Suchergebnisse

L'affermazione delle cosiddette "democrazie costituzionali" dotate di costituzioni rigide, ha portato a compimento un complesso processo storico ed ha condotto alla realizzazione quasi completa del "costituzionalismo", dove la legge, per la prima volta, viene sottoposta ad un giudizio di tipo assiologico. In tale contesto è di notevole importanza il complicato e delicato lavoro del giudice costituzionale, il quale deve interpretare la Costituzione, nel cui tessuto sono introdotti direttamente una serie di principi contenenti valori etico-politici , la cui applicazione non assume più la forma classica sillogistica della sussunzione, bensì della ponderazione. Le più note teorie giuscostituzionaliste e dell'argomentazione giuridica hanno dedotto che i principi sono delle norme di ottimizzazione che descrivono un valore da realizzare il più possibile, con riguardo a quanto risulta effettivamente realizzabile, sia sotto il profilo fattuale che giuridico, talché il loro adempimento non dipende soltanto dalle possibilità reali, ma anche da quelle giuridiche, oltre che da regole e da principi controversi. Nell'interpretazione costituzionale, seguendo il metodo argomentativo, la gerarchia assiologica, la scala di priorità tra i principi costituzionali diversi si rende necessaria, perché essa si riferisce a particolari tipi di norme date da una stessa fonte del diritto, ossia la Costituzione: nel balancing test tra diritti concorrenti la Corte Suprema americana parla di preferred position per taluni diritti riconducibili ad un valore costituzionale primario, come la libertà di espressione e di associazione, la libertà religiosa, i diritti della personalità e di partecipazione politica. Ma anche la nostra Corte Costituzionale è continuamente costretta a scegliere nel caso da decidere, con ragionevolezza e proporzionalità, non solo nell'ipotesi di giudizi di eguaglianza, alla luce dell'art. 3 della costituzione, ma anche quando, nel reperire la norma parametro, deve scegliere tra principi, diritti e valori contrastanti, come ad esempio tra diritto di libertà individuale e diritto alla salute o tra diritto di proprietà e di impresa e riconoscimento del valore "primario" del paesaggio. La difficile ricerca di una gerarchia tra i valori costituzionalmente tutelati esige un'opera continua e incessante di ridefinizione e di ri-armonizzazione dei principi costituzionali sulla base degli elementi specifici forniti dai casi da decidere. Gli enunciati costituzionali debbono perciò tener fermo un nucleo identificativo del valore originariamente tutelato, domandando, nel contempo, attraverso una ragionevole varietà di interpretazioni e di applicazioni, di essere continuamente rimodellati ed adeguati alla storia e alla politica, nonché al mutare delle assunzioni di senso e dei significati sociali. I principi che si trovano alla base delle costituzioni, e attorno ai quali i documenti costituzionali si sono formati, con l'aprirsi di nuovi orizzonti e di nuovi problemi, debbono continuamente essere aggiornati, rielaborati e ricomposti in un insieme dotato di senso. Essi hanno bisogno di rinnovata giustificazione da un interprete dotato di un peculiare ed elevato habitus giuridico, idoneo a rendere un giudizio complesso e articolato come quello di costituzionalità. . Dal punto di vista della metodologia ermeneutica, l'habitus del giudice costituzionale corrisponde alla precomprensione critica, attraverso la quale si può individuare se il giudizio costituzionale sia stato effettuato da un giudice privo di habitus e invalidare tale giudizio, anche a prescindere dalla corretta motivazione del giudice stesso. Se poi si tiene presente che la Costituzione è essa stessa il risultato dell'interpretazione dei principi costituzionali, risulta di tutta evidenza l'importanza di un "circolo ermeneutico" tra i principi conformatori della società e valutazioni della società stessa. Nel giudizio costituzionale la circolarità ermeneutica è molto accentuata, infatti, tra il giudice interprete, la collettività e la Costituzione, oggetto interpretato, si instaura un intimo rapporto circolare diacronico, dal momento che la Costituzione contiene dei principi e dei valori appartenenti alla società della quale lo stesso giudice costituzionale fa parte. Nell'attività giudiziale della Corte costituzionale italiana è possibile riscontrare l'accezione scettica dell'interpretazione giuridica, tipica dei sistemi di common law: laddove, sul piano della creatività, le sentenze interpretative di rigetto, sentenze additive e sentenze manipolative sono tutte varianti suggerite o imposte dalla necessità nei singoli casi di un unico modello di pronuncia del giudice delle leggi, che in presenza di determinate condizioni, consente di superare i confini prestabiliti dai canoni legali dell'interpretazione giudiziaria per addentrarsi verso una funzione che non è solo etero-integrativa del diritto ordinamentale e costituzionale, ma anche suppletiva del potere legislativo. L'utilizzo dell'ermeneutica giuridica, come metodo d'interpretazione, trova particolare rilievo dinanzi alle Corti de-statalizzate operanti in ambiti giuridici ad ordinamento pluristatale come la Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione Europea e dinanzi alle Corti Costituzionali di diversi Stati, riconoscendo l'attività creativa ed etero-integrativa da parte del giudice costituzionale di civil law. Tramite la precomprensione critica e la circolarità tradica e diadica, l'ermeneutica giuridica si pone sempre più come metodo interpretativo indispensabile per l'interpretazione dei principi fondamentali, preesistenti al testo Costituzionale, e per la costruzione e l'impiego dei cosiddetti "parametri non scritti", utilizzati, a volte, dai giudici costituzionali italiani, al di là dei limiti tracciati dal metodo giuridico argomentativo: dove il punto di partenza del ragionamento deduttivo-assiologico dovrà sempre esser il testo scritto, dal quale l'interprete potrà denotare il valore del principio. Pur riconoscendosi nell'alveo delle teorie scettiche dell'interpretazione giudiziale, la metodologia ermeneutica offre una valutazione della decisione di costituzionalità capace di non lasciare alla discrezionalità del giudice uno spazio illimitato, dal momento che precomprensione critica e circolarità ermeneutica, dalle quali discende la canonistica ermeneutica, garantisce un metodo per la controllabilità del giudizio, senza che possa sfociare in decisioni arbitrarie o di opportunità politica. Dopo la riforma del titolo V, con il novellato art.117, primo comma, della Costituzione, la dottrina giuscostituzionalista ha parlato di una possibile estensione della legalità costituzionale, qualora i principi discendenti dal diritto comunitario-europeo ed internazionale andrebbero ad integrare i parametri ermeneutici utilizzati nel giudizio di costituzionalità: nel caso in cui il giudice a quo, in via incidentale, e lo Stato e le Regioni, in via diretta, sollevassero la questione di costituzionalità, per violazione del suddetto articolo della Costituzione. L'estensione della legalità costituzionale, tuttavia ha, anche, il suo risvolto "inverso", nel caso in cui fossero i principi esterni a ledere i principi fondamentali dell'ordinamento Costituzionale Repubblicano. Nel contemporaneo costituzionalismo europeo, che accomuna più vicende ordinamentali diverse, risulta essere di peculiare interesse l'esperienza giuridica della Svezia, una delle più solide ed efficienti democrazie mondiali, caratterizzata da un' antica tradizione costituzionale e da una lunga vaganza del controllo di costituzionalità delle leggi. Quest'ultime, fino a poco tempo fa, venivano interpretate dalle Corti nell'assoluto rispetto e subordinazione alla volontà storica del legislatore. Ultimamente, con l'entrata della Svezia nell'Unione Europea, a seguito delle recenti riforme costituzionali ed attraverso l'introduzione di un controllo di costituzionalità diffuso, le corti svedesi stanno gradualmente cambiando i loro tradizionali criteri interpretativi, per una più ampia ed efficace tutela dei diritti umani, nell'ambito giuridico costituzionale ed europeo. ; The claim of so-called "constitutional democracy" with rigid constitutions has completed a complex historical process and has led to the almost complete implementation of "constitutionalism", where for the first time the law is submitted to a value judgment. In this context, it is of great importance to the complicated and delicate work of the Constitutional Judge, who must interpret the Constitution, whose tissue directly holds a set of principles containing ethical and political values, and whose application does have the classic syllogistic form of subsumption, but that of weighting. Most of the Laws are rules, i.e. require something to run to the occurrence of specific conditions, and, therefore, one can refer to them as "conditional rules". In addition, rules can take a categorical form, such as total ban on access. If the rule is valid and applicable, it is absolutely crucial to impose the exact performance means that the rule prescribes. If this happens, one can determine whether the provisions were complied with or not. For the theories of constitutionalism and of the legal argumentation, principles, however, are rules that require that some value shall be fully accomplished with regard to what is actually feasible, both at the legal and factual levels. Consequently, principles are "rules of optimization", thus characterized by the fact that these can be viewed in differing degrees, and because the measurement of their performance depends not only on real possibilities, but also on legal ones, as well as issues on rules and principles. Following the method of the legal argumentation, in the constitution interpretation, hierarchy, the priorities among the various constitutional principles, is necessary so that it refers to specific types of norms laid down by the same source of law, the Constitution: in the balancing test between competing interests, the U.S. Supreme Court talks about preferred position for certain rights related to a primary constitutional value, such as freedom of expression and association, religious freedom, personal rights, and political participation. But even Italian Constitutional Court is constantly forced to choose according to what is being decided on, not only in the event of equality judgments according to Article 3 of the Constitution, but also when, in raising the standard parameter, it must choose - for example - between the right to individual freedom and right to health, or between property and company rights and recognition of the value of "primary" value of the context. The difficult search for a hierarchy of constitutionally protected values requires constant work and constant redefining and re-harmonizing of constitutional principles on the basis of the details provided by the cases to be decided upon. The statements should therefore take constitutional firm identification of an originally protected core value, requiring at the same time, through a variety of reasonable interpretations and applications, to be continually reshaped and adapted to history and politics, and to the effect of changing assumptions and of social meanings. The principles that lie at the heart of constitutions and upon which constitutional documents were formed, with the opening of new horizons and new challenges, must be continually updated, revised and put back together reasonably. They require renewed justification by judge with particular juridical habitus and critical pre-understending: he/she must have acquired, throughout his/her legal career, technical skills needed to make appropriate assessments in constitutional judgment. From the prospective of hermeneutic methodology, the habitus of the Constitutional Judge corresponds to critical pre-understanding through which one can identify whether the constitutional judgment was conducted by a judge lacking a habitus and invalidate that judgment, even regardless of proper motivation presented by the Judge. If one bears in mind that the Constitution itself is the result of the interpretation of constitutional principles, the importance of a "hermeneutic circle" between the principles in accordance with assessments of society and society itself is quite evident. In Constitutional judgement, hermeneutic circularity is highly stressed, in fact, between the court interpreter and the Constitution, the subject interpreted; it establishes a circular diachronic relationship, since the Constitution contains the principles and values belonging to the society which the constitutional Judge is part of. In the activity of the Italian Constitutional Court, it is possible to find the skeptical conception of legal interpretation, typical of common law systems: where, in terms of creativity, the Constitutional Court, through the "manipulative decisions", exceeding the legal boundaries of legal interpretation, integrates the constitutional law and carries a substitute function of the State legislature. The use of the "juridical hermeneutic" as a method of interpretation is particularly relevant before de-nationalized courts operating in legal fields having multi-state regulations, as the Court of Justice of the European Union and before the Constitutional Courts of several countries, recognizing the creative activity by the constitutional judges of civil law. Through the pre-comprehension and the circularity triadic and dyadic , the juridical hermeneutic, has became an indispensable element for interpretation of fundamental principles and for the construction and use of so-called "unwritten parameters" used, sometimes, by Italian constitutional Judges, leaping the methods based on logical argumentation techniques, for which the judge-interpreter must begin his/her legal reasoning always from the written text, to denote the value of the principle. Although the methodology hermeneutic belongs to the skeptical theory of the judicial interpretation, it provides an assessment of constitutional decision without leaving unlimited space to the will of the Judge, since hermeneutics secures a method for the controllability of the interpretive process, to prevent to the judgment of constitutionality is arbitrary or political. After the constitutional reform of 2001, the doctrine has spoken of a possible extension of constitutional legality, because the new Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution allows the principles descendants from European Union law and international conventions of integrate parameters of the constitutional control on the State laws. The extension of constitutional legality could have its inverse implication in the case some international law violates the fundamental principles of Italian Republican Constitution. In the contemporary European constitutionalism, that unites various juridical cultures, it appears to be of particular interest the juridical experience of Sweden: one of the most solid and efficient democracies in the world, characterized by an old constitutional tradition and a long absence of a control of constitutionality over state laws. Until recently, all the laws were interpreted by the swedish courts in full compliance and subordination to the will of the historical legislator. Lately, with the entry of Sweden in the European Union, following the recent constitutional reforms and through the introduction of a more stronger "widespread" control of constitutionality, the Swedish courts are gradually changing their traditional interpretation criteria for a more comprehensive and effective protection of human rights. ; Dottorato di ricerca in Persona, impresa e lavoro: dal diritto interno a quello internazionale (XXVIII ciclo)

Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ; The purpose of this review is to canvas policies and, to the extent possible, practices of major multilateral and bilateral development agencies, aimed at including disability in development. Development that includes disability, as referenced in this review, is understood as development in which persons with disabilities participate as both actors and beneficiaries. It can be achieved by disability specific initiatives, by adding disability-specific components to development programs, by fully inclusive programming, designed to include disability concerns into all development processes, or by a combination of these approaches. While this review does not claim to be exhaustive, it does attempt to provide as comprehensive as possible an overview of policies and practices on disability and development (D&D), both within and among the United Nations (UN) system, and among major bilateral development agencies. It should be noted that this is a dynamic issue and thus many development agencies are either in the process of crafting new disability policies or strategies or are currently reviewing their existing approaches with a view to modifying or amending them. Section two of this report reviews the international legal and policy framework pertinent to the consideration of D&D with particular attention to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Section three reviews multilateral agencies and structures, particularly those within the UN system, and reviews their existing policies and/or practices related to D&D. Section four includes coverage of regional structures supporting the inclusion of disability in development. Section five identifies bilateral development agencies that, either as matter of written policy or as evidenced through practice, have taken steps to design and implement programs and practices that are inclusive of disability. Section six provides conclusions.

Ensuring food security and halting biodiversity loss are two of the most pressing global sustainability challenges. Traditionally food security and biodiversity conservation were treated as mutually exclusive goals, and as a result, discourses and approaches were developed separately around each of these goals. Recently, however, sustainability science increasingly recognizes the close interdependence of food security and biodiversity and hence, pays greater emphasis to the need for integration of the two goals. Navigating pathways to ensure the successful integration of the two goals is, therefore, an important requirement. Attempts to identify pathways toward such integration have been dominated with a biophysical-technical focus that provides technical solutions to the integration of food security and biodiversity conservation. To this end, different food production techniques, and agricultural land use strategies have been widely considered as a solution to the food security-biodiversity nexus. While much scholarly attention has been given to the biophysical-technical dimensions, the social-political dimension, including equity, governance, and empowerment received little to no attention. By focusing on the poorly investigated social-political dimension, this dissertation aimed to identify governance properties that facilitate and impede the integration of food security and biodiversity conservation through an empirical case study conducted in a multi-level governance setting of southwestern Ethiopia. To address the overarching goal of this dissertation, first I examined how the existing widely discussed food security approaches and agricultural land use framework, land sparing versus land sharing unfold in the local context of southwestern Ethiopia. The finding in this dissertation indicated that the existing global framing of food security approaches as well as frameworks around agricultural land use has limited applicability in on-the-ground realities mainly because landscapes are complex systems that consist of stakeholders with multiple and (often) conflicting interests. This was evident from the finding that, unlike the binary framing of agricultural land use as land sparing and land sharing, local land use preference was not a matter of 'either/or', but instead involved mixed features exhibiting properties of both land sparing and land sharing. Moreover, in addition to the biophysical factors embedded in the existing food security approaches and land use frameworks, stakeholders preference involved social factors such as the compatibility of land use strategy with local values and traditions, which are mainly unaccounted in the existing global frameworks. Findings in his dissertation revealed that the existing reductionist analytical framings to the issues of food security and biodiversity conservation seldom address the complexity inherent within and between food security and biodiversity conservation sectors. Second, this dissertation identified governance structural and process related challenges that influence individual as well as integrated achievements of food security and biodiversity conservation goals. The result of the study showed that the governance of food security and biodiversity conservation was characterized by a strongly hierarchical system with mainly linear vertical linkages, lacking horizontal linkages between stakeholders that would transcend administrative boundaries. This type of governance structure, where stakeholders interaction is restricted to administrative boundaries could not fit with the nature of food security and biodiversity conservation because the two goals are complex in their own involving sub-systems transcending different policy sectors and administrative boundaries. Furthermore, with regard to the governance process, three key and interdependent categories of governance process challenges namely, institutional misfit, the problem of interplay, and policy incoherence influenced the achievement of individual and integrated goals of food security and were identified. Given the interdependence of these governance challenges, coupled with the complexity inherent in the food security and biodiversity conservation, attempts to achieve the dual goals thus needs an integrative, flexible and adaptive governance system Third, to understand how food security and biodiversity conservation unfold in the future, I explored future development trajectories for southwestern Ethiopia. Iterative scenario planning process produced four plausible future scenarios that distinctly differed with regard to dominating land use strategies and crops grown, actor constellations and governance mechanisms, and outcomes for food security and biodiversity conservation. Three out of the four scenarios focused on increasing economic gains through intensive and commercial agricultural production. The agricultural intensification and commercialization may increase food availability and income gains, but negatively affect food security through neglecting other dimensions such as dietary diversity, social justice and stability of supply. It also affects biodiversity conservation by causing habitat loss, land degradation, and water pollution, biodiversity loss. In contrast, one scenario involved features that are widely considered as beneficial to food security and biodiversity conservation, such as agroecological production, diversification practices, and increased social-ecological resilience. In smallholder landscapes such as the one studied here, such a pathway that promises benefits for both food security and biodiversity conservation may need to be given greater emphasis. In order to ensure the integration of food security and biodiversity conservation, recognizing their interdependence and addressing the challenges in a way that fits with the local dynamics is essential. In addition, addressing the food security-biodiversity nexus requires a holistic analytical lens that enables proper identification of system properties that benefit food security and biodiversity conservation. Moreover, this dissertation indicated that there is a clear need to pay attention to the governance structure that accommodates the diversity of perspectives, enable participation and strong coordination across geographical boundaries, policy domains and governance levels. Finally, this dissertation revealed opportunities to integrate food security and biodiversity through the pro-active management of social-ecological interactions that produce a win-win outcome. The win-win outcome could be achieved in a system that involve properties such as diversification and modern agroecological techniques, smallholders empowerment, emphasize adaptive governance of social-ecological systems, value local knowledge, culture and traditions, and ensure smallholders participation. While such diversification and agroecological practices may lack the rapid economic development that is inherent to the conventional intensification, it essentially create a system that is more resilient to environmental and economic shocks, thereby providing a more sustainable long-term benefit. ; Die Gewährleistung von Ernährungssicherheit und die Eindämmung des Verlustes der biologischen Vielfalt sind zwei der dringendsten globalen Herausforderungen, die für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung notwendig sind. Traditionell wurden Ernährungssicherheit und der Erhalt biologischer Vielfalt als sich gegenseitig ausschließende Ziele behandelt. In letzter Zeit wird in der Nachhaltigkeitswissenschaft jedoch zunehmend die enge Wechselbeziehung zwischen Ernährungssicherheit und biologischer Vielfalt anerkannt und damit wird auch verstärkt die Notwendigkeit der Integration dieser beiden Ziele betont. Die Entwicklung von Anwendungen und Lösungsansätzen für eine erfolgreiche Integration ist dabei ein wichtiger Schritt. Viele bisherige Versuche, sowohl Ernährungssicherheit als auch biologische Vielfalt zu gewährleisten, wurden von disziplinären und reduktionistischen Ansätzen dominiert, die oft auf technische Lösungen fokussieren. Zu diesem Zweck wurden besonders technische Lösungen zur Steigerung der Nahrungsmittelproduktion und Strategien zur Optimierung von Landnutzungsplanung vorgeschlagen. Während damit den biophysikalisch-technischen Aspekten sehr viel Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt wurde, wurden die sozialen und politischen Dimensionen, wie zum Beispiel Gerechtigkeit, Governance und Empowerment, eher vernachlässigt. Diese Dissertation konzentrierte sich auf diese sozio-politische Dimension und zielte darauf ab, Steuerungsmechanismen im Sinne von Governance zu identifizieren, die die Integration von Ernährungssicherheit und den Erhalt von biologischer Vielfalt am Beispiel einer empirischen Fallstudie im Südwesten Äthiopiens ermöglichen oder behindern. Zunächst untersuchte ich dafür, wie sich bereits bestehende Ansätze zur Integration von Ernährungssicherheit und Biodiversität, wie z.B. dem 'Land sparing/Land sharing' Ansatz, im lokalen Kontext der Fallstudienregion entfalten. Die Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation zeigten, dass die derzeit dominierenden konzeptionellen Ansätze zur Integration nur eingeschränkt anwendbar sind, da Agrarlandschaften komplexe sozial-ökologische Systeme sind und deren Akteure unterschiedliche und teilweise gegensätzliche Interessen verfolgen. Dies wurde besonders daran deutlich, dass z.B. im Gegensatz zum binären Denkmodel von land sparing/land sharing die tatsächlichen Landnutzungspräferenzen eher Mischformen aus intensiver landwirtschaftlicher Nutzung und weniger intensiver, umweltfreundlicherer Nutzung aufwiesen. Des Weiteren beinhalteten die Präferenzen zur zukünftigen Entwicklung häufig soziale Faktoren, wie z.B. die Vereinbarkeit von Landnutzungsstrategien mit lokalen Werten und Traditionen, die in den bestehenden globalen Ansätzen und Diskussionen größtenteils unberücksichtigt bleiben. Die Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation zeigen, dass die bestehenden reduktionistischen analytischen Rahmenbedingungen zu den Themen Ernährungssicherheit und Erhaltung der biologischen Vielfalt selten der Komplexität des Wirkungsfeldes von Ernährungssicherheit und Biodiversität in tatsächlichen Landschaften gerecht werden. Zweitens wurden durch diese Dissertation strukturelle und prozessbezogene Herausforderungen für Governance im Südwesten Äthiopiens identifiziert, die sowohl die individuellen Ziele von Ernährungssicherheit und Biodiversität, als auch deren Integration beeinflussen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Steuerung von Ernährungssicherheit und biologischer Vielfalt durch ein stark hierarchisches System gekennzeichnet ist, welches hauptsächlich lineare, vertikale Verknüpfungen aufweist und keine horizontalen Verknüpfungen zwischen den Beteiligten beinhaltet, welche auch Verwaltungsgrenzen überbrücken würden. Diese Art der Governance-Struktur, bei der die Wechselwirkungen zwischen Interessengruppen auf Verwaltungsgrenzen beschränkt sind, steht der Integration von Ernährungssicherheit und dem Erhalt von Biodiversität entgegen, da die beiden Ziele für sich genommen schon komplex sind und außerdem eine größere räumliche Dynamik entfalten als die bestehende Verwaltungsgrenzen vorgeben. Im Hinblick auf den Governance-Prozess wurden drei wichtige und voneinander abhängige Herausforderungen identifiziert, nämlich institutionelle Fehlanpassungen (misfit), das Problem des Zusammenspiels (interplay) und der Policy-Inkohärenzen (incoherence). Angesichts der wechselseitigen Abhängigkeiten dieser Governance-Herausforderungen und der Komplexität, die mit Ernährungssicherheit und dem Erhalt biologischer Vielfalt einhergehen, ist ein integratives, flexibles und anpassungsfähiges Governance-System erforderlich. Drittens habe ich untersucht wie sich Ernährungssicherheit und biologischen Vielfalt im Südwesten Äthiopiens in Zukunft verändern könnten. Mit Hilfe der Methode der partizipativen Szenarienplanung wurden vier plausible Zukunftsszenarien entwickelt. Die Szenarien unterschieden sich in Bezug auf Landnutzungsstrategie, Akteurskonstellation, Governance-Mechanismen, sowie der erreichten Ernährungssicherheit und biologischen Vielfalt. Drei der vier Szenarien konzentrierten sich auf die Steigerung des wirtschaftlichen Gewinns durch intensivierte und kommerzialisierte landwirtschaftliche Produktion. Die Intensivierung und Kommerzialisierung der Landwirtschaft können zwar die Verfügbarkeit von Nahrungsmitteln und die Einkommensgewinne erhöhen, sie können die Ernährungssicherheit jedoch auch beeinträchtigen, indem andere Dimensionen wie die z.B. Nahrungsmittelvielfalt, die soziale Gerechtigkeit und die Versorgungsstabilität vernachlässigt werden. Außerdem führen diese zu einem Verlust an biologische Vielfalt, da z.B. Lebensräume verloren gehen oder sich Boden- und Wasserqualität verschlechtern. Im Gegensatz dazu umfasste ein Szenario Merkmale, die allgemein als vorteilhaft für die Ernährungssicherheit und den Erhalt der biologischen Vielfalt angesehen werden können. Dieses Szenario beinhaltet agroökologische Produktionsmethoden, eine Diversifizierung von Einkommensquellen und eine erhöhte sozial-ökologische Resilienz. Um die Integration von Ernährungssicherheit und den Erhalt von biologischer Vielfalt zu gewährleisten, ist es unerlässlich, deren gegenseitige Abhängigkeit zu erkennen und die Herausforderungen in einer Weise anzugehen, die den lokalen sozial-ökologischen Bedingungen entspricht. Außerdem ist ein ganzheitlicher analytischer Ansatz erforderlich, um Systemeigenschaften zu identifizieren, die sowohl der Ernährungssicherheit als auch dem Erhalt von Biodiversität zugutekommen. Durch diese Dissertation wurde deutlich, dass eine erfolgreiche Governance im Südwesten Äthiopiens unterschiedliche Perspektiven berücksichtigen und eine Beteiligung und Koordinierung über geografische Grenzen, politische Bereiche und Führungsebenen hinweg ermöglichen sollte. Durch die Entwicklung von Zukunftsszenarien zeigte diese Arbeit Möglichkeiten zur Integration von Ernährungssicherheit und biologischer Vielfalt durch ein proaktives Management sozial-ökologischer Interaktionen auf. Insbesondere würde eine Integration der beiden Ziele durch Strategien zur Diversifizierung von Einkommensquellen, moderne agrarökologische Methoden, eine Stärkung der Rechte von und der Beteiligung von Kleinbauern, einer Betonung von adaptiver Governance und die Wertschätzung lokaler Kenntnisse, Kultur und Traditionen umfassen. Obwohl ein solcher Ansatz möglicherweise keinen raschen wirtschaftlichen Erfolg bringen würde, schüfe er doch ein System, das widerstandsfähiger gegenüber Umwelt- und Wirtschaftsschocks ist und ein langfristig nachhaltigere Entwicklung ermöglicht.

