Suchergebnisse

Lebensmittelverluste sind größtenteils unbeabsichtigt und werden unter anderem durch Ineffizienz im Lebensmittelsystem verursacht (vgl. FAO 2017, S. 4). Ein großer Anteil des Lebensmittelabfalls entsteht bei Verbraucher*innen in Privathaushalten. Das sorgt für einen Anteil von etwa einem Drittel an Lebensmitteln, die vom Anbau beziehungsweise der Schlachtung bis zu unseren Tellern verlorengehen. In Deutschland sind das ungefähr elf Millionen Tonnen verschwendete Lebensmittel pro Jahr (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2023b). Welche Auswirkungen hat das und was wird dagegen getan?In diesem Blogbeitrag wird es um die komplexen Ursachen der Lebensmittelverschwendung gehen, genauso wie um die Auswirkungen, die die Lebensmittelverluste sowohl auf die Umwelt als auch auf die Gesellschaft haben. Es soll dargestellt werden, welche Strategien Deutschland beschlossen hat, um die Lebensmittelverschwendung zu verringern. Die Initiative "Zu gut für die Tonne" (https://www.zugutfuerdietonne.de) kann ein Tipp für alle Blogleser*innen sein. Welchen Beitrag die Umweltbildung in der Schule leisten sollte, soll als letztes kurz angeschnitten werden.In diesem Blogbeitrag sollen Lebensmittel nach der Definition der Europäischen Verordnung (EG) Nr. 178/2002 verstanden werden. Laut dieser sind Lebensmittel"alle Stoffe oder Erzeugnisse, die dazu bestimmt sind oder von denen nach vernünftigem Ermessen erwartet werden kann, dass sie in verarbeitetem, teilweise verarbeitetem oder unverarbeitetem Zustand von Menschen aufgenommen werden" (Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2019).Dazu zählen auch alle Stoffe, die bei der Produktion zugesetzt werden. Tiere und Pflanzen sind erst nach der Schlachtung bzw. Ernte Lebensmittel (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2019).Die FAO (vgl. 2011, S. 2) definiert Lebensmittelverluste als Abnahme der essbaren Lebensmittelmasse in dem Teil der Lieferkette, der speziell zu essbaren Lebensmitteln für den menschlichen Verzehr führt. Diese treten in Produktions-, Ernte-, Nachernte- und Verarbeitungsstufen der Lebensmittelversorgungskette auf. Als Lebensmittelverschwendung werden Lebensmittelverluste bezeichnet, die am Ende der Lebensmittelkette auftreten und für die Händler und Verbraucher verantwortlich sind (vgl. FAO 2011, S. 2).In einer weiteren Definition wird hinzugefügt, dass Lebensmittelverluste entlang der gesamten Versorgungskette auftreten, neben Produktions-, (Nach-)Ernte- und Verarbeitungsstufen betrifft das demnach auch Lagerung und Transport. Lebensmittelverluste oder -verschwendung werden stets als Abnahme der Menge und/oder Qualität von Lebensmitteln gesehen, die für den menschlichen Verzehr bestimmt waren (vgl. FAO 2017, S. 4).Ursachen der LebensmittelverschwendungLebensmittelverschwendung findet an allen Stellen der Lebensmittelwertschöpfungskette (auch Lebensmittelversorgungskette) statt (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2021). Diese umfasst nach dem Bundeszentrum für Ernährung (vgl. 2023) verschiedene Stufen. Die erste Stufe besteht aus der Produktion und der Erzeugung und beinhaltet Agrarproduktion und Viehzucht. Die zweite Stufe betrifft die Weiterverarbeitung, demnach die Herstellung der Lebensmittel. Die dritte Stufe, Handel und Vermarktung, betrifft den Groß- und Einzelhandel. Als letztes folgt der finale Konsum, sowohl im Bewirtungssektor als auch in den Privathaushalten. Lebensmittelverluste entstehen nicht nur in den Stufen der Versorgungskette, sondern gerade auch bei Transport und Lagerung zwischen und nach den einzelnen Stufen (vgl. Bundeszentrum für Ernährung 2023).Durch die globale Vernetzung in den letzten Jahrzehnten wurde auch der Ernährungssektor vernetzt. Strukturelle Veränderungen sowie der gesellschaftliche Wandel haben die Lebensmittelversorgungskette demnach verlängert (vgl. FAO 2009, S. 18 f.).Weltweit gehen durch die verschiedenen Stufen der Lebensmittelwertschöpfungskette ein Drittel der produzierten Lebensmittel verloren. Nach Schätzungen der Welternährungsorganisation sind das jedes Jahr 1,3 Milliarden Tonnen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2021). Dafür verantwortlich sind vor allem Industrie, Handel, Großverbraucher und Privathaushalte. Letztere verursachen den größten Anteil an Müll. Laut Eyerund/ Neligan (vgl. 2017, S. 2) wirft jede*r Bundesbürger*in im Jahr rund 82 kg Nahrungsmittel in den Müll, davon wäre ein großer Teil, zum Beispiel Speisereste, vermeidbar. Ein kleiner Teil, zum Beispiel Knochen und Bananenschalen, müssen tatsächlich entsorgt werden.Seit ungefähr 1870 ist die Herstellung von Lebensmitteln stärker wissensbasiert und Fortschritte ermöglichen, dass aus wenigen Rohstoffen eine große Vielfalt an Lebensmitteln produziert werden kann (vgl. Hamatschek 2021, S. 351). Allerdings sorgen eine weniger effiziente Ernte sowie neue Transport-, Lagerungs- und Verarbeitungstechniken für größere Verluste. Dazu gehören Ernteverluste, Überproduktion auf dem Feld und Verluste in der Produktion, weil beispielsweise fehlerhaft geplant wurde oder es technische Störungen gab (vgl. Hamatschek 2021, S. 356f.).Die ersten Verluste entstehen in der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion, wenn beispielsweise das Obst und Gemüse nicht den Standards entspricht, von Schädlingen befallen oder auf andere Art und Weise verunreinigt ist. In der Verarbeitung entstehen Abfälle, weil nur Teile eines Lebensmittels gebraucht werden können oder maschinell bedingt Reste entstehen. Auch Etikettierungsfehler können dazu führen, dass Lebensmittel ganz aussortiert werden müssen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2020).Im Groß- und Einzelhandel kann es passieren, dass Bestellmengen nicht der Nachfrage entsprechen oder die Ware falsch gelagert und gekühlt wurde. Auch bei fehlerhaften Logistikprozessen kann es zu unnötigem Abfall kommen. Wenn Lebensmittel zu lange gelagert wurden und überreif sind beziehungsweise das Mindesthaltbarkeitsdatum abgelaufen ist, kann es auch so zu Lebensmittelverschwendung kommen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2020).In der sogenannten Außer-Haus-Verpflegung, mit welcher die Gemeinschaftsverpflegung in Betriebskantinen, Schulen, Kindergärten oder der Gastronomie gemeint ist, kommt es zu Lebensmittelverschwendung durch eine schwankende Nachfrage, zu großen Portionsgrößen oder fehlerhaften Einschätzungen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2020).Haushalte sind für zwei Drittel der Abfallmenge verantwortlich. Häufige Gründe für die hohe Lebensmittelverschwendung in Privathaushalten sind unüberlegte Einkäufe, zu große Portionspackungen im Supermarkt, ein falsches Verständnis für das Mindesthaltbarkeitsdatum oder unzureichendes Wissen über die richtige Lagerung von Lebensmitteln (vgl. Hamatschek 2021, S. 356f.). Dazu kommen in der Regel andere individuelle Gründe, die sehr vielfältig sein können (vgl. Universität Stuttgart/ Institut für Siedlungswasserabbau, Wassergüte- und Abfallwirtschaft 2012, S. 216) und von den Lebensumständen, der Lebensweise der Haushalte und bestimmten Situationen abhängig sind (vgl. ebda., S. 219).Des Weiteren liegt bei der Ermittlung von Ursachen der Lebensmittelverschwendung eine besondere Schwierigkeit vor. Die Haushalte müssen mitmachen und Gründe für ihren Lebensmittelabfall angeben. Dazu müssen sie in der Lage sein, den Grund anzugeben und diesen auch angeben zu wollen, denn das Ergebnis wird verfälscht, wenn Personen anfangen, im Sinne sozialer Erwünschtheit zu antworten (vgl. ebda., S. 219).Es ließ sich feststellen, dass Personen, die Lebensmittelknappheit im Zweiten Weltkrieg erlebt haben, deutlich weniger Lebensmittel verschwenden als heutige Generationen (vgl. Eyerund/ Neligan 2017, S. 3). Neben individuellen Gründen kommen außerdem gesellschaftliche Ursachen hinzu. Die heutige westliche Welt lebt in einer Konsum-, Überfluss- und Wegwerfgesellschaft, welche das Wegwerfen von Lebensmitteln begünstigt.In den Supermärkten herrscht ein Überangebot an Lebensmitteln. Durch eine zunehmende Mobilisierung und Flexibilisierung der Gesellschaft sind die meisten Lebensmittel immer vorhanden. Dazu kommen soziographische Veränderung wie die Zunahme an Ein-Personen-Haushalten oder die Verstädterung (vgl. Universität Stuttgart/ Institut für Siedlungswasserabbau, Wassergüte- und Abfallwirtschaft 2012, S. 216).Durch die Zunahme des ökonomischen Wohlstands ist auch der Konsum von Fleisch seit Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts gestiegen (vgl. Dräger de Teran 2013, S. 11). Soziale Faktoren bestimmen die gesellschaftlich-kulturellen Essgewohnheiten. Die Industrialisierung sorgte für eine Entfremdung von Nahrungsmitteln durch die Nahrungsmittelproduktion, die immer komplexer wurde. Vor allem bei den Menschen, die keine Lebensmittelknappheit erlebt haben, führte das zu einer verminderten Wertschätzung der Lebensmittel, weil die Herkunft der Lebensmittel zunehmend unbekannt wurde (vgl. Universität Stuttgart/ Institut für Siedlungswasserabbau, Wassergüte- und Abfallwirtschaft 2012, S. 217).AuswirkungenAuf die UmweltJährlich wird für verschwendete Lebensmittel eine Fläche bearbeitet und geerntet, die so groß ist wie Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Von diesen 2,4 Millionen Hektar, die gespart werden könnten, werden 1,4 Millionen Hektar für die Produktion von tierischen Produkten benötigt (vgl. Dräger de Teran 2013, S. 13). Würden alle Lebensmittel gegessen werden, die auch hergestellt wurden, würde demnach eine Fläche von 2,4 Millionen Hektar für andere Zwecke frei werden. Diese Fläche könnte beispielsweise als Grünfläche genutzt werden und beim Kampf gegen den Verlust der Biodiversität helfen (vgl. Noleppa 2012, S. 7).Von den jährlich rund 6,5 Millionen Tonnen Lebensmittelabfall aus Privathaushalten in Deutschland sind ungefähr ein Drittel Obst und Gemüse, am zweithäufigsten werden Speisereste weggeworfen und am dritthäufigsten Brot und Backwaren. Ein kleiner Teil ist unvermeidbar (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2023c). Im Pro-Kopf-Vergleich der Lebensmittelverschwendung der EU liegt Deutschland mit seinem Lebensmittelabfall im EU-Durchschnitt, genauso wie Frankreich oder Österreich (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2020).Folgeprobleme dieser Lebensmittelverschwendung werden seit Jahrzehnten immer größer. Dazu gehört beispielsweise die Erzeugung von Treibhausgasemissionen (vgl. Brunner 2009, S. 33). Noleppa (vgl. 2012, S. 25) unterscheidet zwischen direkten Treibhausgasemissionen von Lebensmitteln, die während der Lebensmittelwertschöpfungskette zu Stande kommen, und indirekten Treibhausgasemissionen, die aus Landnutzungsänderungen entstehen.CO2-Emissionen bilden sich bei der Erzeugung, Produktion und Weiterverarbeitung von Lebensmitteln, während Lachgas-Emissionen durch anorganische und organische Stickstoffdüngung gebildet werden. Methan-Emissionen sind die Folge einer Wiederkäuerverdauung sowie der Nutzung von organischem Dünger und Reisanbau (vgl. Dräger de Teran 2013, S. 14). In internationalen Inventaren und unterschiedlichen Standards werden die indirekten Emissionen im Vergleich zu den direkten Emissionen allerdings häufig nicht berücksichtigt.Von 2009 bis 2010 wurde ein leichter Anstieg der Lebensmittelnutzung der Deutschen von 667 kg auf 677 kg verzeichnet. Dieser gering wirkende Anstieg sorgte allerdings für einen Mehrausstoß an indirekten Emissionen von ungefähr 40 Millionen Tonnen. Da die landwirtschaftliche Nutzfläche Deutschlands irgendwann seine Grenze erreicht hat, müssen zusätzlich Flächen im Ausland in Anspruch genommen werden (vgl. Dräger de Teran 2013, S. 14).Es wird ein weiteres Problem des hohen Lebensmittelverbrauchs sichtbar: die Flächennutzung. Die von Deutschland in anderen, meist ärmeren Ländern genutzten Flächen fehlen anschließend beim Anbau von Nahrungsmitteln für die Ernährung der einheimischen Bevölkerung (vgl. Verbraucherzentrale 2022). Um diese ethische Problemsituation soll es weiter unten gehen.Des Weiteren sorgen eine hohe Materialnutzung, ein hoher Energieverbrauch, Bodenkontamination und eine Reduktion der Artenvielfalt für Umweltproblematiken aufgrund der Lebensmittelherstellung (vgl. Brunner 2009, S. 33). Laut Brunner (vgl. 2009, S. 34) hat besonders die Industrialisierung die Landwirtschaft produktiv gemacht, wodurch die oben genannten Umweltproblematiken gestiegen sind, besonders die schädigenden Emissionen."Seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg hat sich die moderne Landwirt­schaft vom Energielieferanten zum Energieverbraucher entwickelt" (Brunner 2009, S. 34).Nach Angaben der OECD führen energieintensive Produkte, wie zum Beispiel Fertigmahlzeiten und der Konsum von tierischen Lebensmitteln, insbesondere Fleisch, zu höheren Umweltbelastungen. Deshalb lässt sich sagen, dass die Konsument*innen durch ihr Nachfrageverhalten einen Einfluss haben, jede*r Bürger*in entscheidet selbst, was gekauft und gegessen wird (vgl. Brunner 2009, S. 34). Ein Beispiel dafür wäre der Vergleich zwischen dem Kauf einer Tomate aus der eigenen Region, welche weniger Umweltschäden verursacht und dem Kauf eines abgepackten Tomatensalats, der höhere Emissionen mit sich bringt. Die Lebensmittelversorgungskette sorgt nicht nur für Umweltbelastungen, sondern hat auch Auswirkungen auf die Menschheit, was im Folgenden gezeigt werden soll.Auf den MenschenDer Weltagrarbericht (IAASTD) hat 2009 durch das Menschenrecht auf Nahrung gefordert, dass kein Mensch mangelernährt sein darf. Laut Hamatschek (vgl. 2021, S. 355) wird damit Realität und Anspruch gegenübergestellt. Der globale Welthunger-Index (WHI)-Wert von 2022 zeigt, dass die Fortschritte gegen die Hungersnot stagnieren. Im Jahr 2021 ist die Zahl der chronisch Hungerleidenden auf fast 828 Millionen gestiegen, die Zahl der akut Hungernden lag bei ungefähr 192 Millionen (vgl. Von Grebmer et al. 2022, S. 3).Ursachen für diese dramatische Situation sind die "strukturelle Ungleichheit und Macht-Asymmetrien im Ernährungssystem" (vgl. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. 2022). Aufgrund globaler Krisen und fehlendem politischem Willen soll sich die Hungersnot laut der Deutschen Welthungerhilfe e.V. (vgl. 2022) noch weiter verstärken. Die COVID-19-Pandemie hat die Problematik bereits verstärkt (vgl. Möhle 2023, S. 87). Das ethische Problem zeigt: die Weltproduktion von Lebensmittel reicht theoretisch, um die Menschheit zu ernähren, wenn Lebensmittel fair verteilt und weniger verschwendet werden würden (vgl. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. 2022).Nicht nur die Hungersnot ist ein Problem, sondern auch soziale, ökonomische und gesundheitliche Folgen des Ernährungssystems. Beispiele dafür sind die Konzentration der Marktmacht in den reicheren Gebieten, die Zunahme an Krankheiten durch die Ernährung, Bauernhofsterben, Übergewicht als Gegensatz zur Ernährungsarmut und (Umwelt-)Kosten, die auf die Allgemeinheit abgewälzt werden (vgl. Brunner 2009, S. 33).Des Weiteren entstehen allein in Privathaushalten pro Jahr finanzielle Verluste von rund 25 Milliarden Euro durch weggeschmissene Lebensmittel. Anschließend entsteht dadurch eine Menge an Abfall, der entsorgt werden muss. Das führt zu weiteren Kosten und Umweltbelastungen (vgl. Dräger de Teran 2013, S. 15).Die Problematik der Flächennutzung sorgt gerade in den armen Ländern, in denen typischerweise Ackerflächen für die Ernährung in den wohlhabenderen Ländern genutzt werden, für Probleme. Der dortigen Bevölkerung fehlen die für Lebensmittelexporte genutzten Flächen anschließend für die eigene Ernährung (vgl. Verbraucherzentrale 2022). Häufig werden Futtermittel für tierische Lebensmittel angebaut.Durch ein Überangebot und eine Überproduktion entsteht in den Industriestaaten ein leichtfertiger Umgang mit Lebensmitteln. Die dadurch entstehenden Lebensmittelverluste erhöhen laut der Verbraucherzentrale (2022) wieder die Nachfrage nach Rohstoffen wie zum Beispiel Getreide. Das sorgt für einen Preisanstieg von Grundnahrungsmitteln, worunter arme Länder besonders leiden.Zu einer Knappheit an Anbauflächen und einem Preisanstieg kommen meistens eine unzureichende Versorgung und Infrastruktur hinzu. Die Lebensmittel, die ärmere Länder besitzen, können manchmal nicht transportiert, gelagert oder gekühlt werden und gehen deshalb auch auf diese Art verloren (vgl. Verbraucherzentrale 2022). Deshalb ist es wichtig, dass die FAO jedes Jahr einen Bericht zur Nahrungsmittelsicherheit (The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World) vorlegt. Die drei wichtigsten Indikatoren sind dabei die Prävalenz der Unterernährung (PoU), das Befragungselement, die Food Inequality Experience Scale (FIES), und der Welthungerindex (WHI) (vgl. Möhle 2023, S. 91).GegenstrategienNachhaltiger Konsum lässt sich folgendermaßen definieren:"'Nachhaltig' ist ein Konsumverhalten dann zu nennen, wenn es die Bedürfnisse der Kon­sumenten in einer Weise erfüllt, die die Absorptions­- und Regenerationsfähigkeit der natürlichen Mitwelt nicht überfordert" (Brunner 2014, S.5, zit. n. Scherhorn et al. 1997, S. 7).Daraus lässt sich schließen, dass das momentane Ernährungssystem gemeinsam mit der Lebensmittelwertschöpfungskette in großen Teilen nicht nachhaltig sein kann. Schon auf der UN-Konferenz in Rio 1992 wurde über nachhaltige Entwicklung in Verbindung mit dem Abbau nicht-nachhaltiger Konsum­- und Produktionsweisen gesprochen. Beim Weltgipfel in Johannesburg 2002 wurde das Ziel einer "weltweiten Förderung nachhaltiger Konsum- und Produktionsmuster" (Brunner 2009, S. 31) beschlossen. Mittlerweile weiß man, dass ein Konsummuster nicht weltweit zu verallgemeinern ist, sondern sich je nach Region und Wohlstand unterscheidet. Es wird deshalb ein besseres Verständnis für Konsummuster gesucht und versucht, Lebensstile und Konsummuster in Richtung Nachhaltigkeit zu lenken (vgl. Brunner 2009, S. 31, zit. n. Wuppertal Institut 2005).Laut Brunner (vgl. 2009, S. 45) sind Lebens- und Ernährungsstile eng mit der Identität der Menschen verknüpft und von sozialen, kulturellen und ökonomischen Kontexten beeinflusst. Damit sich das Konsument*innenverhalten ändert, müssen sich zuerst kontextuelle Rahmenbedingungen ändern. Dazu gehören Angebote und Anreizsysteme sowie kommunikative Maßnahmen. Auch die Voraussetzungen der Konsument*innen müssen sich ändern.Ein geringerer Fleischkonsum wird durch die Ernährungsökologie eingefordert. Genauso wie die Wahl von ökologisch produzierten und wenig verarbeiteten Lebensmitteln oder regional und saisonal erzeugten Produkten. Ein veränderter Fleischkonsum sowie die Zunahme wenig verarbeiteter Lebensmittel haben längerfristig gesundheitlich und ökologisch eine positive Wirkung (vgl. Brunner 2009, S. 34). Hier sind kommunikative Maßnahmen besonders wichtig. Die Wertschätzung für Lebensmittel sollte gesteigert werden (vgl. Universität Stuttgart/ Institut für Siedlungswasserabbau, Wassergüte- und Abfallwirtschaft 2012, S. 280).Ein sorgsamerer Umgang mit Lebensmitteln führt in der Regel zu weniger Lebensmittelverschwendung. Eine gesündere, fleischärmere Ernährung sorgt für weniger Umweltbelastungen in der Lebensmittelversorgungskette sowie bei der Flächennutzung. Flächen, die frei werden, weil beispielsweise weniger Futtermittel angebaut werden muss, könnten für den Schutz von Ökosystemen genutzt werden oder positiv zur Welternährung beitragen.Denn bei der Lebensmittelverschwendung entstehen nicht nur viele Tonnen an Müll, sondern auch die verwendeten Ressourcen wurden verschwendet. Dazu gehören wertvoller Ackerboden, Wasser und Dünger, was gerade heute, in Zeiten einer kommenden Wasserknappheit, zum Problem werden könnte. Auch die bereitgestellte Energie für Verarbeitung und Verbrauch wurde damit umsonst erzeugt. Treibhausgasemissionen wie CO2 werden umsonst freigesetzt. Die nationale Strategie Deutschlands will deshalb dafür sorgen, dass unnötige Abfälle erst gar nicht entstehen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2023c). Laut der FAO ist die"Verringerung von Lebensmittelverlusten und -verschwendung […] ein wichtiger Hebel für umfassendere Verbesserungen unserer Lebensmittelsysteme zur Verbesserung der Lebensmittelsicherheit, der Qualität und der Nachhaltigkeit sowie zur Steigerung der Effizienz" (FAO 2018).Die Agenda 2030, die 2015 von den Vereinten Nationen beschlossen wurde, enthält 17 Ziele für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung. Zwei Ziele sprechen die Lebensmittelverschwendung an. Das zweite Ziel, welches "Kein Hunger" heißt und gegen die dramatische Hungersnot vorgehen soll, will eine Ernährungssicherheit erreichen und die nachhaltige Landwirtschaft fördern. Das zwölfte Ziel heißt "Nachhaltige/r Konsum und Produktion". Es soll die Nutzung natürlicher Ressourcen fördern und einer hohen Nahrungsmittelverschwendung entgegenwirken (vgl. Bertelsmann Stiftung o. J.).Jedoch muss die Politik die formulierten Ziele anhand von Maßnahmen durchsetzen (vgl. Universität Stuttgart/ Institut für Siedlungswasserabbau, Wassergüte- und Abfallwirtschaft 2012, S. 280). Dafür ist eine gute Kommunikations- und Kooperationsbereitschaft der Landwirtschaft, der