Suchergebnisse

Gegenstand der Studie:
Der Autor untersucht die wirtschaftliche Dimension des Hauptstadtstatus einer Stadt im Rahmen eines breiter angelegten Untersuchungsdesigns. Es wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie lukrativ in wirtschaftlich-finanzieller Sicht der Hauptstadtstatus für eine Kommune ist bzw. war und welchen Beitrag die Ausgaben eines Staates für das Funktionieren seiner zentralstaatlichen Organe von Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative zur wirtschaftlichen Wertschöpfung einer Hauptstadt leisten. Wie hoch waren die Geldsummen, die für die Aufrechterhaltung und das Funktionieren der für das Regieren und die Verwaltung des Staates benötigten Institutionen an zentraler Stelle in der Hauptstadt verausgabt wurden?
Berlin hat in seiner Geschichte den doppelten Status als Hauptstadt Preußens und als Hauptstadt des Deutschen Reichs von der Reichsgründung 1871 bis zum Zusammenbruch 1945 eingenommen. Damit sind sowohl vom Preußischen Staat als auch vom Deutschen Reich finanzielle Mittel in die Hauptstadt geflossen.
In Zentrum des Interesses stehen die wirtschaftlich-finanziellen Auswirkungen der Hauptstadtfunktion, die in der vorliegenden Studie in historischer Perspektive untersucht wird.
Definition des Begriffs 'Hauptstadt':
"Insgesamt wird in der theoretischen Hauptstadtforschung von den drei Funktionsbereichen Politik, Wirtschaft und Integration gesprochen, in denen eine Hauptstadt hinsichtlich Qualität und Quantität der ansässigen Einrichtungen die anderen zentralen Orte eines Landes übertrifft. Im wesentlichen sind es dabei folgende typologische Erscheinungsformen, die das Wesen einer Hauptstadt in ihrer Aufgabenstellung für die Gesamtgesellschaft bestimmen …:
1. Residenzfunktion …
2. Behördenzentralisation für entscheidende Einrichtungen eines Staates im Bereich Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative …
3. Anwesenheit der ausländischen Missionen und internationalen Vertretungen am Ort der nationalen Regierung eines Staates, konkret also die immer in der jeweiligen Hauptstadt vertretenen Botschaften und Konsulatsvertretungen anderer Staaten …
4. Zentrum des Verbandswesens der wichtigsten nationalen intermediären Kräfte (Lobbyarbeit).
5. Militärisches Zentrum des Landes mit der Anwesenheit der militärischen Oberbehörden, Elitetruppen, allgemeine Truppenmassierungen sowie der Rüstungsindustrie.
6. Kulturell-wissenschaftliches Zentrum eines Landes mit den Funktionen nationaler Identitätsstiftung nach innen und staatlich-internationaler Repräsentation nach außen.
7. Presse- bzw. Medienzentrum eines Landes …
8. Wirtschafts- und Finanzzentrum.
9. Tourismusziel Hauptstadt … .
10. Verkehrsmittelpunkt des Landes.
11. … Charakter einer nationalen oder gar internationalen Metropole …, die für ein Land stark integrativ wirken kann und für eine nationale Elitenbildung von Bedeutung ist." (S. 6-8)
Berlin als Hauptstadt:
Die Anwesenheit zentraler Staatseinrichtungen in Berlin sowie die Funktion als Regierungs- und zentraler Verwaltungssitz des Staates bildet für Berlin während des gesamten Untersuchungszeitraums eine wichtige Komponente. Mit der Zentralfunktion als Residenz sowie als Regierungs- und Verwaltungsmittelpunkt des Landes eng verbunden war die daraus folgende Anwesenheit der Botschaften und Vertretungen anderer Staaten. Hinzu trat die Bedeutung Berlins als Ort internationaler Kongresse. Auch hinsichtlich der Militärlokation nahm Berlin eine herausragende Stellung ein. In der Hauptstadt Berlin konzentrierten sich die wichtigsten Einrichtungen der zentralen militärischen Verwaltungsbehörden zunächst Preußens und später des Deutschen Reichs. Die Konzentration von Elitetruppen und Kasernen in der Nähe von Berlin kam noch hinzu. Gerade aber im Bereich von Kultur und Wissenschaft konnte Berlin außerordentlich von staatlicher Förderung profitieren. Aus Gründen der staatlichen Repräsentation nach außen wurde die kulturelle Ausstrahlungskraft durch den Staat Preußen und das Deutsche Reich gefördert. Zwischen der Hauptstadtfunktion einer Stadt und deren Bedeutung als Verkehrsknotenpunkt besteht oft eine enge Verbindung, was auch für Berlin zutrifft. Hauptstädte werden bevorzugt in das jeweilige Verkehrssystem eingebunden. Berlin entwickelte sich schon in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jh. zu einem der wichtigsten deutschen bzw. mitteleuropäischen Eisenbahnknotenpunkte und verfügte auch über ein schon seit dem 17. Jh. gepflegtes und ausgebautes Binnenwasserstraßensystems mit hervorragender Anbindung zu den wichtigsten Transportsystemen. Berlin konnte diese bevorzugte Verkehrssituation auch mit dem Aufkommen des Flugverkehrs sowie als Mittelpunkt des Autobahnsystems seit den dreißiger Jahren deutlich ausbauen. (S. 20) Weiterhin zeichnete sich Berlin durch seine außerordentliche leistungsfähige Wirtschaftsstruktur im 19. Jh. aus. Berlin bildete schon im frühen 19. Jh. eine der Kernregionen der deutschen Industrialisierung. Firmen wie Siemens, die AEG oder Schering im Bereich der Elektroindustrie, dem Maschinenbau und der Chemie verliehen Berlin eine dominierende Stellung in der deutschen Wirtschaftslandschaft.
Die Hauptstadtfunktion wirkte sich dahingehend auf Berlins Wirtschaft positiv aus, als daß wichtige staatliche Unternehmen in Berlin ihren Hauptsitz hatten (Deutsche Reichspost, Reichsbahn, die Vereinigten Industrie-Unternehmungen (Viag)).

Untersuchungsdesign, Methode:
Um die wirtschaftlich-finanziellen Auswirkungen des Hauptstadtstatus in konkreten Zahlen zu errechnen, müssten im Idealfall diejenigen Zahlen aus den Quellen herausgezogen werden, die nachweislich als hauptstadtbedingte Ausgaben in das Bruttosozialprodukt der Hauptstadt Berlin eingeflossen sind. Die Quellenrecherchen ergaben jedoch, daß es im Untersuchungszeitraum niemals fest institutionalisierte bzw. etatisierte Finanzierungen für Berlin als Hauptstadt gegeben hat. Es sind also jährlich festgelegte Summen, die der Stadt speziell für die Zwecke der Aufrechterhaltung als Hauptstadt (Stadtbild, Repräsentation, Sicherheitsaspekte, Verkehr, etc.) gewährt wurden, nicht extra aufgeführt worden. Damit stand fest, dass ein Instrumentarium erarbeitet werden musste, mit dessen Hilfe die nachweisbar hauptstadtbedingten Summen aus den Ausgabenvolumina des Preußischen Staates und des Deutschen Reiches herausgefiltert werden können.
Die für die Hauptstadt ausgegebenen Summen wurden hauptsächlich über die gedruckten staatlichen Haushaltspläne erschlossen, welche im Bedarfsfall durch weiteres einschlägiges Material aus den Archiven ergänzt wurde.
Ausgehend von der Definition des Begriffs Hauptstadt wird zunächst untersucht, welche Sektoren für die Berechnung eines hauptstadtrelevanten Finanzvolumens herangezogen werden können. Während der engere politisch-administrative Kern für eine Hauptstadt konstitutiv ist und deshalb einbezogen werden muß, sind andere Bereiche aufgrund der Quellenlage zahlenmäßig schwer zu erfassen. So sind die Anzahl der Botschaften und ausländischen Vertretungen in Berlin für den Untersuchungszeitraum leicht zu erfassen, aber es liegen keine konkreten Angaben zum Personal und zu den Sachmittelbedarf und –verbrauch der Botschaften vor.
Hinzu kommt, dass nicht in allen Bereichen eine eindeutige Abgrenzung der Ausgaben für den Staat bzw. für das Reich auf der einen Seite und der hauptstadtbedingten Ausgaben auf der anderen Seite nicht möglich ist. Der Bereich Kultur- und Wissenschaftsförderung ist sehr eng mit der Hauptstadt verbunden und entsprechende Ausgaben lassen sich eindeutig der Hauptstadt zuordnen. Im Bereich Militär können zwar die zentralstaatlich und an der Spitze der Militärverwaltung Preußens bzw. des Reichs vorhandene hauptstadtbedingten Einrichtungen (z.B. der Generalstab, die Kriegsakademie) berücksichtigt werden, dagegen sind die in der Umgebung Berlins verstärkt etablierten allgemeinen Truppenkräfte hinsichtlich ihrer Hauptstadtrelevanz nicht zweifelsfrei zu bestimmen.
Kern der Darstellung der Finanzierung der Hauptstadt Berlin ist demnach in dieser Untersuchung der Themenbereich, der am engsten mit der eigentlichen politischen Hauptstadt in Verbindung steht: die Geldausgaben, die dem Gesamtsozialprodukt von Berlin in seiner Doppelfunktion als Hauptstadt Preußens und des Deutschen Reichs aus den obersten Verfassungsorgangen von Legislative, Judikative und Exekutive aufgrund der aufgestellten jährlichen Haushaltspläne zugeflossen ist. Neben diesen engeren administrativ-politischen Kern des Staates ist der Bereich Kultur und Wissenschaft, und hier insbesondere diejenigen Ausgabenpositionen aus den Staatshaushalten, die einzelnen Einrichtungen von zentralstaatlicher Bedeutung exakt zuzuordnen sind, in die Betrachtung mit einbezogen worden. (vrgl. S. 64f) Für die weiteren Bereiche wurden nur diejenigen Einrichtungen und Institutionen in die Berechnung mit einbezogen, die eindeutig als hauptstadtbedingte Institution identifiziert werden können. Jene in Berlin ansässigen Einrichtungen, die sich auf der Ebene unterhalb der jeweiligen zentralstaatlichen Verwaltungsspitze befinden und auch in anderen Provinzen bzw. Städten vorhanden waren, werden nicht erfasst.
Angesichts des langfristigen Untersuchungszeitraums war bei der Erfassung der Ausgaben eine Deflationierung der Werte notwendig, um auf diese Weise die Geldentwicklung in dem langen Untersuchungszeitraum zu berücksichtigen und den Vergleich der Hauptstadtfinanzierung in den verschiedenen Epochen sinnvoll zu gestalten.


