of this collectivity precisely because they undermine the shared commitment to work that defines it, and in the way that it functions as a strategy. Negative solidarity can only see any improvement, collective bargaining, protection of employment, and so on, as not only partial, and thus some sense corrupt, but also as a deviation of the fundamental ethical basis of work itself, which demands individual strength and fortitude. As much as negative solidarity is aimed at others, at those who are perceived not to work, seeking to discipline those who rely on state spending or those who are protected by union agreements, it ultimately further the attenuation of class struggle, obscuring actual divisions with imagined ones. The attachment to work and independence ultimately undermines its own status in the world, as individual workers are left to fend for themselves."Tenure, the idea of job security supposedly independent of effort seems absolutely antithetical to a world where effort, hard work is supposed, to be the basis of not only continued employment, but one's very existence and worth as a person. There is nothing more out of sync with the contemporary regime of work subject to constant surveillance, evaluation, and examination than the idea of someone continuing to work with no other motivation than their own particular passion and interest. One important difference between the tenured academic and the other figures of the negative solidarity imaginary, such as the welfare queen and lazy school teacher, is that there is an actual injustice here. It is not the one that DeSantis imagines, of tenured faculty as deadweight (although I am sure that happens as well), but the fact that people doing the same job, and probably even more work, are doing it for a fraction of the salary and with no job security or stability. This is worth imagining because the attack on tenure that is starting in Florida, Texas, and other states is an attack on an already divided and demoralized labor force. I cannot really imagine the thousands of adjunct faculty rallying to defend tenure when it already has been effectively eroded for so many (often with tenured faculty doing little to stop this transformation). Moreover, while some people have responded to the attack on tenure in Florida to argue that this will make it difficult to attract talented teachers and researchers, making it ultimately self defeating. I would argue that such an argument overlooks the truly desperate and demoralized state of the academic job market. Many talented researches and teachers are already working for poverty wages at multiple institutions. Some of these people would gladly take jobs in Florida even without the prospect of tenure if those jobs would at least pay for rent, food, and maybe even insurance. Negative solidarity is at its strongest when it is able to mobilize actual grievances and frustrations, attaching them to illusory objects and fictitious goals. The "Keep Working" bumper sticker referenced above is fueled by an actual frustration, the experience of working hard with no real improvement of one's life. It is this sense that something has gone wrong with work that fuels its indignation. It imagines the cause of this condition to be the welfare queen rather than say the CEO, to put it simply, or, more accurately, the structure of capital. It is an inadequate idea in Spinoza's use of the term, reflecting more the imagination and bias of the one using it than anything about the world. Its inadequacy in terms of a grasp of the world does not diffuse its hold on the imagination, and one could argue it is all the more convincing in that it refers to imaginary causes and less to the actual causes and conditions of the world. This becomes even more the case as these figures, the welfare queen, the radical professor corrupting the youth, the lazy school teacher become part of a powerful mythology circulated though pundits and the media. This is what Yves Citton refers to as a mythocracy and, as he argues, these myths and some sense function by acting on and channeling existing frustrations, anger, and indignation. The more these myths circulate, the more they become the common sense that we grasp the world. Case in point people still believe in the "welfare queen" in millions living off of welfare long after the program has become gutted and subject to disciplinary work regimes. Beneath the Boardwalk, The Gators All of this is a rather long preamble to discussing the video above. Two things strike me in DeSantis discussion of his crackdown on higher education: the increasing cost of higher education and its inability to deliver a better job to those who graduate. These are real sources of frustration. Of course neither of these things have much to do with what DeSantis is proposing, but, as with the idea of the "Millions on Welfare" the important matter is how DeSantis is mobilizing actual frustrations towards imaginary targets. Eliminating majors in things like Women and Gender Studies, Black History, or other sorts of Ethnic studies will do little to reduce the cost of tuition. DeSantis invokes the figure of the taxpayer, arguing that the taxpayer should not bear the costs of such niche and unmarketable majors. The taxpayer could be understood as a kind of stand in for the the citizen, but, as theorists such as Wendy Brown have noted, the shift from the political to the economic has a fundamentally anti-democratic function. The taxpayer is a figure of both individual sovereignty