Lebensmittelindustrie, des Einzelhandels, der Wissenschaft und der Politik notwendig (vgl. ebda., S. 282). Um diese gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe zu bewältigen, wurde im Februar 2019 die Nationale Strategie zur Reduzierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung vom Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (BMEL) beschlossen.Nationale Strategie zur Reduzierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung Im Koalitionsvertrag wurde das Ziel gesetzt, die Lebensmittelverschwendung branchenspezifisch zu reduzieren. Diesen Auftrag will die Nationale Strategie (siehe hier) nach und nach durchsetzen, denn in Zeiten von Krisen wie dem Russland-Ukraine-Krieg, der Klimakrise und steigenden Energie- und Lebensmittelpreisen wird dies immer dringender (vgl. Die Bundesregierung 2022).Die Lebensmittelabfälle und -verluste sollen in allen Stufen der Lebensmittelwertschöpfungskette verringert werden mit besonderem Augenmerk auf den Schnittstellen zwischen den Sektoren (vgl. Bundeszentrum für Ernährung 2023c). Das große Ziel ist, die Lebensmittelverschwendung bis 2030 um 50% zu reduzieren (vgl. Die Bundesregierung 2022). Dazu wurden vier Handlungsfelder geschaffen: der Politische Rahmen, die Prozessoptimierung der Wirtschaft, eine Verhaltensänderung bei allen Akteur*innen und Potenziale durch Forschung und Digitalisierung (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2021b).Durch den Politischen Rahmen wurden verschiedene Gremien gebildet. Beispielsweise wurde das Bund-Länder-Gremium gebildet, um ressort- und länderübergreifend die Strategie zu steuern und weitere Handlungsfelder zu identifizieren. Die Arbeitsgruppe AG Indikator SDG 12.3 besteht aus Vertreter*innen des BMEL, des Verbraucherschutzes, des Thünen-Instituts und weiteren und koordiniert die Berichterstattung (vgl. Bundeszentrum für Ernährung 2023c). Weil alle Akteure entlang der Lebensmittelversorgungskette vernetzt sein müssen, wurde ein Nationales Dialogforum geschaffen."Vertreter:innen aus Unternehmen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen arbeiten in den fünf sektorspezifischen Dialogforen Primärproduktion, Verarbeitung, Groß- und Einzelhandel, Außer-Haus-Verpflegung und Private Haushalte zusammen" (Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2021b).Das zweite Handlungsfeld, die Prozessoptimierung der Wirtschaft, hat Maßnahmen geschaffen, mit denen Unternehmen eigenverantwortlich Ziele gegen die Lebensmittelverschwendung umsetzen sollen. Ein Beispiel wäre die Überprüfung von Werbeaussagen auf Produkten hinsichtlich der Wertschätzung von Lebensmitteln.Das dritte Handlungsfeld, die Verhaltensänderung bei allen Akteur*innen, ist für die Informations- und Kommunikationsarbeit zuständig, um eine Verhaltensänderung gegenüber Lebensmitteln zu schaffen. Dafür wurde die Initiative "Zu gut für die Tonne!" geschaffen, um die es weiter unten gehen wird. Des Weiteren sollten Informations- und Lehrmaterialien zur Sensibilisierung von Kindern und jungen Erwachsenen erstellt werden, in denen es um die Vorteile einer Reduzierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung geht (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2021b).Das letzte Handlungsfeld, Potenziale durch Forschung und Digitalisierung, steht für die Erforschung und Entwicklung innovativer digitaler Möglichkeiten. Beispiele wären intelligente Verpackungen oder Systeme zur Erstellung von Nachfrageprognosen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2021b). Die Bundesregierung hat deshalb 16 Millionen Euro bereitgestellt, um Forschungsprojekte zu ermöglichen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2019, S. 9f.). So soll die Strategie immer weiterentwickelt werden.Eine große Rolle spielt des Weiteren die Erfassung von Lebensmitteln, denn nur mit dem Wissen, wo, wie viele und warum Lebensmittel weggeworfen werden, kann die Lebensmittelverschwendung reduziert werden (vgl. Bundeszentrum für Ernährung 2023c).Weitere Maßnahmen sollen die Umsetzung der Strategie fördern: die Erleichterung der Weitergabe von Lebensmitteln oder eine strafrechtliche Neubewertung des Containers soll überdacht werden (vgl. Bundeszentrum für Ernährung 2023c); für ein gesamtgesellschaftliches Umdenken in Richtung mehr Wertschätzung gegenüber Lebensmitteln wurde 2016 der Tag der Lebensmittelverschwendung durch den WWF geschaffen. Am 2. Mai landet statistisch gesehen die Menge an Lebensmitteln, die von Januar bis Mai produziert wurde, im Müll (vgl. Die Bundesregierung 2022). Initiative "Zu gut für die Tonne!"Durch die Initiative (https://www.zugutfuerdietonne.de) soll das Thema Lebensmittelverschwendung stärker in die Öffentlichkeit gebracht werden. Sie hat das Ziel, Verbraucher*innen für den Prozess der Lebensmittelproduktion und die notwenige Wertschätzung zu sensibilisieren (vgl. Bundeszentrum für Ernährung 2023c). "Zu gut für die Tonne!" wird vom BMEL durchgeführt und informiert Bürger*innen durch eine Website über Ursachen der Lebensmittelverschwendung und Möglichkeiten, bei der Reduzierung zu helfen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2019, S. 9).Die Bundesregierung will alle Stufen der Lebensmittelkette miteinbeziehen. Auch die Länder spielen eine wichtige Rolle, denn Länder und Kommunen sind für das Abfallmanagement zuständig, und auch hier wurden einige Aktionen und Initiativen gestartet. Die Wirtschaft erarbeitet Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien, während die Wissenschaft in Forschungseinrichtungen neue Methoden und Techniken entwickelt (vgl. ebda.). Besonders wichtig ist, dass neben diesen Bereichen gerade auch die Zivilgesellschaft die Lebensmittelverschwendung reduziert."Zahlreiche Vereine und Organisationen tragen dazu bei, dass nicht mehr marktgängige Lebensmittel, die noch für den Verzehr geeignet sind, als Lebensmittel verwendet werden" (Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2019, S. 8).Tafeln, foodsharing und Brot für die Welt sind Beispiel dafür. Spendensysteme, Internetforen und sogenannte fairTeiler helfen bei der Verteilung von Lebensmitteln, die noch brauchbar sind, aber sonst weggeschmissen werden würden.Verbraucher*innen, die über den Prozess der Herstellung und beispielsweise den Ressourceneinsatz bei der Produktion der Lebensmittel Bescheid wissen, erkennen eher den Wert der Lebensmittel und die Wichtigkeit, den Umgang damit nachhaltiger zu gestalten (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2023b). Die Website der Initiative stellt deshalb ein großes Angebot an Informations-, Bildungs- und Werbematerial bereit.Bürger*innen bekommen Tipps zur Lagerung von Lebensmitteln und Rezepte sowie Tutorials zur Resteverwertung. Auch ein Thema ist das bedarfsgerechte Einkaufen und Zubereiten. Ein langfristiges Ziel der Initiative ist es, Bürger*innen zu zeigen, wie man das eigene Verhalten im Alltag ändert, um so wenig Lebensmittel wie möglich wegzuwerfen (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2023b).Veranstaltungen wie die "Aktionswoche Deutschland rettet Lebensmittel!" (https://www.zugutfuerdietonne.de/unsere-aktivitaeten/aktionswoche-deutschland-rettet-lebensmittel) soll Bürger*innen bei der Umsetzung helfen. Am 29. September ist der International Day of Awareness of Food Loss and Waste der FAO. Aus diesem Grund startet die Initiative des BMEL eine bundesweite Aktionswoche mit Aktionen zum Thema Lebensmittelverschwendung. Sowohl digital als auch vor Ort können Bürger*innen teilnehmen. 2023 liegt der Schwerpunkt auf dem Thema "Kochen und Essen nach Maß" (vgl. Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft 2023d).Bewusstseinsförderung & Umweltbildung zum Thema LebensmittelverschwendungDie Deutsche UNESCO-Kommission sieht einen direkten Zusammenhang zwischen den Handlungsfeldern Lebensstil, Konsum, Klimawandel, globaler Gerechtigkeit und Ernährung. Diese sind entscheidend für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung (vgl. Innemann 2013, S. 66). Daraus entsteht die Anforderung einer Ernährungsbildung, die praxisorientiert stattfindet und eine alltägliche und individuelle Umsetzung fördert (vgl. ebda., S. 75). Für eine entsprechende Kompetenzförderung müssen laut Innemann (S. 66) Lehr-Lern-Arrangements geschaffen werden, was der Bildung in der Schule eine besondere Rolle zuschreibt.Laut Schlegel-Matthies (2005) ist die Ernährungsbildung in der Schule ein "unverzichtbarer Bestandteil der Vermittlung zentraler Kompetenzen für die Lebensgestaltung und insbesondere [für die] […] Gesundheitsförderung". Sie hat nicht nur Einfluss auf das Individuum, sondern auf die ganze Gesellschaft. Ziel ist, einen lebenslangen, selbstbestimmten und verantwortlichen Umgang mit Lebensmitteln und der eigenen Ernährung zu schaffen (vgl. Schlegel-Matthies 2005). Der erste Schritt ist deshalb die Vermittlung von natur-, sozial- und kulturwissenschaftlichem Basiswissen (vgl. ebda.).Weil einfaches Wissen über Ernährung in den meisten Fällen nicht ausreicht, um sich gesund und nachhaltig zu ernähren, ist es wichtig, dass neben der Vermittlung von theoretischem Fachwissen ein Diskurs in der Klasse stattfindet, bei dem über förderliche gesellschaftliche Strukturen und die Motivation sowie Bereitschaft und Kompetenzen für eine Ernährungswende in der Gesellschaft gesprochen wird (vgl. Schlehufer/ Goetz 2014, S. 9).Eine besondere Herausforderung für Lehrkräfte und für Schüler*innen stellt die Ernährungsbildung deshalb dar, weil das meist persönlich und emotional besetzte Bedürfnisfeld Ernährung mit einem komplexen, normativen Leitbild der Nachhaltigkeit verbunden werden muss (vgl. Innemann 2013, S. 66f.). Schulnahe Projekte können bei der Vermittlung nachhaltiger Ernährung helfen, weil sie besonders praxisorientiert sind (vgl. ebda., S. 74).Der Bildungsanspruch einer Ernährungs- und Verbraucherbildung durch die Vermittlung von Kompetenzen zur "Bewältigung von Anforderungen im Rahmen der alltäglichen Lebensführung und für eine aktive Teilhabe am gesellschaftlichen Leben" (Schlegel et al. 2022, S. 109) besteht bereits von Anfang an. Der Sachunterricht in der Primarstufe und der weiterführende Unterricht in der Sekundarstufe soll die Bildungsziele durchgängig erreichbar machen.Da die derzeitigen Bildungspläne den Anforderungen der notwendigen Ernährungsbildung nicht entsprechen, haben Schlegel et al. (vgl. 2022, S. 110) zehn wichtige Bildungsziele formuliert, die lebenswelt-, kompetenz-, problem- und handlungsorientiert sein sollen. Durch diese sollen individuelle und gesellschaftliche Bezüge hergestellt und notwendige Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten erworben werden (vgl. ebda., S. 111). Im Folgenden sollen einige davon kurz aufgeführt werden.Es soll sich mit den Chancen und Risiken einer nachhaltigen Lebensführung und den dafür notwendigen Ressourcen auseinandergesetzt werden. Dabei soll klar werden, inwiefern Individuen bei ihrem Verhalten oder Handeln voneinander abhängig sind. Die Auswirkungen der Konsumentscheidungen von Konsument*innen müssen reflektiert und analysiert werden und dabei gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse betrachtet werden.Es ist wichtig, dass die Zusammenhänge zwischen Ernährung und Gesundheit sowie der eigenen Identität verstanden werden. Praxisnah sollen deshalb Einflussfaktoren, Begrenzungen und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten des eigenen, individuellen Handels betrachtet werden. Unterschiedliche Konzepte und gerade die Organisation der eigenen Lebensführung müssen außerdem behandelt werden (vgl. Schlegel et al. 2022, S. 110). Mithilfe dieser Ziele sollen die Schüler*innen bei der Entwicklung eines nachhaltigen Lebensstils inklusive einer nachhaltigen Ernährung unterstützt werden. Gerade in der heutigen Welt, in der global mehr Nahrungsmittel zur Verfügung stehen als notwendig wären, ist ein nachhaltiger Umgang besonders wichtig (vgl. Kofahl/Ferdaouss 2013, S. 6).FazitEine vollständige Vermeidung von Lebensmittelverlusten ist nicht möglich, eine deutliche Verringerung jedoch schon, wenn Maßnahmen ergriffen und Strategien umgesetzt werden (vgl. Verbraucherzentrale 2022, S. 283). Dies ist außerdem notwendig, um die Nachhaltigkeitsziele der UN von 2015 durchzusetzen. Die Lebensmittelverluste sollen nicht nur in der Lebensmittelversorgungskette während und zwischen den einzelnen Stufen reduziert werden, sondern gerade auch beim finalen Konsum in der heutigen Wegwerfgesellschaft (vgl. Eyerund/ Neligan 2017, S. 4).Aufgrund der schwerwiegenden Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt, wie beispielsweise der Ausstoß von Treibhausgasemissionen und ein hoher Landverbrauch sowie eine Gefährdung der Biodiversität, sollten Maßnahmen schnell umgesetzt werden. Auch aufgrund unethischer Dilemmasituationen, wie der dramatischen Hungersnot, muss dringend gehandelt werden. Die Umsetzung von Strategien stellt die Lebensmittelindustrie sowie die Konsument*innen vor Herausforderungen (vgl. Hamatschek 2021, S. 355). Ein besonderes Augenmerk wurde auf die Sensibilisierung der Bevölkerung gelegt, weswegen die Initiative "Zu gut für die Tonne!" geschaffen wurde (vgl. Eyerund/ Neligan 2017, S. 4). Weil die Sensibilisierung für einen nachhaltigen Umgang mit Lebensmitteln schon früh beginnen sollte, muss die Umweltbildung in der Schule praxisorientiert und alltagsnah sein.QuellenBertelsmann Stiftung (o. J.): SDG-Portal. Die Agenda mit den 17 SDGs. URL: https://sdg-portal.de/de/ueber-das-projekt/17-ziele (Zugriff am 08.09.2023).Brunner, K.-M. (2009): Nachhaltiger Konsum - am Beispiel des Essens. In: SWS-Rundschau, 49(1), S. 29-49. URL: https://nbn- resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-250335 (Zugriff am 11.09.2023).Brunner, K.-M. (2014): Nachhaltiger Konsum und soziale Ungleichheit. In: Working Papers. Verbraucherpolitik, Verbraucherforschung. Wien: AK-Wien. URL: https://www.arbeiterkammer.at/infopool/akportal/Working_Paper_Nachhaltiger_Konsum.pdf (Zugriff am 16.09.2023). Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (2019): Nationale Strategie zur Reduzierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung. URL: https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/_Ernaehrung/Lebensmittelverschwendung/Nationale_Strategie_Lebensmittelverschwendung_2019.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 (Zugriff am 08.09.2023). Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (2021): Zu gut für die Tonne! Nationale Strategie zur Reduzierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung. Hintergrund. URL: https://www.zugutfuerdietonne.de/strategie/hintergrund (Zugriff am 09.09.2023). Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (2021b): Zu gut für die Tonne! Nationale Strategie zur Reduzierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung. Handlungsfelder. URL: https://www.zugutfuerdietonne.de/strategie/handlungsfelder (Zugriff am 17.09.2023). Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (2023a): Fragen und Antworten zum Pakt gegen Lebensmittelverschwendung. URL: https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/FAQs/DE/faq-pakt-lmv/FAQList.html#f104622(Zugriff am 06.09.2023) Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (2023b): Zu gut für die Tonne! Nationale Strategie zur Reduzierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung. URL: https://www.zugutfuerdietonne.de/strategie (Zugriff am 08.09.2023). Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (2023c): Nationale Strategie zur Reduzierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung. URL: https://www.bmel.de/DE/themen/ernaehrung/lebensmittelverschwendung/strategie-lebensmittelverschwendung.html(Zugriff am 17.09.2023). Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (2023d): Aktionswoche Deutschland rette Lebensmittel! URL: https://www.zugutfuerdietonne.de/unsere-aktivitaeten/aktionswoche-deutschland-rettet-lebensmittel (Zugriff am 19.09.2023). Bundeszentrum für Ernährung (2023c): Lebensmittelverschwendung vermeiden. Zu gut für die Tonne! URL: https://www.bzfe.de/nachhaltiger-konsum/lagern-kochen-essen-teilen/lebensmittelverschwendung/ (Zugriff am 10.09.2023). Collaborating Centre on Sustainable Consumption and Production GmbH/ Johann Heinrich von Thünen-Institut Bundesforschungsinstitut für Ländliche Räume, Wald und Fischerei (2022): Schlussbericht zum Thema. Nationales Dialogforum des Groß- und Einzelhandels zur Reduzierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung. Bonn: Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. (2022): Welthunger-Index. URL: https://www.welthungerhilfe.de/hunger/welthunger-index/?gclid=CjwKCAjwvMqDBhB8EiwA2iSmPCUSS2n-a2TzwsWjalPgtMB_nOibD7yxOThTtMqYhh3XLcDyjIUqWRoCUQMQAvD_BwE (Zugriff am 16.09.2023). Die Bundesregierung (2022): Alle sind gefragt! Lebensmittelabfälle reduzieren. URL: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/weniger-lebensmittelabfaelle-2029762 (Zugriff am 17.09.2023). Dräger de Teran, T. (2013): Gut für uns, gut für den Planeten. Gesunde Ernährung und eine geringe Lebensmittelverschwendung können unseren ökologischen Fußabdruck in erheblichem Ausmaß reduzieren. In: Journal für Generationengerechtigkeit, 13(1), S. 11-17. URL: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-343442(Zugriff am 17.09.2023). Eyerund, T./ Neligan, A. (2017): Verschwenderische Generationen X und Y. IW-Kurzbericht, Nr. 56/2017. Köln: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft. URL: https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/167636 (Zugriff am 17.09.2023). FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2017): Save Food for a better climate. Converting the food loss and waste challenge into climate action. URL: https://www.fao.org/3/i8000e/i8000e.pdf (Zugriff am 10.09.2023). FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2011): Global food losses and food waste. Extend, causes and prevention. URL: https://www.fao.org/3/i2697e/i2697e.pdf (Zugriff am 10.09.2023). FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2009): How to Feed the World in 2050. URL: https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/expert_paper/How_to_Feed_the_World_in_2050.pdf (Zugriff am 10.09.2023). FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2018): Food loss analysis case study methodology. URL: https://elearning.fao.org/course/view.php?id=374 (Zugriff am 17.09.2023). Hamatschek, J. (2021): Lebensmitteltechnologie. Die industrielle Herstellung von Lebensmitteln aus landwirtschaftlichen Rohstoffen. 2. Aufl. Stuttgart: Eugen Ulmer KG. Innemann, H. M. (2013): Prinzipien und Konzepte nachhaltiger Ernährung und ihre Vermittlung in Bildungsprozessen. In: Haushalt in Bildung & Forschung 2 (1), S. 66-78. URL: https://www.pedocs.de/volltexte/2020/20952/pdf/HiBiFo_2013_1_Innemann_Prinzipien_und_Konzepte.pdf (Zugriff am 21.09.2023). Kofahl, D./ Ferdaouss, A. (2013): Komplikationen im Schlaraffenland. Ethische und politische Nahrungsproduktion. In: Außerschulische Bildung. Materialien zur politischen Jugend- und Erwachsenenbildung. Politische und soziale Dimensionen von Ernährung, 44(1), S. 6-14. URL: https://www.adb.de/download/publikationen/AB_1-2013_Komplettausgabe.pdf (Zugriff am 21.09.2023). Möhle, M. (2023): Globale soziale Ungerechtigkeit. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer GmbH. Noleppa, S. (2012): Klimawandel auf dem Teller. Ernährung, Nahrungsmittelverluste, Klimawirkung. Berlin: WWF Deutschland. Schlegel-Matthies, K. (2005): Ernährung und Verbraucherbildung im Internet. EVB. URL: http://www.evb-online.de/evb.php (Zugriff am 21.09.2023). Schlegel, K. et al. (2022): Konsum – Ernährung – Gesundheit. Didaktische Grundlagen der Ernährungs- und Verbraucherbildung. Opladen/Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich. Schlehufer, A./ Goetz, M. (2014): Mit Genuss und Verantwortung. Praxisbeispiel zu nachhaltiger Ernährungsbildung im Kreisjugendring München-Land. Pullach: Kreisjugendring München-Land im Bayerischen Jugendring. URL: https://www.jugendbildungsstaetten.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/KJR_Mit_Genuss_und_Verantwortung.pdf(Zugriff am 21.09.2023). Universität Stuttgart/ Institut für Siedlungswasserabbau, Wassergüte- und Abfallwirtschaft (2012): Ermittlung der weggeworfenen Lebensmittelmengen und Vorschläge zur Verminderung der Wegwerfrate bei Lebensmitteln in Deutschland. URL: https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/_Ernaehrung/Lebensmittelverschwendung/Studie_Lebensmittelabfaelle_Langfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 (Zugriff am 09.09.2023). Verbraucherzentrale (2022): Lebensmittelverschwendung: Folgen für Umwelt, Ressourcen, Welternährung. URL: https://www.verbraucherzentrale.de/wissen/lebensmittel/auswaehlen-zubereiten-aufbewahren/lebensmittelverschwendung-folgen-fuer-umwelt-ressourcen-welternaehrung-59565 (Zugriff am 06.09.2023). Von Grebmer, K. et al. (2022): Welthunger-Index. Transformation der Ernährungssysteme und lokale Governance. Bonn/Dublin: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V./ Concern Worldwide. URL: https://www.welthungerhilfe.de/aktuelles/publikation/detail/welthunger-index-2022 (Zugriff am 20.09.2023).

