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List of Figures. List of Tables. List of Contributors. Acknowledgements. Part I Introduction 1. Refugees: Status, Conditions and their Future Part II Constitution and Refugees 2. Genealogies of Discourse: Updating the National Register of Citizens in Assam 3. The State of Being Stateless: Examining and Evaluating the Grounds of Exclusion in Assam's NRC Exercise through Class and Gender 4. The Citizen Determination Process in India (including the citizenship Amendment Bill 2016) and the Ensuing Refugee Crisis 5. Exclusionary Trends in the Indian Citizenship Regime Part III Refugee Law and Policy 6. Exploring Refugee Lives in India Through the Lens of Legal Pluralism 7. Rohingya Refugees in India: Governmental and Judicial Attitude 8. India's Refugee Law and Politics of Hospitality since Independence 9. Discourse around the Refugee Protection Paradigm in India 10. International Refugee Law and the Indian State: Contested Law and Refugee Life between 'Two States" 11. India's Refugee Protection Obligations beyond the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol 12. The Refugee Convention of 1951: India's Persisting Dilemma 13. Reimagining Refugee Protection in India vis-à-vis Global Compact on Refugees Part IV Statelessness 14. Statelessness and the Indian State: National Belonging and the Right of Space 15. Stateless in India: Institutionalizing Home-Grown Solutions 16. Stateless among the Refugees 17. Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Stateless Citizens Part V Refugees 18. The Life of Labels: Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants 19. Between Host and Home: Cultural Lives and Activism of refugees 20. Refugees and Sustainable Development Goals: An Insight 21. Socio-Demographic Profile of Forced Migration 22. Resilience and Coping Mechanisms of Refugee Communities 23. Education and Lifelong Learning for Refugees: Equity and Inclusion in Policy and Practice 24. Conservation of Resources and Post-migration Stress Part VI Jewish Refugees 25. The History of Refugee Jewish Migration Part VII Rohingya Refugees 26. Rohingya Refugees in India 27. Living Conditions of Rohingya in India 28. The Rohingya Refugees in Hyderabad 29. The Perpetual Exceptions to Rights: Rohingya in India 30. Statelessness-Citizenship Continuum: The Rohingya's Quest for Belonging and Surviving 31. Autonomy and Dignity of the Rohingya Woman 32. Human Security: A Solution-based Approach to the Rohingya Refugee Policy 33. India's Response towards the Rohingya Crisis 34. Rohingya Refugees and Myanmar: State, Citizenship and Human Rights 35. Rohinya Refugees in Jammu: Analysis of Socio-economic and Demographic Conditions Part VIII Sindhi Refugees 36. Cartographies of Sindh: Religion, Region, Language 37. Resettlement Experiences of Sindhi Women Refugees Post-Partition Part IX Pakistani and Bangladeshi Hindu Refugees 38. Locating Pakistani Nationals in India: Challenges and Responses 39. A Pakistani Hindu Demographic Survey, Western Rajasthan 40. Livelihood Strategies: Pakistani Hindu Refugees in Rajasthan 41. Bengali Hindu Refugees in the Andaman Islands Part X Tibetan Refugees 42. The Privileged Refugees: Questions on Tibetan Nationality and Citizenship 43. Education of Tibetan Refugees: Sowing Future Seeds of Tibet 44. Making of a Mediatized Tibetan Diaspora in the 21st century 45. Household Economy and Livelihood Strategies among Tibetan Refugees Part XI Sri Lankan Refugees 46. Resolution of the Sri Lankan Refugee Dilemma 47. At the margins: Tamil refugee women in camps in Tamil Nadu 48. Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees: A Voiceless, Undignified Existence 49. Life of Sri Lankan Refugee Women in the Camps of Tamil Nadu 50. A synthesis of studies examining Sri Lankan Refugee families in India 51. Life-Livelihood-Dignity model of rehabilitation for Sri Lankan Refugees 52. The Contribution of Forced Colonial Migration to the Refugee Crisis: A Focus on Indian Origin Tamil Refugees from Sri Lanka 53. Repatriates and Refugees in Tamil Nadu: Learning to Live in Colonies and Camps 54. Spatial Dimensions in Narratives of History: Sri Lankan Repatriates on Katchal and Little Andaman Part XII Afghan Refugees 55. Gendered Refugee Experience: The Case of Afghan Women Refugees 56. Cast Away: Understanding Experiences of Afghan Hindu, Sikh and Christian Refugees Part XIII Emerging Issues 57. Tibetan Community in Exile: A Model for Other Refugee Groups 58. Pushbacks at Borders 59. The Economic Status of Sri Lankan and Tibetan Refugees in India 60. Afghans Refugees in the Higher Education System in Delhi 61. Agony of Survival: Refugees and Marginality in India during COVID-19 62. From Frames of Victimhood to that of Othering: Mapping Media Representations of Refugees 63. Media Representation of Rohingya Refugees 64. Healthcare for Refugees in India: A Humanitarian Approachtowards Public Health for All 65. The Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Migration: A Grand Experiment. Index.

Although
there might be a couple of interesting intraparty matchups ahead in Louisiana's
last round of blanket primary elections for Congress before 2026, the Public
Service Commission, and the Supreme Court, partisan outcomes are almost
certainly already secured after qualifying
for these offices ended last week for the 2024 cycle.

With a new
and almost certainly one-off congressional map for this cycle, all GOP
incumbents will defeat, and handily, the political unknowns and lightweight
retreads of all parties up against them. As testimony to the disarray state
Democrats find their party, they couldn't find someone of their label to run
against Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson, who drew only
another of his party as an opponent. Typically, the party out of power in a chamber
of Congress makes it a priority to run someone to run against the body's leader
of the other party just to create national talking points, but that didn't work
against Johnson (who at least this time will have competition, having run
unopposed in 2022 before he became speaker).

The only
serious competition will come in the new and transient Sixth District, whose boundaries
were declared unconstitutionally gerrymandered to elect a black candidate by
the federal judiciary, that to prevent election administration difficulties
will be allowed to stand for this election. It spanning from Shreveport to Baton
Rouge, Democrat state Sen. Cleo Fields
hopes for the third time to win in an unconstitutional district – his previous
two successful elections to Congress in 1992 and 1994 came under maps also
declared unconstitutional – whose main challenger should prove to be GOP former
state Sen. Elbert Guillory. Both are black.

Registration
numbers favor a black Democrat, but with GOP presidential nominee former Pres. Donald
Trump polling
as high as 30 percent among intended black voters, there's hope that
Guillory, with Fields facing three other black Democrats, can push Fields into
a runoff. Then, without a presidential election on the ballot, blacks disproportionately
would roll off compared to whites who mostly would favor Guillory and snatch a
victory.

The
problem with that scenario is that Guillory never has shown much heft in running
at a level higher than a legislative district. Since leaving the Legislature, he
had a dig at lieutenant governor and then again eight years later or last year,
and in 2016 against Johnson, every time finishing in the single digits in the
general election. He's also 80 years old, with advanced age being one reason
Democrat Pres. Joe Biden,
his senior by a couple of years, refused renomination. This suggests that while
Guillory could finish second to Fields in the general election, he might not do
well enough to hold Fields under 50 percent plus one of the vote, much less go
over the top of him in a runoff.

Democrat
weakness also became evident in the party's fielding a political unknown in the
District 2 PSC race against Republican state Sen. Jean-Paul Coussan and GOP former state Sen.
Julie Quinn. Perhaps at the cajoling of party insiders, Democrat Nick Laborde went from an intended run for
the Baton Rouge Metropolitan Council to sliding into the PSC contest so as the
party wouldn't face the embarrassment of not fielding a candidate. Politics may
run in his family's blood, but with zero campaign, much less elective, experience
even with latent Democrat support he would make a runoff only if one of Coussan
or Quinn don't campaign well, and even if he did has pretty much zero chance of
winning in a district with that demography.