and mass conformity. With respect to the former, it is more akin to a consumer than a citizen, as in the often repeated phrase uttered at school boards, teachers, and city halls, "I pay your salary." The citizen gives consent, elects officials and passes laws, but the taxpayer pays the bills and always reserves the right to get its money back. The taxpayer never alienates some of its liberties or claims in exchange for rights, as in a social contract, but demands to be treated as a customer, and the customer is always right. At the same time, however, the taxpayer is a figure of the majority. The taxpayer is a figure of a kind of silent majority, taxpayers only pay for the general good and, in our society, the general good can only take one form, jobs: it can only be private self interest. This is the second claim of DeSantis speech, that such majors are not well positioned to be employable. We could argue about the employability of majors in women studies, ethnic studies, philosophy, etc., Or we could even talk about the fact that the university's role is to prepare people for more than just work, preparing them for political and cultural life. However, both responses miss the point that the university has, at least in the US, been touted for decades as the only solution to declining wages, automation, and globalization, replacing unions, collective action, and legal protections as the path to a "good job." The solution to every problem with work has been "go to college; get a good job." There are many faults to such a slogan. It overlooks the many "good jobs" that do not involve college, as well as the inherent limitations of such an individual solution to getting, acquiring, and protecting good jobs--leaving everyone to compete with everyone else in getting classes, credentials, and other investments in human capital. It also seems wholly inadequate to the changes of work in recent decades. Education cannot contend with the structural forces of deskilling, offshoring, and casualization that have made work more precarious, less financially rewarding, and just worse. Many students work through college only to return to the same service jobs when they graduate; or, as Communique from an Absent Future put it, "We work and we borrow in order to work and to borrow. And the jobs we work toward are the jobs we already have." All of which is to say that DeSantis is drawing on existing frustration and indignation with the university. Rising tuition combined with failures to deliver on social mobility have made many people frustrated at the university system. What DeSantis is offering is targets and directions for that frustration; it does not matter that these targets have little to do with the real problems with the university. In fact one could argue that the targets he picks are all the more effective in that they tap into existing myths about race, professors, and universities. The imagined nature of the targets should not overlook the real problems. College cost and with it college debt have been increasing at exponential rates. Students find themselves massively in debt upon graduation only to go into jobs that might require college degrees, as it becomes the new high school diploma, but do not offer the same class mobility. Thus it would foolish to respond to DeSantis by simply defending the university as it is, defending academic freedom, tenure, and so on. Any defense of the university has to be against both the assaults on freedom and the neoliberal university that makes those assaults possible. What I hear when I listen to speeches like the one above is the beginning of a larger assault on the university that will come to every state not because DeSantis will be President, but because it is fueled by real frustrations, college costs, jobs, uneven labor protections, and imaginary enemies. (In retrospect I should have called this post De te Fabula Narratur part two, emphasizing less the exceptional state of Florida and more the general condition). As this struggle spreads from state to state I fear that a rearguard defense of the university as it exists is just not going to be enough. Any attempt to confront the right's attack on the university is going to have to take on rising costs and also address head on the university's role in the meritocratic mythocracy which claims that the solution to the collective condition of work is individual education and advancement. I realize that these two propositions are nothing less than revolutionary, but it appears that we are living though, once again, the lesson that revolutionary change is the most effective opposition to fascist creep (and fascist creeps). I decided to illustrate this post with pictures of Alligators from my recent trip to Florida