This paper develops a novel methodology to measure the quantity of jobs and value of wages embodied in exports for a large number of countries and sectors for intermittent years between 1995 and 2011. The resulting Labor Content of Exports database allows the examination of the direct contribution of labor to exports as well as the indirect contribution via other sectors of the economy for skilled and unskilled labor. The analysis of the new data sets documents several new findings. First, the global share of labor value added in exports has been declining globally since 1995, but it has increased in low-income countries. Second, in line with the standard Hecksher-Ohlin trade model, the composition of labor directly contained in exports is skewed toward skilled labor in high-income countries relative to developing countries. However, that is not the case for the indirect labor content of exports. Third, manufacturing exports are a key source of labor demand in other sectors, especially in middle- and low-income countries. And the majority of the indirect demand for labor spurred by exports is in services sectors, whose workers are the largest beneficiaries of exporting activities globally. Fourth, differences in the labor value added in exports share across developing countries appears to be driven more by differences in the composition of exports rather than in sector labor intensities. Finally, average wages typically increase rapidly enough with the process of economic development to more than compensate the loss in jobs per unit of exports. The paper also includes the necessary information to build the Labor Content of Exports database from the original raw data, including stata do-files and matlab files, as well as descriptions of the variables in the data set.

In democracies, innovative political institutions have opened up scope for direct public participation often in the form of talk: citizens talking to the state and mutual talk among citizens on matters concerning community development. A prominent example is the Indian gram sabha, or village assembly, which occurs in a highly stratified context. This paper undertakes a talk-centered analysis of the gram sabha with a focus on examining the oral participation of women in general and women affiliated with microcredit self-help groups who have access to an associational life. The qualitative analysis of 255 gram sabha transcripts from four South Indian states finds that women associated with microcredit self-help groups employ a wider variety of narrative styles and utilize a more multilayered structure to convey their messages compared with all women taken together. Thus, the difference is not so much in the numerical instances of talking or in the types of issues raised, but rather in the quality of participation. The paper makes an important theoretical contribution by proposing the concept of oral democracy as an alternative to deliberative democracy, and urges an analytical focus on the oral or oratory competency of subordinated groups as they participate in these important institutions.

Prior to the war in Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian interests had already been deadlocked in a heated battle. But this clash wasn't being waged on the streets of Kyiv, it was being fought on K Street in Washington D.C. The combatants donned suits, not camouflage. Their targets weren't hardened military units, they were U.S. policymakers in Congress and the executive branch. Their goal wasn't total victory, it was to win hearts, minds, and, above all, votes for their cause. This was the lobbying battle before the Ukraine war. As I documented in a Quincy Institute brief, this David vs. Goliath style battle between a small, relatively low-funded, but remarkably zealous Ukrainian lobby had largely been thwarted by a multi-million dollar lobbying and PR campaign by Russian interests. But when Russian President Vladimir Putin made the disastrous decision to invade Ukraine two years ago, this Russian influence advantage in D.C. quickly evaporated. Within a week of the war's onset, U.S. sanctions effectively decimated Russia's influence in Washington, forcing a number of top lobbying and public relations firms to sever ties with their Russian clients. Since then the Ukraine lobby has been largely unopposed in its efforts to steer U.S. foreign policies related to the war. The Ukraine lobby has helped pave the way for more than $100 billion in U.S. assistance to Ukraine and meticulously crafted the media narrative to maintain U.S. public support for Ukraine's war effort.The Ukraine Lobby Since the War BeganIn the two years since the war in Ukraine began, 46 different firms or individuals have been registered under FARA to represent Ukrainian interests. This includes lobbying heavyweights like BGR Government Affairs, Hogan Lovells, and Hill & Knowlton, as well as international public relations firms like Qorvis Communications. In total, these firms have received nearly $10.92 million from Ukrainian clients since 2022, according to FARA data compiled by OpenSecrets. Just as in the year before the war — when FARA registrants reported conducting 13,541 political activities on behalf of their Ukrainian clients — the Ukraine lobby has been working feverishly since the war began. A Quincy Institute analysis of FARA records found that, since the war began, Ukrainian interests have reported doing more than 12,000 political activities on behalf of Ukrainian interests, primarily contacting Congress, the executive branch, and media outlets. By far the busiest firm working on behalf of Ukrainian interests has been Yorktown Solutions, which has represented the Federation of Employers of the Oil and Gas Industry of Ukraine, the Civil Movement For a Just Ukraine, and the Primary Trade Union Organization of State Enterprise National Nuclear Energy Generating Company, better known as "Energoatom."For just one of these clients — the Federation of Employers of the Oil and Gas Industry — Yorktown has reported doing 8,296 political activities since the war began. To put that remarkable workload in perspective, it equates to an average of more than 11 emails, phone calls, and meetings completed every day on behalf of just one client. No other foreign client registered under FARA has had more work done on their behalf in the past two years, according to a Quincy Institute analysis of FARA records.Since the war began, Yorktown hasn't hidden the fact that one of the primary objectives behind all this work is to increase U.S. military assistance to Ukraine. "We've gone from energy security to security," Daniel Vajdich, President of Yorktown Solutions, told Politico less than a month after the war began, explaining the firm's shift away from lobbying related to the Nordstream 2 pipeline and towards acquiring U.S. military assistance for Ukraine. Vajdich added that, "It is 24 hours, even when we're sleeping the phone is on, and the phone is going off, and there are phone calls from Kyiv, and there are phone calls from others here in Washington both in and out of government … We speak to the administration. We speak to Capitol Hill. We certainly speak to media as well."In addition to its Ukrainian clients, Yorktown has also been working feverishly for the Centre for a European Future, reporting more than 4,000 political activities on behalf of the Belgium based non-profit whose objectives revolve heavily around Ukraine and include, "rebuilding Ukraine," "joining NATO," and "securing compensation for the war."The Pro-Bono Push for UkraineAt just under $11 million in reported FARA spending by Ukrainian clients since the war began, the Ukraine lobby isn't funded at the level of perennial influence powerhouses in Washington, like Saudi Arabia, whose lobbying and public relations firms have received more than $70 million from the Kingdom since 2022, according to OpenSecrets. But, the actual dollar amount of spending on lobbying, public relations and the other influence efforts done on behalf of Ukrainian interests is deceptive, as many individuals, and even some of the most prominent lobbying firms in D.C., have been working for Ukraine pro-bono. In fact, of the 46 different firms and individuals that have been registered under FARA to represent Ukrainian clients, 29 have done the work for free.Working for Ukraine pro-bono became somewhat trendy in the Washington influence industry shortly after the war began. Many of the firms registered under FARA to represent Ukrainian interests for free, however, appear to have done little work on behalf of Ukrainian interests. Some reported just a handful of contacts with congressional offices on behalf of Ukraine. Another reported a "one day pro bono effort" for a Ukrainian Parliamentary Delegation to the U.S. In one infamous case, a firm registered under FARA claiming to be working pro-bono for the Ukrainian ambassador to the United Nations, only to deregister just days later after the ambassador publicly explained that he was not actually working with the firm. On the other hand, a number of lobbying and PR firms have done a considerable amount of work for Ukrainian interests at no charge to their clients. A Quincy Institute analysis of FARA records found that Plus Communications tops this list with nearly 3,000 political activities reported in its pro-bono work for the Ukrainian PR Army, a non-profit organization that purports to help, "global media tell the accurate story of this war through the perspectives of Ukrainian experts, authorities, and witnesses." Plus Communications' work involved pitching interviews with prominent Ukrainian officials to seemingly every mainstream U.S. media outlet, including Fox News, The Washington Post, and NPR. Another major pro-bono endeavor is being run on behalf of the Ministry of Culture and Informational Policy of Ukraine, specifically in relation to the ministry's "Advantage Ukraine Initiative," which seeks to attract international investment in Ukrainian industries, with the top choice being the defense industry. Several firms are registered under FARA to support this pro-bono initiative, including Hill & Knowlton Strategies, Ogilvy Group, and Group M. The latter has reported nearly 300 emails to major media outlets, most of which were in reference to "ad materials" for Advantage Ukraine. The firm's FARA filings show these ads include slogans like, "Davos is over. The opportunities in Ukraine have just begun," and "Imagine an investment where you get applauded by shareholders AND the public?"Group M's collaborator on the Advantage Ukraine Initiative, Ogilvy Group, is also one of several firms that have been working pro-bono for Ukraine while taking money from firms that are profiting from the Ukraine war. As Eli Clifton and I previously reported for Responsible Statecraft, Hogan Lovells, BGR Government Affairs, Mercury Public Affairs, Navigators Global, and Ogilvy Group have all done pro-bono work for Ukraine interests while also lobbying on behalf of weapons makers that could profit from the war.The Ukraine Lobby TodayWhile the size of the Ukraine lobby has decreased since the early months of the war, 18 firms are still registered under FARA to represent Ukrainian interests. Most of them are still doing the work pro-bono, and many of them remain intent on shaping U.S. foreign policy to Ukraine's favor. More so than at any time since the war began though, they're having to fend off an American public which increasingly believes the U.S. is providing too much aid to Ukraine. How this tension pans out remains to be seen, but there is little doubt that the Ukraine lobby has all the ammunition it needs to continue winning the lobbying battle in Washington.