'Social pedagogy' is not a familiar term in South Africa. Instead, everything to do with education outside or beyond schooling is subsumed under 'adult education'. Community education or alterna- tives are generally known as 'radical' or 'popular' education' concerned with social, economic and political transformation. Based on the pedagogy of Paulo Freire and participatory development paradigms these are rooted in the mass democratic struggles against apartheid. This paper is based on extensive research by the authors as participant observers and activists, conducted over many years into university-based adult education on the one hand, and praxis outside academic institutions, on the other. The authors have a his- tory of engagement in worker education, and key elements of education in the non-racial trade union move- ment as one of the most important organised forces of internal political resistance are suggested as informing curricula of university-based adult education.Since 1994 and the change to democracy, adult education departments in universities have increasingly been eroded or disappeared as separate departments or programmes. Like elsewhere in the north, we have witnessed the undermining and increased professionalization and institutionalization of adult education across contexts – and with it a marked reduction in radical outlook and purpose. However, the method- ological approach has remained committed to participation and dialogue, and, with the waning of commu- nity-based students who bring with them extensive experience from the field, there is a consistent emphasis on other, practice-based knowledges through guest educators, and by sending students to design and con- duct research and small interventions, at community level.Popular education outside the university takes numerous forms, and as an 18-month research project has shown, there are still many initiatives that target members of working class communities who have no other access to education. Much of this work is based on a 'pedagogy of contingency' in that it responds di rectly to local needs and concerns. However, not all of the popular education practices continue the tradi tion of radical, conscientising education. We describe three tensions or contradictions experienced by ed- ucators concerned with transformation; firstly, the tension between participation as a principle or a technique; secondly, the tension between individual or collective change; thirdly, the tension between working 'bottom- up' or 'top-down' in designing curricula and asking 'Who leads, and who follows?' in attempts to work dem- ocratically. We conclude that constraints and demands informed by neoliberal politics have made the work of activist academics and academic activists increasingly difficult. The paper concludes by suggesting that building global solidarity amongst adult educators who have carried their struggles from the past into the future, and younger educators who create new forms of radical pedagogy forward, are important ways of keeping social justice agendas and practices alive. ; La Pedagogía Social no es un término común en Sudáfrica. En su lugar, todo cuanto hace referencia a la educación que quede fuera o más allá de la escolaridad se integra en la ense- ñanza de adultos. La educación de la comunidad u otras alternativas son conocidas generalmente como educación radical o popular, y se ocupa de la transformación social, económica o política. Según la pedagogía de Paulo Freire y paradigmas de desarrollo participativo, esta pedagogía hunde sus raíces en la lucha democrática de masas contra el apartheid. Este artículo se basa en una ex- tensa investigación realizada por los autores como observadores participantes y activistas, llevada a cabo durante varios años en la educación de adultos con base universitaria por una parte, y en la praxis fuera del ámbito académico por la otra. Los autores han estado comprometidos con la educación obrera, y los elementos esenciales de la educación en el movimiento sindicalista anti- rracista, considerado como una de las fuerzas organizadas de resistencia política interna más im- portantes, son sugeridos como planes de estudio de la educación de adultos con base universitaria.Desde 1994 y el cambio hacia la democracia, los departamentos de educación para adultos en las uni- versidades se han visto cada vez más mermados o directamente han desaparecido en otros departamen- tos o programas diferentes. Como en cualquier otro lugar en el norte, nosotros hemos sido testigos de una extenuante e incrementada profesionalización e institucionalización de la educación de adultos indepen- dientemente del contexto -y, con ello, de una notable reducción en punto de vista y propósito. Sin embargo, el enfoque metodológico ha permanecido comprometido con la participación y el diálogo, y, con la dismi- nución de estudiantes localizados a nivel comunitario que aporten amplia experiencia obtenida en el te- rreno. Por ese motivo existe un continuo énfasis en otros conocimientos basados en la práctica a través de educadores invitados, y en enviar estudiantes a diseñar y realizar investigaciones y pequeñas intervencio- nes a nivel comunitario.La educación popular fuera de la universidad presenta numerosas formas, y como un proyecto de in- vestigación de 18 meses de duración ha mostrado, aún hay muchas iniciativas cuyo objetivo son miembros de comunidades de clase trabajadora que no tienen ningún otro acceso a la educación. Gran parte de este trabajo se basa en una 'pedagogía de la contingencia' que responde directamente a las necesidades y pro- blemas locales. Sin embargo, no todas las prácticas de educación popular continúan la tradición de una edu- cación radical y de concienciación. Describimos tres tensiones o contradicciones experimentadas por educadores preocupados por la transformación; en primer lugar, la tensión entre la participación como prin- cipio o como técnica; en segundo lugar, la tensión entre el cambio individual o colectivo; en tercer lugar, la tensión entre trabajar de arriba abajo o en sentido contrario a la hora de diseñar planes de estudio y pre- guntarnos '¿Quién lidera, y quién sigue?' en un intento de trabajar democráticamente. Concluimos que las limitaciones y las exigencias de los políticos neoliberales han hecho el trabajo de los académicos activistas y de los activistas académicos cada vez más difícil. El artículo concluye sugiriendo que construir la solidari- dad mundial entre educadores de adultos que han transmitido sus luchas desde el pasado hasta el futuro,y educadores más jóvenes que crean nuevas formas de pedagogía radical, es una manera importante de mantener vivas las agendas y prácticas de la justicia social. ; "Pedagogia social" não é um termo familiar na África do Sul. Em vez disso, tudo que tem a ver com educação fora ou além da escolaridade está subsumida na "educação de adultos". Educação comuni- tária ou alternativa são geralmente conhecidas como educação 'radical' ou 'popular' interessada com a trans- formação social, econômica e política. Com base na Pedagogia de Paulo Freire e paradigmas de desenvolvimento participativo, estão enraizadas nas lutas democráticas de massa contra o apartheid. Este artigo é baseado em extensa pesquisa pelos autores como observadores participantes e ativistas, realizada ao longo de muitos anos em educação de adultos de base universitária, por um lado, e na práxis fora de ins- tituições acadêmicas, por outro. Os autores têm uma história de envolvimento com a educação do traba- lhador e elementos-chave da educação no movimento sindical não-racial como uma das forças organizadas mais importantes de resistência política interna são sugeridos como informando currículos da educação de adultos universitária.Desde 1994, mudança para a democracia, os departamentos de educação de adultos nas universidades cada vez mais têm sido erodidos e desapareceram como departamentos ou programas separados. Como em outros lugares no Norte, temos assistido o aumento da profissionalização e institucionalização da Pe- dagogia Social em vários contextos - e com ela uma redução acentuada na perspectiva e propósito radical. No entanto, a abordagem metodológica permaneceu comprometida com a participação e o diálogo, e, com a diminuição de estudantes enraizados em comunidades que trazem consigo uma vasta experiência no campo, há uma consistente ênfase sobre outros conhecimentos baseados em práticas através de educa- dores de hóspedes, enviando os alunos a projetarem e realizarem investigações e pequenas intervenções a nível comunitário.A educação popular fora da universidade assume inúmeras formas e, como um projeto de investigação de 18 meses mostrou, ainda existem muitas iniciativas que têm como alvo os membros das comunidades da classe trabalhadora que não possuem outra acesso à educação. Muito desse trabalho é baseado em uma "pedagogia de contingência" a medida que responde diretamente às necessidades e interesses locais. No entanto, nem todas as práticas de educação popular continuam a tradição radical de educação conscienti- zadora Nós introduzimos três tensões que descrevem as contradições para educadores preocupados com a transformação; em primeiro lugar, as tensões entre a participação como princípio ou a uma técnica; em segundo lugar, a tensão entre a mudança individual ou coletiva; em terceiro lugar, a tensão entre o traba- lho "bottom-up" ou "top-down" na concepção de currículos e perguntando "quem lidera e quem segue" na tentativa de trabalhar democraticamente. Concluimos que as restrições e exigências informados por polí- ticas neoliberais fizeram o trabalho de ativistas acadêmicos e acadêmicos ativistas cada vez mais difícil. O artigo conclui sugerindo que a construção de uma solidariedade global entre os educadores de adultos que tem carregado suas lutas suas lutas do passado para o futuro e os jovens que criam novas formas de pe- dagogia radical para a frente, é uma forma importante de manter vivas agendas e práticas de justiça social.