"If there was ever a doubt about just how American Mr. Obama is, Sunday's raid eliminates it better than any long-form birth certificate. This was his finest hour." Bret Stephens, the Wall Street Journal Late at night on Sunday May 1st President Obama announced to the nation that Osama Bin Laden had been found and killed by a US Navy Special Operations team. The Navy SEAL team Six, as it is known here, landed two helicopters inside a walled three-story compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where years of painstakingly gathered intelligence had led authorities to believe there was a high chance the Al Qaeda leader may be hiding. This may well have been the largest, most successful intelligence operation in US history; the President acted boldly and decisively and for that he received accolades from both sides of the political divide. Coming as it did just a month after the President launched his re-election campaign, this victory immediately boosted his approval rate by eleven points, according to surveys.Even if the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda has not yet been accomplished, this was a huge milestone and the closing of a chapter that started ten years ago when the hunt for Osama Bin Laden was launched by the Bush administration. Last week's operation resulted in the largest trove of data ever found on Al Qaeda, including information on immediate threats being planned, location and structure of its leadership, and scores of data that will help piece together a deeper understanding of their long-term tactics, techniques and procedures.Disposing of such a reviled figure who, for over ten years had ordered the killing of innocent civilians around the world, is undoubtedly a great blow both symbolic and real, to Al Qaeda, a decentralized movement whose members are tied together mainly by feelings, emotions and mythology. But does it sound the death knell for the organization? What are its short and long term implications? Al Qaeda has proven to be quite resilient, but is it still spreading and growing? More importantly, how relevant is it in the face of the Arab Spring moving throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa?All these questions need to be pondered carefully, since they have deep implications for US foreign policy in the region, for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for its difficult and troubled relation with Pakistan. This unexpected win will lead to a comprehensive reassessment of US military presence in the area, its strategies of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and its alliance with Pakistan.American reaction to Osama Bin Laden's death was one of noisy, overt celebration in New York and DC, and of relief and jubilation in the rest of the country. It was indeed the reverse of the deep shock, terror and bereavement of 9-11, but both instances had one common denominator: there was a sense of collective emotion, of a long-forgotten and now recovered national unity. However, this did not last long as incipient criticism and second-guessing started 24 hours later over Bin Laden's burial at sea and the decision by the administration not to show pictures of his death. It came from both sides of the ideological spectrum and, in some cases, it was bolstered by strong arguments. For example Alan Dershowitz, the Harvard Law professor, considered the burial at sea a "willful destruction of evidence that may arise suspicions that there was something to hide." Others used the occasion to stir up doubts and demanded pictures to certify Bin Laden's death, but then again, these are not to be taken seriously sine they were the same groups that had to be shown a long version of the President's birth certificate as evidence he was American. A second criticism coming mainly from some Neo-conservatives, was the administration's failure to recognize publicly that the intelligence gathering that led to the finding and killing of Bin Laden was a vindication of the "enhanced interrogation techniques" (read: water boarding) used by the Bush administration in foreign detention centers and at Guantánamo, which Obama had consistently and very publicly condemned during the 2008 campaign and into his years in office.To the first, members of the administration responded that the point was to dispose of his body in a respectful manner, not because he deserved it but to deny a source of friction with other Muslims and to deprive his followers with a shrine and an opportunity to exploit him as an iconic martyr. A similar argument was used to explain the decision not to release the pictures: the President wants to avoid ostentatious displays of triumphalism that may come back to haunt him. His sobriety and restraint further reinforce the boldness of his decision and his steadfast determination to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat" Al Qaeda and not be distracted from his goal by premature claims of "mission accomplished".To the second claim, the White House responded that the success of the operation is far from a vindication of such unconstitutional techniques, since it was the result of the hard work of professionals over time and across two administrations, who integrated thousands of small pieces of intelligence gathering coming from human and technological sources into one gigantic puzzle, and that no one single piece led the US to Bin Laden. It took all the resources only the US can muster, from military bases to networks of human intelligence, to electronic eavesdropping, to specially trained forces, to locate and kill one hidden individual in a foreign country, and then match his DNA in an aircraft carrier before disposing of the corpse. But it also took a courageous American president to make such a risky call, namely, authorizing a covert operation deep into Pakistani territory based on circumstantial evidence at best, and without alerting the Pakistani authorities about it. Fortunately, wide recognition was given to the President's courage and many on the Right called it "Obama's Finest Hour". Both former President Bush and his prickly vice-president Cheney congratulated Obama and gave him full credit.A more productive conversation that has already started in academic and diplomatic circles