While the
intraparty battle between Coussan and Quinn will determine which Republican
picks up the baton from the retiring Republican Craig Greene, an intraparty
clash will determine who wins the new District 2 Supreme Court seat.
Reapportioned to create a black-majority district – but not subject to constitutional
concerns because judicial spots aren't considered policy-making even if many of
their decisions have that impact – three black Democrats signed up.

Appellate
Judge John Michael Guidry, based in Baton
Rouge, seems likely to advance to a runoff based upon a past competitive election
he ran under the previous map. Based in Monroe, Appellate Judge Marcus Hunter also
is a good bet to make it, after having built upon his father Willie's legacy in
the area, both having served in the Louisiana House. Given the lion's share of
the district's population surrounds East Baton Rouge Parish, Guidry has the
edge.

In the last few years, a complex and polycentric debate on marginal territories has taken shape, rekindling attention on the inner areas and the urban peripheries, where contradictions, inequalities and conflicts materialize, but where old and new forms of solidarity and social innovation are also activated and reactivated. This double essence shows only part of the complexity of these urban frontiers, which cannot be represented with a one single perspective. This essay aims at providing a contribution to this debate, examining the results of a case study carried out in a suburban area of Rome, observing two phenomena: the processes of marginalization, concentration of poverty, social disorganization, and political disaffection; the genesis of criminal phenomena, the urban security and law enforcement policies. The case study focuses on Montespaccato, in the north-west outskirts of the Capital. A borgata built at the beginning of the 1900s, during the urban expansion in the Roman countryside, which today has the characteristics of an urban frontier, an area with vague social boundaries, a lack of places of attraction and opportunities, as well as an urban configuration lacking compared to the needs of the inhabitants. In this scenario, recent judicial inquiries have shown the presence of organized crime groups, capable of territorial control executed through the threat but also the use of violence, leading to a subjugation of the local economy. To understand the coexistence of these phenomena, the case study aims at understanding the construction (or production) of territoriality in a Roman borgata in a social and historical key, meaning the territory as a constantly acted and (re) built process in its socio-cultural, political, economic, and ecological dimensions. Our thesis is that criminal phenomena must be situated in the historical process of transformation of the periphery and in the rupture of the community. Spontaneism, informality, disobedience and anti-politics have over time connoted the active periphery of the borgata making a "center on the edge". The processes of modernization, individualization and secularization, the rupture of the community ties of provenance have fuelled the urban polarity by marginalizing the suburbs, reducing the spontaneous social control and the levers for regulating public life by the public and private institutions of the territory. ; Negli ultimi anni è tornato vivace il dibattito sui territori marginali, dove si materializzano contraddizioni, disuguaglianze e conflitti, ma anche forme di solidarietà e di innovazione sociale. Questa doppia valenza restituisce solo una parte della complessità dei margini, da conoscere dall'interno, non riconducibili a un unico modello. Il saggio proposto si inserisce in questo dibattito, restituendo i risultati di uno studio di caso in un'area ai margini di Roma, osservandone due fenomeni: i processi di marginalizzazione, concentrazione dello svantaggio, disorganizzazione sociale e disaffezione politica; la genesi di fenomeni criminali, il tema della sicurezza urbana e delle politiche di contrasto. Siamo a Montespaccato, borgata a nord-ovest della Capitale, sorta all'inizio del Novecento, nella fase di espansione romana verso l'agro. Oggi presenta le caratteristiche di una frontiera urbana, un'area dai confini sociali vaghi, dalla carenza di luoghi di attrazione e di opportunità, oltre a una configurazione urbanistica complicata. In questo scenario, recenti indagini giudiziarie mostrano la presenza di gruppi di criminalità organizzata che presidiano il territorio attraverso piazze di spaccio, assumendo competenze di regolazione sociale (dirimere conflitti, garantire sicurezza) ed economica (distribuire lavoro e altri benefit). Allo stesso tempo, la borgata è stata sede di attivazione e riattivazione per molteplici ed eterogenee esperienze che negli anni alimentano reti sociali e appartenenza. Per comprendere questa coesistenza, attraverso lo studio di caso abbiamo tentato di indagare come si costruisce una borgata e quali sono i contesti di genesi socio-spaziale dell'illegalità urbana. La tesi di fondo è che i fenomeni criminali vadano compresi nel processo storico di trasformazione della periferia e di rottura della comunità. Spontaneismo, informalità, disobbedienza e antipolitica hanno nel tempo connotato una perifericità attiva delle borgate facendone un "centro ai margini". I processi di modernizzazione, individualizzazione e secolarizzazione, la rottura dei legami comunitari di provenienza hanno alimentato la polarità urbana marginalizzando le borgate, riducendo il controllo sociale spontaneo e le leve di regolazione della vita pubblica da parte delle istituzioni pubbliche e private del territorio.

The features of decommunization on the example of the toponymic policy of Ukraine and Poland are explored in the article. The "last" wave of decommunization of the city toponymics, which began in 2014 and peaked in 2015–2017, was the object of interest. 14 Ukrainian and Polish cities were selected for comparative research. The study covered all decommunization legal acts in selected cities. 451 urbanonims were analyzed, the vast majority of which were decommunizated in Ukraine (89%). Polish cities accounted for 11% of the total renamed amount, respectively.The content-statistical analysis made it possible to determine the scale of urbanonymy changes, the recurrence of old and new urbanonymy in the sample under study. The classification of old and new names has been carried out in terms of persons, events, or other objects and phenomena. As a result, objective information was obtained to assess the scale, intensity, and territorial characteristics of urban changes in both states. It has been established that, although in general toponymic decommunization was supported and understood in both states by a significant part of society, it caused certain ideological, political, organizational, and competence contradictions. Decommunization toponymic policy in Ukraine and Poland has not only common but also distinctive features. In particular, the renaming in Ukraine turned out to be several times larger than the Polish one. Along with the signs of decommunization, it also bore signs of de-Russification of symbolic space. Decommunized names in Ukraine turned out to be, on the whole, more neutral, compromise and de-ideologized. It was revealed that, unlike the Ukrainian one, the Polish judicial system often defended local self-government bodies from attempts by the central government under the guise of decommunization to interfere in local urbanonymy politics. ; В статье исследуются географические особенности декоммунизации на примере топонимической политики Украины и Польши. Объектом интереса была выбрана «последняя» волна декоммунизации урбанонимики, которая началась в 2014 году и пик которой пришелся на 2015–2017 годы. Для анализа политики осуществлено выборку из 14 городов Украины и Польши. Исследованием охвачено все декоммунизационные правовые акты урбанонимического характера в избранных городах. Проанализирован 451 урбаноним, подавляющее большинство из которых было декоммунизированно в Украине (89 %). На польские города пришлось соответственно 11 % всей совокупности исследуемых переименований. Содержательно-статистический анализ позволил определить масштаб урбанонимичних изменений, повторяемость старой и новой урбанонимики в исследуемой выборке. Осуществлена классификация старых и новых названий с точки зрения лиц, событий или иных объектов и явлений. В результате получено объективную информацию для оценки масштаба, интенсивности и территориальных особенностей урбанонимичних изменений в обоих государствах. Установлено, что хотя в целом топонимическая декоммунизация встретила в обоих государствах поддержку и понимание значительной части общества, однако вызвала определенные идейно-политические и организационно-компетенционные противоречия. Декоммунизационная топонимическая политика в Украине и Польше имеет не только общие, но и отличительные черты. В частности, переименование в Украине оказалось в несколько раз масштабнее, чем польское. Наряду с признаками декоммунизации оно носило одновременно признаки дерусификации символического пространства. Декоммунизированные названия в Украине оказались в целом более нейтральными, компромиссными и получили деидеологизированный характер. Выявлено, что в отличие от украинской, польская судебная система часто становилась на защиту органов местного самоуправления от попыток центральной власти под видом декоммунизации вмешиваться в местные урбанонимические политики. ; У статті досліджуються особливості декомунізації на прикладі топонімічної політики України та Польщі. Об'єктом зацікавлення була обрана «остання» хвиля декомунізації урбаноніміки, яка розпочалася 2014 року і пік якої припав на 2015–2017 роки. Для аналізу політики здійснено вибірку з 14 міст України і Польщі. Дослідженням охоплено всі декомунізаційні правові акти урбанонімічного характеру у вибраних містах. Проаналізовано 451 урбанонім, переважна більшість з яких була декомунізована в Україні (89 %). На польські міста припало відповідно 11 % всієї сукупності досліджуваних перейменувань. Змістовно–статистичний аналіз дозволив визначити масштаб урбанонімічних змін, повторюваність старої і нової урбаноніміки в досліджуваній вибірці. Здійснено класифікацію старих і нових назв з точки зору осіб, подій чи інших об'єктів та явищ. Як наслідок отримано об'єктивну інформацію для оцінки масштабу, інтенсивності та територіальних особливостей урбанонімічних змін в обох державах. Встановлено, що хоча у цілому топонімічна декомунізація зустріла в обох державах підтримку та розуміння значної частини суспільства, проте спричинила певні ідейно-політичні та організаційно-компетенційні протиріччя. Декомунізаційна топонімічна політика в Україні та Польщі має не лише спільні, а й відмінні риси. Зокрема, перейменування в Україні виявилося в декілька разів масштабнішим, ніж польське. Поряд з ознаками декомунізації воно носило одночасно ознаки дерусифікації символічного простору. Декомунізовані назви в Україні виявилися назагал нейтральнішими, компроміснішими і отримали деідеологізований характер. Виявлено, що на відміну від української, польська судова система часто ставала на захист органів місцевого самоврядування від намагань центральної влади під виглядом декомунізації втручатися в місцеві урбанонімічні політики.