Republican presidential candidate Nikki Haley regaled a pro-Israel lobby group Wednesday with stories of Chinese mind-control attacks, among other foreign bugaboos. Addressing the group at a posh country club in Tenafly, New Jersey, the former South Carolina governor and UN ambassador delivered prospective donors a combination of big-tent domestic politics and a heavy dose of hawkish foreign policy, especially in the Middle East.Some of her talking points harkened back to Bush administration. Haley warned that "we can never be so arrogant to think that another 9/11 won't happen," and mocked UN inspectors' claims that they were able to investigate the Iranian nuclear program, just as the Bush administration had mocked UN inspectors' inability to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.In a modern twist on War on Terror fears, Haley frightened her audience with the claim that China was developing "neurostrike" weapons, possibly to use on Americans.The campaign remarks to the low-profile event hosted by the pro-Israel lobby group NORPAC, were clearly aimed at wooing potential donors more than making headlines. The event served as a window into the type of constituency Haley considers her core supporters — literal country-club Republicans with a hawkish foreign policy outlook and neoconservatives — and how she plans to appeal to them.Tenafly is a leafy, picturesque upper-middle-class suburb. Just outside New York City, the town boasts a median household income of $153,000 per year and an average home value around $1 million. Downtown Tenafly looks straight out of a Norman Rockwell painting, with a classic 1950s diner, a colonial-style church, a Lubavitcher synagogue, and an ornate brick train station that has been turned into a trendy cafe.Organizers chose a venue that was a little more exclusive: the Knickerbocker, one of Tenafly's two country clubs. The event was not advertised on Haley's campaign website or official social media, only through print ads in a few local newspapers and on the NORPAC blog.The Knickerbocker main hall, which had around 300 seats plus standing room, filled up before Haley arrived. A man wearing a yarmulke on his head and holding a red "Trump was right" trucker hat in his hand wandered the aisle, looking for open seats, while 80s rock music blared from the loudspeakers.

The Knickerbocker country club, Tenafly, NJ. Photo: Matthew PettiTickets to Haley's speech were free, but there had also been a VIP fundraising reception before the main event, hosted by Wall Street investment banker Bennett Schachter. NORPAC had advertised a Haley fundraising dinner open to donors who committed $6,600 or more, reports Al-Jazeera journalist Ali Harb.On stage, Schachter thanked "our friends" at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee for their "support behind the scenes" for the event."If the local people are getting behind Nikki and supporting her and there's this big swell of momentum, that sends a message to the broader Republican Party, which says this candidate actually is reaching people on the ground level, she's not aloof, she's not unattainable, she's not unrelatable," Schachter had explained on the radio show "JM in the AM" a few days before the event. "That sends a message to the larger funders, and when you get that kind of swell, that leads to lots of money."Haley experienced a boost in polls after the first Republican debate in August. And a recent CNN poll found that she was the Republican with the strongest lead over incumbent president Joe Biden in the general election.However, she still lags far behind her Republican rivals. Haley's FiveThirtyEight polling average is 6.3 percent in the primaries, fourth place among Republican candidates, after biotech financier Vivek Ramaswamy. Former president Donald Trump remains the frontrunner.During his radio interview, Schachter praised Haley for going "full throttle" in support of Israel at the Republican debate, when she bashed Ramaswamy's plan to wean Israel off of U.S. military aid. He predicted that Haley "will carry the Right politically, she will carry the Center politically, and she will carry a lot of the Left."Fellow event organizer Joey Folkman added that he knew Haley from the time his family owned a factory in South Carolina. He praised the former governor for being the first to remove the Confederate flag from the state capitol and the first to ban boycotts of Israel.Haley and the organizers pitched the same combination of moderate domestic politics and hawkish foreign policy on stage."We are dying to have a Republican in the White House, yet not enough are rallying around Ambassador Haley, who — unlike the current frontrunner [Trump] — has never lost an election, and has certainly never lost to Joe Biden," Folkman said in his introduction. "We are going to stop being enticed by campaigns that prey on divisiveness, anger, immaturity, conspiracy, and retribution."Haley herself said that, when she faced bullying in school, her mother told her that "it isn't your job to show them how you're different, it's to show you how you're similar."She cited that same childhood trauma as a reason for her pro-Israel stance. The Israeli ambassador to the United Nations was "humiliated" by the UN Security Council, said Haley, when the Obama administration refused to veto a Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories."The kid on the playground that got bullied got her back up," Haley said. "I never wanted anyone to feel like that."Haley complained that President Joe Biden only met Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu several months into Netanyahu's term, and only "on the sidelines of the United Nations, not at the White House." (The meeting took place the same day as the campaign event.) She said that Americans needed "moral clarity about who your friends are."Echoing one of her lines from the Republican debate, Haley declared that "Israel doesn't need America. America needs Israel." She argued that the same was true for the United Arab Emirates: "It was never that Israel needed them, they needed Israel."If Israel was the unsung hero of Haley's worldview, Iran was the villain. Haley made her usual points about the threat posed by Russia and China, and the need to support Ukraine and Taiwan, but reserved her most vehement, emotional condemnation for Iran.Iran had agreed last month to send home five Americans held in Iranian prisons, in exchange for five Iranians held in American prisons, as well as $6 billion in Iranian money frozen in a South Korean bank to be used only for humanitarian purposes. Biden administration officials greeted the American captives at the airport on Monday. Haley claimed that the prisoner exchange "put a bounty on every American's head." And she complained that Iranian president Ebraham Raisi, a "murderous thug," thanked America for the deal with an anti-American speech at the United Nations."You can't change a culture," Haley said, although she was careful to clarify that she meant the culture of "this regime, not the Iranian people."Haley added that any future deal with Iran "needs to include Israel and the Arab countries."She accused Biden of putting Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman in a position that "would make [bin Salman] look weak" if Saudi Arabia accepted any U.S. proposal. Because of that, Haley argued, Saudi Arabia was now unwilling to sign the U.S.-Israeli-Saudi deal that Biden is pushing for.The focus on the Middle East didn't mean China was off the hook. Haley claimed that the Chinese government "has been preparing for war with us for years."To audible gasps from the audience, she called China the "lead developer of 'neurostrike' weapons, engineered to change the brain activity of military commanders or segments of the population." Haley had issued the same warning in a July interview with CNBC, and again at an August speech in Iowa.The term "neurostrike" was popularized by a thinly-evidenced July 2023 article, which speculated that China is developing strategies to "directly attack, or even control, mammalian brains." The researchers, calling themselves the CCP BioThreats Initiative, have previously made alarmist claims about Chinese virus research, nanotechnology, and electromagnetic pulse weapons. She also contended that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea were spreading "disinformation" to turn Americans against each other. "The one thing that bothers me the most is the national self-loathing that's taken over our country," Haley said. "All of our enemies are circling us in a way that is really dangerous."

El presente trabajo analiza la regulación del CTM (2006) en materia de repatriación, a través del estudio del largo proceso conducente a su adopción y a través del análisis de los Convenios OIT anteriores en esta materia. El CTM (2006) consagra el derecho de la gente del mar a ser repatriada sin coste para ella y dispone igualmente una obligación para los miembros relativa a la necesidad de que exijan garantías financieras a los armadores de buques que enarbolan su pabellón para asegurar que la gente del mar sea debidamente repatriada conforme a lo que dispone el propio Código. Son derechos y obligaciones que deben cumplirse de acuerdo con lo previsto en el Código, buena parte de cuya regulación se recoge en la parte no obligatoria en la idea de flexibilizar al máximo su contenido en aras a lograr el máximo posible de ratificaciones. El trabajo analiza detenidamente la totalidad de la regulación del CTM (2006): las distintas causas en las que nace el derecho a la repatriación, entre las que se incluye el «abandono» aunque curiosamente no aparece esta expresión en ningún momento y las obligaciones .normativas y aplicativas. que surgen para los Miembros que lo ratifiquen pues los destinatarios de las disposiciones del CTM (2006) son los Miembros, quienes deben dar pleno efecto a sus disposiciones mediante disposiciones normativas (ley, reglamento, convenio colectivo o cualquier otra medida de aplicación) si bien esta obligación alcanza únicamente al Reglamento (Reglas) y a la parte obligatoria del Código (Parte A) mientras que, por lo que respecta a la Parte B, los Miembros únicamente deben tenerla en consideración en el cumplimiento de dichas obligaciones, sin que se encuentren obligados finalmente a adoptar dichas medidas concretas. En este sentido, se analiza el grado de adecuación de la normativa española en la materia pues no hay que olvidar que España tiene ratificados tanto el Convenio OIT núm. 23 (en 23-2-1931) como el Convenio OIT núm. 166 (en 3-7-1990), por lo que, en principio, su normativa debe cumplir con lo dispuesto en el Convenio OIT núm. 166 (1987). Especialmente importante es la regulación del régimen de responsabilidades en materia de repatriación pues, junto a la responsabilidad principal del armador, el CTM establece una cadena de responsabilidades. Estas responsabilidades se caracterizan por su carácter subsidiario respecto de la obligación del armador; por su naturaleza sucesiva o «en cadena », y además, por el grado distinto de obligatoriedad de los eventuales responsables, pues mientras en unos casos, es obligatoria, en otros es meramente potestativa. Surge así, en primer lugar, la responsabilidad del Estado del Pabellón, a quien se le reconoce, además, el derecho a recuperar los gastos incluso autorizando la inmovilización de los buques del armador interesado hasta su reembolso, en la introducción de una previsión o mandato que constituye un hito por su coercitividad en una norma de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Con carácter subsidiario, se contempla, como mera posibilidad y con derecho a recuperar el coste de la repatriación .en este caso del Estado del Pabellón., dos eventuales responsables: el Estado del Puerto o el Estado del cual sea nacional el marino a repatriar. También se analiza por su importancia en esta materia, pues el propio CTM (2006) reconoce su carácter incompleto en esta materia [III Resolución adoptada por la Conferencia Internacional del Trabajo en su 94ª reunión (Marítima), de 22 de febrero de 2006] no obstante consagrar la necesidad de que los Miembros exijan a los buques que enarbolan su pabellón el aporte de garantías financieras para asegurar el derecho a la repatriación en los términos contemplados en el Código, la Resolución Conjunta de la Organización Marí- tima Internacional (OMI) y de la OIT (Consejo de Administración) núm. A.930 (22) que establece Directrices para la provisión de garantía financiera para los casos de abandono de la gente de mar. Finalmente, también se exponen brevemente la regulación de esta materia en el ámbito de la Unión Europea en cuyo ámbito se ha aprobado recientemente un conjunto importante de normativa siendo especialmente importantes dos normas: la Directiva 2009/13/CE de 23 de abril, por la que se aplica el acuerdo suscrito por los agentes Sociales europeos (ECSA y ETF) relativo al Convenio de Trabajo Marítimo, 2006; y la Directiva 2009/16/CE, de 23 de abril, relativa al control por el Estado del Puerto ; This work analyses the regulation of the MLC (2006) on the subject of repatriation, through a study of the long process leading to its adoption and through the analysis of the previous ILO Conventions on this matter. The MLC (2006) grants seafarers the right to be repatriated at no cost to themselves; it also states that Members shall require the owners of ships that carry their flag to provide financial security to ensure that seafarers are duly repatriated in accordance with the Code. These rights and obligations must be complied with in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Most of the regulations of this code are included in the non-mandatory part, with the aim of achieving the highest degree of flexibility in its content and thereby having it ratified by as many states as possible. The work performs an in-depth analysis of the whole of the MLC (2006) regulation, that is, the different causes that give rise to the right to repatriation, including "abandonment", although interestingly this expression does not appear in the text, and the normative and applicative obligations that arise for the Members that have ratified it, since the MLC (2006) is addressed to the Members, who must give its terms full effect through regulatory provisions (law, regulations, collective agreements or other implementing measures); this obligation, however, extends only to the Regulations (Rules) and the mandatory part of the Code (Part A), whereas Part B should only been taken into consideration by Members in the fulfilment of these duties, but without finally being forced to take such specific measures. In this regard, the article also analyses the extent to which the Spanish regulations embrace the subject because it must be borne in mind that Spain has ratified both ILO Convention no. 23 (on 23/02/31) and ILO Convention no. 166 (on 03/07/1990), and consequently its regulations must comply with the provisions of ILO Convention no. 166 (1987). One especially important point is the regulation of the regimen of responsibilities concerning the subject of repatriation because, together with the main responsibility of the shipowner, the MLC also establishes a chain of responsibilities. These responsibilities are characterised by their subsidiary nature with respect to the shipowner's obligations; by their nature as a succession or as forming a "chain", and also by the different degree of obligation of those who might be held liable, since in some cases it is mandatory while in others it is merely elective. First of all, then, there is the liability of the Flag State, which is also recognised as having the right to recover the expenses even by authorising the detention of ships belonging to the shipowner concerned until the reimbursement has been made, by the introduction of a provision or mandate that is a landmark due to its coerciveness within a standard of the International Labour Organisation. As mere subsidiaries and as just a possible course of action, there also exists the possibility of being reimbursed with the cost of repatriation, in this case from the Flag State, from two possible authorities: the Port State or the State of which the seafarer to be repatriated is a national. Due to its importance in this field it is also analysed, since the MLC (2006) itself recognises it is incomplete as regards this subject [Resolution III adopted by the International Labour Conference at its 94th (Maritime) Session, on February 22nd 2006], yet it establishes the need for Members to require that ships that carry their flag provide financial security to ensure the right to repatriation in the terms covered by the Code, the Joint Resolution of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the ILO (Council of Administration) no. A.930 (22), which establishes Directives for provisioning financial securities for cases of seafarers' abandonment. Finally, the European Union regulations on this subject are also outlined; in this respect the European authorities recently approved an important set of regulations, two of the most important of which are: Directive 2009/13/CE, dated 23rd April, by virtue of which the agreement signed by the European Social Agents (ECSA and ETF) referring to the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, was applied; and Directive 2009/16/CE, dated 23rd April, concerning control by the Port State

