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To cope with the economic uncertainties of the changes, transformations, and transitions affecting current European and world agriculture, many farmers are rethinking the purposes of their business and are looking to diversify their activities. Taking advantage of certain assets related to their operation and of opportunities for tourism development in the region (such as availability of buildings, subsidies related to ecology and environment images), some of them have chosen agritourism, a tourist activity proposed by the farmer on his/her farm. The literature includes many studies on this topic, but there is no consensus on terminology, definitions, and concepts: they vary from one author to another and evolve over time. Having distinguished different agritourist typologies in which accommodation is a basic element, we have personally chosen to study agritourism defined as "all tourist and leisure activities and services present in a working farm". Wallonia and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, our geographical research areas, are neighbouring entities, with similar agriculture, and their tourist markets offer some similarities. Included in rural tourism, agritourism is nevertheless marginal compared to the overall tourist product offered. Some successes might suggest that agritourism could be the panacea against the crisis in agriculture. But is this always the case? Agritourism should be defined, localized, and differentiated. Working on these two periurban entities of Western Europe which are not yet discussed in the literature, we wanted to understand and to identify agritourist dynamics. We wanted to understand the geographic relationship between agritourism, periurban countryside, local resources, and agricultural and tourist specializations. We wanted to understand the logic of the emergence of tourism on a farm and the links between tourist and agricultural functions in a specific spatial context. Finally, we wanted to understand the integration of the motivations of different types of tourists and their reasons for visiting particular regional and local contexts. To do this, we analyse both the location and the agritourist geographical position in relation to the different markets. To meet the objectives, we conducted a comparative heuristic analysis of agritourism in both territories. We interviewed key organisational representatives (31 persons), we made field observations, documents comparisons. We conducted interviews with various Walloon and Luxembourg farmers (34 life histories) affording different agritourist practices that we synthesized by circumstantial geographical sketches. We conducted surveys with potential tourists (1148surveys) in seven Walloon and Luxembourg tourist spots. These steps and the statistical and cartographic processing based on the results allowed us to build a heuristic geographical model of the Walloon and Luxembourg agritourism. The experiences of farmers interviewed allowed us to understand the position of the agritourist system in its spatial context. Each of them develops opportunities and experience threats (economic, social, from heritage) in connection with the launch of the project, a true survival kit in some cases. It appears that agritourism is not always a panacea for farmers. On the farm, the tourist function comes after the agricultural one and is based on the latter, but the agricultural function also benefits from the tourist function because both activities are related. The emergence of tourism is an autonomous decision of the farmers who can be influenced by other actors, including authorities, but also by other factors such as the existence of a local demand or the regional real estate pressure. There is no particular profile of tourists visiting agritourism, but some features, including those of family, are more favourable to the experience of this type of tourism. Definitions and representations as well as the reasons and expectations differ depending on the characteristics of the interviewed tourists: urban or rural origin, level of experience. Three agritourist profiles were also highlighted: those seeking accommodation in a rural environment, those who think about accommodation linked to gastronomy, those who prefer accommodation that would be a comfortable basis from which to tour in a tourist area. The comparison between the experiences of farmers and the expectations of tourists shows that there is a risk of developing different organizational temporalities in the farm "open" to tourists as well as of favouring unbalanced images of agritourism, which could lead to a vision and a promotion of agriculture which does not correspond to its regional reality. By combining the different results and by linking the typology of the Walloon and Luxembourg agritourist products, the types of rural areas and the geographical components, it appears that agritourism should not only be analysed according to the environmental dimensions, but that the analysis must also take into account other factors such as accessibility, local communities, hospitality, rural development policies, the real estate market, the agricultural orientation of farm operations, as well as the degree of complementarity with tourist spots. We have demonstrated that agritourism, combining agriculture with tourism, is not developing, either everywhere, or in the same manner, and differs between different types of periurban countryside, depending on local resources. Moreover, agritourism is not always a solution for all countrysides, nor always a path for each farmer, nor always a perfect tourist destination for all tourists. However, even if strict regionalization of agritourism does not seem possible when we consider all the factors involved in the different regions, trends may emerge depending on agritourist types. There is thus a link between agritourism type and countryside type, which the heuristic model we propose should allow to improve in order to increase the convergence between the expectations of the different stakeholders. ; Pour faire face aux incertitudes économiques auxquelles les mutations, transformations et transitions actuelles confrontent les agricultures européennes et mondiales, nombre d'agriculteurs repensent les finalités de leur métier et cherchent à diversifier leurs activités. Profitant des atouts liés à leur exploitation et des opportunités de développements touristiques régionaux (tels que disponibilité de bâtiments, subsides, images liées à l'écologie et à l'environnement), certains d'entre eux se sont orientés vers l'agritourisme, cette activité de tourisme proposée par l'agriculteur dans son exploitation agricole. La littérature abonde d'études relatives à ce phénomène, mais il n'y a pas de consensus quant à la terminologie, aux définitions et aux concepts y afférant : ceux-ci varient d'un auteur à l'autre et évoluent avec le temps. Après en avoir dégagé différentes typologies de l'agritourisme, où l'hébergement est à considérer comme un produit de base, nous avons choisi d'étudier un agritourisme défini comme « l'ensemble des activités et services de tourisme et de loisirs présents dans une exploitation agricole en activité ». La Wallonie et le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, cadre géographique de la recherche, sont des entités contiguës, proches par leur agriculture, dont les marchés touristiques offrent certaines similitudes. Inclus dans le tourisme de terroir, l'agritourisme y est pourtant marginal par rapport à l'offre touristique globale. Toutefois, quelques réussites donnent à penser que l'agritourisme pourrait être une panacée pour cette agriculture en crise. Mais est-ce le cas partout ? L'agritourisme demande à être défini, localisé, différencié. En travaillant sur ces deux entités périurbaines d'Europe occidentale non encore analysées dans la littérature, nous voulions comprendre et faire émerger des dynamiques agritouristiques. Nous voulions comprendre la relation géographique entre agritourismes, campagnes périurbaines, ressources locales et spécialisations agricoles et touristiques. Nous voulions comprendre les logiques d'émergence du tourisme au sein d'une exploitation agricole et les liens entre les fonctions touristiques et agricoles dans un contexte spatial particulier. Enfin, nous voulions comprendre l'intégration des raisons et motivations des touristes par rapport aux contextes régional et local. Pour ce faire, il s'agissait d'analyser à la fois la localisation et la position géographique de l'agritourisme par rapport aux différents marchés. Afin de pouvoir répondre aux objectifs, nous avons procédé à une analyse heuristique comparative de l'agritourisme au sein des deux territoires cités. Nous avons interviewé des témoins privilégiés (31 personnes), nous avons fait des observations de terrain, des comparaisons documentaires . Nous avons effectué des interviews auprès de différents agriculteurs wallons et luxembourgeois (34 récits de vie) proposant différentes pratiques agritouristiques que nous avons synthétisées sous forme de schémas circonstanciels géographiques. Nous avons réalisé des enquêtes auprès de touristes potentiels (1148 enquêtes) dans sept lieux touristiques wallons et luxembourgeois. Ces étapes et les traitements statistiques et cartographiques effectués sur les résultats nous ont permis de construire un modèle heuristique géographique de l'agritourisme wallon et luxembourgeois. Les expériences des tenanciers interrogés nous ont permis de renforcer le positionnement de l'agritourisme dans son contexte spatial. Chacun d'eux développe des circonstances positives et négatives (patrimoniales, économiques et sociales) en rapport avec le lancement de son projet, véritable kit de survie dans certains cas. Il en ressort que l'agritourisme n'est pas toujours une panacée pour les agriculteurs. Au sein de l'exploitation, la fonction touristique arrive après la fonction agricole et repose sur cette dernière, mais la fonction agricole bénéficie aussi de la fonction touristique puisque les devenirs des deux activités sont liés. L'émergence de l'activité touristique est une décision autonome de l'exploitant qui peut être influencé par d'autres acteurs, notamment par les autorités publiques mais aussi par d'autres facteurs comme l'existence d'une demande à proximité ou la pression immobilière. Il n'existe pas un profil particulier de touristes fréquentant l'agritourisme, mais certaines caractéristiques, notamment familiales, sont plus favorables à la pratique de ce type de tourisme. Les définitions et représentations ainsi que les raisons et attentes diffèrent selon les caractéristiques des touristes interrogés : origine urbaine ou rurale, degré d'expérience. Trois profils d'agritouristes ont aussi été mis en évidence : ceux qui cherchent un hébergement situé dans un environnement rural, ceux qui pensent à un hébergement lié à la gastronomie, ceux qui privilégient un hébergement qui serait un pied-à-terre confortable pour rayonner dans une région touristique. La comparaison entre les expériences des tenanciers et les attentes des touristes fait apparaître le risque de développer des temporalités organisationnelles en concurrence au sein même de l'exploitation agricole « ouverte » aux touristes ainsi que de favoriser des images déséquilibrées de l'agritourisme, ces dernières pouvant aboutir à une vision et à une promotion de l'agriculture qui ne correspondent pas à sa réalité régionale. En combinant les différents résultats et en reliant la typologie des produits agritouristiques wallons et luxembourgeois, les types de milieux ruraux et les composantes géographiques, il ressort que l'analyse de l'agritourisme ne doit pas seulement tenir compte des aspects environnementaux, mais qu'elle doit aussi tenir compte d'autres facteurs tels l'accessibilité, les communautés locales, l'hospitalité, les politiques de développement rural, le marché immobilier, l'orientation agricole de l'exploitation et le degré de complémentarité avec les lieux touristiques. Nous avons ainsi mis en évidence que l'agritourisme, combinaison de l'agriculture avec le tourisme, ne se développe ni partout, ni de la même manière, quel que soit le type de campagne périurbaine puisqu'il utilise les ressources locales. De plus, il n'est ni toujours une solution pour toutes les campagnes, ni toujours une solution possible pour tous les agriculteurs, ni toujours une destination de tourisme idéale pour tous les touristes. Cependant, même si une régionalisation stricte de l'agritourisme ne semble pas possible quand on considère l'ensemble des facteurs intervenant dans les différentes régions, des tendances peuvent se dégager en fonction de types agritouristiques. Il existe donc un lien entre type d'agritourisme et type de campagne, lien que le modèle heuristique que nous proposons doit permettre de resserrer pour augmenter la convergence entre les attentes des différents acteurs. ; Um sich den wirtschaftlichen Unsicherheiten zu stellen, welche Änderungs, Umwandlungs und Transitionsprozesse in der europäischen und globalen Landwirtschaft mit sich ziehen, überdenken viele Landwirte ihre berufliche Positionierung und versuchen ihre Tätigkeitsfelder zu diversifizieren. Eine Option zur Diversifikation bietet die zusätzliche Nutzung der Ressourcen des landwirtschaftlichen Betriebs (Verfügbarkeit von Gebäuden, ökologische Ressourcen und kulturelle Umwelt) für eine touristische Inwertsetzung. Diese von Landwirten angebotene Form des Fremdenverkehrs wird als Agrotourismus bezeichnet. In der Fachliteratur findet sich eine Vielzahl von Untersuchungen zu diesem Thema, allerdings werden Terminologien, Definitionen und Konzepten in der Literatur bisher nicht einheitlich verwendet. Die Anwendung von Begrifflichkeiten und Konzepten hat sich zudem im Zeitablauf verändert. Aus diesem Grund wurde für die vorliegende Untersuchung zunächst eine Differenzierung der verschiedenen Typologien von Agrotourismus, in der "Beherbergung" als Basisprodukt betrachtet wird, durchgeführt. Auf Basis der Ergebnisse kann ""Agrotourismus" hier als "die Gesamtheit der dem Tourismus und der Freizeit dienenden Aktivitäten und Dienste, die auf einem Bauernhof in Betrieb zu finden sind" definiert werden. Die Wallonie und das Großherzogtum Luxemburg, die das Untersuchungsgebiet dieser Forschungsarbeit darstellen, sind benachbarte Gebiete mit einer ähnlichen landwirtschaftlichen Struktur und einem vergleichbarem Tourismussektor. Im Vergleich mit dem gesamten Tourismusangebot dieser Regionen ist die Bedeutung des Agrotourismus bisher noch begrenzt gleichwohl ist er ein wichtiger Bestandteil des regionalen Tourismus. In Zukunft könnte der Agrotourismus jedoch eine wichtige Rolle als Mittel zur Überwindung der Krisen in der regionalen Landwirtschaft spielen. Doch, um zu beurteilen, ob dies wirklich überall der Fall ist, muss "Agrotourismus" zunächst genauer charakterisiert, differenziert und lokalisiert betrachtet werden. Durch die Untersuchung der beiden ausgewählten periurbanen Gebiete in Westeuropa, die bisher noch nicht in der Fachliteratur analysiert wurden, soll deshalb die Dynamik des Agrotourismus erfasst und Besonderheiten herausstellt werden. Ziel war es die geographische Beziehung zwischen Agrotourismus, periurbanen Landschaften, lokalen Ressourcen und landwirtschaftlichen und touristischen Spezialisierungen zu verstehen. Dazu wurde zum einen die Struktur des Tourismusaufkommens in landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben sowie das Verhältnis zwischen touristischen und landwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten in diesem spezifischen räumlichen Kontext untersucht. Zum anderen wurden auch die Gründe und Motivation der Touristen im regionalen und lokalen Kontext erfasst und die geographische Verteilung und Position des Agrotourismus im Bezug auf die verschiedenen Tourismusmarktsegmente analysiert. Zur konkreten Bearbeitung dieser Fragestellungen wurde eine heuristische Vergleichsanalyse des Agrotourismus in beiden Gebieten durchgeführt. Dazu wurden umfangreiche empirische Erhebungen in Form von Expertengesprächen (31 Personen) und Beobachtungen vor Ort sowie dem Vergleich von Dokumente durchgeführt. Zusätzlich wurden Interviews mit 34 luxemburgischen und wallonischen Landwirten, die verschiedene agrotouristische Praktiken anwenden, geführt. Diese Praktiken wurden mittels umstandsabhängige geographische Schemata zusammengefasst. Zudem wurden Touristen an sieben touristischen Orten der Wallonie und des Großherzogtums von Luxemburg befragt (1148 Befragungen). Diese Schritte und die statistische und kartographische Bearbeitung der Ergebnisse haben uns erlaubt, ein geographisches heuristisches Modell des wallonischen und luxemburgischen Agrotourismus zu erstellen. Die Erfahrungen der befragten Betreiber haben uns erlaubt, die Position des Agrotourismus in seinem räumlichen Kontext besser zu verstehen. Jeder der Befragten hat sowohl positive als auch negative Erfahrungen (patrimonial, wirtschaftlich und sozial) seitdem Start seines Projektes gemacht, in einigen Fällen hat sich der Agrartourismus als überlebenswichtig erwiesen. Es zeigt sich aber auch, dass das Agrotourismus nicht immer ein Wundermittel für die Landwirte darstellt Im landwirtschaftlichen Betrieb kommt die touristische Funktion nach der landwirtschaftlichen Funktion und beruht auf ihr. Allerdings profitiert der landwirtschaftliche Bereich von der touristischen Funktion. Die Endscheidung über den Umfang der touristischen Aktivität liegt bei den Landwirten, die jedoch durch andere Akteure, wie Behörden, und weitere Faktoren, wie lokale Nachfrage oder Druck auf dem Immobilienmarkt, beeinflusst werden kann. Die Untersuchung hat gezeigt, dass Touristen, die Urlaub auf dem Bauernhof verbringen, keine klares Profil haben, das aber bestimmte Gruppen wie Familien diese Art von Tourismus bevorzugen. Die Definitionen und Vorstellungen sowie die Gründe und Erwartungen hängen zudem von der Herkunft der befragten Touristen, städtische oder ländliche Herkunft, sowie vom Erfahrungsgrad ab. Zusammenfassend lassen sich drei Profile von Agrotouristen definieren: jene, die eine Unterkunft im ländlichen Raum suchen, jene, die eine Unterkunft mit einem gastronomischen Angebot suchen, und jene, die eine angenehme Bleibe in einer touristischen Gegend suchen. Der Vergleich zwischen den Erfahrungen der Betreiber und den Erwartungen der Touristen zeigt, dass die Schwierigkeiten darin bestehen organisatorische Zeitabläufe innerhalb des landwirtschaftlichen Betriebs, zu entwickeln, die beide Bereichen gerecht werden. Zudem besteht die Gefahr, dass verzerrte Bilder von Agrotourismus entstehen, die zu einer Vorstellung und einer Förderung der Landwirtschaft führen können, die nicht der regionalen Wirklichkeit entsprechen. Durch die Kombination der verschiedenen Ergebnisse und durch das Verbinden der Typologie der wallonischen und luxemburgischen Agrotourismusprodukte, der ländlichen Gebietstypen und der geographischen Aspekte, geht hervor, dass das Agrotourismus nicht nur anhand von Umweltaspekten analysiert werden darf. Die Analyse muss auch andere Faktoren wie Erreichbarkeit, lokale Gemeinschaften, Gastfreundlichkeit, Entwicklungspolitiken des ländlichen Raumes, Immobilienmärkte, landwirtschaftliche Orientierung des Bauernhofes sowie das Vorhandensein von Sehenswürdigkeiten, berücksichtigen. Unsere Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Agrotourismus, als Kombination von Landwirtschaft und Tourismus, sich weder überall, noch auf dieselbe Art und Weise selbstständig entwickelt, da es für die Entwicklung lokaler Ressourcen bedarf. Außerdem ist Agrotourismus keine Pauschalösung für alle periurbane Landschaften und nicht alle landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe sind als Reiseziele für alle Touristen geeignet. Dennoch, auch wenn eine strikte Regionalisierung des Agrotourismus nicht möglich scheint, können wenn alle Faktoren gemeinsam betrachtet werden gemeinsame Tendenzen hervorgehoben werden. Es besteht demnach eine Verknüpfung zwischen dem Agrotourismus und seinen Landschaften, diese identifizierten Verknüpfungen können helfen das heuristische Modell, das wir vorschlagen, zu verbessern und die Erwartungen der verschiedenen Akteure zusammenzuführen.

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio's successful visit to Washington between 9 and 11 April testified to a deepening of the US-Japan alliance and important strategic shifts across the First Island Chain, which includes archipelagos stretching from the Kurils up in Northeast Asia down to the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan, the Philippines, all the way south to the Malay peninsula in Southeast Asia.
This is part and parcel of a shift in favour of a "Strategy of Denial", as per the thinking of then US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development Elbridge Colby, a key policymaker under the Trump administration.[1] According to Colby, the US would double its efforts at balancing China, enlist US allies and partners across the First Island Chain to buttress deterrence capabilities towards the People's Republic – including in Taiwan – and avoid a potentially domino-like process of subordination to Beijing. These efforts revolve around Japan's ability to shoulder more security responsibilities, a strengthened and more seamless US-Japan alliance – including joint operational planning over a Taiwan crisis scenario and the restructuring of portions of the US military planning to Japan – and a set of geopolitical minilaterals, within which the US-Japan alliance plays a key role.US-Japan(-Philippines) cooperation in the security domain
Japan's three strategic documents from December 2022 and the joint statements by Japan and the US in 2023 suggest that the transpacific allies are indeed working in lockstep in the security domain, with deterrence and coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis China high in policymakers' minds. According to these documents, Japan is about to shoulder more security responsibilities as it militarises and embraces offensive strike capabilities. In the process, Japan would ease US fatigue and work side-by-side to buttress its military and diplomatic projection – an aspect emphasised by Kishida in his speech to a joint session of the US Congress. Interestingly, Kishida's visit coincided with a trilateral Japan-Philippines-US summit, which attested to the strategic outreaches of both Washington and Tokyo to interlock the US hub-and-spokes system across the First Island Chain.
Japan's minilateral diplomacy aimed at purposeful multi-layered security ententes, often on an ad hoc basis, has worked in concert with the US government's regional efforts. The aim has been to balance China militarily, counter its regional and global diplomatic and economic influence, and do so "by taking full advantage of comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defence, economic, technological, and intelligence/information capabilities", as per Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy.[2]
This whole-of-government grand strategy walked side-by-side with the US concept of an "integrated deterrence" that leveraged allies' capabilities, including basing rights and access for the aforementioned strategic objectives. The force posture and – to all effects – military doctrine changes in Japan have gone hand in hand with increases of US basing rights in both Japan and the Philippines and through enhanced bilateral military cooperation with Manila.Developments in the Taiwan Strait and the creation of the MLR
While underplayed by government actors, especially so now that US-China relations have (to some extent) stabilised and public reassurances are gaining more traction, the Taiwan-specific aspects of these strategic changes are worthy of note.
From a geopolitical standpoint, Japan and the US benefit from the preservation of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait because it bottles up China's advancement into the seas within the First Island Chain and facilitates the tracking of Chinese military assets venturing beyond it, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, ships and submarines. In fact, as mentioned, the Japanese government has been discreetly overhauling its security regime, military doctrine and force posture to preserve a modicum of military balance of power, even just asymmetrically, to deter Chinese aggression.
In parallel, the US government has been providing Taiwan with weapons, training and ways to bolster resilience along its newfound emphasis on asymmetric deterrence across the First Island Chain, while eliciting coalition-building with and among third parties, including NATO allies.
Japan's interlinkage of its own security with Taiwan's is evident in US-Japan alliance developments in 2023. On 11 January 2023, the Japan-US "2+2" meeting of foreign and defence ministers was held in Washington during which both governments announced that "the 12th Marine Regiment w[ould] be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025", a move aimed at "strengthen[ing] alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities".[3] This initiative dovetailed with the expansion of the US-Philippines Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement to allow for four new US bases in key spots across the First Island Chain, thus increasing from five to nine, with more possibly in store to allow for rotational deployments.