Quellenproblematik:
Die wesentlichen Quellen für die vorliegende Studie sind die gedruckten Haushaltspläne des preußischen Staates und des Deutschen Reichs. Die staatlichen Etats bilden eine homogene, nach den jeweiligen Kriterien der Haushaltsermittlung und –aufstellung zustande gekommene Quellenform der Ausgabenstrukturen beider Staaten dar. Sie eignen sich daher für eine Längsschnittuntersuchung über mehrere Epochen der neueren Geschichte Deutschlands. Die staatlichen Haushaltspläne bilden in dieser Untersuchung somit die Quellengrundlage für die Analyse der Hauptstadtfinanzierung. Problematisch hinsichtlich der Homogenität der Massenquellen ist der Umstand, daß infolge der Entwicklung von Verfassung und Verwaltung und vor allem durch politische Transformationsprozesse der Staatsorgane und der Verwaltung in der Zeit vom Kaiserreich zum Dritten Reich einige Verwaltungsbereiche neu zugeordnet wurden. Anders ausgedrückt, die Systematik der Haushaltspläne hat sich verändert. Der Autor hat die Einrichtungen von Regierung und obersten Verwaltungsbehörden, soweit sich ihre Zusammensetzung durch die Neustrukturierungen nicht zu stark geändert haben, in ihrer Zusammensetzung unverändert in die Berechnung mit einbezogen. Wenn die Zuordnungen und die Systematik der Ausgabenstrukturen in den Haushaltsplänen sich im Verlauf der vierundsiebzig Jahre des Untersuchungszeitraumes so stark verändert haben, dass eine Vergleichbarkeit über die Zeit nicht mehr gegeben ist, wurden vom Autor rechnerische Anpassungen vorgenommen. Weiterhin ist der Vergleich und die Zusammenführung von Haushaltsplänen verschiedener staatlicher und kommunaler Gebietskörperschaften methodisch problematisch, da die Haushaltspläne nicht ohne Weiteres miteinander vergleichbar sind aufgrund unterschiedlicher Erfassungssystematiken. Während die preußischen Haushaltsrechnungen generell mit Bruttoveranlagungen arbeiteten, wurden die Reichshaushalte bis in das späte Kaiserreich mit Nettowerten zusammengestellt. Somit umfassen die staatlichen Haushaltspläne nicht alle Gesamtausgaben eines Staates, sonder immer nur einen bestimmten Anteil, der sich je nach dem Privatisierungsgrad öffentlich-staatlicher Leistungen auch noch jährlich unterscheidet. Außerdem wurden nicht alle hauptstadtrelevanten Ausgaben berücksichtigt, da beispielsweise Veränderungen in den Rechtsformen von staatlichen Einrichtungen wie der Reichsbahn sowie Privatisierungen durchgeführt wurden, so daß das Gesamtvolumen der zu berücksichtigenden Einrichtungen variiert. Der Autor ist so verfahren, daß aus den Haushaltsplänen errechenbare Bruttogesamtzahlen bei praktizierten Nettoetatisierungen berücksichtigt wurden, soweit dies die Zahlen erlaubten. Gänzlich privatisierte Einrichtungen, die nicht im staatlichen Haushaltsplan berücksichtigt wurden, hat der Autor auch nicht in die Gesamtrechnung aufgenommen. Alle eigentlich hauptstadtrelevanten, aber aufgrund der jeweiligen Rechtsordnung nicht mehr im Staatshaushalt zu findenden Verwaltungseinrichtungen wie etwa die Reichspost, Reichsbahn oder Reichsdruckerei, sind also nicht erfaßt worden, weil sie im Laufe der 20er Jahre in selbständige Unternehmen umgewandelt wurden. Ebenso unberücksichtigt blieb für die NS-Zeit die NS-Parteibürokratie.
Das Zahlenmaterial aus den gedruckten Haushaltsplänen wurde punktuell durch Überlieferungen in den staatlichen Archiven ergänzt. Dies war besonders für die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus notwendig, in der zahlreiche Finanzierungen in den Etats einzelner Verwaltungen und Ministerien versteckt wurden. (vergl. S. 83f) Für die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus gilt, dass finanzhistorische Studien für diese Zeit mit einer qualitativ ganz eigenen Materie konfrontiert werden. Im Vergleich zum Kaiserreich und der Weimarer Republik ist hinsichtlich des Haushaltsplanes ein Bruch vorhanden, da z.B. 1944 mehr als ein Drittel der städtischen Ausgaben Aufwendungen für den Krieg und seine Folgen betrafen. Weiterhin wurde Berlin infolge der Ausbaupläne zur Welthauptstadt Germania zu umfangreichen Ausgaben gezwungen, die aus kommunaler Kasse finanziert werden mussten. Eine entsprechende Einbettung der Zahlenreihen in die politischen Rahmenbedingungen ist unverzichtbar, um Fehlinterpretationen zu vermeiden. Insgesamt entspricht die NS-Finanzpolitik, die eine starke Ausweitung der Staatsschulden in Kauf nahm, um diese Defizite durch Ausbeutung eroberter Länder gegenzufinanzieren, nicht einer ordentlichen Haushaltsführung. Desweiteren müssen die zugrunde liegenden rassistischen Tendenzen der NS-Politik einschließlich Diebstahl, Sklaven- und Zwangsarbeit sowie die Zusammenarbeit mit SS-Wirtschaftsbetrieben mit berücksichtigt werden.


Untersuchungszeitraum:
Der festgelegte Untersuchungszeitraum von 1871 bis 1945 bietet sich aus verschiedenen Gründen an. Die Daten markieren den Beginn und das Ende der ersten Phase Berlins als Hauptstadt. Die Ausdehnung des Zeitraums von der Kaiserzeit über die erste deutsche Demokratie – die Weimarer Republik – bis hin zum Ende der nationalsozialistischen Diktatur ermöglicht das Einbeziehen der Auswirkungen unterschiedlicher politischer Systeme und deren Transformationen auf den Umfang hauptstädtischer Finanzierung. Der große Zeitraum ermöglicht auch die Identifizierung aussagefähiger, von Zufälligkeiten freier Trends, so daß beispielsweise durch konjunkturelle Entwicklungen bedingte Strukturveränderungen richtig eingeordnet werden können. Aus Zeitgründen musste hinsichtlich der Behandlung des gesamten Untersuchungszeitraums anstelle einer Gesamtaufnahme aller Etatjahre zwischen 1871 und 1945 stichprobenartig vorgegangen werden. Dennoch sind die Stichjahre geeignet, einen generellen Trend der Ausgaben abzubilden. Die Einbettung der gefundenen Ausgaben für die Hauptstadt in die allgemeine makrohistorische Entwicklung der beiden Staaten und ihrer Finanzen ermöglicht die Vermeidung einer auf Berlin eingeschränkte Sicht und eröffnet eine Vergleichsebene zwischen Berlin und den beiden Staaten.


Datentabellen in HISTAT (Thema:…):

A. Vergleichende Übersichten: Hauptstadtbedingte Ausgaben – Preußen und Deutsches Reich im Vergleich
B. Der Haushalt des Deutschen Reichs
C. Der preußische Staatshaushalt
D. Haushalt der Stadt Berlin
E. Tabellen aus dem Textteil

In the context of the global environmental and developmental crisis, both environmental relations of modern societies as well as their relations to non-modern, 'traditional' groups are called into question. In this regard, the global environmental and developmental crisis not only threatens the well-being of present and future human populations, but also reflects a crisis of modernity. The demarcation of protected areas for the protection of 'nature' is an important approach to tackle global environmental problems. Frequently, the remaining 'natural' areas suitable for nature conservation are, at the same time, living spaces of non-modern peoples. The 'classical' modern concept of protected areas - based on ideas of an inherent antagonism between humans and nature - in many cases led to the eviction of these people from protected areas. The poor balance of this 'classical' approach to preserve nature in protected areas, resistance from affected local people, as well as a growing awareness for the rights of these people have induced a revision of this approach. In the international discourses a new utility-oriented approach has gained rather broad acceptance which is based on a conservation strategy that takes into account the interests and rights of local populations in resources and services of protected areas. In practice, however, the establishment and management of protected areas often is far away from the standards of this revised protected area concept. Furthermore, this utility-oriented conservation approach has not only provoked a counter-movement within the conservation community, but also has to confront a critical localist approach to nature conservation focusing on local resource control and self-determination. Against this background, the study is concerned with the conflicts and debates involving local communities of the Karen ethnic minority group living in the Thung Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary in Western Thailand which was established in 1974 and was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1991. People of the Karen ethnic minority group have been living in the area for at least 200 years. Until today, the Karen in Thung Yai predominantly grow hill rice for subsistence needs in a rotational swidden system under a communal resource management regime. Since the establishment of the sanctuary villages have been removed by state authorities at different times. Specifically with the declaration as a World Heritage Site, the remaining Karen villages became a political issue. The Royal Forest Department, the Military and politicians frequently request their resettlement, impose restrictions on their tradi-tional land use system, and are trying to induce them to resettle 'voluntarily' using violence and terror. At the same time, within the present discourse on 'people and forests' in Thailand, the Karen in Thung Yai are quoted for the position that human forest use and conservation of forests may well go hand in hand. The research focused on processes of local change within the Karen communities, as well as on the political conflicts regarding the villages in the sanctuary. Both aspects only become comprehensible within the broader context of national and international processes of modernisation and environmental discourse. The dynamic cultural identity of the Karen in Thung Yai, which is essentially related to their specific place of living, is crucial for their adaptability towards these external changes and challenges, but also for their resistance towards the threats regarding their existence in Thung Yai. However, this research not only explores the concrete local case of conflict within its encompassing national and international contexts of deforestation, nature conservation, indigenous rights, etc., but also intends to reflect this conflict and the research on it with regard to the self-conceptualisation of modern science and the culture of modernity. The findings of the study support claims to legalise the traditional settlement rights and land use areas of the Karen in the sanctuary, and suggests the appreciation of their traditional forest- and land use systems as well as their integration into the conception and management of the sanctuary. Concerning the problem of national integration, modernisation and cultural diversity, the study proposes a 'culture conservation approach' focusing on local rights to self-determination and resource use in the context of participative, democratic approaches to conflict resolution. With regard to the culture of modernity this approach implies questioning universalistic and hegemonic claims of 'modernity' as well as an increased attentiveness for environmental relations beyond the stereotypes of 'tradition' and 'modernity'. ; Die Fähigkeit des Menschen, seine Umwelt so zu verändern, dass er damit die eigenen Lebensbedingungen beeinträchtigt - bis hin zur Gefährdung der Existenzgrundlagen - ist seit den 1960er Jahren zunehmend deutlich und problematisch geworden. Als Ursachen dieser realen und potenziellen Gefährdungen gelten einerseits die technischen Möglichkeiten und die Entwicklungsdynamik moderner Industrie-Gesellschaften, andererseits das Bevölkerungswachstum und die Entwicklungsoptionen in den Ländern der sogenannten 3. Welt. Die globale Umweltkrise rückt somit in einen engen Zusammenhang mit einer globalen Entwicklungskrise, indem moderne Konzeptionen von 'Wachstum', 'Entwicklung' und 'Fortschritt' in Frage stehen, und zwar in den 'Entwicklungsländern' wie auch in den 'entwickelten' Gesellschaften selbst. Damit wird in der globalen Umwelt- und Entwicklungskrise sowohl das Naturverhältnis der Kultur der Moderne als auch deren Verhältnis zu nicht-modernen, 'traditionalen' Gesellschaften und Gruppierungen problematisch. Diese Problematisierung des Verhältnisses der Moderne gegenüber der 'Natur' und dem 'Traditionalen' - den beiden konstitutiven Anderen der Moderne - lässt sich auch als eine Krise der Moderne lesen. Der Rückgang der Tropenwälder und der damit verbundene Verlust an biologischer Vielfalt spielen sowohl in der wissenschaftlichen und politischen Diskussion als auch in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung der globalen Umweltkrise eine wichtige Rolle. Ein dominierender Ansatz zur Lösung dieser problematischen Aspekte des modernen Naturverhältnisses ist seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts der Versuch, 'Natur' durch die Einrichtung von Natur-Schutzgebieten zu bewahren. Aus einer globalen Perspektive betrachtet decken sich diese schützenswerten Gebiete häufig mit Lebensräumen nicht-moderner sozialer Gruppierungen. Konflikte zwischen Interessen an der Einrichtung von Schutzgebieten und Interessen 'indigener' oder 'traditionaler' Bevölkerungsgruppen, die in diesen Gebieten leben oder deren Ressourcen nutzen, sind die Regel, und haben nicht selten zur Vertreibung von Menschen aus Naturschutzgebieten geführt. Die 'klassische' moderne Schutzgebietskonzeption geht primär von einem Antagonismus zwischen Naturschutz und menschlicher Natur-Nutzung aus. Im Kontext des Modernisierungs-Diskurses gefährden sowohl Bevölkerungswachstum und Armut 'traditionaler' Gruppen als auch die Modernisierung dieser Gruppen die natürlichen Ressourcen und die biologische Diversität ihres Lebensraumes. Deshalb zielen Naturschutzbemühungen in dieser Rahmung des Problems i.d.R. auf die Umsiedlung der in Schutzgebieten lebenden Menschen. Lediglich über die Identifizierung einfacher nicht-moderner Gesellschaftsformen mit 'Natur' und der Festschreibung dieses Status, wird deren Existenz in Schutzgebieten aus dieser Perspektive heraus tolerierbar, bzw. werden sie sogar selbst schutzwürdig. Die schlechte Bilanz dieser Schutzgebietsstrategie, der Widerstand betroffener Bevölkerungsgruppen sowie ein wachsendes Bewusstsein für die Rechte dieser Gruppen haben seit den 1980er Jahren zu einer Revision der 'klassischen' Schutzgebietskonzeption geführt. Im internationalen Schutzgebiets-Diskurs hat sich inzwischen ein utilitätsorientierter Ansatz durchgesetzt, der den problematischen Zusammenhang von Mensch und Natur in der Schutzgebietsproblematik primär im Rahmen von Schutz-durch-Nutzungs-Strategien konzipiert und die Interessen und Rechte lokaler Bevölkerungsgruppen in und um Schutzgebiete in Rechnung stellt. Die Praxis der Einrichtung und des Managements von Schutzgebieten ist häufig weit entfernt von den Maßstäben des revidierten Schutzgebietskonzepts und ist insbesondere in 3. Welt Ländern meist noch dem 'klassischen' Modell verhaftet. Darüber hinaus stößt dieser utilitäts-orientierte Managementansatz, der als Teil einer Strategie globalen Ressourcenmanagements konzipiert ist, im Kontext des Globalisierungs-Diskurses auf den Widerstand lokalistischer Gegenpositionen. Diese Positionen stellen Strategien lokaler Ressourcenkontrolle und kultureller Selbstbestimmung in den Mittelpunkt ihres alternativen Lösungsansatzes für die globale Umwelt- und Entwicklungskrise. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht die Arbeit die Auseinandersetzungen um die Gemeinschaften der ethnischen Minderheit der Karen im Wildschutzgebiet und Weltnaturerbe Thung Yai Naresuan im Westen Thailands. Hierbei zielt die Arbeit nicht nur auf die Analyse des konkreten lokalen Konfliktfalls im Zusammenhang der nationalen und globalen Kontexte, sondern auch auf die Reflektion dieser Auseinandersetzungen und meiner Beschäftigung mit ihnen mit Blick auf das eigene wissenschaftliche Selbstverständnis und den eigenen kulturellen Kontext, die Kultur der Moderne. Mit ihrer traditionellen Lebensweise, die eine nachhaltige und ressourcenschonende Nutzung ihres Lebensraumes ermöglicht, haben die Karen in Thung Yai erheblich zur Ausprägung der biologischen Vielfalt des Schutzgebietes und deren Erhaltung beigetragen. Hinsichtlich der Ressourcen und Ziele des Schutzgebietes stellen Bevölkerungsentwicklung und traditioneller zyklischer Brandrodungsfeldbau der Karen bis heute keine wesentlichen Probleme dar und werden dies im Kontext des traditionellen Systems vermutlich auch in Zukunft nicht sein. Erhebliche Einschränkungen der Nutzung von Bracheflächen durch das Royal Forest Department gefährden derzeit das traditionelle, subsistenzorientierte Land- und Waldnutzungssystem, was zunehmend zu Marktabhängigkeit und Cashcrop Anbau führt. Der Übergang von einer überwiegend subsistenz- zu einer stärker marktorientierten Wirtschaftsweise ist in verschiedenen Haushalten und Dörfern unterschiedlich weit fortgeschritten. Von staatlichen Behörden wird er teilweise propagiert und gefördert. Diese Veränderungen führen z.T. zu einer stärkeren Belastung und tendenziell zunehmenden Gefährdungen des Schutzgebietes und drohen so, die Legitimation der Siedlungen im Schutzgebiet in Frage zu stellen. Während eine Minderheit der Karen von diesen Veränderungen profitiert und sich mit den externen Interessen und Einflüssen zumindest arrangiert, empfindet die große Mehrheit der Karen diese Veränderungen und Einflüsse von 'außen' als eine Bedrohung ihrer traditionellen Lebensweise und Werte sowie ihres Lebensraumes, mit dem sie sich in hohem Maße identifizieren. Um sich mit diesen Veränderungen auseinander zu setzen und um eigene Interessen zu vertreten entstehen neue Institutionen und Organisationsformen.