Sosialistisessa T ekkoslovakiassa yksilöiden ammatilliset ja henkilökohtaiset selviytymisstrategiat olivat monipuolisempia kuin on yleensä ajateltu. Toimintamallit ja vaikutuskeinot eivät aina noudata stereotyypistä jakoa kommunisteihin ja ei-kommunisteihin. Tutkimus analysoi tunnettujen t ekkoslovakialaisten luonnontieteilijöiden toimintaa kylmän sodan aikana. Luonnontieteet on tutkimuksessa esimerkki rautaesiripun lävistäneestä yhteistyöstä. Yksilötason tarkastelu hahmottaa yhteistyön muotoja, haasteita ja tuloksia. Tutkimus tarkastelee sosialistisen maan tieteentekijöiden toimintaa kansallisessa ja kansainvälisessä tutkijayhteisössä sekä heidän erilaisia selviytymismallejaan pitkällä aikaväillä vuosina 1945 1989. Luonnontieteilijät nousevat tutkimuksessa esiin niin menestyneinä keksijöinä, tieteen managereina, yhteiskunnallisina kriitikkoina kuin myös salaisen poliisin vainoamina epähenkilöinä. Henkilöesimerkkeinä on kaksi kemistiä, Franti ek orm ja Otto Wichterle. orm oli T ekkoslovakian tiedeakatemian puheenjohtaja 1960-luvulla ja Wichterle tunnetaan erityisesti pehmeiden piilolinssien keksijänä. Molemmat olivat tietoisia kansainvälisen yhteistyön ja liikkuvuuden merkityksestä heidän tutkimukselleen. Kommunistiselle puolueelle kansainvälinen yhteistyö oli sen sijaan ongelma. Todistellakseen lojaalisuuttaan Neuvostoliitolle T ekkoslovakian oli rajoitettava omien tutkijoiden yhteistyötä länsimaisten tieteentekijöiden kanssa. Vapauden määrään, jonka puolue oli luonnontieteilijöille valmis sallimaan, vaikuttivat paitsi poliittiset suhdanteet myös taloudelliset tekijät. Näitä muutoksia kuvaa Wichterlen esimerkki. Wichterle ei ollut kommunistisen puolueen jäsen ja hän kritisoi avoimesti tieteen paikallisia käytäntöjä. Siitä huolimatta hän toimi tiedeakatemian alaisen instituutin johtajana, ministeriön neuvonantajana, kansainvälisen tiedeorganisaation aktiivisena jäsenenä sekä Prahan kevään aikana poliittisena vaikuttajana. T ekkoslovakian halukkuus osallistua tieteellis-teknologiseen vallankumoukseen ja tieteen kansainväliseen kilpailuun kiihtyi 1960-luvulla. Prahan kevään aikaisista tieteen uudistuspyrkimyksistä tärkeimpiä oli kansainvälisen liikkuvuuden lisääminen. Tutkimus osoittaa, että yksilöt, joilla oli riittävästi auktoriteettia, ammatillista osaamista ja vaikuttamisväyliä, kykenivät vaikuttamaan tiedepolitiikkaan. Neuvottelu vallanpitäjien kanssa oli edellytys sille, että tutkimuksen tekemisen ehdot paranivat. Myös puolue oli riippuvainen luonnontieteilijöiden osaamisesta. Heitä konsultoitiin mm. taloudellisesti merkittävissä kysymyksissä. Luonnontieteilijöiden ammatillinen osaaminen sai 1960-luvun lopussa suuremman painoarvon tiedemaailmassa kuin puoluekirja. Muuttuneet realiteetit ja tiedemiesten aktiivisuus mahdollistivat yhden menestyksekkäimmistä idästä länteen suuntautuneista teknologiasiirroista eli pehmeiden piilolinssien lisenssin myymisen Yhdysvaltoihin vuonna 1965. T ekkoslovakian miehitys elokuussa 1968 oli vakava takaisku t ekkoslovakialaiselle tiedeyhteisölle. Miehitys ja sitä seurannut normalisointi vaikeuttivat ja rajoittivat tieteentekijöiden ammatillisia mahdollisuuksia ja liikkumavapautta. Yksilötasolla Prahan kevään ajatukset jäivät elämään ja pohjustivat samettivallankumouksen jälkeisiä uudistuksia. ; This research analyses the activities of prominent scientists in Czechoslovakia during the Cold War. The research highlights the active role of individual scientists and investigates their participation in national and international scientific communities as well as their manifold survival strategies and room for manoeuvre. The role of natural scientists in society is illustrated by case studies of two chemists, Franti ek orm the President of the Academy of the Czechoslovak Sciences and Otto Wichterle the inventor of the soft contact lens. The individual scientists recognised the dependence of their research on world science. They had to engage in constant negotiations with the state, which in turn attempted to limit this necessity because of its own political and ideological dependency on the Soviet Union. As the case studies exemplify, individuals with sufficient authority, scientific capacity and access to the Party structures could, however, use their bargaining powers to influence science policy. At the level of the natural sciences the Communist Party was dependent on the expertise of scientists and had to consult them on issues that were relevant among others for solving larger economic questions. The strategies of the two scientists to navigate in their professional lives do not always fit the stereotypical dichotomy of communist and non-communist but are far more nuanced. The study argues that the amount of the freedom granted to natural scientists varied in time and was a consequence of many factors. One of the historical events influencing the scientists' amount of freedom was the Czechoslovak invasion in August 1968. It had dramatic consequences for Czechoslovak society for years to come. It forced the case study scientists to give up their highly ambitious professional careers. The world-class scientists became persona non gratae and were followed by the State Security Police. In this research, the August 1968 occupation of the country by the Warsaw pact forces and its aftermath presents itself as a historical watershed. The study is divided into three parts. The first part offers a historical background with a particular emphasis on the period of the Nazi occupation and the subsequent period of socialism until 1960. From the era of relative autarky and restricted contacts with the outside world in the 1950s, Czechoslovakia went further than other countries of the socialist bloc in its aspiration to improve Western cooperation. International cooperation was one of the priorities of Czechoslovak natural scientists. When the opportunity was given, scientists published in international journals, participated in conferences, organised them, and were involved in international scientific organisations. The second part covers the gradual liberalisation of the 1960s and the events of the Prague Spring in 1968. Czechoslovakia gradually acknowledged the necessity to cooperate with Western universities and scientific communities. Moreover, problems in the intra-bloc cooperation worked as a catalyst for further Western cooperation. Through participation in these scientific communities scientists gained Western recognition. In order to maintain its international reputation Czechoslovakia had to acknowledge the meaning of those organisations. The third part of this study investigates the consequences of the occupation and the era of so-called normalisation until the collapse of communism in 1989. By the end of the 1960s from the point of view of the Soviet Union Czechoslovakia had crossed the line of what was permitted. The invasion and its aftermath were an example of how politics forcefully interfered in the realm of science and influenced the life of individual scientists. The research relies on empirical and critical qualitative analysis of sources. The research uses social and political history approaches by setting the case study examples into the wider social and political context of the time. It thus looks at Czechoslovak society through the prism of academia. The research focuses on cooperation, interactions and attempts to avoid divisions into polar categorisations. Instead of opting exclusively for either a macro or micro level perspective, three levels are used in the analysis: a micro level (individual level), a middle level (the Academy of Sciences) and a macro level (the state and international level). The case studies of prominent chemists exemplify all three levels as well the interactions between the respective levels. Macro level source material used in this study consist mainly of the documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Security Police. At the middle level this study uses material from the archives of the Academy of Sciences such as reports on science policies and foreign exchanges, documents of chemical institutes, the patent department and travel reports of scientists. At the micro level, correspondence, biographies, autobiographies and interviews are the most important sources. In this study, the innovation of the soft contact lens represents a high-level Eastern achievement in science and technology. The study shows how the liberalisation process of Czechoslovak society created conditions for technology transfers from East to West as happened with the soft contact lens. The transfer required both government support and an opening up towards the West. Without these conditions the transfer of the lens would have not been realised, but Otto Wichterle was someone who rose to the challenge. The licence for the soft contact lens was sold to the USA in 1965 and after that it revolutionised the contact lens industry worldwide. Hence, in this study the natural sciences are used as an example of a phenomenon of penetration of the Iron Curtain from East to West. The focus is on forms of cooperation without direct relation to Cold War competition in armaments production. These forms of scientific cooperation therefore rather supported further and more efficient contacts and connected the two societal systems. In Czechoslovakia, the desire to succeed in the worldwide revolution of science took more radical form in the late 1960s than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Concepts like the Scientific and Technological Revolution and the integration of world science began to appear in the official rhetoric on scientific issues from the mid-1960s onwards. It seems that Czechoslovakia grasped the opportunity offered by the notion of the Scientific and Technological Revolution. As a result of the Warsaw Pact invasion and the following normalisation, these ideas supporting academic freedom were shelved for two decades. However, at the level of individual scientists, these ideas which had been allowed to be expressed openly in the late 1960s survived symbolised by the election of Otto Wichterle as the President of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences after the Velvet Revolution. After 1989 Czechoslovakia began to rapidly re-establish academic contacts with Western scientific communities. At least at the level of freedom of movement, the ideas and hopes of the Prague Spring reformers of science were finally fulfilled.

Ten technology forecast reports from the Fraunhofer Institute have been reviewed by staff at the Department of Military-Technology at the Swedish National Defence College (Note that there probably are other technology areas, equally interesting, but not included in this study). The task given by FMV was to assess the military utility of the chosen technologies in a time frame from 2025 to 2030, from a SwAF viewpoint. The method used was first to make a summary of each forecast report. The technology was then put into one or more scenarios that are assessed to be the best in order to show possible utility as well as possibilities and drawbacks of the technology. Based on a SWOT-analysis, the contribution to SwAF capabilities and the cost in terms of acquisition, C2 footprint, logistic footprint, doctrine/TTP, training, facilities and R&D were assessed. Conclusions regarding the military utility of the technology were drawn. We introduce our definition of military utility as being activities that efficiently and with the lowest cost in terms of lives and materiel lead to fulfilment of the mission objectives. The technologies were grouped in three classes; technologies with a significant potential, with uncertain potential and with negligible potential. The following technologies were assessed to have a significant potential for military utility; Augmented Reality Nano air vehicles Solid State Laser weapons In the scenarios studied, Augmented Reality (AR) is assessed to have a positive impact on several SwAF capabilities, especially for C2 and intelligence. AR is a relatively mature technology, applicable in many different branches. There are examples where AR is already applied with great success, e.g. Head-Up-Displays, HUD. The technology has proven its value. However, there are well known drawbacks to the technology such as weaknesses regarding models, increased weight for dismounted soldiers, power consumption etc. There is also a risk that personnel will have problems solving their tasks when AR systems fail, not being used to fighting without supporting systems. Nano air vehicles (NAV's) have been assessed to contribute to a large range of capabilities, primarily intelligence. Their lifecycle cost has been assessed to be low, since development in this area is commercially driven, bringing down acquisition costs. Also, FAA has decided to allow NAV's in controlled air space from 2015, which is expected to lead to an increase in civilian use of NAV's. The technology is relatively mature even though there are obstacles concerning suitable materials, energy efficient propulsion systems as well as miniaturized microprocessors and software to control them. In the scenario studied, High Energy Solid State Lasers are assessed to have a positive impact on SwAF capabilities to engage targets on surface and in the air. The technology can be used to protect vessels on the surface and thereby increase survivability. The development of SSL in the given timeframe is expected to lower cost per shot and avoid the environmental problems with use of chemical lasers. Neighbouring military powers are expected to use laser weapons in the future, therefore SwAF should monitor the development of the laser weapons technology and develop and purchase adequate countermeasures. The following technologies were assessed to have uncertain potential for military utility; Metamaterial cloaking Electromagnetic gun Small satellites Ultra-violet communication Metamaterial cloaking, if realisable in the future, is assessed to be firstly implemented in the acoustic spectrum, since manufacturing of small structured cloaks for the shorter wavelengths in the optic and radar spectra is believed to be more difficult. Cloaking of submarines is primarily assessed to increase the survivability against torpedoes having active sonar. The use of cloaked mines could pose a deterring threat, even to advanced amphibious operations against Sweden. The technological development in this area should be closely monitored and compared to existing, maturing techniques for countermeasures and for the development of broad spectrum active torpedoes. The greatest concern is that cloaking will have negative impact on submarine manoeuvrability. The electro-thermal chemical (ETC) gun seems to be a first step towards a fully electrical gun such as the rail-gun or the coil-gun. The fully electrical guns have been a work in progress for some decades and there are still remaining challenges both concerning electrical power supply and design materials. When or if, they will be operational is difficult to say. The military utility of small satellites is disputed, despite an assessed contribution to several of the SwAF capabilities. The main reason for this is that there seems to be other alternatives which provide the desired capabilities, at a lower cost. Furthermore, the realisability and performance of small productionline manufactured nanosatellites is uncertain. However the scenario has shown that there are benefits to the military utility not met by other resources, e.g. the capability to perform surveillance and reconnaissance in operational areas globally without risking violation of the territorial integrity of other states or the lives of military personnel. Since there is a great interest in the technology area and several programmes are ongoing internationally the knowledgebase is assessed to be significantly better in a five year period. Also, the Swedish in depth study of space exploitation is soon to report. Ultra-violet communication has uncertain potential for military utility within the period, but the technology is assessed to have a positive impact on SwAF capability to maintain communications. The theoretical understanding of the area is low It is therefore uncertain if systems can be realized in the time frame. However, if commercial applications are developed, the prospect of military applications might change. In that case UV-communication could be a complement to RF- communication but is not foreseen to replace it. The following technologies were assessed to have negligible potential for military utility; Biomimetic unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) Automated behaviour Analysis Evolutionary Robotics Biomimetic UUV's could be used for covert surveillance and inconspicuous naval reconnaissance missions at sea or in amphibious missions. Even though the report focuses on fishlike propulsion, the military utility of UUV's is assessed to be mostly dependent on the development of advanced automation and learning systems. As of now, we assess other existing technologies as being preferable due to lower cost and less complexity. The performance of UUV's needed for SwAF capabilities are assessed to be far off into the future. Simpler UUV systems could however be used by potential adversaries for monitoring our own base areas and hence the development should be monitored from a protection point of view. Automated behaviour analysis may be of some relevance for increased security screening and surveillance. The primary military utility of the technology will however probably be for international activities and to a lesser extent for increased base security in Sweden. Generally the main applications for this kind of technology are assessed to be for civilian use in public spaces and close to high value areas like airports, important official buildings and other similar objects. Evolutionary Robotics, here restricted to the sub domain Advanced Robotics, has uncertain potential for military utility within the period. In the scenarios studied the technology is assessed to have a positive impact on a broad range of SwAF capabilities. The area is large and inconsistent comprising sub areas that are assessed to have significant potential, but also those that are believed to have negligible potential or where technological obstacles might retard the development. Our evaluation of the used method shows that there is a risk that the assessment is biased by the participating experts' presumptions and experiences from their own field of research. The scenarios that were chosen do not cover all possible aspects of the technology and their possible contribution to operational capabilities. It should be stressed that we have assessed the ten technologies' military utility in the presented scenarios, not the technology itself. The chosen definition of military utility clearly affects the result of the study. The definition is believed to be good enough for this report, but could be further elaborated in the future. The greatest value of the method used is its simplicity, cost effectiveness and the trade off that it promotes learning within the working group. The composition of the working group and the methodology used is believed to provide for a broad and balanced coverage of the technologies under study.

1International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Provisional measures of protection — Circumstances in which Court will indicate provisional measures — Whether necessary to determine that prima facie basis for jurisdiction exists — Nature of provisional measures in case involving continuing armed conflictInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Removal of case from list — Circumstances in which request for removal will be granted — Necessary that there must be no prima facie basis for jurisdictionInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Intervention — Application by State to intervene to contest jurisdiction and admissibility — Whether any basis for such intervention in Statute — Whether appropriate to hold hearing — Refusal of request to intervene not a bar to intervention at merits phase of proceedingsInternational Court of Justice — Organization of the Court — Judges — Standards of behaviour — Press conference — Reference by State party to case to nationality of certain judges — Suggestion that secret information could not be disclosed to court containing judges from certain countriesInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — Declaration of acceptance — Declarations made under Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice — When transferred to International Court of Justice — Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36(5) — Whether necessary for declaration to have been binding in respect of Permanent Court in order to be transferred under Article 36(5) — Declaration made by Nicaragua on signing Protocol of Signature to the Statute of the Permanent Court — Never completed by ratification — Whether possessing any legal effect — Whether constituting a binding acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court by virtue of Article 36(5)International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — State listed in Court publications as having accepted compulsory jurisdiction — Whether inclusion in list legally significant — Conduct of States — Whether capable of curing defect in State's acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction — Whether conduct must be consistent and unequivocal — Whether State's conduct amounting to an estoppel2International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — Withdrawal or amendment of declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction — Declaration stating that notice required — Whether States within Optional Clause system possessing extra-statutory right to withdraw declarations with immediate effect — State practice under Optional Clause — Reciprocity — Whether applicable to notice provisions of declarationsInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — Reservations — Reservation excluding jurisdiction of the Court in relation to disputes arising under a multilateral treaty if the other parties to the treaty who would be affected by the decision not before the Court — Interpretation — Whether reservation capable of being applied in proceedings relating to jurisdiction — Whether more appropriate for application at merits phase — Reservation precluding Court from adjudicating upon claims based on treaty provisions on the use of force and intervention — Whether also precluding application of customary law principles with content similar or identical to treaty provisionsInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Under bilateral treaty — Nicaragua-United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 1956 — Disputes regarding interpretation and application of Treaty — Extent of jurisdiction conferred upon CourtInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Admissibility of application — Legal dispute — Definition — Whether excluding dispute involving continuing armed conflict — Whether such disputes reserved for Security Council — Whether State required to exhaust regional political machinery for settlement of disputes before referring matter to Court — Absence of other States involved in regional dispute — Whether international law includes indispensable parties rule — Whether admissibility to be considered at jurisdiction or merits phase of proceedingsInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Fact-finding — Rules of evidence — Procedure for determining facts — Relevant period — Press information and matters of public knowledge — Statements by representatives of States — Oral evidence of witnesses — Material not presented in accordance with Rules of CourtInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Absence of respondent State from part of proceedings — Statute of the International Court, Article 533International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Power to award damages — Whether including power to make interim award of damagesSources of international law — Treaties — Customary international law — Relationship between treaties and custom — Development of customary international law through the conclusion of treaties — Whether treaty completely supplants identical rules of customary international law as between parties to the treaty — United Nations Charter — Charter of the Organization of American States — Provisions relating to intervention and the use of force — Whether codificatory of existing customary law at the date of their conclusion — Whether customary law has subsequently developed to take the same form as Charter provisionsSources of international law — Customary international law — Constituent elements — Practice — Whether absolute consistency required — Opinio iuris — Evidence of — Treaties as evidence of opinio iuris — Resolutions of international organizations as evidence of opinio iuris — Significance of concordant views of parties to case as evidence of content of customary lawState responsibility — For acts of armed groups supported by State — Rebel groups operating in one State financed and equipped by other State — Whether acts of rebel groups imputable to the State which supports them — Degree of control necessary for acts to be imputable to StateWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Definition — Whether supplying rebel groups operating in another State a use of force against that State — Whether an armed attack — Provision of funds and supply of arms — Logistical and organizational support — Training — Covert operations — Sending armed bands — Whether an armed attack — United Nations Charter, Articles 2(4) and 51 — Customary international lawWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Self-defence — Limitations on the right of self-defence — Requirement of an armed attack — Necessity and proportionality — Motive of State using force in alleged self-defence — Collective self-defence — Requirements — Whether State which has been the victim of an armed attack must request assistance — Whether third State coming to assistance of victim State must itself be under threat — Duty to report measures taken to Security Council under United Nations 4Charter, Article 51 — Whether also a requirement of customary international law — Evidential significance of failure to report measuresWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Self-defence — Whether State entitled to use force in response to unlawful intervention not amounting to an armed attackWar and armed conflict — Humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict — Geneva Conventions, 1949 — Whether an expression or a development of fundamental principles of humanity — Common Article 3 — Fundamental principles applicable to non-international conflicts — Minimum yardstick also applicable to international conflicts — Conflict in Nicaragua — Whether international — Common Article 1 — Duty to ensure respect for Conventions in all circumstances — Publication of manual advocating the commission of acts contrary to humanitarian law — Whether publication a violation of humanitarian lawWar and armed conflict — Humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict — Naval warfare — Mines — Hague Convention No. VIII, Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 1907 — Duty to notify international shipping of the existence and location of minefieldsStates — Sovereignty — Duty of non-intervention — Scope and extent of duty at customary international law — Support for rebel groups in another State — Right of each State to determine political system and foreign policy for itself — Whether this freedom curtailed by announcement to regional organization of political programme — Whether announcement constituting binding undertaking — Regional organization and some States within region recognizing new government on strength of undertakingStates — Sovereignty — Mining approaches to State's ports — Unauthorized intrusion into State's airspace — Whether violations of State's sovereigntyGovernments — Recognition — Conditions of recognition — Nicaragua — Junta for National Reconstruction offering certain undertakings about future direction of Nicaragua — Organization of American States withdrawing recognition from previous "Somoza" Government — Whether undertakings binding5Governments — Succession — Successful rebellion — New government responsible for acts of rebelsHuman rights — Enforcement — Whether States have a right to use force against State which is violating human rights — Alleged violations of human rights in Nicaragua — Whether justifying use of force by the United StatesAir — Airspace — Unauthorized intrusion into State's airspace — Whether a violation of State sovereigntySea — Territorial Sea — Internal waters — Freedom of passage — Mines — State laying mines in territorial sea and internal waters of other State — Access to other State's ports impeded — Whether a violation of freedom of navigationEconomics, trade and finance — Economic sanctions — Trade embargo — State blocking loans in international organizations — United States sanctions against Nicaragua — Whether contrary to general international law — Whether contrary to Nicaragua-United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 1956 — Whether defeating object and purpose of treatyDamages — Basis for award of damages — Reparation for unlawful use of force and intervention — Declaration that Respondent State under a duty to make reparation — Form and amount of reparation to be settled in later proceedingsTreaties — Form — Informal undertakings — Plan for political development of State issued by government in exile to regional organization — Whether intended to have legal effect