У статті проаналізовано М.С. Грушевського як центральну постать в українській політико-правовій думці кінця ХІХ – першої третини ХХ століття і погляди Великого Українця щодо проблем держави і права та опрацьовано концепцію академіка стосовно українського конституціоналізму;і обґрунтовано, що спадщина Михайла Грушевського є культурним надбанням українського народу і має важливе значення для духовної і соціальної розбудови України. ; M.S. Hrushevsky has been analyzed as a central figure in Ukrainian political and legal thought of the late XIX - the first third of the ХХ century; the views of Great Ukrainian on issues of the state and law have been researched; the concept of academic concerning Ukrainian constitutionalism has been elaborated and it has been proved in the article that Mykhailo Hrushevsky's heirdom was the cultural heritage of the Ukrainians and was important for spiritual and social development of Ukraine.Mykhailo Hrushevsky is the outstanding Ukrainian historian, public and statesman, creator of «History of Ukraine-Rus», which in the vast archival material showed the continuity of the history of the Ukrainian people from the Kievan state times and proved that the Ukrainian people, like all the other Slavic peoples, have had its own roots.Thanks Mykhailo Hrushevsky for the fact that after nearly 300 years of national oppression, he proclaimed Ukraine as an independent state, which was recorded by IV Universal.The heirdom of Mykhailo Hrushevsky is the cultural heritage of our nation and is essential for spiritual and social development of Ukraine. He wrote nearly two thousands works, which traced the history of Ukraine from ancient times to the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic.The scientific heirdom of Mykhailo Hrushevsky interested not only historians, but also lawyers, because he had a lot of research on the legal aspects of the Ukrainian statehood. Mykhailo Hrushevsky leads the research of Ukrainian political and legal history from Kievan Rus through Galicia – Volyn principality, then – Lithuanian-Russian times, period of the liberation struggle of Cossack-Hetman times and Pereyaslav treaty with Moscow kingdom. Great Rus story according to M.Hrushevsky, has started with Volodymyr- Moscow principality, which evolved under the strongest influence of Kievan Rus. Overall Russian history as overall Russian nation doesn't not exist – it is an artificial construction,according to Hrushevsky's point of view.L. Hrushevsky in his research on the state and law issues gave the definitions to the following categories: political theory; political process; political institutions; political culture. Hrushevsky's merit was in the drafting constitution of the Russian Empire restructuring, where he focused on the state decentralization; providing the cities with broad nationalterritorial autonomy; parliamentary government; separation of powers into legislative, executive, judicial and human rights and freedoms.All scientific and social activities of M. Hrushevsky were based on the idea of federalism and populism. In his article "The constitutional issue and the Ukrainians in Russia" scientist proposed a project, which included the state decentralization, regions provided with broad national territorial autonomy, parliamentary government, a clear definition of the subjects' status of the Federation.M. Hrushevsky required considering only the unity of people and the state, social and national interests, internal and external freedom, past, present and future of the nation; he demanded to consider in the unity also the interests of "top" and "bottom" of the nation.M. Hrushevsky actively considered political and legal issues in the period of existence and the Central Council activity. This period was the highest flight of political, social and public activities of M. Hrushevsky. He was one of the main ideologists of the Ukrainian revolution; the creator of its concept and together with the UCC he passed the way from the requirements of limited national-territorial autonomy to the formation of independent Ukraine.Scientific works of the academic and representatives of his scientific school were written on the issues of history, politics, and law of Ukraine and have become a real phenomenon in scientific and public life of independent Ukraine.State and legal concept of M. Hrushevsky was certified in laws that were made by the Central Council during its existence, including the law "On national and personal autonomy", "On voting rights", "On citizenship", in the Constitution of UNR as the fundamental law etc.M. Hrushevkiy's contribution to the development of the Ukrainian state and law is undeniable, and the flow of social and political process in Ukraine nowadays largely depends on the specific historical background, prevailing in the Ukrainian history.