Tutkimuksen kohteena on kolmen maailmanhistorian perusrakennetta käsitellen metahistorijoitsijan Yhdysvalloissa saama vastaanotto. Amerikkalaisen Brooks Adamsin pääteos The Law of Civilization and Decay ilmestyi 1896, saksalaisen Oswald Spenglerin Der Untergang des Abendlandes 1918-22(engl. The Decline of the West I-II 1926-28) ja englantilaisen Arnold J.Toynbeen 12-osainen A Study of History 1933-61. Tutkimus perustuu laajaan aikalaiskirjallisuuteen, erityisesti käsiteltävistä teoksista johtavisssa tieteellisissä ja kulttuurilehdissä julkaistuihin arviointeihin. Työ jakautuu yhdeksään päälukuun jossa esitellään kunkin globaaalihistorijoitsijan teoriat sekä aikalaisreseption avulla selvitetään em. historianfilosofien vaikutusta Yhdysvaltalaisen liberaalin eliitin tulkintaan Amerikan roolista maailmanhistoriassa. Tutkimus osoittaa, yleisellä tasolla, että aina Puritaanien maailmanreformaation ajatuksesta Francis Fukuyaman Historian loppu - teoriaan saakka globaalista historiaa koskevilla teorioilla on ollut suurempi merkitys Yhdysvalloissa kuin Euroopassa. Yhdysvaltain poliittisen eliitin piirissä erityisesti debatilla sivilisaatio-käsitteen sisällöstä on ollut keskeinen sija Amerikan maailmanpoliittisen roolin hahmottamisessa. Yhdysvaltain liberaalien näkökannan mukaan Valistuksen aatteisiin perustuva nykyaikaistuminen tuli suorittaa Yhdysvaltain johdolla ja Amerikkalaisen sivilisaation periaatteet vallitseviksi koko maailmassa. Aihe on tutkimuksen ­ ja nykyisen maailmantilanteen ymmärtämisen kannalta ajankohtainen. Yhdysvalloissa on syntynyt laaja maailmanhistoriaa kokonaisuutena käsittelevä globaalisen historian koulukunta. Tämä oppiala on noussut yleisen historian erääksi merkittävimmäksi osa-alueeksi. (Globaalinen historia pohtii senkaltaisia kysymyksiä, kuin mitkä olivat maailmanhistorian yhdistävät teemat? johtiko kadonneiden sivilisaatioiden tuhoon valloittajien sotakoneet, vai heidän mukanaan tuomansa mikrobit? johtavatko suuriksi uskonnoiksi muodostuneet aatteet sivilisaatioprosessia?. etc.) Väitöskirja selvittää osin Adamsin, Spenglerin ja Toynbeen osuutta globaalisen historian oppialan syntyyn Yhdysvalloissa. Brooks Adamsin (1848-1927) merkitys globaalisen historian ja globalisaatioteorian pioneerina on jäänyt hänen kuuluisamman historijaveljensä Henryn varjoon. Brooks Adams, Bostonilainen patriisi ja presidentti Theodore Rooseveltin taustavaikuttaja hahmotteli 1900-luvun alkuvuosikymmeninä Yhdysvaltain maailmanvallan ympärille luotavaa maailmanjärjestystä: korporaatioiden ja kovan tieteen hallitsemaa maailmaa, vapaakauppaa, sekä arvoista ja ympäristöstä riippumatonta hallintotapaa, joka on eksakti ja tehokas. Ensimmäisen maailmansodan jälkeen sivilisaatio ja kulttuuri käsitteiden uudelleenarviointi oli maailmanhistorian kirjoituksessa sen keskeisin teema. Tutkimus osoittaa myös, ensi kertaa transatalanttisessa kontekstissa, että Oswald Spenglerin Europassa 1919 kohua herättänyt Länsimaiden perikato saavutti myös Yhdysvalloissa 1920-luvun Jazz-kaudella New Yorkin älymystön piirissä suorastaan kulttimaineen New Yorkin lehdistössä Spenglerin uhkaava preussilainen hahmo oli kuin modernin aikakauden Cato, joka lupasi tuhoa amerikkalaistyyliselle massakulttuurille. Mutta 1930-luvun poliittisessa ympäristössä Yhdysvaltain johtavat liberaalit leimasivat Spenglerin yksimielisesti fasismin profeetaksi. Toisen maailmansodan jälkeen merkittävä englantilainen historiantutkija ja kansainvälisen politiikan vaikuttajan Arnold Toynbeen laaja uskonnollissävyinen sivilisaatiohistoria sekä Toynbee henkilönä nousi maineeseen ja asemaan, jota kenelläkään historioitsijalla Yhdysvalloissa ei ole ollut. Tutkimus osoittaa, että tämän Toynbee-ilmiön taustana oli toisaalta kylmän sodan alkuvaiheen uhkaava tilanne ja toisaalta Timen ja Lifen mahtavan kustantajan Henry L. Lucen innostus Toynbeeen selitykseen maailmanhistoriasta spirituaalisena prosessina eli Lucen luentana Toynbeen teoriasta Amerikasta kristillisen sivilisaation esitaistelijana. Arvostetun The Survey of International Affairs-julkaisun päätoimittajan Toynbeen vihamieliset lausunnot Yhdysvaltain ylimielisestä roolista maailmanpolitiikassa 1950-luvulla käänsivät kuitenkin amerikkalaisten uusliberaalien mielipiteet Toynbeetä vastaan. Tutkimus näyttää myös, että Toynbee on oppilaansa Chicagon yliopiston professori William McNeillin koulukunnan kautta keskeinen globaalisen historian oppi-isä. ; This dissertation deals with three metahistorians and their reception in the United States. American Brooks Adams published his main work The Law of Civilization and Decay 1896, German Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes 1918-1922 (The Decline of the West, in English, 1926, 1928) and Englishman Arnold Toynbee A Study of History (12.vols. 1934-1961). The study is based on an extensive material dealing with the three world-historians, mainly in the leading scholarly [a majority in history and social sciences] and highbrow magazines, such as The New Republic and The Atlantic Monthly. The book is organized in nine main chapters, which include a summary of each thinker s theory of global history and their assessment of America s role in world-history; the chapters also explore through reception-analysis the American reaction to the major works of the three world-historians and the zeitgeist that informed the reviews. The study, in its general theme, demonstrates how world historical ideas from the Puritan idea of world reformation to Francis Fukuyama s End of History -hegemonic liberalism have been conceptualized by the American political and scholarly elite. The text argues that the liberal consensus of the definition of the term civilization consists in the United States mainly of modernization and Enlightenment values which are expected to bring positive changes to the world through emancipation, freedom, and material affluence. This progressive description of the liberal paradigm which the pessimistic metahistories, and the prophets of decline, in spite of their brief popularity in the U.S. tried to depose could not, in the final analysis, be defeated. The study also argues that, because of its perennial concern for civilization [the American political elite from Franklin D.Roosevelt to George W. Bush use the term, in defining their world-political agendas] the United States has been more receptive to world historical explanations than Europe. Furthermore the study is important, because in the United States world-history, as an academic discipline, has returned to university curriculums. World history draws its basic agenda partly from the metahistorians, by asking questions, like: why did great civilizations collapse? what is the role of the great religions in world history? what is the role of technological modernization in the global change?. As a pioneer of global history and globalization theory Brooks Adams (1848-1927) has not received up-dated attention from contemporary scholarship. The dissertation demonstrates how the Boston patrician partly outlined technocratic and activist policies, which his friend president Theodore Roosevelt used in order to create the American superpower. The book also demonstrates how Adams was also a pioneer in the field of global history and globalization theory, who paved the way for subsequent efforts. After the First World War the revaluation of the concepts of civilization and culture was the central theme of world-history. The breakthrough from Victorian optimism to a modernist post-war gloom focused attention to Oswald Spengler s famous world-historical interpretation The Decline of the West. The argument demonstrates in the transatlantic context, that also the cynical and disillusioned Jazz Age, Smart Set New Yorkers accepted Spengler as the prophet, who doomed the 1920s American spending spree and its mass- culture. When the political context changed in the 1930s the same New York liberals condemned Spengler as a precursor of the Nazi-movement. After the Second World War British historian, and respected expert in international politics, Arnold Toynbee and his large, spiritually flavoured, world historical synthesis A Study of History rose to the status in the United States that hardly any historian, or theory of history, has achieved. The study shows that behind this Toynbee phenomenon was, on the other hand the threatening situation at beginning of the Cold War 1947, on the other hand the enthusiasm of the Time-Life-Fortune publisher Henry Luce, who presented him as a prophet of the American Century and in Luce s American reading of Toynbee s theory also as a defender of the Christian civilization. When Toynbee s opinions turned against American foreign policy, in the1950 s, and his religiosity into syncretism, American New Liberals opinion turned heavily against the superhistorian. The study shows also that through his pupil William McNeill, and his Chicago school of world- historians, Toynbee is one of the founders of the contemporary discipline of world-history writing.