is how relevant Bin Laden's death is for the Arab world. If he had died eight years ago, says one French scholar, he would have instantaneously become a martyr in the Arab street, an icon of anti-Western sentiment. However, in 2011, he had receded into the back of the consciousness of young Arabs for several reasons. First, because he had been in hiding for so long that his presence in the media had been noticeably diminished: out of sight, out of mind. Time spent out of the limelight erases mystiques and cools down emotions. Secondly because many saw him as the culprit for bringing the United States into Iraq and Afghanistan, which in turn gave an excuse for authoritarian regimes in the region to become even more repressive and extend their time in power. In Iraq, local Sunnis blame Al Qaeda for bringing the Shiites to power and expanding the influence of Iran in their country. Also, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had increasingly lost the allegiance of many Muslims around the world for their indiscriminate bombings of hospitals, mosques and shrines and the killings of non-combatant Muslims in Baghdad, Basra and Amman (even if many were Shiite, the slaughter of innocent women and children caused revulsion in these populations).More importantly, the wave of pluralistic revolutions sweeping the Middle East and North Africa has rendered Al Qaeda irrelevant. There is an emerging sense of strong national identities, whereby the masses are thinking of themselves first as Egyptians, Tunisians or Libyans, with ethnicity and religion taking a secondary role. Indeed, Nasser's Pan-Arabism died the 1960sm, and the dream of a Caliphate "extending Islamic rule from Indonesia to Spain", which Bin Laden proposed as Al Qaeda's ultimate goal is no longer an interesting proposition to the extremely young populations of the region, many of whom have access to the new social media in the Internet, and who crave freedom and modernity more than anything else. The "Arab Spring" may spell the end of Al Qaeda's political aspirations for the region: the Turkish model of a secular, modern state with an overwhelmingly Islamic population and a pluralistic party system is far more appealing than the pan-Islamic caliphate of the Prophet's era. In the words of Professor Fouad Ajami, "It is risky to say, but Arabs appear to have wearied of violence…It was Bin Laden's deserved fate to be struck down when an entirely different Arab world was struggling to be born."Time and treasure spent in a ten-year war have also changed perspectives in America, especially for the younger generations. There is an on-going unofficial revision of the Bush doctrine of invading whole countries "that harbor, train or fund terrorists" in favor of narrower, more focused actions against the terrorists themselves. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken their toll on the American military as far as recruitment and resources. The main concern of voters is the American economy, especially unemployment and the ever-expanding national debt. A hundred and forty thousand American and NATO troops are involved in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, with no endgame in sight. Killings of Americans by despondent Afghan soldiers and other groups whose "hearts and minds" the US is supposed to win, occupy the headlines daily. Counter-terrorism increasingly seems to be a much more appealing and productive strategy. Expressing this widely-held sentiment, Senator Kerry recently declared: "There is no possible victory to be had in Afghanistan".Even though President Obama called it a war of necessity and has invested deeply in it, this is no longer a popular war: two-thirds of the American electorate is against it. Therefore, there will be pressure on President Obama to accelerate the phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, and complete it before the set deadline of 2014. He is a rational decision-maker who does not easily cave under pressure, but the 2012 election is likely to enter into his calculations. As a champion of counter-terrorism and opposing counter-insurgency from early on, Vice-president Biden might still be vindicated in his wisdom. When Obama opted for the surge in Afghanistan two years ago, he overruled Biden and sided with the military. Will he change his mind and speed up the withdrawal now? The killing of Bin Laden certainly gives him an opening to change his initial timetable. "Al Qaeda is no longer there, and the Taliban must be beaten by Afghans themselves", says Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council of Foreign Relations.Finally, the fact that Pakistan has proved to be an unreliable partner in the war against terrorism is also putting pressure on the President to review his Afghan policy. The alliance is frayed; Pakistan is giving sanctuary to violent militants of all sorts, and another high Al Qaeda operative now in American custody, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, was also found in Pakistan (Rawalpindi). Indeed, by the rationale of the Bush doctrine, the US should be invading Pakistan next. The White House says they have no evidence that there was any "foreknowledge" by the Pakistani leadership that Bin Laden was holed up in a one-million-dollar compound, in a military town, only 30 miles away from Islamabad. Pakistan will conduct its "own investigation" and will have to prove itself a worthy ally, for example, by sharing information gleaned from Bin Laden's three wives and several