Table of contents: Wojciech Włoch -The Democratic Paradox Revisited - how liberal constitutionalism supports democratic equality; Tomasz Milej - Liberal democracy's rocky path – the cases of Kenya and Tanzania; Tímea Drinóczi, Agnieszka Bień-Kacała - Illiberal constitutionalism in Hungary and Poland: The case of judicialization of politics; Fabio Ratto Trabucco - The Hungarian Judicial System evolution between 'Orbánism' and European Governance; Zbigniew Witkowski, Maciej Serowaniec - The role of 'controlled' referendum in Polish democracy; Faith Kabata - Impact of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms in Kenya; Lóránt Csink, Réka Török - The collision of national security purpose secret information gathering and the right to privacy. The present and future of Hungarian regulation; István Sabjanics - The Legality of National Security; Václav Stehlík - Metamorphosis of Public Security Exception in the EU Internal Market and EU Citizens' Rights ; Can a democracy work without liberalism? Or in other words, is the concept of governing and being governed in turns sustainable without respecting individual rights? Or is a democracy doomed to be hijacked by authoritarian rulers, if not backed by robust mechanisms of individual rights protection, by a rule of law and as system, in which – as James Madison wanted – an ambition is made to counteract ambition and the abuses of government are controlled? A standard answer of the so-called 'Western' constitutionalism is still a clear 'no'. The present volume offers study material on countries and historical situations, in which this clear 'no' faces challenges. It traces trajectories of democracy's development as it embraced and rejected liberal ideas. The contribution by Timea Drinoczi and Agnieszka Bien-Kacała does it with respect to Hungary and Poland, while the contribution by Tomasz Milej focuses on Kenya and Tanzania. But before embarking on the developments in particular countries, Wojciech Włoch takes the reader through the contemporary thought on the relationship between democracy and liberalism. He argues from the philosophical perspective that the liberal ideal of equal rights of individuals enables a democracy to thrive and prosper. Tomasz Milej takes up this point showing on the examples of Kenya and Tanzania how the attempts to base a democratic regime on illiberal pillars eventually lead to a collapse of the same. In this vein, Timea Drinoczi and Agnieszka Bien-Kacała make a strong case against theorising violations of constitutional stipulations and disenfranchisement of judiciaries as some new concepts of democracy or political constitutionalism as opposed to the legal one; one of the terms they prefer to describe the departure from the liberal democracy is abusive constitutionalism. Various examples for this type of regime from Hungarian practice are provided by Fabio Ratto Trabucco, who discusses the legal means employed by the Hungarian government to take over the judiciary by replacing judges with new ones under a new politicised appointment procedure. In so doing, the author also discusses the interaction of the Hungarian government with external actors, such as Venice Commission and various organs of the European Union. On such a dialogue focuses Faith Kabata documenting a poor record of Kenya in implementing of the UN monitoring bodies recommendations and even obstructionism by the state executive organs regarding civil and political rights. Her study shows that these rights were best implemented when individuals took their cases to the courts and that the biggest obstacle to the implementation was a lack of social and political internalisation of certain human rights provisions. Aren't those internalisation deficits the same ones that derailed the liberal democracy – at least temporarily – in Hungary and Poland? One could look from this perspective at the failure of the direct democracy instruments to enhance people's participation in public matters, as discussed by Zbigniew Witkowski and Maciej Serowaniec in the Polish context. Those more general accounts are supplemented by three case studies on a sensitive area of clash between the collective and individual interest. The contributions by Lóránt Csink and Réka Török, by István Sabjanics and by Václav Stehlík examine the relationship between the national security concerns and the individual freedoms. Quite interestingly, Stehlík's research shows that the readjustment away from the individual movement rights towards the protection of national security concerns has also found its way into the case law of the Court of Justice if the European Union.

Система периферийного капитализма, сформированная в 90-х гг., в последние 10 лет закреплялась. Ни персональные изменения во власти, ни трансформация политического ландшафта, ни «антиолигархические» кампании, ни рост цен на нефть, повлекший рост доходов населения, не затронули ее основ. Краткая характеристика сегодняшней России период «развитого периферийного капитализма». Эта система обладает определенной устойчивостью, но в динамичном мире XXI века она обрекает страну на безнадежное отставание, а при определенных условиях может привести к серьезным потрясениям. Путь к преодолению периферийного капитализма лежит через преодоление разрыва между обществом (народом) и государством, воссоздание российского государства на качественно новой основе. Ниже мы предлагаем «дорожную карту» российской модернизации ; Shaped as far back as in the 1990s the negative developments in Russias economy, politics and social sphere have sustained until today or even grew considerably in the past ten years. The most important social effect of the system of Peripheral Capitalism is that it has triggered the launch of an escape mechanism. This mechanism has led to the overall social passivity, political apathy, emigration, plunging into poverty, antisocial behavior and criminalization. The authors stress that the historical gap between the society and the state and the escape mechanism are the fundamental reasons of low social political activity and its ongoing decrease. Maintenance and further development of these trends have turned into a problem which threatens the very existence of the Russian state. Recognizing the need of political liberalization the authors often note that reduction of the authoritarian burden on the socio-political system will not automatically lead the country to the progressive way of development. Scattered and eclectic consciousness of Russian citizens is rather unstable, and if it does not shift towards a modern European organization of life, it will continue to degrade. The roadmap of Russian modernization, which is offered in the article, consists of high priority measures that have to be adopted to overcome the existing gap between the society and the state, and provides key guidelines for such systemic reforms. Such values as the priority of human rights, including property rights, individual freedom and social justice are regarded as a ruling compass which determines the overall vector of reforms. The establishment of trust between the society and the state requires de-oligarchization of the government and better access for deputies from different social groups to the leverages of the state power, in particular via the round table mechanism. Finally, it is proposed to convene a Constituent Assembly to adopt a new Constitution. Also it is proposed to resolve the problem of legitimizing the large property on the basis of a compromise which, on the one hand, would guarantee the inviolability of the owners rights, and, on the other hand, would constitute the effective management of assets once acquired as a result of non-market mechanisms and procedures. It is also proposed to allocate a significant part of state resources for the program of mass-scale housing and infrastructure construction (houses roads land). To own a house in Russia is a dream which has been nurtured for by people hundreds of years. The uniqueness of the present moment is that for the first time in its history Russia has the necessary resources to do this. These reforms can be generally outlined as follows: public service reform; in-depth reforms of the judicial system; anticorruption reform and adoption of laws targeted against organized crime; development of the mechanisms to protect the freedom of information and at the same time the toughening of liability for violations; reform of natural monopolies, the housing and utilities sector; reform of the social security system, including the pension system, and the reform in labor relations. In addition, it is necessary to create a system which encourages long-term investments and complex forms of modern economic activities, as well as introduce considerable transformations in the economic sector that should provide resources for the future economic and social development: education, research and the establishment of a national financial sector. The authors also raises the issue of the elite replaced by the bureaucratic nomenklatura under the system of Peripheral Capitalism, which, in fact, is one of the major obstacles to modernization

Deep and liquid securities markets appear to be an exception to a worldwide pattern in which concentrated ownership dominates dispersed ownership. Recent commentary has argued that a dispersed shareholder base is unlikely to develop in civil law countries and transitional economies for a variety of reasons, including (1) the absence of adequate legal protections for minority shareholders, (2) the inability of dispersed shareholders to hold control or pay an equivalent control premium to that which a prospective controlling shareholder will pay, and (3) the political vulnerability of dispersed shareholder ownership in left-leaning "social democracies". Nonetheless, this article finds that significant movement in the direction of dispersed ownership has occurred and is accelerating across Europe. But can this trend persist in the absence of strong legal protections for minority shareholders and in the presence of high private benefits of control? To understand how dispersed ownership might both arise and persist in the absence of the supposed legal and political preconditions, this article reconsiders the appearance of dispersed ownership in the late 19th and early 20th Century in the U.S. and the U.K. and contrasts their experience with those of France and Germany over the same period. During this era, the private benefits of control were high, and minority legal protections in the U.S. were notoriously lacking, as the famous Robber Barons of the age bribed judges and legislators and effectively employed regulatory arbitrage to escape even minimal anti-fraud regulation. Nonetheless, strong self-regulatory institutions (most notably, the New York Stock Exchange) and private bonding mechanisms by which leading underwriters pledged their reputational capital by placing directors on the board of sponsored firms enabled the equity market to expand and dispersed ownership to arise. In contrast, in the U.K., the London Stock Exchange for a variety of path-dependent reasons played a far more passive role and did not become an effective self-regulator until much later in the 20th Century. Yet, dispersed ownership also arose, although at a slower pace. The lesser role for private self-regulation in the U.K. may have been the consequence of its lesser need for self- regulation as a functional substitute for formal law, given both earlier legislation in the U.K. and lesser exposure to judicial corruption and regulatory arbitrage. In contrast to the New York and London Exchanges, the Paris Bourse over this same period made little, if any, effort to develop a self-regulatory structure or to upgrade listing or disclosure standards. Why not? The answer seems closely associated with the fact that it operated as a state-administered monopoly whose stockbrokers were formally considered civil servants and who were legally denied the ability to trade as principals for their own account. Facing no competition and composed of members having little incentive to promote or enhance its reputational capital, the Paris Bourse did not innovate and fell behind the London Stock Exchange. The intrusive role of state regulation, which discouraged private self-regulatory initiatives, appears to have a factor in its competitive decline. In Germany, the state strongly supported the growth of large private banks and enacted a punitive tax on securities transactions. Because the German central bank offered very liberal rediscounting terms to the principal private banks, they were able to satisfy the capital needs of German industry without resort to the equity market. In this respect, concentrated ownership seems less to have evolved naturally than to have been subsidized by the state. Prospectively, this article argues that "functional convergence" will dominate "formal convergence" and that the principal mechanism of functional convergence may be private self- regulation. However, rather than reject the "law matters" hypothesis, this article suggests that one of the principal advantages of common law legal systems is their decentralized character, which encourages self-regulatory initiatives, whereas in civil law systems the state may monopolize all law-making initiatives. Further, this article proposes that legal reforms, while important, are likely to follow, rather than precede, market changes – as happened in both the U.S. and the U.K. Once however a constituency for liquid and transparent securities market is thus created, it will predictably seek and secure legislation that fills in the enforcement gap that self-regulation leaves. Both in the U.S., the U.K. and Europe today, the growth of securities markets has been largely divorced from politics.