ABSTRACT In the present research work, a doctrinal framework of what constitutes circumstantial evidence is developed, its compatibility with the right to the presumption of innocence, the requirements of logical reasoning that a judicial sentence based on circumstantial evidence must follow, the classification of indications, and why the circumstantial evidence is so relevant in the context of a criminal process. In order to determine the responsibility of the accused, not only is the evidence used, which not only responds to the rules of logic, maxims of experience or scientific knowledge, but also to logical reasoning that responds to signs of presence or of physical opportunity, of participation in the crime, of motive is the context in which the criminal act occurs, there is no voluntary act without motive or motive, of suspicious attitudes or the behavior of the subject before or after the fact, of personality where it is taken into account the behavior of the subject, the previous and subsequent indications that consists in establishing the external manifestations of the individual both before and after the criminal act and the indication of logical inconsistency where the factual and justificatory story of the defendant or his defense is analyzed. One of the most complex topics within the theory of evidence in criminal proceedings is undoubtedly referred to the circumstantial evidence. The circumstantial evidence is constructed on the basis of a logical inference, where certain indirect facts that are taken for granted are linked to a univocal and necessary conclusion that proves some aspect of the material object of the criminal process in the making. Thus, although it is considered an indirect proof of the central facts to be proven in a criminal proceeding, it does not lack evidential force capable of sustaining a condemnatory sentence and is, in that sense, an important tool for the judge when the facts judged not they can be tested by direct evidence or by evidence supported by technical or scientific knowledge. This, within the framework of the principles of free evidentiary assessment and the sound criticism that inform the system of evidence of our criminal process, that grant the judge a wide margin for the construction of a theory that explains the existence of the crime and the participation of the imputed in it. However, as is known, this wide margin of appreciation of the evidence can not be arbitrary, since, the Political Constitution imposes on the judge the obligation to explain the logical - factual - legal reasoning on which it bases its final decision condemning or absolving the imputed, respecting at all times the right to presumption of innocence and the right to the counter test that assists the accused. In this virtue, the establishment of the criminal responsibility of the accused through a circumstantial test has repercussions in three areas of the fundamental rights of the person subject to criminal proceedings, the right to the presumption of innocence, the right to control and production. of the test, and the motivation of judicial decisions. ; RESUMEN La presente investigación tiene como propósito determinar el tema de qué manera la prueba indiciaria puede evitar la impunidad en casos de ausencia de prueba directa en los diversos delitos investigados por los Juzgados Penales de la Provincia de Chachapoyas durante el periodo 2015-2016. La delincuencia en nuestra sociedad cada vez va incrementándose de manera preocupante, se observa que los delincuentes adoptan nuevas modalidades para la comisión de delitos, lo que hace en el aspecto probatorio del delito mucho más difícil para nuestro sistema judicial, porque como sabemos la probanza de un delito generalmente es complejo, lo que académicamente me motivó a investigar el tratamiento de la prueba indiciaria por parte de los magistrados de la Provincia de Chachapoyas a fin de evitar la impunidad en casos de ausencia de prueba directa. La presente investigación se encuentra orientada desde un método analítico y un enfoque cualitativo; empleando a su vez método de recolección de datos como análisis documental y análisis del marco normativo mediante lo que se pudo concluir específicamente que los Jueces Penales de la Provincia de Chachapoyas si deben de aplicar los distintos criterios de valoración de la prueba indiciaria, sin afectar los principios y garantías del proceso penal a fin de evitar la impunidad en casos de ausencia de prueba directa. Este trabajo de investigación se desarrolla dentro del marco doctrinario de lo que constituye Prueba indiciaria, su compatibilidad con el derecho a la presunción de inocencia, los requisitos del razonamiento lógico que debe seguir una sentencia judicial que se fundamente en prueba indiciaria, la clasificación de indicios, y el porqué es tan relevante la prueba indiciaria en el marco de un proceso penal. Así también para determinar la responsabilidad del imputado no solo se utiliza la prueba indiciaria la misma que no solo responde a las reglas de la lógica, las máximas de la experiencia o a los conocimientos científicos sino a un razonamiento lógico que responda a los indicios de presencia o de oportunidad física, de participación en el delito, de motivo es el contexto donde ocurre el hecho delictuoso no existe acto voluntario sin motivo o móvil, de actitudes sospechosas o el comportamiento del sujeto anteriores o posteriores al hecho, de personalidad donde se toma en cuenta la conducta del sujeto, de los indicios anteriores y subsiguientes que consiste en establecer las manifestaciones exteriores del individuo tanto antes como después del hecho delictivo y el indicio de inconsistencia lógica donde se analiza el relato factico y justificativo del imputado o de su defensa. Uno de los tópicos más complejos dentro de la teoría de la prueba en el proceso penal es sin duda lo referido a la prueba indiciaria. La prueba indiciaria se construye sobre la base de una inferencia lógica, donde determinados hechos indirectos que se dan por probados se enlazan a una conclusión unívoca y necesaria que acredita algún aspecto del objeto material del proceso penal en ciernes. Así, aunque es considerada una prueba indirecta de los hechos centrales a probarse en un proceso penal, no por eso carece de fuerza probatoria capaz de sustentar una sentencia condenatoria y es, en ese sentido, una herramienta importante para el juzgador cuando los hechos juzgados no pueden ser probados por elementos de prueba directos o por pruebas sustentadas en los conocimientos técnicos o científicos. Ello, dentro del esquema de los principios de libre valoración probatoria y la sana crítica que informan el sistema de pruebas de nuestro proceso penal, que otorgan al juzgador un amplio margen para la construcción de una teoría que explique la existencia del delito y la participación del imputado en el mismo. Sin embargo, como se sabe este amplio margen de apreciación de la prueba no puede ser arbitrario, ya que, la Constitución Política impone al juez la obligación de explicar el razonamiento lógico – fáctico – jurídico en el que sustenta su decisión final condenando o absolviendo al imputado, respetando en todo momento el derecho a presunción de inocencia y el derecho a la contraprueba que le asiste al imputado. En tal virtud, el establecimiento de la responsabilidad penal del imputado a través de una prueba indiciaria repercute en tres ámbitos de los derechos fundamentales de la persona sometida a un proceso penal, el derecho a la presunción de inocencia, el derecho al control y a la producción de la prueba, y a la motivación de las resoluciones judiciales. ; Tesis

La presente investigación, pretende un acercamiento a aquellos elementos básicos que podrían constituir de algún modo, límites a las decisiones políticas sean o no discrecionales, dentro del marco de la Razón de Estado, aplicada en el Estado Social y Democrático de derecho. Límites como el fin o bien público entendido en sentido positivo como "la obediencia a la ley" (Foucault, 2006, p. 122), y en sentido naturalista como los intereses del colectivo, así como los derechos humanos, la norma, la razón, temporalidad y responsabilidad, pueden evitar el margen de autoritarismo o abuso del poder. El inicio de partida, será aquellos hechos que motivaron el origen de este modelo estatal, intentando encontrar indicios sobre su razón de ser o su objeto. Se analizará el concepto clásico de Razón de Estado maquiavélico, el cual podría ser entendido en estricto sentido, como aquella institución subjetiva que permite al gobernante la ejecución de medidas para garantizar la supervivencia y conservación del Estado como un bien superior a los demás, por encima inclusive de derechos y garantías individuales tan importantes como la libre locomoción, la libertad de expresión, la intimidad y hasta la propia vida. No obstante, se pretende abordar una visión distinta de Razón de Estado enfocada a dar mayor protección a la conservación y bienestar de las personas y a los derechos humanos, enfoque que también podría tener origen en el mismo Maquiavelo. Por último, se abordará el proceso de paz con las FARC adelantado por el gobierno nacional, donde se puede advertir violación al derecho fundamental de participación característico del modelo democrático; en el que, mediante plebiscito, el poder soberano deslegitimó el acuerdo final, lo que podría haber inhabilitado al presidente de la república para ejercer su iniciativa legislativa, con base en los acuerdos consultados al pueblo, sin que signifique que el presidente haya quedado sin facultad para realizar acuerdos, solo que no debió utilizar contenido del texto del acuerdo consultado. ; Tabla de contenido RESUMEN 1 Palabras Clave 1 Keywords 1 INTRODUCCIÓN 2 1. TITULO I 4 Estado social y democrático de derecho 4 1.1. CAPITULO I 4 1.1.1 Introducción a la teoría del Estado social y democrático de derecho 4 1.1.2 Teorías sobre el origen del Estado 7 1.1.2.1. Teoría teológica 7 1.1.2.2. Teoría de la fuerza 7 1.1.2.3. Teoría positivista 8 1.1.2.4. Teoría organicista 8 1.1.2.5. Teoría contractualista 9 1.1.3. Clasificación de los Estados 12 1.1.3.1. Según el régimen político y el sistema de gobierno 12 1.1.4. Elementos del Estado 14 1.1.5. Estado de derecho 15 1.1.6. Estado social y democrático de derecho 21 1.1.6.1. Elemento "democracia" en el Estado social y democrático de derecho 23 1.2 CAPITULO II 26 Estado colombiano, social, democrático y de derecho 26 1.3 CAPITULO III 31 División del poder público 31 1.4 CAPITULO IV 34 Mutación del elemento "Soberanía" 34 1.5 CAPITULO V 38 Principios de la administración que contribuyen al logro de los fines del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho. 38 1.5.1 Justicia 39 1.5.2 Buena fe, y respeto, fuente de estados de paz y tranquilidad 40 1.5.3 Debido proceso administrativo 41 1.5.4 Eficacia y eficiencia 41 2. TITULO II 43 ¿Qué es Razón de Estado y cuáles son sus límites? 43 2.1 CAPITULO I 43 ¿Qué es Razón de Estado? 43 2.2 CAPITULO II 58 Orígenes de la Razón de Estado y de la Razón de Estado Constitucional, en Colombia 58 2.3 CAPITULO III 64 ¿Cuáles son los límites de la Razón de Estado en el Estado Social y democrático de derecho? 64 3. TITULO III 67 Derechos Humanos como límite a la Razón de Estado 67 3.1. Derechos humanos en el ordenamiento jurídico colombiano 73 3.2. Hipótesis de Caso para la aplicación de la Razón de Estado 78 5. TITULO IV 80 5.1. Estudio de caso, una reflexión a los acuerdos de la Habana por la indebida aplicación de la Razón de Estado 80 5.2. Principales aspectos del Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y no Repetición 91 6. CONCLUSIONES 93 Referencias Bibliográficas 97 ; The present investigation, intends an approach to those basic elements that could constitute in some way, limits to the political decisions whether or not discretionary, within the framework of the Reason of State, applied in the Social and Democratic State of law. Limits as the end or public good understood in a positive sense as "obedience to the law" (Foucault, 2006, p.122), and in a naturalistic sense as the interests of the collective, as well as human rights, norm, reason , temporality and responsibility, can avoid the margin of authoritarianism or abuse of power. The start of departure, will be those events that led to the origin of this state model, trying to find clues about its raison d'être or its purpose. The classic concept of Machiavellian Reason of State will be analyzed, which could be understood in a strict sense, as that subjective institution that allows the governor the execution of measures to guarantee the survival and conservation of the State as a superior good to the others, above including individual rights and guarantees as important as free locomotion, freedom of expression, privacy and even life itself. However, it is intended to address a different vision of Reason of State focused on giving greater protection to the conservation and welfare of people and human rights, an approach that could also have its origins in Machiavelli himself. Finally, the peace process with the FARC will be addressed by the national government, where a violation of the fundamental right of participation characteristic of the democratic model can be seen; in which, by plebiscite, the sovereign power delegitimized the final agreement, which could have disqualified the president of the republic to exercise his legislative initiative, based on the agreements consulted with the people, without meaning that the president has been left without faculty to make agreements, only that it should not use content of the text of the agreement consulted. ; La présente enquête vise à aborder les éléments fondamentaux qui pourraient constituer en quelque sorte une limite aux décisions politiques, qu'elles soient ou non discrétionnaires, dans le cadre de la Raison d'État, appliquées dans l'État de droit social et démocratique. Les limites en tant que fin ou bien public, comprises dans un sens positif comme "obéissance à la loi" (Foucault, 2006, p.122), et dans un sens naturaliste au sens des intérêts du collectif, ainsi que des droits de l'homme, de la norme, de la raison , la temporalité et la responsabilité peuvent éviter la marge de l'autoritarisme ou des abus de pouvoir. Ce sont les événements qui ont conduit à l'origine de ce modèle d'État, qui tentera de trouver des indices sur sa raison d'être ou son objectif, seront le point de départ. Le concept classique de la raison d'Etat machiavélique sera analysé, ce qui pourrait être compris au sens strict, comme cette institution subjective qui permet au gouverneur l'exécution de mesures visant à garantir la survie et la conservation de l'État en tant que bien supérieur aux autres, ci-dessus. y compris les droits individuels et les garanties aussi importantes que la libre circulation, la liberté d'expression, la vie privée et même la vie elle-même. Toutefois, il est prévu d'aborder une vision différente de la Raison d'Etat axée sur l'amélioration de la protection de la conservation et du bien-être des personnes et sur le respect des droits de l'homme, approche qui pourrait également avoir ses origines dans Machiavel lui-même. Enfin, le processus de paix avec les FARC sera traité par le gouvernement national, où une violation du droit fondamental à la participation, caractéristique du modèle démocratique, peut être constatée. dans lequel, par plébiscite, le pouvoir souverain a délégitimé l'accord final, ce qui aurait pu disqualifier le président de la république pour qu'il puisse exercer son initiative législative, sur la base des accords consultés avec le peuple, sans que le président soit laissé sans faculté conclure des accords, mais seulement qu'il ne devrait pas utiliser le contenu du texte de l'accord consulté.