children now held under Pakistani custody. On the other hand, veteran security experts retort, more terrorists have been arrested by the Pakistani authorities since 2001 than anywhere else in the world. In this case, was it incompetence or complicity? Pakistan is a very complex country, where the military are an autonomous force above civilian rule, and they also control the Intelligence Services (ISI). It is a house divided against itself. It harbors numerous militant groups, and goes after some but not others. It hedges its bets this way so as not to lose influence and power in the region, for example by supporting the Taliban and Haqqani networks fighting to seize power in Afghanistan, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba organization against India in Kashmir. Pakistan's foreign and national security policy is built around its obsession with India, its most vilified enemy and against which it has fought several wars. It is clear now that ISI gave sophisticated support to the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2009. Pakistan needs a friendly government in Afghanistan so that it can maintain its "strategic depth" vis à vis India. Armed with over a hundred nuclear weapons and with some control over this wide array of militant groups, Pakistan is pivotal in the stability of South Asia. Those are the two main reasons why the US-Pakistani relationship survived after the Cold War ended. Because of the weakness and corruption of civilian governments, past and present, the US has preferred to engage with the military, who control the nuclear arsenal, and has made them the recipient of most US aid (indeed, by the end of this year alone the Pakistani military will have received $3 billion from the US). But this may be about to change if Pakistan rejects the US request to be in charge of the internal investigation on whether Bin Laden was given sanctuary, and if so, by whom.Now that its main leader has been killed, and in spite of its virtual irrelevance, Al Qaeda is likely to undergo an internal struggle to determine its future. The mystique of its international role has already somewhat dissipated and the different groups in the network are shifting their focus to their national agendas. Indeed, this has already been the case in Egypt, where after days of ominous silence on the Tahrir Square Revolution, Al Qaeda's second in command, Egyptian-born Al-Zwahiri injected himself in the process by supporting the leader of an Islamist party that wants post-Mubarak Egypt to adopt Sharia law. But his attempt did not resonate with the young revolutionaries, most of which want a pluralistic society and are much more concerned with jobs and government accountability than with religious utopia. However, revolutions are just the beginning of a long process, transition periods are by definition unstable, and post-revolutionary regimes have historically been highjacked by extremists. So one can only be cautiously optimistic about what will come next, but it appears as if the Middle East and the Arab world are moving on and beginning to spell the end of Al Qaeda's aspirations. Bin Laden's demise is the appropriate end of this chapter in the region's history.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
"This sweltering summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning…I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal…"And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true."Martin Luther King Jr." I have a dream speech" (March on Washington, August 28, 1963)On Wednesday August 27th, at the Pepsi Center in Denver, Colorado, before a crowd of 20,000, Barack Obama became the first biracial man to be officially nominated as presidential candidate by a major party. When the turn came for the delegates from the state of New York to vote, Obama had received 1,549 and Hillary Rodham-Clinton 231. Hillary then made a motion to suspend the roll call vote and select him by acclamation:"With eyes firmly fixed on the future in the spirit of unity, with the goal of victory, with faith in our party and country, let's declare together in one voice, right here and right now, that Barack Obama is our candidate and he will be our president."The night before, Hillary had made a gracious and persuasive speech in support of Obama, calling on her supporters to vote for the man that would bring health care to all Americans and restore the country's standing in the world, thus tacitly acknowledging that their platforms are one and the same. She had also reminded the audience that the (presidential) "glass ceiling now had 18 million cracks", a reference at the number of votes she received and a reminder of how close women had come this time around to win the Presidency, a white male domain until now. That was her way to give comfort to her female supporters, some of which have avowed to vote for McCain in the Fall. Then on Wednesday night it came up to Bill Clinton to put the proverbial final nail in the coffin of the bitter conflict that had bitterly divided the party up to then. He did it with a masterful, authoritative speech, in which he reassured the audience that Obama was just as ready for the Presidency as he himself had been in 1992. The clarity of his ideas and the perfect delivery reminded us all of why he will go down as one of the greatest Presidents in this country's History.Already by Wednesday night there was a sense of fulfillment and relief, since the unification of the Democratic Party was perceived by most