Just how
low could certain members of the Bossier City Council go – and just how hypocritically
they may act – now that there's a very real chance city voters will have a term
limits proposal before them in December not to the liking of a majority of
councilors with no way to counter it?

This
week, a citizen petition for one of three items to appear on the Dec. 7 ballot was certified, that would establish a retroactive three-term limit for
mayor and city councilors. By city
charter, as certified now it must be presented to the City Council, where
at that point the Council must approve it within 90 days or the next scheduled
election, which would be Oct. 23 but no scheduled election is before then and the
deadline for the next, Nov. 5 has passed, so that would be Dec. 7. If it does
not, it is required within 30 days, or Aug. 24, to add the item as an ordinance
automatically amending the charter, meaning that if for whatever reason the
Council fails to forward it at any regular meeting or any special
meeting before Aug. 24 it must by then vote to amend the charter with the item.
Failure to do either puts it in violation of the charter and sets up a slam
dunk declaratory judicial judgment that essentially goes over its head.

Expect
there to be resistance by the five councilors who have voted against efforts to
put a previous similar term limits amendment on the ballot which was ruled out judicially
by a technicality – Republicans David
Montgomery, Jeff Free,
and Vince
Maggio; Democrat Bubba
Williams; and no party Jeff
Darby, of whom all but Maggio would be disqualified from running for office
this spring or ever again – that will take two forms. The first will be to
refuse to follow the charter in passing any enabling ordinance, instruments
which any of GOP Mayor Tommy Chandler or Republican Councilors Chris Smith
and Brian
Hammons who have advocated for term limits since their elections, can introduce.

That would
trigger going to court which the majority bloc knows it will lose, but hopes it buys enough delay to prevent the matter from appearing in front of
the State Bond Commission at its Sep. 19 meeting. Aug. 20 is the deadline for
submissions, just before the last legal date the Council can act. But the SBC can waive that
deadline, and with its chairman Republican Treasurer John Fleming having been a long-time
backer of term limits and certain to instruct consideration of the petition
item onto the December ballot (which it will have until Oct. 14 to do so, the due
date for propositions for the Secretary of State), it seems unlikely even a
sympathetic 26th Judicial District judge could find ways to delay inclusion
of the item onto the last ballot of the year.

Knowing
almost certainly they will fail with this prong of the attack, the anti-term
limits old guard of Bossier politics has another. This depends upon reviving the
moribund Charter
Review Commission put into place by the majority bloc of councilors for the
express purpose, one way or the other, of keeping the strict version of term
limits in the petition from becoming amended into the charter.

Ideally,
this would be accomplished by placing for voter consideration a supposedly "revised"
charter into place that had no term limits or a weaker version, such as
grandfathering in existing councilors. Then, according to the charter,
whichever version received more votes, if both passed, would take effect. Also,
an ancillary argument made by the catspaw of majority bloc Assistant City
Attorney Richard Ray purports that because this was allegedly a "new" charter
that the petitioned items didn't apply to it, whether a court eventually would
buy this.All of
this presupposes that the charter "revision" makes to the ballot – and that's
where the anti-term limits forces have a big problem. The Commission had a 5-4
anti-term limits majority given each councilor appointed a member and the mayor
two, views which have become obvious throughout several meetings. Indeed, at
the last attempted meeting
Jul. 22 at which only term limits opponents attended, multiple commissioners,
particularly Montgomery appointee GOP Police Juror Julianna
Parks, made clear they saw the product of the Commission as a means of
stopping the end result of the petition.

That
failed as a tool to discourage petitioners when they successfully acquired
enough verified signatures, so now the Commission as a tool of the anti-term
limits forces has to deliver and, as its members present made clear in the
recent gathering, no later than the ballot on which the petitioned amendments
would appear. But it couldn't up until now, most recently because the "gathering"
was only a "gathering" and not a meeting because it legally lacked a quorum to do
business. Having
adopted Robert's
Rules of Order, that guide clearly states to do business a body had to have
a majority of regular/voting members present which is five, and only four
showed up.

The fifth
appointee, of Darby, who could have provided the crucial warm body, Panderina Soumas,
had attended almost no meetings and resigned at the end of the previous month.
She joined the former chairman of the Commission, Smith appointee Preston
Friedley, whose resignation came after an acrimonious
gathering on Jun. 18 at which none of the anti-term limits forces showed up
thereby denying a quorum that featured a dustup between him and Ray over
agenda-setting. Because neither resignation had been accepted, which must
happen in a meeting in order for more members under statute to be appointed
by the remaining members in their places, membership remained at nine and a
quorum at five.

This means
that if the appointees of Hammons and Chandler, one of whom is the vice
chairman Shane Cheatham, stay away from future meetings, the Commission can't convene
legally. Worse for the beleaguered quartet – all political insiders by family of
elected officials or by business connections in Bossier Parish – in the last meeting
taking advantage of the absence of Soumas and another of the quartet the
Commission passed a strict term limits proposal, so if left alone this becomes part
of the final product if the panel ever again meets and eventually forwards changes.

Facing a
potential impasse where the Commission can't meet legally until after the deadline
for ballot inclusion as long as the Chandler and Hammons appointees fail to
attend meetings scheduled – and this brings up another question of legality, as
under Robert's Rules as the Commission has exhausted its approved schedule of
meetings meaning any additional meetings are special and thus unless it otherwise
has procedures for calling special meetings, and does not, it can meet only
when authorized by the panel itself, as part of formal disciplinary procedures,
or for purposes of conducting a trial and determining a punishment – it cannot
complete its mission in time to make the last 2024 ballot. In fact, both Ray and
City Attorney Charles Jacobs warned the quartet at the last gathering that if
they tried to claim that with only four commissioners in attendance they could
have a valid meeting that this would be illegal and any actions taken null and
void.

That
advice didn't deter Parks, who claimed counting ex-oficio members Ray
and Chief Administrative Officer Amanda Nottingham would constitute a majority
for purpose of a quorum – even though Robert's Rules expressly contradict this.
She also said she was ready to go ahead with what would be an illegal meeting
under these conditions.

Whether
that had anything to do with it, it now appears a Jul.
29 meeting has been scheduled despite no authority, as mediated by Robert's
Rules, available to permit this. According to Internet news and entertainment
site SOBO.live in an e-mail message it distributed, the purpose of this meeting
is to accept the resignations, appoint as commissioners Keith Bush and Walter
Bigby, Jr. (a close political ally of Montgomery), remove the vice chairman
Cheatham, appoint a new chairman, unwind all of the previously approved
amendments (including the strict term limits measure), vote on a previously
unseen version of the charter, and approve the new charter to send to voters on
the December ballot.