Le volume élevé de biosolides municipaux et industriels (BS) produits dans le monde entier est une source de préoccupation majeure pour les écologistes. Actuellement, la production mondiale de BS est estimée à environ 100 à 125 millions de tonnes par an et devrait augmenter continuellement. Au Canada, 6,6 millions de tonnes de BS stabilisés secs sont produites chaque année par plus de 3 500 stations d'épuration des eaux usées (STEP). La gestion et l'élimination des BS sont très préoccupantes pour de nombreuses municipalités, car cela peut représenter plus de la moitié du coût total du traitement des eaux usées. La valorisation des BS pour la production de biogaz présente un grand avantage. En effet, la digestion anaérobie des BS peut être utilisée pour produire du biogaz comme combustible si celui-ci est correctement collecté et purifié. Outre cet avantage, les BS représentent une menace environnementale à travers la production de gaz à effet de serre (GES), et la production de lixiviat contenant de nombreux contaminants organiques (incluant des contaminants organiques à l'état de traces (TrOCs), tels que les composés pharmaceutiques actifs (PhACs) et pesticides). Ainsi, à partir des sites d'enfouissement et de l'amendement des sols avec les BS municipales, ces contaminants peuvent se retrouver dans les eaux souterraines. Pour remédier à cela, le Québec a mis en place des politiques strictes en matière d'élimination des BS. On compte parmi les mesures prises l'interdiction du déversement des BS dans les décharges et établit une taxe verte qui est prélevée en fonction de l'inflation pour chaque tonne de BS incinérée ou mise en décharge au Québec. Cependant, avec l'aide de technologies de bioprocédés avancées, ces BS peuvent être traités et utilisés simultanément comme matière première pour la production de produits de grande valeur ou de précurseurs de produits de grande valeur. Ce travail de recherche fournit une évaluation des principales méthodes d'élimination (réduction du volume et des contaminants) et passe en revue l'état des processus biotechnologiques, en particulier pour la digestion aérobie pour la production d'enzymes hydrolytiques et lignolytiques à partir des BS. En premier lieu, l'impact des microorganismes endogènes a été étudié avec ou sans co-traitement. En ce sens, divers traitements comprenant l'utilisation de microorganismes indigènes présents dans les BS, l'effet combiné d'un prétraitement enzymatique, la biostimulation par l'ajout d'une source externe de carbone et l'effet synergique de la biostimulation et du prétraitement enzymatique ont été étudiés pendant 28 jours. En raison de diverses stratégies de traitement, une réduction totale des solides en suspension de 12% à 23%, une élimination des PhACs de 44% à 62% et une élimination des pesticides d'environ 10% à 54% ont été observées. Aussi, pour améliorer l'élimination des solides en suspension des PhACs et pesticides, l'effet de quatre stratégies de prétraitement différentes (ultrasonication, congélation-décongélation, addition enzymatique et traitement alcalin), suivis d'une bioaugmentation avec la souche de bactérie Bacillus subtilis a été étudiée. Après 28 jours de traitement, la bioaugmentation a amélioré l'élimination totale des solides en suspension par 8 à 54% et une l'élimination des PhACs par 21 à 80% et une l'élimination des pesticides par 22 à 76%. La production d'un cocktail d'enzymes extracellulaires (ex. : laccase, peroxydase, glucose oxydase, lipase, phosphatase, estérase…etc.) à la suite de la bioaugmentation des BS avec B. subtilis a été observée. Ces enzymes peuvent être impliquées dans l'élimination des contaminants présents dans les BS ainsi que dans la réduction des solides observée. Cette étude est une approche bio-intégrée, où les enzymes produites lors de la digestion aérobie des BS ont été évaluées pour l'élimination des contaminants organiques présents dans les BS issus du traitement des eaux usées municipales. Pour souligner cela, la bioaugmentation des BS avec la souche de champignon Aspergillus niger a été évaluée dans le but de produire une enzyme d'intérêt telle que la glucose oxydase (GOD). La GOD sécrétée par A. niger, a été utilisée pour le processus d'oxydation avancé basé sur le bio-Fenton pour la dégradation de 15 PhACs d'intérêt dans l'eau. En somme, l'utilisation des BS comme substrat par les microorganismes étudiés a permis d'une part de diminuer les contaminants organiques et, d'autre part, de réduire le volume des BS. ; Abstract : The high volume of municipal and industrial biosolids (BS) produced all over the world is a cause of major concern to the environmentalists these days. Currently, the worldwide production of BS is estimated to be around 100-125 million tonnes per year and is expected to increase continuously. According to Canadian context reported on, 6.6 million tonnes of dry stabilized BS are generated yearly by more than 3500 wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs). Management of BS is primarily handled as a technical matter. The disposal of BS is of great concern for many WWT facilities because it accounts for over half of the total cost of wastewater treatment. BS disposal in landfill sites leads to a great advantage of biogas generation by anaerobic digestion which can be used as a fuel if the biogas is properly collected. Apart from adding advantages, it poses environmental threat such as trace organic contaminants (TrOCs), green house gases (GHGs) production, potential contaminant leachate into the ground water system at the landfill site as well as soil amendment of municipal BS . Stringent laws in BS disposal are followed in Quebec which focuses on restraining from the dumping of BS in landfills and green tax is levied based on the inflation for each ton of biosolid that is incinerated or landfilled in Quebec. However, with the help of advance bioprocess technologies these biosolids can be treated and simultaneously used as a raw material for the production of high value products or high value product precursors. This current research work delivers an assessment of the leading disposal methods (volume and contaminant reduction) and reviews the state of biotechnological processes, particular to aerobic digestion for the production of hydrolytic and lignolytic enzymes from BS. During aerobic digestion, various pretreatments including utilization of indigenous microbes present in BS, the effect of an enzymatic pretreatment, biostimulation by the addition of an external carbon source and the synergic effect of biostimulation and enzymatic pretreatment were studied for 28 days. As a result of various treatment strategies, the total suspended solids reduction of 12-23% ,total PhACs removal of 44-62% and total pesticides removal around 10- 54% were observed. Further, to enhance the total suspended solids, total PhACs and total pesticides removal, effect of four different pre-treatment strategies (ultrasonication, freezethawing, enzymatic and alkaline addition) subsequent bioaugmentation with Bacillus subtilis for IV 28 days were studied. Impact of bioaugmentation improved the total suspended solids removal by 8-54%, total PhACs removal by 21-80% and total pesticides removal by 22-76%. The production of enzymatic cocktail by bioaugmented along with indigenous microorganisms, which contain high laccase, peroxidase, glucose oxidase, lipase, phosphatase, esterase activities and other activities related to elimination of contaminants present in the BS. This study is biointegrated approach, where the enzymes producing during aerobic digestion of BS is evaluated to reduce the contaminants present in water or wastewater. To emphasize that, bioaugmentation of Aspergillus niger to BS to produce glucose oxidase (GOD), which was utilized for bio-Fenton based advanced oxidation process for the partial removal of 15 pharmaceutically active compounds in water. Therefore, the use of BS residuals as a substrate can decrease the contaminants on the one hand and, on the other hand, it can reduce the volume of BS.

Pakistan is a multilingual and multi-ethnic country: all the provinces have their own regional languages as lingua franca, i.e., Punjabi in Punjab, Pashto in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, etc.; Urdu is the national language, i.e., it is the language of majority of the state schools and of the media; whereas English, owing to its colonial past, is the official language of Pakistan, i.e., it is the language of the official transactions, the constitution, law and higher education in the country. Such division means that individuals may have to switch from one language to another when they move from home to school, to work settings, or to official business in public or private offices. The analysis of the data collected from different sites (educational and judicial sectors) reveals how and why the discourses of differential use of languages, created and shaped by the educational institutes, are affected by the overall linguistic attitudes existing in society towards different languages. This research concludes that, on the societal level, this differential language system excludes those who do not know a particular language, i.e., English, and disempowers them structurally from getting their due share of state-provided services, such as justice and education. In 2013, all the stakeholders working for the development of Pakistan, both public and private, came together and agreed upon an agenda for development, called Vision 2025. This document is an aspirational tool to be used as a conceptual framework for steering the country into the direction of sustainable and inclusive development. The aim of this vision is to bring Pakistan among the top 25 world economies by year 2025. In order to see whether such ambitious attempts, as outlined in the document, complement or contradict the already existing social realities and discourses of development remains central theme to the current research. In this regard, language policies, perceptions, attitudes, and daily practices become the lens that is used to investigate the relation between the theoretical aspirations and practical situations on the ground. Language choice becomes a contested field in a multilingual society. Any act of speech in such societies is a political act, where different languages are chosen for different purposes. In a contemporary globalized world where one language, i.e., English enjoys the most acceptance; those who know better English acquire added leverage and symbolic power over others in everyday interactions of members of Pakistani society. This dissertation maintains that fascination with English in the context of Pakistan is actually a colonial legacy that has worked towards establishing and perpetuating symbolic superiority against other languages and speakers of those languages in contemporary Pakistani society. My contribution departs from the traditional themes of political economy of nation-state models that focus on the broader themes of nation-building and the issues of governance, identity and marginality in a post-colonial nation(s). I attempt to address the questions of power and distribution of linguistic resources in Pakistani polity from a sociological angle. In the following pages, I specifically conceptualise and analyse the social practices, attitudes and discourses of marginality and identity construction along linguistic lines by using the concepts of habitus, field, capital, and symbolic power. This dissertation tries to untangle multilingualism from two broad themes: 1) it addresses the questions of the sociocultural dominance of English and Urdu languages over regional languages; 2) it shows how the distribution of linguistic resources is contested, negotiated and reproduced in the praxis of the stakeholders interacting in a multilingual setting. In order to conduct an empirical investigation, two sectors are selected, i.e., the educational and judicial sectors of Pakistan. The rationale behind this choice is both theoretical and practical. The educational sector is selected as it becomes the seedbed where discourses and perceptions are produced and reproduced for the official and legitimate practices of language use; whereas, the judicial sector is selected as it links directly with the manifestation of these discourses and perceptions. It is in the judicial sector, where one sees the direct effects of knowing or not knowing a specific language manifested as every letter, word, and comma, matters in the judicial proceedings. An institute that is responsible for disseminating justice to the citizens of the state, the judicial system uses a language (English) that is alien to the majority of Pakistani population. For example, only in the Punjab province, around 45% of the total population speaks Punjabi, whereas only 4-7% can speak or understand English, yet the judicial system in its official discourse conducts all its business in English. The laws, court proceedings, and verdicts disseminated in various trials in the judicial courts are conducted in English. This research aims at finding out whether this very act of conducting judicial proceedings in English disenfranchises the masses from the system. A mixed-method research design was used to investigate these questions at the public universities and judicial courts in Pakistan. The question remains if and how the choice of language in education can become a tool for estrangement and exclusion. Discourses of development and language-based inequality seem to exist next to each other, weaved seamlessly in the overall social fabric, habitus, of the contemporary Pakistani society. The empirical evidence from the educational institutes further elaborates why a certain language, e.g., English, is preferred at the expense of others. What kind of benefits and disadvantages are entailed in knowing or not knowing English and what kind of identities are associated with English and other languages, such as Punjabi. The underlying generative principle, habitus, combines this language-based inequality with development in a way that current education policy actually perpetuates ideologies, perceptions and practices of social inequalities. These structurally inculcated distinctive principles inadvertently "convince" the dominated, the less-advantaged, into accepting the conditions of his/her own dominance as natural, thereby resulting in symbolic constraint. Moreover, this research shows how language is used as an aspirational capacity for social mobility and what hurdles, both social and psychological, students face in using this capacity in their prospective lives. Historically speaking, after the independence of Pakistan, the British rulers left in 1947, but the unequal social spaces they created stayed behind as these arrangements suited those who were already working under the British rule. Under such conditions and neo-colonial patterns of life, there emerges a hybrid form of speech; one where words of Urdu, English, Punjabi or other regional languages are inter-mixed. An act of using a signifier of one language, say English, while speaking in another language, say Urdu or Punjabi, results in providing extra leverage, symbolic superiority, and authority to the speaker. This hybrid speech serves two purposes; a) it keeps the power inequality intact as it renders one language, i.e., English, superior over all other local languages, and b) it helps to appease those who, not having the capacity to compete in the English dominant market, nevertheless remain at the periphery of the circle, trying to carve out their own spaces. Thus the linguistic interactions, eventually and inadvertently, result in shaping, reproducing, and reinforcing the sociological habitus that in the first place creates social inequalities generated by varied use of languages for various purposes. Therefore, it is argued that the official discourse of sustainable development, though promising in principle, stands miles away from the social realities of development of Pakistan. The development experts, both national and international, have to consider the socially participative model of development in order to address the pressing challenges of nation-building as compared to state-building as far as the language related problems of the Pakistani society are concerned.