Democrats as the Convention's main objective. The party had been divided since the 1970s, when the moderate, blue collar workers and Southerners became disgruntled with McGovern's socially liberal platform and voted for Nixon. Ten years later they would become known as the Reagan democrats, and the label would stick. Bill Clinton was able to bring them all back to the fold by focused policies and his ability to connect both with white and black blue-collar workers. But in the last eight years the divisions have reappeared, as it became plain during the primary: Obama appeals strongly to the black community and to white college educated youth but has been unable to extend that appeal to older women and white workers. That is why Hillary got 18 million votes. That is also why Obama's choice of Vice President is a solid one. Senator Joseph Biden, with his Catholic, blue-collar background, his toughness and his 30 years of experience in the Senate, and his wisdom and knowledge of foreign affairs, has added weight and credibility to the ticket. The expectation is that this formula will reunite the fractured party once again.This has been a historic Convention in more ways than one: the first African-American to win the nomination, the first woman to come so close to winning it, the passing of the torch to a new generation of Americans by Ted Kennedy, the brilliant speech by Bill Clinton which by all measures restores his stature within the party. But more than anything else, this Convention is historic because, as Clinton said, Barack Obama is "the twenty first century incarnation of the American Dream", and a reaffirmation of Ted Kennedy's proclamation on the first day of the Convention, that "the Dream Lives on" in Obama.The climax came on Thursday night with Obama's long awaited acceptance speech at the closing of the Convention. It was a carefully choreographed affair, overlaid with symbolism. Delivered before a crowd of 75,000 at the INVESCO open-air stadium at Mile High, against a background evoking the pillars of the Lincoln Memorial, it was watched by a TV audience of around 40 million and ended with fireworks across the Colorado sky. Barack Obama is also the first candidate since John F Kennedy to choose an open-to-the public venue to deliver his acceptance speech. There were some risks to this venue, from security to climactic. But more than anything else, his greatest challenge on this historic night was to communicate to his huge audience and the American nation at large, that he is not just a great orator but that he understands their woes and has the fortitude to fight for them; that he is ready to battle ahead and bring about the change he so brilliantly articulates in his speeches, and that this young man standing before them, half preacher, half professor, is also a practical politician, able to back his ideas with concrete and feasible plans. As Richard Haas says in his latest article on the Foreign Affairs Journal, the next president must confront "the reality of the country's expectations" and he must do so by "identifying meaningful yet achievable goals and lay them out before the nation…and then achieve them through leadership skills that will be tested by pressures unimaginable to anyone who has not held he job." Obama passed this difficult test on the first two requirements. The third is awaiting him, if elected in November.By most accounts, the speech was an overwhelming success. Obama presented a complete blueprint on how he will govern if elected. He first listed all the issues Americans are dissatisfied with, starting with the economy and ending with Iraq. He then outlined his specific policies to solve these problems. He subsequently gave examples of how McCain is closely aligned with George W. Bush's failed policies, thus demolishing his opponent's claims of independence from the incumbent. Finally, he presented himself as open-minded and pragmatic, willing to find middle ground on the so-called culture wars issues (gays, guns, abortion) that are frequently framed as false choices to elicit emotions, not rationality, from the part of the voters. He re-introduced himself to the public as a common man, with personal accounts of his childhood as son of a single mother, who raised him with the help of her parents and at times had to use food stamps to take care of him; of his admiration for his grandfather, a WWII veteran who went to college on the GI bill and taught him hard work, pride and love of country. Looking straight into the cameras, he humanized his message and connected with people. He was able to turn the tables on John McCain, who he presented as elitist, out of touch and thus, less trustworthy. His move to the middle ground on cultural issues ("We can withhold the Second Amendment and still get AK 47s out of the hands of criminals") and his calls for greater civic and parental responsibility ("Government cannot replace parents in educating their children…") gave consistency to his claim of post-partisanship.By asserting that America is the best hope for the world, he rejected the notion that only Republicans are patriotic ("Democrats can own that, too."). He also defied the fallacy that Democrats are weak on foreign policy ("We are the party of FDR and JFK, so don't tell us Democrats that we cannot defend the country…and restore the moral standing for all who fight for freedom."). And he did all this not so much with the soaring rhetoric of his earlier speeches, but with a tone of strength and defiance. He