If so, that
creates at least two legal objections that would invalidate whatever product
emerges, which likely would be stripped down to either a diluted term limits
provision if any and possibly making it more difficult for future petitions to
succeed: the meeting was not legally called, which at the very least should
have come from the prompting of its new chief officer, Cheatham, and if only
the same quartet shows up, nothing done during it will be legal. And there's
actually potentially a third legal impairment to such a scenario, dating back
to the very inception of the Commission: it didn't become
enabled legally in a way that it could replace rather than amend the charter,
so unless it passes along (as an illegitimate product) only a handful of
amendments, whatever else emerges for this reason will sink in court. Even if
the Council majority bloc tries to whip it through in time to make the ballot –
which would be highly hypocritical since, contrary to the charter's
instructions for a certified petition, it refused to approve of the previous
attempt, citing questions of legality – it seems highly unlikely that a court
at some judicial level wouldn't kick it off the ballot under this scenario, or
the SBC simply could reject its ballot placement, citing unresolved legal questions.

In other
words, while it will be almost impossible to keep the petitioned item from
appearing on Bossier Citians' ballots Dec. 7, it also will be almost impossible
to have any Commission product appear on the same. The only questions now are
whether the likes of Montgomery, Free, Maggio, Williams, and Darby will make
fools of themselves and how many taxpayer dollars they will waste in trying to
stall the inevitable.

Trafficking is an emerging concern in West Africa that is gaining increasing attention from the international community. This paper examines the relationship between trafficking and fragility in the region through a meta-analysis of existing knowledge and data on the subject. Given the scope of this paper, we will not attempt to provide any primary empirical or qualitative analysis, but instead focus on offering a comprehensive, unbiased overview of the recent policy and academic literature on the subject, which we hope will assist development practitioners working in the region and help the World Bank identify possible programmatic responses. The authors start this paper by defining trafficking to frame our analysis, and then provide an overview of the trafficking economy across the region. Next, authors outline the potential channels between trafficking and fragility, discussing the actors involved (organized criminal groups, rebels, local or national level politicians, the military, and civilians) and their relevance to specific countries. Finally, the authors present our suggestions on possible policy and programmatic responses, based on identifying both regional and external dimensions to the problems.

In Louisiana politics this year, perhaps the only
thing more inevitable than a Republican Jeff Landry gubernatorial victory was
the Louisiana
Supreme Court denying an appeal of lower courts' decisions rerunning the
Caddo Parish sheriff's contest. By contrast, successfully picking a winner in
the Mar. 23 faceoff is very much evitable, an exercise that will be determined
more by forces outside of the contest than the campaigning and dynamics within
the parish.

After the Nov. 18 runoff, Democrat former
Shreveport police chief and chief administrative officer Henry Whitehorn led Republican
former city councilor John Nickelson
by a single vote. However, a district court found enough irregularities under
law to order another election, and the Second Circuit agreed. This week, the Louisiana
Supreme Court ratified that with its action.

Given the undisputable proof and wording of
Louisiana law, as was the case with the appellate court. the only real question
was whether the non-Republicans on the Court would try to bring the matter to a
potential reversal. Once again, they tried. Democrat Assoc. Justice Piper Griffin
voted to hear and in a dissent
essentially repeated the same objections made by the dissenters at the
appellate level: elections with illegal ballots have these sanitized into legal
ones if the unrealistic laws in place to challenge these can't be followed. No
party Chief Justice John Weimer provided
a further rationale in his for
empowering tainted election results and dispensing with common sense by saying
procedures to overturn certified election results should be onerous, if not
unworkable, such was the sanctity of the process compared to the desirability
of judicial intervention.

Arguments which Republican Assoc. Justice James Genovese
easily slew in his concurring
opinion:

In a two-candidate race, the mere fact that one
candidate ends up with one or more votes than his opponent, without regard or
consideration given to proven fraud and unqualified voters casting ballots,
does not equate to a just and fair election under our law and jurisprudence. A
just and fair election can only be had when one candidate wins by a majority
vote of qualified electors ….… this election was not a free and fair election.
A one-vote margin of victory supported by clearly established eleven
unqualified voters cannot be said to constitute a fair election.What is fair and essential to the candidates and
the electorate, and to preserve election integrity, is to have a new runoff
election with a winner decided by qualified voters.





As clear-cut as the case for a new election was,
who will win is anything but. The date is significant in that it will coincide
with the state's presidential preference primaries, which for both parties will
come later rather than sooner in the national delegate-collection process.

This means the most
likely outcome of that process would be both nominees – almost certainly
Democrat Pres. Joe Biden and Republican
former Pres. Donald Trump –
mathematically will have been decided by then, leaving little on the ballot to
generate enthusiasm for the mass public and lowering turnout for all partisans.
The next most likely scenario is that Biden has things wrapped up, but that
Trump still hasn't sealed the deal although it may be only a matter of time.
Less likely still is neither has unassailable leads, and the least of all that
Trump has secured the nomination but Biden hasn't.

Reviewing
the general and runoff elections this fall, Nickelson did better the higher
the turnout. Reviewing those turnout figures with past Louisiana presidential preference
primary turnouts under the varying competitive environments, this means if the
GOP's nomination remains in doubt, he will have the edge; otherwise, Whitehorn
likely does, all things equal.

Money initially seems to be. Nickelson
plunked down $565,000 throughout but held only $16,000 at year's end. Whitehorn
spent only $140,000 and raised nothing after the general election, but has
$50,000 banked. Nickelson likely can outraise Whitehorn, but the latter seems
to be able to gather enough to offset the former's advantage.

Yet Whitehorn has a better rallying cry to
mobilize partisans, regardless of exogenous turnout factors or money. Look for his
campaign to trot out some version of he was robbed of a win, coupled with the
race card played in some diluted version that stands the best chance of mobilizing
his largely black voting base. Note that as soon as the news of the Court's declination
came out, he
began going very negatively against Nickelson and his supposedly favored treatment
by the courts, and earlier
he alleged, using a racial dog whistle, that prospective voters in the
runoff supporting him needed to vote "Because Your Life May Depend Upon It."

It may well work. Excepting that one scenario
where the GOP presidential nomination remains somewhat competitive, the turnout
cards are held by Whitehorn. Nickleson will have to come up with an excellent
strategy to outplay those.

While much of the obvious has been covered in how
the ascension of Republican Speaker Mike Johnson to that post will
affect Louisiana politics, one under-the-radar aspect is how it can strengthen
the state's hand in the current legal tussle over congressional reapportionment.

Last
year, Louisiana, which has a black voting age population of just under a
third, enacted a plan that created one majority-minority district out of six.
Special interests sued, claiming that the Voting Rights Act, despite its explicit
statement that population proportions didn't have to be translated into proportions
of districts, required the state to have two M/M districts.

In a related Alabama case, the U.S. Supreme Court
elevated racial proportion to a preferred status among reapportionment criteria,
which include such things incumbent protection, continuity of representation, and
keeping communities of interest together. Using that as a precedent, an Eastern
District of Louisiana judge firstly threw out the enacted maps and secondly ordered
new ones be drawn.

The decisions were appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
which hasn't ruled on the former but placed a stay on the latter, saying the
former needed resolution first. The Supreme
Court this month backed the stay, using the Louisiana case as a potential vehicle
that gives the Court a chance to set parameters to its Alabama ruling.
Practically speaking, if the former ruling stands, then the Legislature could
deal with the latter next year during the regular session or in a special session
preceding it without judicial involvement.