The issue of non-return of rejected international protection applicants does not enjoy a high political profile on its own, but has been discussed as part of a global debate on asylum. Significant efforts are required when considering the wide spectrum of possible reasons of non-return, some reasons depending on the countries of destination, others on the returnee himself/herself. In this respect, reasons of non return range from the non-respect of deadlines, the issuance of travel documents, postponement of removal for external reasons to the returnee, for medical reasons, the resistance of the third-country national and the lack of diplomatic representation of Luxembourg, to name but a few. In regards to the procedure, in Luxembourg the rejection of the international protection application includes the return decision. The Minister in charge of Immigration, through the Directorate of Immigration, issues this decision. The return decision only becomes enforceable when all appeals are exhausted and the final negative decision of rejection of the competent judicial authority enters into force, as appeals have suspensive effects. This decision also sets out the timeframe during which the rejected international protection applicant has to leave the country. In case the applicant does not opt for a voluntary return, the decision will also include the country to which s/he will be sent. In general, the decision provides for a period of 30 days during which the applicant has the option to leave voluntarily and to benefit from financial support in case of assisted voluntary return through the International Organization for Migration (IOM). There are two exceptions to this rule: the applicant who is considered a threat to national security, public safety or homeland security and the applicant who has already been issued a return decision before. The declaration and documentation provided during the procedure of international protection can be used to facilitate return. Subsequent applications are possible, in particular if new evidence of facts appears resulting in an increased likelihood of the applicant to qualify for international protection. For rejected international protection applicants who did not opt for voluntary return and did not receive any postponement of removals, a certain (limited) support is available while waiting for the execution of the enforceable return decision. As such, they continue to stay in reception facilities and to receive certain social benefits unless they transgress any internal rules. If an urgent need exists, rejected applicants may be granted a humanitarian social aid. However, they are not entitled to access the labour market or to receive 'pocket money' or the free use of transport facilities. They benefit from an access to education and training, however this access cannot constitute a possible reason for non-return. These benefits are available to rejected applicants until the moment of their removal. In order to enforce the return decision and prevent absconding, the Minister may place the rejected international applicant in the detention centre, especially if s/he is deemed to be obstructing their own return. Other possible measures include house arrest, regular reporting surrendering her/his passport or depositing a financial guarantee of 5000€. Most of these alternatives to detention were introduced with the Law of 18 December 2015 which entered into force on 1st January 2016. As a consequence, detention remains the main measure used to enforce return decisions. A number of challenges to return and measures to curb them are detailed in this study. A part of these measures have been set up to minimize the resistance to return from the returnee. First and foremost is the advocacy of the AVRR programme and the dissemination of information relating to this programme but also the establishment of a specific return programme to West Balkan countries not subject to visa requirements. Other measures aim at facilitating the execution of forced returns, such as police escorts or the placement in the detention centre. Finally, significant efforts are directed towards increasing bilateral cooperation and a constant commitment to the conclusion of readmission agreements. No special measures were introduced after 2014 in response to the exceptional flows of international protection applicants arriving in the EU. While the Return service within the Directorate of Immigration has continued to expand its participation to European Networks and in various transnational projects in matters of return, this participation was already set into motion prior to the exceptional flows of 2014. As for effective measures curbing challenges to return, this study brings to light the AVRR programme but especially the separate return programme for returnees from West Balkan countries exempt of visa requirements. The dissemination of information on voluntary return is also considered an effective policy measure, the information being made available from the very start of the international protection application. Among the cases where return is not immediately possible, a considerable distinction has to be made in regards to the reasons for the non-return. Indeed, in cases where the delay is due to the medical condition of the returnee or to material and technical reasons that are external to the returnee, a postponement of removal will be granted. This postponement allows for the rejected applicant to remain on the territory on a temporary basis, without being authorized to reside and may be accompanied by a measure of house arrest or other. In cases of postponement for medical reasons and of subsequent renewals bringing the total length of postponement over two years, the rejected applicant may apply for a residence permit for private reasons based on humanitarian grounds of exceptional seriousness. Nevertheless, apart from this exception, no official status is granted to individuals who cannot immediately be returned. Several measures of support are available to beneficiaries of postponement to removal: they have access to accommodation in the reception centres they were housed in during their procedure, they may be attributed humanitarian aid, they continue to be affiliated at the National Health Fund, they continue to have access to education and professional training and they are allowed to work through a temporary work authorization. The temporary work authorization is only valid for a single profession and a single employer for the duration of the postponement to removal, although this is an extremely rare occurrence in practice. OLAI may allocate a humanitarian aid might be allocated if the individual was already assisted by OLAI during the procedure of her/his international protection application. All of these measures apply until the moment of return. The study also puts forth a number of best practices such as the Croix-Rouge's involvement in police trainings, their offer of punctual support to vulnerable people through international networking or the socio-psychological support given to vulnerable people placed in the detention centre among others. A special regard has to be given to AVRR programmes and their pre-departure information and counselling, the dissemination of information and the post-arrival support and reintegration assistance. Indeed, stakeholders singled the AVRR programme out as a best practice and the Luxembourgish government has made voluntary return a policy priority for a long time. However, this increased interest in voluntary returns has to be put into perspective as research shows that sustainable success of voluntary return and reintegration measures is only achieved for a very restricted number of beneficiaries (namely for young, autonomous and dynamic returnees with sizeable social networks and who were granted substantial social capital upon return). Hence, returning women remains a sensitive issue, especially if they were fleeing abusive relationships. Another factor contributing to hardship set forth by research is the difficult reintegration of returnees that have lived outside of their country of return for a prolonged period of time and are therefore unable to rely on social networks for support or for a sense of belonging. Based on these considerations, NGOs and academia cast doubts on the 'voluntary' nature of these return programmes, their criticism targeting the misleading labelling of these policy measures.