Regulatory reform has emerged as an important policy area in developing countries. For reforms to be beneficial, regulatory regimes need to be transparent, coherent, and comprehensive. They must establish appropriate institutional frameworks and liberalized business regulations; enforce competition policy and law; and open external and internal markets to trade and investment. This report examines the institutional set-up for and use of regulatory policy instruments in Zambia. It is one of five reports prepared on countries in East and Southern Africa (the others are on Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania). The report is based on a review of public documents prepared by the government, donors, and the private sector, and on a limited number of interviews with key institutions and individuals.

The Better Work Program has its roots in the Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) program, established in 2001 as a follow-on from the 1999 U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Trade Agreement. The free trade agreement (FTA) was the first to link improved labor conditions with greater market access. The BFC program benefitted all the key stakeholders by improving work conditions, supporting the growth of the apparel sector in Cambodia (benefitting all local stakeholders), and boosting developed world buyers' reputation by sourcing from ethical workplaces. BFC has also helped to cushion the negative effects of external changes to the trading environment in the apparel sector (the end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement quota system in 2005 and the global financial crisis in 2008–09). The program has grown substantially; as of December 2014, BW has reached over a million workers in more than 1,000 factories across eight countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Lesotho, Nicaragua, and Vietnam).

This evaluation assesses the performance of the Community Officer (CO) project, a trial community policing mechanism initiated by the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) in late 2009, with assistance from the Participating Police Force (PPF) of the Regional Assistance to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Current interest in community policing in Solomon Islands is occurring in the larger context of the rebuilding and reform of the RSIPF that has been taking place with the assistance of RAMSI. The Solomon Islands Government (SIG) and RSIPF are committed to introducing a viable form of community policing across the country.

International audience ; The Jews of Algeria, who had been full French citizens since the « Crémieux decree » of October 24, 1870, were brutally relegated to the condition of simple "French subjects" by the Vichy regime's law of October 7, 1940 which repealed the decree which had originally collectively awarded them full citizenship. The Jews who were natives of the three districts of Algeria (the « departments » of Algiers, Oran and Constantine) remained French subjects whose civil rights, and effective and personal statuses remained dependent on French law But stripped of their French citizenship, their political rights were aligned on the lower status of Algerian Muslim natives. Those who resided in metropolitan France in 1940 were moreover victims of German decrees of exclusion in the directly German-administered areas of northern France, and of Vichy edicts in both the north and south of the country, aimed at excluding Jews from the national community. The measures of anti-Jewish legislation included a specific census of Jews, the special marking of their identity and rationing documents economic spoliation, the compulsory wearing of yellow stars, arrests, round-ups and internment. It is thus that Algerian Jews who had resided in metropolitan France for years, and sometimes for decades, or were simply caught up passing through there at the time, were among the six million Jews killed during the Shoah.According the historian Serge Klarsfeld, nearly 76,000 Jews then in France were deported, mostly to Auschwitz death camp. Only 3,860 survived. One should add that a further 3,000 Jews died in internment camps in France itself. Among these 80,000 victims, S. Klarsfeld estimated that there were 24,500 French Jews or French Jewish subjects, the rest being of other nationalities. Among the 24,500, there were about 1,500 natives of Algeria. Ever since the very first deportation convoy of March 27, 1942, French Jews and immigrants of other nationalities found themselves side-by-side in the same railway carriages. Among the internment records opened in their names in the "Fichiers juif" (listings of Jews), or on the lists of deportees, French Jews appear as "French subjects" (SF) or "Of French origin" (FO), or sometimes, as "French protégés." In Marseilles, many Jews were arrested during « Aktion Tiger », the code name given to the round-up carried out in the "old harbor" area of the city in January 1943. These Jews made up a majority (780 among 994 deportees) of the deportees sent by convoy number 52 to Sobibor death camp on March 23, 1943. Some 571 of these deportees held one of the multiple forms of legal attachment to French nationality: They were either born French or had opted to become French, or were French by marriage, or were naturalized or declared French, or were French protégés or French subjects. Some 212 of them, including 198 who were resident of, or refugees in, Marseille, were originally from Algeria. There were no survivors from this convoy.The total number of Jews deported who were from the Constantine district, ie the subject of this study, was 218 including 139 men, 58 women and 21 minors aged under 18 including some very young children. The highest number of deportees (86) was from the city of Constantine itself; 45 men, 30 women and 11 children. Just 13 survived. The number from other cities in the Constantine district were 30 from the city of Bône, 17 from Bougie, 12 from Sétif and 11 each from the towns of Aïn Beïda and Guelma. There were ten deportees each from the cities of Batna and Philippeville. Many individual records from the "listings of Jews" kept by the French National Archives at the Paris Shoah Memorial show that in a way, the victims sought to resist their fate: One sometimes reads "CA" (Married to an Aryan), "half-Jews," "says he (or she) is not Jewish", (Christian) "Orthodox", "Copt," "Muslim," "Ward of the Nation" or even "Spanish subject". All these self-descriptions concerning other nationalities or religions were aimed at avoiding deportation. Right to the end, the Jews of Constantine, of Algeria and of elsewhere did all they could, alas often without success, to defeat the exterminating logic of the Third Reich which was largely helped by the zealous leaders of the French (Vichy) state. Alas, only very few of the individual records carry at the top of them the word: "Escaped." ; Citoyens français depuis près d'un siècle, en vertu du décret Crémieux du 24 octobre 1870, les Juifs d'Algérie, où qu'ils vivent, se voient brutalement relégués à la condition de simples « sujets français » par la loi du 7 octobre 1940 qui abroge le décret de naturalisation collective. Les Juifs indigènes des trois départements restent des sujets français dont les droits civils, le statut réel ainsi que le statut personnel demeurent réglés par la loi française. Mais, déchus de leur citoyenneté française, leurs droits politiques sont désormais alignés sur ceux des indigènes musulmans algériens. Ceux d'entre eux qui vivent en France métropolitaine en 1940 ont, au surplus, été victimes, des mesures d'exclusion allemandes (en zone nord) et vichyssoises (dans les deux zones) visant à éliminer les Juifs de la communauté nationale : législation antijuive, recensement, marquage des papiers d'identité et d'alimentation, exclusions professionnelles, spoliation économique, port de l'étoile jaune, arrestations, rafles et internement. C'est ainsi qu'établis en France depuis plusieurs années, voire des décennies, ou simplement de passage, des Juifs d'Algérie s'inscrivent parmi les six millions de morts de la Shoah.Suivant les recherches entreprises par l'historien Serge Klarsfeld, près de 76 000 Juifs de France furent déportés, la plupart vers Auschwitz ; seuls 3 860 d'entre eux environ survécurent. Il faut y ajouter quelque 3 000 Juifs qui moururent dans les camps d'internement en France. Sur ces 80 000 victimes au total, S. Klarsfeld dénombre environ 24 500 Juifs français ou sujets français, dont environ 1 500 natifs d'Algérie. Dès le premier convoi de déportation, le 27 mars 1942, des Juifs français et immigrés se sont côtoyés dans les mêmes wagons. Sur les fiches d'internement établies à leurs noms dans les « Fichiers juifs » ou encore sur les listes de déportation, ils figurent comme « sujets français » (SF), « Français d'origine » (FO) ou parfois, « protégés français ». À Marseille, de nombreux Juifs sont arrêtés au cours de l'« Aktion Tiger », nom de code donné à la rafle du Vieux-Port de la fin janvier 1943. Ils constituent la grande majorité des déportés du convoi n° 52 parti le 23 mars 1943 vers le camp de Sobibór (780 sur 994). La plupart des déportés, soit 571, possédaient l'une des multiples formes juridiques de rattachement à la nationalité française : Français d'origine, Français par option, Français par mariage, Français naturalisé, Français par déclaration, protégé français, ou encore sujet français. 212 d'entre eux étaient natifs d'Algérie, dont 198 domiciliés ou réfugiés à Marseille. Aucun déporté de ce convoi n'est revenu.Le bilan de la déportation des Juifs originaires du Constantinois – objet de cette étude –, se monte à 218 personnes : 139 hommes, 58 femmes et 21 enfants de moins de 18 ans, parmi lesquels de très jeunes enfants. Le nombre de déportés (86) est le plus élevé pour Constantine-même : 45 hommes, 30 femmes et 11 enfants. Seuls 13 d'entre eux survécurent. Suivent les villes de Bône (30 déportés), de Bougie (17 déportés), de Sétif (12 déportés) puis les deux localités d'Aïn Beïda et de Guelma, avec chacune 11 déportés. Les villes de Batna et de Philippeville enregistrent respectivement 10 déportés. Nombreuses sont les fiches des « Fichiers juifs », conservées par les Archives nationales au Mémorial de la Shoah qui témoignent, à leur façon, de leurs tentatives de résistance : on y lit parfois sur leurs en-têtes, des mentions telles que "CA" (conjoint d'aryen), "demi Juif", "se dit non Juif(ve)", "orthodoxe", "copte", "musulman", ou "pupille de la nation", ou encore "citoyen espagnol" – autant de situations, autant de nationalités ou de confessions, censées les épargner de la déportation. Jusqu'au bout, les Juifs de Constantine, d'Algérie et d'ailleurs ont tout fait pour déjouer la logique exterminatrice impulsée par le Troisième Reich à laquelle ont largement collaboré les dirigeants zélés de l'État français, trop souvent, hélas, sans y réussir. Sur peu, trop peu de fiches, figure en en-tête, la mention "évadé".