took the fight to John Mc Cain, promising to debate him not on petty issues but on who has the "judgment and the temperament" to be Commander-in-Chief. He thereby injected the question of McCain's short temper into the Fall campaign. The speech ended with an evocation of Martin Luther King's I have a dream speech delivered on this same day forty-five years ago at the Lincoln Memorial, and a pledge to once more "March forward together."Memories of the Democratic National Conventions and the momentum created by this brilliant speech were not, however, destined to linger for long in the American psyche. They were shattered by two events, one man-made, one natural. On Friday, August 29th, John McCain made an announcement that caused quite a stir in the media and public alike. He chose as his Vice president Mrs. Sarah Palin, the little-known first-term female governor of Alaska, a no exceptions pro-lifer who believes that Creationism should be taught in the schools alongside Evolution, and whose thin political résumé is startling to most observers. After they recovered from the initial shock, some pundits were able to articulate the intriguing yet-to be-answered question: was this the brilliant decision of a crafty tactician or the insane choice of an impulsive, overly ambitious politician? Is this a masterful stroke or a risky gamble? Only time will tell.That same day, Mrs. Palin had to share the limelight with Gustav, an impervious hurricane that was making its way toward the Gulf Coast at vertiginous speed and strength. Plans for the Republican National Convention to start on Monday had to be scrapped, while McCain and Palin made their way to Mississippi, turning this into an opportunity to distance themselves early on from Bush's fiasco during hurricane Katrina two years ago. Most Convention events were suspended for Monday and Tuesday and replaced by a bare-bones schedule of committee meetings, while the crucial events (vice-presidential speech and nomination vote) start this Wednesday and culminate Thursday with McCain's acceptance speech. This could turn out to be a blessing in disguise for Republicans. Courtesy of Gustav, now downgraded to a grade one hurricane, speeches by Bush and Cheney were cancelled. The President, who hastily made his way to New Orleans, may still speak for a short time via satellite on Wednesday, which will give him an opportunity to amend the terrible legacy of Katrina by replacing those images in the minds of the public with a much improved disaster relief response to Gustav.Palin is expected to give a good speech at the Convention. As a young political reformer who has fought corruption in her home state, she has energized the campaign. As a social conservative with deep convictions against abortion she has galvanized the conservative Evangelical base of the party. She is attractive and warm, and connects easily with the public, one of the few advantages of her political experience in Alaska, a sparsely populated state that requires extensive face-to-face contact with voters. An active hunter and life-long member of the NRA, she may be able to connect with the kind of independent blue-collar and rural voters that Obama has not been able to appeal to. But Palin has never been under the extreme national scrutiny that the next few months will bring, nor has she had to answer any unscripted questions about a wide variety of topics from the often vicious national press. Mc Cain picked her over men with extensive experience in economic matters (Mitt Romney) and in homeland security (Tom Ridge), both of whom had been extensively vetted. His choice of Palin as running mate is even more surprising if we consider that his main campaign theme against Obama was the latter's lack of executive experience. In contrast with Palin, Obama has had his trial-by-fire in the primary debates and through 18 months of campaigning. He has run against formidable candidates in the Primary, has been repeatedly tested by the media, and has emerged as the choice of Democratic voters. Palin, on the other hand, has one year of executive experience and a gaping lack of foreign policy knowledge. She is the choice of one man, John McCain, who has only met her twice. What will be the public's perception of Palin's credibility and readiness to step in as President should something happen to McCain? Did McCain, always the maverick, abdicate in his duty to the people by not choosing someone manifestly ready for the presidency? We may have some answers to these questions in a week or two.For those that expect Hillary's women to flock to the Republican side just because of McCain's Vice-presidential pick, think again. If there is one principle those women activists care about is the protection of the Roe v Wade Supreme Court decision, so they would be loath to vote for a strongly anti-abortion candidate such as Palin. Nevertheless, Obama does need to worry about the white blue-collar workers' vote. He has been consistently ahead in the polls but the margin has narrowed somewhat. He is now 6 percentage points ahead in the polls (47% to 41%) but so far has been unable to break the 50% barrier. Given the byzantine workings of the Electoral College in a presidential election, even a sliver of independents and Reagan democrats here and there (especially in Ohio, Pennsylvania and Michigan) can win this election for McCain. The long-awaited Autumn of Freedom would then become for many, the Winter of Discontent.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