137 p. Cd ; La Discapacidad ha evolucionado en el tiempo, pasando de un modelo medico a un modelo social, donde el contexto de la persona con discapacidad es el principal determinante de la misma. Es así que las acciones del Estado a través de sus políticas públicas deben tener un enfoque intersectorial para dar respuesta integral a las problemática reales de la población. El municipio de Bucaramanga según censo DANE 2005 tiene 30.799 personas con discapacidad, por lo tanto requiere una política pública que este acorde a las necesidades de su población para que los programas y proyectos ofertados por la administración municipal generen impacto real y efectivo que mejore la calidad de vida de la población con discapacidad y promueva el goce efectivo de sus derechos. Objetivo: Dar a conocer la experiencia en la formulación de una política pública de Discapacidad para el municipio de Bucaramanga a partir del acuerdo 053 del 2010 Métodos: Es una investigación cuantitativa de tipo descriptiva, que se realizo a través de tres fases. Primero, se realizo un estado del arte de la Discapacidad y políticas públicas, segundo, un diagnostico comunitario de la situación problema de la población con discapacidad del municipio de Bucaramanga y finalmente se formulo la política pública de discapacidad con participación de todos los actores. Resultados: Se logra un diagnostico de la situación real de las personas con discapacidad de las 17 comunas de Bucaramanga como documento base para la formulación de la política pública de discapacidad que es aprobada según acuerdo 039 del 2011. Conclusión: La política pública de Bucaramanga fue formulada desde la participación activa de la población con discapacidad organizada, la academia y la administración municipal, con una mirada externa desde el Ministerio de la Protección Social y la comunidad en general, con la voluntad política del honorable concejo municipal, basado en el diagnóstico contextual de la población, la normatividad, las experiencias y saberes propios y ajenos, que orientaron los principios que la rigen, los componentes que abordan la problemática, las líneas de acción y actividades que la van a poner en práctica, haciendo de esta una política pública que cumple con su esencia y fin. ; Disability has evolved over time, moving from a medical model to a social model, where the context of the person with disabilities is the main determinant of it. Thus, the actions of the state through its public policies should have a cross-sectoral approach to respond comprehensively to the real population problem. The municipality of Bucaramanga as DANE census 2005 has 30,799 people with disabilities, therefore public policy requires this according to the needs of its population for programs and projects offered by the municipal administration and effective generate real impact that improves the quality of life of people with disabilities and promote the full enjoyment of their rights. Objective: To present the experience in the formulation of public policy of Disability for the municipality of Bucaramanga from the agreement 053 of 2010. Methods: A descriptive quantitative research, conducted through three phases. First, there was a state of the art of Disability and Public Policy, second, Community diagnosis of the problema situation of the disabled population of the municipality of Bucaramanga and finally made public disability policy with participation of all stakeholders. Results: We achieved a diagnosis of the real situation of people with disabilities in the 17 municipalities of Bucaramanga as the base document for the formulation of public policy on disability that is approved by the agreement 039 of 2011 Conclusion: Bucaramanga public policy was formulated from the active participation of people with disabilities organized, academia and local government, with an external view from the Ministry of Social Protection and the community at large, with the political will of the honorable city council, based on the diagnostic context of the population, the regulations, the experiences and knowledge themselves and others, that guided the principles that govern, the components that address the problem, the lines of action and activities that will be put in practice, making this a public policy that metes its essence and purpose. ; INTRODUCCIÓN 13 FORMULACIÓN DEL PROBLEMA 16 JUSTIFICACIÓN 19 OBJETIVO GENERAL 21 OBJETIVOS ESPECÍFICOS 21 CAPITULO I 22 1. ESTADO DEL ARTE DE DISCAPACIDAD Y POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS. 22 1.1. DIAGNÓSTICO TERRITORIAL E INSTITUCIONAL. 22 1.2. DISCAPACIDAD. 25 1.3. DATOS EPIDEMIOLOGICOS EN DISCAPACIDAD. 34 1.3.1. Discapacidad en Colombia. 35 1.3.2. Discapacidad en Santander. 37 1.3.3. Discapacidad en Bucaramanga. 44 1.4. NORMATIVIDAD EN DISCAPACIDAD. 48 1.4.1. La discapacidad antes de la Constitución de 1.991. 49 1.4.2. La discapacidad en la Constitución de 1.991. 51 1.4.3. Desarrollo normativo de la discapacidad con ocasión del nuevo estatuto constitucional. 53 1.4.4. Concepto de discapacidad en el ordenamiento jurídico colombiano. 64 1.5. POLÍTICA PÚBLICA PARA DISCAPACIDAD. 68 1.5.1. Definiciones de Políticas Públicas 72 1.5.2. Aspectos generales de una política pública. 78 1.5.3. Pasos para la formulación de políticas públicas. 82 1.5.4. Modelos para la formulación de políticas públicas. 83 1.5.4.1. Modelo racional o racionalista. 83 1.5.4.2. Modelo incremental o incrementalista. 85 1.5.4.3. Modelo de las elites o elitista. 85 1.5.4.4. Modelo de los grupos, grupista o interaccionista. 86 1.5.4.5. Modelo de las instituciones o institucionalista. 87 1.5.4.6. Modelo de sistemas o sistémico. 88 1.6. EVALUACIÓN DE POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS. 88 CAPÍTULO II 94 2. DIAGNÓSTICO COMUNITARIO PARA LA FORMULACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA EN DISCAPACIDAD. 94 2.1. ANTECEDENTES. 94 2.2. PROPÓSITO. 99 2.3. METODOLOGÍA. 99 2.3.1. Propuesta Metodológica. 99 2.3.2. Convocatoria. 99 2.3.3. Logística. 100 2.3.4. Desarrollo de los talleres. 102 2.3.5. Instrumento aplicado. 104 2.4. RESULTADOS Y ANÁLISIS DE LOS RESULTADOS. 109 CAPITULO III. 111 3. FORMULACION DE LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA DE DISCAPACIDAD DEL MUNICIPIO DE BUCARAMANGA 111 3.1. Propósito. 111 3.2. Metodología. 112 3.3. Resultados. 115 3.3.1. Exposición de motivos. 115 3.3.2. Política Pública de Discapacidad para el municipio de Bucaramanga. 118 3.3.2.1. Marco Legal. 118 3.3.2.2. Artículos Modificados. 119 3.3.3. Documentos. 123 CONCLUSIONES 124 RECOMENDACIONES 127 BIBLIOGRAFÍA 129 TABLAS. Tabla 1. Indicadores Económicos de Bucaramanga. 24 Tabla 2. Visión de conjunto de la CIF. 31 Tabla 3. Grupos de Edad, según Categorías de Discapacidad – 2013. 46 Tabla 4. Normas sobre discapacidad antes de la Constitución de 1.991. 50 Tabla 5. Normas sobre discapacidad en la Constitución de 1991. 52 Tabla 6. Normas sobre discapacidad a partir de la Constitución de 1.991. 53 Tabla 7. Clasificación de las políticas públicas. 78 Tabla 8. Registro de los talleres y entidades participantes. 102 Tabla 9. Número de preguntas por líneas de acción del acuerdo 053 del 2010. 105 Tabla 10. Resultados Obtenidos del diagnóstico Comunitario de las diecisiete (17) comunas de Bucaramanga. 110 Tabla 11. Elementos de la matriz a diligenciar por cada secretaría o ente descentralizado para la construcción de las líneas de acción de la política pública. 113 MAPA. Mapa 1. Población por Comuna. 23 GRÁFICA. Gráfica 1. Plan de desarrollo de Bucaramanga 2012- 2015. 25 FIGURA. Figura 1. Limitación en las Actividades de la Vida Diaria (AVD). 36 ANEXOS: Anexo 1. Metodología y plan de trabajo. Anexo 2. Acuerdo No 053 del 10 de diciembre de 2010. Anexo 3. Soportes documentales del diagnostico comunitario. 1. Resultados y análisis de los resultados. 2. Registro fotográfico. 3. Instrumento de recolección de la información. 4. Registro de Asistencia. Anexo 4. Soportes documentales para la formulación de la política Publica de Discapacidad del municipio Bucaramanga. 1. Matriz diligenciada por secretaría de despacho o Instituto descentralizado. 2. Resumen de Actas. Anexo 5. Exposición de Motivos y proyecto de acuerdo para la Modificación del acuerdo 053 del 2010. Anexo 6. Acuerdo No 039 del 29 de diciembre de 2011. Anexo 7. Artículo publicado en la revista ASCOFI. ; Ej. 1 ; Maestría ; Magister en Gestión Pública y Gobierno

Political uncertainties in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) continue to affect the short term economic prospects in the region, while major developments in the global economy over the past six months have put the region on a two-track growth path for 2012. These developments include a significant rise in crude oil prices on fears of oil supply disruptions and weak economic activity in the Eurozone. Economic growth of MENA's oil exporting countries will be strong as it rebounds from the average of 3.4 percent in 2011 to 5.4 percent in 2012. Overall growth in the region is expected to be 4.8 percent in 2012, surpassing the 3 percent growth achieved in 2011. Improvement in the growth prospects of oil exporters is due to strength in oil markets. The fiscal situation is expected to remain tenuous for oil importing countries, especially those going through transitions. Overall, inflation is expected to remain subdued in 2012, with the notable exceptions of Iran and Egypt. Subsidies are currently dampening currently dampening the effects of increased global food and energy prices in many MENA countries.

In Latin America, labor markets have been the main channel through which growth has reduced poverty, with higher labor income accounting for 49 percent of the reduction in poverty in 2008–13. Understanding labor markets is critical to designing policies and programs aimed at reducing poverty. With close to 70 percent of the population under age 30 years, labor markets are bound to be central to defining Haiti's future. Yet, labor analysis in Haiti has been constrained by the dearth of data and the focus on measuring the impact of the 2010 earthquake. This present paper contributes to filling this gap by providing an overview of Haiti's labor markets and the determinants of labor income over a decade, focusing on growing urban areas. The paper also contributes to the research on Haiti in general, as well as labor markets in fragile countries such as Haiti, in particular through an unprecedented effort to harmonize three household surveys conducted between 2001 and 2012. Building on this exercise, the study provides new insights into the development of labor markets in a particularly turbulent decade for Haiti, one that was marked by the political crisis of 2004 and the earthquake of 2010. In spite of the earthquake, the analysis shows that Haiti's labor markets are characterized by continuity over the period. Somewhat surprisingly, the defining features remain overall unchanged in spite of the shock, pointing to heavy forces shaping economic and labor dynamics.

On May 29, South Africans went to the polls in one of this year's most anticipated elections. In an outcome that shook the country's political system, the ruling African National Congress (ANC), which has governed South Africa since Nelson Mandela became the country's president following the fall of apartheid, lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since taking power in 1994.
As a result, the ANC has been forced to form a coalition with rival parties. It has forged a political alliance with the center-right, pro-business Democratic Alliance (DA) party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the right-wing Patriotic Alliance (PA), and a small party called GOOD, which holds a single seat in parliament. Collectively, this coalition, which could still grow as the ANC continues to negotiate with other parties to expand its unity government, accounts for 68% of the seats in the country's national parliament, which convenes in Cape Town. Leaning on its newly formed coalition, the ANC successfully reelected Cyril Ramaphosa as the country's president on June 14.
The ANC's poor showing in the parliamentary election is largely the result of frustrated voters responding to the party's inability to improve the country's severe economic challenges and reduce widespread wealth inequality, whose roots date back to apartheid. These issues have been aggravated by the ANC's self-admitted corruption, which has handcuffed its ability to respond to South Africa's economic issues and undermined the credibility of its commitment to improving the welfare of the the great majority of the country's 60 million people.
Under the ANC, South Africa's foreign policy has made global headlines in recent months. In December, it brought a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) — the U.N.'s legal body charged with resolving international disputes between countries — accusing Israel of committing genocide against the Palestinian people in its war in Gaza.
The center-right DA, which was then the ANC's main opposition party, initially opposed the ANC's decision to bring the case. The DA has since, however, said that it will abide by the ICJ's decision and has condemned Israel's violence in Gaza. Despite this, the DA remains unwilling to call Israel's conduct a genocide, thus suggesting that it remains opposed to the ANC's case and decision to take it to the ICJ.
The ICJ case has also strained relations with the United States. While Pretoria has long been one of the world's most vocal proponents of the rights of Palestinians, Washington has been Israel's strongest international supporter and supplier of weapons. In response to South Africa's ICJ case, in February, several members of the U.S. Congress joined in proposing a bill that urged a "full review" of Washington's relations with South Africa.
The DA has also been vocally skeptical of the country's participation in an expanding BRICS, an organization originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa and which has recently added several new members and seeks to act as an alternative to Western-based international forums. South Africa has used BRICS to enhance its influence globally in a world dominated by institutions built by the West after World War II.
As the ANC's largest coalition partner, the DA will likely have a greater say in the government's domestic and foreign policy moving forward. But given that the ANC, which has led South Africa's case at the ICJ, still holds the presidency and will likely continue to run the country's foreign ministry, the DA is unlikely to be able to substantially alter South Africa's foreign policy, though it might attempt to use foreign policy as a bargaining tool in debates on the ANC's other efforts in parliament.
Neither the IFP nor the PA — two smaller coalition partners — focused much on foreign policy while campaigning, instead emphasizing the need for the government to shift domestic policy to promote economic growth and reduce inequality. Neither party, for example, mentioned foreign policy in their respective manifestos, although PA leadership has openly questioned South Africa's support for Palestine.
Two parties that performed well in May's election but have stated that they will not join the unity government are the left-wing uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) and the communist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Both parties are staunchly anti-West and see the international system, from the U.N. to international legal bodies such as the ICJ and the International Criminal Court, as having been built to serve Western interests at the expense of poorer Global South states. The MK, which is headed by former South African President Jacob Zuma, is widely seen as being more supportive of South Africa building ties with Russia than with the United States.
But Pretoria's long-term foreign policy of non-alignment — by which the country avoids forming a full-fledged alliance or even close security partnerships with Western states, Russia, or China, and instead chooses to support whatever policies promote its own interests — is unlikely to change following the election.
Ziyanda Stuurman, a senior analyst specializing in southern Africa for the Eurasia Group, told RS that "foreign policy is likely to be a second- or third-order priority for the new … unity government." Stuurman said that "all of the parties to the coalition have divergent foreign policy positions, (on Russia-Ukraine, the government's BRICS alliance ties, and the Israel-Hamas conflict) — and given the very sensitive balance that the alliance will have to maintain going forward — foreign policy issues will likely be dealt with on a case by case basis as opposed to forming part of the most crucial policy decisions going forward."
She adds that the country's current foreign minister, Nelendi Pandor, will likely continue in the role. If not, then the ANC's Second Deputy Secretary-General Maropene Ramokgopa is likely to be her successor. Ultimately, Stuurman says that "the South African government's foreign policy positions are unlikely to significantly change in the coming months."