This dissertation examines the political tensions between metropolitan planning and immigrant incorporation in Miami over the past 50 years. I develop a planning history encompassing the transformation of metropolitan planning in Dade County from the early 1960's to the post-Cuban period in contemporary times. By combining the historical analysis of planning documents, data from interviews with different actors shaping planning practice - metropolitan planners, community development practitioners, residents and artists - and participant observations of charrettes and grassroots mobilizations of local residents, I analyze how immigrant empowerment influenced the work of metropolitan planners and currently yields political practices through the deployment of discourses that uphold cultural production as a place-making strategy. By developing the concept of spatial politics, I argue that an analysis of urban space is crucial to understand immigrant incorporation and empowerment in American Cities. I define spatial politics as the practices and tactics carried out by social groups to achieve political empowerment in the City. By tracing the effects of immigration in the history of metropolitan planning in Miami, I consider how spatial politics is exemplified by linkages between planning, community development, and political mobilizations carried out by social groups competing for political control in an urban context transformed by the status of immigrants as the social majority. In Chapter One, I introduce the physical context of metropolitan Miami. I provide a mapping of Miami's urban geography, government structure and socio-demographic composition. I continue by developing the narrative of a participant observation based on a contentious policy measure voted upon in 2010 that aimed to give control of planning decisions to local community groups: Amendment Four. The Amendment Four debate illustrates the underlying tensions of Miami's urban politics as it is defined by claims and counter-claims defined by ethnicity and the experience of immigration. I continue by explaining the need to explore the relationship between immigrant incorporation and urban planning through an analytical lens that considers the empowerment of immigrant groups. In Chapter Two I draw on archival evidence from Dade County's Department of Planning and Zoning and carry out a review of Miami's architectural, urban design and urban history literature to develop a history of metropolitan planning in Dade County. I argue that Miami's urban historiography has mostly emphasized developers, architects and entrepreneurs as the main actors of urban transformation. Due to this tendency, the relationship between social history, immigration and planning has remained mostly unexplored. By considering the work of metropolitan planners from the introduction of the "Home Rule" Charter and the Two-tier System of governance through the development of Miami's first set of comprehensive development master plans, I analyze how demographic change and immigrant influx were important factors in planning practice. From its inception, metropolitan planning was envisioned as a tool for regional management in behalf of the public interest. Its goal was to facilitate the management and distribution of resources through a centralized system of government exemplified by two tiers; an upper tier for regional issues and a lower tier for local issues. The two-tier governance structure, however, led to the political under-representation of residents of unincorporated areas, who did not have the direct representation of municipal representatives. This condition would have consequences in the following decades as demographic growth and immigrant political empowerment transformed the city's political status quo. The demographic growth of Hispanics resulting from immigration led to the political empowerment of Cuban Americans during the 1980's. In Chapter Three, I explore this particular period by combining archival evidences from Dade County's Department of Planning and Zoning, interviews with retired planners and practicing community development specialists, spatial analysis of demographic data, and a review of civil rights legal history. I consider how the work of metropolitan planners was influenced by the electoral empowerment of Cuban Americans at the municipal and county levels. I begin by reviewing of the existing literature on Cuban American incorporation in Miami to argue that it has remained a-spatial. The political, economic and cultural tensions that affect urban space have not been considered in the incorporation of Cuban Americans. I continue by arguing for the consideration of Cuban American spatial politics through three phases - crisis, community development and empowerment - and four types of practices - planning, electoral, discursive, and allied. During the refugee crisis of the Mariel Boatlift, metropolitan planners produced demographic data that facilitated the planning agenda of a burgeoning Cuban American community development system focused on public policy, economic development and housing. This planning apparatus facilitated the concentration of electoral voting blocs in Miami's ethnic enclave of Little Havana, which mobilized to elect Cuban Americans at the municipal and county levels by generating discourses upholding the positive economic contributions of Cuban Americans in Miami. A decade after the Mariel Boatlift the demographic changes brought forth by crisis and continuing immigration led Cuban American and African Americans to ally and join suit against Dade County in the Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County lawsuit. This coalition argued for a change in the composition and number of county commission seats given the socio-demographic make up of Dade County. The lawsuit's decision changed the numbers and re-drew commission district boundaries, establishing a new political order in Miami based on minority power. Metropolitan planners were protagonists in this process by providing demographic data and mapping alternatives for the new commission districts. In Chapter Four I connect archival data from the Dade County Planning Department and the Miami Herald - Miami's most prominent news daily - with interviews of retired planning practitioners to consider how communities of interest countered the empowerment of Cuban Americans. Beginning in 1991 with the municipality of Key Biscayne, a wave of grassroots incorporation efforts led by ultra-local neighborhood groups swept throughout unincorporated Dade County. These mobilizations were based on the perception of donor communities that metropolitan government was inefficient inadequately used taxes for the local service provisions of recipient communities - residents in unincorporated Dade County. Miami's Cuban American community considered the rebellion of municipal incorporations a backlash to their political gains. Fearing the prospect of political and economic fragmentation, metropolitan planners attempted to resolve the problem of political under-representation and economic imbalance embedded in the Two-Tier system by establishimg community councils. Community councils were envisioned as units of local government that would to bring government closer to the people by giving local residents control over zoning issues and budgetary decisions. Nevertheless, community councils became training grounds for ethnic leadership across unincorporated Dade County. As the decade of the 1990's ended the evolving process of spatial politics was defined by a new political geography exemplified by newly minted municipalities. In Chapter Five I turn to Miami's recent history to consider how the practices of cultural producers- developers, artists, art collectors, and community development specialists - offer a new field of spatial politics. I carry out participant observations between two sites - the District of Wynwood in the City of Miami and the Municipality of Opa-Locka in northwest Dade County - to explore how art is used as a tool of urban revitalization through the deployment of collective and individual discourses formed by notions of community, identity and multiculturalism. I develop the first part of this analysis in the art district of Wynwood where I consider the collective mobilizations of urban developers, gallery owners, artists and art collectors against big development as well as the individual practices of artists who negotiate their immigrant identity to access resources and social capital in Wynwood's artistic milieu. I continue by turning to Opa-Locka's, where a robust community development system led by African Americans uses a discourse of pan-african multiculturalism to revitalize impoverished areas of the municipality. I finalize the dissertation by providing a brief call for the need to consider the figure of the empowered immigrant to re-evaluate the role of urban planning in immigration debates. Urban planning practice has traditionally been defined by an assimilationist ideology underlined by the imperative of adaptation and incorporation into the mainstream of society. Because of this undercurrent, the political agency of immigrants in American cities remains under-studied and bound by a framework of identity politics, cultural rights, and national citizenship. The case of spatial politics in metropolitan Miami, however, offers an example of the urban citizenship that organized immigrant groups can develop through the claim, control and transformation of urban space.

This guide accompanies the following article: Michael M. Wehrman, 'Examining Race and Sex Inequality in Recidivism', Sociology Compass 5/3 (2011): 179–189, 10.1111/j.1751‐9020.2011.00362.x.Author's introductionScholars and policymakers are well aware of the high likelihood of failure for recent releases from prison. High recidivism rates are expected, though not necessarily welcome. This article highlights some of the issues that go beyond noting that recidivism rates are simply high: they are higher for some groups than others. Identifying some of the unique mechanisms and processes that lead to race and gender disparity in recidivism rates will help inform policymakers as they seek to write effective policies aimed at a growing population of prisoners facing re‐entry.Author recommendsBroidy, Lisa and Robert Agnew. 1997. 'Gender and Crime: A General Strain Theory Perspective.'Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 34: 275–306.This article offers up a theoretical explanation specifically aimed at how women are influenced by General Strain Theory differently than men. In short, men are prone to respond to sources of strain with aggression and external attribution of blame; women, with depression and internal attribution of blame. As a result, they would be less likely to seek out external sources as a means of criminal coping. Of the many gender‐specific theories, this has a unique application to those re‐entering society, as the disruption they experience during transitioning out of prison is a significant source of strain.Clear, Todd R. 2009. Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes Disadvantaged Neighborhoods Worse. Oxford University Press.This book looks at the impact of mass incarceration on disadvantaged communities. As most prisoners come from poor neighborhoods, they return to (often the same) poor neighborhoods upon release. Such communities are characterized by strained resources and weak job opportunities for all its citizens – something that only exacerbates the high likelihood of recidivism for those leaving prison. An additional focus here is the concentration of African‐Americans in impoverished communities, something that contributes to their markedly high recidivism rates.Pager, Devah. 2009. Marked: Race, Crime and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration. University of Chicago Press.Pager focuses on comparing racial discrimination and felon exclusion in hiring practices in her highly regarded research. While racial discrimination in hiring is illegal and socially taboo, in most states failing to hire a felon due to their criminal history is not only legal, but considered a sensible business practice (at least in the eyes of the business owner). Pager finds that racial discrimination is greater than felon discrimination. However, she finds that African‐Americans with a criminal background suffer from a 'two strikes, you're out' pattern, as they experience the fewest chances of all at being hired. The policy implications for recidivism are clear, as being continually denied employment will only enhance the likelihood of reoffending (and, in this case, racial disparity in reoffending).Reisig, Michael D., Kristy Holtfreter and Merry Morash. 2006. 'Assessing Recidivism Risk Across Female Pathways to Crime.'Justice Quarterly 23: 384–405.Female prisoners have lower recidivism rates compared with males. This article tests the predictive validity of a widely used risk assessment instrument, the Level of Service Inventory‐Revised (LSI‐R). By comparing groups of women based on their motivation (economic motivation versus gendered pathways to crime), the authors find that the LSI‐R was able to reliably predict recidivism for women whose offenses were economically motivated. For women whose motivations were gendered (e.g. drug‐connected or harmed/harming women), the LSI‐R's predictions were significantly less successful. This reinforces that women's pathways to crime, and also to reoffending, are influenced by different factors compared with men.Western, Bruce. 2007. Punishment and Inequality in America. Russell Sage Foundation Publications.Westerns' work here summarizes the political causes of the mass incarceration period in American history. The impact of punitive policies of the past several decades has disproportionately targeted poor and minority populations. Similar to Clear's book, Western discusses the impact of mass incarceration on poor minority communities, paying attention to the high likelihood of recidivism for those who reside in and return to such neighborhoods. In addition, he notes the impact of mass incarceration on masking wage disparity between non‐incarcerated Whites and African‐Americans.Online materials
National Reentry Resource Center: http://www.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/
Established in 2008 with the passage of the Second Chance Act, the National Reentry Resource Center is a group of the Council of State Governments (CSG). The center recognizes the need to identify policies that work to assist the ever growing number of people leaving prison in transitioning to life outside of prison walls. They provide education, training, and assistance to states that seek to implement re‐entry programs and policies in order to curb recidivism.
Prison Policy Initiative: http://www.prisonpolicy.org/
This organization is devoted to studying and presenting research findings on the impact of mass incarceration in individuals, communities, and the nation at large. Their research has helped show, in one example, how mandatory sentencing policies in Massachusetts neglected to protect children from exposure to crime, and additionally perpetuated racial disparity in prison populations (as the policy disproportionately impacted densely populated largely African‐American communities).
This American Life Episode 430: Very Tough Love: http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio‐archives/episode/430/very‐tough‐love
This radio program (approx. 60 min) tells of a drug court in Glynn County, GA. The judge in this court is well known for shouting down defendants, offering the harshest sentences possible, and in some cases imposing indefinite sentences. Such programs not only run contrary to the guiding philosophy of drug courts, but also impact a number of women as noted in the story – one of whom spent over 10 years behind bars and can not find work (due to felon status), all because she was found to have had two off‐prescription pills in her purse.
Office of Justice Programs – Reentry: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reentry/
The United States Department of Justice built this page to serve as a portal for news and resources on re‐entry programs organized by the government. This includes programs and policies that emphasize the need for job training and job placement, as well as councils to study effective programs and policies. Links provide access to publications, as well as a list of available resources, opportunities, and programs.
The National H.I.R.E. Network: http://www.hirenetwork.org/index.html
The H.I.R.E. Network is an organization focused on helping formerly incarcerated offenders find work. Unlike other organizations that focus on developing and implementing programs, H.I.R.E. is closer to a lobbying organization, trying to impact state‐level policy as well as educate the public on matters of re‐entry, recidivism, and the risk current practices pose to communities. Special attention is paid to the disparate racial impact of policies that impact African‐Americans and the communities they reside in.
Sample syllabusA sociology course focusing on corrections and punishment should necessarily address issues of inequality. The sample section here specifically addresses inequality found in the outcomes of the corrections system. The Pager article focuses on inequality in hiring potential and discrimination for recent felons (and how it interacts with race). The Wehrman article is an summary of research on how race and sex influence postrelease outcomes, and the probability of recidivism.Topics for lecture and discussion, sociology of corrections and punishmentWeek 8: Inequality in punishment outcomesReadings:Pager, Devah. 2003. 'The Mark of a Criminal Record.'American Journal of Sociology108: 937–75.Wehrman, Michael M. 2011. 'Examining Race and Sex Inequality in Recidivism.'Sociology Compass5(3): 179–89.OptionalFocus questions
 Given disparate recidivism rates for racial groups, should politicians consider possible policy solutions to reduce recidivism rates in minority populations? Discuss the pros and cons of such targeted policies.
 What are some means of reducing disparate minority representation in prisons (as a means of reducing disparity in recidivism rates)?
 Research shows that job opportunities for ex‐felons, who are legally obligated to disclose their status, are few and far between. Should states reconsider forcing felons to disclose their background, or do business owners have the right to knowing who they are hiring?
 How might the public respond to policy changes that promote successful re‐entry programs, such as furloughs, treatment centers, or employment policies? Which policies might be difficult to implement in light of public opinion?
 Identify some of the unique factors women experience during and after incarceration compared to men. What can be done to address those factors?
Seminar/Project ideaGroup project – develop a re‐entry agencyStudents in this project will develop and present a plan for an agency focused on assisting recently released prisoners. They will use their knowledge to identify risks and needs for specific populations, research effective solutions, and identify potential sources of funding. They will develop programs to help provide solutions to the most pressing needs for prisoners returning to society. Students will present their plans for the program, and respond to questions and critiques of those plans from their classmates.