Normal
0




false
false
false

EN-US
X-NONE
X-NONE
















































































































































































































































































































































































































/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin-top:0in;
mso-para-margin-right:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:8.0pt;
mso-para-margin-left:0in;
line-height:107%;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;
mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;
mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;}

Yesterday, the U.S. Senate passed after extensive debate a
bill greenlighting the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline. The final vote
was 62-32 in favor, two votes more than the 60 vote threshold required to avoid
a filibuster. The Senate version of the bill will either go back to the House
where they can pass it as is, or the House can request a conference committee to
hash out the differences. If the House goes the conference route, the committee
will produce a report subject to a straight up-down vote in both chambers. In
either case, everyone anticipates that some form of Keystone legislation will
be sent to the president within the next week.









But, it really doesn't matter. Because President Obama has
indicated he will veto any Keystone XL bill, as he believes that Congress is
intruding on his presidential powers by authorizing an infrastructure project
crossing an international boundary. And, as there are not enough votes in either
chamber to override his veto, Keystone XL will be again delayed and remain
unbuilt unless and until Obama gives the project his assent.



The political realities of Keystone did not prevent political
gamesmanship in the wake of the vote here in Montana though. Republicans have
been chomping at the bit to get this legislation passed, giving it the
designation of Senate Bill 1 to signal the importance of the issue. But the legislation
has been debated for weeks now and subject to scores of amendments. To expedite
the bill's passage earlier this week, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
filed a cloture motion to end debate on the bill and prevent additional
amendments from being considered. As you all know, a cloture motion is used
either to prevent or stop an ongoing filibuster, and if it passes, places
strict limits on further discussion before moving to a vote on final passage.



This cloture motion failed 53 to 39 (again, the motion
needed 60 votes), with Montana Senator Jon Tester voting against cloture. Montana's
freshman senator, Steve Daines, supported McConnell and voted to end debate. 






 (Caption: Montana's congressional delegation, presumably before the vote on Keystone XL)




 Freshman Congressman Ryan Zinke immediately took the
opportunity to blast Tester. "To me, a vote against the Keystone is a vote
against Montana," he said. "I'm a proud co-sponsor of the House bill to build
the Keystone XL Pipeline because it is proven to be safe and in the best interest
of Montana. I will always put Montana before raising money from special
interests in Washington, D.C." (Full story here).



Zinke implied, of course, that Tester's a flip-flopper
and in the pocket of special interests—special interests that are opposed to
the construction of Keystone and the production of good paying Montana jobs.



Yesterday's press release from Montana's State Republican Party
was much more hyperbolic than Zinke's statement. Here is what they sent via
e-mail to those subscribing to their list:

"Last November,
Tester voted to build the
Keystone XL pipeline.
On Monday, Tester joined Senator Democrats' delay tactics and voted against the
Keystone XL pipeline. 

Tester claimed he wanted more amendments and debate but last
November- when Tester voted for the Keystone XL pipeline- there were no
amendments allowed and just 6 hours of
debate. 
Under the
Republican-led Senate, there have already been "more amendment votes than in all of 2014 under Democratic
control" on the Keystone bill alone.  And,
the Senate has spent 3 weeks debating the bill. 


On Wednesday, Tester voted to support President Obama's latest land power grab, allowing Obama to
declare land in Phillips County a national monument and immediately halt
construction of the Keystone XL pipeline."



Both Congressman Zinke and the Montana Republican Party, in
their eagerness to score political points, are pushing a narrative spun of
cynicism and obfuscation instead of an honest consideration of the facts. And
this, I find as a political scientist, quite disturbing. 



Let's consider reality for a moment.



Tester supports construction of Keystone XL, but with some
qualifications, and as he has since the project was proposed. I spoke with him
about Keystone XL and energy development in the Bakken on Veteran's Day in 2011
as we flew between Billings and Helena—an interview I conducted as part of the
research for my book, Battle
for the Big Sky. Here is the transcript verbatim:



David:                  Do you have any problems
with more development in the Balkan?

Sen. Tester:          No. 


David:                  No?

Sen. Tester:          No. 
As long as it's done right.  It's
kind of like the Keystone pipeline, as long as it's done right, you can do
it.  Now, I'm going to tell you
what.  There's a lot of times that this
stuff isn't done right and taxpayers for generations and generations to come
have to fix the problem.  Take a look at
a lot of the abandoned mines around. 
Yeah, they create a bunch of jobs and then when they left, it becomes a
Superfund site the taxpayers have to pick up. 
That isn't a false choice.  That
should have been -- the rules should have been dictated early and that's what
I'm saying is make sure we get the playing field established so that it is done
right so that it isn't a false choice.

David:                Are you confident with the
rules and regulations in place now that the Bakken can be drilled safely?

Sen. Tester:          Yeah. 


David:                Well then let me ask the
follow-up question to that.  If we sit
and put our eggs in the Bakken basket, don't we risk basically having Butte
part 2 over again?  All this development
happens, big towns happen, oil's gone, it collapses.  How do we, as a state, look beyond that?

Sen. Tester:          I don't know that I say we put all our
eggs in the Bakken basket.  I think we've
got incredible opportunities in wind and solar and renewable energies across
the board, but we also need to do right because they can be done wrong, but do
those right and expand upon those.  I
think the Bakken [play], if that's all we're going to look at for energy
future, big mistake, big mistake.  I
think if we developed the Balkan right, there are going to jobs there for many,
many years and there can be a level of energy security there for many, many years. 

David:                      But what about the environmentalist
movement?  There's a number of folks that
are really opposed to the pipeline, opposed to drilling the Bakken and
ostensibly those people are going to be people who are probably going to want
to vote for you and not Denny Rehberg [Tester's opponent in 2012], isn't there
a risk that they're not going to show up and turn out to help you?

Sen. Tester:          I always think common sense is going
to be the deciding factor when it comes to elections and I think, if you
develop in a common sense way, everybody can win.  That's the basis of my Forest Jobs bill.  And there's going to be people on the hard
right and the hard left that want it all their way, but that's not practical
and it's not common sense.  So you've got
to be thoughtful about it.  You've got to
make sure you do it right.  You've got to
make sure that folks follow the rules.

                              And if agency
folks don't follow the rules, by the way, I don't care if you're talking about
benefits for veterans or you're talking about drilling in the Bakken or
whatever, that's an important part of the equation.  So but no, I think enviros in the end can
take a look at what I stand for.  You
know, it is a good choice, it is a clear choice for them because you've got, on
the one hand, the guy [Rehberg] who built the Keystone pipeline, come hell or
high water and I'm saying let's use our heads about this.  Let's do it right if we're going to do
it.  And the same thing with drilling in
the Balkan, let's do it right. 

I searched Tester's Senate press releases, available on his
Senate website, for the term "Keystone XL" to further understand his position
on Keystone XL.  The first mention of the
project came in 2010, when Tester questioned TransCanada's request to operate
the proposed pipeline at a higher than standard pressure—a request which TransCanada
withdrew at Tester's urging. The press release aptly portrays Tester's position
on Keystone XL: He wants it built, but with certain restrictions. Completely in
step, mind you, with what he told me in fall of 2011 more than a year later.



That's the same pattern you see when reviewing Tester's
votes on amendments to Senate Bill 1. Tester supported some amendments mandating
that the pipeline to be built with American material and labor. He voted for an
amendment clarifying that products produced from tar sands would be subject to
federal petroleum excise taxes. He supported an amendment requiring a renewable
standard for electricity production. He opposed an amendment requiring the
federal home heating assistance program to be funded at a minimum level, and
another restricting the transportation of petroleum coke. 



Most of these amendments, including those Tester favored,
failed. And despite the fact Tester has long supported amendments requiring the
use of American labor and material in the construction of Keystone XL, he
supported the bill on final passage. To be clear, Tester did not get his ideal
Keystone XL bill. But he voted for it anyway—figuring, I suspect, that half a
loaf was better than none.

You can see all the roll call votes on the Senate website here.



So, where's the alleged flip flop? As far as I can tell, in
my review of previous pieces of legislation and Senate amendments concerning
Keystone XL going back to 2011, Tester has always supported the construction of
Keystone XL.



The "flip flop" is because Tester did not vote in favor of
cutting off debate on Senate Bill 1 says the Montana Republican Party. He's not
a Keystone XL "purist" because he favored more debate and more amendments.



Well, a funny thing happens when a party moves from the
minority to the majority. Because all of the sudden, positions the party once
took become, shall we say, inconvenient. 



When Republicans served in the Senate minority in the last
Congress, they expressed indignity when Senator Reid did not allow them the
courtesy of considering Republican amendments to Democratic-crafted bills. Democrats
did not allow the amendment process to run its full course, they said, and they
felt debate was rushed and did not consider the minority party's point of view.



Here's Republican Senator Orrin Hatch in a National Journal piece on Harry Reid's
ironclad control over the Senate floor agenda, achieved by filling the
amendment tree (thereby shutting out the minority party in the amending of
legislation): "When the Senate Democratic leadership decides to bring a
bill to the floor, far more often than not we are blocked from offering any
amendments," Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, said on the floor last week." You
can access the article here.
Republicans, of course, vowed to allow more amendments and greater debate if
only voters gave them a majority in the Senate.



Majority status means majority control, and it often means
that in order to get things done, you have to shut down debate and control what
can and cannot be discussed. It also means limiting the amending process. I'll
bet you good money that we'll see far less amend-a-thons on future bills in the Republican-led
Senate. The Republicans, while in the minority, doth protest too much.



On this point, the Republican Party's press release was disingenuous.
But what followed next was either disturbing or laughable. Take your pick.



One of the amendments voted upon by the Senate AFTER cloture
failed was Senator Steve Daines' Senate Amendment 132, which expressed the
"sense of Congress" that restrictions should be placed on the president's
ability to create National Monuments. You can read the text of the amendment here.



Tester voted no on that amendment—a vote which he never
would have taken had the cloture petition succeeded—the same cloture petition
that Tester was criticized for voting against in the same press release! 



So Tester's faulted for voting against cloture, and then he
is criticized for endorsing "President Obama's latest land power grab, allowing Obama
to declare land in Phillips County a national monument and immediately halt
construction of the Keystone XL pipeline." At least, that's what is
spun in the press release. Don't believe it.



Facts are stubborn things. Had Daines' amendment passed, it
would have done nothing to change existing statute.



There is no land grab in Phillips County—and even if there
was or is, Senator Tester's vote on Senate Amendment 132 certainly didn't
express his views on it. At best, Tester voting no suggests that he believes
that the executive branch has and should have the power to protect land by
declaring it a national monument under the Antiquities Act. Every president
since has created at least one National Monument—including Gerald Ford and
Ronald Reagan. It does not mean he wants President Obama to drop a national
monument in Phillips County and stop Keystone XL because HE WANTS KEYSTONE XL
BUILT.



The process of legislating is messy, tortuous, and
complicated. To truly understand it requires taking each and every vote and
placing it into its proper context. To do otherwise represents a gross
distortion of the how the Senate and House operate, and at its core, represents
elevating a politically-driven narrative at the expense of what Stephen Colbert
termed as "truthiness." 



Perhaps more importantly, no piece of legislation is
perfect. To expect our legislators to vote for the perfect bill asks the
impossible. No legislator can or should be held to that standard. But the way
in which political operatives abuse roll call records, they aim to make us think
there is only one way—the true way—to represent a political position and the
interests of a place or a people. Everything else is craven and suspect. I
fundamentally object to this standard, and to this particular misrepresentation
of legislating. We ought to expect better of civic discussion and discourse.



One final point. Using the logic of the Montana Republican
Party as expressed in their press release, I guess Senator Mitch McConnell
hates Keystone, too, because he voted against his own cloture motion! He
flip-flopped!



Don't believe me? Go look it up here. 



No, of course not. He voted against it as a procedural
matter so that he could later introduce a possible motion to reconsider on the
bill. But hey, context doesn't matter, right?