In 1946 reporter John Hersey published a harrowing report from Hiroshima that followed the travails of a number of survivors of the Bomb, including those of Father Wilhelm Kleinsorge, a Jesuit missionary from Germany.
On a search for water for some of the wounded, Kleinsorge came across a group of survivors"…about twenty men, and they were all in exactly the same nightmarish state: their faces were wholly burned, their eye-sockets were hollow, the fluid from their melted eyes had run down their cheeks. (They must have had their faces upturned when the bomb went off; perhaps they were anti-aircraft personnel) Their mouths were mere swollen, pus-covered wounds, which they could not bear to stretch enough to admit the spout of the teapot."Passages such as these revealed the horrors Japanese survivors endured in the aftermath of the American nuclear attack. Hersey's Hiroshima became, in the view of essayist Roger Angell, "part of our ceaseless thinking about world wars and nuclear holocaust."And throughout the Cold War, the idea of fighting a nuclear war was anathema to the respective leaders of the American and Soviet superpowers — a revulsion that found its ultimate expression in the pledge made by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan that "a nuclear cannot be won and should never be fought."
Yet little by little, as the Cold War has receded into memory, American and Russian leaders have torn up a series of arms control measures beginning with the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (2002), the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty (2019), and the Open Skies treaty (2020). For its part, in 2023 Russia unilaterally withdrew from both the Convention Armed Forces in Europe treaty and suspended participation in the landmark New START treaty.
And one of the more worrisome developments in a time which does not lack for them has been a worrying epidemic of loose talk about the use of nuclear weapons.
Of late, the Russians have been the worst offenders. Yet perhaps even more troubling is the blithe disregard with which some American analysts dismiss Putin's stated readiness to deploy these weapons. As Brown University professor of Slavic studies Vladimir Golstein memorably puts the matter:"Putin conducts nuclear exercises, Putin warns the densely populated areas in Europe, Putin talks about going to heaven as the result of nuclear confrontation — what else does one need? Knowing Russians, I am extremely certain that they would respond. Sooner or later, but they would."Consider the, well, explosive language coming from former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev to the revelation, made by Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski on May 25, that the U.S. "told the Russians that if you detonate a nuclear bomb, even if it doesn't kill anyone, we will hit all your targets and positions in Ukraine with conventional weapons and destroy them all." Medvedev responded with threats of his own:"Americans hitting our targets means starting a world war, and a foreign minister, even of a country like Poland, should understand that. And third, considering that yet another Polack, [President Andrzej] Duda, has recently announced the wish to deploy TNW [thermonuclear weapons] in Poland, Warsaw won't be left out, and will surely get its share of radioactive ash. Is it what you really want?"According to a May 28 report in the Chinese-state run news service Xinhua, Russia has accused NATO forces of "practicing nuclear strikes against Russia." This accusation comes only a week after reports that Russia itself has launched tactical nuclear drills in "response to provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials against the Russian Federation," according to the Russian defense ministry.And then there are the alarming statements coming from Russian analysts and government advisers. A video circulating on social media shows Russian political scientist Konstantin Sivkov issuing nuclear threats against Poland, while the noted academic and Kremlin adviser, Sergei Karaganov published an article calling for Russia to launch limited nuclear strikes on Western Europe. As the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists points out, Karaganov's "proposal and other Russian political and military thinking about nuclear weapons raise profound questions about whether Russia might attempt to conduct a so-called limited nuclear war."As can only be expected, certain American politicians are pitching in to make things worse. Within the last few weeks, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) has called for Israel to do its very worst by invoking the American attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as justification. A month into the Israel-Hamas War, a member of the Israeli cabinet issued his own irresponsible nuclear threat, while the U.S. continues to run diplomatic cover for Israel by denying the existence of its nuclear weapons program.
Meanwhile, recent statements coming out of Iran hinting at a potential change in its nuclear doctrine have raised alarm bells with the International Atomic Energy Agency which is meeting this week in Vienna to discuss the matter.
Amidst the madness, there's a silver lining.
There remain multiple organizations that have been doing valuable, utterly necessary work to raise awareness about the omnipresent threat of nuclear catastrophe, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, NuclearWakeUpCall.Earth, and Women Transforming Our Nuclear Legacy. The founder of the latter two groups, the activist and award-winning documentary filmmaker Cynthia Lazaroff, believes citizen action is needed — and soon.
"We all have a voice," says Lazaroff, who urges citizens to "contact their Congressional representatives and tell them how worried they are about the growing threat of nuclear war. Urge them to hold congressional hearings on escalating nuclear dangers, nuclear winter and the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and to co-sponsor legislation like: H. Res. 77 and H.R. 2775 to back us away from the brink and eliminate nuclear weapons once and for all."The nuclear age is not past. It is our present — and one that the next administration needs to urgently confront, and ultimately, dismantle.

Ukraine's top commander acknowledged that his army is currently locked in a "stalemate" with Russia that seems unlikely to break any time soon."Just like in the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate," Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, told The Economist. "There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough." This is the starkest acknowledgement to date from the Ukrainian military that its counteroffensive has stalled, and, comes "amid a wider effort by Ukrainian officials to temper allies' expectations of rapid battlefield success, while urging them to maintain military support to allow Ukraine to gain the advantage on the battlefield," according to the New York Times. But despite the realities of grinding war and sapping international attention and support, discussion of a negotiated settlement with Russia is still "taboo" in Kyiv, according to a new profile of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky."Zelensky's stubbornness, some of his aides say, has hurt their team's efforts to come up with a new strategy, a new message. As they have debated the future of the war, one issue has remained taboo: the possibility of negotiating a peace deal with the Russians," writes Simon Shuster in TIME magazine. "Zelensky remains dead set against even a temporary truce. 'For us it would mean leaving this wound open for future generations,' the President tells me."Shuster reports from Kyiv that many of the fears surroundings funding and arming Ukraine without a clear endgame are coming true. In RS this week, David Sacks analyzes which of these concerns have been validated: Ukraine's maximalist war aims are unrealistic; the long war has decimated Zelensky's army; Kyiv's conscription policies are increasingly draconian; morale in the country is collapsing; and corruption in the government is rampant.Accompanying the changing domestic and battlefield dynamics is lagging support among Ukraine's most important international backers. The piece focuses primarily on Washington, where reluctance to fund Kyiv — primarily from Republicans in Congress — has steadily grown in recent months, and focus has quickly shifted away from Europe as war has broken out in the Middle East. The Biden administration's pursuit of new strategies, including framing support for Kyiv as good for the American economy and combining the next tranche of aid with a number of other policy priorities, show that Ukraine's war effort no longer has the same political power it once did.Public opinion in the United States has also trended away from aid for Ukraine."Public support for aid to Ukraine has been in decline for months in the U.S., and Zelensky's visit did nothing to revive it," reads the TIME piece. "Some 41% of Americans want Congress to provide more weapons to Kyiv, down from 65% in June, when Ukraine began a major counteroffensive, according to a Reuters survey taken shortly after Zelensky's departure [from a visit to Washington in September.]" As the Quincy Institute's Anatol Lieven argued over a year ago: "Any peace initiative will have to come from the United States. (...) The Ukrainian government's ability to negotiate is crippled by (understandable) fury at the Russian invasion and Russian atrocities; by pressure from Ukrainian hardliners, especially in the military; and, increasingly, by the government's own rhetoric, which is committing Ukraine to goals (like the recovery of Crimea) that could only be achieved by total military victory over Russia."Zelensky's reluctance to pursue a diplomatic solution with an invading country is understandable and will be difficult to change without Washington's support, and the increasingly clear realities of the war laid out in TIME could incentivize the Biden administration to do so.In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:—Malta hosted officials from 65 countries for a third round of "peace talks" surrounding the war in Ukraine. Participation has increased from 15 during the first round in Copenhagen in June and 43 for the second round in Saudi Arabia in August, according to the Associated Press. However, Russia continues to not be invited to these negotiations, and Moscow has dismissed the initiative. —New Speaker of the House of Representatives, Rep. Mike Johnson (R-La.) has moved forward with his pledge to separate aid for Ukraine from aid for Israel, going against the wishes of the White House and Senate Republican leadership. Johnson has said that he is supportive of Ukraine's cause, but called on the Biden administration to provide clear guidelines on what the objective and endgame in Ukraine are. —European politicians are planning a trip to the United States in an effort to shore up support for Ukraine and echoing the Biden administration's rhetoric on how the war effort strengthens the American economy. "We need to find ways to reach out to [the public] on both sides of the Atlantic — not to forget that there are actual electorates that see their problems in a certain way," Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis told Politico. "We have a plan to travel … to separate states, meeting — for example — the companies that sell equipment that actually create jobs in the U.S. Most of the money that has been spent on Ukraine was actually spent in the U.S." It is not yet clear which other politicians will accompany Lithuania's foreign minister. U.S. State Department news:During a press briefing on Wednesday, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller was asked about whether disagreements in Congress and the broader domestic political context could imperil aid for Ukraine."It continues to be important that the United States be there to help Ukraine defend itself against these horrific attacks that Russia has launched on them and continues to launch on them. And we believe, as a practical matter, that should funding for Ukraine get an up or down vote, it will pass in both houses of Congress," Miller said. "So I understand the kind of churn that has accompanied this, but it continues to be our position that funding is important, it should pass, and that as a practical matter if it gets a vote, it will pass."