Assuming the legal wrangling ends in time for the
change to occur next year, whatever the state's majoritarian branches do can
set an important precedent. The Alabama ruling instructed that preference
should be given to proportional use of race to ensure that roughly as many districts
proportional to a discrete minority group's proportion in the population should
exist to give that group a opportunity to elect a chosen candidate, but didn't
mandate that the proportional output should be constructed utilizing only M/M districts.

Thus, it left the door open for "opportunity
districts," or those where the minority population is sufficiently proportionally
large enough to elect a chosen candidate without being a majority, to be utilized
in this kind of mapping, subject to other reapportionment criteria. A subsequent
Alabama attempt that created one M/M and one district with about 40 percent black
population was found inadequate to meet the new criterion.

Louisiana might have the chance to define this
further, if it must come to that. In contrast to the Alabama case, creating two
rather than one M/M district does much greater violence to other
reapportionment criteria, so there would be more leeway to creating an opportunity
district instead. In fact, one bill offered during the 2022 First Extraordinary
Session of the Legislature, called for reapportionment purposes, SB 22 by Democrat
state Sen. Greg Tarver, did
precisely this in making the Fifth District – which in two M/M plans was made
narrowly the second M/M district – a bare majority white district with 43
percent black population.

The case for accepting this arrangement became
stronger with Johnson's ascending to the speakership, referring particularly to
incumbency protection. With Johnson now the most powerful and important official
in the House, it becomes more imperative to maintain a district in which he can
get elected.

Almost every
of over a dozen bills filed in sessions in 2022 to create two M/M districts made
for convoluted plans with these districts at 53 and 52 or 52 and 51 percent
black population and, as compared to the enacted plan
which largely mirrored existing boundaries, considerably altered Johnson's District
4 by chopping off its four southern-most parishes and instead pushing it to gobble
up six parishes to the east and part of Ouachita now in District 5. Tarver's
plan did worse, removing more southern parishes and spreading further east,
circling around Ouachita. Even so, Johnson's district is nearly a third populated
with blacks.

If the GOP legislative majority could swap some
things around with CD 5 – for example, some of St. Landry parish for all of
Grant – and work on CD 5's borders with other districts, this could push CD 5
above 40 percent black while adhering more closely to CD 4's pre-2022
boundaries and better protect Johnson. This would give the judiciary an interesting
test case as to just how much preference to give race when other traditional
factors loom large.

It may not come to this, but if it does, Johnson's
unexpected promotion may cause equally unanticipated permutations to Louisiana's
congressional maps.

Summary. The purpose of the paper is to compare the fate of the representatives of the Western Ukrainian intellectual stratum under the communist and Nazi repressive regimes, in particular in the years of the World War II. The methodology of the research includes the principles of history, civilizational and objectivity approaches. The research uses the following methods of historical research and general research: concrete-historical, comparative-historical, systematic, biographic, generalization, analysis and synthesis etc. The scientific novelty of the article is in the deeper comprehension of the politics of terror, conducted by two conflicting totalitarian regimes, which tried to suppress Ukrainian intellectual stratum, especially in the legal field. Conclusions. The advent of the communist authorities on the Western Ukrainian territories in September 1939 was marked by repressions against local intellectual stratum which was part of their attempt to reinforce communist regime. Ukrainian lawyers came under criminal prosecution precisely as carriers of the idea of legal protection, which was practically emasculated in the Soviet judicial system. The main goal of such prosecutions against lawyers was to root out any attempt to defend civil and personal rights of citizens as well as lawyers themselves. The regime strove to reinforce legal nihilism and absolute power of the state over the society in a violent way. The article highlights the results of repressions against lawyers, the atmosphere of those repressions and the further fate of the detainees and defendants. The paper also describes the ways the lawyers resorted to in order to avoid persecution from the communist and Nazi sides. It is estimated that 80 advocates who either had been working in the Stanislaviv region at the beginning of autumn 1939 or had close connections to the region fell victims to either NKVD or Gestapo. Thirty-five of the Stanislaviv lawyers failed to flee from the communist repression system in 1939‒1941 and 1944‒1945 and only five of them survived in the Soviet camps. German repressive organs were responsible for the death of other three personalities, several more lawyers were arrested by Gestapo but they managed to survive. Over two dozens of the former advocates managed to avoid communist repressions, as they successfully moved on the territory of the General Government (General Governorate for the Occupied Polish Region). A part of them came back to the Galychyna region in between 1942‒1944 and they worked in public institutions or even pursued their careers. After the war they lived as emigrants in the number of Western countries. Out of the ten lawyers, who had stayed in Ukraine, only three lawyers were allowed to practice their profession in the post-war period. It is still impossible to trace the fate of over a dozen of advocates who used to work in the Stanislaviv region before the war. ; Анотація. Мета – на прикладі долі українських адвокатів Станиславівщини зіставити ставлення радянського та німецького каральних режимів до представників західноукраїнської інтелігенції, зокрема у роки Другої світової війни. Методологія дослідження визначена застосуванням принципів історизму, цивілізаційного підходу та об՚єктивності. У ході дослідження використовувалися такі методи історичних досліджень, як конкретно-історичний, історико-порівняльний, системний, біографічний, загальнонаукові методи узагальнення, поведінковий, методи аналізу і синтезу та ін. Наукова новизна статті полягає в осмисленні політики терору, котру здійснювали два супротивні тоталітарні режими, прагнучи нав՚язати свою владу українцям стосовно представників правничого стану, покликаних своїм фахом бути захисниками проти порушень закону. Висновки. Встановлення у вересні 1939 р. на західноукраїнських землях більшовицької влади супроводжувалося початком репресій проти місцевої інтелігенції з метою утвердження комуністичної тоталітарної системи. Українські адвокати потрапили під кримінальні переслідування саме як носії ідеї правового захисту, котра у радянській судовій системі практично була вихолощена. Головна мета репресій щодо правників – зламати будь-яку спробу у правовий спосіб відстоювати громадянські і особисті права власні чи звинувачених, утвердження у суспільній свідомості правового нігілізму, нав՚язування дискурсу абсолютного права держави на насильство. З՚ясовано атмосферу та результати репресій каральних органів стосовно правників, подальшу їх долю. Встановлено шляхи уникнення частиною з них переслідувань з боку комуністичної та нацистської влади. З՚ясовано, що із 80 адвокатів, які на початок осені 1939 р. працювали на Станиславівщині, чи тісно були пов՚язані з нею, половина стали жертвами діяльності НКВС та гестапо. Через більшовицькі репресії 1939–1941 і 1944–1945 рр. пройшли понад 35 станиславівських правників, з них тільки п՚ятеро вижили в радянських таборах. Від рук німецьких каральних органів загинули три особи, ще кількох було арештовано, але вони змогли уникнути смерті. Понад два десятки колишніх адвокатів зуміли уберегтися від комуністичних репресій, перебравшись на окуповані німцями землі Польського генерал-губернаторства. Частина з них у 1942–1944 рр. повернулися в Галичину і працювали за фахом або в громадських структурах. Після війни вони продовжили життя у західних країнах. Із 10 правників, котрі залишилися в Україні, тільки три були допущені до надання юридичних послуг у повоєнний час. Доля півтора десятка передвоєнних адвокатів області ще не встановлена.