Effectively, the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), made up of ca. 1,800-2,000 servicemen, will split into smaller teams of 50-100 soldiers to allow for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) of Chinese activities across the East and South China Seas by deploying unmanned surface, underwater and aerial vehicles. Hence, in a contingency, these US amphibious teams in Japanese and the Philippines' territory may distribute maritime operations (that is, disperse lethal forces) through anti-ship missiles and low-altitude defence systems, all while theoretically hopping from island to island every 48 to 72 hours to avoid Chinese attacks, while continuing to conduct ISR and fight. These so-called "stand-in forces", which will have to rely on Japanese military and/or civilian facilities (and, potentially, on Japan's direct military involvement), may well disrupt a Chinese blockade or amphibious landing on Taiwan and facilitate logistical support to the self-governed island. Finally, and in connection to that, a Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement, which is currently under negotiation, would strengthen the Tokyo-Manila security side of the newly born trilateral.Enlisting the Republic of Korea
Aside from the US-Japan alliance preparations for a Taiwan contingency and coordination with the Philippines, minilateral alignments have gone through the enlisting of the Republic of Korea (RoK), better known as South Korea. The advent of the conservative Yoon Suk-Yeol presidency translated into a stronger RoK alignment with the US and its goals. In fact, an Indo-Pacific Strategy was announced in December 2022. Yoon Suk-Yeol specifically assigned its development to the North America Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggesting a desire to align with Washington. Aided by his forceful character as a former prosecutor, Yoon single-handedly abandoned his predecessor Moon Jae-in's engagement policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), aka North Korea, and aligned more fully with the United States on the China and Russia dossiers, so much so that it "indirectly" supplied more artillery shells to Ukraine than all European countries combined. Yoon's decision to tilt on one side of the conflict in Ukraine was not a foregone policy choice given the influence and leverage that Russia and China may exert over their North Korean neighbour, which constitutes Seoul's main foreign and security policy preoccupation. These developments cemented the idea of a progressive rift among competitive blocs, following Russia's 2022 war of aggression in Ukraine.
More importantly, and through active US intercession under the Biden administration, the South Korean government took the initiative in perhaps the hardest foreign policy call: reprising dialogue with Japan. This had soured over a negative spiral of disputes over the legacy of past colonial occupation and economic retaliation, especially in 2019. Kishida's mellower public persona and more conciliatory political background compared to his immediate predecessors in Japan's Prime Minister's Office, the late Abe Shinzō in particular, partly smoothened the road. But there were no meaningful concessions from the Japanese government's side, not least because of Kishida's unpopularity and, crucially, the weight of nationalists within his own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Still, the stabilisation of Japan-RoK relations – two major US allies – ushered the way for the landmark trilateral US-Japan-RoK cooperation, as evidenced by the Camp David summit of 18 August 2023.[4] There too, minilateral cooperation expanded horizontally to include the diplomatic, educational and technological fields. But the key "integrated deterrence" outcomes were in security, through expanded intelligence sharing, missile defence and strengthened cybersecurity coordination. More importantly, the three documents released at the summit aimed at regularising security consultations, routinising trilateral meetings, both at the summit and working level, and diversifying and expanding their remit beyond North Korea to include food security, economic security and, importantly, China.The potential benefits of minilateralism
Through these arrangements, first and foremost, the US government aimed at an institutionalisation of US-RoK-Japan cooperation, thus inter-locking the region's most powerful, prosperous and technologically advanced US allies. It did so with an eye on binding South Korea and Japan into cooperation into the future, as successive governments in either country may not be as sympathetic to their counterpart across the sea as the current ones (especially Yoon's). The routinisation of trilateral cooperation and coordination also aimed at damage limitation in the event of a potential Trump comeback, who would prioritise his own interests at the expense of trilateral coordination.
Second, in the context of the RoK-Japan-US minilateral, regularised avenues for dialogue were deepened at multiple levels: from Director General level up to summit meetings, which will be held at least once a year.
Third and in connection to the above, the scope of trilateral cooperation expanded notably across agencies, given the multi-layered nature of the challenges and opportunities faced by the three countries. The inauguration of a Japan-US-RoK Indo-Pacific Dialogue and of a Trilateral Framework on scientific cooperation, including defence technology, testified to this logic, not unlike other minilaterals that the Biden administration promptly revitalised or gave birth to, such as the Quad with Australia, India and Japan, or AUKUS with Australia and the UK (soon to include, perhaps, Japan and Canada in one of their two pillars of cooperation). Japan-US-RoK cooperation, however, promised to go deeper with new dialogues or plans on common or coordinative frameworks aimed at combating North Korea's cyber activities, stifling disinformation and promoting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), as well as government financing across the Indo-Pacific (starting with the Pacific Islands), maritime, space and economic security, including the establishment of an early warning system on potential disruptions to supply chains.
Fourth, the most publicised development has been the strengthening of intelligence sharing, notably by allowing for a trilateral real-time system that linked the three countries radars tracking and evaluating missiles flying from North Korea, with potential implications also in a Taiwan contingency scenario. This may also well apply to the Philippines – although Manila was likely not as appealing as Seoul's capacity in this regard. Notably, reporting has suggested that Japan was quietly beefing up military and intelligence assistance to the self-governing island, if not directly, by triangulation through the United States, and potentially with some help from South Korea as well.[5]Looking ahead to November 2024 and beyond
While momentum has been clear, some of these mechanisms may be put to the test – especially the pledge to consult – by regional dynamics, as North Korea's bellicose behaviour toward its neighbour has been accompanied by DPRK leader Kim Jong-un's overtures towards Japan. Moreover, the Japanese government is still watchful about domestic political developments in South Korea, such as the progressive parties' electoral resounding win in the recent legislative elections (that is, a non-confidence vote against Yoon) and the South Korean Supreme Court's decision to uphold lower courts' orders for compensation by Japanese industries' responsible for wartime labour. Also for this reason, Tokyo is unlikely to allow South Korea into the G7 framework on a more regular basis, which is arguably also one of Washington's desiderata to buttress the rostrum of "like-minded partners". Similar hesitancies have been likely at play vis-à-vis Manila, where former President Rodrigo Duterte's daughter – the current Vice-President – may swift the pendulum away from this alignment of planets carefully engineered by the Biden administration.
Developments in US politics may affect the process too. With a second Trump presidency, the Japanese government would be again fearful of a reprise of US concessions to, and US summit diplomacy with, North Korea. This same logic may apply to the US-Japan-Philippines minilateral and other ententes that have been cajoled or blessed by Washington, such as NATO's outreach towards the Asia-Pacific, especially Japan, South Korea and Australia. A Trump redux may break apart NATO, but he might also rethink the merits of his mercenary and transactional tactics in the context of coercive diplomatic leverage towards China.
Thus, the bigger test of the "resilience" of minilateral alignments is the possible resurface of a disruptive and unilateral Trump presidency, whose transactional logic would thrive on US leverage at a bilateral level, and, perhaps, the incognita of China's staying power and of US-China strategic rivalry at large. As events unfold, the First Island Chain is and will be the place to watch to understand the geopolitics of US-China competition.Giulio Pugliese is Associate fellow (Asia-Pacific) at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Lecturer in Japanese Politics at the University of Oxford and Part-time Professor on EU-Asia Studies at the European University Institute.
This commentary is an extract and re-adaptation from a forthcoming academic article: Giulio Pugliese and Marco Zappa, "Japan 2023: Still Walking on Abe Shinzō's Footsteps", in Asia Maior, Vol. XXXIV.[1] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial. American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2021.[2] The English language version of the strategy translates jōhō merely as "intelligence", but it is a broader concept that encompasses (and can be translated as) "information". In fact, the Japanese government has been particularly apt at leveraging information and intelligence to shape its strategic environment. Cfr. Japan Ministry of Defence, Kokka anzen hoshō senryaku [National Security Strategy], December 2022, p. 4, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-j.pdf. For the English language version see: National Security Strategy of Japan, December 2022, p. 3, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html.[3] US and Japan, Joint Statement of the Security Consultative e Committee ("2+2"), 11 January 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100444894.pdf.[4] Japan, RoK and US, The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states.[5] Kathrin Hille and Demetri Sevastopulo, "US to Link up with Taiwan and Japan Drone Fleets to Share Real-Time Data", in Financial Times, 8 June 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/bde0db76-a7f8-4ecd-b5d5-03de0b5a8659.

The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8195 Security Council Seventy-third year 8195th meeting Wednesday, 28 February 2018, 10.35 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-05507 (E) *1805507* S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 2/22 18-05507 The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/138, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: We have received a lot of questions about resolution 2401 (2018), which the Security Council adopted on Saturday, 22 February, and its demand for a cessation of hostilities without delay for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria. I want to start today by answering the questions we have received. Is the United Nation ready to deliver to people who need humanitarian assistance? Yes. We have convoys ready to go to 10 besieged and hard-to-reach locations, including a 45-truck convoy with aid for 90,000 people to Douma and eastern Ghouta. Are you ready to support medical evacuations from eastern Ghouta? Yes, we are working very closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other health partners on that. Has resolution 2401 (2018) been implemented? Is there a ceasefire in Syria? No, and no. Have you got any inter-agency cross-line convoys through to hard-to-reach or besieged areas? No. Have you been given permission to access any of those locations? No. Have you received the necessary facilitation letters for convoys? No. Have there been any medical evacuations? No. Have any civilians left eastern Ghouta? No. Is there any actual improvement in the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta since the adoption of the resolution demanding, as it did, unimpeded access? No. Can you deliver assistance in eastern Ghouta during a humanitarian pause between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m. local time? To quote the ICRC Middle East Director, who spoke about that yesterday: "It is impossible to bring a humanitarian convoy in five hours." Agencies now have years of experience in that area, and it can take a day simply to pass checkpoints, even when the parties have agreed. The goods then have to be offloaded. If there has been no humanitarian access since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, what has happened in the past few days? More bombing, fighting, death, destruction, maiming of women and children, hunger and misery — in other words, more of the same. On 26 February, two days ago, airstrikes, barrel bombs and artillery shelling were reported across eastern Ghouta, including in Harasta, Shafuniyeh, Otaya, Hosh Eldawahreh, Al-Ashari, Jobar, Beit Sawa, Hazerma, Hannnura, Nashabiyeh, Sagba and Douma. Reports indicate that at least 30 civilians, including women and children, were killed. In Shafuniyeh, 14 people, including three women and four children, were reportedly killed and many others injured by airstrikes. Eighteen civilians, including drivers of ambulances, women and children, were reportedly received at health facilities in Shafuniyeh with difficulties breathing, consistent with the use of chlorine. One child reportedly died as a result. On the same day, two workers from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were reportedly killed as a result of shelling on the besieged enclave. It was also reported that two health-care facilities in Saqba were taken out of service by airstrikes. In the past few days, shells have also reportedly continued to fall on Damascus city from eastern Ghouta. Since 18 February, more than 580 people are now reported to have been killed due to air and ground strikes in eastern Ghouta, with many more than 1,000 people injured. At the same time, hundreds of rockets fired from eastern Ghouta into Damascus have reportedly killed 15 people and injured more than 200. I now want to update the Security Council on the situation in other parts of the country. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 3/22 In Idlib, fighting continues to kill and injure civilians, destroy civilian infrastructure and result in large population movements. Since December, an estimated 385,000 people have been displaced, with many civilians moving north. Half of Idlib's population was already displaced. People are being forced to move yet again, with each disruption increasing their vulnerability. Civilians are concentrated in an ever-smaller area. Many are forced to live in makeshift camps or in the open air. Formal camps are overwhelmed, operating at up to 400 per cent of their capacity. The response is being stretched to its limits. We are receiving reports of civilian deaths and injuries and of restriction on the movement of many civilians as a result of military operations in Afrin. Those who risk moving continue to be stopped at exit points by the local authorities in Afrin, preventing them from accessing safer areas. We believe that, so far, approximately 5,000 people have reached the surrounding villages and Aleppo city. Tens of thousands are believed to be displaced within Afrin. The Turkish authorities have emphasized to us their willingness to facilitate humanitarian access. We would like to see aid convoys operated from Damascus. However, to date that has not been agreed by the Syrian side. In Raqqa city, conditions remain unsafe for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Among those trying to return home, 637 people have been injured and more than 125 killed by unexploded ordinance since last October. Medical and other essential services are absent and access for humanitarian workers to the city remains precariously limited because the conditions are so dangerous. As I have said before, demining activities need to be accelerated as a matter of urgency. Humanitarian access for the United Nations and its implementing partners in Hasakah was limited for much of January due to the increased restrictions placed by the local authorities. United Nations convoys were blocked from travelling to the northeast from elsewhere within the country. The delivery of aid already in local warehouses was also blocked. While an agreement to resume humanitarian deliveries was reached on 30 January, that agreement will end in March. NGO partners continue to deliver goods and services across the north-east. However, sustainable access for the United Nations is critical. Any protracted interruption of humanitarian assistance and services in the IDP sites may drive the displaced people back to areas where they are not safe. Earlier this month, the United Nations received clearance for the first assessment visit to Deir ez-Zor after it had been under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) for three and a half years. More than 100,000 people live in the town despite that fact that it is estimated to be 80 per cent destroyed. The infrastructure is almost completely destroyed, particularly in the central and the eastern areas, where ISIL was in control. In coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, the United Nations has dispatched 78 trucks carrying food, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, education, water and sanitation items since last September, when ISIL was driven out. Finally, we remain concerned about the tens of thousands of people stranded in Rukban, in south-eastern Syria. We continue to seek the necessary agreements for convoys of life-saving assistance to them. As I said last week (see S/PV. 8186), there was a severe reduction, of nearly 40 per cent, in cross-line access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2017 as compared to 2016. On average in 2017, over the entire 12-month period, we reached 165,000 people a month with cross-line convoys. That was completely inadequate. So far this year, we have reached a total of only 7,200 people through a single small convoy earlier this month. In other words, we were reaching more than 50 times as many people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas last year as to date this year. The main reason for the reduction in the number of convoys has been the consistent refusal by the Government of Syria to provide the necessary approvals and facilitation letters to support delivery. As the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138) details, while we continue to reach millions of people in urgent need in areas controlled by the Government of Syria and through the cross-border programmes mandated in resolution 2393 (2017), assistance across conflict lines to millions of people in hard-to-reach and besieged areas has completely collapsed in recent months. Unless that changes, we will soon see even more people dying from starvation and disease than from the bombing and shelling. The United Nations remains focused on reaching those most in need throughout the country, including the 5.6 million people considered to be in acute need. The needs-based approach means that the United Nations will continue to seek to deliver aid and to S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 4/22 18-05507 provide services to millions of people in a principled manner regardless of where they are located. More than half of those in need are in Government-controlled areas. However, millions more people are not. What the Syrian people need has been made abundantly clear — protection, access to basic goods and services, an end to sieges and respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Security Council has unanimously supported all such needs in adopting resolution 2401 (2018). I started today by answering questions that we have received regarding resolution 2401 (2018). I would like to end with a question for the Security Council. When will the resolution be implemented? The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman. Mr. Feltman: I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council following the comprehensive briefing by Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. In two weeks, we will mark the beginning of the eighth year of the Syrian conflict. There are no words to express our frustration over the collective failure of the international community to end this war, but that frustration is nothing compared to the suffering and destruction visited ceaselessly upon the Syrian people. We are here again today because the brief respite that the Council unanimously demanded only days ago in resolution 2401 (2018) has not materialized, as Mr. Lowcock just described. The air strikes, shelling and ground offensives continue. There are even reports of yet another chlorine gas attack. What we need is the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and that is not happening. Nearly seven years since the peaceful protests in Dar'a and the reaction that set in motion what would eventually become all-out war, we are still grasping for a political solution, which is the only way to end the bloodletting. The Secretary-General has called eastern Ghouta a hell on Earth. The United Nations will continue to work with Syrians and the international community to help bring about a durable political solution. We will also continue to demand that all the parties involved in the conflict respect international humanitarian law — the rules of war — and protect civilians. We will continue to demand the release of those who have been arbitrarily detained and the end of enforced disappearances. We will continue to forcefully call for justice and accountability. Those responsible for the catalogue of horrors that mark daily life in Syria, including chemical and terrorist attacks, torture and sexual violence, sieges and attacks on hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, must be held accountable. Those outrages continue in large part because the perpetrators have so far enjoyed impunity. As the Secretary-General said earlier this week, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The United Nations acknowledges Russia's announcement of a daily five-hour pause for eastern Ghouta. In addition to Mr. Lowcock's briefing and what the International Committee of the Red Cross has stated, we respectfully remind all parties that resolution 2401 (2018) demands the sustained delivery of humanitarian aid for a minimum of 30 consecutive days. The Secretariat and relevant agencies are united and pulling in one direction towards the immediate and continuous cessation of hostilities that can be sustained beyond 30 days for unimpeded aid delivery. We also urgently need to get humanitarian aid and services in and the sick and critically wounded evacuated from besieged eastern Ghouta and other locations. We are ready to deliver. The Secretary-General has repeatedly reminded parties of their absolute obligation under international humanitarian law and human rights law to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Earlier this month, Emergency Relief Coordinator Lowcock told the Council (see S/PV.8186) in no uncertain terms that that is an obligation, not a favour. He has just updated us all on the humanitarian situation and provided an update on the United Nations readiness to deliver aid and services, and the tireless efforts of humanitarians to reach all in need, wherever they are. But right now we must address the particular needs of those in besieged eastern Ghouta. Resolution 2401 (2018) affirms that the cessation of hostilities shall not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front, and "all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council". (resolution 2401 (2018), para. 2). In our view, that rightly maintains the parameters set out in resolution 2254 (2015), but there must be 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 5/22 a frank assessment of what that means in relation to the humanitarian tragedy that we are witnessing in eastern Ghouta. First, we condemn all violations of international law by all parties, including shelling from eastern Ghouta, which has injured or killed civilians in Damascus. The scale of the Government's indiscriminate military attacks against eastern Ghouta — an area with a civilian population of 400,000 — cannot be justified based on targeting Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Efforts to combat terrorism do not supersede obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. Secondly, the United Nations has not seen any confirmation by the Government of Syria of its commitment to implement resolution 2401 (2018), although at the resolution's adoption Syria's Permanent Representative to the United Nations said, "As a State, we bear a responsibility towards our citizens and we have a sovereign right to counter terrorism" (S/PV.8188, p. 12). Thirdly, yesterday the Head of the Syrian Negotiations Committee transmitted to the Secretary- General a letter on behalf of the three major non-State armed opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — and civil groups in eastern Ghouta regarding their full commitment to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Specifically, they committed to ensuring the necessary environment for United Nations humanitarian access as well as, "to expel all elements of Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, Jabhat Al-Nusra and Al-Qaida and all who belong to these groups from eastern Ghouta". Fourthly, the United Nations has no independent verified reports that those three non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta created a coordination centre, as has been alleged regarding Jabhat Al-Nusra, nor has the United Nations seen any public announcement by those groups of such a centre. Jaysh Al-Islam has denied that claim. What the United Nations can verify is that non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta, over the past 24 hours, have expressed their readiness in writing to evacuate Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Previous negotiations on that issue among those groups and key members of the International Syrian Support Group humanitarian task force in Geneva and Damascus have not resulted in success. Alleviating the tragic situation in eastern Ghouta has the Council's full attention. Yet we cannot forget that resolution 2401 (2018) demands a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. Violence continues in Afrin, Idlib and the eastern part of the country. Council members have heard about the humanitarian challenges and suffering of the people in those areas as well. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that developments in those areas will undoubtedly render the situation in Syria even more complex. There will be no sustainable solution if the Council's resolutions are not implemented. That will require that the parties step back from the brink and fulfil their obligations to end the fighting in Syria. All our efforts will be in vain if there is no serious investment in a political solution. As Council members are aware, resolution 2401 (2018) calls on all Member States to use their influence with the parties to ensure the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations calls for a renewed commitment by all concerned Member States to work seriously to implement the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations also cautions against drawing the Organization into monitoring exercises. That has been tried in the past without success — not for lack of trying — but in the absence of political will among Member States to underpin United Nations efforts. Member States, especially those working within the Astana and Amman arrangements, should use their resources and clear influence over the parties to ensure the implementation of a sustained cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. The conflict in Syria continues to threaten regional and international stability because the warring parties believe there is a military solution. There is not. The United Nations remains convinced that a political solution is the only way forward. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura is pressing forward on facilitating the establishment of a constitutional committee in Geneva, as part of the overall intra-Syrian political process towards the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), for which the United Nations requires the positive and constructive engagement of both negotiating delegations. Special Envoy De Mistura will need the full support of the Council and the international community as a whole if the United Nations efforts are to have a chance of reinvigorating a serious and meaningful political process. I trust that he will have that support. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 6/22 18-05507 The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): I make my remarks today on behalf of Sweden and Kuwait as co-penholders for the humanitarian track of the Security Council's work on the situation in Syria. I would like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock once again for a very sobering update. We share his sense of urgency following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) last weekend to fully take advantage of the 30- day pause so that the United Nations and its partners can dispatch life-saving aid convoys and begin medical evacuations. Since the resolution's adoption, we have been asked, as penholders, when the resolution would take effect and to whom it would apply. We are very clear: the resolution took effect upon its adoption and applies to all parties across the entire country. The clock is ticking. There is no time to lose. Let me also sincerely thank Mr. Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing today. We share his deep concern concerning reports of the flagrant lack of compliance with the ceasefire in eastern Ghouta. We would like to extend our sincere appreciation to all members of the Council for their constructive cooperation, which enabled the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). The resolution represents decisive and meaningful action by the Council in response to the calls from the United Nations, the humanitarian community and, above all, the civilian population in Syria. However, the value of a resolution is not in its adoption, but in its implementation. We must now all build on the spirit of cooperation that led to the resolution's adoption and work together to ensure that it is enforced. Compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council is not optional; it is an obligation of all Member States. The humanitarian community stands ready to do its part. Having adopted this resolution, the Council must do its part. For the next few weeks, let us seize the opportunity that this resolution represents and focus on its implementation. We would like to make four concrete recommendations on the way forward. First, existing de-escalation agreements must be complied with most urgently in eastern Ghouta. We call on the three Astana guarantors to spare no effort to achieve this end. Resolution 2401 (2018) clearly demands that all parties cease hostilities; air strikes, the ground offensive and shelling must stop. We take note of the initial positive indications from armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta that they are ready to comply with the resolution. We also note their commitment to expel the Al-Nusra Front from the area. We must build on this, and we call on those with influence over armed opposition groups to secure their commitment to the cessation of hostilities. Clearly the Council has demanded in resolution 2401 (2018) that the Syrian Government cease all military operations without delay. Secondly, as Mr. Lowcock has told us, the United Nations and its implementing partners in the field are ready to commence life-saving convoys and medical evacuations. We urge the Syrian authorities to immediately issue facilitation letters for the convoy to Duma to proceed this week as a necessary first step. It can no longer be business as usual; the Council has demanded weekly convoys to all areas and populations in need. Thirdly, existing structures to strengthen compliance with and monitoring of the cessation must urgently be activated. We look to the Chairs of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group to undertake more frequent meetings, which are needed at least on a weekly basis. The Amman operations room should also be utilized. We see merit in making a clearer link between monitoring mechanisms and the Security Council. Fourthly, the Council must remain actively seized of this matter. Sweden and Kuwait will request an open briefing from the incoming presidency on the Secretary-General's report on implementation and compliance that is due 15 days after the resolution's adoption. We should also stand ready to meet and take appropriate action at any time necessary so as to ensure implementation of this resolution. Finally, we welcome any efforts to de-escalate violence and to allow and facilitate humanitarian access in Syria, but let us be clear — resolution 2401 (2018) demands a 30-day, nationwide ceasefire, with immediate access for weekly convoys and medical evacuations. A five-hour ceasefire does not meet the requirements of the resolution. The resolution is not primarily about the evacuation of civilians, but demands humanitarian access to civilians and medical evacuations. The 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 7/22 cessation of hostilities must be implemented fully and without delay. It is imperative that all parties uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law at all times. Last Saturday's unanimous action reinforced the legitimacy and credibility of the Security Council (see S/PV.8188). Today's briefings demonstrate that there is no time to rest on the laurels of this achievement. We must now move without delay to ensure our action here last Saturday is translated into the relief and assistance expected by the millions of people affected by this conflict. It is now incumbent on all the parties and all those with influence over the parties to spare no effort and use all channels available in order to advance the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): First of all, I want to thank Mark Lowcock and Jeffrey Feltman for their very clear briefings. I would like today to focus my remarks on our shared road map, namely, the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously last Saturday (see S/PV. 8188). On behalf of France, I would like to express three main messages today. My first message is that we must not pay lip service. The situation on the ground remains dramatic and has not improved in recent days. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), the offensive against the eastern Ghouta has continued relentlessly. France, of course, strongly condemns these indiscriminate bombings, which affect inhabited areas and civil infrastructure. In this context, the disastrous humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. No United Nations convoy has been able to reach the eastern Ghouta or any of the other besieged areas, no emergency medical evacuation has been carried out, no siege has been lifted. The Syrian regime is maintaining its stranglehold on the civilian population and is methodically pursuing its policy of destruction. More than 400,000 people remain under siege in eastern Ghouta, including 130,000 children. The demand sent by the United Nations to authorize a priority convoy for Duma, the main city in eastern Ghouta, has not received any response from the Syrian authorities to date. My second message is this. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 February makes very specific demands on the parties. Hostilities must cease without delay in order to establish a lasting humanitarian truce for at least 30 days, in order to allow both the delivery of humanitarian aid and the evacuation of the wounded and sick. Let me stress this point. These demands are perfectly clear and cannot be distorted or reinterpreted. Contrary to what some would have us believe, the demands made by the resolution are absolutely clear. Our responsibility today is to implement, fully and in their totality, the provisions that we have unanimously adopted. If we do not that, what credibility can be given to our commitments? What credibility can be given to Security Council resolutions? The United Nations and its partners tell us that they are ready to deliver aid to the people of eastern Ghouta and other priority areas. There is therefore not a minute to lose because every minute that passes can turn lives upside down. At the conclusion of difficult negotiations, the Council managed to unite in the face of the gravity of the humanitarian situation and the escalation of the Syrian conflict in recent months. We must now work together, in the same spirit of unity, to effectively implement on the ground the resolution we unanimously adopted. This is my third message. Following yesterday's meeting in Moscow with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, France is putting forward four concrete proposals for making progress and for doing so without delay. The first is to ensure that all parties implement the cessation of hostilities that resolution 2401 (2018) demands. I note that the three main opposition groups present in eastern Ghouta as well as Nassar Al Hariri, head of the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition, have written to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Council to state that they would respect the truce. It is therefore urgent in the extreme — if I can put it that way — that the Damascus regime also unambiguously express its willingness to respect the Council resolution and to formalize it in writing. We have taken note of the Russian proposal of a daily five-hour humanitarian truce. It is a positive first step, but it is insufficient. We must go further. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands of the parties a minimum period of 30 consecutive days of cessation of hostilities. Respecting that demand is non-negotiable. That goal requires more than just symbolic declarations or political posturing. At a minimum, it requires that humanitarian personnel be allowed to do their work. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 8/22 18-05507 These workers are used to taking risks on a daily basis, but the parties must allow them to do their work. Given that the opposition groups have formally committed to doing just that, the regime must do so as well, and without delay. To that end, supporters of the regime, beginning with Russia, must bring the necessary pressure to bear. Our second proposal, by way of a demand, pertains to the need to immediately open the relevant, clearly identified checkpoints — beginning with Wafideen — in order to allow the access of priority convoys of the United Nations. We therefore demand that the Syrian authorities submit without delay the necessary letter to facilitate the deployment of humanitarian convoys. Thirdly, it is extremely urgent to allow medical evacuations for the most critical cases, giving priority to children. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent indicates that 1,065 people need emergency medical evacuations. We have not a minute to lose. Finally, France considers it essential to create a monitoring mechanism to ensure the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and compliance with the resolution by the parties. We are working diligently to establishing that mechanism now. Those are the French proposals to address the urgent need to put an end to the bombing and protect civilians, who beyond resolution 2401 (2018), are protected under international humanitarian law. It is also crucial to intensify our efforts to reach a political solution in the framework of the Geneva process and resolution 2254 (2015). It is the only way out of the conflict and the only way to prevent a looming escalation of tensions. France will not deviate from that path. The overall credibility of the Security Council and the responsibility of each of its members are crucially at stake today in the context of the Syrian tragedy. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-Generals Lowcock and Feltman for their clear, factual briefings and for reiterating to all of us on the Security Council the ongoing horror of the conflict in Syria — and in particular in eastern Ghouta, because that is where it is clear the situation is most dire by a huge order of magnitude. It was five days ago (see S/PV.8188) that we sat in this Chamber and all of us raised our hands in support of a 30-day ceasefire, which we hoped would provide some relief to Syria's people. That was a desperately needed step, one that came too late for many. In eastern Ghouta alone, Médecins Sans Frontières reported that at least 630 people were killed and 3,000 injured in the week before resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, with women and children representing nearly 60 per cent of the wounded and 50 per cent of the deceased. We also continue to condemn attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta. Let us recall the demands of our resolution. It called for at least a 30-day ceasefire without delay to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuation. "Without delay" means right now, immediately — that there should be no delay. We all voted for those demands and we committed to using our influence to ensure that. In response, Russia has declared a five-hour daily humanitarian window. That is not what the Council demanded, nor what Russia agreed to use its influence to ensure. A five-hour window has not delivered and cannot deliver any meaningful improvement on the ground. Under-Secretary-General Lowcock has made clear that the United Nations cannot get humanitarian convoys in and out within that time frame, as has the International Committee of the Red Cross. Humanitarian pauses of a few meagre hours are no substitute for a sustained ceasefire, which is vital to ensuring the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations. If Russia is able to deliver a five-hour pause, let it deliver a 24-hour pause, as it agreed on Saturday. Let us now take stock of the situation in Syria, and specifically in eastern Ghouta, where the situation is at its most desperate. Let us review if any real change has occurred in the past five days. Has the resolution been implemented? Has there been a ceasefire? Has there been any delivery of humanitarian aid or any medical evacuations? Has the adoption of the resolution brought any relief to the people of Syria? The fighting has not stopped. All of the main armed opposition groups have committed to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The Al-Assad regime has not, and has in fact ignored the resolution we adopted. Reports of attacks and air strikes by pro-regime forces continue. Twenty-two air strikes reportedly took place even during Russia's so-called humanitarian pause. And, as if it could not get any worse, there have been disturbing reports of the use of chlorine gas. Doctors in eastern Ghouta reported to the Syrian-American Medical Society that 16 patients, including six children, were suffering from symptoms 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 9/22 indicative of exposure to chemical compounds, following an alleged regime attack on Sunday — only one day after the resolution was adopted. Since Saturday not a single aid convoy has been able to access eastern Ghouta to provide relief to the desperate civilians. The World Health Organization estimates that 1,000 people are now in need of medical evacuation from eastern Ghouta. None have been evacuated since the resolution was adopted. The consequences of the failure to implement the resolution are clear: the casualties continue to rise and the horror continues. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports at least 14 civilians, including three children, were killed on Sunday. In short, in the words of one doctor from eastern Ghouta, "Nothing has changed." It is the responsibility of us all to ensure that resolution 2401 (2018) is enacted in full. In the words of my Foreign Secretary, the Al-Assad regime must allow the United Nations to deliver humanitarian aid, in compliance with resolution 2401 (2018), and we look to Russia and Iran to make sure this happens, in accordance with their own promises. I implore all those with influence over the Syrian regime to act now to ensure that the ceasefire that they supported in the Chamber is implemented in full and immediately. To do anything less is an affront to the Council, the United Nations and the international system that we live by. We will continue to monitor the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and commit to returning to the Council regularly until we see it respected. Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Every time the Security Council attempts to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria, we take a small leap of faith. I say "we" in reference to the Security Council. I speak of faith because all Council members and most States Members of the United Nations still genuinely try to uphold the responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, including abiding by and fully implementing Security Council resolutions. Despite the grim updates we heard today, we must maintain the hope that we can help the Syrian people. If we do not have that hope, we are wasting our time here. Just four days ago, the Security Council took another leap of faith. We adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a 30-day ceasefire for all of Syria, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to deliver desperately needed food and medical supplies, and immediate and unconditional medical evacuations based on need and emergency. Our goal was clear and simple. The Al-Assad regime and its supporters have been pummelling eastern Ghouta, where 400,000 people live under siege and constant bombardment. Resolution 2401 (2018) demanded that the assault stop. That was the Council speaking in one, clear voice. The opposition groups operating in eastern Ghouta have made clear their commitment to the ceasefire. The Free Syrian Army, Jaysh al-Islam, the Al-Rahman Legion and Ahrar al-Sham all committed to implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Against all odds, we hoped that Mr. Al-Assad might respect the resolution, cease hostilities and allow unfettered humanitarian access to all those who need it. Against all odds, we hoped that Russia would use its influence to ensure Mr. Al-Assad's commitment to resolution 2401 (2018). Once again, that hope has been crushed because so far, for the people of eastern Ghouta, nothing has changed. Despite the unanimous call for a ceasefire, the regime's attacks continue unabated. Hundreds of Syrians have been killed or injured since we adopted the resolution on Saturday. What is worse is that less than 24 hours after we demanded the ceasefire, there were reports that the Al-Assad regime again used chlorine gas as a weapon. Such attacks demonstrate Syria's complete and utter contempt for the Council and the United Nations. On Monday one human rights organization reported 18 attacks that defied the Council's demands. On Tuesday another organization reported at least 23 air strikes and four barrel bombs in eastern Ghouta. Syrians on the ground are reporting that Tuesday was worse than Monday with regard to strikes from the regime. How can that be? On the humanitarian front, as Mark Lowcock stated, the Al-Assad regime has allowed no deliveries of assistance into eastern Ghouta — not one. Opposition groups in the area have expressed their commitment to allowing aid in, but the Al-Assad regime still says no. Since we adopted resolution 2401 (2018), Russia has announced a daily five-hour humanitarian pause in the aerial bombing of civilians in eastern Ghouta, which is cynical, callous and in flagrant defiance of the demands of resolution 2401 (2018). The cessation of hostilities is for at least 30 days — every day, all day. Russia does not get to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the resolution. It negotiated it and voted for it. Russia, S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 10/22 18-05507 Iran and the Al-Assad regime are not even trying to hide their intentions. They are asking civilians to leave eastern Ghouta on the false premise that they can then attack anyone left in the area as much as they would like. Let us call the actions what they are. Mr. Al-Assad and his allies want the civilians of eastern Ghouta to walk into the arms of a regime that has been attacking and starving them for the past seven years. That is not a humanitarian gesture. They do not care if the 400,000 people of eastern Ghouta suffer, as long as they can continue to pursue their military and political objectives. We know what Iran, Syria and the Al-Assad regime are doing because they have done the same thing in the past. It is the same playbook they used for Aleppo in 2016. Once again, we, including Russia, demanded in the Security Council Chamber that Mr. Al-Assad stop the bombing, and yet Russia, Iran and Mr. Al-Assad continue their attacks, defying the wishes of the Council and of the international community. Because we have been through this before, we know what Russia will say today. It will say that there are terrorists in eastern Ghouta so that the Al-Assad regime can bomb as ferociously and indiscriminately as it wants and kill as many civilians as it wants. That defies the principles governing the laws of war. The Al-Assad regime should not be allowed to bomb and starve its own people into submission under the guise of counter-terrorism. That Russian argument makes a mockery of the Council and of international law. Russia also accuses the United States of somehow being responsible for humanitarian crises in Syria, but such accusations are ludicrous. The United States does not block humanitarian aid in any area. In fact, the United States has provided more than $7 billion in humanitarian aid in response to the crisis. The Council must not fall for Russia's misdirections. When the ceasefire was adopted unanimously on Saturday, including by the Russians, Ambassador Haley stated that our resolve to stand by our demands in the resolution would be tested. It has come to pass. Despite everything that has happened since Saturday, we are not casting aside the ceasefire in Syria; just the opposite. We would like to redouble our efforts in the Security Council to implement it, but the only way to change the situation on the ground is for all of us — every single one of us — around the table and each State Member of the United Nations to speak the truth about what is happening. The past four days should show us that when it comes to demanding a ceasefire, it is not enough to say that all parties should show restraint or commit to the ceasefire because in eastern Ghouta there is only one party dropping barrel bombs, gassing the Syrian people and denying deliveries of food and medical assistance. It is the Al-Assad regime, operating with the full support of Russia and Iran. On Saturday we stated that the only way to restore the credibility of the Council was to make the ceasefire a reality. Russia, Iran and the Al-Assad regime have not complied with the Council's demands and have not silenced their guns. Unless we take action, they will stop at nothing to destroy eastern Ghouta and we will again fail to help the Syrian people. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): First, let me thank Under-Secretaries-General Lowcock and Feltman for their briefings. In my statement I will address three points: implementation, implementation and implementation. First, I will speak about the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. Since the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, civilians are still dying in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere in Syria. The humanitarian disaster continues worsen. We need a full, nationwide cessation of hostilities and we need it now. The Russian proposal for a humanitarian corridor and pauses of five hours per day cannot be a substitute for a humanitarian pause of 30 consecutive days, as demanded in resolution 2401 (2018). Those five hours do not meet the obligations under the resolution and are not enough for the United Nations to be effective in delivering aid to the entire area of Ghouta, as Under- Secretary-General Lowcock just stated. We call upon the parties to the conflict and on those with influence on the parties to show decisive action and stop the violence. As Under-Secretary- General Feltman stated, three armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta have announced that they are committed to fully implementing resolution 2401 (2018). We expect the regime to do the same. The air strikes, the shelling and the shooting must stop. For the credibility of the Council, it is crucial that its resolutions be fully implemented. That is the obligation of all States Members of the United Nations, under the Charter. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 11/22 The Kingdom of the Netherlands repeats the call made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, to the Astana guarantors. She called on the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkey to "take all necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and that urgent humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations are taking place". My second point is about the implementation of humanitarian access. Resolution 2401 (2018) calls for sieges of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta, to be lifted immediately, and demands safe, unimpeded and sustained access for humanitarian convoys. As Under-Secretary-General Lowcock just explained, the United Nations stands ready with 45 trucks to deliver essential aid to eastern Ghouta. But the necessary facilitation letters are still lacking, and the security conditions do not permit those deliveries. At this point, more than 1,000 people are in urgent need of medical care, but they are still trapped in eastern Ghouta. If they are not given the care they need in hospitals in Damascus or elsewhere, they may die. The United Nations and the Security Council have consistently pleaded for these medical evacuations, and yet there are still no developments with regard to them. We also need to see access to aid for those fleeing the fighting in Afrin. More generally, there should be delivery of humanitarian aid to the areas that are not under Government control. As Mr. Feltman just said, we should reach all who are in need, wherever they are. My third point is about implementing the protection of civilians. The exception on the cessation of hostilities in paragraph 2 of the resolution allows targeted action against terrorists who are designated as such by the Council. However, that does not mean that absolutely anything is allowed. International humanitarian law applies to all military combat operations and counter-terrorism actions. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution must be respected in all circumstances. The civilians in the conflict must be protected. There is talk of humanitarian corridors for civilians who want to leave eastern Ghouta, but evacuations should always be voluntary. We are concerned about the possibility that humanitarian corridors will be used for forced population transfers. Civilians cannot be forced to leave, and neither should they be forced to stay. If voluntary evacuations do take place, we will call on the United Nations to monitor them. Currently, the most urgent humanitarian situation is in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, but needs remain high elsewhere in Syria as well. We welcomed the January delivery of aid to Rukban, but we want to stress the importance of sustained access and a durable solution. As others have said today, the demining activities in Raqqa should be increased, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is doing its part in that regard. The media coverage of the issue of the exploitation of Syrian women in exchange for aid is very disturbing. There should be no tolerance of such behaviour, as the Secretary-General and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have already said. The probity of any United Nations implementing parties should be beyond any doubt. In conclusion, we must ensure that resolution 2254 (2015) is fully implemented. There can be no military solution to the conflict, and we call on all the parties to engage seriously in the United Nations-led political process as a matter of urgency. The suffering of the people of Syria has lasted for more than seven years. For the sake of the millions of women, children and men trapped in this horrendous war, it is high time that all parties started putting the protection, interests and well-being of the Syrian people on the top of their agenda. Yesterday, my Minister, Ms. Sigrid Kaag, said that humanitarian access and the protection of civilians are cornerstones of international humanitarian law. They are part of our shared values and shared humanity. The Security Council must do justice to those values and to our shared humanity. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank you for convening today's meeting, Mr. President, and for the briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman on the situation in Syria. On Saturday, when we adopted resolution 2401 (2018) after long and complex negotiations, we highlighted the commitment that Council members have shown to achieving a humanitarian ceasefire in Syria. As we said at the time, it will be crucial to closely monitor its proper implementation and to maintain the Council's unity with regard to its responsibility to protect the civilian population, in line with international law and international humanitarian law. Four days in, we are still being forced to lament and condemn the attacks on civilians and to reiterate S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 12/22 18-05507 our calls for the immediate and comprehensive implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As the Secretary-General has pointed out, Council resolutions make sense only if they are effectively implemented. The credibility of the Security Council as a whole, and of those of its members with the greatest potential influence on the ground in particular, is at stake. In the light of this, we want to emphasize that the cessation of hostilities that the Council has demanded clearly covers the whole of Syrian territory, including eastern Ghouta and Afrin, and should last for a minimum of 30 days. If we are to ensure that, in our view we should mobilize the International Syria Support Group's Ceasefire Task Force. It is essential to ensure that all the parties to the conflict comply with the ceasefire provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and that the Council is able to closely monitor that compliance. In that regard, we support the four recommendations outlined by Sweden and Kuwait. We must remind the Syrian authorities of their responsibility to protect their people, and we firmly condemn the military operations in eastern Ghouta and other areas of the country that have continued even after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). However, we welcome the strenuous efforts of the Organization, and of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in particular, to prepare 45 trucks carrying supplies and ready to enter eastern Ghouta as soon as the necessary permits are granted. The first report on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) will be presented in less than two weeks, and we hope that it will be able to inform us that the humanitarian crisis caused by the Syrian conflict has been alleviated, because we cannot wait any longer. It is the Security Council's duty to continue working relentlessly to achieve what we have all unanimously agreed on. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I very much appreciate today's clear and informative briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman, and I would like to share a few thoughts from Poland's point of view. Since the Council's adoption on Saturday of resolution 2401 (2018), we have been seeing yet more extremely worrying developments on the ground. As I said in my last statement on the subject (see S/PV.8188), the heavy fighting in Syria has unfortunately not only continued but is increasing. In that context, we should persist in our efforts to take every possible action to ensure the resolution's full and safe implementation. We call on all to work to alleviate the suffering of civilians, including children, by giving them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance. That should include voluntary evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and its implementing partners and based solely on medical need, in order to ensure that the process is genuinely voluntary. We would like to stress that all the relevant actors should use all their influence to help to improve the conditions on the ground immediately. We urgently call for a cessation of hostilities throughout all of Syria for 30 days, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018). In that context, it is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also offer an opportunity for the talks being held under United Nations auspices in Geneva to gain momentum, so that a political solution can finally be reached. For that reason, we call on all parties to fulfil their commitments to the existing ceasefire agreements. It should be emphasized that the implementation of the ceasefire announced by resolution 2401 (2018) should ensure the safe entrance and stay of humanitarian and medical personnel without prejudice to their health or life. When such personnel enter hard-to-reach areas, we should know precisely how long they can stay while delivering assistance under the ceasefire, otherwise their lives could also be in danger. In conclusion, let me stress the importance of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the implementation of humanitarian resolutions. The unanimous adoption of the resolution is just the beginning of the process. We call on all actors with influence on the ground to take all steps necessary to ensure that the fighting stops, that the Syrian people are protected and, finally, that urgent humanitarian access is enabled and that the necessary medical evacuations can take place. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their respective briefings. Once again, we would like to say how appalled we are at the terrible situation suffered by the Syrian people, as the past two months have been the most violent since the start of the conflict, and civilians, primarily women and children, are the ones that are suffering the gravest consequences of this intensification of the war. We call the attention of the Security Council to the continuing 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 13/22 violations of international law, especially international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as these attacks have targeted civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and homes. My delegation would like to express once again its gratitude to the delegations of Sweden and Kuwait for their work in promoting the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which imposes a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria, which is as urgent as it is necessary. We urge the parties to implement the resolution immediately in order to speed up access of humanitarian assistance without any restrictions, allow urgent medical evacuations and the entry of humanitarian convoys, and ensure the protection of hospitals and medical facilities, especially in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and north of Hama. We wish to underscore once again the need for continued cooperation and coordination among the Syrian Government and the various humanitarian assistance agencies, so that the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be effective, especially in hard-to-reach areas, and to prevent administrative obstacles from derailing or negatively affecting the deployment of the required humanitarian assistance. We also stress the need to begin, as soon as possible, humanitarian mine-clearing in areas that require it, in particular in the city of Raqqa, to allow the return in dignified and safe conditions of people who were forced to flee their homes because of the conflict. As we have stated previously, we believe that if our aim is to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people in the face of armed violence, the Security Council has the major challenge of maintaining its unity so as to ensure that this organ's decisions are implemented. We reiterate that the solution to this conflict can be found only through an inclusive political process based on dialogue and coordination, led by the Syrian people and for the Syrian people, that will make it possible to reach a peaceful solution among all parties involved. With this in mind, we wish to highlight the various forums for dialogue, specifically the Astana process, at which de-escalation zones were agreed on that must be respected by all parties. We will be closely following the next round of the process. We wish also to highlight the other opportunities for dialogue that could make it possible to reach further compromises to achieve a definitive end to hostilities, such as the Sochi national dialogue, which is aimed at strengthening the Geneva political process, with respect for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and its right to choose its own political, economic and social system without any external pressure or interference. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire thanks Mr. Jeffrey Feltman and Mr. Mark Lowcock for their respective briefings on recent developments in the situation in Syria following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2401 (2018), on the humanitarian situation in Syria. My delegation commends the Secretary-General for his unstinting efforts as part of the political dialogue among the Syrian parties with the aim of arriving at a lasting solution to the protracted crisis ravaging that country. In that regard, my country welcomes the holding of intra-Syrian peace talks on 25 and 26 January in Vienna in the framework of the Geneva process, followed by the talks held in Sochi on 29 and 30 January. My delegation cherishes the hope that the proposals stemming from the Sochi talks, including the establishment of a committee tasked with drawing up a new constitution, will receive consistent attention from the international community, as part of the concerted quest to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Syria. The situation on the ground is deeply alarming. Military operations that include the use of non-conventional weapons are leading to mass displacements of people, the loss of human lives, injuries and the destruction of public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. The grave humanitarian crisis spawned by the fighting led to the adoption by the Security Council this past Saturday, 24 February, of resolution 2401 (2018), with a view to the cessation without delay of hostilities for a 30-day period to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need as well as medical evacuations. My delegation notes with regret that the adoption of the resolution did not contribute to restoring calm on the ground. The ceasefire proposed was short-lived, despite the numerous appeals for a cessation of hostilities. Even the very minimum one called for by the Russian Federation, an ally of the Damascus Government, on Monday 26 February did not lead to a positive response. Air raids and rocket launches continue on the ground, thereby obstructing the work of humanitarian personnel. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 14/22 18-05507 We deplore the ongoing loss of life among humanitarian workers — 22 United Nations personnel and 66 staff members or volunteers of the International Red Cross — and we deplore also the material damage that has been wrought, which includes the destruction of 25 vehicles and 44 facilities, according to the information we have received. Nonetheless, Côte d'Ivoire welcomes the fact that United Nations humanitarian agencies and their partners have managed to assist people in need by conducting 1,567 deliveries. My country reaffirms that a resolution of the crisis in Syria must be part of an inclusive dialogue and political process, as set out in the road map under resolution 2254 (2015). In that regard, my country calls for full compliance with the 30-day ceasefire, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018), which will not only allow humanitarian actors to respond to critical emergencies but also create the conditions for a return to the negotiating table by all parties to the Syrian crisis. To that end, Côte d'Ivoire urges the members of the Security Council to unite and surmount their differences in order to send a message of hope and solidarity of the international community to the Syrian people. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): As usual, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman just gave us detailed briefings on the humanitarian and political situation in Syria. Those were the first briefings to be delivered to the Security Council following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), on 24 February. I take this opportunity to thank both Under-Secretaries-General, as well as to acknowledge the willingness of the United Nations and its partners to send convoys of trucks with the necessary humanitarian aid and begin medical evacuations as soon as conditions on the ground allow. As Secretary-General António Guterres said two days ago in his statement before the Human Rights Council, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The Republic of Equatorial Guinea hopes resolution 2401 (2018) is meaningful in that way in order to relieve the affected population of the suffering it has endured, especially in eastern Ghouta, that is, we hope for it to be immediately implemented. We want to reiterate that the Syrian conflict has no military solution. The opponents therefore must take a seat at the negotiating table to engage in direct and frank dialogue, without exclusions, however complicated it may be to do so. It must be the Syrians who determine the future they want for their country. The international community must redouble its efforts in making sure the opponents engage in negotiations, and the countries that have influence need to wield it to establish trust, with the ultimate goal of achieving lasting and just peace in Syria. We commend the intention expressed by the largest opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — to respect the ceasefire, and we invite all the other parties involved to take the same decision. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea believes that the only reason that the humanitarian situation remains of concern is because the opponents do not agree on negotiating to reach a peace agreement, which consequently causes more civilian victims, leads to the destruction of hospital facilities and hampers humanitarian aid operations. The conflict has recently intensified around the town of eastern Ghouta and some other parts of Syria, which has resulted in civilian casualties, the destruction of a considerable number of medical and relief facilities and the obstruction of humanitarian relief operations led by the United Nations. Equatorial Guinea is very touched and horrified by the critical situation the Syrian people are experiencing, and we must not show indifference to so much pain and suffering. It is therefore imperative that the parties to the conflict implement and uphold the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially the most recent, resolution 2401 (2018), including allowing access to humanitarian aid, halting hostilities and ultimately, cooperating with the United Nations in its efforts to assuage the conflict and make humanitarian operations effective by ensuring aid deliveries reach the affected populations and evacuating the sick and seriously injured so that they can receive the necessary medical care. The international community, while striving to help Syria, must not forget the neighbouring countries that have welcomed refugees and shown a spirit of solidarity worthy of praise. I would like to conclude my statement by expressing well-deserved tribute to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and all those who work with it on the ground for their bravery and determination in fulfilling their humanitarian mission to deliver aid to 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 15/22 those in need. We encourage them to persist in their noble efforts. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General Feltman for their comprehensive and sobering briefings. Kazakhstan welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). That document should be urgently implemented to ensure a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria. The ceasefire regime should be implemented fully, especially in the areas of eastern Ghouta, southern Idlib and northern Hama, to resolve their long-accumulated acute humanitarian problems, deliver aid to the most difficult regions and evacuate the wounded and sick. Turning to the situation on the ground in the country, according to our humanitarian colleagues, over the past 78 hours and to our deep regret, military operations continued to be reported in besieged eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, including women and children. Attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta are also continuing. To our great disappointment, a Syrian Arab Red Crescent warehouse in a Damascus suburb was reportedly struck by shelling. During the same period, attacks on the city of Damascus and the governorate resulted in 14 deaths and 214 injured. We are glad to know that the United Nations has mobilized and is ready to immediately support life-saving aid convoys in several areas in eastern Ghouta. We therefore call on the Council members and the wider United Nations membership to assist the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in operationalizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance in eastern Ghouta, as well as in carrying out hundreds of medical evacuations. We echo the United Nations calls on all parties to facilitate unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country and take all measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required by international law. It is equally important to ensure, in close coordination with OCHA, the protection of medical and humanitarian workers. We must also insist that parties support United Nation agencies in the fulfilment of their mandates. In that context, Kazakhstan proposes that all-round assistance be provided to the inter-Syrian negotiations through the Astana process and that positive developments be taken advantage of to improve the humanitarian situation. My country stands for a solution in Syria based on resolution 2254 (2015), the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and agreements on the de-escalation zones reached through the Astana process. We regret the lack of full agreement and close coordination among the key stakeholders in managing the Syrian crisis. We also attach great importance to strengthening the inter-Syrian political dialogue with greater support from the world community. Lastly, Kazakhstan notes the need to establish closer interaction among the leading stakeholders in Syria, in particular between the Russian Federation and the United States, to improve the political process and ensure positive changes on the humanitarian track. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. China commends the United Nations aid agencies for their humanitarian relief efforts in Syria. The security situation in various parts of Syria, including Damascus and eastern Ghouta, has escalated recently, causing significant civilian casualties. We sympathize profoundly with the suffering of the Syrian people and condemn all acts of violence against innocent civilians. The parties concerned should take immediate measures to de-escalate the tensions in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) demonstrates the consensus and unity of its members on the humanitarian issue in Syria. We appreciate the positive efforts of the parties concerned. China welcomed Russia's announcement by Russia that it will implement the ceasefire measures and assist with the evacuation of people from conflict areas. We call on the parties in Syria to put an immediate end to hostilities in accordance with the resolution, actively coordinate with United Nations relief efforts and ensure safe humanitarian corridors in the relevant areas. A political settlement is the only viable solution to the Syrian issue. The Syrian National Dialogue Congress was recently held successfully in Sochi and has had positive results. Special Envoy de Mistura is making ongoing efforts to advance the Syrian political process. The international community should support the Syrian parties in resuming dialogue and negotiations under the auspices of United Nations mediation as soon S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 16/22 18-05507 as possible and in seeking a solution that is acceptable to all parties through a Syrian-owned and -led political process. That is the only way to fundamentally ease the humanitarian situation in Syria and end the suffering of the Syrian people without delay. Terrorist organizations are still launching attacks in Syria, causing significant civilian casualties and impeding United Nations humanitarian relief efforts. The international community should strengthen its cooperation on counter-terrorism, adopt unified standards and resolutely combat all terrorist organizations that are designated as such by the Security Council. Ms. Guadey (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for their comprehensive briefings. We would like to express our gratitude to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for their continuing efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to millions of Syrians. As Mr. Lowcock said, the humanitarian crisis in Syria continues to be a devastating one. Military activities in various parts of the country, including eastern Ghouta, have affected the ability of the United Nations to deliver lifesaving assistance to all in need. As the report of the Secretary- General (S/2018/138) says, the conflict and other obstacles have had a disastrous effect on the level of humanitarian access. In order to address those challenges and to alleviate the Syrians' suffering, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding the institution without delay of a cessation of hostilities for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuations. As we all emphasized on Saturday after welcoming the resolution's adoption (see S/PV.8186), what is now required is its full and comprehensive implementation with the immediate engagement of all parties and those with influence on them. Of course, we understand and appreciate the fact that the United Nations is ready to provide immediate humanitarian aid across the country. However, as Mr. Lowcock just highlighted, there are still military activities in various areas. In that regard, we call on all the parties to fully implement resolution 2401 (2018) for the sake of the Syrian people, who have continued to bear the brunt of the conflict for almost eight years. We appreciate any measure taken by Member States to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire, including the humanitarian pause and humanitarian corridor announced by the Russian Federation. At the same time, it is obvious that more needs to be done to fully implement the resolution. It is therefore imperative to take urgent and coordinated action to bring about an immediate ceasefire, thereby ensuring that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have safe, sustained and needs-based access in order to deliver humanitarian aid to all Syrians in need of assistance. In conclusion, it is ultimately a comprehensive, Syrian-led political solution, facilitated by the United Nations on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), that can sustainably end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. By the way, at the outset I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask Mr. Lowcock where the United Nations is getting its evidence and data on deaths in Damascus, for instance. According to the Syrian authorities' information, for example, just since 22 January, 12 people have died in Damascus, while the United Nations figure is 11 for the whole month. Where is he getting his information from? The White Helmets, maybe? Today, as has been usual recently, the United States delegation devoted its statement to Russia. It told us that it knew what we were going to say today, which it does not. And I am pleased about that, because it means that it did not see our statement before the meeting began. On 24 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), in an important decision aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Syria, especially in areas where the danger of military clashes remains or there are obstacles of one kind or another to the civilian population's access to essential assistance. Today many questions have been asked — emphatic questions, rhetorical questions, questions aimed directly at us. We answered the questions asked of us during our discussion at the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). There are a lot of people here who like to pick citations from the resolution that they like and forget the ones that do not suit them. If I may, I will quote two extracts from it, from paragraph 1 and paragraph 10. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 17/22 (spoke in English) "Demands that all parties cease hostilities without delay, and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation of this demand by all parties, for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria, to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and … medical evacuations". "[U]nderscores the need for the parties to agree on humanitarian pauses, days of tranquillity, localized ceasefires and truces to allow humanitarian agencies safe and unhindered access to all affected areas in Syria". (spoke in Russian) Has everyone read the resolution? We have said, and we will say it again, that any sustained pause must be preceded by an agreement between the parties on de-escalation. The demands that military activity end overnight are either the result of a misunderstanding of the realities or a deliberate exploitation of this human tragedy. The statement by the United States delegation simply rewrote resolution 2401 (2018). What sort of joint effort, such as the Permanent Representative of France called for today, can we talk about in these circumstances after what we heard today in the United States delegation's statement? Russia has announced the establishment in eastern Ghouta of daily five-hour humanitarian pauses. Everything possible is being done to ensure that they function successfully. Specifically, medical and temporary accommodation posts have been equipped, ambulance teams organized, motor transport provided. We call on the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other recognized humanitarian organizations to join these efforts. However, on the very first day, the militias took advantage of the announcement of the pause to go on the offensive. The same thing happened on the second day. The mortar shelling continued, including in the humanitarian operations corridors. Not a single person was able to leave the danger area. We took note of the relevant letters submitted on behalf of the illegal armed groups. We were told previously that the most convenient way of informing Council members about them was being sought. It has been found and it is indeed highly original — directly through the work e-mail addresses of all the political coordinators, meaning that someone deliberately sent the relevant contact information to dubious individuals from the ranks of the radical Syrian opposition. It is very similar to the situation that occurred when information about the closed negotiations on humanitarian resolutions became available to Western media agencies. However, we hope that the opposition leaders are serious and that their deeds will match their words. We are expecting clear guarantees in that regard from the militias' foreign sponsors, many of whom are seated around this table. The first thing that is needed is a definitive repudiation of the terrorist organizations. It has to be understood that terrorists continue to be a legitimate target of military operations, and we will not stand on ceremony with them. Overall, we have to decide on the most effective way to neutralize Jabhat Al-Nusra in eastern Ghouta. Why can't some members show a willingness to cooperate on that issue? Or do they not want to? The information background to this issue is overheated to the point of no return. If we had not adopted resolution 2401 (2018), it is difficult even to imagine what the Western media outlets would have made of it or how they would have portrayed Russia. But even now, when the resolution has been adopted, our Western partners act as if everything in it pertains solely to Damascus and Russia, and that its successful implementation depends almost entirely on the will of our two countries, while they, the self-styled champions of humanity, somehow imagine that they have an exclusive right to lecture us on the subject. In various media outlets, especially American ones, there have been false allegations that we mock the tragedy of this war and the situation in eastern Ghouta, and that we say that the campaign is exaggerated and fake. I will ask these humanistic gentlemen once again: Where were they when American aircraft blew Raqqa off the face of the Earth? Where were the cries and the hand-wringing? Months have passed since the terrorists were banished from that city and yet it is still uninhabitable. On top of that, there are new reports of 24 civilian casualties from Coalition air strikes in Deir ez-Zor province. Who are they — second-class citizens? Or when innocent people die from democratic bombs, is that somehow immaterial — perhaps even honourable? We urge the United Nations — in fact, we insist — to send an assessment mission to Raqqa as soon as possible, and that the Coalition, which is in de facto control of the area, give it all necessary support. We also expect that instead of establishing quasi- S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 18/22 18-05507 administrations in areas liberated from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the Coalition leadership will come up with a plan to turn them over to the central authorities, in consideration of the Security Council's repeated affirmations of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. That would be a great deal more constructive than the relentless quest to find what is a non-existent basis in international law for maintaining its presence on Syrian territory. If Council members have interesting ideas on how to raise the profile of local Government and find effective ways to rebuild the ethnic and religious balance that existed before the war, they should present them to the Syrians in the negotiations in Geneva and let them decide the issues for themselves through the mediation of the United Nations. We also demand that the Coalition open humanitarian access to the territory it is occupying around the Al-Tanf military base in order to bring aid to the residents of the Rukban camp as soon as possible. By the way, that is also a provision of resolution 2401 (2018). It is not for nothing that we keep saying that what is going on is painfully reminiscent of the situation in eastern Aleppo when the West unleashed a wave of monstrous anti-Russian hysteria. We are the only country being asked to implement resolution 2401 (2018). We are being criticized for instituting humanitarian pauses. Some claim that there are not enough of them. Demands, demands, demands. For some reason, someone is always bossily demanding something of Russia. Britain's Foreign Secretary has altogether decided that he is the prosecutor who is threatening to punish our country. Apparently, he called for today's meeting to be convened. He said so himself. The Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic is making daily and hourly efforts to achieve a cessation of hostilities, establish humanitarian pauses and ease the suffering of civilians. May I ask what other members have done to implement resolution 2401 (2018)? Has even one of their countries lifted a finger? Have they brought their influence to bear on those whom they consider the moderate opposition? Have they persuaded them to lay down their weapons and stop taking hostages? The hugely complex issue that the Syrian conflict represents is being used for unscrupulous purposes. The rivers of tears roll down only when the next stronghold where militias and terrorists mingle is threatened, at which point an unheard-of level of action kicks in. The real aim is the regime, as some members like to refer to the lawful Syrian authorities. Any hint of its success in fighting terrorism on its own territory is a thorn in their side. They are ready to use any means to stop it. This is a warning. We know about the chemical evidence being fabricated in order to blame Damascus. We know about the meetings on the subject, where they are being held and who is taking part in them. Today we once again heard unsubstantiated allegations about the Syrian Government's use of chemical weapons. I am tired of asking if members understand the futility of Damascus using chemical weapons from both a military and a political point of view, and the completely believable probability of militias using chemical provocations. I think they do understand it perfectly, but they persist in seeking an excuse for military intervention. United States officials, and the head of the Foreign Office and others, have already talked about military strikes against Syria, and it is obvious where that intellectual activity is heading. We urge everyone to stop the dirty tricks and join the concerted efforts to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Syria by implementing the resolution we have just adopted. We hope that the United Nations generally and Mr. Lowcock personally, as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, will rise to the occasion. We have circulated a draft presidential statement on the resolution's implementation. We have placed it under the silence procedure until 1 p.m., and we call on the Council to adopt it. We hope that there will be no objections before one o'clock. I will take the liberty of reading it out. (spoke in English) The Security Council, with reference to its resolution 2401 (2018), urges all parties to implement it and, to this end, further urges all armed groups and all Member States with influence on them to ensure the safety of the announced humanitarian corridors for evacuation from eastern Ghouta. The Security Council calls for the establishment of similar humanitarian corridors in Al-Tanf and Rukban. The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to expeditiously send a mission to Raqqa to assess humanitarian needs there. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 19/22 (spoke in Russian) And by the way, we, like the other members of the Security Council, believe that there can only be a political solution to the Syrian conflict. We are doing everything we can to achieve that, and certainly somewhat more than those who have been spreading fire and fury today. We propose, as we have always proposed, that they join in these efforts, rather than throw up road blocks in an attempt to serve their own geopolitical agendas. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity. First of all, the delegation of Kuwait aligns itself to the statement made by the representative of Sweden on behalf of our two countries as co-penholders on the issue of Syria. We thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under- Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their briefings. Four days after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that all parties cease hostilities throughout Syrian territory for 30 days, I would like to make the following points. We have said from the outset that resolution 2401 (2018) is only the first step towards improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. However, to date we have not seen the implementation of the provisions of the resolution — not even a partial implementation — as we heard from Mr. Lowcock this morning, in particular in eastern Ghouta. The Council demonstrated unity in adopting the resolution and it is up to us now to ensure that all its provisions are implemented in full and immediately in order to alleviate the suffering of our brethren in Syria and to protect civilians. The resolution is binding on all, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, we welcome the fact that the United Nations is ready to come to eastern Ghouta and other besieged areas so as to deliver all kinds of aid and assistance to those that need them. We call on all the parties to the conflict in Syria to uphold international humanitarian law and abide by the provisions of the resolution, which cover all the various aspects that are causing the daily suffering of the Syrian people. Thirdly, we underscore the importance of members of the Council making their contribution by spurring all the parties to the conflict in Syria to immediately implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018), keeping in mind that, as co-penholders, we are committed to closely follow its implementation, including ensuring a briefing by the Secretariat 15 days after the adoption of the resolution. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. In accordance with to rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The Syrian Government has examined the forty-eighth monthly report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and, yesterday morning, as usual, we sent a formal letter to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council setting forth the position of the Syrian Government on the report. We are realistic. We know well that the United Nations is not a charitable organization. That is clear given that it has been unable to implement the principles of the Charter and international law since its inception — and the Palestinian question is a case in point. There have been other failures by the United Nations: in Iraq, Libya, the former Yugoslavia, Grenada — for those who have forgotten Grenada — Nicaragua, and the list goes on. However, I hope we can preserve the United Nations as an organization even as it continues to lack charitability. I would now like to make the following points. First, the Syrian Government is fully committed to the principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as well as Syrian law and the Syrian Constitution, all of which stipulate that the Syrian Government has the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of Syrian citizens and protect them from terrorist groups. Secondly, the current report, just like previous reports, has a great flaw, namely, that the authors of the report continue to rely on politicized sources, open sources and unreliable figures. At the same time, the report continues to ignore credible Government sources and even the reports issued by the representatives of the United Nations in Syria. Those representatives, along with the reports they have submitted to the United Nations in New York, acknowledge the efforts S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 20/22 18-05507 of the Syrian Government and its cooperation on the humanitarian issue. However, none of this information that reaches New York appears to be mentioned in the report, as if by miracle. Thirdly, the Syrian Government condemns the authors of the report — the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — especially after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), for their failure to mention the Turkish aggression against the Syrian city of Afrin. That aggression has claimed the lives of many people, including women and children, destroyed public and private facilities and has led to the displacement of the city's inhabitants and a severe shortage of humanitarian goods. However, Afrin is not eastern Ghouta, eastern Aleppo, Fo'ah or Kefreya. Fourthly, the Syrian Government fully rejects the failure of the authors of the report to mention the catastrophic impact of the so-called International Coalition and its members. The Coalition, which has claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and members of the Syrian forces who are fighting Da'esh, committed two new massacres yesterday that claimed the lives of 29 civilians and injured dozens, most of them women and children, in the villages of Sha'fa and Thahret Allouni in eastern Deir ez-Zor. It appears that the International Coalition is focused on this part of eastern Deir ez-Zor because it is home to civilians who do not host Da'esh or Al-Nusra Front terrorists. The Coalition has also destroyed the city of Raqqa, as my colleague the representative of the Russian Federation just noted. My Government calls once again for dismantling this illegitimate aggressive Coalition and for an immediately stop to its crimes against the Syrian people. The Russian military issued a communiqué today saying that the areas under the control of the allies and agents of the United States in Syria are witnessing the worst humanitarian crisis currently in the country. Those areas have become black holes, just like the black holes in outer space. With regard to the situation in eastern Ghouta, the Syrian Government believes that the current deterioration in the situation is due to the fact that terrorist groups there have launched attacks against residential zones and military targets. Up until yesterday, they had launched more than 2,180 missiles and mortars against the city of Damascus. Those attacks claimed the lives of 66 civilians and injured 474 others. Government forces have been forced to respond to those attacks and to carry out their constitutional responsibility in guaranteeing security and safety for the citizens. My Government condemns the use, by the authors of the report, of the term "besieged areas" when considering the situation in eastern Ghouta, in rural Damascus. Under pressure from influential countries in and outside of the Council, they continue to deliberately ignore the fact that people in eastern Ghouta are besieged from within by the various armed terrorist organizations operating there. Those terrorist organizations are exploiting civilians and using them as human shields. They are seizing and monopolizing humanitarian assistance, distributing the aid to their supporters or selling it at exorbitant prices, as was the case in eastern Aleppo. Syria regrets the failure of the authors of the report to refer to the suffering of thousands of kidnapped people who are in eastern Ghouta prisons and other places where the terrorist groups are spread. The kidnapped people include women, children and elderly. These people were kidnapped from their homes and places of work and have been subjected to the worst forms of torture. There are civilians, including from city of Adra and from Latakia, who were kidnapped from their homes five years ago. The Syrian Government also condemns the statements by the Secretariat and reports of the Secretary-General, which continue up till now to disregard the suffering of 8 million civilians in the capital Damascus as a result of hundreds of missiles and mortars launched daily from terrorist groups within eastern Ghouta. The accusations by the authors of the report, like those of the Western countries that have influence on them, that the Syrian Government is allegedly besieging Ghouta have been consistently refuted. They have proven to be unfounded, as we have seen in recent reports noting that the Saudi regime provided "aid" to eastern Ghouta in February. That proves, first, that eastern Ghouta is not besieged and, secondly, that it is possible to access it. In particular, the terrorist groups in Ghouta continue to receive arms and munitions from Governments that support terrorism, including Saudi Arabia's so-called humanitarian assistance. The Syrian Government is more committed than anyone to protecting its citizens across Syria. In that 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 21/22 regard, it has taken all necessary measures to protect its citizens and to respond to the attacks of terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta. We have sought to protect these civilians from the terrorists by establishing a humanitarian corridor to ensure their exit from eastern Ghouta. We announced the humanitarian corridor only hours after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) in order to ensure the safety of civilians — in cooperation with our Russian friends and allies. We have provided them with shelter, food, medicine and medical care at the expense of the Syrian Government, not the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Syrian Government has also called on members of the armed groups to lay down their weapons, cease their terrorist activities inside residential areas and engage in national reconciliation efforts. However, those terrorist groups, including the Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh al-Islam and Faylak ar-Rahman, have forcibly prevented civilians from reaching the corridor, as some members of the Council may know. They also sought to target the humanitarian corridor after it was announced, through the use of mortars. As for the letter sent by the terrorist Mohamed Alloush, it is a clear indication that he rejects the exit of civilians from Ghouta. It is clear that he wants to use them as human shields. There seems to be a new trend in the United Nations to circulate a letter from a terrorist group as an official document. That is an innovation at the United Nations. There is no respect for the Member States concerned. We have followed closely the way resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted and today's statements and briefings. We can clearly say that the main goal behind the adoption of the resolution is neither to reach a clear truce or ceasefire, as some may claim, nor to protect civilians and meet their needs. The main goal was to use the Security Council once again as a means to prevent any progress by the Syrian army and its allies in the fight against the terrorist groups that are targeting the city of Damascus. I say that for the thousandth time. How else to explain the fact that the resolution fails to refer to any Council resolution on counter-terrorism? Who can explain to us the strong resistance of some States during the negotiations on the draft resolution to any text that excludes Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and the terrorist groups affiliated with them from the supposed ceasefire? For three days, the Council has continued to negotiate the issue of whether to include or exclude them. The false humanitarian propaganda on the situation in eastern Ghouta coincided with another campaign under the supervision of the United States, claiming the use of chemical weapons again in Syria, in areas under the exclusive control of terrorists or, I should say, the White Helmets. Today, The New York Times published a Tin-Tin style, childish report claiming that there is cooperation on the chemical issue between my country and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The article is a full-page report on the front page of The New York Times. It seeks to tarnish the image of the Syrian Government and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It ends by saying that this information is not substantiated. "Though experts who viewed the report said the evidence it cited did not prove definitively that there was current, continuing collaboration between North Korea and Syria on chemical weapons." That is a word-for-word quote from The New York Times. It seems that The New York Times is not up to date on what is going on in the world. It seems that the New York Times does not know that the American vessel, the MV Cape Ray, destroyed the chemical arsenal voluntarily submitted by the Syrian Government after joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as a full member. That is old information, déjà vu, as is said in French. However, it seems that The New York Times has decided to address this issue today. I will read a communiqué that we received just now of information that I think should be taken into consideration when addressing the issue of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. And I can tell the Council that terrorists will use chemical weapons in Syria. On the morning of 20 February, four days ago, three Turkish trucks carrying chlorine entered Idlib governorate through the Bab Al-Hawa crossing. I think that The New York Times should verify that information. Two trucks stopped in the village of Qalb Loze in Idlib, and the third continued its way to Al-Habit village in northern Idlib. Information available to the Syrian Government points to the fact that terrorists are currently preparing for a chemical weapon using the substance of chlorine on a large scale and to then accuse the Syrian Arab Army of using such weapons. Those terrorists have clear instructions from Western and Turkish intelligence to fabricate a chemical attack before 13 March, because S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 22/22 18-05507 it is on that date that the eighty-seventh session of the Executive Council of the OPCW will be held. According to the information I received just now, the two trucks are currently in the school of Qalb Loze village. Other cars and terrorists are also currently in the school, which they have turned into a warehouse for chemical weapons. As for the third truck, it is currently in a centre belonging to the Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, which is a Turkish agent, in the north-eastern part of Al-Habit village. A vast number of terrorists are currently unloading the truck there. In providing the Security Council with this information, we affirm that these terrorists, at the instructions of their operators, will use these chemical weapons before 13 March. The main responsibility for ending hostilities lies with those countries that have real influence with terrorist groups in Ghouta and other parts of Syria. They should compel these terrorist groups to stop their terrorist activities and allow civilians to leave those areas, which are used by these groups as a base to launch their terrorist attacks. There is in this Organization a group of five countries that are shedding tears over the humanitarian situation in Syria. Unfortunately, some of them are members of the Council. They have invited Member States to watch a movie about the White Helmets, two days from now in the Economic and Social Council Chamber here at the United Nations. Some members of the Council are advocating for a group that has been designated as a terrorist group by the Council. I hope that the Council will address the information I have provided seriously and appropriately. The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of February, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of Kuwait to the members of the Security Council, especially my colleagues the Permanent Representatives, their respective staff and to the secretariat of the Council for all the support they have given to us. Indeed, February has been a busy month, and one in which we rallied to consensus on several important issues within our purview. We could not have done it alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of all the delegations and the representatives of the Secretariat, as well as all the relevant conference service officers, interpreters, translators and security staff. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of the Netherlands good luck in the month of March. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

[spa] En la actualidad existe una creciente preocupación por la protección del medio ambiente, y no parece razonable que el Derecho Penal no forme parte del arsenal del Estado para su tutela. Porque no sólo los bienes jurídicos individuales requieren y merecen amparo penal, sino también los supraindividuales -como el medio ambiente-, cuyos grandes riesgos son generados y pueden ser controlados por unos pocos, pero cuya lesión afecta el derecho de muchos a disfrutarlos. Esta tesis es un modesto intento por abordar aquella necesidad de protección penal, que se cimienta en un análisis crítico del tipo penal del artículo 325 del Código Penal español y persigue dos grandes objetivos. El primero, arribar a una interpretación de lege lata para dicha norma que a su vez sea respetuosa de los principios de proporcionalidad, ultima ratio, y lesividad; y el segundo, proponer un tipo penal base para Chile que respete estos términos y se adecue a nuestro modelo social-económico. El límite inferior de la legítima intervención penal sobre el medio ambiente, se situará en las conductas que generan un resultado jurídico de idoneidad lesiva para el equilibrio de los sistemas naturales constatado ex post, que sea imputable a la creación -dolosa o imprudente- de un riesgo penalmente relevante para ese bien jurídico-penal. Consiguientemente, se rechaza la comprensión del tipo del art. 325 CPE como delito de peligro hipotético, por estimarse que la sola valoración ex ante de la aptitud de una conducta para afectar el equilibrio de los sistemas naturales, dará lugar a un juicio demasiado incierto sobre la real potencialidad lesiva de la acción, pues habida cuenta de la infinita diversidad e interconexión de los ecosistemas, una misma conducta puede generar resultados muy disímiles, que no son anticipables. El principal escollo que sortear para establecer la lesividad de una conducta, se presentará porque las conductas riesgosas para el medio ambiente tienen lugar casi exclusivamente en el ámbito empresarial, y en ese contexto no resulta fácil identificar el preciso riesgo que causa el resultado desvalorado, porque en muchas ocasiones el recurso natural objeto de la acción -o el ecosistema al que pertenece-, está siendo contaminado por múltiples fuentes. Por otra parte, la atribución del descontrol o incremento del riesgo medioambiental a un determinado individuo tampoco será sencilla, porque precisará identificar el ámbito competencial desde el que emanó el riesgo, las sucesivas delegaciones de funciones, y la verificación de si la cúspide empresarial cumplió su deber de control y supervisión de un riesgo que, en la mayoría de los casos, será propio de la actividad empresarial que desarrollan. Pero estas y otras dificultades para incardinar la protección medioambiental en las clásicas categorías del Derecho Penal no pueden servir de argumento para estimarla ilegítima sino, por el contrario, deben constituir un aliciente para que la mejor Doctrina redoble sus esfuerzos en la búsqueda de una adecuada síntesis entre la necesidad de protección del bien jurídico y el respeto de los principios de un Derecho Penal propio de un Estado democrático de Derecho. ; [cat] En l'actualitat existeix una creixent preocupació per la protecció de l'entorn, i no sembla raonable que el Dret Penal no formi part de l'arsenal de l'Estat per a la seva tutela. Perquè no només els béns jurídics individuals requereixen i mereixen empara penal, sinó també els supraindividuals -com el medi ambient-, els grans riscos dels quals són generats i poden ser controlats per uns pocs, però la lesió dels quals afecta el dret de molts a gaudir-los. Aquesta tesi és un modest intent per abordar aquella necessitat de protecció penal, que es fonamenta en una anàlisi crítica del tipus penal de l'article 325 del Codi Penal espanyol i persegueix dos grans objectius. El primer, arribar a una interpretació possible de lege lata per a aquesta norma que al seu torn sigui respectuosa dels principis de proporcionalitat, ultima ratio, i lesivitat; i el segon, proposar un tipus penal base per Xile que respecti aquests termes i s'adeqüi al nostre model social-econòmic. El límit inferior de la legítima intervenció penal sobre el medi ambient, se situa en les conductes que generen un resultat jurídic d'idoneïtat lesiva per a l'equilibri dels sistemes naturals constatat ex post, que sigui imputable a la creació -dolosa o imprudent- d'un risc penalment rellevant per a aquest bé jurídic- penal. Consegüentment, es rebutja la comprensió del tipus de l'art. 325 CPE com a delicte de perill hipotètic, per estimar-se que la sola valoració ex ante de l'aptitud d'una conducta per afectar l'equilibri dels sistemes naturals, donarà lloc a un judici massa incert sobre la real potencialitat lesiva de l'acció, ja que tenint en compte la infinita diversitat i interconnexió dels ecosistemes, una mateixa conducta pot generar resultats molt diversos, que no són anticipables. El principal escull a sortejar per establir la lesivitat de la conducta es presentarà perquè les conductes perilloses per al medi ambient tenen lloc gairebé exclusivament en l'àmbit empresarial, i en aquest context no resulta fàcil identificar el precís risc que causa el resultat desvalorat, perquè en moltes ocasions el recurs natural objecte de l'acció -o l'ecosistema a què pertany-, està sent contaminat per múltiples fonts. D'altra banda, l'atribució del descontrol o increment de risc mediambiental a un determinat individu tampoc serà senzilla, perquè necessitarà identificar l'àmbit competencial des del qual va emanar el risc, les successives delegacions de funcions, i la verificació de si la cúspide empresarial va complir el seu deure de control i supervisió d'un risc que, en la majoria dels casos, serà propi de l'activitat empresarial que desenvolupen. Però aquestes i altres dificultats per incardinar la protecció mediambiental en les clàssiques categories del Dret Penal no poden servir d'argument per considerar-la il·legítima sinó, per contra, han de constituir un al·licient perquè la millor Doctrina redobli els seus esforços en la recerca d'una adequada síntesi entre la necessitat de protecció del bé jurídic i el respecte dels principis d'un Dret Penal propi d'un Estat democràtic de Dret. ; [eng] Today there is growing concern about environment protection, and it does not seem reasonable that Criminal Law should be not part of the State's arsenal for its protection. Because not only individual legal assets require and deserve criminal protection, but also the supra-individual ones -such as the environment- whose great risks are generated and can be controlled by a few, but whose damage affects the right of many to enjoy them. This thesis is a modest attempt to address that need for criminal protection, which is based on a critical analysis of the criminal type of article 325 of the Spanish Criminal Code and pursues two major objectives. The first, to arrive at a possible interpretation of lege lata for said norm that in turn is respectful of the principles of proportionality, ultima ratio, and harmfulness; and the second is to propose a criminal base rate for Chile that would respect these terms and be in line with our social and economic model. The lower limit of legitimate criminal intervention on the environment is located in the behaviors that generate a legal result of harmful suitability for the balance of the natural systems found ex post, which is attributable to the creation -malicious or reckless- of a criminally relevant risk for that legal- criminal good. Consequently, the understanding of the type of art. 325 SCC is rejected as a hypothetical danger offense, as it is estimated that the mere ex ante assessment of the ability of a behavior to affect the balance of natural systems, will lead to a judgment that is too uncertain about the real harmful potential of the action, given that from the infinite diversity and interconnection of ecosystems, the same behavior can generate very different results, which are not anticipated. The main stumbling block to establish the harmfulness of the behavior will occur because risky behaviors for the environment take place almost exclusively in the business environment, and in this context it is not easy to identify the precise risk caused by the undervalued result, because in many times the natural resource object of the action -or the ecosystem to which it belongs- is being contaminated by multiple sources. On the other hand, the attribution of the lack of control or increase of the environmental risk to a certain individual will not be simple either, because it will need to identify the competence field from which the risk originated, the successive delegations of functions, and the verification of whether the business leadership fulfilled its duty of control and supervision of a risk that, in most cases, will be characteristic of the business activity they carry out. But these and other difficulties to incardinate environmental protection in the classic categories of Criminal Law cannot serve as an argument to estimate it illegitimate but, on the contrary, must constitute an incentive for the best Doctrine to redouble its efforts in the search for an adequate synthesis between the need for protection of the legal good and respect for the principles of a Criminal Law proper to a democratic State of Law.

Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Bettageri-1microwatershedwas conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and these physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundaries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characteristics, classification, behavior and use potentials of the soils in the microwatershed. The present study covers an area of 391ha in Koppaltalukand district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought - prone with an average annual rainfall of 662 mm, of which about 424 mm is received during south –west monsoon, 161mm during north-east and the remaining 77 mm during the rest of the year. An area of about 91 per cent is covered by soils, 9 per cent byhabitation and water bodies. The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below.  The soils belong to 8soil series and 9soil phases (management units) and 7 land use classes.  The length of crop growing period is 200mm/m) in available water capacity.  Entire area has very gently sloping (1-3%) lands.  About 33per cent area is slightly eroded and about 58 per cent area ismoderately eroded (e2) lands.  About 6 per cent area is slightly acidic (pH 6.0-6.5) about 18 per cent neutral, 67 per cent area is slightly alkaline (pH 8.4 to 9.0)to very strongly alkaline (pH>9.0)in soil reaction.  The Electrical Conductivity (EC) of the soils are dominantly 0.75%) in organic carbon.  About 6 per cent area is low (57 kg/ha) available phosphorus.  Major area of about 86 per centismedium (145-337 kg/ha) in available potassium and a small area of about 5 per cent has high (>337 kg/ha) in available potassium.  Available sulphur is low (20 ppm).  Available boron is low (0.5 ppm) in about 60 per cent area and medium (0.5-1.0 ppm) in 31per cent area.  Available iron is sufficient (>4.5 ppm)in40 per cent area and deficient (<4.5 ppm) in about 51 per cent area.  Available zinc is deficient (<0.6 ppm) inan area of about 36 per cent and sufficient in 55per cent area.  Available manganeseand copper are sufficient in all the soils.  The land suitability for 25 major crops grown in the microwatershedwere assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (S1) and moderately suitable (S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the microwatershed Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum 20 (5) 143 (37) Guava - 101 (26) Maize - 142 (36) Jackfruit - 101 (26) Bajra 88 (23) 54 (14) Jamun - 108 (28) Groundnut - 142 (36) Musambi 20 (5) 101 (26) Sunflower 20 (5) 101 (26) Lime 20 (5) 101 (26) Chilli - 142 (36) Cashew - 160 (41) Tomato - 142 (36) Custard apple 108 (28) 127 (32) Drumstick - 121 (31) Amla 88 (23) 147 (37) Mulberry - 193 (49) Tamarind - 20 (5) Mango - - Marigold - 163 (42) Sapota - 101 (26) Chrysanthemum - 163 (42) Pomegranate - 121 (31) Jasmine - 143 (37) Crossandra - 145 (36) Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan has been prepared for the7identified LUCs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fodder,fibre and other horticulture crops.  Maintaining soil-health is vital to crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested to these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc.,  Soil and water conservation treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required.  As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands, field bunds and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. That would help in supplementing the farm income, provide fodder and fuel, and generate lot of biomass which in turn would help in maintaining the ecological balance and contribute to mitigating the climate change. FINDINGS OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY  The survey was conducted in Bettageri-1 is located at North latitude 150 13' 35.664" and 160 11' 29.015'' and East longitude 760 3' 22.648'' and 760 2' 6.455" covering an area of about 391.08 ha coming under bettageri village of Koppal taluk.  Socio-economic analysis indicated that, out of the total sample of 35 respondents, - 5 (14.29%) were marginal, 11(31.43%) were small and 10 (28.57%) were semi medium, 7 (20%) were medium.  The population characteristics of households indicated that, there were 84 (57.14%) men and 62 (42.18%) were women.  Majority of the respondents (40.82%) were in the age group of 35-60 years. Education level of the sample households indicated that, majority there were 17.69 per cent illiterates and only 11.56 per cent attained graduation.  About, 54.29 per cent of household heads practicing agriculture and 31.43 per cent of the household heads were engaged as agricultural labourers.  Agriculture was the major occupation for 36.73 per cent of the household members.  In the study area, 91.43 per cent of the households possess katcha house and 2.86 per cent possess pucca house.  The durable assets owned by the households showed that, 80 per cent possess TV, 37.14 per cent possess mixer grinder and 100 per cent possess mobile phones.  Farm implements owned by the households indicated that 11.43 per cent of the households possess plough.  Regarding livestock possession by the households, 17.14 per cent possess local cow and 5.71 per cent possess buffalo respectively.  The average labour availability in the study area showed that, own men and women labour availability in the micro watershed was 7.71 each, while the hired labour (men) availability was 1.58.  Further, 8.57 per cent of the households opined that hired labour was inadequate during the agricultural season.  Out of the total land holding of the sample respondents (66.25 ha), 73.68 per cent of the area is under dry condition and the remaining 26.21 per cent area is irrigated land.  There were 9 bore wells and 0 dry bore wells among the sampled households.  Bore well was the major source of irrigation for 25.71 per cent of the households.  The major crops grown by sample farmers are Bajra, Groundnut, Bengalgram, Sorghum and Maize and cropping intensity was recorded as 98.47 per cent.  The sample households possessed 5.71 per cent bank account and 5.71 per cent of them have savings in the account. 2  About 5.71 per cent of the respondents borrowed credit from various sources.  The per hectare cost of cultivation for Bajra, Groundnut, Bengalgram, Sorghum and Maize was Rs.28756.92 , 101401.12, 40347.70, 30650.44, and 27142.57 with benefit cost ratio of 1:1.20, 1:0.80, 1:0.90, 1:1.50, and 1:1.60, respectively.  Further, 28.57 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was adequate and 28.57 per cent of the households have opined that the green fodder was adequate.  The average annual gross income of the farmers was Rs. 122345.71 in microwatershed, of which Rs. 69631.43 comes from agriculture.  Sampled households have grown horticulture crops has planted 9 coconut trees in the fields and forest species have grown 33 neem trees and 1 banyan trees together in both field and backyard.  Regarding marketing channels, 94.29 per cent of the households have sold agricultural produce to the local/village merchants, while, 17.14 per cent have sold by Agents/Traders.  Further, 114.29 per cent of the households have used tractor for the transport of agriculture commodity.  Majority of the farmers (57.14 %) have experienced soil and water erosion problems in the watershed and 88.57 per cent of the households were interested towards soil testing.  Firewood connection was the major source of fuel for domestic use for 94.29 per cent of the households and 5.71 per cent households has LPG.  Piped supply was the major source for drinking water for 91.43 per cent of the households.  Electricity was the major source of light for 100 per cent of the households.  In the study area, 40 per cent of the households possess toilet facility.  Regarding possession of PDS card, 88.57 per cent of the households possessed BPL card and 11.43 per cent do not possess PDS card.  Cereals (105.71%), pulses (80%), oilseeds ( 0%) were adequate for consumption.  Farming constraints experienced by households in the micro watersheds were lower fertility status of the soil (88.57%) wild animal menace on farm field ( 11.43%), frequent incidence of pest and diseases (80%), inadequacy of irrigation water (28.57%), high cost of fertilizers and plant protection chemicals (80%), high rate of interest on credit (65.71%), low price for the agricultural commodities (77.14%), lack of marketing facilities in the area (60%), inadequate extension services (0%), lack of transport for safe transport of the agricultural produce to the market (11.43%), Less rainfall (8.57%) and Source of Agri-technology information(Newspaper/TV/Mobile) (5.71%). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project

Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Haligeri-4 & Haligeri-5 microwatersheds was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and these physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundaries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characteristics, classification, behavior and use potentials of the soils in the microwatersheds. The present study covers an area of 472 ha in Koppal taluk and district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought - prone with an average annual rainfall of 662 mm, of which about 424 mm is received during south –west monsoon, 161 mm during north-east and the remaining 77 mm during the rest of the year. An area of about 96 per cent is covered by soils, 4 per cent water bodies, settlements and others. The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below.  The soils belong to 4 soil series and 5 soil phases (management units) and 2 land use classes.  The length of crop growing period is 150 cm) in soil depth.  Entire area of the microwatersheds has clayey soils at the surface.  About 59 per cent of the area has non-gravelly (200 mm/m) in available water capacity.  Entire area has very gently sloping (1-3%) lands.  An area of 25 per cent has soils that are slightly eroded (e1) and 71 per cent moderately eroded (e2) lands.  An area of 85 per cent has soils that are strongly alkaline (pH 8.4-9.0) and 11 per cent are very strongly alkaline (pH > 9.0).  The Electrical Conductivity (EC) of the entire soils 337 kg/ha) in available potassium content.  Available sulphur content is low (20 ppm).  Available boron is medium (0.5-1.0 ppm) in about 23 per cent area and high (>1.0 ppm) in about 72 per cent.  Available iron is sufficient (>4.5 ppm) in 0.6 ppm) in about <1 per cent area.  Available manganese and copper are sufficient in all the soils.  The land suitability for 28 major agricultural and horticultural crops grown in the microwatersheds were assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (S1) and moderately suitable (S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the microwatersheds Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum 223 (47) - Pomegranate - 223 (47) Maize - - Guava - - Bajra - - Jackfruit - - Red gram - 223 (47) Jamun - 120(25) Bengalgram 223 (47) - Musambi 120 (25) 103 (22) Groundnut - - Lime 120 (25) 103 (22) Sunflower 120 (25) 103 (22) Cashew - - Cotton 223 (47) - Custard apple 223 (47) - Chilli - - Amla - 223 (47) Tomato - - Tamarind - 120 (25) Drumstick - 223 (47) Marigold - 223 (47) Mulbery - 165 (35) Chrysanthemum - 223 (47) Mango - - Jasmine - - Sapota - - Crossandra - 120 (25) Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan has been prepared for the 2 identified LUCs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fodder, fibre and other horticulture crops that helps in maintaining productivity and ecological balance in the microwatersheds.  Maintaining soil-health is vital to crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested for these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc.,  Soil and water conservation treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required.  As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands, field bunds and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. That would help in supplementing the farm income, provide fodder and fuel, and generate lot of biomass which in turn would help in maintaining the ecological balance and contribute to mitigating the climate change. DINGS OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY  The survey was conducted in Haligeri-4 & 5 is located at North latitude 150 25' 3.888" and 150 22' 24.782" and East longitude 760 6' 4.369" and 760 4' 8.663" covering an area of about 472.48 ha coming under Halageri village of Koppal taluk.  Socio-economic analysis of Haligeri-4 & 5 micro watersheds of Haligeri subwatershed, Koppala taluk & District indicated that, out of the total sample of 35 total respondents, 8 (22.86 %) were marginal, 10 (28.57%)were small, 11 (31.43 %) were Semi medium and 6 (17.14 %) were medium farmers.  The population characteristics of households indicated that, there were 89 (53.94%) men and 76 (46.06 %) were women.  Majority of the respondents (43.03%) were in the age group of 16-35 years.  Education level of the sample households indicated that, there were 21.82 per cent illiterates, 83.63 per cent pre university education and 4.85 per cent attained graduation.  About, 97.14 per cent of household heads practicing agriculture.  Agriculture was the major occupation for 59.39 per cent of the household members.  In the study area, 77.14 per cent of the households possess katcha house and 28.57 per cent possess pucca house.  The durable assets owned by the households showed that, 65.71 per cent possess TV, 60.00 per cent possess mixer grinder, 97.14 per cent possess mobile phones and 31.43 per cent possess motor cycles.  Farm implements owned by the households indicated that, 20.00 per cent of the households possess plough, 2.86 per cent possess tractor and 11.43 per cent possess bullock cart.  Regarding livestock possession by the households, 28.57 per cent possess local cow and 11.43 per cent possess buffalo.  The average labour availability in the study area showed that, own men and women labour availability in the micro watershed was 6.58 each, while the hired labour (men) availability was 1.40.  Out of the total land holding of the sample respondents 84.81 per cent (75.20 ha) of the area is under dry condition and the remaining 15.19 per cent area is irrigated land.  There were 9.00 live bore wells and 9.00 dry bore wells among the sampled households.  Bore/open well was the major source of irrigation for 28.57 per cent of the households.  The major crops grown by sample farmers are Maize, Sorghum, Green gram, Bajra and Groundnut and cropping intensity was recorded as 79.37 per cent. 2  Out of the sample households 80.00 percent possessed bank account and 80.00 per cent of them have savings in the account.  About 80.00 per cent of the respondents borrowed credit from various sources.  The per hectare cost of cultivation for Maize, Sorghum, Green gram, Bajra and Groundnut was Rs.28404.75 , 30176.41, 29266.76, 17385.92 and 47167.65 with benefit cost ratio of 1:1.80, 1: 0.90, 1: 1.70, 1: 2.70 and 1:1.60 respectively.  Further, 45.71 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was adequate and 42.86 per cent of the households have opined that the green fodder was adequate.  The average annual gross income of the farmers was Rs. 117160.00 in microwatershed, of which Rs. 84588.57 comes from agriculture.  Sampled households have grown 16 horticulture trees and 36 forestry trees together in the fields and back yards.  Regarding marketing channels, 117.14 per cent of the households have sold agricultural produce to the local/village merchants, while, 22.86 per cent have sold in regulated markets.  Further, 140.00 per cent of the households have used tractor for the transport of agriculture commodity.  Majority of the farmers (91.43%) have experienced soil and water erosion problems in the watershed and 100.00 per cent of the households were interested towards soil testing.  Fire was the major source of fuel for domestic use for 74.29 per cent of the households and 25.71 per cent households has LPG connection.  Piped supply was the major source for drinking water for 91.43 per cent of the households.  Electricity was the major source of light for 100.00 per cent of the households.  In the study area, 62.86 per cent of the households possess toilet facility.  Regarding possession of PDS card, 94.28 per cent of the households possessed BPL card, 2.86 per cent of the household's possessed APL card and 2.86 per cent of the household's were not having ration cards.  Households opined that, the requirement of cereals (100.00%), pulses (100.00%) and oilseeds (94.29%) are adequate for consumption.  Farming constraints experienced by households in the micro watersheds were lower fertility status of the soil (100.00%) wild animal menace on farm field (100.00%), frequent incidence of pest and diseases (100.00%), inadequacy of irrigation water (5.71%), high cost of fertilizers and plant protection chemicals (97.14%), high rate of interest on credit (97.14%), low price for the agricultural commodities (91.43%), lack of marketing facilities in the area (100.00%) and lack of transport for safe transport of the agricultural produce to the market (42.86%). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project

Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Hankunti-2 microwatershed was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and these physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characterstics, classification, behaviour and use potentials of the soils in the microwartershed. The present study covers an area of 391 ha in Koppal taluk and district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought - prone with an average annual rainfall of 662 mm, of which about 424 mm is received during south –west monsoon, 161 mm during north-east and the remaining 77 mm during the rest of the year. Entire area is covered by soils. The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below.  The soils belong to 6 soil series and 6 soil phases (management units) and 6 land use classes.  The length of crop growing period is 150 cm).  About 7 per cent area has loamy soils, 93 per cent area has clayey soils at the surface.  About 28 per cent of the area has non-gravelly (0.75%) in organic carbon.  About 18 per cent area is low (57 kg/ha) available phosphorus.  An area of about 2 per cent is low (337 kg/ha) in available potassium.  Available sulphur is low (4.5 ppm) in 36 per cent area and deficient (<4.5 ppm) in about 64 per cent area.  Available zinc is deficient (<0.6 ppm) in an area of about 86 per cent and sufficient in 14 per cent area.  Available copper and manganese are sufficient in all the soils.  The land suitability for 28 major crops grown in the microwatershed were assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (S1) and moderately suitable (S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the microwatershed Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum 109 (28) 107 (27) Pomegranate 109 (28) - Maize 109 (28) 107 (27) Guava 109 (28) - Bajra 109 (28) 107 (27) Jackfruit 109 (28) - Groundnut - 107 (27) Jamun 109 (28) - Sunflower 109 (28) - Musambi 109 (28) - Cotton 109 (28) 107 (27) Lime 109 (28) - Red gram 109 (28) - Cashew - 131 (34) Bengalgram - 216 (55) Custard apple 109 (28) 129 (33) Chilli 109 (28) 107 (27) Amla 109 (28) 129 (33) Tomato 109 (28) 107 (27) Tamarind 109 (28) - Drumstick 109 (28) - Marigold 109 (28) 107 (27) Mulberry 109 (28) 22 (6) Chrysanthemum 109 (28) 107 (27) Mango 109 (28) - Jasmine 109 (28) 107 (27) Sapota 109 (28) - Crossandra 109 (28) 107 (27) Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan has been prepared for the 6 identified LUCs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fodder, fibre and other horticulture crops.  Maintaining soil-health is vital to crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested for these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc.,  Soil and water conservation treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required.  As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands, field bunds and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. That would help in supplementing the farm income, provide fodder and fuel, and generate lot of biomass which inturn would help in maintaining the ecological balance and contribute to mitigating the climate change. Findings of the socio-economic survey  The survey was conducted in Hankunti-2 is located at North latitude 150 12' 20.596" and 150 10' 38.087" and East longitude 760 3' 14.596'' and 760 1' 41.401" covering an area of about 391.64 ha coming under Hanakunti and Betageri Villages of Koppal taluk.  Socio-economic analysis of Hankunti-2 micro watersheds of Bettageri sub-watershed, Koppal taluk & District indicated that, out of the total sample of 37 total respondents, 12 were marginal, (32.43 %) were small 5 (13.51%), 7 (18.92 %) were Semi medium and 7 (18.92 %) were medium and 1 (2.70 %) were large farmers.  The population characteristics of households indicated that, there were 90 (55.56%) men and 72 (44.44 %) were women.  Majority of the respondents (42.59%) were in the age group of 16-35 years.  Education level of the sample households indicated that, there were 17.90 per cent illiterates, 21.60 per cent of them had primary school education, 8.02 per cent middle school education, 24.07 per cent high school education, 10.49 per cent of them had PUC education, 9.88 per cent attained graduation.  About, 62.16 per cent of household heads practicing agriculture and 32.43 per cent of the household heads were engaged as agricultural labourers.  Agriculture was the major occupation for 39.51 per cent of the household members.  In the study area, 81.08 per cent of the households possess katcha house and 10.81 per cent possess pucca house.  The durable assets owned by the households showed that, 75.68 per cent possess TV, 43.24 per cent possess mixer grinder, 97.30 per cent possess mobile phones and 37.84 per cent possess motor cycles.  Farm implements owned by the households indicated that, 10.81 per cent of the households possess plough, 5.41 per cent possess tractor and 13.51 per cent possess bullock cart.  Regarding livestock possession by the households, 16.22 per cent possess local cow and 5.41 per cent possess buffalo.  The average labour availability in the study area showed that, own men and women labour availability in the micro watershed was 8.88 each, while the hired labour (men) availability was 1.44.  Further, 5.41 per cent of the households opined that hired labour was inadequate during the agricultural season.  Out of the total land holding of the sample respondents 71.99 per cent (70.91 ha) of the area is under dry condition and the remaining 24.11 per cent area is irrigated land.  There were 8.00 live bore wells and 1.00 dry bore wells among the sampled households.  Bore/open well was the major source of irrigation for 21.62 per cent of the households.  The major crops grown by sample farmers are Maize, Bajra, Sorghum, Groundnut, Bengal gram and Sunflower and cropping intensity was recorded as 93.98 per cent. 2  Out of the sample households 5.41 percent possessed bank account and 5.41 per cent of them have savings in the account.  About 5.41 per cent of the respondents borrowed credit from various sources.  The per hectare cost of cultivation for Maize, Bajra, Sorghum, Groundnut, Sunflower and Bengal gram was Rs.32568.16, 19035.23, 18433.29, 27266.34, 34457.13 and 34399.77 with benefit cost ratio of 1:1.50, 1: 0.90, 1: 1.30, 1: 1.60, 1:1.40 and1:1.60 respectively.  Further, 27.03 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was adequate and 29.73 per cent of the households have opined that the green fodder was adequate.  The average annual gross income of the farmers was Rs. 117078.38 in microwatershed, of which Rs. 57375.68 comes from agriculture.  Sampled households have grown 26 horticulture trees and 128 forestry trees together in the fields and back yards.  Regarding marketing channels, 86.49 per cent of the households have sold agricultural produce to the local/village merchants, while, 5.41 per cent have sold in regulated markets.  Further, 91.89 per cent of the households have used tractor for the transport of agriculture commodity.  Majority of the farmers (45.95%) have experienced soil and water erosion problems in the watershed and 83.78 per cent of the households were interested towards soil testing.  Fire was the major source of fuel for domestic use for 81.08 per cent of the households and 18.92 per cent households has LPG connection.  Piped supply was the major source for drinking water for 89.19 per cent of the households.  Electricity was the major source of light for 100.00 per cent of the households.  In the study area, 37.84 per cent of the households possess toilet facility.  Regarding possession of PDS card, 91.89 per cent of the households possessed BPL card and 10.81 per cent of the household's were not having ration cards.  Households opined that, the requirement of cereals (105.41%), pulses (91.89%) and oilseeds (2.70%) are adequate for consumption.  Farming constraints experienced by households in the micro watersheds were lower fertility status of the soil (45.95%) wild animal menace on farm field (40.54%), frequent incidence of pest and diseases (62.16%), inadequacy of irrigation water (37.84%), high cost of fertilizers and plant protection chemicals (70.27%), high rate of interest on credit (51.35%), low price for the agricultural commodities (75.68%), lack of marketing facilities in the area (64.86%), inadequate extension services (2.70%), lack of transport for safe transport of the agricultural produce to the market (13.51%), Less rainfall (5.41%) and Source of Agri-technology information (Newspaper/ TV/Mobile) (2.70%). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project

This dissertation investigates the governance of seventeenth-century Damascus by examining claims upon the productive capacity of land, and the collection and redistribution of agricultural taxes. The early modern Ottoman Empire--of which Damascus was a province--was a large agrarian empire wherein the interests of numerous groups and individuals converged around the land and its produce. In light of its centrality to both the subjects and the state, the management of land as a resource has much to tell us about what governance was expected to be in this period, at a time before religious, economic, political or social authority had been disembedded from one another. In this, Damascus is not much different from any other provincial town lying within the early modern empires of Asia and Europe; the issues raised here are not pertinent to the history of the Middle East alone but are relevant to other early modern states. The inquiry into what the state governs and how it does so starts with the observation that Ottoman political literature conceives of a unified political body wherein different groups of people play different roles in allowing the state to function. Through the lens of tax assessment and collection, the first chapter examines the role within the Ottoman state body that is played by the peasant cultivators in the villages surrounding Damascus. The first half of the chapter explores how the prerogatives comparable to other fiscal military states shaped Ottoman taxation policy in the seventeenth century. The importance of obtaining cash led not only to the imposition of new taxes and updated tax registers at the Istanbul finance bureau, but to a new responsibility of the villagers for tax collection. The chapter argues that where compliance with taxation was concerned, the most important governing authority in the village was the villagers themselves. Examining the interactions between villagers, judges, muftis and tax farmers, the chapter examines how individuals and groups that are not state agents strictly speaking, become authorized to exercise state power. The chapter concludes that peasant cultivators do not merely maintain a relationship with the Ottoman government, rather, in some sense they are the government and form an integral part of its machinery.The question of how the governing authority of the state intersects with the authority of Islamic law has long been a question in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire and Islamic societies in general. However, the question of shifts in the configuration of religious and temporal authority in the seventeenth century is not an issue whose importance is confined to the history of the Islamic regions of the world. Rather, the question of expanding state power and the proper role of `religion' in the body politic is a widespread concern of the early modern period. With this question in mind, the second and third chapters explore the changing legal powers of the sultan and his agents to control productive land and peasant labor. Chapter two notes a change in the meaning and scope of sultan's authority to legislate peasant access to the land in the seventeenth century. This expansion in the sultan's legislative role is absorbed into the jurisprudence of the empire's jurist-scholars, and creating a specifically `Ottoman' practice of Islamic scholarship. Starting in the sixteenth century, the sultan's enacted laws--known as `qanun'--regulate with far greater detail the rights and obligations of peasants and soldier-tax collectors. What emerges is a right of usufruct for the peasantry that is controlled by the dynasty's statutes rather than the interests of local military administrators or local custom. The fact that this concept of the usufruct right eventually comes to prevail in Damascene villages suggests that usufruct was an increasingly standardized right across the empire's rural communities. This is despite the fact that the Damascenes had their own local and juridical traditions that ran counter to the concept of usufruct being promulgated by the sultan. What we find in juristic discussion of usufruct is a very slowly changing idea of the boundaries of imperial authority and its legal consequences. While the second chapter demonstrates a growing consensus that the sultan had wider authority to legislate in matters pertaining to the lands of the state treasury, the legality of some land tenure practices sanctioned by the sultan remained controversial. The third chapter examines the limits of state power to pursue its need to fill the coffers, and how it was expected to treat the village taxpayers. There was no debate among Ottoman subjects that a solvent treasury was a necessity. Without exception, we find that keeping fertile land productive and distributing the revenues in appropriate ways are shared priorities. The common reference point defining the limits of the sultan's authority over production and taxation was the shari'ah, yet there was great disagreement on what the shari'ah enjoined, and in some sense, what the shari'ah was. When it came to what means of extraction the shari'ah permitted or the extent to which the state could coerce the villagers to produce, disagreement was rampant. It was not always the ulema (religious scholars) that opposed state actions on the grounds that such actions violated the shari'ah--as this chapter shows, the views of the ulema were sometimes more cooperative with the dynasty's decisions than those held by its temporal administrators. Both chapters address the question of the shifting configuration of state and religious authority in the early modern world, and examine its consequences on the lives and livelihoods of Damascene cultivators. The fourth and fifth chapters investigate two groups in Damascus who were frequent beneficiaries of the revenues produced in the villages, the ulema and the soldiers based in the city. The right of these groups to receive the tax moneys of the peasant cultivators was premised on the services that each provided for the political body as a whole. There did not appear to be much dispute about the nature of the services that each was to perform, but differences did spring up when the question arose of how or whether such services had been performed in specific instances. The chapter maintains that it is these conflicting interpretations of service, status, privilege and vocational responsibility that most clearly reveal how the provincial elites did or did not take part in the exercise of Ottoman authority in Damascus. The ulema earned their access to the revenue sources through their scholarship and teaching and the general duty of providing moral guidance to other Muslims. Part of this duty was to denounce oppression, and to protect the strong from abusing the weak. An argument arose among the ulema of how much honor or revenue one could seek from the state without compromising oneself in the process. Could one covet the sultan's largess and still be adequately critical if he or his agents overstepped their authority? Other ulema found that the dignity of their profession was an asset when their management of cultivators and taxes was called into question. They deflected the accusations of greed and fraud by invoking their dedication to pious works and scholarship. In all cases, the self conception of the ulema as a group with a particular function in the political body was critical to the way they responded to opportunities for gaining wealth and power. For the soldiers stationed in Damascus as well as the great military families of the countryside, access to rural revenues was contingent upon obedient military service. Increasingly, the entirety of the fiscal and military resources of the province of Damascus was oriented towards financing the pilgrimage to Mecca. The need for effective, reliable and obedient military leadership of the pilgrimage began to assume a higher priority for the Ottoman government. From 1660 to 1690, the Damascene janissaries dominated the office of pilgrimage leader, as they had a number of qualities to recommend them for the position: not only did know the routes from accompanying the caravan, but their capacity to create trouble as well as their expectation of reward was modest in comparison with the great military families of the countryside. Through investigation of their economic activities, it is clear that the question of which soldiers were considered `local' to Damascus had more to do with their involvement in the city's commerce rather than their origins or ethnicity. In turn, when the dynasty finally moved to destroy their leadership and punish them for insubordination, the question of how their `local' sympathies had affronted imperial prerogatives played out differently than might be imagined. While the issue of what constituted obedience might be read differently in Damascus than in Istanbul, it was clear that the Damascenes shared the belief that military men, even local military men, must be obedient to the sultan. This dissertation argues that Damascenes from all backgrounds play an important role in Ottoman governance of the province, and one that is comparable to that of other early modern subjects. It shows people trying to locate their place within the political body as a whole, while the limits of their duties and powers associated with different groups underwent great flux and were vigorously debated. It is this uneasy integration of these various groups into the body of state which best demonstrates the relations between the subjects and the state in the early modern Middle East.