The same reason why Louisianans appear to be a bit more
skeptical about vaccinations generally is behind why Americans
have fallen to just about record lows in trust of the media – with a
perfect example recently teed up by the state's largest newspaper.

Last week, the Baton Rouge Advocate ran a piece
with scare headline "Anti-vaccine movement gains steam with Louisiana
politicians. Here's why doctors are concerned." It contended that "An
unprecedented number of bills and resolutions aimed at weakening vaccine
requirements are now law in Louisiana following a wave of successful
legislation taking aim at public health authorities." Hold on to your hernia
belts, as "The anti-vaccine movement … is becoming more mainstream in the
Louisiana statehouse, causing concern among doctors and public health officials
who worry it is eroding decades of health policy and will result in more
disease and death."

Of concern, the article offers, is the drop in kindergarten
vaccination rates from 90 to 86 percent, and similar drops in other age groups.
The absolute number is small, but it's contended even a little erosion can be
risky to allow a breakout of disease. Charles Stoecker, a Tulane health economist,
laments that if there comes something like this, "we'll have only ourselves to
blame." Dr. Mark Kline, physician in chief at Children's Hospital New Orleans
said alleged "dismantling" of vaccine policies runs "counter to everything we
know about the legitimate practice of public health. It jeopardizes all of our
safety, and particularly the safety of people who have medical conditions that
make them vulnerable to these diseases."

Perhaps the first warning sign that this opinionated
piece poses as straight news is with the choice of these sources; both demonstrated
they have an ideological interest in perpetuating the idea that Wuhan coronavirus
vaccines in children if not being mandatory, then should be extremely
encouraged. Stoecker came to attention recently through an article propounding a
bribery system of cash rewards to entice people, including older children, to become
vaccinated.

Kline was more blunt and egregious in his
advocacy. In the same Advocate he authored an opinion piece
in 2022 that bemoaned rhetoric discouraging policies requiring children's mask-wearing
and virus vaccination. Ironically headlined in a way to suggest this discouragement
was based upon myth, his piece spread misinformation exaggerating both
the efficacy of masking and number of child deaths, using an uncorrected
figure for deaths already
revised downward in official statistics significantly which in any case (derived
from a study
from 2020-21) was less than 0.02 percent of the child population contracting
the virus and extrapolates to less than half of the raw total he cited, research
which in any event implicitly disavowed Kline's argument of broadly-applicable
mandates in noting the overwhelming number of deaths and serious hospitalizations
of children occurred among those with pre-existing risk factors.

But it's not the one-sidedness of the article's
sources that really shows its ideological slip, but what it terms as the
so-called "anti-vaccination legislation" that comprises its very core to which
the sources merely are ornaments. These are the legislative instruments that
the article claims fit the bill:

HB
46 prohibits any public or private school from requiring students
to get a COVID-19 vaccination.
HB
47 requires schools to include opt-out information in any
communication about required immunizations. 
HB
908 prohibits discrimination in schools based on vaccination
status.
SB 133 restricts the state from enforcing any
rules issued by the World Health Organization, the United Nations and the
World Economic Forum.
SB 357 allows a majority of either the House or
Senate to end a public health emergency.
HR 292 requests that the Louisiana Department of
Health conduct a study on the unexpected deaths of children under the age
of two related to the administration of vaccines.
HR 222 requests that the state health department
investigate the factors affecting children diagnosed with autism. 


None of these prohibits a family from deciding
their child should receive a vaccination. Only one even directly would have a
practical effect of reducing vaccinations, HB 46, and then with only the one coronavirus
strain addressed by an intervention that's not
really a vaccination but a prophylactic (confusion over which also marked Kline's
opinion article). Two aren't even laws but requests for academic study, one
addresses policy concerning public health emergency declarations, another asks
for clearer dissemination of parental rights and another protection of a civil
right, and finally includes a symbolic statute replicating current policy about
extra-jurisdictional mandates.

None of this remotely conveys an "anti-vaccination"
sentiment – unless you're a believer in forcing mandates that affect almost
nobody positively while asking everybody to surrender individual rights in the
process, increasing research on a virus, establishing checks and balances in
government's ability to usurp people's basic rights, keeping people in the dark
about their rights if not creating bias towards violating these, or in preventing
transnational organizations from dictating domestic policy despite existing of
state sovereignty, as defining "anti-vaccine." Which in that case you might be more
at home in a totalitarian state than in America.

It's within what is held out as straight news this
blatant editorializing – entirely misrepresenting the subject matter at hand in
order to create a story where none exists – that has turned people so much away
from the mainstream media as a reliable source of information. Contrary to what
many in that institution think, many news consumers aren't stupid and can see
though attempts to interject ideological posturing into what it presents and dares
to characterize as impartial "news."

And this carries over to their rational behavior
in the face of government edicts. It's not that any decline in vaccination
rates came from some phantom surge of anti-vaccination policy-making – the
legislative record shows zero evidence of that – but because the public was so
badly fooled by "authorities" including the mainstream media on issues such as coronavirus
vaccination. The heavy-handedness on this issue by government, as a ruse to
increase the size of government and its command and control over people, has
poisoned the well for some on all vaccinations.

If anti-vaccination sentiment has grown among
Louisianans, it's because of misbegotten policies of the federal government and
in Louisiana of the administration of Democrat former Gov. John Bel Edwards, in
office during the pandemic, that served to deprive people of liberties that neither
arguments nor data sufficiently justified taking such actions. And the mainstream
media's uncritical vetting, if not actual cheerleading, of that just because it
fit their dominant ideology provided another reason why the public increasingly
loathes them.

On July 4, British voters will elect lawmakers to fill all 650 seats in the House of Commons, and the leader of the majority who will become prime minister. Polls give a comfortable victory to the Labour opposition. UK snap election is Rishi Sunak's response to the severe defeat the Conservative Party suffered in the last local elections, where the Tories achieved their worst results in the last 40 years.The British Conservative party will leave Downing Street after 14 years and 5 incompetent prime ministers who have left Britain poorer and weaker. Trade and investment flows have shrunk. The promised trade deals with India and the US have not followed Brexit. Workers from continental Europe have been replaced by much larger numbers of Asians and Africans. The dismal state of the National Health Service, the fact that there seems to be more foodbanks than McDonalds, the broken railways, rivers overflowing with sewage, or growing child poverty, tell the story of a country which has reverted to its status before Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, that of the sick man of Europe. More than at any time in modern history, Britain has lost the respect of the world.Prime Minister Rishi Sunak relentless bid for the votes of the elderly frames the election as a chance to reclaim the past: national service for 18-year-olds (military chiefs dismiss it with scorn), tax breaks for pensioners, cutbacks in courses for feckless students, refugees expelled to Rwanda… All of it suggests Sunak will be lucky if he gets the backing of more than 10% of the 18-24 age bracket. In this sense, Brexit was the ultimate exercise in nostalgia. But hauling up the drawbridge with the rest of the European continent has not allowed Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak to rediscover Britain's past glory. Britain has become poorer, meaner. A Downing Street strategic review pushed aside what the Tories felt was a "parochial" preoccupation with Europe, only to wake up the next day with Russia invading Ukraine.Many British people would agree with the Financial Times US National Editor, Edward Luce, when he writes: "July 4 is my second favourite US holiday after Thanksgiving. This year, however, I will be primed to celebrate Independence Day with un-English abandon. Since it coincides with the British general election, that will be the day when my compatriots will award the Order of the Boot to the least competent UK government in my life – indeed, the worst since Lord North blundered his way into the American Revolution." He describes the Tory government as an "omnishambolic clusterfuck", strong words which sum up the feeling of many British people and non-British who had learned to respect a country whose politics, financial and commercial nous, sport and arts had done so much over the past two centuries to shape the modern world.The Conservative Party has become the latest casualty of Brexit. However, that policy itself is not the only nor indeed the root cause which explains why the Tories are starring into an electoral abyss. Voters have concluded that they have been governed by serial incompetents for fourteen years and that the country is in worse state than in 2016, let alone 2010. They have not forgotten the spending cuts – far worse than anything practised in Europe – imposed on them by the minister of finance, George Osborne, and the prime minister David Cameron in the wake of the 2008-9 financial crisis.Those who promoted Brexit elevated ideology over pragmatism, purged their most talented leaders and unleashed a form of populist policies unheard of in the UK. The Conservatives abandoned pragmatism and chased former Labour Party supporters who had voted for Brexit with promises to "level up" the poorer North in the 2019 election. Defeat in these so called "red wall" seats will cost the Tories their majority, but by neglecting voters who are graduates, city dwellers and other supporters in the South, they risk an electoral wipe out. Brexit fostered unconservative instincts among Tory MPs. The first is that the end justifies the means. The second is the Trump inspired tendency to depict core institutions of British democracy, notably the courts and the civil service, as enemies of the people. Rules, laws and essential bodies could be publicly thrashed. Such behaviour left many electors, including Tories, dumfounded.Meanwhile, the populist Nigel Farage has erupted into British politics like "the sonorous belch that warns of a meal undigested", as "the scorn for a Westminster class", and "the lament for a country in social, economic and moral decline; the warning that mass immigration is gobbling scarce public resources". These are the words of the Guardian columnist, Rafael Behr, about Farage's return: "it is the dish cooked up for Brexit, now back on the menu under the Reform UK brand". Farage will appeal (as he has always had) to older, white, non-graduated British worried about crime and immigration, people who are doubtful that politics makes much difference. For almost two decades, successive Conservative leaders have appeased Farage. The consequences have been disastrous for the party and the country. The last prominent Tory to take Farage on was David Cameron in 2006, when he described UKIP as "a sort of bunch of fruitcakes and losers and closet racialists". Cameron characterised UKIP as a "stop the world, I want to get off party". Farage is an amplifier of impotent rage who, for a quarter of a century, has offered fantasy slogans whose cost far outweigh any benefits. He has never been a provider of practical solutions. His project is to take Britain further right and his power rests on the influence of a very nasty and xenophobic right-wing press, whose influence many foreign observers underestimate. Such people see leaving the EU and denying migrant workers their rights as essential, while taxing the rich and investing in public services as swivel-eyed Marxism.Britain is not about to reverse Brexit. The EU has no interest in such negotiations until and unless it becomes the settled will of British politicians across the spectrum. Brussels will not allow the incoming prime minister, most likely the Labour leader Keir Starmer, to cherry pick the areas of cooperation he wants in any new government agreement with Brussels. Yet sustained economic recovery in Britain will depend on a closer, less obstructed relationship with the EU —which accounts for most of the country's trade and investment. Nor can the UK underpin its security without the EU. The Tories have stopped talking about Brexit, but the incoming British prime minister will not have that luxury. The conspiracy of silence on the state of the economy which characterises this electoral campaign cannot last beyond election day. A huge Labour majority (and a Conservative party swallowed up in a bitter fight about how reactionary it wants to become) would offer the new prime minister a unique opportunity to liberalise planning restrictions, which make building large infrastructure projects more expensive in the UK than in comparable states, and reform property taxation. Dare one hope for a large Labour majority and a bold Keir Starmer?All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donors.