Tässä väitöskirjassa tutkitaan, miten yhtäältä henkilökohtaiset ja toisaalta jaetut ideat sekä ajatusmaailmat vaikuttavat ulkopolitiikan tekoon. Väitöstyön viisi itsenäistä tutkimusta tarkastelevat Suomen ulkopolitiikkaa jostain ideationaalisesta näkökulmasta. Vaikka artikkelit käsittelevät Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan eri ajanjaksoja, työ on kiinnostunut erityisesti kylmän sodan loppuvuosista sekä kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alusta. Työn keskeinen teoreettinen väite on, että kattavan näkemyksen ideoiden vaikutuksesta ulkopolitiikkaan voidaan saavuttaa vain lähestymistavalla, joka yhdistää ulkopolitiikan analyysin subjektiivisiin sekä intersubjektiivisiin ideoihin keskittyvien teorioiden pääperiaatteet. Tutkimus korostaa, että integroiva menettelytapa on sovellettavissa eri ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen analyysintasoilla. Yhdistävän lähestymistavan soveltaminen perustuu näkemykseen siitä, että yksilökeskeiset psykologiset teoriat ja sosiaalisuutta korostavat konstruktivistiset lähestymistavat täydentävät toistensa heikkouksia. Väitöstyö rakentaa argumenttinsa jatkamalla ja täydentämällä Vaughn P. Shannonin and Paul M. Kowertin kirjassaan Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance aloittamaa tutkimusohjelmaa. Ideationaalisen allianssin asemesta tutkimuksessa kuitenkin puhutaan ideationaalisesta ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksesta (Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis, IFPA). Valintaan on kaksi syytä. Ensinnäkin ideationaalinen ulkopolitiikan analyysi ottaa teoriaperinteiden väliseen dialogiin mukaan lisää teoreettisia näkökulmia sekä analyysin tasoja. Se siis toimii kattokäsitteenä ulkopolitiikan analyysin eri ideoiden merkitystä korostaville lähestymistavoille. Toinen syy valinnalle on semanttinen. Rationaalisia ja ideationaalisia teorioita ei tule nähdä täysin vastakohtaisina, ja tutkimusohjelman rakentaminen jotain käsitystä vastaan lähettää turhan vahvan viestin. Idea itsessään on käsitteenä liian epämääräinen, jotta sitä voitaisiin käyttää ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen työkaluna. Tarkempia ja selitysvoimaisempia käsitteitä tarvitaan, jotta ideoiden maailmaa voidaan yksinkertaistaa ja tehdä ymmärrettäväksi. Väitöskirja hyödyntääkin konstruktivismin ja psykologisen ulkopolitiikan analyysin käsitteistöä. Tarkemmin sanottuna tutkimus soveltaa ideationaalisen ulkopolitiikan periaatteita neljällä eri analyysin tasolla. Samalla se tarkastelee tarkemmin neljää eri ulkopolitiikan analyysin teoriakokonaisuutta. Väitöstutkimuksen ensimmäinen teoreettinen osio selittää yksilöiden uskomusjärjestelmien merkitystä ulkopolitiikan tekemisessä ja korostaa sosiaalisen ympäristön merkitystä yksilön ajatusmaailman lähteenä. Työn toinen kumpuavaa kansallisen identiteetin mallin, jossa kollektiivisen kansallisen omakuvan perusta on yksilön identifioituminen tiettyyn kansakuntaan. Tämän lisäksi tutkimus jakaa kansallisen identiteetin kolmeen komponenttiin: maailmankuviin, poliittiseen tarkoitukseen ja statukseen. Tutkimuksen kolmas teoreettinen mielenkiinnon kohde on yleisen mielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan suhde, ja se hahmottaa kolme julkinen mielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan välistä dynamiikkaa. "Alhaalta ylös" –mallissa kansalaismielipide vaikuttaa selvästi ulkopolitiikan tekemiseen, siinä missä "ylhäältä alas" –dynamiikassa valtiojohto pyrkii muokkaamaan yleistä mielipidettä. Kolmannessa mallissa ulkopolitiikan tekeminen ja julkinen mielipide eivät ole yhteydessä johtuen kansalaisten kiinnostuksen puutteesta tai poliittisen johdon välinpitämättömyydestä. Käsiteltyään kolmea valtion sisäistä analyysitasoa tutkimus kiinnittää huomiota ideoiden rooliin valtioiden välisissä suhteissa. Se käsittelee valtioiden välistä luottamusta kolmesta eri teoreettisesta perspektiivistä, ja analysoi, miten erityisesti valtioiden välillä koettu epäluottamus voi vaikuttaa niiden keskinäisiin suhteisiin. Toisin sanoen osiossa tutkitaan, miten valtiotoimijan piirissä elätellyt ideat ilmentyvät kahden maan keskinäisessä kanssakäymisessä. Väitöstutkimus koostuu viidestä itsenäisestä tutkimusartikkelista, jotka käsittelevät Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan eri aspekteja. Laajemman, konstruktivismia ja psykologiaa integroivan, teoreettisen tavoitteen ohella artikkeleilla on omat teoreettiset päämääränsä, jotka tukevat työn kattavampaa tavoitetta. Julkaisu I tutkii Mauno Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmää ja samalla punniskelee, miten sosiaalinen ympäristö vaikuttaa yksilön uskomuksiin. Se kutsuu Koiviston ajattelumaailmaa suurvaltaempiristiseksi. Lisäksi se väittää, että kylmän sodan loppuminen ei sanottavammin muuttanut Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmää, mikä tuki jatkuvuutta myös Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittisessa linjassa. Julkaisu II taas yhdistää koulukuntakäsitteen ja valtioin sisäisessä diskurssissa kilpailevat käsitykset valtiolle sopivasta omakuvasta. Samalla se edistää alhaalta ylös kumpuavaa näkemystä kansallisesta identiteetistä. Tutkimus hahmottaa neljä Suomen kylmän sodan lopussa ja sen jälkeisen ajan alussa vaikuttanutta koulukuntaa – pienvaltiorealismin, integrationismin, euroatlantismin ja globalismin. Eurorealistiselle maailmankuvalle perustunut integrationismi oli koulukunnista selvästi vahvin. Suomen kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alkuvuosien ulkopolitiikassa oli kuitenkin elementtejä jokaisesta neljästä koulukunnasta. Julkaisu III tarkastelee yleisen mielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan suhdetta Suomen ulkopolitiikan historiassa. Se väittää, että Suomen ulkopolitiikasta on löydettävissä kolme erilaista mallia kansalaismielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan välillä. Itsenäistymisen alkuvuosina ja sotienvälisenä aikana ulkopolitiikka ja yleinen mielipide eivät juuri kommunikoineet. Tilanne muuttui kylmän sodan alettua, ja kyseistä aikakautta leimasikin valtiojohdon vahva pyrkimys muokata yleistä mielipidettä. Kylmän sodan loputtua julkinen mielipide voimaantui ja se alkoi vahvemmin vaikuttaa ulkopoliittisiin päätöksiin. Työn seuraava tutkimus, julkaisu IV, analysoi Suomen ja Ruotsin puolustusyhteistyössä ilmenevää epäluottamusta. Se toisin sanoen tarkastelee, miten Suomessa Ruotsia kohtaan tunnettu epäluottamus vaikuttaa maiden väliseen yhteistyöhön turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikassa. Tutkimuksessa on kolme teoreettista argumenttia. Ensinnäkin tutkimuksessa on syytä erottaa tiettyjen kokemuksien aiheuttamat luottamuksen menetykset (mistrust) laajemmasta epäluottamuksen tunteesta (distrust). Toiseksi on huomioitava se, että luottamus on skaalattava ilmiö. Valtioiden välistä luottamusta on mahdollista arvioida ideaalityyppisten minimaalisen (reliance) ja täyden luottamuksen välillä. Kolmanneksi tutkimuksessa olisi syytä erottaa pettymyksen ja petetyksi tulemisen tunteet. Artikkelin keskeisin empiirinen argumentti on se, että uusi kireämpi turvallisuuspoliittinen tilanne ja lisääntynyt puolustusyhteistyö Suomen ja Ruotsin välillä on saanut suomalaisen eliitin keskuudessa nousemaan muistot vuodesta 1990, jolloin Ruotsi yllättäen päätti hakea jäsenyyttä Euroopan yhteisössä. Tällä kertaa pelkona on Ruotsin yllättävä liittyminen Natoon. Suomen ja Ruotsin puolustusyhteistyön keskeinen tavoite onkin syventää maiden välistä luottamussuhdetta, ja lisääntyvä luottamus on syvenevän yhteistyön ennakkoehto. Väitöstyön viimeinen tutkimus, julkaisu V, tutkii suomettumisen eri puolia. Tutkimuksen lähestymistapa on historiallinen, mutta se sisältää elementtejä väitöstyössä käsiteltävistä analyysin tasoista. Tutkimus ymmärtää suomettumisen ennen kaikkea poliittisena kulttuurina, joka syntyi Suomen kylmän sodan ulkopoliittisen doktriinin kylkiäisenä. Kulttuuri toisin sanoen tuki Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton välistä ystävyyspolitiikkaa. Vaikka Suomen kylmän sodan ulkopolitiikkaa voidaan pitää onnistuneena, suomettumisen kulttuuri sisälsi ylilyöntejä, jotka itse asiassa syövyttivät Suomen ulkopolitiikan keskeisiä tavoitteita kuten maan suvereniteetin säilymistä. Kuten todettua, tutkimus on kiinnostunut erityisesti kylmän sodan lopusta ja kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan ensimmäisistä vuosista. Tarkastelemalla ja yhdistämällä viiden yllämainitun julkaisun tuloksia tutkimus pyrkii ymmärtämään, miten kylmän sodan loppuminen muutti Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan ideationaalisia perusteita. äitöstyö toteaakin, että muutos tapahtui kolmessa suhteessa. Ensinnäkin Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisessa orientaatiossa tapahtui muutos. Pienvaltiorealismin ajasta siirryttiin integrationismin aikaan. Suomi lähti lopulta innokkaasti mukaan Euroopan integraatioon unohtamatta kuitenkaan geopoliittisen realismin pääoppeja. Suomen uusi ulkopoliittinen suuntaus perustuikin eurorealismille. Realismin säilymisellä oli konkreettisia vaikutuksia Suomen ulkopoliittiseen doktriiniin – erityisesti päätökseen jatkaa liittoutumattomuuspolitiikkaa. Toiseksi eritoten suomalaiset politiikantekijät ja eliitin edustajat kokivat Suomen länsimaisuuden vahvistuneen. Suomettumisen leima katosi, ja maa kykeni ajamaan intressejään täysivaltaisena länsimaana. Kolmanneksi suomalaisen ulkopolitiikan teon ideationaalisessa ympäristössä tapahtui tietynlainen vapautuminen. Yritykset kontrolloida yleistä mielipidettä ja ulkopoliittista keskustelua vähenivät, ja erilaiset ideat Suomen ulkopolitiikan perusteista saivat kilpailla vapaammin kuin kylmän sodan aikana. Kylmän sodan loppumisen jälkeen suomalaisessa keskustelussa on ollut aitoja vaihtoehtoja kulloinkin vallitsevalle ulkopoliittiselle linjalle, ja yritykset luoda ulkopoliittista konsensusta ovat vähentyneet. ; This doctoral dissertation seeks to demonstrate how personal and collective ideas affect foreign policy. The five original publications making up the dissertation all investigate Finnish foreign policy from various ideational aspects. Although the publications deal with different periods of Finnish foreign affairs, the dissertation places particular emphasis on the end of the Cold War and early post-Cold War years. The dissertation's main theoretical claim is that in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the significance of ideas in foreign policy, one must concentrate on both individual and intersubjective ideas and that this approach is applicable at multiple levels of analysis. In other words, the dissertation suggests that one must harness the respective strengths of cognitive psychology and constructivism, and adopt an integrative approach to the analysis of foreign policy. The rationale behind the integrative approach is the viewpoint that psychology and constructivism support each other's weaknesses. The dissertation builds its theoretical argument on a research program initiated by Vaughn P. Shannon and Paul M. Kowert in their book Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance. However, instead of an ideational alliance, the dissertation speaks of Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). There are two main reasons for this choice. First, IFPA incorporates additional theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis into the realm of ideational dialogue. Thus, it serves as an umbrella for the various ideational approaches of FPA. Secondly, the decision to use another concept is a matter of semantics. To imply that a theoretical construct is against something sends a strong signal, and it is perhaps unnecessary to see material/rational and ideational views as polar opposites. Moreover, "idea" is too broad and vague a concept to be employed as an analytical tool, since ideas are practically infinite and ubiquitous. In order to conduct a sound and theoretically solid analysis, one needs more specific concepts to simplify the world of ideas and to make it understandable. This research taps into the vocabulary of constructivism and political psychology, particularly cognitive and social psychology. More precisely, the dissertation applies the principles of IFPA to four levels of analysis, and sheds light on four different theoretical approaches. The first section of the theoretical chapter explains the importance of individual belief systems in foreign policymaking, and highlights the significance of the social environment as a source of individual beliefs. The second theoretical contribution relates to national identity. The dissertation advocates a bottom-up view of national identity, in which the basis of collective national self-images is in fact individual identifications with a nation state. Furthermore, national identity is divided into three components: worldview, political purpose and status. The third theoretical question under scrutiny is the public opinion-foreign policy nexus. The dissertation outlines three dynamics between public opinion and foreign policy. In the bottom-up model, public opinion clearly influences foreign policymaking, whereas the top-down dynamic refers to a situation whereby leaders actively try to shape public views. The third model is disconnection, which describes a condition where there is either a public disinterest toward foreign policy, or where decision-makers neglect the opinions of the public. In this context, the principles of IFPA elaborate the public opinion- foreign policy link in two central ways. Firstly, the beliefs of ordinary citizens come about in a process akin to elite opinion formation – that is, in the interplay between inherent dispositions and the social environment. Secondly, the manner in which decision-makers understand the importance of public views is partly dependent on their belief systems. After treating the three intra-state levels, the dissertation moves on to inter-state relationships. More precisely, it discusses the issue of trust from three theoretical perspectives, and points out how intra-state ideas of trustworthiness may affect inter-state interaction, namely foreign policy. In other words, the section's main purpose is to show how certain ideas can affect bilateral relations between two states. The dissertation consists of five publications, which all deal with different aspects of Finnish foreign and security policy and which to a varying degree apply the principles of IFPA. In addition to the overarching theoretical objective of promoting the synthesis of psychology and constructivism, every publication has its own theoretical objectives that serve the broader goal of ideational integration. The aim of Publication I on the belief system of Mauno Koivisto is to understand the effects of the social environment on individual beliefs. It claims that Koivisto's belief system is best described as great-power empiricist. Moreover, the article argues that the great transformation caused by the end of the Cold War did not considerably change Koivisto's belief system. Publication II links the schools of thought approach to the intra-state competition between different national identities, and promotes a bottom-up view of national identity rooted in psychology. It outlines the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of the post-Cold War era: small state realism, integrationism, euro-atlanticism and globalism. Integrationism, which was based on a "eurorealist" worldview, was clearly the most powerful school. Finnish early post-Cold War foreign policy nevertheless contained elements from all four schools. The focus of Publication III is on the historical nexus between public opinion and Finnish foreign policy. It claims that three different models of the public opinion- foreign policy nexus have prevailed in Finland during its independence: a disconnection in the years of early independence, the top-down model of the Cold War, and a stronger bottom-up dynamic of the post-Cold War era. In other words, in the post-Cold War era, public opinion has become a stronger force in Finnish foreign policymaking. Publication IV unpacks Finnish beliefs on the untrustworthiness of Sweden as a defense cooperation partner and is thus interested in the interstate-level manifestations of individual and collective ideas. The study lays out three main theoretical arguments. Firstly, it differentiates between distrust and mistrust. The second point the article drives home is that trust is a scalable phenomenon. Thirdly and lastly, the article suggests that a sense of disappointment and a feeling of being betrayed must be separated. Its chief empirical argument is that the Finnish experiences of misplaced trust from October 1990 and Sweden's surprise announcement of its ambition to join the European Communities have now manifested as elite-level mistrust towards Sweden as a defense cooperation partner. In order to intensify mutual defense cooperation, Helsinki and Stockholm must overcome the looming mistrust in their defense relationship. The final publication, Publication V, explores different aspects of Finlandization. The analytical approach to the phenomenon is historical, but it nevertheless contains elements from the four levels of analysis. The publication treats Finlandization first and foremost as a political culture, which was born in part to support the official foreign policy line vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One can argue that the foreign policy strategy of Finland was rather successful but that the political culture of Finlandization had excessive features. It is therefore too naïve to interpret Finlandization only as a successful foreign policy strategy, as some international commentators have done. In fact, it can be said that some of the features of the culture actually eroded the hard core, namely Finnish sovereignty, which the foreign policy strategy tried to preserve. As implied, in addition to the interests in the original publications, the dissertation has an interest in the end the Cold War and in the early post-Cold War years. More specifically, it aims at understanding what the end of the Cold War meant in terms of the ideational foundations of Finnish foreign policy. The study suggests that it signified three things in particular. First, it led to an adjustment from small-state realism to integrationism as the primary orientation of foreign policy. In other words, Finland enthusiastically adopted a pro- European integration policy, but did not forget the core tenets of geopolitical realism. Thus, the approach was based on a "eurorealist" worldview. Secondly, the end of the era vindicated Finland in terms of its Western-ness in the minds of decision-makers. To put it differently, Finland was finally released from the stigma of Finlandization, and was free to pursue its ambitions as an accepted Western nation. Thirdly, the ideational milieu of Finnish foreign policymaking became more relaxed, as the attempts to shape public opinion and control societal debate diminished and as ideas about Finland's position in the world were able to compete more freely. Ever since the end of the Cold War, there have been genuine alternatives to the existing poli attempts to impose a consensus have been less considerable.