The work notes that many researchers highlight the special role of the United States in solving of the Korean problem and maintaining security in Northeast Asia. The US Government's approaches ofdifferent periods of resolving the problem in the Korean Peninsula are set out in detail. Although theUnited States is far from the Korean Peninsula, due to geopolitical factors, Korea has always been inthe US national interest. It is known that the United States was one of the the perpetrators and initiators of the Korean Peninsula split and never lost sight of the Korean Peninsula after 1945. Depending on the political and economic situation in the world, the US government has applied different types of doctrines, strategies, and approaches, such as the Guam and Pacific doctrines. Despite all thechanges in the international political world, the US has always paid attention to the security of South Korea, as it did in the Korean War of 1950-53. In order to protect the Republic of Korea and strengthen its influence in Northeast Asia, the United States continues to maintain a contingent of troops in Korea today, providing tremendous assistance in rebuilding the Republic of Korea's economy and modernizing theSouth Korean army. So, from 1945 to 1975 the United States spent about $ 13 billion on economic andmilitary goals and spent about $ 4 billion in the 1970s. Of course, many US presidents have made great efforts at various times to build peace and resolve theconflicts of various levels that have occurred periodically on the Korean Peninsula. President Carter continued to withdraw US troops from South Korea for 4-5 years, but when the Reagan administration came to power, the issue of withdrawing the US contingent was removed from the agenda. The motive forpreserving US troops was to gain time to strengthen South Korea's military power. Many researchers, such as E. Reishauer and G. Henderson, emphasize that a devided Korean Peninsula is adestabilizing factor in Northeast Asia and the presence of US troops in South Korea is a major obstacle tounification of Korea. Today, given the fact that a contingent of US troops is still present in Korea, wecandraw some conclusions to what America wants: a unification of Korea or not? Many scientists find it paradoxical that South Korea has significant economic advantages and a fairly strong army, but still retains US troops in its home country. Is this fear of North Korea or unwillingness to upset the US ally? Despite changes in relations of US-DPRK and RK-DPRK, the USA and the Republic of Korea continue to conduct large-scale military exercises, thereby provoking the DPRK's participation in military exercises with China and Russia, prompting North Korea to resume missile tests. After Donald Trump came to power, which began to apply protectionist policies, things have changed a bit, but South Korea has still allowed the United States to deploy THAAD missile systems in Korea, thereby sharply deteriorating relations with China. It is also known that the confrontation between the US and China has intensified today. This fact certainly affects the process of settling the Korean problem. In the current situation, the role of China and the Republic of Korea as a mediator and catalyst for intensified continuation of the negotiations on peacekeeping and stabilization on the Korean peninsula started in 2018 has sharply increased. ; У статті зазначено, що багато дослідників виділяють особливу роль США увирішенні корейської проблеми і збереження безпеки вПівнічно-Східній Азії. Докладно наводяться підходи уряду США урізні періоди щодо вирішення або врегулювання проблеми наКорейському півострові. США хоч і знаходиться далеко від Корейського півострова, але через геополітичні чинники Корея завжди перебувала всфері національних інтересів США. Відомо, що США були одними звинуватців та ініціаторами розколу Корейського півострова та після 1945 року ніколи невипускали звиду Корейський півострів. Залежно від політичної та економічної ситуації усвіті, уряд США застосовував різні види доктрин, стратегій і підходів, наприклад Гуамська та Тихоокеанська доктрини. Не дивлячись навсі зміни уміжнародному політичному світі, США завжди приділяли увагу безпеці Південної Кореї, так як було і вкорейській війні 1950-53 років. З метою захисту Республіки Корея і посилення впливу вПівнічно-Східній Азії, США і сьогодні тримає контингент своїх військ уКореї, надає величезну допомогу увідновленні економіки Республіка Корея і модернізації південнокорейської армії. Так, тільки з1945 по 1975 роки наекономічні та військові цілі вПівденній Кореї США витратило близько 13 млрд. доларів і на1970-ті роки витратили близько 4 млрд. доларів. Звичайно, багато президентів США врізні періоди докладали величезних зусиль, спрямованих назміцнення миру і урегулювання конфліктів різного рівня, які періодично виникали наКорейському півострові. Президент Дж. Картер продовжив здійснювати вивід американських військ зПівденної Кореї протягом 4-5 років, але зприходом довлади адміністрації Рейгана питання про виведення американського контингенту військ був знятий зпорядку денного. Мотивом збереження американських військ було виграти час для зміцнення військової могутності Південної Кореї. Багато дослідників, такі як Е. Рейшауер та Г. Гендерсон, підкреслюють, що поділ Кореї є нетільки дестабілізуючим фактором вПівнічно-Східній Азії, присутність американських військ вПівденній Кореї є головною перешкодою для об'єднання Кореї. Сьогодні, якщо взяти доуваги той факт що контингент американських військ досих пір присутній вКореї, то можна зробити деякі висновки щодо того чого бажає Америка: об'єднання Кореї чи ні? Багато вчених вважають парадоксальним, що Південна Корея має значні переваги векономіці та досить сильну армію, але все ж зберігає американські війська всвоїй країні. Це що: страх Північної Кореї чи небажання засмучувати союзника– США? Незважаючи назміни, які відбуваються увідносинах США– КНДР, Республіка Корея– КНДР, США та РК продовжують проводити великомасштабні військові навчання, тим самим провокуючи участь КНДР увійськових навчаннях спільно зКитаєм і Росією, підбивають Північну Корею довідновлення ракетно-ядерних випробувань. Після приходу довлади Дональда Трампа, який почав застосовувати протекціоністську політику, ситуація трохи змінилася, але Південна Корея як і раніше дозволила США розмістити натериторії Кореї протиракетну систему THAAD, тим самим різко погіршила відносини зКитаєм. Відомо також, що сьогодні загострилися протистояння США та Китаю. Цей факт безумовно позначається напроцесі врегулювання корейської проблеми. У ситуації, що склалася, різко зросла роль Китаю і Республіки Корея вякості посередника і каталізатора для посиленого продовження розпочатих у2018 році переговорів по денуклеаризації та стабілізації миру наКорейському півострові.

The foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates is characterized by mobility, flexibility and ability to respond to quickly changing conditions. By signing a US-mediated agreement on full normalization with Israel the UAE's top political leadership has demonstrated a willingness to take risks and work hard to secure its own national interests and create a new geopolitical environment in the Middle East. The strategic plan envisages that successful bilateral Emirati-Israeli relations should become a reference point for other countries in the region. In the near future this factor will have a significant impact on the development of the regional situation and needs to be studied. The purpose of the article is to determine the main directions of development of bilateral relations between the UAE and Israel based on the analysis of the Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization between the United Arab Emirates and Israel. The process of development of political dialogue between the countries, establishment of diplomatic relations and the progress that the countries managed to achieve in the year after the signing of peace agreements is examined in details. The paper assesses the impact of Abraham Accords on the UAE's foreign policy in the context of the de-escalation and resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It has been proved that Emirati diplomacy now plays more active role and has more opportunities for effective participation in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement. At the same time the Emirates continues to support the "two-state solution", advocating creation of an independent Palestine with its capital in East Jerusalem. To obtain scientific results general and special policy research methods, namely methods of analysis, content analysis, comparison and synthesis were used in the article. It is proved that the current foreign policy of the UAE is capable of diplomatic breakthroughs for implementation of economic, investment and technological priorities, as well as other projects that will contribute to the development of the state and its digital, technical, and scientific advantage. The normalization of relations with Israel has been found to be in line with the UAE's strategic principles for the next 50 years. It has been suggested that the normalization of relations with Israel opens new prospects for the UAE in relations with the United States and creates additional opportunities in the confrontation with Iran. ; Зовнішня політика Об'єднаних Арабських Еміратів характеризується мобільністю, гнучкістю і здатністю швидко реагувати на зміни. Підписуючи за посередництва США договір про нормалізацію відносин з Ізраїлем, вище політичне керівництво ОАЕ продемонструвало готовність до ризику і напруженої роботи заради забезпечення власних національних інтересів і створення нового геополітичного середовища на Близькому Сході. Стратегічний задум передбачає, що успішні за всіма параметрами двосторонні еміратсько-ізраїльські відносини мають стати орієнтиром для інших країн регіону. Найближчим часом цей фактор матиме значний вплив на розвиток регіональної ситуації і потребує вивчення. Метою статті є визначення основних напрямків розвитку двосторонніх відносин між ОАЕ та Ізраїлем на основі аналізу Договору про мир, дипломатичні відносини та повну нормалізацію між Ізраїлем та ОАЕ. Детально розглянутий процес розвитку політичного діалогу між країнами, встановлення дипломатичних відносин і прогрес, якого вдалося досягти країнам за рік після підписання мирних домовленостей. Оцінено вплив Авраамових угод на зовнішню політику ОАЕ у контексті деескалації та розв'язання палестино-ізраїльського конфлікту. Встановлено, що відтепер еміратська дипломатія грає помітно активнішу роль і має більше можливостей для ефективної участі у палестино-ізраїльському врегулюванні. При цьому Емірати продовжують підтримувати принцип «двох держав», виступаючи за створення незалежної Палестини зі столицею у Східному Єрусалимі. Для отримання наукових результатів у статті використовуються загальні та спеціальні політичні методи дослідження, а саме методи аналізу, контент-аналізу, порівняння та синтезу. Доведено, що сучасна зовнішня політика ОАЕ здатна на дипломатичні прориви заради реалізації економічних, інвестиційних та технологічних пріоритетів, а також інших проєктів, які сприятимуть розвитку держави і набуттю нею цифрової, технічної та наукової переваги. З'ясовано, що нормалізація відносин з Ізраїлем відповідає стратегічним принципам ОАЕ на наступні 50 років. Висловлено припущення, що нормалізація відносин з Ізраїлем відкриває для ОАЕ нові перспективи у відносинах з США і створює додаткові можливості у протистоянні з Іраном. ; Зовнішня політика Об'єднаних Арабських Еміратів характеризується мобільністю, гнучкістю і здатністю швидко реагувати на зміни. Підписуючи за посередництва США договір про нормалізацію відносин з Ізраїлем, вище політичне керівництво ОАЕ продемонструвало готовність до ризику і напруженої роботи заради забезпечення власних національних інтересів і створення нового геополітичного середовища на Близькому Сході. Стратегічний задум передбачає, що успішні за всіма параметрами двосторонні еміратсько-ізраїльські відносини мають стати орієнтиром для інших країн регіону. Найближчим часом цей фактор матиме значний вплив на розвиток регіональної ситуації і потребує вивчення. Метою статті є визначення основних напрямків розвитку двосторонніх відносин між ОАЕ та Ізраїлем на основі аналізу Договору про мир, дипломатичні відносини та повну нормалізацію між Ізраїлем та ОАЕ. Детально розглянутий процес розвитку політичного діалогу між країнами, встановлення дипломатичних відносин і прогрес, якого вдалося досягти країнам за рік після підписання мирних домовленостей. Оцінено вплив Авраамових угод на зовнішню політику ОАЕ у контексті деескалації та розв'язання палестино-ізраїльського конфлікту. Встановлено, що відтепер еміратська дипломатія грає помітно активнішу роль і має більше можливостей для ефективної участі у палестино-ізраїльському врегулюванні. При цьому Емірати продовжують підтримувати принцип «двох держав», виступаючи за створення незалежної Палестини зі столицею у Східному Єрусалимі. Для отримання наукових результатів у статті використовуються загальні та спеціальні політичні методи дослідження, а саме методи аналізу, контент-аналізу, порівняння та синтезу. Доведено, що сучасна зовнішня політика ОАЕ здатна на дипломатичні прориви заради реалізації економічних, інвестиційних та технологічних пріоритетів, а також інших проєктів, які сприятимуть розвитку держави і набуттю нею цифрової, технічної та наукової переваги. З'ясовано, що нормалізація відносин з Ізраїлем відповідає стратегічним принципам ОАЕ на наступні 50 років. Висловлено припущення, що нормалізація відносин з Ізраїлем відкриває для ОАЕ нові перспективи у відносинах з США і створює додаткові можливості у протистоянні з Іраном.