Las metodologías de evaluación de pavimentos, son utilizadas como una herramienta técnica, objetiva, sistemática y reproducible, para evaluar la eficiencia y eficacia de las obras de rehabilitación y mejoramiento vial, empleadas en todo el mundo para recopilar y analizar información sobre el estado de las carreteras. Evaluaciones que incluyen diagnósticos, tanto de la capacidad estructural de las vías, como de su capacidad funcional en términos de comodidad y costo de operación de los vehículos, así como elementos de diseño geométrico, de seguridad vial y de su condición superficial lo cual permite tener un enfoque integral de los diversos problemas asociados a la infraestructura vial. Los resultados obtenidos se constituyen en guía para que quienes administran el patrimonio vial puedan técnicamente determinar las políticas y estrategias de intervención, tanto a nivel de red vial, como a nivel de proyectos específicos y lograr así que estas prácticas conlleven a inversiones eficientes y eficaces de los limitados fondos públicos. Existen varias metodologías o manuales para la evaluación de las condiciones de los pavimentos asfálticos, que difieren en definiciones y sistemas de calificación; para el desarrollo del presente trabajo se adelantaron actividades de campo relacionadas con la aplicación de diferentes formas de calificación de estado de los pavimentos asfálticos, comparando los resultados de la evaluación superficial del sector elegido, mediante las metodologías VIZIR, PCR y PCI. El Instituto Nacional de Vías – INVÍAS encargado de administrar la red vial nacional, adoptó en el 2002 la metodología francesa VIZIR para el inventario de daños de las calzadas con pavimento asfáltico de la red a su cargo, igualmente con base en esta metodología estructuró los contratos de mantenimiento integral; adicionalmente el Instituto Nacional de Concesiones INCO en los estudios contratados para establecer los anexos técnicos del proyecto de concesión Ruta del Sol realizados por la firma Euroestudios para la IFC International Finance Corporation utilizó la metodología antes mencionada. El Ministerio de Transporte - Plan Vial Regional en el 2008 desarrolló un proyecto para el levantamiento de inventarios viales en la red secundaria y parte de la terciaria de los departamentos; en los pliegos de condiciones estableció que para determinar el estado de superficie de las vías que se encuentren con pavimento asfáltico o concreto, debería calcular el índice de condición de pavimento (PCI) siguiendo las pautas dadas en el documento "PAVEMENT CONDITION INDEX (PCI) PARA PAVIMENTOS ASFÁLTICOS Y DE CONCRETO EN CARRETERAS", preparado por el ING. ESP. LUIS RICARDO VÁSQUEZ VARELA. De lo anterior surge la pregunta: ¿Cuál es la metodología más adecuada para evaluar el estado de los daños y los índices de condición en pavimentos asfálticos en las carreteras de Colombia? Los resultados obtenidos por las entidades territoriales, no se han comparado con la aplicación de otras metodologías (PCR, PCI), convirtiéndose en un incentivo para el presente trabajo, a fin de proponer mediante el mismo para los entes gubernamentales, la metodología más cercana a las necesidades de la red vial a cargo a partir de las evaluaciones y recomendaciones que reflejen realmente las condiciones de estado de los daños e índices de condición en pavimentos asfálticos. Situación que permitirá disponer de una herramienta útil que estandarice las actividades de inspección de los deterioros de los pavimentos asfálticos, a la vez contar con instructivos con los cuales se puedan llevar a cabo, de una manera práctica y sencilla, la caracterización y la evaluación de los deterioros, obteniendo la información necesaria para el diseño de las intervenciones requeridas por la vía considerando que: 1. Proveer información cualitativa para determinar las posibles causas de deterioros en los pavimentos asfálticos y el desarrollo de estrategias apropiadas para reparar los defectos y prevenir su recurrencia. 2. Evalúen la progresión de los daños, las consecuencias de postergar su intervención y el costo de las diferentes estrategias de rehabilitación. 3. Permitan zonificar tramos uniformes para el diseño. Para la elaboración de este documento se han tenido en cuenta diversas experiencias obtenidas en la práctica local, así como de agencias reconocidas en otros países como Méjico y Costa Rica, a partir de las cuales se determina que la valoración visual de los deterioros del pavimento no se constituye en un criterio suficiente para definir las acciones que requiere una calzada para su rehabilitación. De lo anterior, un estudio de estos deberá complementarse con la siguiente información: •Análisis de los resultados del Índice de Rugosidad Internacional (IRI). •Valoración para cada uno de los sectores de estudio de la capacidad mecánica de la estructura de pavimento mediante análisis deflectométrico de subsectores representativos y la caracterización físico-mecánica de las capas granulares y de la subrasante, para cumplir tal fin, se evaluará la información tomada en campo, así como la obtenida en estudios previos. ; Pavement evaluation methodologies are used as a technical, objective, systematic and reproducible tool to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of road rehabilitation and improvement works, used throughout the world to collect and analyze information on the state of the roads. roads. Evaluations that include diagnoses, both of the structural capacity of the roads, as well as of their functional capacity in terms of comfort and cost of operation of the vehicles, as well as elements of geometric design, road safety and their surface condition which allows to have a comprehensive approach to the various problems associated with road infrastructure. The results obtained constitute a guide so that those who administer the road assets can technically determine the intervention policies and strategies, both at the road network level, and at the level of specific projects and thus achieve that these practices lead to efficient and effective investments of limited public funds. There are several methodologies or manuals for the evaluation of the conditions of asphalt pavements, which differ in definitions and rating systems; For the development of this work, field activities related to the application of different forms of qualification of the condition of asphalt pavements were carried out, comparing the results of the surface evaluation of the chosen sector, using the VIZIR, PCR and PCI methodologies. The Instituto Nacional de Vías - INVÍAS, in charge of managing the national road network, adopted in 2002 the French VIZIR methodology for the inventory of damage to the asphalt paved roads of the network under its charge, and based on this methodology it structured the contracts comprehensive maintenance; Additionally, the National Institute of Concessions INCO in the studies contracted to establish the technical annexes of the Ruta del Sol concession project carried out by the firm Euroestudios for the IFC International Finance Corporation used the aforementioned methodology. The Ministry of Transport - Regional Road Plan in 2008 developed a project for the survey of road inventories in the secondary network and part of the tertiary of the departments; In the specifications it established that to determine the surface condition of the roads that are with asphalt or concrete pavement, the pavement condition index (PCI) should be calculated following the guidelines given in the document "PAVEMENT CONDITION INDEX (PCI) FOR ASPHALTIC AND CONCRETE PAVEMENTS ON HIGHWAYS ", prepared by ING. ESP. LUIS RICARDO VÁSQUEZ VARELA. From the above, the question arises: What is the most appropriate methodology to evaluate the state of damage and condition indices in asphalt pavements on Colombian roads? The results obtained by the territorial entities have not been compared with the application of other methodologies (PCR, PCI), becoming an incentive for this work, in order to propose through it for government entities, the methodology closest to the needs of the road network in charge of the evaluations and recommendations that really reflect the condition of the damage and condition indices in asphalt pavements. Situation that will allow to have a useful tool that standardizes the activities of inspection of the deterioration of the asphalt pavements, at the same time having instructions with which the characterization and evaluation of deterioration, obtaining the necessary information for the design of the interventions required by the road considering that: 1. Provide qualitative information to determine the possible causes of deterioration in asphalt pavements and the development of appropriate strategies to repair defects and prevent their recurrence. 2. Evaluate the progression of the damage, the consequences of delaying your intervention, and the cost of the different rehabilitation strategies. 3. Allow uniform spans for the design to be zoned. For the preparation of this document, various experiences obtained in local practice have been taken into account, as well as from recognized agencies in other countries such as Mexico and Costa Rica, from which it is determined that the visual assessment of the deterioration of the pavement does not it constitutes a sufficient criterion to define the actions that a road requires for its rehabilitation. From the above, a study of these should be complemented with the following information: • Analysis of the results of the International Roughness Index (IRI). • Evaluation for each of the study sectors of the mechanical capacity of the pavement structure through deflectometric analysis of representative subsectors and the physical-mechanical characterization of the granular layers and the subgrade, to fulfill this purpose, the information will be evaluated taken in the field, as well as that obtained in previous studies. ; Magíster en Infraestructura Vial ; http://unidadinvestigacion.usta.edu.co ; Maestría

Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has averaged roughly 5 percent per year over the past decade, improving living standards and bolstering human development indicators across the continent. Stronger public institutions, a supportive, private sector focused policy environment, responsible macroeconomic management, and a sustained commitment to structural reforms have greatly expanded opportunities for countries in SSA to participate in global markets. In recent years, many countries in the region have benefited from an increasingly favorable external environment, high commodity prices, and an especially strong demand for natural resources by emerging economies, particularly China. Over the longer term, leveraging Chinese investment to support broad-based growth will require policies designed to boost the competitiveness of sectors in which China s economic rebalancing may create a comparative advantage for SSA. To date, few African countries have been able to benefit from large-scale Chinese investment outside the resource sector. However, as China s growth slows and its economy shifts toward a more consumption-driven model, it is likely that global demand for resource imports will slow as well. Countries with the most heavily concentrated export mix, particularly in the mineral and oil sectors are the most vulnerable to China s economic rebalancing and should be ready to adopt measures to mitigate the impact of negative terms-of-trade shocks. By contrast, as wage rates in China continue to rise and firms refocus their attention on domestic demand, countries in SSA will be well positioned to exploit emerging opportunities for investment in export-oriented manufacturing. Ethiopia provides an instructive example, as its inexpensive yet relatively skilled labor force, coupled with the government s proactive efforts to court Chinese investors, have enabled Ethiopia to attract substantial investments in labor-intensive industries. Infrastructure enhancement, workforce development, and good-governance reforms offer a promising strategy for many countries in the region. Although the establishment of industrial zones has yielded mixed results, several salient success stories warrant careful attention. This report discusses how Africa could take advantage of the untapped opportunities offered by China s progressively intensifying investment and trade ties with SSA. It is hoped that this analysis will enrich the ongoing dialogue between policy makers, private firms, and civil society regarding China s increasingly important role in the growth and development of Sub-Saharan Africa.

This technical note highlights some of the work the World Bank has recently conducted in support of the growth agenda outlined in the Europe 2020 strategy. The World Bank is actively supporting the new member states, as well as accession and neighborhood countries, in achieving the Europe 2020 targets of smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth. The engagement consists of policy and program lending in these areas as well as analytical work. This note focuses on highlighting some of the Bank's analytical Europe 2020 work pertaining to raising employment rates and skills levels as well as to spur innovation and technology absorption. The technical note is structured as follows: section one provides the macroeconomic background, and highlights how the economies of the European Union (EU)-10 countries were steadily catching up with those of the EU-15 countries, but then the catching-up was interrupted by the onset of the global financial and economic crisis. Section two focuses on low employment rates in EU-10 countries, particularly among older and less-educated workers, women, and minority groups, in particular Roma, and highlights some key issues in the organization of labor markets and labor market related institutions. Section three focuses more specifically on skills development across the life cycle, with a brief discussion on selected policy areas: (1) expansion of early childhood development programs to universal coverage; (2) adopting ambitious, comprehensive approaches to schooling to support higher levels of generic skills for all; and (3) strengthening access to and efficiency of tertiary education through higher education financing reform and data collection as a basis for system steering. Section four focuses on innovation and technology absorption, highlighting how more and more efficient research and development (R&D) spending will boost economic growth in EU10 countries.

Doing Business in Egypt 2008 covers three topics at the sub national level: starting a business, dealing with licenses and registering property. These indicators have been selected because they cover areas of local jurisdiction and practice. In the last two years, doing business in Egypt has become more affordable the minimum capital required to start a business and the costs of registering property and dealing with licenses have been slashed. Doing Business in Egypt 2008 records all procedures required for a business in the construction industry to build a standardized warehouse. Doing Business in Egypt 2008 records the full sequence of procedures necessary when a business purchases land and a building to transfer the property title from another business so that the buyer can use the property for expanding its business, as collateral in taking new loans or, if necessary, to sell to another business. The ease of doing business index is limited in scope. The Doing Business indicators provide a new empirical data set that may improve understanding of these issues.

Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Yagapur Tanda-2 Microwatershed was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and the physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundaries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characteristics, classification, behavior and use potentials of the soils in the microwatershed. The present study covers an area of 540 ha in Yadgir taluk & district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought-prone with an average annual rainfall of 866 mm, of which about 652 mm is received during south-west monsoon, 138 mm during north-east and the remaining 76 mm during the rest of the year. An area of 620 ha in the microwatershed is covered by soils, 10 ha by rock outcrops and 15 ha by others (habitation and water body). The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below.  The soils belong to 5 soil series and 6 soil phases (management units) and 5 land management units.  The length of crop growing period is about 120-150 days starting from 1st week of June to 4th week of October.  From the master soil map, several interpretative and thematic maps like land capability, soil depth, surface soil texture, soil gravelliness, available water capacity, soil slope and soil erosion were generated.  Soil fertility status maps for macro and micronutrients were generated based on the surface soil samples collected at every 320 m grid interval.  Land suitability for growing 29 major agricultural and horticultural crops was assessed and maps showing the degree of suitability along with constraints were generated.  About 246 ha area in the microwatershed is suitable for agriculture.  About 150 cm).  About 21 per cent area in the microwatershed has loamy soils and 25 per cent clay soils at the surface.  An area of 35 per cent is non gravelly (200 mm/m) in available water capacity, 24 per cent is low (51-100 mm/m) and 0.75%) and 5 per cent area is medium (0.5-0.75%) in organic carbon content.  An area of about 31 per cent is medium (23-57 kg/ha), low (57 kg/ha) in available phosphorus content in the microwatershed.  An area of about 4 per cent is medium (145-337 kg/ha) and 42 per cent area is high (>337 kg/ha) in available potassium content of the microwatershed.  Available sulphur is low (4.5 ppm) in the entire area of the microwatershed.  Available manganese and copper are sufficient in all the soils of the microwatershed.  Available zinc is deficient (0.6 ppm) in 2 per cent area in the microwatershed.  The land suitability for 29 major crops grown in the microwatershed were assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (S1) and moderately suitable (S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the Microwatershed Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum - 189 (35) Guava - 77 (14) Maize 77 (14) 112 (21) Sapota - 77 (14) Bajra 77 (14) 112 (21) Pomegranate - 123 (23) Groundnut 77 (14) - Musambi - 123 (23) Sunflower - 123 (23) Lime - 123 (23) Redgram - 189(35) Amla 77 (14) - Bengal gram - 46 (9) Cashew - 77 (14) Cotton - 46 (9) Jackfruit - 77 (14) Chilli 77 (14) 46 (9) Jamun - - Tomato 77 (14) - Custard apple 77 (14) 46 (9) Brinjal 77 (14) - Tamarind - - Onion 77 (14) - Mulberry - 77 (14) Bhendi 77 (14) 46 (9) Marigold 77 (14) 46 (9) Drumstick - 77 (14) Chrysanthemum 77 (14) 46 (9) Mango - -  Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan has been prepared for the identified LMUs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fodder, fibre and other horticulture crops.  Maintaining soil-health is vital for crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested for these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc.,  Soil and water conservation treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required.  As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands, field bunds and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. This would help in not only supplementing the farm income but also provide fodder and fuel and generate lot of biomass which would help in maintaining an ecological balance and also contribute to mitigating the climate change. SALIENT FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY  The data indicated that there were 112 (51.61%) men and 105 (48.39%) women among the sampled households.  The average family size of landless farmers' was 7.4, marginal farmers' was 4.5, small farmers' was 6.3, semi medium farmers' was 7.35 and medium farmers' was 6.5.  The data indicated that, 37 (17.05%) people were in 0-15 years of age, 115 (53.00%) were in 16-35 years of age, 50 (23.04%) were in 36-60 years of age and 15 (6.91%) were above 61 years of age.  The results indicated that Yagapur Tanda-2 had 58.99 per cent illiterates, 7.37 per cent of them had primary school education, 10.14 per cent of them had middle school education, 8.76 per cent of them had high school education, 1.84 per cent of them had PUC education, 0.46 per cent of them had diploma and ITI and 5.07 per cent of them had degree education.  The results indicate that, 74.29 per cent of households were practicing agriculture, 5.71 per cent of the households were agricultural labourers and general labourers, 2.86 per cent of the households were private services and 8.57 per cent of them were housewives.  The results indicate that agriculture was the major occupation for 32.72 per cent of the household members, 7.37 per cent were agricultural laborers, 3.69 per cent were general labourers, 0.46 per cent were in government service, 23.69 per cent were in private service, 16.13 percent of the households were trade & business, 16.13 per cent were students, 27.19 per cent were housewives and 5.53 per cent were children.  The results show that 0.46 per cent of the population has participated in self hel group and 99.54 per cent of the population in the micro watershed has not participated in any local institutions.  The results indicate that 65.71 per cent of the households possess katcha house and 34.29 per cent of them possess pucca house.  The results show that 71.43 per cent of the households possess TV, 2.86 per cent of the households possess mixer/grinder, 31.43 per cent of the households possess motor cycle, 91.43 per cent of the households possess mobile phones and 2.86 per cent of the household possess unnamed asset.  The results show that the average value of television was Rs. 85200, mixer/grinder was Rs. 2,000, motor cycle was Rs. 35,454, mobile phone was Rs. 1,717 and unnamed asset was Rs. 1,000.  About 28.57 per cent of the households possess bullock cart, 37.14 per cent of the households possess plough, 2.86 per cent of them possess seed/fertilizer drill, 5.71 2 per cent of them were in tractor, 45.71 per cent of them possess sprayer, 25.71 per cent of them possess sprinkler and 57.14 per cent of them possess weeder.  The results show that the average value of bullock cart was Rs. 16,100, plough was Rs. 2,153, seed/fertilizer drill was Rs. 12,000, tractor was Rs. 700,000, the average value of sprayer was Rs. 3,343, sprinkler was Rs. 10,166 and the average value of weeder was Rs. 168.  The results indicate that, 54.29 per cent of the households possess bullocks, 40.00 per cent of the households possess local cow, 5.71 per cent of them possess goat and 2.86 per cent of them possess sheep and poultry birds.  The results indicate that, average own labour men available in the micro watershed was 1.90, average own labour (women) available was 1.97, average hired labour (men) available was 5.40 and average hired labour (women) available was 12.47. The results indicate that, 85.71 per cent of the households opined that the hired labour was adequate.  The results indicate that, households of the Yagapur Tanda-2 micro-watershed possess 21.06 ha (57.12 %) of dry land and 15.82 ha (42.88 %) of irrigated land. Marginal farmers possess 5.20 ha (97.28%) of dry land and 0.15 ha (2.72%) of irrigated land. Small farmers possess 10.92 ha (80.38%) of dry land and 2.67 ha (19.62%) of irrigated land. Semi medium farmers possess 4.94 ha (37.23%) of dry land and 8.32 ha (62.77%) of irrigated land. Medium farmers possess 4.68 ha (100%) of irrigated land.  The results indicate that, the average value of dry land was Rs. 518,201.73 and average value of irrigated land was Rs. 581,473.91. In case of marginal famers, the average land value was Rs. 1,056,376.37 for dry land and Rs. 2,058,333.25 for irrigated land. In case of small famers, the average land value was Rs. 393,516.12 for dry land and Rs. 712,139.60 for irrigated land. In case of semi medium famers, the average land value was Rs. 226,754.10 for dry land and Rs. 600,388.93 for irrigated land. In case of medium farmers, the average land value was Rs. 427,335.64 for irrigated land.  The results indicate that, there were 14 functioning bore wells in the micro watershed.  The results indicate that, bore well was the major irrigation source in the micro water shed for 42.86 per cent of the farmers.  The results indicate that, the depth of bore well was found to be 35.62 meters.  The results indicate that, marginal, small, semi medium farmers and medium farmers had an irrigated area of 0.15 ha, 2.67 ha, 9.37 ha and 4.68 ha respectively.  The results indicate that, farmers have grown cotton (8.26 ha), green gram (6.87 ha), groundnut (4.29 ha), paddy (1.21 ha), red gram (14.43 ha) and sorghum (3.29 ha). Marginal farmers have grown cotton, sorghum, red gram and green gram. Small farmers had grown cotton, green gram, sorghum and red gram. Semi medium 3 farmers had grown cotton, green gram, groundnut, paddy, red gram and sorghum. Medium farmers had grown cotton, groundnut, paddy, red gram and sorghum.  The results indicate that, the cropping intensity in Yagapur Tanda-2 microwatershed was found to be 76.06 per cent.  The results indicate that 100 per cent of the households have bank account and 31.43 per cent of the households have savings.  The results indicate that, 65.71 per cent of the households have availed credit from different sources.  The results indicate that, the total cost of cultivation for green gram was Rs. 107299.32. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 58623.20. The net income from green gram cultivation was Rs. -48676.12, thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:0.55.  The total cost of cultivation for Paddy was Rs. 114346.98. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 134669.89. The net income from Paddy cultivation was Rs. 20322.91. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.1.  The total cost of cultivation for groundnut was Rs. 126519.62. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 195444.40. The net income from groundnut cultivation was Rs. 68924.78. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.54.  The total cost of cultivation for cotton was Rs. 66382.67. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 129700.69. The net income from cotton cultivation was Rs. 63318.02. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.95.  The total cost of cultivation for red gram was Rs. 50365.85. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 79503.54. The net income from red gram cultivation was Rs. 29137.68. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.58.  The total cost of cultivation for sorghum was Rs. 77467.18. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 50852.48. The net income from sorghum cultivation was Rs. -26614.70. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:0.66.  The results indicate that, 57.14 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was adequate and 2.86 per cent of the households opined that green and dry fodder was inadequate.  The results indicate that the annual gross income was Rs. 140,000 for landless farmers, for marginal farmers it was Rs. 117,885, for small farmers it was Rs. 166,430, for semi medium farmers it was Rs. 183,547.50 and for medium farmers it was Rs. 311,900.  The results indicate that the average annual expenditure is Rs. 27,065.71. For landless households it was Rs. 28,000, for marginal farmers it was Rs. 19.300, for small farmers it was Rs. 17,380, for semi medium farmers it was Rs. 33,437.50 and for medium farmers it was Rs. 86,500. 4  The results indicate that, sampled households have grown 10 coconut tree, 165 custard apple, 8 mango and 1 sapota trees in the field. Also, 1 coconut and 4 custard apple tree in the backyard.  The results indicate that, households have planted 126 neem trees, 5 tamarind trees, 19 teak and 5 acacia tree in their field and 7 neem trees in their backyard.  The results indicated that, households have an average investment capacity of Rs. 27,171.43 for land development, Rs. 15,714.29 for irrigation facility and Rs. 2,571.43 for improved crop production.  The results indicated that government subsidy was the source of additional investment for 11.43 per cent for irrigation facility. Loan from bank was the source of additional investment for 8.57 per cent for land development, for 11.43 per cent for irrigation facility and for 5.71 per cent for improved crop production. Own funds was the source of additional investment for 42.86 per cent for land development and 2.86 per cent for irrigation facility.  The results indicated that, cotton was sold to the extent of 100 per cent, green gram was sold to the extent of 91.45 per cent, groundnut was sold to the extent of 86.67 per cent, paddy was sold to the extent of 86.21 per cent, red gram was sold to the extent of 82.63 per cent and sorghum was sold to the extent of 73.68 per cent.  The results indicated that, about 28.57 per cent of the farmers sold their produce to local/village merchants and 91.43 per cent of the farmers sold their produce to Regulated market.  The results indicated that, 117.14 per cent of the households have used tractor and 2.86 per cent of the households have used truck as a mode of transportation for their agricultural produce.  The results indicated that, 48.57 per cent of the households have experienced soil and water erosion problems in the farm.  The results indicated that, 91.43 per cent have shown interest in soil test.  The results indicated that, 74.29 per cent of the households used firewood 2.86 per cent used biogas and 31.43 per cent used LPG as a source of fuel.  The results indicated that, piped supply was the major source of drinking water for 97.14 per cent of the households and 5.71 per cent of the households used bore well in the micro watershed. Electricity was the major source of light for 100 per cent of the households in micro watershed.  The results indicated that, 45.71 per cent of the households possess sanitary toilet.  The results indicated that, 100 per cent of the sampled households possessed BPL card.  The results indicated that, 80 per cent of the households participated in NREGA programme.  The results indicated that, cereals were adequate for 71.43 per cent of the households, pulses were adequate for 77.14 per cent, oilseeds were adequate for 5 62.86 per cent, vegetables were adequate for 2.86 per cent, milk was adequate for 34.29 per cent and eggs were adequate for 11.43 per cent.  The results indicated that, cereals were inadequate for 28.57, pulses were inadequate for 20.00 per cent, oilseeds were inadequate for 37.14 per cent, vegetables were inadequate for 97.14 per cent, fruits were inadequate for 100 per cent, milk were inadequate for 65.71, eggs were inadequate for 88.57 per cent and meat was inadequate for 100 per cent of the households.  The results indicated that, lower fertility status of the soil was the constraint experienced by 77.14 per cent of the households, wild animal menace on farm field (80.00%), frequent incidence of pest and diseases (85.71%), inadequacy of irrigation water (74.29%), high cost of fertilizers and plant protection chemicals (85.71%), high rate of interest on credit (85.71%), low price for the agricultural commodities (85.71%), lack of marketing facilities in the area (20.00%), inadequate extension services (22.86%) and lack of transport for the safe transport of agricultural produce to the market (54.29%) ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project.