Saksan jälleenyhdistymisestä lähtien Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan suunnasta on käyty intensiivistä debattia. Viime vuosien kriisien aikana Saksan ja liittokansleri Angela Merkelin rooli on kasvanut sekä kansallisessa että Euroopan politiikassa. Samalla Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikka on näyttäytynyt paikoitellen tempoilevana ja epäjohdonmukaisena suhteessa yhdistymisen jälkeen harjoitettuun politiikkaan. Tapaus Kreikka vuonna 2010, jolloin Saksa nopeasti päätti puoltaa Kreikan tukipakettia kansan mielipiteen vastaisesti, tapaus Libya vuonna 2011, jolloin Saksa ei äänestänyt YK:n turvallisuusneuvostossa EU- ja Nato-kumppaneiden kanssa päätöslauselmasta 1973, sekä Fukushiman katastrofi, jonka yhteydessä liittokansleri Merkel päätti sulkea Saksan jo jatkoaikaa saaneet ydinvoimalat nopeutetulla aikataululla, ovat esimerkkejä tempoilevasta politiikasta. Tieteellinen tutkimus Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikasta liittokansleri Merkelin aikana onkin tarpeellista, jotta voidaan ymmärtää ja selittää nykyisiä muutoksia Saksan politiikassa ja arvioida niiden laajempia seurauksia eurooppalaiselle ja kansainväliselle politiikalle. Saksan ulkopolitiikkaa on yleensä selitetty rakenne- ja identiteettiteorioiden näkökulmasta, mutta tämä tutkimus katsoo, että ne eivät yksinään pysty selittämään ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan teon maailman kompleksisuutta. Myös yksilötaso, korkein päätöksentekijä, tulee sisällyttää analyysiin. Saksan ulkopolitiikan tutkimuskirjallisuudessa ei ole monia tutkimuksia, jotka asettaisivat korkeimman päätöksentekijän kuten liittokanslerin analyysin keskiöön. Tämä tutkimus lähestyykin Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan tutkimusta liittokansleri Merkelin näkökulmasta ja pyrkii ymmärtämään ja selittämään mahdollisia muutoksia Saksan politiikassa Merkelin poliittisten, operationaalisen koodin, uskomusten muutoksen avulla. Uskomukset ja niiden vaikutus politiikan sisältöön ja prosesseihin on laajasti tutkittu aihe kansainvälisten suhteiden alalla. Eri tutkimustraditiot näkevät kuitenkin uskomusten roolin eri tavalla. Realistinen ja rationalistinen koulukunta näkee uskomuksilla vähäisen roolin kv-politiikassa kun taas kognitiivinen ja konstruktivistinen koulukunta korostaa uskomusten kausaalista, jopa konstitutiivista, vaikutusta. Joka tapauksessa uskomuksilta puuttuu itsessään mekanismit, joiden kautta ne toimivat. Tämän vuoksi tutkimus lisää kansainvälisen ja kansallisen kontekstin Merkelin uskomusten tutkimuksen ympärille. Tämä auttaa kehittämään ymmärrystä, miten uskomukset toimivat konkreettisessa politiikan teon maailmassa. Tutkimuksen keskeinen käsite on operationaalinen koodi. Operationaalisen koodin uskomukset ovat poliittisia uskomuksia. Ne ovat jotain, jota pidämme totena politiikasta. Erityisesti käsitellessään monimutkaisia asioita ja toimiessaan epävarmuustekijöiden vallitessa päätöksentekijä saattaa tukeutua uskomuksiinsa, jotka yksinkertaistavat hänen kuvaansa maailmasta. Tämä tutkimus kartoittaa johtajan operationaalisen koodin uskomuksia perustuen Alexander Georgen määrittään 10 kysymykseen. Hän määritti, että johtajan operationaalinen koodi käsittää sekä filosofisia uskomuksia, jotka ohjaavat johtajan diagnoosia liittyen operationaaliseen toimintaympäristöön ja muihin toimijoihin että instrumentaalisia uskomuksia, jotka koskevat päätöksentekijän uskomuksia parhaasta strategiasta ja taktiikasta saavuttaa tavoitteet. Tutkimuksen tavoite on, ensinnäkin, tarkastella ja verrata liittokansleri Merkelin poliittisia operationaalisen koodin uskomuksia hänen kahden ensimmäisen kauden, 2005–2009 sekä 2009–2013, välillä. Toiseksi, tutkimus pyrkii yhdistämään operationaalisen koodin uskomukset Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan vähittäiseen muutokseen. Väitän, että uskomukset vaikuttavat sekä politiikan sisältöön ja politiikan prosesseihin. Toisin sanoen, kun liittokansleri Merkelin operationaalisen koodin uskomukset alkoivat muuttua hänen kahden ensimmäisen kauden välillä, alkoi hän vähitellen kehystää Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikkaa uudelleen. Tämä saattoi vaikuttaa myös Saksan kansalliseen instituutioiden väliseen voimatasapainoon korkeimman päätöksentekijän sekä liittopäivien ja perustuslakituomioistuimen välillä. Nämä muutokset voidaan nähdä Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan normalisoitumisena. Tutkimusmetodina käytän monimenetelmätutkimusta, joka yhdistää kvantitatiivisen operationaalisen koodin tutkimuksen sekä kvalitatiivisen pitkittäisen sisällönanalyysin ja process-tracing-menetelmän. Kvantitatiivisten ja kvalitatiivisten metodien yhdistelmä antaa paremmat mahdollisuudet löytää kausaalisuhteita uskomusten ja politiikan ts. kausaalisuuden, prosessien ja lopputuloksen välillä. Tutkimusmateriaali koostuu liittokansleri Merkelin saksankielisistä julkisista, ei spontaaneista, puheista. Merkelin operationaalisen koodin uskomusten muutosta ja niiden vaikusta Saksan politiikkaan tarkastellaan kolmessa eri asiakysymyksessä ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikassa, talous- ja Eurooppa-politiikassa sekä ympäristö- ja energiapolitiikassa. Kolmen tapaustutkimuksen perusteella on mahdollista vetää joitakin yleisiä johtopäätöksiä. Ensimmäinen johtopäätös liittyy operationaalisen koodin uskomusten muutokseen. Liittokansleri Merkelin poliittiset uskomukset muuttuivat, joko kääntyivät tai vahvistuivat, hänen kahden ensimmäisen kautensa välillä. Jokaisessa tapaustutkimuksessa, Merkelin uskomus liittyen operationaalisen toimintaympäristön ystävällisyyteen tai yhteistyötä painottavaan luonteeseen vahvistui kahden kauden välillä. Lisäksi uskomus eri keinojen hyödyllisyydestä laajentui käsittämään enemmän negatiivisia keinoja kuten "uhkaus" ja "sanktiot" sekä positiivisia keinoja kuten "lupaus" ja "palkitseminen", mikä puolestaan vähensi yhteen keinoon liitettyä riskiä. Analyysin perusteella uskomukset ovat muuttuneet vähitellen ajan myötä. Korkeimman päätöksentekijän "oppiminen", toisin sanoen uskomusten muutos, on tulosten mukaan kaikkein selvin liittyen laajentuneeseen keinovalikoimaan, mikä voi toimintaympäristöön liittyvien uskomusten muutoksen ohella vaikuttaa ajan myötä päämäärien uudelleenmuotoiluun ja muokata Saksan kansallista ymmärrystä. Tulosten mukaan finanssi- ja talouskriisin puhkeaminen vuonna 2008 vahvisti linkkiä Merkelin operationaalisen koodin uskomusten ja Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan välillä. Toisin sanoen, kansainvälinen kriisi ei kääntänyt Merkelin uskomuksia kohti vihamielistä näkemystä liittyen operatiiviseen toimintaympäristöön vaan kriisin jälkimainingeissa Merkelin kansainvälisen toimintaympäristön ystävällisyyttä ja yhteistyötä painottavia strategioita koskevat uskomukset jopa vahvistuivat. Voidaankin todeta, että tulokset osoittavat uskomuksilla ja ideoilla olevan jonkin verran riippumatonta, sekä suoraa että epäsuoraa, vaikutusta politiikan kehystämiseen, kun uskomuksia testataan ulkoista todellisuutta vastaan. Tutkimuksen toinen yhtenäinen tulos liittyy liittokansleri Merkelin politiikan kehystämiseen ja Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan suuntaan. Toista kautta kohti Merkel alkoi kehystää yhteistyön käsitettä, Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan jatkuvuuden tärkeintä indikaattoria, pragmaattisella tavalla. Tämä tarkoittaa, että Merkel alkoi määritellä yhteistyön käsitettä instrumentaalisemmaksi ja tavoiteorientoituvammaksi. Kun kansainväliset multilateraali- tai EU-tason neuvottelut eivät etene, on yhteistyötä määriteltävä suuntaan, joka sallii kyseisellä aihealueella pienemmät koalitiot ja kumppanuudet, jotka edistävät samoja tavoitteita. Kahden ensimmäisen kautensa aikana liittokansleri Merkel korosti nousevien talouksien roolia ja etenkin kansainvälisen finanssi- ja talouskriisin jälkimainingeissa näiden valtioiden kasvavaa vastuuta kansainvälisestä yhteistyöstä. Toisin sanoen, yhteistyökäsitteen ja yhteistyörakenteiden uudelleenkehystäminen on tarpeellista. Saksalla on taloudellista valtaa ja tämä saattoi johtaa Saksan ottamaan enemmän roolia tulevaisuuden yhteistyön ja sen rakenteiden määrittelystä eri aihealueilla. Saksan mahdollisesti kasvava vastuu ja rooli kansainvälisessä ja Eurooppa-politiikassa ei kuitenkaan tarkoita, että liittokansleri Merkel olisi luomassa suurvalta-Saksaa. Päinvastoin, tavoitteena saattaa olla kehystää kansainvälistä yhteistyötä suuntaan, joka vastaa saksalaista tapaa ajatella. On tärkeää ottaa osaa tulevaisuuden kansainvälisten yhteistyörakenteiden, niiden sääntöjen ja toimintatapojen määrittelyyn, sillä ajan myötä kansallisten rakenteiden on mukauduttava näihin sääntöihin. Tutkimukseni kolmas ja viimeinen keskeinen tutkimustulos liittyy kansainvälisen politiikan vaikuttamisen mekanismeihin. Väitän, että vallankäytön mekanismien lisäksi liittokansleri Merkel käytti kognitiivista suostuttelua tehdessään ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikkaa. Hän käytti asia- ja politiikkalinkityksiä sekä kontrolloidakseen agendoja että suostutellakseen sekä kansainvälisesti että kansallisesti. Kirjallisuudessa asialinkitykset nähdään kansainvälisen vallan harjoittamisen muotona. Tämä tutkimus ei kyseenalaista tätä argumenttia. Kuitenkin voidaan esittää, että kun uskomukset muuttuvat ja korkein päätöksentekijä alkaa uudelleenkehystää politiikkaansa, prosessissa täytyy olla mukana kognitiivisen suostuttelun mekanismi, joka sisältää sekä kansainvälisen että kansallisen yleisön. Suostuttelu liittyy kansainvälisen ja kansallisen yhteisymmärryksen muuttamiseen kyseisessä asiakysymyksessä merkitysten ja konseptien uudelleenkehystämisen avulla. Kahden ensimmäisen kautensa aikana Merkel suostutteli erilaisilla ideationaalisilla käsitteillä kuten "verkostoitunut turvallisuus", "sosiaalinen markkinatalous" ja "kestävyys". Viimeisenä huomiona voidaan nostaa esiin se, että vallankäytön lisäksi näissä kolmessa tapaustutkimuksessa, on myös mukana suostuttelun mekanismi. Tämä saattaa vähitellen muuttaa Saksan kansallista ymmärrystä liittyen Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikkaan ja kansainväliseen rooliin sekä kansallista institutionaalista voimatasapainoa. Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan tutkimuksen tulisi jatkossa keskittyä muutoksen ja jatkuvuuden välisen vuorovaikutuksen analyysiin. Lisäksi on tärkeää analysoida johtajien pragmaattista politiikan uudelleenmäärittelyä ja -kehystämistä, sillä Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan pysyvämpi muutos on mahdollista todeta vasta tulevina vuosikymmeninä. Tutkimukseni määritteli tämän politiikkojen pragmaattisen uudelleenkehystämisen Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan normalisoitumiskehitykseksi. Kolmen tason (yksilö, kansainvälinen ja kansallinen) vuorovaikutuksen ymmärtäminen analyysin taustalla on olennainen osa kattavaa mutta silti nyanssoitua Saksan ulko- ja Eurooppa-politiikan analyysia. ; Since the reunification of Germany, the direction of German foreign and European policy has been highly debated. During the series of crises during the past several years, the role of Germany and Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel has increased. However, Germany's policies have been somewhat inconsistent with its past positions, for example, as can be witnessed in the case of Libya, in euro crisis and during the Fukushima catastrophe. Thus, scientific research on German foreign and European policy under Federal Chancellor Merkel is necessary in order to be able to understand and explain the current changes in German foreign and European policy and to gain perspective on the wider the implications of these changes for both European and international politics. This study views that structural or identity theories alone are not able to explain the complex nature of foreign and European policy-making. Further, on the individual level, the key decision-maker, should be included in the analysis. There are not many current studies on German foreign policy that concentrate on the key political decision maker, such as the Federal Chancellor, as the main subject of study. Therefore, this study will approach the study of German foreign policy from the perspective of Federal Chancellor Merkel and will try to understand and explain the current changes in German foreign and European policy through the possible changes in her political operational code beliefs. Beliefs and their influence on policies and politics is widely studied in the field of international relations. However, the main research traditions view their role differently. Realist and rationalist theories assign only a minor role for how beliefs affect policies, whereas cognitive and constructivist theories emphasise their causal or even constitutive effect. However, taken alone, beliefs lack mechanisms. This study will add international and national contexts around the study of Merkel's beliefs in order to further develop understanding of beliefs and how they operate in the concrete policy-making environment. Beliefs can be defined as what we hold to be true. This study will examine a leader's operational code beliefs based on ten questions presented by Alexander George. George conceptualised a leader's operational code as a political belief system with some elements, philosophical beliefs, guiding the diagnosis of the context for action and others as well as instrumental beliefs that prescribe the most effective strategy and tactics for achieving goals. The aim of this study is, firstly, to examine and compare the political operational code beliefs of German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel between her two first periods of office, between 2005–2009 and 2009–2013. Secondly, the study also aims to link the operational code beliefs to gradually changing German foreign and European policy. It argues that beliefs affect both policy content and policy process. Thus, as the operational code beliefs of Chancellor Merkel gradually changed, the Chancellor also began to reframe German foreign and European policy, which also affected the German domestic power balance between the key executive and domestic institutions such as the Bundestag and Federal Constitutional Court. These possible changes might indicate that German foreign and European policy is in a gradual process of normalization. The study uses a mixed method approach, which combines quantitative operational code research, qualitative longitudinal content analysis and process-tracing. It maintains that a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is powerful in providing causal links between beliefs and policy, between causation, processes and outcome. The research material comprises public, not spontaneous, German speeches of Chancellor Merkel. The change of Merkel's operational code beliefs and its implications for German foreign and European policy will be examined in three case studies: in foreign and security policy, in economic and European policy, and in environmental and energy policy. On the basis of the three case studies, it is possible to draw some common key findings. The first finding relates to the changes in operational code beliefs. Merkel's political beliefs have changed, either reversed or reinforced, between her two first terms in office. In all three cases, Merkel's belief relating to the friendly and cooperative nature of the operational environment has reinforced between the two periods of office. Furthermore, the belief in the utility of different means available widened significantly to include even more 'threat' and 'sanctions' as well as 'promise' and 'reward' as foreign policy means, which in turn reduce the risk related to one single mean. This study views that these changes have taken place gradually over time. However, the learning of the key decision-maker, which is the most apparent in relation to the utility of different means, may gradually influence the redefinition of goals and also shape German national identity. According to the findings, the outbreak of the international financial and economic crisis in 2008 reinforced the link between Merkel's operational code beliefs and German foreign and European policy. Thus, the international crisis did not reverse the direction of beliefs towards a more hostile and protectionist view of the operational environment, rather in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Merkel's beliefs on the friendly and cooperative nature of the political universe and cooperative strategies seemed to reinforce somewhat. It can be stated that the analysis showed some of the independent effect of beliefs and ideas, both direct and indirect, on policy framing when tested against material reality. The second common finding discusses the policy framing of Chancellor Merkel and the current direction of German foreign and European policy. Towards the second term, Merkel began to reframe cooperation, an important indicator of the German policy of continuation, in a more pragmatic way, which implies a more instrumental and goal-oriented approach to cooperation. As the international multilateral or EU level negotiations in the different fields of policy did not seem to progress, the cooperation was defined towards a direction that also allowed for smaller partnerships and alliances that advanced the same goals. During the two first terms, Chancellor Merkel stressed the rise of the emerging economies and, especially in the aftermath of the international financial crisis, their increasing responsibility for international cooperation. Thus, reframing cooperation and cooperation structures is necessary. Germany has economic power and this might have led Germany to take in an increasing role in defining future cooperation structures in different issue areas. The possibly increase in responsibility and the role of Germany do not, however, imply that Chancellor Merkel is creating a super power Germany. On the contrary, the aim might be to define international cooperation structures in a way which relates better to the German way of thinking. Thus, it is important to take part in defining future international cooperation structures, their rules and procedures, because national structures must adapt to these rules over time. The third and final key finding of this study suggests that in addition to power mechanisms, Chancellor Merkel used cognitive persuasion in her foreign and European policy-making. She used issue and policy linkages for controlling agendas and persuading her audiences, both internationally and nationally. In the literature, issue linkages are often seen as a form of exercising international power. This study will not try question this argument. However, when beliefs change and the leader starts to reframe policies, there must always be a cognitive mechanism of persuasion involved including both international and domestic audiences. This relates to changing international and national understanding of an issue through reframing meaning and different concepts. In Merkel's case, she persuaded with different ideational concepts that linked various policies and means such as Vernetzte Sicherheit, Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft and Nachhaltigkeit. Thus, as a third observation, this study argues that alongside power, there was also a mechanism of persuasion involved in these three cases, which might, in addition to the national understanding of German foreign and European policy and Germany's international role, also gradually alter the German domestic institutional power balance. The future research of German foreign and European policy should continue to study the interaction between continuity and change and future German leaders' pragmatic redefinition and reframing of German foreign and European policy as it may be only be possible to state that there has been any permanent change in German policy in the upcoming decades. This study defined this pragmatic reframing of policies as the normalization in the development of German foreign and European policy. Furthermore, all levels of analysis (individual, international and national) should be included in future research in order to gain a comprehensive but still nuanced analysis of German foreign and European policy.

Beginning in 2003, Turkey initiated a series of reforms under the Health Transformation Program (HTP) that over the past decade have reshaped the health system. Understanding the political economy of this process is important for the future of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in Turkey, and also for many other countries and the development agencies that assist them. This report analyzes the historical context and complex political economy challenges of the reform. Our findings are based on stakeholder interviews and a review of literature. First, we identified five contextual factors that were important in bringing health reform to the policy agenda in Turkey, and were helpful in sustaining the reform during adoption and implementation: (1) a long history of reform plans and attempts; (2) fiscal pressure to reform the social sectors; (3) public support for health reform; (4) strong economic growth; and (5) favorable demographic conditions. Second, we assessed four political economy challenges central to the reform and the strategies used by the Ministry of Health (MoH) to overcome them. First, the MoH built public support for reform among the broad base of beneficiaries by focusing on highly visible and fast changes. Second, the MoH overcame well-organized interest group opposition to the reforms by splintering their support or delegitimizing their views. Third, Turkey asserted its own domestic priorities over those of the IMF and World Bank in cases of direct conflict. Fourth, the MoH circumvented potential political and institutional opposition to the large expansion of benefits and coverage through a carefully sequenced adoption and implementation plan that could be executed mostly without requiring the support of other ministries. This analysis also highlights important trade-offs made by the MoH with respect to the redistribution of resources, quality of care, financial sustainability, and physician satisfaction, which will all have to be considered as Turkey enters its next phase of health system development.

Social funds represent a diverse universe of World Bank projects. Social funds are defined as agencies or programs that channel grants to communities for small scale development projects. Social funds typically finance some mixture of socio economic infrastructure (e.g. building or rehabilitating schools, health centers, water supply systems,), productive investments (e.g. micro?finance and income generating projects), social services (e.g. supporting nutrition campaigns, literacy programs, youth training, support to the elderly and disabled), and capacity building programs (e.g., training for community based organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and local governments). Social Fund programs are demand driven and aim to involve the active participation of several local actors, often using a community driven development approach. The main goal is usually to address the needs of poor and vulnerable communities while building social capital and empowerment at the local level. Social funds have several features that place them in the social protection (SP) realm. They typically target poor communities and/or vulnerable households. They finance social risk management interventions like temporary employment generation and expanded access to basic services by the poorest. Social funds are often employed to address immediate post?conflict needs and responses to natural disasters.