Summary. The purpose of the paper is to compare the fate of the representatives of the Western Ukrainian intellectual stratum under the communist and Nazi repressive regimes, in particular in the years of the World War II. The methodology of the research includes the principles of history, civilizational and objectivity approaches. The research uses the following methods of historical research and general research: concrete-historical, comparative-historical, systematic, biographic, generalization, analysis and synthesis etc. The scientific novelty of the article is in the deeper comprehension of the politics of terror, conducted by two conflicting totalitarian regimes, which tried to suppress Ukrainian intellectual stratum, especially in the legal field. Conclusions. The advent of the communist authorities on the Western Ukrainian territories in September 1939 was marked by repressions against local intellectual stratum which was part of their attempt to reinforce communist regime. Ukrainian lawyers came under criminal prosecution precisely as carriers of the idea of legal protection, which was practically emasculated in the Soviet judicial system. The main goal of such prosecutions against lawyers was to root out any attempt to defend civil and personal rights of citizens as well as lawyers themselves. The regime strove to reinforce legal nihilism and absolute power of the state over the society in a violent way. The article highlights the results of repressions against lawyers, the atmosphere of those repressions and the further fate of the detainees and defendants. The paper also describes the ways the lawyers resorted to in order to avoid persecution from the communist and Nazi sides. It is estimated that 80 advocates who either had been working in the Stanislaviv region at the beginning of autumn 1939 or had close connections to the region fell victims to either NKVD or Gestapo. Thirty-five of the Stanislaviv lawyers failed to flee from the communist repression system in 1939‒1941 and 1944‒1945 and only five of them survived in the Soviet camps. German repressive organs were responsible for the death of other three personalities, several more lawyers were arrested by Gestapo but they managed to survive. Over two dozens of the former advocates managed to avoid communist repressions, as they successfully moved on the territory of the General Government (General Governorate for the Occupied Polish Region). A part of them came back to the Galychyna region in between 1942‒1944 and they worked in public institutions or even pursued their careers. After the war they lived as emigrants in the number of Western countries. Out of the ten lawyers, who had stayed in Ukraine, only three lawyers were allowed to practice their profession in the post-war period. It is still impossible to trace the fate of over a dozen of advocates who used to work in the Stanislaviv region before the war. ; Анотація. Мета – на прикладі долі українських адвокатів Станиславівщини зіставити ставлення радянського та німецького каральних режимів до представників західноукраїнської інтелігенції, зокрема у роки Другої світової війни. Методологія дослідження визначена застосуванням принципів історизму, цивілізаційного підходу та об՚єктивності. У ході дослідження використовувалися такі методи історичних досліджень, як конкретно-історичний, історико-порівняльний, системний, біографічний, загальнонаукові методи узагальнення, поведінковий, методи аналізу і синтезу та ін. Наукова новизна статті полягає в осмисленні політики терору, котру здійснювали два супротивні тоталітарні режими, прагнучи нав՚язати свою владу українцям стосовно представників правничого стану, покликаних своїм фахом бути захисниками проти порушень закону. Висновки. Встановлення у вересні 1939 р. на західноукраїнських землях більшовицької влади супроводжувалося початком репресій проти місцевої інтелігенції з метою утвердження комуністичної тоталітарної системи. Українські адвокати потрапили під кримінальні переслідування саме як носії ідеї правового захисту, котра у радянській судовій системі практично була вихолощена. Головна мета репресій щодо правників – зламати будь-яку спробу у правовий спосіб відстоювати громадянські і особисті права власні чи звинувачених, утвердження у суспільній свідомості правового нігілізму, нав՚язування дискурсу абсолютного права держави на насильство. З՚ясовано атмосферу та результати репресій каральних органів стосовно правників, подальшу їх долю. Встановлено шляхи уникнення частиною з них переслідувань з боку комуністичної та нацистської влади. З՚ясовано, що із 80 адвокатів, які на початок осені 1939 р. працювали на Станиславівщині, чи тісно були пов՚язані з нею, половина стали жертвами діяльності НКВС та гестапо. Через більшовицькі репресії 1939–1941 і 1944–1945 рр. пройшли понад 35 станиславівських правників, з них тільки п՚ятеро вижили в радянських таборах. Від рук німецьких каральних органів загинули три особи, ще кількох було арештовано, але вони змогли уникнути смерті. Понад два десятки колишніх адвокатів зуміли уберегтися від комуністичних репресій, перебравшись на окуповані німцями землі Польського генерал-губернаторства. Частина з них у 1942–1944 рр. повернулися в Галичину і працювали за фахом або в громадських структурах. Після війни вони продовжили життя у західних країнах. Із 10 правників, котрі залишилися в Україні, тільки три були допущені до надання юридичних послуг у повоєнний час. Доля півтора десятка передвоєнних адвокатів області ще не встановлена.

Forming the Question The GNU General Public Licenses are the most widely used open source software licenses worldwide. According to a license breakdown statistics from freshmeat.net, one of the largest software repositories, some 70 percent of applications that are released under an open source license carry that of GNU1. Here, the reference to the GNU General Public Licenses is made in plural, for there are in all three GNU software licenses: a) the GNU General Public License (GPL), b) the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) and c) the GNU Affero General Public License (AGPL)2. Of these, the GPL is far and away the most popular. The prevalence of the LGPL is approximately one tenth thereof, and the latest entrant, AGPL, is still rather marginal, albeit increasingly used latterly.3 Each of the licenses has, however, its intended use and, in that regard, particular contractual provisions and effects, which naturally influence the potential penetration. Such elements form the very research problem of this study, so that at this stage it suffices to say that, on average, the GPL is used for programs, the LGPL for libraries and the AGPL for software that is commonly run over a network. Notwithstanding the fact that most projects licensed under the GNU software licenses are unquestionably of minor importance or intended for a limited audience, the great social significance of these licenses stems from the other fact that some of the most widely used computer software is GNU-licensed, as well. Examples of such programs include, among others, the Linux kernel, the GCC compiler collection, MySQL database server, Perl programming language, OpenOffice.org productivity suite, Java development kit, Samba file and print services, Qt development framework, iptables filter control tool, the CVS concurrent versioning system and Launchpad code hosting platform, which are all licensed under a GNU software license4. Many factors can drive a decision about technology architecture, information management, systems integration or software licensing in general. History, legacy systems, internal politics and the location of key people within an organisation may all be relevant, as well as other commercial motives, such as cost considerations and offerings of competing vendors. What tends to be on a lower level of priority, if indeed is properly considered at all, is the legal or regulatory impact of such a decision.5 However, since various contractual restraints contained in proprietary and open source licenses, respectively, may at a later time be proven to mean a significant effect on the contemplated use or even the dilution of the whole investment, judicial risk analysis ought to constitute an essential part of the planning work of a licensing strategy. Now, therefore, the purpose of this work is to interpret the reciprocity clauses included in the GNU software licenses, viz. which obligations they impose on the licensee and what sort of activity triggers such commitments. Looking at prior studies, one can find many general statements in the literature that characterise the GPL as possessing something called the 'viral effect'6, the LGPL as being 'persistent'7 and the AGPL as offering a plug for the 'application service provider (ASP) loophole'8 in the ordinary GPL. However, the more precise meaning of such effects and the demarcation between various forms of combinations and modifications—as well as defining which acts constitute derivatives of functional relevance with regard to reciprocally licensed software—have been subject to unfortunately diminutive analysis in our jurisdiction9. My aim is to systematise the mechanisms of reciprocity under the doctrine of GNU software licenses. First, I seek to offer, from the legal point of view, the intellectual readiness for making strategic licensing decisions in relation to the GPL and its derivatives for undertakings that are directly or indirectly conducting business in the computing industry. It is fundamental for developers to appreciate how the licenses affect the extent to which they can adapt the licensed software, and under what restrictions. Nevertheless, secondly, the factual audience is much wider. According to the statistics from a recent survey, more than half of the enterprises are using open source applications in their organisations today, and an additional ten percent plan to do so during this year10. Further, by 2012, research firm Gartner, Inc. believes that 80 percent of all commercial software applications will include open source components11. Inasmuch as the GNU software licenses hold the lion's share of the open source market, it is highly probable that one wishes to be conscious of one's risk position in such arrangements to eschew being legally exposed for violations of the license requirements.