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has managed to overcome most of the strict sanctions imposed by Western economies, largely due to its ability to maintain economic relations with emerging powers in the field of energy, particularly oil, gas and nuclear. The atomic sector is spearheaded by the worldwide presence of Rosatom – a Russian company that heads a conglomerate of more than 300 companies responsible for the manufacture and sale of nuclear technologies for both civilian and military uses.
In recent years, Russia has emerged as a partner in providing nuclear technologies to countries in the Global South, gradually expanding its presence in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. This strategy hinges on Moscow's ability to find new diplomatic and trade partners by negotiating with these countries without imposing severe non-proliferation conditionality (such as the United States' 123 Agreements[1]) and selling a wide range of nuclear-related technologies – being the only supplier worldwide of all the necessary elements to establish a nuclear programme.[2]
For Global South countries, Russia has become a potential provider of nuclear-related technologies. Therefore, Moscow employs Rosatom as a diplomatic tool to garner support within the United Nations to avoid further sanctions – what the literature calls "international clientelism" where Russia builds diplomatic ties and partnerships with countries to receive support for its positions during global governance negotiations.[3]
Rosatom has won numerous bids for the sale of reactors, positioning itself as the leader in terms of the number of simultaneously implemented nuclear reactor construction projects, with 3 units in Russia and 33 abroad at various stages of implementation.[4] Likewise, it controls approximately 20 per cent of the global market of conversion and enriched-related materials, something that made it an important partner of scientific groups from the US and European countries regardless of the Russia-Ukraine War[5] – for example, participating in the ongoing construction of the Facility for Antiproton and Ion Research (FAIR), an international accelerator facility to perform cutting-edge research in Germany.[6]
Similarly, since 2023 Rosatom has been the exclusive supplier of enriched uranium-related products to Brazilian nuclear facilities.[7] This landmark agreement is the first long-term partnership with Brasília, replacing previous imports from Canada and European consortiums. These factors come precisely at a time when Rosatom seeks to expand its relations with BRICS countries to increase its participation in the sale of nuclear subsidies for the production of radioisotopes in these nations and to secure financing from the BRICS New Development bank.[8]The increasing presence of Rosatom in the Global South
Rosatom currently controls approximately 70 per cent of the global export market for the construction of nuclear power plants.[9] Its expansion in the Global South occurs within the context of emerging powers seeking to boost their energy production through nuclear means.Middle Eastern and North Africa (MENA) region
On 27 April 2023, Turkish President Erdoğan expressed gratitude to Putin regarding the inauguration of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant – Turkey's first nuclear power reactor.[10] It will start operating in 2025 with four VVER 1200 pressurised-water reactors and will be responsible for around 10 per cent of the total national production of electricity. Located in Turkey's southern Mersin province, the nuclear power plant was constructed by Rosatom – whose subsidiaries financed 93 per cent of the project.[11] This development has had created tension with the Western bloc, as Turkey, a member of NATO, sought Russian technology to advance its civil nuclear programme regardless of the sanctions imposed because of the Russia-Ukraine War. Likewise, Rosatom has provided Egypt with four VVER reactors for the construction of its first nuclear power plant – the second on the African continent – in a contract worth approximately 30 billion US dollars. The Russian government has also agreed to provide funding for 85 per cent of the cost.[12]
In North Africa, a region grappling with rapid population growth and a growing need for sustainable energy sources, Russia has initiated strategic dialogues to bolster nuclear cooperation. Countries like Morocco, Libya (whose nuclear reactor – temporarily shut down – was produced by the Soviet Union) and Tunisia, seeking to diversify their energy portfolios away from fossil fuels, have become focal points for these discussions.[13]
Rosatom has been at the forefront of these dialogues, leveraging memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and commercial negotiations to explore potential nuclear projects and collaborations. While aiming to address the region's energy demands, these engagements also align with Russia's broader geopolitical and economic interests in the MENA region.Sub-Saharan Africa
In a similar vein, different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia, have nuclear-related diplomatic and commercial agreements with Russia. Rosatom has actively engaged in the region, offering scholarship opportunities for local students to complete engineering studies in Russia.[14] In this regard, Russia seeks diplomatic rapprochement with Nigeria based on cooperation in uranium exploration and the establishment of a nuclear power plant financed through Russian credit lines.
Moscow has pursued preferential access to rare earth and uranium mines on the continent, as seen in agreements with Tanzania and Namibia. South Africa, a key member of the BRICS, is another notable case. The ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), has close relations with the Kremlin since the Cold War, and the country needs to generate more electricity to address the recurrent blackouts. In 2023, Pretoria decided to boost nuclear energy production, with Rosatom poised as a top contender. Plans for new nuclear plants, however, face opposition, also due to corruption allegations surrounding a previously cancelled agreement.[15]
In all, Sub-Saharan countries have drawn closer to Russia, serving as both a diplomatic support and a market for Russian products.[16] While financing the growth of these nations by supplying nuclear technology, Russia receives diplomatic support in return, especially in the United Nations General Assembly. For instance, South Africa has supported Russia in UN votes, casting votes against several resolutions condemning Moscow and becoming embroiled in controversies regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict.[17]South Asia
Russia's nuclear diplomacy has extended to the Asian continent too – especially South Asia. In the case of India, the construction of Units 3, 4, 5 and 6 at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant revives a long-standing partnership dating back to agreements with the Soviet Union.[18] Likewise, the Russian company operates in Bangladesh, with preparations underway for the construction of the Rooppur nuclear power plant, the country's first nuclear power facility. In Sri Lanka too, Russia is a potential candidate for building nuclear reactors as part of a recently released long-term project to boost local energy production in the country.[19] Hence, in South Asia, Russia aims to leverage historical ties by offering technology and energy opportunities in the nuclear field to sustain commercial ties. Indeed, despite Western pressures, South Asia maintains significant trade with Moscow, thus mitigating the impact of sanctions on its economy.Latin America
Finally, in Latin America, Russia is strategically pursuing expanded partnerships and seeking increased access to raw material markets. Notably, in Bolivia, a 450 million US dollars contract with Rosatom will lead to the construction of a lithium carbonate mining and production complex – a material that is essential for nuclear reactors' cooling and containment systems. Concurrently, Russia has extended nuclear collaborations with Brazil.[20]
Once again, Russia clearly aims to bolster its diplomatic ties with these countries through nuclear energy. Former Brazilian President Bolsonaro, known for his right-wing policies, travelled to Moscow in 2022 to meet with Putin, signalling his intention to deepen diplomatic relations in the nuclear sector. Bolsonaro treated the information discussed during the trip as confidential, but the Brazilian press reported conversations with Russian companies to promote the interests of the navy and seek assistance with the certification of the fuel to be used in reactors for nuclear submarines.The challenges that lie ahead, and how to address them
Russia has found in the nuclear market a means to buttress ties with countries in the Global South by providing high-technology elements to these nations. Through partnerships in the nuclear sector, Russia has not only strengthened its presence in the global energy landscape but has also enhanced its geopolitical influence, particularly in regions where emerging economies seek technological advancements and energy solutions.
Russia's strategic use of nuclear partnerships with countries in the Global South does not only increase its global influence, but also poses challenges related to technology transfer and economic dependency. Indeed, these partnerships often rely heavily on Russian technology and financing, raising concerns about recipient countries' autonomy and economic vulnerability.
To mitigate the risk of Russia leveraging nuclear partnerships to augment its influence in the Global South, Western partners could offer alternative innovative solutions aligned with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines – such as the 2009 US agreement with the United Arab Emirates. Encouraging technology transfer and local capacity building based on the existing rules, Western assistance may empower recipient countries to develop their nuclear expertise while reducing dependency on a single supplier. For their part, adhering to IAEA standards and developing diversified partnerships, countries in the Global South could better navigate challenges and foster sustainable nuclear development in the long term.João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel holds a PhD in Political Science from the Catholic University of Louvain (UCLouvain) and the Federal University of Minas Gerais.[1] The 123 Agreements are bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between the United States and other countries, facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation while ensuring non-proliferation through safeguards.[2] Kacper Szulecki and Indra Overland, "Russian Nuclear Energy Diplomacy and Its implications for Energy Security in the Context of the War in Ukraine", in Nature Energy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (April 2023), p. 413-421 at p. 414, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-023-01228-5.[3] Thales Carvalho and Dawisson Belém Lopes, "International Clientelistic Networks: The Case of Venezuela at the United Nations General Assembly, 1999–2015", in Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 64, No. 3 (August 2022), p. 37-66, DOI 10.1017/lap.2022.11.[4] Rosatom website: Projects, https://www.rosatom.ru/en/investors/projects.[5] Darya Dolzikova, "Atoms for Sale: Developments in Russian Nuclear Energy Export", in RUSI Special Reports, 14 February 2023, p. 7-8, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/atoms-sale-developments-russian-nuclear-energy-exports.[6] "Russia to Supply Unique Equipment for FAIR Research Accelerator Being Built in Germany", in TASS, 16 November 2015, https://tass.com/science/836929.[7] Ivan Dybov, "Opening New Horizons for Cooperation", in Rosatom Newsletter, No. 262 (February 2023), https://rosatomnewsletter.com/?p=16907.[8] "Rosatom to Get Financing for Projects from BRICS Bank", in Interfax, 31 July 2023, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/93126.[9] Alexandra Prokopenko, "Rosatom: A Difficult Target", in EIRP Russia's Global Energy Role Working Papers, No. 1 (May 2023), p. 3, https://innovationreform.org/?p=3049.[10] "Erdogan Thanks Putin for His Help on Turkish Nuclear Plant", in Al Jazeera, 27 April 2023, https://aje.io/tm54z9.[11] Rosatom, "Investment Management", in Public Report of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom for 2016, 2017, https://ar2016.rosatom.ru/?/en/162-investment-management.[12] Marina Lorenzini, "Why Egypt's New Nuclear Plant is a Long-term Win for Russia", in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 20 December 2023, https://thebulletin.org/?p=109481.[13] Chiponda Chimbelu, "African Countries Start Mulling Nuclear Energy", in Die Welt, 22 October 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/a-50872702.[14] Rosatom, "Rosatom: Bringing Better Education to Africa", in Rosatom Newsletter, No. 223 (December 2019), https://rosatomnewsletter.com/?p=11863.[15] Gerald Imray, "South Africa to Build New Nuclear Plants. The Opposition Attacked the Plan over Alleged Russia Links", in AP News, 12 December 2023, https://apnews.com/article/83f81ae6efd328a532b0f0b16370f730.[16] Aanu Adeoye, "UN Vote on Russia Invasion Shows a Changing Africa", in Chatham House Expert Comments, 7 March 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/node/28423.[17] Crystal Orderson, "A 'Russian Love Affair': Why South Africa Stays 'Neutral' on War", in Al Jazeera, 2 June 2023, https://aje.io/5o8re2.[18] Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Visit of External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar to Russia (December 25-29, 2023), 30 December 2023, https://fsi.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37489.[19] "Sri Lanka Seeks Investors for Nuclear Power Plants", in Reuters, 18 November 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/sri-lanka-seeks-investors-nuclear-power-plants-2023-11-17.[20] Brazilian Government, ENBPar e Rosatom buscam cooperação para novas fontes de energia verde, 3 October 2022, https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/enbpar-e-rosatom-buscam-cooperacao-para-novas-fontes-de-energia-verde.

Newspaper clippings from El Universal with articles titled "La cena de las declaraciones" dated on Tuesday September 13, 1938 and "La verdad descubierta por un tiempo" dated on Saturday October 1, 1938 written by Francisco Javier Gaxiola. He replies to the publications by Miguel Alessio Robles regarding his book about the administration of President Rodríguez, the influence of Gen. Calles and the famous dinner offered to Ambassador Josephus Daniels. Letter from Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles to Francisco Javier Gaxiola Jr. published in EL Universal on October 29, 1938. It is titled "Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles speaks". Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles thanks for the book "President Rodríguez" that Gaxiola gave him. Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles clarifies the relationship between him and Gen. Rodríguez, since he considers that some events are inaccurate. He states the he intervened at the request of Gen. Rodríguez and that he always defended the reputation of Gen. Rodríguez. He states that within one of the paragraphs of the book there are falsehoods, especially in the so-called "la comida de las declaraciones" in which they try to make President Roosevelt and Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles look like they are planning to diminish the figure of President Rodríguez. He states that none of them would be able to do such a disloyal thing. He is sorry that an insignificant event has been misunderstood and explains in his own words the event. He says that a friend of Roosevelt visited him in Cuernavaca and asked him on behalf of the U.S. President to offer a dinner in honor of Ambassador Josephus Daniels so he could give some opinions regarding the situation in Mexico. The dinner was supposed to be private and only close friends of Calles, members of the administration and press would go. He never knew that he would receive a letter from Roosevelt. Before sending the invitations, he asked Gen. Rodríguez his opinion but since he was not in Mexico, he asked Dr. Manuel Puig Casauranc to ask Gen. Rodríguez on his behalf. The president considered it was no convenient to offer the dinner and therefore they did not offer it. Gen Plutarco Elías Calles states that he has thought about the letter that Puig Casauranc addressed to El Universal on September 12, 1938 stating that he kept the letter and delivered it to elected president Gen. Lázaro Cárdenas before he traveled to Argentina in 1935. Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles thinks that it is a disloyal thing that Puig kept the letter and delivered it to a person that was not the recipient. He states that it is not the only letter he received from Roosevelt, with whom he always had a kind relationship. He disapproves the actions of Puig and thinks of him as a disloyal, mean and miserable man. Another fact that Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles wants to clarify is the one stated on page 427 where Gaxiola says that the elected president Gen. Lázaro Cárdenas and Senator Riva Palacio; President of the PNR, visited president Abelardo Rodríguez and asked him on his behalf to order the expulsion of the Archbishop of Mexico. He argues it is false because if he had wanted the expulsion of the Archbishop he would have asked that himself. Regarding the conflict with the clergy, he takes responsibility for what happened during his administration. Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles congratulates Gaxiola for his loyalty to Gen. Abelardo L. Rodríguez. Francisco Javier Gaxiola Jr. replies to Gen. Abelardo Rodríguez informing the receipt of the letter sent through Rodolfo Elías Calles. Gaxiola argues that he is telling the truth, that Dr. José Manuel Puig Casauranc; Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the administration of Abelardo L. Rodríguez did send the invitations on behalf of Gen. Plutarco Elías Calls for the dinner to members of the cabinet and the diplomatic corps. He states that he has a manuscript by Puig with the text of the invitations and the list of guests. He states that President Abelardo L. Rodríguez did not agree to carry out the dinner. He also states that it is true that elected president Gen. Lázaro Cárdenas and Carlos Riva Palacio asked President Abelardo L. Rodríguez the expulsion of the Archbishop Pascual Díaz. Newspaper clipping of an article titled "A propósito del President Rodríguez" (On President Rodríguez) signed by B.A. Eduardo Vasconcelos, published in the Excelsior on September 26, 1938. The article refers to the book by B.A. Francisco Javier Gaxiola; Secretary of President Abelardo L. Rodríguez. It reproduces some paragraphs of the book. It stresses its importance as a historical document. It analyzes the crisis after the death of Obregón and the foundation of the PNR as a means to avoid ungovernability. It praises the party and analyzes the administrations of Ortiz Rubio and Abelardo L. Rodríguez. Newspaper clipping of El Universal publishing letters sent by B.A. Raúl Castellanos; Private Secretary of President Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles. The letter dated on October 31, 1938 states that the letter kept by Puig Casauranc was never given to Cárdenas because he found it among his personal documents. He believed he gave it to Cárdenas before his trip to Argentina, but he only talked about it. Puig states is sending the letter to Castellanos, so Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles can finally read it. Castellanos returns the letter to Puig and asks him to send it to Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles according to the instructions of the President … (It continues in the next record) / Recortes de prensa de El Universal, titulados "La cena de las declaraciones" del martes 13 de septiembre de 1938 y "La verdad descubierta por un tiempo", del sábado 1 de octubre de 1938, escritos por Francisco Javier Gaxiola Jr. en los que contesta notas periodísticas de Miguel Alessio Robles relativas su libro sobre el gobierno del Presidente Rodriguez, la influencia del Gral. Calles y la famosa cena al embajador Josephus Daniels. Carta del Gral. PEC a Francisco Javier Gaxiola Jr., misma que fue publicada en "El Universal" el 29 de octubre de 1938, con el titulo "Habla el Gral. Calles" agradeciendo el obsequio del libro de su autoría "El Presidente Rodríguez", y al cual se permite hacer aclaraciones en lo que se refiere a las relaciones del propio Gral. PEC con el Gral. Rodríguez ya que por enaltecer la figura presidencial se desvirtúan hechos: el Gral. PEC intervinó en el gobierno a petición del propio Gral. Rodríguez y que siempre cuidó y defendió el prestigio del mismo. Aclara que en uno de los párrafos del libro se asientan falsedades, sobre todo en la que se ha dado en llamar "La comida de las declaraciones" en la que se pretende hacer partícipes al Presidente Roosevelt y al Gral. PEC de una confabulación para restar prestigio al Presidente Rodríguez; que ninguno de los dos es capaz de esa deslealtad; lamenta que un hecho sin importancia se haya desfigurado tanto y hace un recuento de lo sucedido desde su perspectiva: un amigo personal de Roosevelt le hizo una visita de cortesía en Cuernavaca y le pidió a nombre del Presidente norteamericano que le ofreciera una comida al embajador Josephus Daniels para que pudiera, antes de un viaje a su país, hacer algunos comentarios encomiables respecto a México. La comida sería privada, sólo asistirían amigos personales de Calles, miembros de la administración y de la prensa; que la persona en cuestión jamás mencionó que le sería entregada una carta de Roosevelt. Que antes de invitar a nadie quiso consultar con el Gral. Rodríguez y tener su opinión y que como no estaba en México, le pidió al Dr. José Manuel Puig Casauranc que lo consultara, que el Presidente quien consideró que no era conveniente hacer la comida y no se hizo. Que mucho ha pensado en la carta que dirige Puig Casauranc al director de EL UNIVERSAL el 12 de septiembre pasado (1938) en la que asegura que él conservó la carta y que se la entregó al presidente electo Gral. Lázaro Cárdenas, antes de su salida para Argentina en 1935. Considera una deslealtad que Puig haya retenido esa carta, que la haya entregado a quien no le correspondía y que el propio Cárdenas la haya conservado; que no fue la única que recibió de Roosevelt, con quien siempre mantuvo una cordial relación. Reprueba la conducta de Puig a quien considera amigo desleal, ruin y miserable. Otro de los hechos que desea aclarar el Gral. PEC es el que se asienta en la página 427 del libro, donde Gaxiola afirma que el Gral. Lázaro Cárdenas, presidente electo, y al Senador Riva Palacio, Presidente del PNR, que visitaran al entonces presidente Abelardo Rodríguez y le solicitaran a nombre del Gral. PEC que ordenara la inmediata expulsión del Arzobispo de México. Esto es falso y si en dado caso él hubiera querido que se expulsara al Arzobispo, él mismo lo hubiera pedido. Con respecto a los conflictos con el clero católico se hace totalmente responsable de lo ocurrido durante su gobierno. Por último el Gral. PEC felicita a Gaxiola por su lealtad al Gral. Abelardo Rodríguez, virtud en desuso en los tiempos que corren. Francisco Javier Gaxiola Jr. contesta al Gral. PEC informando haber recibido la carta enviada a través de Rodolfo Elías Calles y en la cual hace aclaraciones a sul libro "El Presidente Rodríguez". Gaxiola se defiende y afirma que se ajusta a la verdad en el relato de los hechos; que el Dr. José Manuel Puig Casauranc, secretario de Relaciones Exteriores durante el gobierno de Abelardo L. Rodríguez, sí hizo las invitaciones a nombre del Gral. PEC para asistir a la comida de las declaraciones, que fueron distribuidas entre los miembros del gabinete presidencial y del cuerpo diplomático. Que tiene en su poder manuscrito de Puig con el texto de las invitaciones y la lista de invitados y que además él sabía (Gaxiola) que el presidente Abelardo Rodríguez se opuso a que se llevará a cabo; se da por enterado de la aclaración del Gral. PEC de que Puig actuó a espaldas suyas, sin su consentimiento, con lo que se precisa un hecho de interés histórico. En relación a la visita que según Gaxiola hicieron Gral. Lázaro Cárdenas, presidente electo y el senador Carlos Riva Palacio, al presidente Abelardo L. Rodríguez para que en nombre del Gral. PEC le solicitaron la expulsión del Arzobispo Pascual Díaz, es un hecho absolutamente cierto y toma nota de la aclaración de Calles de que jamás le dio tal comisión al Gral. Cárdenas. 2 recorte del artículo de prensa titulado "A propósito del Presidente Rodríguez", firmado por el Lic. Eduardo Vasconcelos, publicado en Excélsior, el 26 de septiembre de 1938, donde se comenta ampliamente el libro del Lic. Francisco Javier Gaxiola, secretario particular del presidente Abelardo L. Rodríguez. Reproduce algunos párrafos del mismo, sobre todo los que lo elogian. Destaca su importancia como documento histórico y político; hace un análisis de la situación de crisis que enfrentó el país a la muerte de Obregón; y de la fundación del PNR como medio para evitar la ingobernabilidad, elogia la función del partido y analiza los gobiernos de Ortiz Rubio y Abelardo L. Rodríguez, hace hincapié en la honestidad y capacidad de este último. Recorte del periódico EL UNIVERSAL que transcribe una serie de cartas que al propio diario envía el Lic. Raúl Castellanos, secretario particular del presidente Gral. Cárdenas, la fechada el 31 de octubre de 1938 aclara lo publicado en la prensa que da crédito a la afirmación del Dr. Puig Casauranc de haber entregado en abril de 1935 al Presidente Cárdenas una carta escrita por el Presidente Roosevelt y dirigida al Gral. Calles (del 22 de marzo de 1934), misma que nunca fue recibida por Cárdenas como el mismo Puig lo confirma en otra carta fechada en septiembre de 1938 que dirige al mismo Lic. Castellanos, en la que afirma haber encontrado la tan manoseada carta entre sus documentos personales, que él creyó haberla entregado a Cárdenas pero que no lo hizo, sólo le habló de ella antes de su viaje a Argentina, pero que ahora sí se la manda para que el Presidente conozca su contenido. Raúl Castellanos devuelve la carta a Puig y le pide que se la entregue al Gral. Calles, su original destinatario, de acuerdo con las instrucciones del Presidente. (continúa en el siguiente registro)