On July 4, British voters will elect lawmakers to fill all 650 seats in the House of Commons, and the leader of the majority who will become prime minister. Polls give a comfortable victory to the Labour opposition. UK snap election is Rishi Sunak's response to the severe defeat the Conservative Party suffered in the last local elections, where the Tories achieved their worst results in the last 40 years.The British Conservative party will leave Downing Street after 14 years and 5 incompetent prime ministers who have left Britain poorer and weaker. Trade and investment flows have shrunk. The promised trade deals with India and the US have not followed Brexit. Workers from continental Europe have been replaced by much larger numbers of Asians and Africans. The dismal state of the National Health Service, the fact that there seems to be more foodbanks than McDonalds, the broken railways, rivers overflowing with sewage, or growing child poverty, tell the story of a country which has reverted to its status before Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, that of the sick man of Europe. More than at any time in modern history, Britain has lost the respect of the world.Prime Minister Rishi Sunak relentless bid for the votes of the elderly frames the election as a chance to reclaim the past: national service for 18-year-olds (military chiefs dismiss it with scorn), tax breaks for pensioners, cutbacks in courses for feckless students, refugees expelled to Rwanda… All of it suggests Sunak will be lucky if he gets the backing of more than 10% of the 18-24 age bracket. In this sense, Brexit was the ultimate exercise in nostalgia. But hauling up the drawbridge with the rest of the European continent has not allowed Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak to rediscover Britain's past glory. Britain has become poorer, meaner. A Downing Street strategic review pushed aside what the Tories felt was a "parochial" preoccupation with Europe, only to wake up the next day with Russia invading Ukraine.Many British people would agree with the Financial Times US National Editor, Edward Luce, when he writes: "July 4 is my second favourite US holiday after Thanksgiving. This year, however, I will be primed to celebrate Independence Day with un-English abandon. Since it coincides with the British general election, that will be the day when my compatriots will award the Order of the Boot to the least competent UK government in my life – indeed, the worst since Lord North blundered his way into the American Revolution." He describes the Tory government as an "omnishambolic clusterfuck", strong words which sum up the feeling of many British people and non-British who had learned to respect a country whose politics, financial and commercial nous, sport and arts had done so much over the past two centuries to shape the modern world.The Conservative Party has become the latest casualty of Brexit. However, that policy itself is not the only nor indeed the root cause which explains why the Tories are starring into an electoral abyss. Voters have concluded that they have been governed by serial incompetents for fourteen years and that the country is in worse state than in 2016, let alone 2010. They have not forgotten the spending cuts – far worse than anything practised in Europe – imposed on them by the minister of finance, George Osborne, and the prime minister David Cameron in the wake of the 2008-9 financial crisis.Those who promoted Brexit elevated ideology over pragmatism, purged their most talented leaders and unleashed a form of populist policies unheard of in the UK. The Conservatives abandoned pragmatism and chased former Labour Party supporters who had voted for Brexit with promises to "level up" the poorer North in the 2019 election. Defeat in these so called "red wall" seats will cost the Tories their majority, but by neglecting voters who are graduates, city dwellers and other supporters in the South, they risk an electoral wipe out. Brexit fostered unconservative instincts among Tory MPs. The first is that the end justifies the means. The second is the Trump inspired tendency to depict core institutions of British democracy, notably the courts and the civil service, as enemies of the people. Rules, laws and essential bodies could be publicly thrashed. Such behaviour left many electors, including Tories, dumfounded.Meanwhile, the populist Nigel Farage has erupted into British politics like "the sonorous belch that warns of a meal undigested", as "the scorn for a Westminster class", and "the lament for a country in social, economic and moral decline; the warning that mass immigration is gobbling scarce public resources". These are the words of the Guardian columnist, Rafael Behr, about Farage's return: "it is the dish cooked up for Brexit, now back on the menu under the Reform UK brand". Farage will appeal (as he has always had) to older, white, non-graduated British worried about crime and immigration, people who are doubtful that politics makes much difference. For almost two decades, successive Conservative leaders have appeased Farage. The consequences have been disastrous for the party and the country. The last prominent Tory to take Farage on was David Cameron in 2006, when he described UKIP as "a sort of bunch of fruitcakes and losers and closet racialists". Cameron characterised UKIP as a "stop the world, I want to get off party". Farage is an amplifier of impotent rage who, for a quarter of a century, has offered fantasy slogans whose cost far outweigh any benefits. He has never been a provider of practical solutions. His project is to take Britain further right and his power rests on the influence of a very nasty and xenophobic right-wing press, whose influence many foreign observers underestimate. Such people see leaving the EU and denying migrant workers their rights as essential, while taxing the rich and investing in public services as swivel-eyed Marxism.Britain is not about to reverse Brexit. The EU has no interest in such negotiations until and unless it becomes the settled will of British politicians across the spectrum. Brussels will not allow the incoming prime minister, most likely the Labour leader Keir Starmer, to cherry pick the areas of cooperation he wants in any new government agreement with Brussels. Yet sustained economic recovery in Britain will depend on a closer, less obstructed relationship with the EU —which accounts for most of the country's trade and investment. Nor can the UK underpin its security without the EU. The Tories have stopped talking about Brexit, but the incoming British prime minister will not have that luxury. The conspiracy of silence on the state of the economy which characterises this electoral campaign cannot last beyond election day. A huge Labour majority (and a Conservative party swallowed up in a bitter fight about how reactionary it wants to become) would offer the new prime minister a unique opportunity to liberalise planning restrictions, which make building large infrastructure projects more expensive in the UK than in comparable states, and reform property taxation. Dare one hope for a large Labour majority and a bold Keir Starmer?All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donors.

On July 4, British voters will elect lawmakers to fill all 650 seats in the House of Commons, and the leader of the majority who will become prime minister. Polls give a comfortable victory to the Labour opposition. UK snap electionis Rishi Sunak's response to the severe defeat the Conservative Party suffered in the last local elections, where the Tories achieved their worst results in the last 40 years. The British Conservative party will leave Downing Street after 14 years and 5 incompetent prime ministers who have left Britain poorer and weaker. Trade and investment flows have shrunk. The promised trade deals with India and the US have not followed Brexit. Workers from continental Europe have been replaced by much larger numbers of Asians and Africans. The dismal state of the National Health Service, the fact that there seems to be more foodbanks than McDonalds, the broken railways, rivers overflowing with sewage, or growing child poverty, tell the story of a country which has reverted to its status before Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, that of the sick man of Europe. More than at any time in modern history, Britain has lost the respect of the world. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak relentless bid for the votes of the elderly frames the election as a chance to reclaim the past: national service for 18-year-olds (military chiefs dismiss it with scorn), tax breaks for pensioners, cutbacks in courses for feckless students, refugees expelled to Rwanda… All of it suggests Sunak will be lucky if he gets the backing of more than 10% of the 18-24 age bracket. In this sense, Brexit was the ultimate exercise in nostalgia. But hauling up the drawbridge with the rest of the European continent has not allowed Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak to rediscover Britain's past glory. Britain has become poorer, meaner. A Downing Street strategic review pushed aside what the Tories felt was a "parochial" preoccupation with Europe, only to wake up the next day with Russia invading Ukraine. Many British people would agree with the Financial Times US National Editor, Edward Luce, when he writes: "July 4 is my second favourite US holiday after Thanksgiving. This year, however, I will be primed to celebrate Independence Day with un-English abandon. Since it coincides with the British general election, that will be the day when my compatriots will award the Order of the Boot to the least competent UK government in my life – indeed, the worst since Lord North blundered his way into the American Revolution." He describes the Tory government as an "omnishambolic clusterfuck", strong words which sum up the feeling of many British people and non-British who had learned to respect a country whose politics, financial and commercial nous, sport and arts had done so much over the past two centuries to shape the modern world. The Conservative Party has become the latest casualty of Brexit. However, that policy itself is not the only nor indeed the root cause which explains why the Tories are starring into an electoral abyss. Voters have concluded that they have been governed by serial incompetents for fourteen years and that the country is in worse state than in 2016, let alone 2010. They have not forgotten the spending cuts – far worse than anything practised in Europe – imposed on them by the minister of finance, George Osborne, and the prime minister David Cameron in the wake of the 2008-9 financial crisis. Those who promoted Brexit elevated ideology over pragmatism, purged their most talented leaders and unleashed a form of populist policies unheard of in the UK. A Conservative partywhich had abandoned pragmatism (its very trade mark for two centuries), chased former Labour Party supporters who had voted for Brexit with promises to "level up" the poorer North in the 2019 election. Defeat here will cost the Tories their majority, but by neglecting voters who are graduates, city dwellers and other supporters in the South, they risk an electoral wipe out. Brexit fostered unconservative instincts among Tory MPs. The first is that the end justifies the means. The second is the Trump inspired tendency to depict core institutions of British democracy, notably the courts and the civil service, as enemies of the people. Rules, laws and essential bodies could be publicly thrashed. Such behaviour left many electors, including Tories, dumfounded. Meanwhile, the populist Nigel Farage has erupted into British politics like "the sonorous belch that warns of a meal undigested", as "the scorn for a Westminster class", and "the lament for a country in social, economic and moral decline; the warning that mass immigration is gobbling scarce public resources". These are the words of the Guardian columnist, Rafael Behr, about Farage return: "it is the dish cooked up for Brexit, now back on the menu under the Reform UK brand". Farage will appeal (as he has always had) to older, white, non-graduated British worried about crime and immigration, people who are doubtful that politics makes much difference. For almost two decades, successive Conservative leaders have appeased Farage. The consequences have been disastrous for the party and the country. The last prominent Tory to take Farage on was David Cameron in 2006, when he described UKIP as "a sort of bunch of fruitcakes and losers and closet racialists". Cameron characterised UKIP as a "stop the world, I want to get off party". Farage is an amplifier of impotent rage who, for a quarter of a century, has offered fantasy slogans whose cost far outweigh any benefits. He has never been a provider of practical solutions. His project is to take Britain further right and his power rests on the influence of a very nasty and xenophobic right-wing press, whose influence many foreign observers underestimate. Such people see leaving the EU and denying migrant workers their rights as essential, while taxing the rich and investing in public services as swivel-eyed Marxism. Britain is not about to reverse Brexit. The EU has no interest in such negotiations until and unless it becomes the settled will of British politicians across the spectrum. Brussels will not allow the incoming prime minister, most likely the Labour leader Keir Starmer, to cherry pick the areas of cooperation he wants in any new government agreement with Brussels. Yet sustained economic recovery in Britain will depend on a closer, less obstructed relationship with the EU —which accounts for most of the country's trade and investment. Nor can the UK underpin its security without the EU. The Tories have stopped talking about Brexit, but the incoming British prime minister will not have that luxury. The conspiracy of silence on the state of the economy which characterises this electoral campaign cannot last beyond election day. A huge Labour majority (and a Conservative party swallowed up in a bitter fight about how reactionary it wants to become) would offer the new prime minister a unique opportunity to liberalise planning restrictions, which make building large infrastructure projects more expensive in the UK than in comparable states, and reform property taxation. Dare one hope for a large Labour majority and a bold Keir Starmer?